Individual and Community – Lesson 1
This transcript was generated automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- Right and left as cross-disciplinary correlations
- The individual versus the collective: a quantitative relation and an ontic relation
- A glowing coal of metal in Bava Kamma as a quantitative explanation
- Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu’s ruling and deciding for the public
- Incitement, “the words of the master and the words of the student,” and agency for a transgression
- Saving life, “normal” risks, and a life that is not an alternative to Torah
- The cosmological proof, infinite regress, and the eternity of the whole
- The Ship of Theseus, personal identity, and the “re-synthesis” experiment
- Emergence, John Searle, and the distinction between weak and strong emergence
- The ontic model: “something additional” that organizes a whole
- From the person to the nation: the collective of Israel, the ministering force of the nations, and the spirit of a nation
- The world as an organism and God as emanator: emanation versus creation
- The Kuzari and sacrifices as eating that strengthens a connection
Summary
General Overview
The text raises a question about the connection between right and left across different fields and argues that there are consistent, non-random correlations. It then proposes understanding them through a basic distinction between the individual and the collective. It defines two models for the individual-collective relationship: a quantitative model, in which the collective is merely a multiplicity of individuals, and an ontic model, in which the collective is an entity beyond the individuals. It tries to show that a large portion of the examples that look “collective” are actually well explained in purely quantitative terms, and then moves toward the claim that when properties appear that cannot be derived from the micro-level, a reasonable possibility arises that there is “something additional” organizing the whole, similar to a soul in a body, and it extends this all the way to a metaphysical idea of an organic world and an understanding of God as emanator.
Right and Left as Cross-Disciplinary Correlations
The text describes how right and left fall under many headings such as economics, policy, security, politics, and morality, and asks why correlations exist between them. It argues that the correlation between economic right and left and political-national right and left exists not only in Israel but also in the United States and Europe, and emphasizes that in Europe the right tends to support Israel and the left tends to oppose Israel. It argues that today the historical pattern of an “antisemitic right” no longer works in any simple way, and that the right is identified with opposition to post-colonial sentiments and therefore sometimes supports Jews more than Arabs. It gives examples of breaks in the classic definitions, such as Argentina, where the far right has conducted itself economically in a socialist way since Juan Perón, and China, where there is a “right-wing” economy with a “left-wing politics,” presenting these as challenges to the traditional definitions.
The Individual versus the Collective: a Quantitative Relation and an Ontic Relation
The text distinguishes between two possible relations between the individual and the collective: a quantitative relation, in which the collective is simply many individuals, and an ontic relation, in which the collective is a collective entity beyond the individuals. It presents a dispute over whether entities like a state, a nation, or a community are merely useful fictions or a real existing “something,” and notes that in the Jewish world there are strong views that see the collective as an actually existing entity. It marks for later discussion the normative implications of these two views, such as whether the collective serves the individual or the individual serves the collective.
A Glowing Coal of Metal in Bava Kamma as a Quantitative Explanation
The text cites the Talmudic passage in Bava Kamma about a glowing coal of metal in the public domain, which may be extinguished on the Sabbath because of danger, as opposed to a private domain, where such permission does not apply. It argues that modern writers present this as a cornerstone of “public halakhic thinking,” relying on the idea that the public allows Sabbath desecration where an individual’s needs would not. It argues that in this case the explanation is not “the public” as an ontology, but probability and quantity: in the public domain many people pass through, so the risk of an accident is greater, whereas in the private domain it is easier to be careful, because it is a familiar courtyard with control over who is there. It notes that the very definition of the public domain is tied to a place where many people pass, so the distinction is physical-functional rather than metaphysical.
Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu’s Ruling and Deciding for the Public
The text brings a case of an army officer who was required to unload a weapon at night using a flashlight, and who asked Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu whether on the Sabbath it was permitted to turn on a flashlight for that purpose; Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu permitted it. It argues that on the private plane he would not have permitted Sabbath desecration for such a tiny risk, but in a ruling intended for a broad public the number of cases accumulates, so that a risk of “one in a thousand” may materialize when a thousand officers are acting. It presents this as a purely quantitative difference between individual and public, in which “public” simply means many individuals, and therefore the ruling changes because probabilities accumulate, not because of a separate public entity.
Incitement, “The Words of the Master and the Words of the Student,” and Agency for a Transgression
The text argues that in Jewish law there is no punishment by a religious court for incitement to transgress, and explains this through the principle “the words of the master and the words of the student — whose words should one obey?” and the idea that there is no agency for a transgression. It gives the example of false witnesses and emphasizes that only in the case of slanderous accusation against one’s wife is there a special fine of one hundred silver pieces, whereas in other cases the witnesses themselves are punished as conspiring witnesses and the sender is not punished in human law. It notes exceptions such as one who hires false witnesses, who is exempt in human law but liable in the hands of Heaven, and raises the possibility of discussion in cases of coercion or relations of authority. It argues that morally and socially, incitement of the public seems graver than incitement of an individual because the number of people exposed and the dynamics among them increase the chance that someone will act, but it again classifies this as a probabilistic-quantitative difference rather than proof of an ontic public entity.
Saving Life, “Normal” Risks, and a Life That Is Not an Alternative to Torah
The text addresses a proposal to ban private cars in favor of public transportation because of accidents, and argues that even if there are considerations of saving life, this does not mean that the world must “freeze in place” or that every resource must go only toward saving lives. It illustrates this through the distribution of the state budget and the health basket, and argues that even individuals do not manage their lives so that every moment is directed toward what is most important in value terms. It criticizes “hysteria” around neglect of Torah study and argues that a person also has to “live” in a normal way, including reading, taking a walk, or watching a film, without manufacturing artificial justifications like “so that I’ll be able to learn more afterward.” It mentions later authorities who propose an intermediate model between reciting Shema morning and evening and continuous study, and compares this to dwelling in a sukkah day and night as defined in Kelayot Yaakov, siman 15, so that the obligation is fulfilled within the framework of normal life needs.
The Cosmological Proof, Infinite Regress, and the Eternity of the Whole
The text uses the cosmological proof as an example of an argumentative structure, presenting the formulation “everything that exists needs someone who made it” and showing that the challenge “and who made Him?” leads to an infinite regress, which it defines as a failure because it dodges the answer and requires a “concrete infinity.” It presents a correction to the argument on the basis of our experience in the world, in which known objects are produced by prior causes, and against that sets Aristotle’s claim of the eternity of the world, in which the particulars are exchanged but the whole is eternal. From this it illustrates the question of the whole versus the particulars and presents Spinoza’s pantheistic option, which identifies “God” with the whole, and then argues that this is a problematic position if the whole is nothing more than a collection of particulars, because then there is no reason the whole should have a property that the particulars do not have.
The Ship of Theseus, Personal Identity, and the “Re-Synthesis” Experiment
The text uses the parable of the Ship of Theseus and thought experiments about replacing organs and reconstructing memory to ask whether personal identity is preserved when all the components are replaced. It proposes a thought experiment in which a person is killed with consent and then synthesized anew exactly, one for one, down to the electron level, and argues that most people would not agree even on the assumption that the reconstruction succeeds. It presents this as a claim pointing to an intuition of “something additional” beyond matter, and connects it to concepts like the soul and to the question whether a person is merely a collection of cells.
Emergence, John Searle, and the Distinction Between Weak and Strong Emergence
The text describes how materialists who do not deny mental phenomena tend to explain them through emergence, and cites John Searle, who compares mental phenomena to liquidity in water as a property of an aggregate rather than of a single molecule. It argues that the example of water is weak emergence, because the macroscopic properties can be explained in terms of microscopic interactions through statistical mechanics. It cites a distinction attributed to Sompolinsky between weak and strong emergence, and defines strong emergence as a property that has no explanation in micro-level terms. It argues that there is no example in the world of strong emergence, and that one who claims it is begging the question, because if there is no explanation one cannot know whether this is “emergence” or truly “something new.”
The Ontic Model: “Something Additional” That Organizes a Whole
The text argues that the ontic model does not mean that the whole is an additional entity on top of the collection of particulars, but that within a whole that functions as an organism there exists an additional component that organizes the particulars and turns them into a unity. It illustrates this through the soul or spirit in the body, and argues that this explains how a person remains “the same person” despite the replacement of cells throughout life, as opposed to the materialist position that defines the unity as a fiction or a mere feeling. It presents this as close to vitalism in the sense that matter and the laws of physics are not sufficient to explain the phenomenon of life completely, while on the other hand it describes the prevailing scientific belief that this is only a matter of complexity and that in the end a full bridge from physics to chemistry to biology will be found.
From the Person to the Nation: the Collective of Israel, the Ministering Force of the Nations, and the Spirit of a Nation
The text argues that when one rises to higher levels of integration such as society and nation, the ontology becomes more speculative and requires “heavy” metaphysics such as the collective of Israel, the Divine Presence, or kabbalistic and mystical concepts. It presents the Talmudic idea of a “minister” over every nation as something parallel to Hegel’s “spirit of the nation,” explaining how a nation is perceived as an organic entity rather than merely a collection of individuals. It notes that fascism views the collective as an existing and even superior entity, and marks that the value discussion about the subordination of the individual and the collective will come later.
The World as an Organism and God as Emanator: Emanation Versus Creation
The text proposes that the entire world displays organicity through cycles in nature, symbiosis, and constant change, and from this arises the need for an “emanator” who gives the whole its organic character, regardless of the chronological question of who “created” it. It presents this as a formulation of the cosmological proof in which God is “the soul of the world” in a synchronic sense of emanation, not only a creator in the sense of a carpenter making a table. It explains this through the kabbalistic distinction between the world of emanation and the world of creation, and cites Leshem as saying that emanation is a relation of “with Him,” like a soul in a body, as opposed to creation, where the creator brings into being something that is not found within him in that same way.
The Kuzari and Sacrifices as Eating That Strengthens a Connection
The text cites in the name of a friend an argument about the Kuzari that sacrifices are similar to a person’s eating in that they preserve the connection between the Holy One, blessed be He, and the world. It describes eating as a mechanism that maintains the connection between soul and body and prevents death, and parallels this to sacrifices as a mechanism that sustains the connection between God as the soul of the world and the world as the body. It notes that the Kuzari presents this as an explanation that makes intuitive sense and as an analogy, not as full knowledge of the internal mechanism.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I want to talk a bit about the individual and the collective. Ido kind of told me maybe we should talk about right and left in one of the topics, so maybe I’ll touch on that at the end, but first of all, it has
[Speaker B] all kinds of context.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In general, to talk about these phenomena — after all, a lot of phenomena fall under these headings. There’s economic right and left, political-national right and left, political, security-related, I don’t know, moral — and the question is whether there’s a connection between these phenomena. Values? Correlations definitely exist; the question is why. Why is the economic left, which for example supports equality, also politically left? Is that how it has to be? At the party level that’s how it is, right? There’s a correlation between left and right at the level of policy — security policy, say, or national policy — and left and right at the economic level.
[Speaker B] It seems to me
[Speaker C] only in Israel?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? No, not only in Israel.
[Speaker B] Look at the United States — absolutely. Same thing, Republicans and Democrats, same thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look at Europe, look at Europe — all the parties, systematically, in almost every country I think, I haven’t checked really systematically, but it’s systematic — the right-wing parties support Israel and the left opposes Israel. What does that have to do with economic right? No, no, I’m not talking about the extreme right. By the way, even the far right — the far right is less anti-Israel than the non-extreme left. Sometimes anti-Jewish and so on, but specifically when it comes to the State of Israel, the far right has less of a problem. No, but Marine Le Pen and all that — no, they don’t have a problem with the State of Israel.
[Speaker B] In the United States too, between Republicans and Democrats there’s a correlation in every respect.
[Speaker C] But the tradition says that the right is generally antisemitic.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but I’m saying that today it doesn’t work like that. Today the right is, so to speak, those who aren’t with all the left-wing post-colonial guilt feelings, and therefore they’re not for the Arabs but for the Jews, even though we’re supposedly the strong side. And so, you know, you always side with the underdog. There are connections. Now, to formulate them precisely and see what it is, why it always appears together — that’s an interesting question. There are also various exceptions, like Argentina on one side and China on the other. Because Argentina is a far right that behaved, economically, in a left-wing socialist way, starting with Juan Perón. And in China what is happening today is the reverse: a right-wing economy and left-wing politics. So today there are all kinds of very interesting phenomena that challenge the classic definitions. Because ostensibly there’s really no connection, no reason.
[Speaker C] I think that in Germany, for example, the definition of the right is very often antisemitic. Xenophobic, not necessarily antisemitic.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, xenophobia — in that sense we’re always on the right, that’s true. But the attitude toward the State of Israel — I haven’t checked one by one, but in almost every country you check, the right is more in our favor and the left is against us. In every country. And here we’re talking about a political question, the attitude toward the State of Israel — what does that have to do with economics? That’s completely right. But I don’t know enough about the policy issues European countries deal with. I would guess that there too you’d find a correlation. I look at the attitude toward Israel because that’s what I know better and it stands out, but I’m sure that if I lived in such a country I’d see it. In the United States it’s obvious — Republicans
[Speaker B] and Democrats — there’s a correlation exactly like with us. So what does that say here about right and left?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The same thing. Here too, right and left are divided from each other both on the economic plane and on the national-security plane, and the question is why. What’s the connection? Why isn’t there an economic left that is security-wise right-wing, and vice versa? There are such people, but not many. I’m saying correlation — correlation is never one hundred percent — but there is a substantial correlation; it’s not something accidental. There’s something deeper here. The question is what it means. Okay, I don’t know, we’ll think about it — maybe I’ll do something with it — but in the meantime let’s start talking about the individual versus the collective, because in my view that is at least part of what lies behind these things. I’ll make some remark about it at the end, to whatever extent I manage to get to it. I still need to think about it more myself; I don’t have a full picture. I have ideas. Okay, so I really want to start with the question of the individual versus the collective, and I want to distinguish between two relations that there are between an individual and a collective — or in principle can be; there is a dispute whether both exist or not. In a collective there are first of all simply many individuals; the relation is a quantitative relation. There are many individuals as against the single individual. So the first relation is simply a quantitative relation: there are more people. The second relation, which is of course disputed, is this: the question whether there is anything beyond the individuals at all, whether the collective is another kind of entity beyond the individuals. There are those who see collective entities as a kind of fiction. What really exists is people. The public — we define for ourselves a state, a nation, a community, whatever — these are fictional definitions that are convenient in various contexts, but they don’t really reflect entities that actually exist. And on the other hand there are conceptions — in the Jewish world, for example, there certainly are such conceptions, strong ones — that see the collective as some kind of existing entity. And then of course one has to discuss, assuming both these entities exist, what the relation between them is, who is subordinate to whom: does the collective serve the individual, does the individual serve the collective, like fascism versus individualism, say, or something like that. Those are later questions; we’ll get to them later. Okay, so first of all I want to talk about the quantitative relation versus the ontic one. Ontic — ontology is the theory of being. When I talk about the ontic relation, I mean entity: that there is a collective entity that is not merely the sum of the particular entities that populate it. We’ll get to that later. First I want to show a few things that always challenge the metaphysical definition. Because the metaphysical definition is something many people are very used to, but it’s not at all simple. In fact, many of the phenomena can be explained without it too, including phenomena that are brought as evidence for it. Let me give you an example. The Talmud in Bava Kamma talks about a glowing coal of metal in the public domain. And the Gemara says that you can extinguish it on the Sabbath, because there is danger. But if it is in the private domain, then no. You can get burned, you can get scalded — that’s a matter of saving life — so in the private domain, no; in the public domain, yes. A lot of modern writers see this as a cornerstone of public halakhic thinking, something that doesn’t really exist in the history of Jewish law, because the Jewish law as we know it was formulated mainly in a period when we were in exile. So most of the discussions relate to individuals or to a collection of individuals who are partners perhaps, but there is no public conception, no conception of a state, of a society that has to conduct itself, and that introduces additional dimensions into the issue. And those dimensions are very hard to distill or to find sources for, from which one can build a halakhic conception relevant for today. So everybody pounces, as though finding great treasure, on the glowing coal of metal in the public domain. Because, after all, the public allows desecrating the Sabbath in a place where the needs of an individual do not allow desecrating the Sabbath. Which is true, by the way, in many contexts, and we’ll see contexts where I think they really do mean what people claim they mean. But here, it seems to me, that’s not correct. Because here what seems to be at work is the quantitative relation.
[Speaker D] Isn’t it? If you have a village of a hundred people, and in all hundred courtyards there is one coal, then the probability is — you don’t extinguish it. But one coal in a place that belongs to a hundred people — then you need to extinguish it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, obviously — first of all because there you have to extinguish a hundred coals and not one. But beyond that, beyond that — with a coal in the private domain it’s also clearly easier to be careful, not only because the chance is smaller. It’s easier to be careful because it’s your courtyard, you know who is there, nobody is wandering around there except you, and you know what goes on in your courtyard, so why extinguish it? No, it’s not because of individual versus public. Not because the public is something beyond a thousand individuals. Obviously in a public there are many individuals — the quantitative relation certainly exists. But the question is whether there is only the quantitative relation, or whether there is also something beyond that, what I called before the ontic relation. So I’m saying that from here you cannot extract an ontic relation; you can’t prove an ontic relation. Here it may be that what is being talked about is only quantity. Let me maybe give you another example. A student of mine
[Speaker D] once asked me — but if there are three people in a village, or in a public domain, in a place shared by three people,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, you know, there are always gray boundaries, so you can’t — where exactly the line passes, I don’t know. I have no idea. I’m not sure. It could be that they would be defined as partners. Quite simply, they’d be defined as partners in the area perhaps. Doesn’t matter. But at the conceptual level, in the end, always — what?
[Speaker E] You could also ask about an area not in a village. Like I find, I see some coal somewhere…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter, but a public passes there, or people pass there.
[Speaker E] But if it’s a place that people rarely come to,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then maybe it really would be forbidden to extinguish it. Who says not? “Public domain” means a place where many people pass through. In other words, it’s not just public domain in the sense that it doesn’t belong to one person. There’s also a physical definition here. A student of mine once wrote an article about public transportation. Not on the Sabbath — in general. He said that one should abolish — forbid driving private cars because of road accidents and things like that, and require everyone to use public transportation and so on. In the course of the article — do buses have more accidents?
[Speaker E] What? Do buses have more accidents? No, not simple, I don’t know.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe common sense — obviously there are more casualties for sure. I checked it. I mean, there are more accidents because there are private cars, but if there were no private cars,
[Speaker D] just no private cars,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] no private cars, only buses. Yes, maybe it would be like that. In any case it doesn’t matter, it’s not important either way; let’s say that isn’t true, but that’s the claim. So the question is — in the course of the discussion he brought me some ruling of Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu. We had spoken a little about these topics, and then an army officer came to him. The army regulation was that only an officer unloads a weapon after a shift, or you have to go to an officer. Now the officer also has to turn on a flashlight at night; it’s not enough just to put your finger in. The regulations changed — doesn’t matter — at some point a regulation came out, and as always that happens after the latest accident, the regulations change, so it was forbidden to insert a finger or something like that or to look; you have to turn on a flashlight. Okay. So he came to Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu and asked him whether on the Sabbath he may unload a weapon and turn on a flashlight for that purpose if he is the duty officer or something like that. So Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu told him yes, it is permitted. Now the risk in such a thing is of course negligible. The chance is zero. I mean, how often does it happen that you missed something because you didn’t turn on a flashlight? I wouldn’t permit anyone to desecrate the Sabbath because of such a tiny risk. But obviously if someone came and asked me privately, I would say: forget it, don’t turn on a flashlight, do I don’t know what, check well, put your finger in properly or something like that, but don’t turn on a flashlight. But when Rabbi Eliyahu issues a halakhic ruling, his assumption is that he is addressing a broad public. Yes, a public figure. Once you address a broad public, then it is no longer a question of public and individual, but simply of how many individuals. If we say that the risk here is, I don’t know, one in a thousand — I’m just throwing out a number — the risk of such an accidental discharge, or danger to life, is one in a thousand, one in ten thousand, whatever. For the private individual, a one in a thousand chance does not justify desecrating the Sabbath. But if you have a thousand officers unloading weapons, then one of them — one of the weapons — will fire. In other words, this is exactly the expression of the point that this is not the difference between public and individual, but simply how many individuals you’re talking about. That is, it’s a quantitative relation, not an ontic one. There’s no — now, also with the glowing coal of metal,
[Speaker D] ostensibly, if it were a hundred coals they would say you do desecrate? What? If it were a hundred coals
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and there were no difference — and there were no difference, say, in the level of caution a person can exercise in his own courtyard, like what I told you before — then maybe yes.
[Speaker D] That law was ruled because in his own courtyard a person is more careful; he knows, he’s familiar.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which is why I’m saying that a hundred coals is not the same thing as one coal in a place where a hundred people pass.
[Speaker D] That’s exactly the difference between a public.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not at all. It’s a technical matter. A matter — doesn’t matter — but it’s technical. Here you can be careful and no accident will happen, and there an accident will happen. But it’s not a question of the public being some different entity for whose sake one does all kinds of things. If a single individual were in the same danger level as the public, it would also be permitted. It’s only that with an individual there simply isn’t such a danger. That’s what I’m talking about. Right. So in examples of this kind, what we’re talking about is simply the quantitative relation. And by the way that is significant. You have to be aware that when you speak to the public, you need to take into account that you are speaking to many more people, and we don’t always notice that when speaking to the public and speaking to an individual, maybe one has to be a bit more careful. Another example perhaps: incitement. Right. So when you incite a private individual, then: “the words of the master and the words of the student — whose words should one obey?” In other words, in principle there is no responsibility on the inciter.
[Speaker E] “One does not plead in favor of an inciter,” and things like that. What do you mean no responsibility on the inciter? Why doesn’t that remove responsibility from the incited person, but…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he isn’t punished either. He isn’t punished either. In the case of one who incites to idolatry, that’s a special case — one does not plead in his favor, and they derive it somehow from the serpent, doesn’t matter. Incitement to a transgression is nothing from the halakhic standpoint. Nothing.
[Speaker E] From the standpoint of punishment by a religious court; from the standpoint of the laws of Heaven obviously.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Does the Holy One, blessed be He, view it seriously? I assume yes. “Do not place a stumbling block” — no? What? “Do not place a stumbling block”? “Do not place a stumbling block” depends if he
[Speaker E] can
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] commit the transgression without you — then why is that “do not place a stumbling block”? Not at all.
[Speaker B] No, “do not place a stumbling block” — even if he knows it’s forbidden.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter. If he would have done it without you, then there is no “do not place a stumbling block.”
[Speaker B] No, and he knows it’s forbidden.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Two sides of the river.
[Speaker B] But you also need both — he also has to know that it’s forbidden.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the example is someone who takes — sends false witnesses to testify, right? Aside from the case of a man who slanders his wife, where there is a fine. He pays a fine of one hundred silver pieces. By the way, he is threatening his wife’s life. When witnesses come and say that she committed adultery under him, then she is liable to death. Okay? What happens? The witnesses who are proven false are killed, because they are conspiring witnesses: “you shall do to him as he conspired to do to his brother.” The one who took them — the husband — pays a fine, one hundred silver pieces. But that too is a special case. It applies only in the case of slanderous accusation. In other words, if now someone were to take false witnesses for, I don’t know, to extract money or something like that — nothing. Nothing at all. The witnesses are punished under “as he conspired,” and he gets nothing. Why? “The words of the master and the words of the student — whose words should one obey?” These are adults, they know it is forbidden, assuming they act intentionally of course, they know it is forbidden, everything — the responsibility is on them. They should know what they are doing. What does it have to do with what I told them?
[Speaker E] But according to that, say, a mafia boss or something like that — so he has no responsibility at all?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He has no responsibility at all, certainly not. No responsibility. In Jewish law. Also, one who hires false witnesses to testify is exempt in human law and liable in the hands of Heaven — there too there is some one exceptional case. But again only in the hands of Heaven; in human law there is no such thing. In any case, and again apparently only if he hires them, meaning he pays them. If he merely incites them or tells them, nothing. Why? The reasoning is straightforward. A person has responsibility. You do something, you can’t say: he incited me. What do you mean he incited me? You’re an adult, you know it’s forbidden, you did it? That’s your business. You did it. Don’t tell stories about what he did.
[Speaker C] And if it’s a relationship of authority? What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, in Jewish law I’m not familiar with such a distinction, but perhaps there is room to discuss that maybe under a relationship of authority it’s different, when you have some possibility of forcing him. A kind of semi-coercion. Yes, that’s why I said: if you coerce him, then that’s something else.
[Speaker B] Right.
[Speaker D] Maybe an army order?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, coercion — there it is already a different discussion. And you did it. Now, when you look at this in the public sense — when someone doesn’t incite one individual, doesn’t say to him “go desecrate the Sabbath” or “steal” or do something, but on the public plane — he’s on Facebook or I don’t know, speaking from a platform, giving an inciting speech. Now, in Jewish law I’m still not familiar with liability for such a thing, but clearly from the moral perspective it’s different. From the moral perspective, in my view, someone who incites — it’s nothing, even morally no, not only legally. What do I mean nothing? I’m exaggerating — not nothing, but I mean it’s not that significant. Fine, of course one shouldn’t do it, because there are also idiots who will indeed be incited, but okay, that’s at the margins. But when you incite a public, just like the glowing coal of metal, when you incite a public, okay, there will be one idiot out of a thousand who will in fact be persuaded, right? When you speak to one person, that’s a small chance, so okay, the responsibility is on him. And what about manipulation too?
[Speaker E] What? Even when you speak to one person it depends on the situation. If you just say something casually to someone then maybe the chance is small, but in many situations — like the things the Rabbi mentioned before, meaning someone who hires false witnesses to testify.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, hiring is something else because he pays. It’s a bit parallel to a relationship of authority because you…
[Speaker E] And even if you don’t pay but you know that you have influence over that person.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What influence? No influence at all. I took false witnesses, asked them a favor to testify falsely for me because I want to profit from something.
[Speaker E] Well, if you know that it matters to them to do what you say, then clearly they… then clearly at least morally there is guilt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, there is responsibility. I said — not that it’s nothing. At first I said it’s nothing, but I said that was hyperbole. Not nothing. The responsibility is on them — they are adults who decided to be criminals. What I did here is not relevant. Not relevant? Not relevant to their responsibility; relevant to you. No, not relevant to me either. They are adults. The Taz and the Sma, the Sma and Rabbi Akiva Eiger, dispute what this means: “the words of the master and the words of the student — whose words should one obey?” In other words, yes, that there is no agency for a transgression. Why? Because “the words of the master and the words of the student — whose words should one obey?” I don’t remember who says what, but one of them says that the sender has a claim: I thought he wouldn’t listen to me. Because “the words of the master and the words of the student — whose words should one obey?” I tell him one thing, but he knows that the Holy One, blessed be He, says something else, so he should have obeyed Him, so I didn’t think at all that he would obey me. Well, that seems a bit disingenuous to me. But what’s the second view? The second view of course says: doesn’t matter — even if I thought he would obey me, okay,
[Speaker E] and he decided to obey me, he’s an adult, he reached the age of responsibility — except in the case of one who sends a deaf-mute, an incompetent, or a minor, that’s a bit different; there too it’s only indirect causation and he is liable only in the hands of Heaven. But when you send an adult, the responsibility is on him. He decided to commit a transgression — what difference does it make what I did? But if that’s the argument, then what’s the difference with a public? Because in a public too all the people are adults; the assumption is they’re adults and sane.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, wait. Now I’m saying — now I’m getting there. Now, part of the point is, I think, that it really does depend somewhat on the probabilities. In the end, a person who is committed to Torah and commandments will not listen to you in most cases. And therefore they really distinguish if he is acting unintentionally. Yes, there is at least one view in Tosafot — it depends on a dispute among the medieval authorities. Okay, so there is agency for a transgression in such situations, because then there really is more chance that… what do you mean more chance? It’s even likely that he will do it. So that does seem like the first view you mentioned: that the exemption is because he thinks they won’t
[Speaker E] listen to him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean he thinks they won’t listen to him? Even if he thinks they will listen to him — what do you mean thinks? He’s trying to get them to listen to him.
[Speaker E] He’s trying to get them to listen to him, but the chance… he knows the chance is low.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s not the same thing. “Thinks they won’t listen to him” means I didn’t say it seriously. I’m talking about someone who is trying to get them to listen to him, but in most cases it won’t happen. He is trying. If he tries with a thousand people, like a thousand courtyards, then if the chance is one in a thousand, one of them will listen to him. Inciting a public is different from inciting an individual, just on the most basic level in the world. Obviously inciting a public is different from inciting an individual.
[Speaker B] Again, that’s quantitatively.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, and that’s it. Not essentially. Obviously. I want to bring this as another example of a relation that is only quantitative. It’s not because the public has some different law or something like that. There are a thousand individuals here. Facebook, for example — Facebook does not address a public; it addresses a collection of individuals at a computer, each one in his own house reading Facebook, or on… I’m already outdated… on his phone, doesn’t matter. Mobile. “Phone” is already outdated too. So it’s a collection of individuals; it’s not a public in the ontic sense. It’s not that now there is some organism or collective entity here. You’re simply speaking to many individuals, that’s all. And when you speak to many individuals, know that you run into all kinds of people. Of course among them there can also be people who lack understanding, and then you’re simply guilty, because when a person lacks understanding, or is a minor, and you incite him, then he is your extended arm; he has no independent judgment.
[Speaker C] Setting
[Speaker D] a dog on someone.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Huh? Yes, exactly — setting a dog on someone, or something like that.
[Speaker C] And with a thousand people there’s also the element that they heat each other up. Meaning, when they’re together.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When they’re together. But if it’s on Facebook, where each person is at his own computer… So you’re saying they heat each other up through Facebook. In the virtual world. Or just they hear the speech, come out of there
[Speaker B] and start talking to each other. Yes, there’s emotional warming and then things start happening between them.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but again, that still isn’t the ontic dimension. You’re simply saying: okay, then the probability that something will happen is even greater. It’s not multiplied by a thousand; it’s multiplied by ten thousand. Fine, there’s some upgrade through interaction.
[Speaker D] The dimension of a public is self-perpetuating — it heats itself up.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, which is why I’m saying — but that is not the ontic dimension of the public. It’s not that the public is another entity for which there are different laws. Rather, what is it? Simply that in a public the chance that something will happen is greater. He says the chance is not only… no, he says that — he says the chance is greater because
[Speaker D] two half-influenced people will produce one fully influenced person. No, no.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I hear you. But that still only affects the fact that the probability is greater. Only the probability is greater, not by a thousand because there are a thousand people, but by ten thousand, because there is also some mutual ignition. Fine, but in the end what there is in a public is still only a greater chance that what is less likely to happen with an individual will happen.
[Speaker D] It depends on the size of the public. Doesn’t matter.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More than the size — the public dimension. No, and that still is not, no. That’s the point. That still is not the ontic dimension of the public. No — it’s only a quantitative relation, only a quantitative relation, except that the quantitative relation is not linear. When you multiply it by a thousand, it goes up by a thousand squared, not by a thousand, or by a thousand to a power greater than one, whatever. Fine. So it is still a quantitative relation; it doesn’t matter. The only question is by what mechanisms and by how much, and obviously it can be more.
[Speaker D] Isn’t that enough to call it a public? That it’s different? Like when people pray — ten people praying, then one affects the other a bit more than if he prays alone, ten people in ten separate rooms.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You already understand this: you translate the ontic concept into that translation. And the question I’m asking is exactly whether there is anything more besides that. That’s precisely the question I’m asking. Right now you’re assuming there isn’t. That’s the question I’m putting here up for discussion. Because I’m saying all these things in order to rule something out. Meaning, to ask whether there is anything more besides that, because all of this we all already know; these are simple things. But there are no metaphysical innovations here, no philosophical innovations, that there is some kind of collective entity beyond the individuals. Okay? So here it already becomes a question… here I’m saying all this in order to sharpen the question. My question is whether that’s all, or whether there is something more in the collective. A dimension of a collective…
[Speaker B] No, clearly there is. Rabbi Soloveitchik’s article about a joint offering… about repentance.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] About repentance he writes that there.
[Speaker B] The Passover offering—it could be that all the Jewish people are partners, but it’s still a joint offering, as opposed to a communal offering. Yes, right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’ll get to those examples, but for now I’m just posing the question. Maybe I’ll give another… another aspect that will already move us one step further. There is…
[Speaker E] Wait, so then according to that you’d need to forbid everyone and stop everyone separately if it were possible? What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what he argued. I’m not connected to him; I’m just describing the context in which this was said.
[Speaker E] According to the logic the Rabbi presented, meaning…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, the logic? According to the logic I presented, then… there’s a greater chance that everyone is traveling by private car. Now decide whether such a probability, that sort of probability, justifies forbidding travel by private car. I think that’s not realistic, it’s not…
[Speaker E] a hypothetical
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] question. Obviously it’s…
[Speaker D] No, I think there was a technical possibility to carry it out.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t know, it places a very heavy burden…
[Speaker D] on life, and seemingly according to the Gezer method they do that, no? They give a special route. Yes, in a minor way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s burdensome, very burdensome on life, and the burden on life is always something we weigh against life-saving concerns. It’s not automatic that, okay, if it’s life-saving then it overrides everything. We spoke once, I think, about budget allocation, yes, allocation of the state budget. Okay? So there are things that aren’t included in the health basket, and some of them involve saving lives. Okay? And still the state doesn’t provide that money. There’s a certain health basket and that’s it; it doesn’t give more. Now there’s money that goes to things that are very far, in level of value and intensity of importance, from saving lives. Why? Culture, sports, yeshivot—let everyone mention here whatever he doesn’t like. Usually people mention what they don’t like, but even what they do like is less important than saving lives. Okay? So why not first finish solving the life-saving issues and only then deal with the other things? A collective doesn’t behave that way. By the way, here I may already be speaking a bit about a collective, though maybe I misspoke because it’s too early. But that’s not how we conduct ourselves.
[Speaker B] Not only a collective—even an individual doesn’t behave like that. It could be. That’s why you work in construction and you’re a concrete worker. The probability that you’ll be injured is much higher than if you sat and wrote an article.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, though maybe he can’t write an article, so he has no choice, he has to…
[Speaker B] work as a concrete worker.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he doesn’t eat, he’ll die too.
[Speaker B] That’s life-saving.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he doesn’t eat, he’ll die too. Fine, but true, obviously, that’s true in an individual life too.
[Speaker B] Still, I don’t know anyone who didn’t work and died today.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, not only that—there’s also how we divide our time. Even our division of time—all this is just a parenthesis in response to that question, it’s not directly connected to our discussion—but in the way we divide our time, we don’t always deal with the things that are most important in our eyes. Each person according to what matters to him, doesn’t matter. We don’t always deal with that. Now, many times there’s some feeling of, okay, well, there’s no choice, you have to compromise. I think that’s not what’s happening here; this is simply healthy life. This is the right way to act. Not because there’s no choice and you have to compromise with the world. No—not compromise, but life: you have to live. Meaning, take for example that hysteria around wasting Torah study that there always is in yeshivot or kollels, where there’s always this sort of every moment and this and that. Yes, maybe with talks too. A kollel during vacation time and a kollel before morning and a night kollel and one here and one there. It’s nice; I’m not trying to mock it. But I’m saying the hysteria at the base of it is that basically if you’re not doing this, then it’s wasting Torah study. And I say no. I want to read a book in the evening. Just because I feel like it—not Maimonides, a book, yes, a good book—or go to a movie. I don’t know exactly what. What, is that forbidden? Is that wasting Torah study? Of course not. Not only I say that; many halakhic decisors say so too. You’ll study Torah better afterward. Ah yes, those are the excuses I don’t want to get to. The ones who explain to you, yes, I’m going on vacation in Switzerland so that afterward I can study more Torah. Fine, that’s nonsense. Why? To a certain extent. To a certain extent, yes, but that’s not what stands behind the matter. Meaning, people aren’t willing to accept this complexity that says: true, Torah study is the most important thing, I’m not denying that. Okay, but still, you also have to live. A person lives, wants to get a little air, wants to live. True, I’ll study no less well afterward too. I’ll make the effort, and I’ll study no less well afterward too. Fine—but right now I feel like reading a book, so what, that’s forbidden? I want to live like a human being in a normal way. By the way, later authorities write this. There are later authorities who discuss a contradiction between two passages in Berakhot and Menachot where Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai and Rabbi Yishmael switch positions from one extreme to the other, and later authorities write there exactly this: if so, many acted that way and did not succeed.
[Speaker B] Yes, many acted that way and did not succeed, and so on.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is reciting Shema morning and evening enough, or is it that many acted that way and did not succeed? And they say that overall—some of them say—that the commandment of Torah study means to study at the times when you can. “Can” does not mean every moment that is not a life-saving emergency, but rather at the times that a normal person can devote to Torah study. And if you want a little air, and to take a walk or go to a movie or just go—do it, no problem.
[Speaker E] Meaning there isn’t only… I thought it was either the opinion of Shema morning and evening, or at the very least every single moment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. On the contrary—they combine it. It can’t be; that’s exactly the point, that it can’t be either this or that. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai says one thing in one place and the other in another place. And Rabbi Yishmael too, same thing—both of them. So you have to explain some intermediate model here that somehow combines them. Meaning, the obligation is day and night. That’s the obligation. But what is the obligation? The obligation is not to study day and night, but that day and night you are supposed to be engaged in Torah study. But what does it mean to be engaged in Torah study? During the times when you can engage in Torah study, while at the same time doing other things. No problem. The obligation is day and night. It’s like the obligation to sit in the sukkah, which is also day and night. But in the end, when does that come into expression? When I eat or when I sleep. If I eat and sleep all day and all night, I really would have to be in the sukkah all the time, because the obligation is day and night. But the normal way to live is that I’m not always eating and sleeping. So now I want to go for a walk—I’m not eating and I’m not sleeping—what, am I obligated to be in the sukkah? Of course not. I want to go for a walk now. Okay, if I sleep or eat, I have to do that in the sukkah, but that doesn’t mean the obligation is not constant, every single moment. Rather, that’s how one actualizes the… By the way, that’s what Kehillot Yaakov says. He has a very nice section about this in Sukkah, section 15, where he really defines this thing. It’s called dwelling in the sukkah day and night. Dwelling in the sukkah day and night means that everything for which you need a house, you do in the sukkah. And if you need a house day and night, then you’ll be in the sukkah day and night. If you didn’t need a house day and night, then no problem, then not. Torah study too is an obligation day and night—“and you shall meditate upon it day and night.” True. But how is that realized? That all the time I’m aware that this is what I’m supposed to do, and I devote time to it as much as I can, while also doing other things when I need to or when I want to. There’s nothing wrong with that at all; that’s perfectly fine. That’s being normal. Someone who wants—I don’t know—to go beyond the line and be something special, fine, I’m not saying that’s invalid. But he needs to know that it isn’t obligatory. If that’s how you’re built and you really see a holy goal in it, or in growing far beyond what a person who does this in the normal way grows into, then true, that requires some kind of crazy devotion. But fine, if people do that, I’m grateful to them for doing it, because I think they contribute a great deal to society, at least to religious society and society in general. But that doesn’t mean it is an obligation for everyone. Each person chooses his own path. Why did I say all this? Because of the question of life-saving concerns, right? That there are things that… yes, with the buses exactly. True, it’s life-saving, but once something is life-saving it doesn’t mean the whole world snaps to attention. There are risks that we take for the sake of normal life, for living like a reasonable human being. Like Rabbi Shlomo Zalman writes in a responsum about smoking, I think he writes this, if I remember correctly. He says, look, okay, things that after people already knew they weren’t healthy—before they knew, fine, they didn’t know. But after they already knew it wasn’t healthy, then he says: true, but people aren’t concerned about it, so it’s okay. “The Lord protects the simple,” there are all kinds of expressions, doesn’t matter—that’s all excuses. It’s either “the Lord protects the simple” or nothing. Rather, if this is a normal way for people to live, then this is a normal way for people to live. You can’t tell me, this is life-saving. The normal way people live today is to drive a car. Fine, true, does that involve risk? Of course. Okay, but that’s the normal way we live. The Torah was not given to ministering angels, and one does not need to live in a cave in the desert. Even though there no one will speak malicious gossip to you, and you’ll be a perfect righteous person if you live in a cave in the desert. Fine—but a person lives the way a normal person lives. And within that framework you should try to do what needs to be done and not do what shouldn’t be done. But that doesn’t mean that the Torah is an alternative to life—as opposed to certain Haredi conceptions. The Torah is supposed to tell me what to do or not do within life itself, not provide alternatives for how to be somewhere instead of life. Yes, as if life itself is… basically the evil inclination. As if the whole world was really created only as an evil inclination so that you won’t do this and won’t do that and won’t do this, but rather…
[Speaker E] But what you’re talking about here isn’t all of life—it’s like… you’re already taking it to the level of the way it’s accepted to live at a specific point in time today.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I’m talking about the present time. Obviously this changes, and a hundred years ago it was different, and in another hundred years it will be different; in another year it’ll be different.
[Speaker E] No, that’s not life itself, it’s like how it’s accepted today to live.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that’s what I’m talking about. That is life. Life not in the sense of breathing. On the contrary, life in the sense of living, like in slang. To say: what is living? Living is doing the things that a normal person does. That’s called living. And that’s perfectly fine; that’s what one should do. Usually that’s the halakhic rule. What a normal person does is okay. That’s the halakhic presumption. Now, I’m not saying it’s always true, but that’s the basic rule. Anyone who says otherwise bears the burden of proof. And you have to understand, this is a view that many people don’t see this way, but there’s a lot of evidence that this is a clear thing in my eyes. Okay, so fine, I’m closing the parenthesis. That was just a side remark on this issue. Maybe I’ll bring another example that will move us to the next step. So far I’ve really presented, you could say, two models: the quantitative model and the ontic model. And until now I’ve defined only the quantitative model, okay? And I’m building it all the way through to see whether it is enough to explain all the phenomena for me, and then I won’t need to reach metaphysical assumptions. Or not—maybe there will be assumptions that cannot be explained only by quantity. Okay? So there’s a certain argument, a proof for the existence of God, a philosophical argument for the existence of God—I’m using it only as an example, I’m not getting into all kinds of debates now—but what Kant called the cosmological proof. The cosmological proof. This is a proof based on the following argument: everything that exists needs someone who created it. And if the world exists—it doesn’t matter, the reality around us exists, I exist; if you want Descartes, “I think, therefore I am”—I reached the conclusion that something exists, so something created it. And since something… and I call that something God, that is the proof for the existence of God, okay? There are of course all kinds of objections to this proof. This formulation obviously doesn’t hold water; the obvious objection is: and who created Him? If everything that exists needs someone to create it, then the Holy One, blessed be He, also exists, so who created Him? Clearly the case has to be fixed, so I say okay, what do you propose? Then someone also created Him. Fine, so he is God. Fine, and who created him? Turtles all the way down, yes? From infinity, so what do you propose, what’s your alternative? The objector’s alternative is infinite regress. Infinite regress is a fallacy. Why is it a fallacy? We’ve discussed this in the past, I won’t get into it again. Infinite regress is a fallacy; in my opinion it’s considered a fallacy because infinite regress doesn’t provide an answer but evades providing an answer. It looks like an answer, but in truth it’s just evading giving an answer, because it requires an actual infinity, not a potential one. When you speak about an infinite chain of causes, you’re basically saying there are infinitely many links in the chain, and that’s the reason I’m offering you, that’s the model I suggested to you. There is no such thing as infinity—infinity is a potential concept, not a concept you can speak about as something actual.
[Speaker E] In mathematics it’s an actual infinity.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I’m talking about the world we know. I’ll get to that in a moment. Again, I don’t want to argue about the proof; that’s not my topic. I want to use it to demonstrate something else. Okay, so what do you do to stop the infinite regress? You have to return to one of the starting points. Clearly there must be things that do not need someone else to create them. Now on the other hand, the things I know from my experience, the things around me, are not like that—they are things that were indeed created in one way or another.
[Speaker D] It’s obvious to us that someone created them? What do you mean it’s obvious to us?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I never saw someone create a sea, but the sea is nothing more than what I know around me; it’s ultimately just matter with mass—water or something like that. I know other materials around me. The sea has simply existed long enough that I didn’t see who created it, but I always infer conclusions from examples I know to cases I don’t know.
[Speaker D] But objects of that kind—of all the water in nature—I’ve never seen who created them either.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So you’re saying that water is exactly a kind of thing that nobody created? What is special about water?
[Speaker D] There’s a water cycle; the same water is there all the time. We haven’t seen where it begins.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait a second, I’ll get to that in a moment, I’ll get to it in a moment. Fine, it’s not only water; it’s true also of solid matter, and with solid matter it’s the same thing—nothing disappears. No, wait a second, I’ll get to that in a moment. So basically the claim is that if the things around me are things that do not exist unless someone created them, then now I correct the wording of the argument and say: I’m not saying everything that exists needs someone to create it, but rather every thing that belongs to the kind of things about which I have experience is something that was apparently created by someone else. Now I say: there are objects like that around me, including myself, so apparently someone created me. Okay, who is that someone? God. Okay, and if it’s not God, maybe He too is an object of that type that needs someone else to create Him? Fine, we’ll go one step further, but at some point it has to stop—and that’s how you stop the infinite regress. Okay, that’s the claim. Now of course another objection can come to this corrected argument, another objection somewhat similar—or I don’t know whether it’s exactly the same kind of argument as what you raised—and it basically says this: every object we know really was created by something or someone, but in the end there is some kind of cycle in nature. Meaning, the universe as a whole always existed; the objects that populate it change form because they break down and are reassembled in processes that involve factors that create new objects, whether human factors or natural factors, doesn’t matter. But every thing that is created has some cause that created it. But those are all explanations on the micro level. Ultimately the macro level always existed—the Aristotelian claim of the eternity of the world. Fine, and of course with the Big Bang that may perhaps be problematic. Again, I’m intentionally not getting into the philosophical argument; what matters to me is to demonstrate something. There are those who formulate this argument of Aristotle, the eternity of the world, not as an argument about the eternity of the objects in the world, as Aristotle perhaps thought—maybe he thought that, I’m not sure—but rather the eternity of the whole. Here we’re getting a bit closer to the question of the whole versus the parts. He says: the whole is eternal, and all the individual things within it are constantly changing. Fine, but the whole is an eternal whole. But then that basically means that the collection of entities that exist in the world—for each one of them, all of them have some property that they do not come into being unless someone created them, but the whole is exempt from that requirement, or from that characteristic. Okay? And then there arises the question—or basically there arises Spinoza’s suggestion of pantheism, which says: okay, then basically the God you’re talking about is the whole itself. The whole is basically God. No, there isn’t another entity beyond the collection of beings I know; rather, the whole is God. Yes, instead of saying at the end of Yom Kippur “The Lord is God,” say “the whole is God.” Okay? The whole is God. So what do we say? How are we to relate to such a pantheistic claim? That too is basically a proof for the existence of God. I proved the existence of something eternal. True, that thing is the whole, not these particulars, but that too is some kind of something. But it seems to me that Spinoza—I think, at least—is not talking about that. He’s not talking about something other than the particulars; rather, the collection of particulars is the whole. There’s nothing more here. That’s what I spoke about earlier as the quantitative relation. The collection of particulars is the whole. But if that’s really so, then that claim is problematic. Because why shouldn’t the collection of particulars have the property that each one of the particulars has? After all, each one of the particulars does not come into existence unless someone created it. So what does it mean that this whole exists even without anyone creating it? The whole is nothing but the collection of particulars. What is there in the whole beyond the collection of particulars? Okay, that is basically the question. Did you want to comment?
[Speaker E] Why are you talking about the whole and not about the components?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The components too are the same in my eyes. The components too are composite. In the end, this whole business—every little thing like that, I would apply my test to it, that it needs to come into being.
[Speaker E] Why can’t you talk about something on the level of a very up-to-date scientific perspective, or on the level of the simple perspective?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A simple perspective? A philosophical perspective…
[Speaker E] A simple one, like Yossi said, on the level of, say, molecules?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They evaporate and switch around, and afterward the oxygen molecule or the hydrogen there—you can split it and it’ll simply stop being oxygen and hydrogen altogether. You can get all the way down to quarks; I don’t know how far, in scientific terms. But I am talking in scientific terms.
[Speaker E] Not that some rare thing happens and it breaks into something else. You could say in the normal case, things are regular.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, and still, it doesn’t matter, because in the end this entire whole either was created by someone or it itself is eternal. But why assume that this thing is eternal? It is nothing but the collection of particulars that compose it, if you assume it is only the collection of particulars. If you adopt the quantitative model, that all there is here is just many particulars, yes? Then what can you say about many particulars that is different from what is true of each of the particulars separately?
[Speaker E] No, but I see that here there are particulars, many particulars, that are constantly breaking down and reassembling, breaking down and arranging themselves in many different ways.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there is nothing different in the building blocks that make up the particulars, as opposed to the particulars themselves. It’s only more complex. So about the building block itself too I would ask: where did it come from?
[Speaker E] But that seems to me like a conclusion—why? Is it something different? Is it a different essence? This is an element and that is an assembly?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so what? What difference does that make? The element too is something. Someone made it. It too is composite in the philosophical view. What, are you assuming there is some element that is not composed of anything? A basic atom? At the moment nothing like that is known, and I don’t see why one should assume such a thing. I don’t think people think quarks are the end of the road.
[Speaker E] Even so, one could assume there is such a thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the end there’s nothing there. We know there are strings—or we don’t know, but that’s what people think. There are all kinds of strings and abstract fields. Fine then—those abstract fields?
[Speaker E] No, the abstract fields…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Those are exactly it—that’s nothing, that’s not… those are things that change too. There’s nothing here that really is an anchor that you can say always exists.
[Speaker E] Every thing—energy exists, or something like that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Energy is our abstraction. That’s exactly what I’m saying. In the end you get to abstractions in order to say this. So I’ll get to those abstractions in a moment. But first I’m looking at the simple, ordinary-person perspective. The simple, ordinary-person perspective says that the whole is nothing but the collection of components—what Spinoza is talking about. So how can you say that this is God? Meaning, to say that God is just the sum total of all of us is basically to be an atheist, not to be a pantheist. You’re calling it by another name, but you haven’t said anything beyond that. Okay? I never understood pantheism. It’s just atheism. It’s the same thing. It’s the collection of particulars; there’s nothing here beyond the collection of particulars. It’s a quantitative difference, but there’s nothing beyond that. There isn’t a different metaphysics here. Okay? So therefore I’m again trying to sharpen the meaning of the quantitative perspective. The quantitative perspective basically says: there is nothing besides individual entities, specific entities. Everything else is just their assemblies, and that’s all. So all wholes—the human body, whatever it may be—are nothing but a collection of cells, or molecules, or whatever, even smaller things. Smaller, it doesn’t matter, but it’s a collection of small components. There is no… yes, when we look at the human body, there too after all there’s the parable of the Ship of Theseus, if you know it—the Ship of Theseus, yes, a famous and ancient philosophical parable. Someone sails on the ship, it breaks in a storm. Someone starts repairing the ship, so he removes the broken planks and puts new planks in their place. Then there’s another storm and more planks break, and those planks are replaced too. In the end you reach a point where we have replaced all the planks. Nothing remains of the original ship. Is it still the ship of Theseus? It may be that the new one is also a ship of Theseus, but leave that aside—Theseus is already dead. So I’m talking about that ship: is it still the same ship that was there? Not whether it still belongs to Theseus, yes? But whether this is still the same ship. Or with respect to human beings—this is always the sort of thing in Bnei Akiva activities, yes? You go, you arrive at some Indian monastery or whatever—in our circles I think that’s how they used to present it. And then they tell you, okay, they remove your hand and put in another hand. Then they remove your head and put in another head. They copied all your memory, copied the memory and everything is fine, it’s the same thing, they reconstruct everything. Are you still the same person? Fine, that’s the same question of course. If you don’t see a human being as anything beyond the collection of his molecules, down to the level of neurons and down to the level of—yes, the smallest thing—I reconstruct all the content. These are the thought experiments at the end of the book The Science of Freedom, where I suggest a few thought experiments there: that someone agrees to let me kill him, and afterward in the lab I synthesize him anew. I copy his brain exactly, I copy exactly his entire biochemical structure, everything the same. Fine? One to one, electron by electron. Fine? The question is whether you would agree. Fine? That’s the question. I assume most people, including the toughest materialists, would not agree. I already spoke with some of them, and they tried to find excuses and didn’t understand, but they did not agree. Whoever was straightforward told me: I don’t agree. No, I mean assuming I succeed—it doesn’t matter, it’s a thought experiment. But then he already has a new soul. What? Okay, so we’ve already reached souls. That means there is a soul. Exactly. So if you say the relation is only a quantitative relation, then these are the implications. Do you understand? I’m simply trying to show various implications in various directions. Collective entities are not only society; we too are a collective entity. We are a collective of cells. Okay? Those too are collective entities. And if you say there is nothing in the collective beyond the particulars that compose it, then there are no human beings either. There are cells that arranged themselves in a certain way.
[Speaker E] It doesn’t seem right to me to make an equal comparison between the collective of the people and the collective of the person.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In what sense an equal comparison?
[Speaker E] I mean, it doesn’t seem right to assume that if in the being of the human person there is something beyond the components of the body, then that means there is…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I still haven’t said there is. I’m not there yet. I’m not there yet. I still haven’t said there is—step by step. Maybe yes, maybe no; I’ll get there, so there’s no point in arguing about it already now. So the claim basically is that if the whole is a collection of particulars, then you can’t say anything about it that is not a result of your knowledge about the particulars. Now this brings us to a problem that again is somewhat connected to the book, to The Science of Freedom, to questions of mental phenomena and so on. How do materialists explain mental phenomena? Among them there are those who are either not sane, or simply such bad philosophers that it’s impossible to talk with them. And I happened to speak with a certain Yosef Neumann, a professor from Tel Aviv University—it turns out he read the book, he read the Evolution book. Then we spoke, and I hadn’t yet published The Science of Freedom, but we spoke about these topics. He’s a militant atheist, very combative. On websites he always appears; they quote him all the time. I think he’s even mentioned in the book. Connected to what? Biology, I think, something like that. So we exchanged a few emails at some point, because—I don’t even remember in what context, I think it was about the book. Then we started just talking about the issue of free choice. He says to me, listen, I don’t understand—my atheist materialist colleagues, there are those, and he too is an atheist materialist—he says they deny the existence of mental phenomena, because it can’t be, we… these are simply people who are not sane. But he says to me, my friends, professors—not fools, intelligent people, people who express themselves well. These are people who can be good professionals in their field, but their philosophical skill is simply scandalous. I mean, how is it possible…
[Speaker E] You’re basically saying they’re zombie-like people, that no soul entered them?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe they really are like that, you’re saying. Fine. In any case, let’s say this: you can be a materialist and intelligent—that’s possible. Even though in my opinion you’re mistaken, you can still be intelligent; being a materialist doesn’t mean you’re stupid. There are some who are also stupid; there are dualists who are stupid too. But I’m saying: how does a materialist who does not deny mental phenomena explain them? So here they recruit for their benefit the idea of emergence. What is emergence? Emergence is, well, something emerging. They say there are properties that emerge at the macroscopic level even though at the microscopic level they have no meaning. One of the first to argue this was John Searle. I think I once brought his argument about liquidity, or about states of matter in general, not specifically liquidity. But today this has become very popular; today this is basically more or less the view of almost all brain researchers, I think, at least nearly everyone I know. A view that in my opinion is absurd, but they do understand it. And basically, John Searle said this: he gave an example. He wanted to say that a mental phenomenon such as choice or free will—he was even willing to accept free will in a materialist world—he wanted to argue that free will is a collective phenomenon. Meaning, when you have a biological whole, some property appears, even though the particles that make up that whole live under completely deterministic laws. And he gave an example for this. He said, for example, the property of liquidity. None of the molecules that make up a liquid is itself liquid. Right? Because a single molecule cannot be liquid. Liquidity, or a state of matter in general, is a property of a cluster; it is not a property of a single molecule. The question is what the relation is between the molecules. Okay? Therefore he says liquidity is a property of water, of a cluster of H2O molecules, of water molecules. Does that mean there is something in water beyond the collection of molecules? That is the example he brings. No. Right? At least the accepted assumption in the scientific world is that there is nothing in water besides the collection of molecules. And the relations of interaction between them—what you said before, the interaction of mutual displacement—yes, that exists in water too. Fine, but that is still the quantitative relation. It is still within the quantitative model. Okay? And still we see that on the macroscopic level, in the whole, at the level of the whole, yes, suddenly properties appear that do not exist in the particulars. Meaning, the particulars are not characterized by the property of liquidity, but the whole has the property of liquidity. And then basically he says: if that’s so, then maybe the mental phenomena we know in ourselves too—even though true, it doesn’t fit for us with atoms or with individual molecules or even perhaps individual cells; cells already have some life phenomena, but not mental phenomena, I think—but when they form some whole, as water is a whole of molecules, then here too, in the whole that is built in the very specific way of an animal or a human being, mental phenomena are also created there. These are phenomena that appear at the macro level, and there is no need to assume that there is some other substance here—spirit, soul, or some other substance beyond the collection of molecules or cells that are there. Because there are properties that emerge at the level of the whole.
[Speaker B] Is that something that Sompolinsky… what? Is that what Sompolinsky thinks? Yes, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So now they distinguish even further. There are those who aren’t sufficiently intelligent—those who say this are already sane. I said, I classify materialists into… the materialist zoo is made up of the insane, the sane but stupid, the sane and smart but mistaken, and that’s it I think, that’s as far as this zoo goes—from my perspective, of course.
[Speaker B] There are those who say there are also some who are right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, true, but I don’t agree with them. But I said, this is my classification, because of course they classify us dualists the same way, fine. I hope at least that they also grant us the higher levels; not sure. Fine, in any case, the claim—when you ask Sompolinsky, say, about this issue, he says: strong emergence and weak emergence. What does that mean? Strong emergence is a situation in which you can explain the property of the whole in terms of the properties of the particulars, by some sort of summation or some manipulation of the properties of the particulars, and from that derive the whole. For example, in that sense Searle’s example is a very poor one, because regarding water specifically, we know exactly how to explain it from the particulars. Someone who knows the field around an H2O molecule knows that when you place two molecules next to one another there is a certain interaction between them, and if you place more molecules there will be some interaction, and we know that in a certain temperature range, or whatever is needed, you get water, and in one temperature range it is liquid and in another temperature range it is solid or gas or whatever. We have a full explanation of this in micro terms. A full explanation in micro terms. So automatically there is really no reason there to assume that at the macro level some additional entity appears beyond the collection of micro-creatures, since I know that the macroscopic property is not really macroscopic; it is an expression of a whole complex of microscopic properties, and it is simply convenient for us to speak in such terms. I once saw a book that… Statistical mechanics—statistical mechanics basically deals with these things. It basically sums up properties of particles or microscopic objects, for example temperature, pressure, density, and it basically creates from them certain properties that appear at the macro level, and it explains how this is created. And all these properties—temperature, pressure, density, or all kinds of things of that sort, temperatures of that sort—these are called intermediate concepts.
[Speaker B] The relation between the molecules doesn’t exist in the individual ones; it exists in the quantity. The relation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, when there are two molecules, there is one molecule and there’s a field around it. Give me that field, and I can give you all the properties of water, because I already know how to calculate from that what will happen when there’s another molecule, because it too has exactly the same field. So I already know what happens when there are two molecules or ten molecules or a million molecules—it makes no difference. Meaning, if you give me the data on a single molecule, from that I can calculate all the properties of water. In that sense, I don’t even need a second molecule. Of course I do it conceptually—I’ll think about what happens when there’s another molecule—but I need data on a single molecule. From that I derive everything. That’s the whole idea of statistical mechanics: you know how a single object behaves—that’s the physics we know of individual particles—and from that we produce the physics of aggregates of bodies, or large collections. So that’s weak emergence. It’s weak because nothing genuinely new really emerges from it. But he says, fine, we’re talking about strong emergence. Strong emergence is when a property appears that has no explanation in terms of the properties of the individual objects or the particles. Okay? And indeed, even then you still don’t have to assume there’s something beyond the individual objects, because something can emerge in the strong sense of emergence. And then you still don’t have to get to what the dualists say, that there’s something else—that there’s spirit or something like that. Now, that’s what I asked him too. Of course he doesn’t have it. He tries to bring examples, and every example he brings I’ll show you is weak emergence. And why? By definition that’s how it is. I know it in advance without hearing his examples. Why? Because one of two things must be the case—this is just a simple philosophical argument. If you have an explanation for how the macroscopic phenomenon can be calculated from the microscopic properties, then it’s weak emergence. If you don’t have an explanation, who told you it’s emergence? You claim it’s emergence, but if you have no explanation, how do you know? Maybe there really is something new here. Now, maybe not—I’m not saying there is—that’s one possibility. But you can’t claim there’s no reason to assume the existence of something extra because it’s strong emergence. There isn’t a single example in the world of strong emergence. There are examples of people assuming the existence of strong emergence. Fine, begging the question—I can do that too. The question is whether you’re actually making an argument. He assumes strong emergence and then says, well then, you don’t need to assume there’s anything else. Thank you very much. If you assume it, then you’re right. But who said so? Usually I think that if I can’t translate it or derive it from summaries of what’s happening at the microscopic level, then apparently something new is appearing here. No, philosophically that sounds very reasonable. Why assume that it emerges in a strong way when I have no explanations? Maybe it’s possible; I’m not saying I’m some great genius who understands everything. But it seems to me the burden of proof is on him, not on me. Meaning, if he wants to assume that you can manage without that, then let him show it. Okay? Therefore I think that philosophically you can show that there cannot be such an example—not because the examples he brought aren’t examples of it, but because I know in advance there won’t be such an example. There can’t be such an example. Okay. So what does this actually mean? It basically means that if I look only at the aggregate of particulars and I adopt only the—I adopt the quantitative model, the quantitative relation between the individual and the particular, the quantitative one including the interactions, it doesn’t matter—yes, of course, it doesn’t have to be linear, but it’s still a quantitative relation—then entirely new things should not appear in the aggregate, things that don’t belong on the plane of the particulars. If I go back to the cosmological argument, then if each one of the particulars has this property that it did not create itself, something created it, then even if I see the whole as simply a collection of such particulars, with nothing beyond that, I don’t see how one can say something different about the whole. It too is a whole that is subject to those same claims, and basically should have those same properties. At most, if you show me that it comes out of the properties of the micro-level, then fine, I understand—but then again it’s not something new. So really the claim I want to make here is that where I see properties that can’t be explained in terms of micro-properties, then the possibility arises at least—and it seems to me it’s even the plausible possibility. As against the ontic model, they differ from each other not only on the question of how you relate to the whole, but on the question of what a whole is in the first place. Because the quantitative model basically says: the whole is only the collection of particulars. The ontic model does not say that the whole is beyond the collection of particulars. If you have a collection of particulars, then the whole is the collection of particulars—on that, the dualist also agrees. The dualist only claims that there are wholes that are sustained by, or clothed with, something that stands behind them, and that turns them into an organism, into a whole. Not that the collection of particulars is the whole. In other words, the claim is that there really is something else here, say like a soul in a body, or a spirit in a body, which is what creates the organicity of the body. In other words, this almost leads us to vitalism. Meaning, what today is a dirty word—if someone says such a thing, he’s immediately thrown out of the faculty.
[Speaker E] So vitalism means—it’s not that there’s some special substance?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. No—what do you mean, a special substance? That there has to be something else. Vitalism can also be something spiritual, it doesn’t matter. But matter is not enough to explain the phenomenon of life. That’s the vitalist claim. That matter alone, and the laws of physics, are not enough to explain—not biology, we’re talking about the laws of physics, because biology may already smuggle in the issue, so then you can’t know. But the laws of physics alone are not enough to explain the phenomenon of life. That is basically the vitalist claim. Okay? And biologists today argue that that isn’t true. We can explain the phenomenon of life by physics alone—which of course nobody can actually do, but the belief is that it’s only a question of complexity. Meaning, if you take a sufficiently complex physical system, you’ll get chemistry—which they more or less do know how to do—and if you take a sufficiently complex system, you’ll also get biology. Okay? That they don’t know how to do. True, there has been progress, there are intermediate fields already, biochemistry and so on, but still there isn’t a system—I don’t think anyone has shown a model that takes the laws of physics and builds from them a full biological system all the way through. Meaning, not without saying, okay, here we skip, strong emergence—and then those are exactly the same jumps. But today it’s accepted to think that there is such an explanation; we’re just on the way to it. Meaning, each time they uncover another piece, and that’s true, and it’s true that each time they uncover more and more stages along the way. The question is whether at the end there really is some complete picture that will truly give me life in full out of physics. That’s an interesting question, because even if we don’t know it today, that doesn’t mean there is no such picture. There may be, and we’re advancing toward it. In the meantime, we still haven’t found everything. It doesn’t—there’s nothing that compels that.
[Speaker B] If the assumption is that there is such a thing, then that’s exactly determinism.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes—materialism, let’s call it. Determinism is already a different question.
[Speaker E] Why isn’t that pan-materialism? Because you could also say something else. The behavior of the object is built from its components, or at least its physical behavior is derived from its components. Okay. But alongside that, there is also attached to it some spiritual or mental component. Which doesn’t affect it. Which doesn’t affect it physically, it—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it doesn’t affect physically, then it’s empty of content. So in what sense is it built into this? After all, the claim—no, that’s epiphenomenalism, but that’s still materialism, it’s not—it’s emergence, it’s the same thing as emergence. What do you mean, affected? Then leave it alone—why do you need to assume it? If matter determines what will happen with it, then what difference does it make whether it exists or doesn’t exist? How do you know it exists at all? If matter in place blocks… what? No, you don’t sense it, you sense phenomena. Aner, the question is what substance stands behind the phenomena. Yes. So if matter produces it, why assume there is another substance? Matter is already doing it.
[Speaker E] Because matter is something multiple, and I experience my own existence as something continuous.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, because this whole produces phenomena of feelings of continuity and unity. So what? There’s no reason to assume another entity if matter explains everything or produces everything. Okay, but I’m saying that in the end, interactionist dualism, as it’s called—when I speak about matter and spirit being in interaction with each other, each one able to affect the other. Okay? That view is, let’s say, opposed to what I’m calling here materialism. What is that view basically saying? You will not find a full biological explanation for all the phenomena of life. You won’t find it. Even if you explain the single cell, yes, you won’t explain the human being. His psychology, the sociology of a society, of course—all these things, the reductionists say it’s all physics, just more and more complex physics, that’s what they say. Everything is physics. And the dualist basically says no, you will not find an explanation for these phenomena in terms of physics, even when you finish all the research. Which is also speculation—how do you know? I don’t know, but I’m saying that’s the thesis. Okay? So here what I want to say is that behind the ontic model—the ontic model doesn’t simplistically say that the whole of particulars is indeed something extra. No, because the whole of particulars is not something extra; it’s simply the collection of particulars. Rather, the ontic model says that within every whole that functions as a whole, as an organism, there sits something else beyond those particulars that compose it, and that is what turns the particulars into an organism. Call it a soul, spirit, or whatever you want. And that is what turns the collection of particulars into a whole—not the fact that there is a collection here in itself. Because the fact that there is a collection here in itself—it seems to me very hard to say that the collection is anything other than the particulars that compose it. Now you understand what that means. It basically means, for example, that within the human being there has to be a soul—or it doesn’t matter, we call it a soul, call it whatever you want, it doesn’t matter. But some entity that is beyond the material particulars that compose him, and it is what turns that collection of particulars into something we see as a unified organism. Into something that is a being, that is not just a collection of molecules, that is the Ship of Theseus—even if all the cells have been replaced, die, and in their place there are already new cells throughout life, I’m still the same person. Exactly the same person. I don’t mean that I’m identical to what I was then, but that I have the same identity—I’m the same person I was then. Even though all the cells have changed. So in what sense am I the same person? The materialists say that this is a fiction. It’s a fiction. The memories are remembered; we know how to explain why the memories remain. Because the cells don’t all change at once, but obviously they enter and enter into the system—little by little is nullified, as they say. Meaning, a little enters, it is nullified, absorbed into the system. Then a few more cells die, other cells enter. And in the end it’s preserved, like the Ship of Theseus. But basically what they are saying is that it’s a fiction. There isn’t really a person as a unified entity; there is a feeling of unity within the person—unless, that is, to say they deny those feelings. But it’s still a collection of molecules. And the counterclaim, the ontic claim, basically says no: behind this thing there sits another substance. Something else exists here, it’s not just the collection of particulars. And that something is what turns this collection of particulars into a whole. So now if we’ve replaced cells, even all the cells, what difference does it make? That something is still there. It’s the same something. Even if all the cells it uses have changed. Therefore it really is the same person. And that’s the ontic explanation versus the quantitative explanation I called it earlier. You have to assume the existence of something extra. Now let’s continue—what does this mean? Up to here I’ve spoken about the human being even at the biological level. Because even at the biological level the feeling is that this is an organism, not only in the mental phenomena—what a person experiences, feels—but simply the phenomenon of life itself seems not exactly physics. There is something here that is a whole, an organism. Organism is a concept from biology, not psychology. An organism is a cell, a biological entity. So that means there is something beyond physics, what gives this thing its life. In Kabbalistic terminology they call this nefesh, say, as distinct from neshamah. There is nefesh, ruach, neshamah. The lower things—what exists also in plants, animals, and human beings—that is what basically gives us life at the biological level. But there still has to be something there, some other entity, that turns this thing into a whole. If we go further up the levels of integration, then what happens with society? The fascists basically grasp this collective as an existing entity, not just a collection of particulars—on the contrary, it’s even the more important thing. We’ll get to that later; I’m building this step by step. Here you already have to get into really heavy metaphysics, or speak about the Jewish people as a whole, the Divine Presence, I don’t know exactly, all kinds of mystical Kabbalistic concepts, or speak about the spirit of the nation like Hegel’s, the general spirit of the world or something like that—but in metaphysical terms, not as abstractions, as fictions. Rather, you want to claim that there really is such a thing called the spirit of the nation, because otherwise we still remain in the realm of fiction, in the quantitative realm, where it’s convenient to treat it as a collective, but in fact there is no collective, there are only particulars. Now this already sounds a bit more speculative—to assume there is such a thing as the Jewish people as a whole. The Jewish people as a whole is not the collection of Israelis, the collection of Jews; rather there is a Divine Presence or the soul of the Jewish people as a whole. Just as there is a soul for a body that turns it into an organism, there is a soul for the Jewish people as a whole that turns it into one. Over every nation there is a ministering angel, in the language of the Sages. It seems to me that this ministering angel is meant to express what Hegel calls the spirit of the nation or the spirit of the world. The ministering angel of the nation is what turns it into an organic entity and not a collection of individual people. So that is an ontic outlook. But notice that here we are already entering heavy metaphysics. What is the ministering angel of the nation? What is that? Is there really something there that turns the whole nation into one thing? That’s already a bit harder to grasp than a soul. We’re already used to the idea that there’s a soul in the body. And what about the whole world? Right, that’s why I say it. Now the question is, in what sense can one really speak about a nation in the metaphysical sense? You can define it as a legal fiction, but why—what is the justification for speaking about it in the metaphysical sense? Or now let’s speak about the whole world, a higher level of integration. In the whole world too there is some kind of feeling of organicity, some kind of symbiosis, cycles in nature, what you described earlier, that things change and become other things. There is some kind of interaction here that still gives some feeling of organicity. And this itself is a formulation of the cosmological proof—I’m going back to that earlier example. Because even if you say it was always this way and the business rolls along and the elements change and are only recombined each time differently, behind this whole thing, which smells like an organism, there has to be something that gives it its organic character. And that itself is the cosmological argument. God is basically the soul of the world.
[Speaker B] And that something is exactly—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. But it’s not the component of things in the chronological sense—first there was that and then He created this and… I’ll talk about that now synchronically. Meaning, something is happening now, and simultaneously someone is creating it—not that someone previously preceded it and made it. Rather, the very fact that there is some organic phenomenon here means that behind it—this is the Kabbalistic term called emanation, as distinct from creation or formation. There is the world of emanation, the world of creation, the world of formation, and the world of action. In the world of emanation there is a concept of emanation. The world of creation is a world that was created. What is the difference between the world of emanation, which is emanated, and the world of creation, which is created? The Leshem explains—it seems to me it’s the Leshem—who says that the infinite light is with it like a soul in a body. That is called emanation; the word is related to “with Him.” In contrast, creation—the Holy One, blessed be He, created it. But He is not in creation like a soul in a body; rather He created it, like a carpenter makes a table, creates a table. Those are two different relations. Now I’m speaking about the relation of emanation, not the relation of creation. God as the emanator of the world and not as the creator of the world. That is basically the cosmological proof. Because the claim is that the world as an organic entity—now I’m not asking how the world was created. That’s the question of who is the cause that created it, who is the carpenter, yes? Maybe it always was. No, fine. Now I’m asking who the emanator is, not the creator, who the maker is. Rather: what is the thing that causes this thing, this whole aggregate, to conduct itself like an organic entity? The fit between things and all the transformations—it looks like some huge body operating in amazing symbiosis among its parts. Behind these things, behind this thing, various philosophers will come and say that some entity sits there, like a soul in a body. And that soul of the world—that is what they call God. This is a certain formulation of the cosmological proof. A bit different, but basically the argumentative structure is very similar. By the way, the Kuzari—someone once told me, a friend of mine, I don’t know it so well—but that the Kuzari writes that the sacrifices are basically like how a person needs to eat. When a person needs to eat, what does eating do? Eating causes us not to die. Forget biology. In the end what does it do? It prevents us from dying. What does it mean to die? To die means to separate the soul from the body, right? When the soul separates from the body, that is called death. Okay? When I eat, that gives the energy of the bond between soul and body. That’s in a borrowed sense, of course, but that is what creates the bond between soul and body—eating. And that is what the sacrifices do, the same work, with respect to the Holy One, blessed be He, and the world. One has to eat, so to speak. Offering sacrifices is like a mechanism of eating that preserves the bond between the Holy One, blessed be He, as the soul of the world, and the body, which is the world. Okay? That is why sacrifices are needed. I think that’s an interesting perspective, that perspective. I don’t know exactly where in the Kuzari this appears; I don’t know, that’s just what he told me.
[Speaker E] Article two, something like that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, could be.
[Speaker E] But it says there—he says that all this is only an explanation to make it easier to grasp, but really we don’t know.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It makes a difference, but he gives you an example that really does make it easier to grasp. It’s an analogy, yes, a nice analogy. Obviously the intention here isn’t eating in the simple sense; it’s also not literally body and soul. The Kuzari says something like that.