Innovation, Conservatism, and Tradition – Lesson 1

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The guys in the swimsuits are waiting for us just around the corner; I’ll get to them in a moment. That is, of course, the next step. I already mentioned this—there’s a well-known story, I think I’ve mentioned it more than once—there’s a famous story that I once saw in Buber, I think, about Rabbi Noach of Lekhovitz. There were Noach and Mordechai of Lekhovitz, father and son; I don’t remember which was the father and which was the son. Hasidic rebbes. When the father passed away and the son took the seat of the rebbe, he changed some of his father’s customs. So the Hasidim asked him: what, how can you change the sacred customs? The tail of the gartel is supposed to be split into three and not into two parts. So he told them: I’m not changing my father’s tradition. Just as my father changed the customs of his father, so too I am changing my father’s customs. I am absolutely sticking to my father’s tradition. So that’s what Ezra said earlier. Once the tradition is not to preserve traditions, then it becomes very hard to define who here is traditional and who is not traditional.

Whenever this comes up, if I’ve told a Hasidic story, I have to offset it with a Lithuanian story. So regarding this—I’ve said more than once that there are two kinds of followers of the Chazon Ish. There are followers of the Chazon Ish who observe everything written in the books of the Chazon Ish literally. They do not deviate right or left from what is written in the books of the Chazon Ish. And there are genuine followers of the Chazon Ish, who do what they themselves think, just as the Chazon Ish did what he thought. And by the way, they are the real followers of the Chazon Ish, because the Chazon Ish writes this in his book. He says that a person should do what he himself thinks, and not what I say—I, the Chazon Ish—but rather a person should do what he thinks. Someone who really wants to be a follower of the Chazon Ish should do what he himself thinks, because that is what the Chazon Ish instructed one to do. If he does it because the Chazon Ish told him to do so, then of course he is conservative; he is obeying the Chazon Ish. But if he does it because he himself thinks so, and I classify him as a follower of the Chazon Ish because of that, then he is not conservative. It depends very much on the motivation. Meaning, if he does it because his rebbe told him always to think, then he still isn’t really thinking; he’s simply carrying out his rebbe’s command. But if he truly is always thinking, and I point out that this happens—whether by chance or not—to fit the policy of his rebbe, then I might define him as conservative, but he isn’t really that. He is continuing his teacher’s tradition, but because he decided to, not in an inert way.

Okay, so that was just a comment on Ezra’s comment. So really the question of how exactly to wedge a foot between the doorframe and the door—that is the question of this whole series: how do you wedge a foot between the frame and the door? How can one, if it is possible at all, define a traditional position that is not conservative? Are those not synonyms—traditionality and conservatism? Can there be a traditional position that is not conservative? If you deviate from the tradition and do what you think, then basically you are not traditional. The fact that in some areas you happen to conduct yourself in accordance with tradition simply because you decided to conduct yourself that way—not because of the tradition, because clearly the things you don’t want you don’t observe—as I wrote in my last or second-to-last column about conversion, I don’t remember which one was the last. In the column about conversion I said there that someone who accepts Jewish law except for one thing—that is not called accepting the commandments. Why? It’s well known. Why is it not called accepting the commandments? Because even the 613 commandments that he does observe, he observes because he decided to—because clearly the last one, which he decided not to observe, he doesn’t observe. That is not called accepting the commandments. Accepting the commandments means observing them because I was commanded, not because I decided— not Ahad Ha’am.

So in that sense, the question of whether one can be traditional but not conservative is not at all as simple as it may sound at first glance. It’s not a trivial question. In other words, does traditionality not entail conservatism? Fine, so I want to define these concepts a little more precisely, but that is really the question I’m aiming at. That is the question. Maybe I’ll formulate it in terms of that story about The Little Prince, where one of the things for which he deserves appreciation is that he is not occupied with himself. He is faithful to the system of rules. He sees value in them, he is committed to them, and he acts accordingly. And once you act according to them, and you are not the one deciding what to do, then what could be non-conservative about your view? Basically, the system of rules dictates what you do; there is no room here to insert yourself into the matter. That is the whole appreciation the prince expresses toward that conservative fellow—that he is really not occupied with himself but with the system of rules, the values, to which he is committed.

Maybe one more remark connected to the earlier one. In this series, as is my way in all the series, I am not dealing with psychology. Psychology does not interest me. I mean, one can talk about conservative and non-conservative types on the psychological level. What is your tendency? Do you have a conservative tendency or a non-conservative tendency? Human psychology does not interest me in the slightest. What interests me is their ideology or their way of thinking. I’m interested in conservative and non-conservative modes of thought, not in tendencies. Because if my tendency dictates my way of thinking, then it’s deterministic; it’s not my decision. So the fact that I have a tendency does not provide a full explanation, at least, for my outlook. I still have to decide whether I go with that tendency or not go with that tendency—that’s the naturalistic fallacy. So I’m already sharpening the focus here: I am dealing with ideology, with logic, with thought, with conservative, traditional, and innovative philosophy, and not with the psychology of these people. What brought them to this, what childhood crises caused them to be conservative or rebellious or whatever—that doesn’t interest me. Not because it isn’t true; it could be true. But that is not the plane on which I’m operating here. Okay.

As I said, this connects to the remark I made at the beginning: I’m not dealing with people, I’m dealing with arguments. And therefore you’ll understand that if so, then indeed the discussion is not about psychology, because to deal with psychology is basically to deal with people, but rather to deal with arguments. Why a person adopts one argument or another—that’s a question for a psychologist; it doesn’t interest me. I want to discuss the arguments, not the people who adopt or don’t adopt them. Okay.

So now we’ll really get to our swimsuit people. I already mentioned this some time ago, but it’s an important model for our discussion here, so I’m returning to it. A group of people received a system of instructions according to which they are supposed to conduct their whole lives—them, their children, and their descendants after them, and so on. Over the course of their lives and across the generations, the circumstances in which they act can change. As a result, two subgroups develop that disagree over how one should behave in relation to the set of instructions. There is a group of conservatives and a group of innovators. So I’ll now offer a first formulation of the difference between the conservatives and the innovators. Conservatives are those who continue to act according to the instructions even if the circumstances have changed. And the changers or innovators are those who adapt the instructions to the new circumstances. If we return to The Little Prince, then the lamplighter was conservative because he continued with the instructions despite the change in circumstances—the planet was spinning faster. And the opposing figure would say: wait a second, so I’ll light the lamp now every ten minutes, every ten days, and not every day, because the planet spins ten times faster. So I’ll change the instructions, adapt them to the new circumstances. So he is, seemingly, the innovator. That’s the difference between the conservative and—this is a first proposal—a first proposal for the distinction between the conservative and the innovator.

And in the scenario with the swimsuits, these are people who were instructed to walk around in swimsuits, and they and their fathers and grandfathers always walked around dressed in swimsuits. They lived in warm regions, so they had no fundamental problem with it, and at some point in their wanderings they arrive in a cold region, and an argument develops. One group says: we must continue going around in swimsuits; we are supposed to be faithful to our tradition, and therefore we must continue going around in swimsuits and pay the price. We’ll be cold—fine. Tradition is worth a price too; it costs us, and it’s worth paying that price for it. That is the conservative group according to the proposal I just suggested. The innovator group consists of people who say: come on, I’m cold, I’m putting on a parka. No, I don’t want to be cold. I’m not following the system of instructions—or I’m adapting them—I’m not following the system of instructions, and I’m putting on a parka, not going around in swimsuits.

But the definition I’ve suggested up to now—between those who continue the instructions and those who change them—is a very problematic definition. Why? Because with the conservative group it’s pretty clear what they’re claiming. The conservative group is basically saying: our ancestors wore swimsuits, the instruction is to wear swimsuits, that’s what we are supposed to do under all conditions and circumstances. That’s clear. It’s clear there that their motivation is faithfulness to tradition—to tradition, yes, faithfulness to the system of rules. There is no doubt there about the motivation or the argument by virtue of which they claim what they claim. With the innovators it’s not so simple, because they can claim: we are wearing a parka because that is the true continuation of the tradition we received. Why? Our ancestors, who passed on to us the tradition that one should go around in swimsuits, did that because they lived in a hot desert. So there the tradition said to wear a swimsuit because that was the garment suited to the climate there. We, who have now arrived in a cold region, need to continue our ancestors’ tradition and wear a parka. Why? Because our ancestors’ tradition tells us to wear clothing suited to the climate. And just as our ancestors wore swimsuits in the desert, the correct continuation of our ancestors’ tradition is to wear a parka in a cold region.

Notice that these people are claiming, against the conservatives, that the conservatives are actually the innovators. They are the ones not preserving the tradition that we received. Because if the tradition says to wear swimsuits, then the conservatives are right, one must wear swimsuits—that’s what the tradition says. But if the tradition says one must wear clothing suited to the climate, then those who continue wearing a swimsuit even in a cold region are not preserving the tradition; they are deviating from the tradition, so they are really innovators, reformers. Okay? So the claim of the innovators can actually be a conservative claim. Because they are really saying: we are no less conservative than you, and even more conservative than you. So what, after all, is the difference between the two groups? The difference is the question—the difference is the question of what exactly is being preserved. The first group preserves the instruction to wear a swimsuit. The second group also preserves something; only the instruction it preserves is to wear clothing suited to the climate, not to wear a swimsuit.

Which means that the disagreement between them is not a disagreement over whether to be conservative or not; both are conservative. The disagreement is over the question: what does the system say that we are preserving? It’s an interpretive dispute. But if it is an interpretive dispute, then it is a dispute between two conservative groups. In fact—and the lesson here is obvious, so I’ll allow myself every now and then to step into the lesson itself—many times, someone who proposes an argument for changing Jewish law is defined as a reformer, as an innovator, as someone who deviates from tradition, and basically the burden of proof is on him. That is, I think, the most common approach within traditional religious groups. But one has to remember that behind this approach there lies the assumption: look, if I’m conservative then I’m surely right; as for you, I don’t know whether you’re right or not, so the burden of proof is on you. A doubt cannot overturn a certainty. But that isn’t true. You should say: a doubt cannot overturn another doubt. What you are doing is not certain either; it too is in doubt. Because if the tradition says to wear clothing suited to the climate, then if you continue to wear a swimsuit you are deviating from the tradition. It’s not that you are definitely okay and with me there is some doubt, maybe I’m okay and maybe not. If I’m right, then you’re not okay; and if you’re right, then I’m not okay. Meaning, the dispute is a symmetrical dispute.

And it is so hard for people to understand this in these disputes about changes in Jewish law, disputes that always arise in all sorts of contexts. The constant feeling—and by the way, even among the changers—the ethos, perhaps unconscious, in which we were all educated and to which we cling very strongly, is that the conservative approach is the default. First of all, that’s surely correct. Someone who wants to innovate—well, I don’t know, let him convince me he’s right. And I don’t accept that at all. I don’t think that the burden of proof is on the innovator. The question is who is more correct on the interpretive plane.

[Speaker E] Maybe to put it another way, regardless of who is certainly right and who is not certainly right, since this is the existing situation, in order to change it you need to bring a clear reason, regardless of certainty.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Mistake. That’s a mistake. Because the question is: what counts as the existing situation? Is the existing situation that they wore swimsuits, or is the existing situation that they wore clothing suited to the climate? I too am continuing the existing situation.

[Speaker E] I understand that claim, but if we compare this to legal systems, how does it work in legal systems?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The same thing. I would argue the same there too. The same thing. I’m claiming that this is preserving the existing situation—that’s exactly—it reinforces my claim. That’s exactly the point. The conservative instinct in thinking—now let’s talk about Jewish law—the conservative instinct in halakhic thinking says exactly what you’re saying. And what I want to claim is that it is not correct. Because to preserve the existing situation—the question is how you define the existing situation. Is the existing situation that one wears a swimsuit, or is the existing situation that one wears clothing suited to the climate? Both are descriptions of the existing situation. And this is a very important point.

And now, when I talk about swimsuits—you know, these are my fox parables, like Rashi explains it about the three hundred fox parables that Rabbi Meir knew. If you want to talk to someone, tell him something that might annoy him, talk about foxes. Don’t talk about human beings, because then immediately the lesson jumps up and doesn’t let the person absorb your rebuke. So if I said this directly in Jewish law it would be terribly provocative. Let’s talk about the fox parables, about people wearing swimsuits in the desert. It seems to me that if someone looks at it there, one can definitely understand the thesis. The thesis is that there are two forms of conservatism here, and I see no way to prefer the first over the second, or to say that it is more conservative. Is the first more conservative than the second? No. These are two kinds of conservatism that have an interpretive disagreement about what principle is to be preserved. That’s all.

[Speaker E] Just to broaden the picture a bit, because this reminded me of a legal system, and I’m not expert in this at all—I understood that in a legal system it’s exactly the same dispute too, or is it different there?… Clearly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The same disputes rage there as well. In every normative system, religious or non-religious, you have the same disputes. There is no escaping it. I’ll also get later to the claim that explains why essentially it has to be this way. It cannot be otherwise. It’s something logical. So this is a very important point, and it is almost the punchline of the whole series; the rest, go and study. Meaning, the point is that you can be a complete conservative, but phenomenologically, when I look at how you behave, it will not resemble in any way how your ancestors behaved—visually, in terms of how it looks externally. But in the logical analysis, the internal analysis, the ideological analysis if you like, of the behavior, you can indeed identify here conservatism of the highest order. These are two kinds of conservatism.

So what, after all, is the difference? There is some kind of feeling—and again, it’s hard to define this, and later I’ll explain more—but there is some kind of feeling that the interpretive effort required by the first type of conservatism is smaller. I continue with the swimsuit; I don’t need to introduce any interpretive act in order to demonstrate my conservatism. The second, in order to demonstrate his conservatism, has to give you explanations. Rabbi Midan’s favorite saying, which I repeat every time—I heard it from him. So Rabbi Midan’s favorite saying, which I keep repeating, is that he says there are twenty-two explanations for why we read the Book of Ruth on Shavuot. And he knows only one explanation for why we read the Book of Esther on Purim. If there are twenty-two explanations for why we read the Book of Ruth on Shavuot, that means none of them is convincing. In a place where it is clear why we read the scroll, there won’t be twenty-two explanations. There will be one explanation, and it will be clear that it is the correct one. Okay?

So when someone has to make interpretive efforts, it arouses in us a certain feeling: well, he’s not really conservative. The other one—look, it’s one-to-one: they wore a swimsuit and he also wears a swimsuit; he is surely conservative. I would add more than that. We have some tendency—and all these are tendencies that in my opinion one needs to overcome—to say that since he is paying a price, that is exactly The Little Prince, yes, the lamplighter: he works very hard to preserve the instructions and continue walking around in a swimsuit even when it’s cold, or to continue lighting the lamp every morning and extinguishing it every morning and lighting it every evening even if the planet spins quickly—he is paying a heavy price for it. And therefore there is some feeling that he is more faithful to the system. By contrast, someone who adapts the system, the system of instructions, to the circumstances, very often that somehow comes out more convenient. And when it comes out more convenient, that means he pays less of a price. I don’t know if he is less willing to pay a price, but in practice he pays less of a price. And that arouses an instinctive suspicion that the first is more faithful than the second. Which is exactly what we saw in the Little Prince passage: he very much appreciates him because he is not occupied with himself but is faithful to the instructions, unlike all the others who are really more occupied with themselves. So this instinct also joins that automatic distinction we make: okay, the first one is conservative and the second one is a reformer with excuses.

But I return and insist on what I said before: I do not agree. These are tendencies that exist, but they should be overcome. Because the fact that something is convenient does not mean it is not the correct thing. Yes, it’s too good to be kosher, as they say. Meaning, there is some tendency—something cannot be too convenient and also permitted, also kosher. If that’s what Jewish law wants, surely it has a price. It can’t be that something we like, that makes life easier and better for us, is also kosher. So I want to deny that assumption. I want to argue that sometimes the correct life is also a more convenient life. Correct halakhically—and also more convenient. The fact that something is convenient does not immediately disqualify it. I do agree, yes, that it should arouse suspicion. Meaning, check it. If the outcome is convenient, then check carefully whether you are doing it because you truly think that is what the system says, or because of psychology. And I said I’m not dealing with psychology, so for our discussion it doesn’t matter, but when I examine myself, here it is important for me to neutralize my own psychology. Therefore it is important for me to be aware of this justified suspicion. That if, by chance, through my interpretive gymnastics I arrive at a more comfortable life, a life that is convenient for me, it is worth checking myself—whether this is really the correct interpretation. But after the check, if I conclude that this is the correct interpretation, then that is the correct conservatism. That is what I should do.

Therefore I argue that the fact that someone interprets things in a way that is convenient—even, by the way, if it always turns out conveniently for him, in principle—maybe that arouses even more suspicion, but still, all we’ve got is suspicion. Because it may be that in this case this really is, in his view at least, the correct way, and it just so happens to also be convenient. Suspicion—yes, just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they’re not after you, as the saying goes. Meaning, we have a certain suspicion, which may be justified, but one must be careful not to translate suspicion into judgment. Suspicion is suspicion; it means it requires examination. But after I do the examination, I determine the judgment; the suspicion does not determine the judgment. So one needs to examine the arguments that the person raises. If the arguments he raises are reasonable arguments, then I am completely willing to accept his conservatism.

Let’s go back for a moment to the swimsuit example. The conservatives, those who continue to go around in swimsuits in the cold, are paying a price for their conservatism. With them I seemingly have no suspicion at all that this is really driven by aspirations for convenience. It may be that I don’t agree with their view. I think they are preserving the wrong system, but clearly with them the suspicion I described earlier regarding the second kind of conservative is absent. That has to be understood; it is certainly true. I accept that distinction. I’m only saying that this is a difference on the level of suspicion. The final judgment should be made after you have checked the suspicion. All right? So there is a difference in suspicion, and I accept it. But on the other hand I want to undermine even that a bit. And once again this returns me to the Little Prince passage—it contains all the elements of this whole series, it really is wonderful. I want to show that there is a certain dimension of convenience even in this simplistic conservatism of continuing to wear a swimsuit. And that is why I called it intellectual laziness—even if it involves costs on the practical plane, practical diligence—because there is something very convenient about continuing and not thinking about what you received, and just continuing to observe it as is. For some people, that is even more convenient, despite the hard work it involves, than a comfortable life that requires intellectual creativity. Especially if you get labeled a reformer, a heretic, and all the social costs that accompany that.

So very often what I said earlier is not correct—that those who continue to wear a swimsuit are not suspect of following convenience. Not quite accurate. Very often there is something very convenient about conservatism. It doesn’t require me to justify things, it doesn’t require me to recheck every time—I am continuing the tradition of my ancestors. That is very convenient. As Marx said—religion is the opium of the masses—and he was right. He was right in the sense of suspicion, not in the final conclusion. There are many believers who believe in the religious world because it gives them a convenient life. And that is true. It is convenient for us, despite the fact that it demands many things from us—Jewish law and religious commitment and so on—but it gives them a more orderly life, thought patterns, right and wrong, we know what to do in every situation. Someone who attends funerals that are not conducted in the religious way constantly feels the doubt, the awkwardness: okay, so what should one do now? What do you do now? What is the right thing to do? What is not the right thing to do? There are no clear rules. In the religious world there are very clear rules: what to do and what not to do, there is a formula for what to say, in what way to say it, what not to say—everything is organized. So it may be more burdensome and more prescriptive in telling you what to do and what not to do, but it is very convenient in the mental, intellectual sense.

And in that sense I want to argue that there is room for suspicion even regarding the first type of conservative. Convenience also plays a role there—not practical convenience but intellectual convenience. But that too is a kind of convenience, and for some people it is more important or more convenient, more dominant, than practical convenience. They are willing to be industrious as long as they don’t have to step outside the accepted norms of society and don’t have to think and justify and struggle for other positions and all sorts of things of that kind. So even regarding suspicion, I understand that there is a difference in the level of suspicion, but I do not agree that this difference is so dramatic. There is room for suspicion on both sides. But in any case, as I said, suspicion belongs to psychology. I’m interested in logic, not psychology. So in the end it seems to me that after we finish with the suspicions—both when we come to form a position about ourselves and when we form a position about others—we can examine the suspicions, but in the very end, after we have disposed of the matter of suspicion, we need to examine the arguments. And if this argument is a reasonable argument, then it is legitimate, it is consistent, one may hold that argument and hold this argument, and there is a symmetrical disagreement here between two conservative approaches.

How does one decide such a dispute? In this dispute, as I said before, the conservative halakhic-religious tendency is to say: the one who changes is at a disadvantage. A doubt cannot overturn a certainty. I explained before why that is not correct. It is not correct. The one who changes, in my view, is the one who keeps walking around in a swimsuit; he is changing because he is wearing clothing unsuited to the climate, so by that logic the burden of proof is on him. In short, you are begging the question. If you assume that you are right, then the burden of proof is on me. If I assume that I am right, then the burden of proof is on you. The burden of proof will not resolve the doubt here.

But there is one consideration that in my opinion can indeed tilt the scales—not necessarily decide, but tilt the scales. And this is a point that many people don’t notice. I wrote about it in an article for the fifth root on the rationale of the verse in Six Roots. Let’s think for a moment about the swimsuits. One possibility—we have reached the conclusion, and I’ll give names to these two kinds of conservatives: the conservatives of the first type are conservatives. The conservatives of the second type, let’s call them midrashic conservatives. They interpret the instructions, because that is what midrash does, and they say: the instruction is not to wear a swimsuit but to wear clothing suited to the climate. And after they have interpreted the instruction—the midrashic interpretation—they preserve that zealously. They are conservative like the others, but the instruction they are preserving is an instruction that is the product of interpretation, not a plain-sense instruction. To wear a swimsuit because that is what we saw—that is the plain-sense route. So I call this plain-sense conservatism and midrashic conservatism.

Now, I rejected the delegitimization of both paths. I rejected the possibility of preferring plain-sense conservatism because of suspicions. I rejected the possibility of preferring plain-sense conservatism because of the burden-of-proof argument, the “the one who changes is at a disadvantage” argument, all of that I rejected. So at the moment we are in a situation where these are two equivalent possibilities. What we need to decide is which of the two interpretations is more reasonable. Right? If I have no other tools for deciding, then we have a dispute between two interpretations of what is to be preserved. Now let’s see how one decides the dispute over which of the two interpretations is more reasonable. The decision, in my view, is very simple. Those who say one must always wear a swimsuit themselves admit that there is no logic at all in that instruction. It didn’t come down to them—they don’t know, at any rate. Maybe it’s a scriptural decree, maybe the Holy One, blessed be He—again I return to the lesson—has all sorts of exalted explanations for why one needs to wear a swimsuit. Anything is possible. But I don’t know that. Right? They are not offering me any explanation that would clarify the idea, why one should wear swimsuits even when it’s cold. By contrast, the midrashic conservatives offer an explanation. They have a logical explanation for the system of instructions. One wears a swimsuit because it suited the climate, and therefore now that it’s cold we will wear a parka. Which means that we have an interpretive dispute between a view that does not offer a logical interpretation and a view that does offer a logical interpretation.

Now I ask you: to whom would you give priority? On whom would you place the burden of proof? I would place it on the first. If the second offers me a logical interpretation and you insist and say: no, no, the logical interpretation is not right; there is another hidden interpretation that I don’t know, and that is the correct interpretation—why should I accept that? It’s like Bertrand Russell’s teapot argument. How do you know there is another interpretation? I am offering you a logical interpretation. Why is it that everywhere else—returning to Jewish law, yes, that’s the lesson—we use our minds and interpret? Why decide that if someone—if my interpretation doesn’t appeal to you, then say it doesn’t appeal to you, I understand that. But if you say: no, no, your interpretation may be logical, but maybe it’s not the correct interpretation; maybe there’s some other hidden interpretation that isn’t yours. Maybe. Notice: a doubt cannot overturn a certainty. I’ve turned the whole thing upside down. I claim that the interpreter—that plain-sense conservatism—the burden of proof is actually on it, because it is in doubt. The logical interpretation has an advantage. It may not be correct, but if I had to say which interpretation I assume is correct unless proven otherwise, obviously it is the logical interpretation. Why assume there is a non-logical interpretation when I have no indication of that whatsoever? Therefore it seems to me that if anything, burden-of-proof considerations lead one to adopt midrashic conservatism rather than plain-sense conservatism.

This is really the opposite of the usual way of thinking in these arguments, and it is because of all the things I rejected earlier. All sorts of tendencies people have to cling to the plain-sense system stem from tendencies that in my opinion one needs to overcome. The essential consideration, the correct consideration, is one that prefers the logical interpretation. Now notice: a logical interpretation is not when I say that I interpret something this way because it is convenient for me—that doesn’t make it more logical. If I interpret it in a way that leads to a more moral result, that produces some kind of correction or improvement, that gives it an advantage. The fact that it is more convenient for me does not mean it is more correct. So one needs to be careful with this swimsuit parable. The swimsuit parable—if it were a religious command, it would be harder for me to talk about it. I am speaking about an instruction, a recommendation from parents to their children: go around in swimsuits, fine? There I can say that the parents simply wanted to give their children a more comfortable life, so there the consideration of convenience is actually a consideration bearing on which interpretation is more correct. In the religious context, when I say, I don’t know, let’s permit eating pork because it tastes good—would that give an advantage to the claim that wants to permit eating pork? I claim not. Why? Because the fact that it tastes good does not make it more correct with respect to the command of the Holy One, blessed be He. It does not seem to me that the laws of forbidden foods are meant to provide me with the tastiest food. That does not emerge from the whole system of the laws of forbidden foods. Therefore the convenience argument—and one has to be careful with the swimsuit parable, because in the swimsuit parable the explanation was an explanation of convenience: one should wear clothing suited to the climate. So when you transfer it to disputes about changes in Jewish law, there I am speaking about interpretations in the sense of what is more correct, what is more moral, or things of that kind—not in the sense of convenience, in the simple sense of convenience.

[Speaker G] In the halakhic context, though, in the swimsuit parable you could add an element not of convenience but of health, saying that if you go around in a swimsuit, then there’s the component that says our ancestors cared about our health when you walk around in—so that’s not convenience.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I completely accept that. I’m only saying you don’t need it there, because in the parable our ancestors also cared that we wouldn’t be cold, even apart from health. Therefore the interpretation of wearing clothing suited to the climate really is the preferable interpretation; it is more correct. But in the halakhic context, one has to pay attention to what from the parable can be transferred to the lesson and what cannot. Considerations of convenience are not considerations—very often not relevant considerations in halakhic debates—because Jewish law is not intended to make our lives more comfortable. Again, I do not deny the possibility that Jewish law is compatible with a comfortable life, but convenience is not an argument in favor of the truth of that interpretation. Nor is it an argument against it, as I said before; “too good to be kosher” is not true. But on the other hand, it’s also not an argument in favor—the fact that it’s good doesn’t mean it’s kosher. You have to reach the conclusion of whether it’s kosher or not, and the fact that it’s good will not bother me if I’ve reached that conclusion. Okay? So one has to be careful in applying the parable when we transfer it to the lesson.

But after all these cautions, when I want to argue in favor of a change in Jewish law and I have a logical explanation—for example, the disqualification of women from testimony. Fine? So I would argue that today women should be deemed eligible for testimony, because today women’s testimony is equal to men’s testimony, whereas in the past women were not involved in public life, whatever, they were not as educated as men, and therefore their testimony was less reliable, so women were disqualified from testimony. And today women should be deemed eligible for testimony. Let’s say we look at a dispute of that type. That claim is not a claim of convenience; it’s not made in the name of equality, and I’m not speaking about women’s rights—although women’s rights are also not convenience—but even if we say they are. I’m not talking at all about women’s rights and equality; I’m talking about the interest of the laws of testimony. I want to clarify the truth. If a woman’s testimony is good testimony, then the legal interest is to accept that testimony, not to do the woman a favor and make her equal to a man, as these arguments are often accused of doing. No. I am saying that if you do not accept a woman’s testimony even though it is in fact good testimony, then you yourself are causing a distortion of justice. Your conservatism is a conservatism that has costs—costs of deviating from Jewish law. The feeling is always that if you are conservative, then you pay no price; that’s why the burden of proof is on the other side. No, that is not true.

[Speaker C] But Rabbi, I heard דווקא in this context that there is no fundamental disqualification—the Rema writes that if women quarrel with one another in the synagogue, they can testify in such a case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the disqualification is a fundamental one. That Rema is from Terumat HaDeshen, and it speaks about—I mentioned this, I’m reminding you—

[Speaker C] It’s explained there that a woman should not have to be in such a setting because it is not honorable for her to be in—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Murder in a mikveh. Meaning, what happens when someone murders a woman in a mikveh? Everyone present there is only women. Or in the women’s section of a synagogue. Okay? So basically he’s playing it safe; there is no chance there will be admissible testimony that can convict him. Therefore Noda B’Yehuda and Terumat HaDeshen—one on a Torah-level basis and one on a rabbinic basis, by the way, so it’s not exactly the same thing—but they say that in such situations we will accept women’s testimony. One of them says this is rabbinic and one says it is Torah-level, but it is not because the disqualification of women is not essential; rather because the repair of the world requires it. It cannot be that I allow a space in the world where someone can murder with impunity. That has nothing to do with the question of whether the disqualification is essential or not. It’s a different question whether it is an essential disqualification or not, but not from here—you won’t bring your proof from there.

[Speaker F] Rabbi, the distinction between plain-sense conservatism and midrashic conservatism seems a bit irrelevant. No one is a plain-sense conservative across the board; the whole world is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So this is what I said earlier: in the end, there’s no escaping interpretation. There’s no system of rules that you can preserve in some simplistic way according to the… no, that’s an illusion. So I’ll get to that later, we’ll still talk about it. This is Wittgenstein; we’ll still talk about these things and his logic, so let’s not get ahead of ourselves. In any case, I see we’re already almost out of time. The claim, really, is that when we talk about conservatism, we actually have several kinds of conservatism. So far I’ve suggested two: plain-sense conservatism and midrashic conservatism. Plain-sense conservatism takes the directives and preserves them in a simplistic way, as they were, without touching them—didn’t touch, okay. Midrashic conservatism takes the directives, interprets them midrashically, and what it preserves is the result—the principle. Okay? That’s midrashic conservatism. And as I said before, first of all, both approaches are fully conservative in the strictest sense. Once you clear away all the suspicions—and you do have to examine the suspicions, I’m not dismissing them. Self-interest can definitely be a consideration. But if I clear away the suspicions and I see that the arguments are arguments on the merits, even if they lead to a more comfortable life, still, bottom line, it sounds reasonable—then not only is there no advantage to the plain-sense conservative, in my opinion there is actually an advantage to the midrashic conservative. The burden of proof is on the plain-sense conservative, not on the midrashic conservative. The burden of proof is on the one who says that women today should be disqualified from testimony, not on the one who says they should be qualified to testify, in my opinion. The burden of proof is on the one who wants to disqualify them. And you understand how far this can go. There is almost no point of Jewish law that can’t be challenged in this way: to explain it against the background of the circumstances that prevailed when it was created, to show that today things have changed, without having to prove that this really was the case. It’s enough to claim that I have a reasonable interpretation, and that it’s preferable to the absence of interpretation, which is the alternative you’re offering. I don’t even have to prove my interpretation. It’s enough to propose a reasonable interpretation. With that you can seemingly wipe out almost the entire Shulchan Arukh. So the concern about this approach of midrashic conservatism is very understandable. But again, that’s on the level of concern. If you want to enact ordinances such that even though midrashic conservatism is correct, we still won’t use it because there are concerns about slippery slopes—then enact an ordinance. But that’s not a real argument; it’s not an argument on the merits. Because if I’m right, then I’m right. The fact that this has implications and could lead to all kinds of things—maybe. So we’ll deal with them when they come. But that’s not an argument on the substantive level. On the substantive level, you have to deal with the proposal I’m making. If I’m right, then I’m right. And if that would nullify the whole Shulchan Arukh, then maybe the whole Shulchan Arukh should be nullified. If not, then either prove to me that I’m wrong, or enact an ordinance that one does not make midrashic interpretations, even though they may be correct. And that can be done; there is room to enact an ordinance. By the way, every ordinance—every ordinance of the sages—is an ordinance to behave incorrectly. Yes, sometimes it means forbidding what is permitted, sometimes permitting what is forbidden, but it means behaving incorrectly, because from the standpoint of Torah-level Jewish law this should not have been done. A rabbinic ordinance means doing something even though the Torah permits it, or not doing something even though the Torah permits it. So in fact the sages are always legislating behavior that is not technically correct. There is room for that when the concerns, slippery slopes and so on, are significant. I’m not rejecting that approach. I just want us to notice clearly, first, that this has to be a special ordinance; it’s not a discussion on the substantive plane. You can’t raise against me the claim: wait, this way you’ll nullify the whole Shulchan Arukh. Do you have something to argue against qualifying women to testify? Then argue it. Don’t tell me what the consequences will be. What the consequences will be doesn’t interest me right now. You can say afterward: know that you’re right, I have no argument against you, but notice the consequences. So should we perhaps enact a special ordinance to prevent such interpretations? Maybe I’d agree. But notice, that’s already on the second floor. On the first floor, the debate has to be conducted over the arguments themselves. Beyond that, when we enact an ordinance, the ordinance has to be enacted by an authorized body. I, as a halakhic decisor living today, cannot enact ordinances. My ordinances have no validity. Therefore these arguments in the name of ordinances or slippery slopes—I don’t accept them at all. They’re not valid halakhically. A slippery slope is not only a question of whether it’s right or not right on the logical level, whether it’s correct to use slippery-slope arguments or not. I’m claiming there is no authority. Slippery-slope arguments are basically a call to make an ordinance or a decree. Today there is no body with authority to do that. Therefore even if you’re right in your concern about a slippery slope, it won’t help. Yes, people forbid riding a bicycle—why? Because maybe you’ll come to fix it if it breaks on the Sabbath. Suppose it’s true that there’s a concern you’ll come to fix it, fine—so what? Is there some Sanhedrin today that can determine there is a prohibition against riding a bicycle because of that concern? It can recommend to me: don’t ride, because you may get into a problematic situation. Recommendations are excellent. But to enact an ordinance you need a body with authority to enact. I don’t think such a body exists today. Again, we won’t get into all those debates—the Chief Rabbinate and various things of that sort. But I just want to show you how many of the arguments that immediately come up in these debates get brushed aside the moment you add proper conceptual analysis. Okay, we’ll stop here. Any comments or questions?

[Speaker E] I have a few comments. Let’s tell the whole story from the opposite direction. There was a group of Eskimos whose parents commanded them to dress from head to toe. Then one day they moved to the equator. And there a dispute arose between the conservatives and the innovators. So now should they go around in the dress of Adam before the sin, which is more suitable for the place, or should they dress modestly as their ancestors commanded them? What’s the question? What do you mean, what’s the question?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is there a question here? The plain-sense conservative will say one thing, and the midrashic conservative will say another.

[Speaker E] Are you sure the midrashic conservative will say that now they should go around in Adam’s dress?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not sure. If there is an argument that they should go around in Adam’s dress, that argument is a midrashically conservative argument.

[Speaker E] Right, that I understand. I’m saying that from the standpoint of comfort, that’s one argument, but it could be, let’s say, our ancestors told us to wear clothing because they had two things in mind: both comfort and modesty.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s a debate on the merits, conducted over interpretation. Fine. It has to be conducted. I have no problem with that.

[Speaker E] What I’m just trying to illustrate is that even when at first glance it seems as though surely the midrashic conservative ought to say to change from A to B, many times there is…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t say that—not at first glance and not at second glance. I’m arguing the opposite. Not that the midrashic conservative must change, but that if someone raises an argument for change, he is not necessarily someone who is not conservative. Understand the difference. I’m not claiming that everyone who isn’t conservative immediately raises arguments. Arguments come up. If it’s reasonable, you raise it; if it isn’t reasonable, you don’t. Sometimes it can be very complex, as you say—modesty, cold, heat.

[Speaker E] No, I just want to say one thing. I mean, who has the presumption in his favor? The burden of proof is on the one who wants to extract from the other. So I’m saying that since the matters are fixed in a number of respects—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The fact that matters are complex—so what? But they’re complex in both directions. Now I’m still asking.

[Speaker E] They’re complex in both directions, that’s true. But when I come to define the existing situation and who is coming to change it—and I think that… so what I’m saying is that the plain-sense conservative is the one with the presumption in his favor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Absolutely not true. Why? What are you talking about? Everything you just said does nothing for that claim. None of your arguments help that claim in any way. I raise a reasonable argument. If you raise a reasonable argument in the opposite direction, with modesty, no problem—then we’ll both be in an equal position. That’s perfectly fine. But if I raise a reasonable claim and you act in the name of conservatism and don’t raise a substantive counterargument, only one in the name of conservatism, then you’re at a disadvantage.

[Speaker E] The question is this: there is a dispute between us whether what our ancestors were concerned with was comfort or modesty. Now this is a dispute on the level of logic. Wait one second—this is a dispute on the level of logic. Aside from the question of the dispute between us, there is also the presumption. Can it be formulated that way, or do you disagree?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I disagree. Because if you’re right, then you have the presumption in your favor; if I’m right, then I have the presumption in my favor.

[Speaker E] I’m saying there is the dry law, so to speak.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is no dry law. Because according to my position, the dry law is to wear clothing suited to the weather. That’s the dry law.

[Speaker E] I think all jurists would disagree with you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think so, and if they disagree with me then they’re in good company; there are many who disagree with me.

[Speaker E] Or let’s put it differently—this may be another argument—that the Torah cannot be left in everyone’s hands.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that is the slippery-slope question.

[Speaker E] No, no. I think that goes beyond a slippery slope. Because when we have an existing state—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re right: what does it mean, “the Torah cannot be left in everyone’s hands”? Argue with me if you think I’m wrong.

[Speaker E] No, one second. When I said “the Torah cannot be left in everyone’s hands,” I didn’t mean slippery slope. I meant that since midrashic conservatism is not clear—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? It’s completely clear.

[Speaker E] No, there are very many cases where it’s not clear.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s completely clear. I’m raising an argument that is very clear to me. What’s not clear? Everything is clear. You need to wear clothing suited to the weather, that’s all. What isn’t clear here?

[Speaker E] That’s your argument. But there’s also the other side, the argument of modesty, and that too is an argument.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no other side.

[Speaker E] In my Eskimo story there is another side.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In your story there is another side, so indeed, that’s a substantive debate. There I’m not claiming to have an advantage. You don’t either, and neither do I. Neither of us has an advantage. No problem. I said, I’m not claiming that the one who argues for change is always right. I’m claiming that the one who puts forward the reasonable argument has the presumption in his favor. The burden of proof is on the other side. Sometimes the conservative will make the reasonable argument, and then that’s perfectly fine. It’s not because he’s conservative that he’s right.

[Speaker E] In short, you’re not willing to accept the argument from presumption.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not in this area.

[Speaker E] And in what cases does presumption exist?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? In a place where I have no counterargument. For example, if I say I think we should switch to a bathing suit, and I have no argument supporting that—what do you mean? If you have no argument supporting it and until now we’ve gone around in a bathing suit, then we keep going around in a bathing suit.

[Speaker E] Is there anyone who supports that? What? In such a case, the reason you’re not right is not because of presumption, but because you have no argument. But what do you mean? You don’t have an argument either.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re saying to continue with the bathing suit.

[Speaker E] I’m asking a general question in the debate.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, wait, answer me about this. You don’t have an argument either. You say to continue with the bathing suit, and I say to put on a parka. Neither of us has…

[Speaker E] No, no. I’m saying continue with the parka and you’re saying switch to a bathing suit. I’m talking about my story.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in your story we both have an argument. You were talking about a situation where neither of us has an argument. So let’s say I’m going with my story and there is no consideration of comfort, okay? No consideration. We’re not sensitive to the cold. Okay. So now I want to switch to a bathing suit—sorry, switch to a parka—and you want to continue with the bathing suit. Here there would be a presumption.

[Speaker E] Here you have a presumption?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, and you need the presumption because you don’t have an argument either. You won’t win by argument; you’ll win by force of the presumption.

[Speaker E] I really got a bit confused this time. What I mean to ask is: is there a situation where one of us is right not because of the argument but because of the presumption? Is there such a situation or not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. The answer is yes. When neither of us has arguments.

[Speaker E] No, when neither of us has arguments, then there is one clear argument: what our ancestors did, what they were commanded—that’s what should be done. That’s not a presumption; that’s an argument.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In free translation, that’s what’s called a presumption. A presumption means what was, will be. That’s called a presumption.

[Speaker E] No, a presumption means, for example, in monetary law, when both of us have an argument and it isn’t clear what happened—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, in monetary law that’s a problem. We’ll talk about an original presumption. Presumption in monetary law is something that’s not at all clear is the same thing.

[Speaker E] Okay, so an original presumption: what was, remains.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The one who seeks to change it is at a disadvantage.

[Speaker E] Yes. No, but an original presumption is speaking about a case where there is a reason to raise doubt, like a ritual bath where there is doubt whether it lost some of its water. I have reason to say that the ritual bath lost water, and nevertheless I say that it remains in its original state, and that’s a presumption.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But here I’m saying I have reason too. Again—not that I have a reason, but there is no reason not to raise the doubt. These are two equal possibilities. I don’t know whether the obligation was to go around in a bathing suit or to wear clothes suited to the weather. Those are two equal possibilities. There’s no argument in favor of this and none in favor of that. The decision is only by presumption.

[Speaker E] I wouldn’t call that a presumption; I would say there is a logic…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know what you call a presumption. To me that is a clear-cut presumption. Fine, but in any case that’s what I meant when I spoke about presumption.

[Speaker E] In any case, when I said “the Torah cannot be left in everyone’s hands,” I meant to say this. There is the… you presented a very extreme case where at first it was very hot and now it’s very cold. And there are also a number of intermediate situations where it isn’t clear that it’s enough to justify change. And here there’s a continuous graph, so to speak—where exactly do I make the change? That’s what I meant by saying the Torah is left in everyone’s hands.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but what do you mean? That’s always true. What does that have to do with anything? In the end, if I have an argument, then from my perspective this graph has crossed the line. It crossed the threshold that requires change. You think it hasn’t. So we have a disagreement. Fine. By the way, in that dispute I really don’t have an advantage. I don’t have an advantage. Because you draw the line here and I draw the line there. But we both agree that there is a line. Earlier I was talking about a situation where you deny the existence of a line altogether. Right. And there I do have an advantage. If the dispute is where the line passes, that’s a dispute between two equal sides. But they are equal.

[Speaker E] I mean to ask regarding conservative midrash: to whom do you give the authority to make a conservative midrashic interpretation? To everyone? Everyone. Or to sages? Everyone.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that’s true of halakhic interpretation as well. Everyone is authorized to make a halakhic midrash for practical Jewish law, I say. Except that only someone who knows how can do it, that’s one thing. And second, if you make an interpretation, it won’t bind me unless I’m persuaded. But if the Sanhedrin makes an interpretation, then it binds me even if I’m not persuaded. There’s a difference between whether one may make an interpretation and whether the interpretation one makes has authority. Two different things. If I have an interpretation from a verse, it binds me, and if I don’t act according to it then I’m a transgressor.

[Speaker E] So that’s why I bring the statement of the Mishnah: the Torah was left in everyone’s hands.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are situations where you enact a special ordinance so that such things won’t happen, but you can’t make a substantive argument against an explanation someone raises by saying “you’ve left the Torah in everyone’s hands.” That’s not a substantive argument. At most it means: if everyone starts expounding, I’ll make a decree, fine? So one has to discuss particular cases where that was done; there is no such general principle.

[Speaker E] Fine, I need to look for where exactly this appears in the Mishnah. I found it once; I need to look where else it appears.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Send me an email if you want and I’ll answer you at length, to check

[Speaker E] where

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it appears, and then we’ll see. I’m sure it doesn’t say that there. Okay, fine. Okay, anyone else?

[Speaker H] Rabbi, may I ask a question? Yes. Precisely on the last topic you finished with, I wanted to know what really is the relationship between the authority of the sages to interpret the verses, or things for example in the give-and-take that we see in the Talmudic text?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The sages have no authority to interpret the verses. Everyone has authority to interpret verses. I don’t think you’ll find anywhere—and I’ve dealt with this quite a bit—someone who speaks about authority to interpret verses. There’s no such thing. Maimonides, on the contrary, everywhere he writes, he says that you interpret the Torah either by the plain sense or by interpretation. He doesn’t enter at all into the question of who can do it. Anyone can; one should.

[Speaker H] Even if it contradicts the rulings of the sages?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a different question. Again, there is authority to what the sages established halakhically, regardless of whether it came to them from an interpretation or not. But there is no such thing as authority to make interpretations. It has nothing to do with interpretations. Everything the sages established is like something the Sanhedrin established, and so it is binding. But not because they have authority to interpret. I too have authority to interpret; it’s just that my interpretations are not binding and the interpretations of the Sanhedrin are binding. My interpretations bind only me, not you.

[Speaker H] By interpretation you mean through the thirteen hermeneutical principles?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, but not only.

[Speaker H] A minority—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The interpretations in the Talmud are only a small minority from the thirteen principles. Most of the interpretations in the Talmud are not from the thirteen principles.

[Speaker H] All right, that’s surely a topic in itself. Fine. Another question, with your permission, Rabbi—a very specific one. Today, would you permit on Rosh Hashanah and on Sukkot when they fall on the Sabbath, blowing the shofar and taking the lulav? No?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand—why? Because there’s a concern that one might carry it?

[Speaker H] Yes, at least unlike in the past, when someone who wasn’t proficient would go to someone who was proficient, and so on.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s true that apparently the concern no longer exists, but with rabbinic ordinances, if the reason has ceased, the ordinance does not cease—precisely because it is rabbinic law. With Torah-level law, yes; with rabbinic law, it’s harder.

[Speaker H] Can we sharpen that? Meaning, why does that contradict what we said earlier, that we interpret the… the two disagreements between the two kinds of conservatives—why isn’t that the same thing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because what I said earlier was a principled statement; I hadn’t yet entered the question of halakhic constraints. On the halakhic level, with a rabbinic ordinance you can’t make interpretations like that. In practice, you can—people do it—but on the principled level, if the reason has ceased, the ordinance has not ceased. Therefore all these interpretations really amount to saying that the reason has ceased. But with rabbinic ordinances, unlike Torah-level interpretations, the rule is that even if the reason has ceased, the ordinance has not ceased. And by the way, medieval authorities (Rishonim) canceled many ordinances and decrees even though… because the reason had ceased. So yes, people do this, but there it is more complicated. If you want, in Neria Guttel’s book, The Changing of Nature, in the last chapter of the book he surveys many dozens of examples there.

[Speaker H] Cases where we are halakhically prevented—we simply don’t have the halakhic tool…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Cases where they did change? Where they did change because the reason had ceased.

[Speaker H] And that’s a legal workaround, you’re saying; it’s not self-evident.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there are various explanations. I also wrote about this in the third book of the trilogy; I summarized there all the mechanisms. Some of them do not appear in Guttel; some are mechanisms that I explained there. But I summarized there the mechanisms that make such a thing possible. But it’s more complicated. In Torah-level law it’s simple.

[Speaker D] Interesting.

[Speaker H] Thank you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, Sabbath peace.

Sabbath peace, thank you very much.

[Speaker D] Goodbye. Thanks.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Very much.