Individual and Community – Lesson 2
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- Two models: quantitative vs. non-quantitative
- Emergence, liquidity, and a critique of John Searle
- The burden of proof and the analogy to “maybe there’s an explanation”
- A computer screen, meaning, and the notion of collective “fiction”
- Strong emergence, panpsychism, and three possibilities
- Synthesizing a human being, vitalism, and whether the problem is “technical”
- Fascism vs. individualism and a normative middle position
- Maimonides in the Laws of Repentance and graded judgment: individual, state, world
- Collective responsibility: the people of Shechem, Maimonides, and Nachmanides
- Dictatorship, Stalin, and the difficulty of attributing guilt to the individual
- Jewish law, the pursuer, and the distinction between necessary harm and punishment
- Sodom, Lot, and weighing private righteousness against collective responsibility
- The commandment of Hakhel in Sefer HaChinukh: a collective commandment and individual responsibility
- The law of education: Rashi and Tosafot, and separating “who fulfills” from “who is responsible”
- A quorum and Torah reading: a commandment of the public and the prohibition against “walking out”
- Already sworn from Mount Sinai, the Rosh, and the commitment of a community
- Community bans, enactments, and proof that “there is a collective”
Summary
General Overview
The text defines two models for the relationship between the individual and the collective: a quantitative model, in which the collective is an aggregate of individuals and macro-properties can be explained in micro terms, and a non-quantitative model, in which there is “something more” in the collective that cannot be reduced to the properties of the individuals alone. The speaker uses the example of liquidity and claims about emergence to challenge John Searle’s analogy between macroscopic physical properties and mental phenomena, arguing that the lack of a micro-to-macro explanation in the mental realm leaves the burden of proof on the materialists, not on the dualists. He then moves from the ontological question to normative-halakhic questions, proposing a “two hats” model in which a person is judged and acts both as an individual and as part of a real collective entity, in a way that creates collective responsibility that does not disappear even when full blame cannot be assigned to every individual.
Two models: quantitative vs. non-quantitative
The quantitative model holds that the collective is only many individuals, and phenomena that seem unique to the many are emergent or statistical phenomena that can in principle be explained from micro to macro. The speaker uses John Searle’s example of liquidity to illustrate that a state of matter belongs to a cluster of molecules and not to a single molecule, but he insists this is weak emergence because liquidity can be explained through the physical properties and relations of the molecules. The non-quantitative model holds that the whole is “something additional” in reality itself, similar to the idea of a soul in a body, and therefore there are macro-properties that cannot be derived from the properties of the individuals even in principle.
Emergence, liquidity, and a critique of John Searle
John Searle is presented as someone who uses liquidity to show how mental properties and free choice “come out of” the material whole without assuming a soul or spiritual dimension. The speaker argues that the example does not help Searle, because with liquidity there is a micro-to-macro explanation and therefore no need to assume “something more,” whereas in mental phenomena there is currently not even a language or direction for such an explanation. The speaker distinguishes between an emergent phenomenon and a basic phenomenon like gravitation, arguing that in gravitation we are dealing with a descriptive law even if explanatory “links” are missing, whereas Searle explicitly claims there is supposed to be an explanatory path from micro to macro. He concludes that the materialist claim may be correct, but the argument from liquidity is weak and does not shift the burden of proof onto the dualists.
The burden of proof and the analogy to “maybe there’s an explanation”
The speaker says one cannot argue “maybe there’s an explanation” and thereby demand that the other side prove the opposite; one has to offer an actual explanation in order to shift the burden of proof. He compares this to a defense claim along the lines of “maybe I have an explanation” in a case of theft, and argues that such an argument remains weak even if the possible conclusion might turn out to be true. He sharpens the point that the dispute with dualism stems from the current inability to ground mental phenomena in the properties of the individuals, unlike liquidity, where such grounding is possible.
A computer screen, meaning, and the notion of collective “fiction”
The comparison of a public to an image on a screen leads to the claim that the “image” exists as a pattern of LEDs, but the meaning and identification of it as a baby are in the observer’s consciousness. From there arises the possibility that the public exists “in my head,” and the speaker formulates a position according to which the collective can be an ontological fiction: there is only a collection of individuals, and referring to the public as an additional entity is a linguistic convenience rather than something that exists in reality. He distinguishes between fiction in the sense of “there isn’t really something extra here” and the claim that the phenomenon is not real at all, and stresses that even if there is a real impact in consciousness, that does not require an additional collective entity.
Strong emergence, panpsychism, and three possibilities
The text presents a claim of strong emergence according to which behavior and consciousness may “emerge” from a certain material arrangement even if atoms have no mental aspect at all. Opposed to this is the panpsychist possibility, according to which every atom has some kind of “psyche,” and the soul is a quantitative model of combining “little psyches” into a higher-level one. The speaker formulates three possibilities: a spiritual aspect in every atom, emergence from matter without such an aspect in the parts, or the need to add a soul to the whole for the whole thing to work. He says an ad hoc explanation does not prove falsehood, but criticizes the use of a particle-like soul as something inferred from the whole rather than as an explanation that begins with the parts.
Synthesizing a human being, vitalism, and whether the problem is “technical”
A principled question is presented through the possibility of synthesizing a human being artificially by connecting molecule to molecule and cell to cell, and the dispute centers on whether this would produce a living being with a soul or just “a lump of dead flesh.” The speaker presents a vitalist position according to which even at the biological level “you won’t get biology from physics alone,” so the problem is not technical but essential and requires a soul. Against this stands a materialist intuition that the matter looks like a technical problem if there is no “something extra,” and the argument remains dependent on one’s underlying assumptions.
Fascism vs. individualism and a normative middle position
The speaker connects ontological models to political and moral implications: fascism sees the whole as primary and the individuals as limbs serving it, while philosophical individualism sees individuals as what exists and the whole as a useful fiction. He presents a middle position in which both are true on the normative-legal-halakhic plane, so that a person acts and is judged both as an individual and as part of a collective. He emphasizes that the whole is not “a thousand and one entities” alongside a thousand individuals, but a real aspect tied to the individuals and their relations.
Maimonides in the Laws of Repentance and graded judgment: individual, state, world
Maimonides in the Laws of Repentance is described as stating that every person is judged according to merits and sins, and so too “the state,” and so too “the whole world,” to the point of saying that a person whose sins outweigh merits “dies immediately in his wickedness,” and so too a state, and so too the world. The commentaries ask why a city or state must be judged if the individuals have already been judged, and the speaker suggests that Maimonides assumes the existence of collective judgment that is not a simple sum of the judgments of individuals. The speaker explains that on Rosh Hashanah a person stands in judgment wearing two hats, and that collective entities also stand in judgment, while harm to the collective is necessarily felt by individuals because they are part of it.
Collective responsibility: the people of Shechem, Maimonides, and Nachmanides
The speaker brings Maimonides regarding the people of Shechem, who are liable to death because they did not uphold the commandment of laws, and Nachmanides is cited as asking what a single citizen could possibly do against the king of Shechem. The speaker argues that what emerges is guilt that “grows on the collective plane” even when on the personal plane many people are unable to act, and he cites the principle “a pot owned by partners is neither hot nor cold” to explain a situation in which there is no address for responsibility if every individual comes out innocent. He presents this as a case in which one may “deal with” a collective phenomenon even if individuals who are not guilty on the individual plane are harmed, because there is no way to strike the collective without touching the individuals.
Dictatorship, Stalin, and the difficulty of attributing guilt to the individual
The speaker uses the example of Stalin to describe a reality in which “one person” holds an empire “by the throat,” and even those in power are afraid to act against him, and he brings the story of Khrushchev’s 1956 speech to illustrate the culture of fear. He concludes that such a situation strengthens the possibility that the collective generates a guilty phenomenon even without the effective ability of individuals to act. He distinguishes between the internal wrongs of a dictator toward his own people, as an internal reckoning, and a situation in which the collective harms an outside party, in which case the question arises whether harming even the “innocent” is justified as part of coping with the collective phenomenon.
Jewish law, the pursuer, and the distinction between necessary harm and punishment
The speaker presents a dilemma involving harm to innocents in the course of self-defense against attackers, and argues that harming them is justified only “when there is no other way,” similar to the principle that “if he can save him by injuring one of his limbs, then the law of the pursuer does not apply.” He objects to the idea of “collective punishment” as punishment for its own sake, but uses collective responsibility to explain why individuals may nevertheless be harmed even though they are not guilty on the individual plane. He clarifies that punishing the collective may also take the form of “dispersal,” but even dispersal is understood as punishment that harms individuals together with harm to the collective structure.
Sodom, Lot, and weighing private righteousness against collective responsibility
The discussion of Sodom is presented as connected to the question of how individual righteousness is weighed against collective guilt, and the speaker raises the possibility that the absence of “collective righteous people” prevents general rescue even if there are individuals who are not partners in the sin. Lot is described as having been saved “for Abraham’s sake” and not on his own merit, and the speaker suggests that this may reflect a demand for collective responsibility and not merely individual clean hands. He presents Abraham’s request about a number of righteous people as a matter of weighing harm to individuals against dealing with the collective.
The commandment of Hakhel in Sefer HaChinukh: a collective commandment and individual responsibility
Sefer HaChinukh is brought regarding the commandment of Hakhel as understanding it as a collective commandment: there is no commandment on each individual to come, but rather a commandment on the collective, while the collective “comes” in practice through the coming of individuals. The obligation of women in Hakhel is explained through belonging to the collective and not through the usual rules of time-bound positive commandments, and the discussion in Sha’agat Aryeh about land for minors is presented as depending on the understanding that the children themselves belong to the collective obligation. The speaker points to a difficulty in the wording of the Chinukh, that one who did not come “has neglected a positive commandment,” and explains a double aspect: the collective is what fulfills the commandment, but the responsibility to ensure its fulfillment rests on every individual so that a situation does not arise in which each person withdraws and the collective can no longer act.
The law of education: Rashi and Tosafot, and separating “who fulfills” from “who is responsible”
Kehillot Yaakov on Sukkah is cited through a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot over whether the law of education is an obligation on the child or an obligation on the father, with a practical difference regarding whether one can fulfill another’s obligation in Grace after Meals on a rabbinic level. The speaker presents an interpretation according to which “both laws are true”: the child is the one fulfilling the commandment when he recites the blessing, but the father is responsible for ensuring that the commandment is fulfilled, because the child does not bear full responsibility. He uses this as a parallel model for collective commandments: the body that fulfills may be one thing, while practical responsibility is imposed on another.
A quorum and Torah reading: a commandment of the public and the prohibition against “walking out”
The speaker presents the example of leaving the synagogue before Torah reading while a quorum still remains, and argues that there is a contradiction in the Mishnah Berurah between viewing Torah reading as an obligation of the public and prohibiting the individual from leaving. He resolves this through the principle of responsibility: even if the obligation is on the public, every individual bears responsibility to ensure that the public of which he is a part can fulfill the obligation, because if “everyone can just leave,” no obligated public will remain. He sums this up with the line that “you can only join; you can’t leave,” as a normative logic arising from the dependence of the collective on the individuals.
Already sworn from Mount Sinai, the Rosh, and the commitment of a community
The model of being “already sworn from Mount Sinai” is presented through the Ran, who understands it as “an oath cannot take effect upon an oath” in the laws of oaths, so that the obligation in the commandments is described in terms of an oath. Opposite this stands a responsum of the Rosh, brought in the Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah, laws of vows, according to which parents cannot bind their children by ordinary vows and oaths, raising the question of how the oath of Sinai can obligate generations who were not present there. The speaker suggests that the one who swore at Mount Sinai was “the Jewish people” as a collective entity, and the individuals who were there spoke as bearers of the collective, so that the commitment remains even when the individuals change, similar to Tosafot in Arakhin/Me’ilah on a communal sin-offering, that “there is no communal sin-offering whose owners have died,” and to the image “a generation goes and a generation comes, but the earth stands forever.”
Community bans, enactments, and proof that “there is a collective”
The Rosh is also cited as saying that in a community, bans and enactments do obligate later generations even though they did not personally accept the vow, and the speaker stresses that this also appears in the Rema in Yoreh De’ah. He explains that the entity that swears or issues the ban is the community itself and not a random collection of individuals, and therefore whoever enters the collective framework is included in its commitments. The speaker concludes that the text points to a conception in which “the community is an entity that plays on the field,” with the individuals bearing responsibility to ensure that the collective entity functions, and he says he will continue to develop the “two hats” model later on.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So last time I basically tried to define, in a more precise way, two models of the relationship between the individual and the collective that includes him. One model is the quantitative model, which basically says that the collective is just many individuals, or several individuals, and the special ways we relate to a multitude can be explained emergently, or quantitatively, or statistically, or however you want to call it. And then that basically means I can explain what happens on the macro level in terms of the micro level. I gave the example of liquidity, John Searle’s example of liquidity, which does not exist at the level of the individual molecule, because an individual molecule cannot be in a state of matter. A state of matter is always a property of a cluster of molecules, so it can be liquid, gas, or solid, but an individual molecule has no such property at all. So you see—he brought that example, by the way, in connection with mental phenomena, free choice, mental phenomena, and all those things. He basically wanted to argue that they emerge from the material whole in an emergent way. And when he wanted to illustrate that, he brought the example of liquidity, that liquidity is a property that exists on the macro level, in a cluster of molecules, even though no individual molecule is liquid, solid, or gas. So that means there are properties that appear at the macro level that have no root at the micro level.
[Speaker B] And of course these are properties, not some thing—it’s just a way of perceiving it, like, that’s just how I chose to define it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but there’s a difference between a solid and a liquid. What do you mean, “I chose to define it”?
[Speaker B] Yes, but that’s a matter of electrical bonds—this I call a solid, and this I call a liquid.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but those are still different states, and the difference between the states appears only on the macro plane, not on the micro plane. Okay? There are people who want to go further and say, fine, if there are different properties—actually I think I even wrote this once, I used to think this way—that if there are properties that appear on the macro level, then apparently the macro is something else, because otherwise who has the properties? Whose properties are these? They can’t be properties of the individuals; they’re properties of the whole. But if there is no such thing as a whole, if there is only a collection of individuals, then whose property is it?
[Speaker B] But “property” is just a concept—I call it that, that’s how I perceive it from some…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and that’s why I said I retract what I wrote back then. I don’t remember where—maybe I wrote it in Two Wagons, I think I wrote it there, right? I don’t remember anymore. So today I don’t think that. Meaning, the property of liquidity does not mean that the liquid is something over and above the continuum of molecules, as I corrected last time too, because overall this is weak emergence. That is, I can explain liquidity in terms of the properties of the individual molecules. True, the properties of the individual molecules won’t be called liquid, solid, or gas, but the field around the molecule will explain to me under what circumstances it will be gas, solid, or liquid. So it can in fact be reduced to the properties of the individuals that make up the collective. In that sense this is emergence. When there is emergence, it means there is no need to posit anything about the whole beyond the fact that there is a collection of particulars there. And the fact that properties appear at the level of the whole—so what? Since only at the level—as you say, that’s our definition, that’s how I relate to the whole. Again, “definition” not in the arbitrary sense; it really is a different state from a solid, it’s not just something I decided. But still, that difference does not mean there is something here beyond the collection of molecules. I can show you, by calculation, from the collection of molecules, how it comes out that this will be liquid or gas under such-and-such conditions. Okay? So basically it seems to me that Searle’s example is not a good one, because he takes an example of weak emergence—this was before people made that distinction and realized that the example was not a good one. He used that example to show how mental properties, mental phenomena, emerge from the material whole. So he says you don’t need to posit that there’s something else—soul, spirit, or a spiritual dimension in us—but only a material whole. Yet when a whole is formed, it has certain properties that don’t exist at the level of the particulars, the individual cells or individual molecules, like mental phenomena, but at the level of the whole they appear, like liquidity. Now the bug in that comparison—and I call it a bug—it could be true, but this comparison doesn’t help here. Because in the case of liquid, how do I know that really, at the level of the whole, without positing that there’s something extra, new properties appear? How do I know that at the level of the liquid there isn’t something there beyond the collection of molecules—maybe the liquid has a soul? How do I know liquid doesn’t have a soul? Very simple. Because I can explain liquidity, the property of liquidity of the whole, of the collection of molecules, in terms of the properties of the collection of molecules, so there is no need to posit that there is something extra here. It’s enough to posit that there is a collection. A collection of molecules—and I can show you that such a property will result—so why posit something extra? The entire argument in the context of dualism—yes, of human beings—the whole argument is because you can’t explain, at least for now, I’m saying, there isn’t even the language to explain it, that the whole can be reduced to the properties of the parts. Again, it doesn’t appear at the level of the parts—that’s clear, we all know that. But maybe it can be explained in terms of properties that do exist in the parts, as with liquidity. If there were such an explanation, there would be no need to posit that there’s something in us beyond cells and molecules. Okay? But once there is no such explanation, that’s the very basis on which dualists want to argue that there is something more. Now, maybe they’re right and maybe they’re not, but the example of liquidity doesn’t help. Because the example of liquidity shows me that in a case where I can explain the macroscopic property—fine, when I can explain the macroscopic property, nobody will claim there is anything there beyond the material particulars. Okay.
[Speaker C] I don’t know whether anyone thinks this through to the end, but isn’t it like the problem that in physics we only describe how something is pulled toward the earth? Okay, you don’t explain why it happens—why this object falls down instead of flying up. Right, if it suddenly started flying upward, we’d look for the physical reasons why it started flying upward and not downward. Okay. So maybe here too, in the liquid example, he says, look, I don’t know why under these conditions it’s liquid and under these conditions it’s…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But look—you can see, it’s liquid.
[Speaker C] Just as it falls downward, right—but why? He’s only trying to explain. The problem is that the property can’t be explained.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With gravitation—no. With gravitation, I’ll tell you: in gravitation you’re talking about a basic phenomenon, not an emergent phenomenon. A basic phenomenon: there’s a point-mass body, it falls downward, you ask why it falls—because there’s a force. What creates the force? The other mass. How does the other mass create a force? I don’t know, but I know that the other mass creates a force. Okay? So there, what’s missing are links further back in the chain. But here I’m talking about a phenomenon that, according to the emergentist, is not a basic phenomenon. Meaning, he is saying there ought to be an explanation that takes me from micro to macro. Look.
[Speaker D] Why? Why not say that just as there’s a law that between two electrons there’s a force, there’s also a law between several million…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem, maybe there is. There may be—I’m not saying there can’t be. Of course. I said before too: maybe he’s right. But the example of liquidity doesn’t help here. Okay? I’m not claiming I have proof he’s wrong. I’m only claiming that he has the feeling that once he brings examples from emergence, that means he’s right—that the burden of proof is on the dualist, let’s put it that way. And I’m saying that’s not true. If you offer an explanation, then the burden of proof will be on the dualist. If you don’t have an explanation, then to claim that maybe there is an explanation does not shift the burden of proof to the other side. It’s like saying: I’m accused of theft, and I say, look, maybe I have an explanation, so you prove that I’m a thief—I don’t have to prove I didn’t steal. Or vice versa, whatever. Do you understand? Maybe I have an explanation—fine. If you show an explanation, then you’re right, and the burden of proof shifts to me. But you can’t say maybe there’s an explanation. Maybe? And maybe not? Do you understand? That’s a weak argument. Now again, it may be true—I’m not… the claim may be true; the argument is weak. An argument is the reasoning for the claim. Okay? The argument is weak; the claim may be true. I have no way of knowing. Maybe yes, maybe no.
[Speaker E] What’s the difference between a public and an image on a computer screen? After all, when you look at a computer screen image, there are millions of LEDs there. In terms of the LEDs, you can’t explain the picture—the picture is in your head.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Same thing with the public, you can’t
[Speaker E] explain the public in terms of individuals, it’s…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in terms of the LEDs I can explain to you how the picture is formed. No—the picture, no. How not? Why not? No, you can’t explain how there’s a baby. You can explain how there’s light in certain points, but you can’t explain why I see a picture of a baby. Why is it a picture of a baby? No—the picture of the baby is in me, not on the screen. What difference does that make? That picture is also in me. What? What difference does that make? If you photograph a baby and photograph a screen, it’s the same thing.
[Speaker D] That’s all
[Speaker E] meaning that you give it,
[Speaker D] but I’m talking about meaning. Meaning has nothing to do with the public; meaning has to do with you. What you’re saying now is
[Speaker E] that there is no public—the public is in my head.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so I’m saying: that’s the second claim. The claim that says there is no such thing as a public—it’s a collection of individuals, and that’s a fiction, or that’s just how I relate to it, but it doesn’t really exist.
[Speaker E] Not a fiction. Just like software isn’t a fiction—there is software. The software is in my head.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s a fiction when you define that thing as a kind of entity. Then it’s a fiction. Because in fact it’s only your impression of a whole made up of particulars. There is not really an additional entity. That’s what I call fiction. Fiction in the ontological sense—there isn’t anything extra here, okay? You treat it as if it were something extra because it’s convenient in language, in how you relate to it, but there isn’t anything extra here. Fine. That’s the second approach; that’s what we’re discussing. But my question is which of the two approaches is actually correct. So up to now I’ve only defined them. One approach is the quantitative approach, which is basically the one you were leaning toward. It’s just a collection of many LEDs, or many individuals, or something like that.
[Speaker E] Not a collection—it’s something new that gets created in my consciousness, whatever that is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but it’s in my consciousness. There’s nothing here in reality. In me. In me. There’s nothing in reality itself here beyond the collection of particulars. It creates some impact on me, as if there were something new here. It’s convenient for me to relate to it that way for all sorts of reasons, so fine, that’s what I do—but it’s ultimately a quantitative phenomenon, a statistical phenomenon, an emergent phenomenon.
[Speaker E] Why, why quantitative?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the emergent phenomenon is not something that happens in you—the public itself.
[Speaker E] It’s something that happens in me. It doesn’t happen in reality; it happens in me. It’s something real that happens in me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what do you mean, something real that happens in you? It’s a perception of something in reality. The perception always exists in you, even the perception of an individual thing is in you.
[Speaker F] When people design a building, they take into account the fact that in a certain place there may be a public there, and then they have to put in a certain amount of steel.
[Speaker E] No, I don’t agree. They take into account the fact that there may be many individuals there. Why?
[Speaker F] What? They take into account the fact that there may be many individuals there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why a public? Yes, of course—many individuals. Right, many individuals are enough for that purpose. That fits into the quantitative model; that’s what we were talking about. Meaning, obviously—what I’m saying is, there are two possible models here. That model is a quantitative model. It doesn’t matter what’s in me, because in the end there is a collection of individuals that produces the whole, while I receive some impression from that whole—whatever kind of impression.
[Speaker E] My point was that saying “there is a public” is like saying “there is a picture on the computer screen,” or “there’s software running here.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand, but that’s what I call the quantitative model. That’s what I call the quantitative model.
[Speaker E] But in other things…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m claiming that in the case of the computer screen I agree with you, and in the case of the public I don’t agree with you—that’s the alternative.
[Speaker E] Then define for me what the difference is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: that’s exactly what I’m trying to define now, these two models. The quantitative model says it’s the same thing. Okay? It’s basically the same thing. And the non-quantitative model basically says there’s something more here. Meaning, there’s something like a soul in a body, yes? What makes the body some kind of whole and not a collection of cells? There’s something in it—I don’t know—it’s not a cell, it’s not something material, it’s not something that speaks in the language or terms of matter, that causes this collection of things to be something else. Not just to be perceived as something else. Of course it is also perceived as something else, but there is something in reality itself that creates the different impression in me. Not that the different impression is created only in me, with no root in reality itself. Okay? That’s basically the alternative. Now the question is whether everything can be explained in terms of the quantitative model. If so, then there’s no need for the second model. If there are things that cannot be explained in those terms, then we’ll have to admit that the quantitative model is not enough. Some other model is needed here.
[Speaker B] This idea in field models, that every particle has some kind of field and then it encounters another particle, and suddenly I see a property I didn’t see before—the same idea, you could also say about a certain kind of molecules, maybe even all molecules, or atoms.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you build them in the form of a human being, with this whole arrangement, suddenly they appear—suddenly they behave differently.
[Speaker B] The potential for different behavior is the encounter with others.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the claim of strong emergence. Yes, right.
[Speaker B] So what’s the difference between that and your explanation—that everything has a little soul, every atom?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem. Call it panpsychism, call it whatever you want—that’s perfectly fine.
[Speaker D] That’s something completely different, because what you just said, if I understood correctly, means that even atoms by themselves have—yes, they have some kind of consciousness, they feel something.
[Speaker B] Some kind of mini partial consciousness that can’t rise to anything, but it’s there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem, you can
[Speaker B] adopt whatever theory you want.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have no way to choose among them. No way at all. All of them are possible. I’m laying out two models here; I haven’t yet said who is right and who isn’t. By the way, panpsychism is not a separate model—it’s a quantitative model. Yes. Because every molecule has some psychic aspect, and what’s called soul is just the quantitative model with respect to the little psyche of the little particle. Yes, exactly. But it’s still not enough that we fail to explain it within the quantitative model.
[Speaker E] In order to say we need another model, you need to prove that it’s
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] impossible in principle to explain it with the quantitative model. No—to prove that something else is needed, I need to prove that it’s impossible. But in order to show that it’s reasonable, I don’t have to prove that it’s impossible. Why is it reasonable? Because I can say, for example, that in our current state of knowledge, there doesn’t seem to be any direction at all for deriving mental phenomena from the material whole. There isn’t even a language for doing that yet. There just isn’t. Now maybe they’ll still find one, and maybe everything…
[Speaker C] But the model he proposes does seem, on the face of it, to have some examples in reality.
[Speaker B] You can’t really say that, because once you go down to those levels, then every soul—we’re floating in some big divinity, it sounds like…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] something.
[Speaker C] Maybe, but if you
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] take that molecule—he’s a materialist—but it’s still an alternative.
[Speaker C] It’s an alternative because it really
[Speaker H] supports it, because when you
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] move
[Speaker C] from inanimate matter to plant life there’s more soul in it, and from plant life to animal there’s even
[Speaker H] more soul.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sure, but that’s an ad hoc explanation. You don’t actually see this soul-particle that exists inside another particle.
[Speaker H] You see
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it only through the fact that when you put them all together, then you basically produce an ad hoc explanation. You’re not really using the particulars to explain the whole. The opposite. You posit the whole, and from it you derive—it’s theology, not philosophy. Look, I can tell you that in a giraffe, or whatever, it’s full of different particles because it has a slightly different level of consciousness—there’s a soul there.
[Speaker G] A little bit different—there’s a soul there.
[Speaker C] If that’s possible in certain situations, then it solves this problem too.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can set this up as
[Speaker B] three possibilities.
[Speaker C] What I’m showing, though, is the gradation. I’m showing you that with you it’s a very, very high consciousness, and as we go downward there’s consciousness and consciousness and consciousness, and if you break it apart then none of that consciousness will remain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—who says no consciousness will remain? You think none will remain. Who says so?
[Speaker C] I don’t know—maybe no consciousness will remain, maybe it will, maybe it won’t. In order to go down to that level, I’m illustrating.
[Speaker H] Fine, right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I said all that is ad hoc, and you can’t bring me…
[Speaker C] But the fact that it’s ad hoc
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] doesn’t mean it’s false.
[Speaker C] No, I didn’t say it’s false, but it gives it meaning, it gives a possibility.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: now there are two possibilities—
[Speaker C] which get strengthened with explanatory evidence.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Either every atom has some kind of spiritual dimension—that’s one possible explanation. Another possible explanation is that it somehow emerges from a material whole even though no atom has any psyche at all. A third possibility is that in this whole, in the material whole, there really is nothing, and you need to add a soul to it in order for the thing to work. Three explanations. Now usually people think the last explanation is the weaker one, right? Materialists think the last explanation is the weaker one, okay? And I think not. I think not because on the materialist level there seems to me to be a fairly strong intuition that it really doesn’t look like they’re even close to finding an explanation. Now you can never know—maybe in the end they will—but right now it doesn’t look that way.
[Speaker D] I’m not assuming you need to find an explanation, but maybe it’s like, again, if it’s something like gravity. Just as there’s gravity between two particles…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying gravity is not a complex phenomenon.
[Speaker D] Doesn’t matter, it’s a simple phenomenon, but just as there’s a law that between two particles there will be a force between them—that’s it. That’s the claim of emergence.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So a collection of that many cells in the form of a human being produces mental phenomena. Exactly the same thing. Yes, of course—that’s the claim of emergence.
[Speaker D] So there’s nothing to find an explanation for, there’s no…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, and then you’re basically making a claim. You’re saying yes—maybe that’s what comes out of the whole.
[Speaker C] Not “maybe” in that sense—maybe in the sense that if it walks like and quacks like, then it’s a duck.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not right at all. If you know what a duck is, then you can say if something walks and quacks like a duck, it’s a duck. But here you don’t know anything else that you’re comparing it to. The only thing you know is human beings and all the… or animals, doesn’t matter. And your question is: what is an animal? That’s a single question; you have nothing to compare it against.
[Speaker D] Why doesn’t the Rabbi ask the same question about the laws of physics? There too, you can’t say: how do you know there’s a law that two particles attract each other? Maybe there’s some third thing…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because I see that it always works. What do you mean? I see that whenever there are two particles, they attract each other.
[Speaker D] And here I don’t see—or I don’t see…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s a descriptive law. I don’t mind accepting this psyche thing and saying there’s also some spiritual element there if you want—it doesn’t matter—but on the level of physics I’m telling you: that’s what will happen. We’ve done experiments; I know that’s what will happen. Now I ask, for example, on the principled level—suppose you succeed in synthesizing a human being artificially. Then maybe I’d compare it, you understand? Take all the molecules of a person, build them—just connect them molecule to molecule, build a cell, build another cell, connect them to each other… and then it won’t have a soul? I don’t know. If that were possible, then it would already be similar to physics. Now what we would say about that, I don’t know. It could still be that I’d say that physics too needs a soul and this too needs a soul. But then you’d be right that it would be like physics, do you understand?
[Speaker D] But it seems to me, on the face of it, that the problem looks technical. I don’t see any reason why it wouldn’t be possible in principle to synthesize…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right—if there really is nothing else, then the problem is technical. But if there is something more here, then the problem is not technical. The question is what you assume. You assume there is nothing here beyond the collection of cells, and then you say the problem is only technical. But I’m saying no—even if you assemble the collection of cells, it won’t help, because the problem isn’t technical. You need a soul.
[Speaker D] What do you mean—and what would happen?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nothing. It would be nothing. It would be dead.
[Speaker D] What do you mean dead? But…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It would be a lump of dead flesh.
[Speaker D] Even on the biological level it would be dead?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, biologically he would be dead. Yes, I’m a vitalist too, not only on the level of souls. I’m a vitalist. Even in biology, there won’t be biology from physics alone. That’s what I think; that’s my view.
[Speaker D] That sounds very implausible.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And certainly it sounds much more plausible
[Speaker B] than the alternative of a Cartesian soul or something like that, to say that it’s attached in some tiny fraction throughout the whole vast cosmos only in human beings or animals up to a certain level. That too seems very implausible, because it’s almost a physical force in every sense, and it exists only in humans or animals.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not a physical force in every sense—what are you talking about? Why?
[Speaker B] Also physical, because it can affect physical things. So what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s unrelated.
[Speaker B] So for practical purposes, call it a physical force.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Call it that for practical purposes, but so what does that mean? So it appears inside the bodies of animals.
[Speaker B] Obviously, because it’s only in animals.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We don’t find biology in anything similar either, so does that mean there’s no biology?
[Speaker B] What does that have to do with it? Yes, but you can see that there’s some kind of
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] differentiation, a progression from man… No, you can’t see it.
[Speaker B] No, you can’t see it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, you can’t see it—that’s what I’m saying.
[Speaker B] The reductionist claim is that even though in the brain it’s supposedly very simple, nevertheless it behaves as if it’s afraid, as if it’s approaching. Okay. As if it understands there’s some danger, and that’s why it doesn’t go near it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be that it really has a soul that’s afraid, just a soul on a lower level, or a psyche on a lower level. What does that prove?
[Speaker D] What does “a lower level” mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That there’s less complexity, fewer functions, I don’t know.
[Speaker D] Right.
[Speaker B] Could be. Okay. The behavior of a flock could be explained as though they think in one way, a flock of birds.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sure, but that’s only terminology. The moment I offer you an explanation in terms of the individuals, I’ve shown you that the collective reference is basically a fiction, because I don’t need to get to the idea that there’s something here beyond the individuals. That’s exactly the point. That’s what happens with liquidity too. In liquidity as well, I don’t use what happens in each molecule to explain how a liquid behaves. There are laws of chemistry. Chemistry already bypasses all that, but I know that in principle it’s only for convenience. Meaning, fundamentally I could have done it with physics too. That’s exactly the point. Now the question is whether there’s a way to do it or not. That’s the dispute; I don’t know. Maybe there is, maybe there isn’t. But I don’t think the side of those who say there is has the upper hand. I don’t see in what sense. Okay, so these are basically the two models: the quantitative ones versus the qualitative ones, or this leap in level. There’s a third model that also has to be taken into account—or not really a third, but a mixed model. Meaning, there is—or this already moves more into ontology, maybe also ontology but more into implications. When I talked about fascism versus individualism, fascism basically sees the whole as primary, and the individuals are limbs within the whole; they serve the whole. And therefore, if some individual dies, then he’s just oil on the wheels of the revolution. And an individualist—by that I mean a philosophical individualist—sees the individuals as what really exists, and the whole is some fiction. It’s convenient to use it, but it isn’t really another thing that exists. What exists is the individuals, not the whole. And then what that basically means is that the whole cannot displace the individual except for the sake of the individual himself. Sometimes even individualists understand that the state or society can instruct private individuals what to do, but only if the goal is to benefit the individuals. The state as such doesn’t function there as an end. Okay? It’s irrelevant; there’s no such thing. It’s just a tool through which we improve the condition of individuals. Now here there’s an intermediate conception—and again, I’m not sure this is on the ontological plane, but it is on the normative, legal, halakhic / of Jewish law plane. There’s a conception that says both things are true. Not that the whole conquers the individual beneath it and erases him, nullifies him, and not that the individuals use the whole but the whole is only a fiction; rather, both things are true. Now one example of this—I’ll bring several examples, mainly in the halakhic / of Jewish law context. One example is Maimonides in the Laws of Repentance. Did I mention this? I don’t even remember anymore. Maimonides in the Laws of Repentance writes that every single human being has merits and sins. One whose merits exceed his sins is righteous; one whose sins exceed his merits is wicked; half and half is intermediate. And so too the state: if the merits of all its inhabitants exceed their sins, then it is righteous, and if their sins exceed, then it is wicked; and so too the whole world. So basically they judge—yes—and a person whose sins exceed his merits immediately dies in his wickedness, and so too a state, and so too the whole world. Meaning there is a graded judgment. First they judge the person, then they judge the city, the state, the whole world. And then the commentators on Maimonides ask: if every person was judged separately, then what is there to judge the city for? There’s already a result. The city is nothing but the sum of the individuals. City, of course, means the collection of people in the city, not the houses. So what is there to judge the state or the city for? What?
[Speaker D] Maybe the houses need to be judged too?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but that’s not what he means; he means the people of the city.
[Speaker B] So beyond the fact that he is a person acting on his own plane, he’s also part of some sort of social covenant that acts—that is, enters into a pact with the individuals—and they act in a way that one person alone cannot act. Okay. So in that sense, to see whether the deeds of this collective are good or bad.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. And basically what Maimonides is saying here is that when I stand in judgment on Rosh Hashanah—or “I stand in judgment,” that itself is already a loaded statement—when I stand in judgment on Rosh Hashanah, I stand in judgment wearing two hats. One hat is my individual hat as a private person, and the second hat is my hat as a limb in a collective. Or in other words, what stands in judgment is the collective. “Like sheep” means one by one.
[Speaker B] One by one, or is it like “numbered” as in battalion by battalion?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So the claim, basically, is that when a person stands in judgment, human beings stand in judgment, but the collective entities also stand in judgment. Now of course when something happens to the city, all the citizens that make up the city or the state or the whole world will feel it. It’s not that something happens to the city but we all remain untouched; you can’t separate the entities, that’s obvious.
[Speaker D] But on the other hand, you could say that if we take that logic all the way, then you could say that if there’s something in the city beyond the people who make it up, then maybe that thing can also be punished, so to speak.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s fine, but I as a private individual also feel it. I’m not saying I’m going to cease to exist. Again, if they destroy the soul of the city—let’s speak in metaphors—they destroy the soul of the city because it’s wicked, fine? But I’ll still remain alive as an individual. But I’ll feel it. Because I have an aspect in which I am also a limb in the collective. It will affect me; it’s not detached. You can’t separate it.
[Speaker D] But why? If we turn a city into a collection of individuals. Exactly! Right, but if everyone keeps living there. Obviously!
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe they’ll keep living there, but inside my consciousness I’ll also feel that something is now missing. My collective aspect will no longer exist. That’s exactly what I’m saying: I wear two hats. Because you can’t say—when people say that the whole exists beyond the individuals, they don’t mean that it’s one more thing. Meaning, there are a thousand individuals, so now there are a thousand and one entities: a thousand private individuals and the whole—one thousand and one entities. The collective entity is obviously some sort of aspect that is also connected to the individuals. It’s not this banal idea that there are a thousand and one entities. Then again it’s not a whole; it’s just a thousand and one individuals. What? So one individual has a different character from the other thousand individuals—so what? Obviously there are differences among the individuals too. Right? That’s not what we’re talking about. We’re talking here about something a bit more complex. We’re talking about the fact that when this whole is created, something enters into it—say, the cells in my body, okay? So they’ll all remain alive even if the soul leaves, but obviously they’ll look different, they’ll look dead. Not obviously—I’m saying according to this conception. They’ll look dead. Fine? So you’ll remain here; there’ll be a cell here, you’ll see a cell.
[Speaker D] But the physiological aspect
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of it—meaning they won’t function. Yes, if they also take the psyche and not only the soul. If they also take the psyche, as the thing responsible for the biological processes, then yes, the cell will remain, all the molecules of the cell will be here, but it won’t be a living cell; it’ll be a dead cell. Okay? So by analogy I’m saying the same in the collective as well: even when I say the collective is something else that exists, I don’t mean it’s creature number one-thousand-and-one; rather, there is a certain aspect in all the individuals—these aspects, like the “psy” thing, yes?—that these aspects combine and create. What is “psy”?
[Speaker H] What? What is “psy”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Psy” is what they call the spiritual-aspect particle in the individual particle, or a spiritual particle. That’s what they called it in what I read, I don’t know. Anyone can formulate it however he wants, because in any case it doesn’t mean anything, so you can formulate it however you want. To that extent there are no observations. Meaning, after all, you’re not giving me predictions of where I’ll see it, what it will do beyond the things I already know in advance. If it gave some prediction, then you could try to test it.
[Speaker D] Exactly like dualism. What? Exactly like all the conceptions, all the explanations.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and that’s why I’m saying: here you can say whatever you want; it’s not—
[Speaker C] Rabbi, if you spell it out here, then there’s still a problem in Maimonides’ approach, because if I try for a moment: they judged each person in that city separately, and suppose one of—I don’t know how many—came out acquitted in judgment and the rest liable. Okay. Now they judged the whole city. And on the collective plane of the whole city, because there are—let’s go the other way—because the majority are righteous, I don’t know, okay?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it doesn’t go by a majority of righteous people; that’s exactly the point. The city is not judged according to a majority of righteous people. The city is judged according to how the city functions. As a city. Certainly as a city—that’s the point. But then there are situations in which I receive pluses and minuses of
[Speaker C] people.
[Speaker B] No
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, that’s exactly the point—there is something floating on the plane of the whole. There are places—I think we all know phenomena like this. There are societies made up of good people. Every private individual you meet is a good person. But the society conducts itself in a highly problematic way. And vice versa.
[Speaker B] How do you measure such a thing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, what Maimonides writes about the people of
[Speaker G] Shechem: if there are five antisemites in some city, then that city is an antisemitic city. Now there could be, say, the example of the Concubine at Gibeah—apparently there were only maybe ten or twenty or thirty criminals there, so why turn it into a civil war?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, so maybe I’ll give an example—what Maimonides writes about the people of Shechem.
[Speaker D] No, what do you mean? But all the people who refused to hand them over are criminals because they refused to hand them over.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no—
[Speaker D] Every single person in the city is a criminal.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s more sophisticated. Maimonides writes—Maimonides writes about the people of Shechem, why they were liable to death, yes, when Simeon and Levi killed them: because they did not keep the commandment of laws, which is one of the seven Noahide commandments. Okay? So they ask about this—Nachmanides already comments against him—what could the individual citizen have done against the king of Shechem? Really, if he had obeyed, they would have chopped off his head. What could he do? So why are you punishing him? Now every citizen of Shechem could make that claim, right? But on the other hand, it’s clear that somehow this guilt came from somewhere—Shechem is guilty. Meaning, this phenomenon came out of Shechem. Shechem is this collection of people; there aren’t any additional people in Shechem. It’s the collection of people that creates Shechem. This phenomenon came out of Shechem. None of the individuals is responsible for it. None of the individuals except the king. None of the individuals is responsible for it. So what do you do? Suppose you can’t strike the king without striking the individuals. So what do you do now? So maybe you can’t blame each individual. And Maimonides writes—I’m saying, this is Maimonides’ conception, okay? But Maimonides says—I’m bringing an example of where one has to reach a non-quantitative model. Here, for example, Maimonides writes that one may harm these individuals even though they’re not guilty. They couldn’t have done anything.
[Speaker E] They could have left the collective.
[Speaker B] What
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How does leaving the collective help? And what if he had forbidden them to leave? In Egypt, after all, it was forbidden—Hazal say it was forbidden to leave there. What do you do? In the Soviet Union too, with Stalin—we talked about this, right? About Stalin. Stalin—I read a biography of Stalin and I literally pinched myself to see whether I was dreaming. Well, I knew this already, but it was amazing to experience it, to actually read it. One man controls a giant empire, I think the second most powerful empire in the world—if I remember correctly, it was commonly accepted that it was the second. A hundred and fifty, a hundred and seventy million people were there in the Soviet Union during Stalin’s period, say in the 1950s, something like that. Then it got to two hundred million by the time it split up.
[Speaker D] In the Soviet Union, yes, in the Soviet Union
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think those are the rough numbers; it doesn’t matter—one hundred and fifty million people for the sake of discussion. Okay? With an enormous army, with incredible power over an inconceivable territory. Okay? One man held all one hundred and fifty million of them, with all their tanks, by the throat. Everyone wanted to kill him. Those who knew; others who weren’t aware—
[Speaker D] There were people who admired him. There are even stories of people who got to labor camps and still admired him and said
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that he was patriotic and so on.
[Speaker D] There were Stalinists; there’s a book that studied the phenomenon.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There were people who had no direct access to him and were fed by propaganda. Everyone who was in his circle, all the people in positions of power, all the people who had some idea of what was going on wanted to kill him. Now the masses—it doesn’t matter; in any case they had no influence. Fine? So the man by himself held a giant empire that basically everyone—everyone relevant, basically—was against him. And he died in bed.
[Speaker G] He died in bed
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] after forty years of rule. Aside from the conspiracy theories that exist there too. Fine, but I’m saying, in the end, in the end he also eliminated Beria, right? If I remember correctly.
[Speaker G] He eliminated him. He eliminated Beria; not sure who eliminated him, but people were even more afraid of him than of Stalin. In the famous speech in ’56 when Khrushchev exposed all of Stalin’s crimes, someone there calls out from a bench and asks: But Comrade Khrushchev, you were there—why didn’t you do anything, why didn’t you say anything? The hall went a bit quiet, and then Khrushchev, in a terrible roar, the primitive Ukrainian peasant, shouted: Who said that? The hall fell into dead silence for a minute or two, and then Khrushchev said: Now you understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, so what this phenomenon—
[Speaker G] I wasn’t
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] there, but I read it; you have to believe it could have been true. But what Maimonides is basically saying here is that there is guilt that grows on the collective plane even though each private individual really had nothing he could do. If he had approached someone… wait—if he had approached someone to form a coalition, maybe they could have done something, so why didn’t they organize? But you can never know, because when you approach someone, who knows whether he won’t collaborate with him. A danger like that—am I crazy? I can’t do that. So what, I need to sacrifice myself so that this Shechem won’t take your daughter—Dinah? I’m going to die with ninety percent certainty if I approach someone to form a coalition against Shechem. I’m saying, true—but you, and you, and you, and you, ultimately create the phenomenon of Shechem. So on whom am I going to place this responsibility if not on you? If each one separately is acquitted, then a pot belonging to partners is neither hot nor cold. So on whom do I place that responsibility? In the end, yes, it falls on you—but it falls on you in your collective capacity, not in your capacity as private people. As private people, you’re good people. But in your collective capacity, in the collective that all of you together create, something wicked emerged. Something problematic emerged that has to be dealt with. Now there’s no such thing as dealing with the collective without touching the individuals. I don’t know how you grasp the collective without touching the individuals, but the individuals will feel the treatment of the collective. So many times they will be harmed even though on the individual level they are not guilty.
[Speaker F] But with you there was no such thing—the entire ancient world up until the modern period was run by dictatorships. Meaning, all of humanity was made up of people subordinate to someone ruling over them without their really having any ability to influence things. Right. So in the hundred years that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nothing, except that there was a wickedness there that had to be punished. If that dictator was oppressing people internally, then that’s their business—they need to decide how to deal with him, whether to take risks or not. When he’s dealing with me, I need to do their calculations, not them. Do you understand? When Palestinians or terrorists or whatever are shooting at me—now… okay, we’ll get to that, I’ll talk about it. But I’m saying, I’m now deliberating whether I’m allowed to harm innocents. Suppose, assuming I need that in order to deal with the terrorists. I can’t do it without harming innocents. If I can, then of course there’s no dilemma. If I can’t, okay?
[Speaker D] No, wait, what do you mean? There are those who hold that they would say that even then there’s no problem, because as punishment, so to speak—that’s what’s called collective punishment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I’m not part of that camp.
[Speaker D] No, and there are those who say that innocent people, by virtue of being part of the nation, become guilty on a level that one should punish them.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There, there’s the example. So there, that’s exactly what I’m talking about. So now, what am I saying? I say to myself: look, the blame for this phenomenon emerging from that public rests on the public. Now true, private individuals may even oppose it. More than that, many of them can’t do anything about it. Anyone who tries something like that will get his head chopped off. Exactly this Stalinist phenomenon, okay? But what can I do? In order to fight the phenomenon, I’m not there, I’m not one of that public, I’m outside. Now on whom do I place responsibility? Who am I permitted to harm in order to save myself? Not because if he—this is the difference from other dictators. Other dictators who harmed their own people—that’s a matter for their own people. If you’re willing to take the risk and it’s worth it to you against the risk of being harmed, make your calculation. That’s an internal consideration. But if I am an outside party and now that people is harming me with the dictator’s permission—most of the citizens oppose it altogether, they have no influence, they can do nothing—but in order to defend myself I also have to harm them, otherwise I can’t defend myself: is there justification to harm them? So if I see them as responsible, what does that mean? It means they are responsible in their collective capacity, not in their private capacity.
[Speaker B] Wait, but according to Maimonides the people of Shechem weren’t punished because when strangers came they abused them, but because they didn’t establish courts for themselves. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, and that’s for themselves—for Shechem. Shechem took Dinah. There was no court—
[Speaker B] Shechem the person, yes, the ruler wasn’t subject to the law.
[Speaker F] There was no legal authority there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They’re guilty of the fact that the ruler goes outside and commits terror outside. You should have judged him and hanged him.
[Speaker B] But if the crimes are committed against the citizens themselves, then that isn’t called a sin of the city.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. That’s what I’m saying. Otherwise it doesn’t come to expression as a sin of the city. Maybe it’s the city’s sin, but that’s their business with themselves.
[Speaker B] We’re not talking now—we’re talking only about Israel. The Holy One, blessed be He, says: if you do not kill the murderer, the land will be cleansed of everyone.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, because the Holy One, blessed be He, stands opposite us. That’s exactly the point. If I say the matter is an internal matter—but for me it’s easier to present this double aspect, the collective versus the private, when I stand as an external party opposite that collective, and now it stands opposite me as a collective and threatens me as a collective. Now the individuals have no influence, a large part of the individuals.
[Speaker B] So it comes out that good and evil, Heaven forbid, the essence of the city—they can
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] be measured only with respect to external factors, outwardly? No, I’m saying that with respect to external factors it’s easier to see it. Now, if you want with respect to internal factors, then say I were a citizen of that city. Then I need to make the calculation for myself: should I form a coalition with others and assassinate the ruler or hang him, establish courts that will hang him or something like that, so that all of us—not just I—will be saved. That too is some kind of collective consideration, but it’s a consideration we make among ourselves. It could be that for me it’s worthwhile to suffer and not establish it. Fine? Then that’s my business and it will be legitimate. Maybe. That’s our business. We have to make the calculation. If we all suffer and we are the ones guilty of the suffering, then who is going to come with claims against us? We’re the ones suffering and we’re guilty of the suffering—fine, our business. But if I’m outside and you cause me suffering and you are guilty, then I ask: who is responsible, and whom may I harm?
[Speaker B] It’s easy when it’s from outside; when it’s from inside the injustice is doubled. Because then it comes out that the thief is punished twice. Both for the fact that he stole, and the whole city is punished for his theft, and he is punished for that once again under the hat of—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, if you can deal with him without punishing the city, then no problem—deal with him alone.
[Speaker B] Fine, but what is… what is evil? Evil is little acts done to him and him and him and him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I’m saying. That’s what I’m saying—no, that’s exactly the point, no, it’s not like that. Because no citizen of Shechem deserves punishment on the private plane. What do you want? Saving life—he can’t do anything. But the million residents of Shechem… Shechem together created something here that does need to be dealt with; I’m allowed to defend myself. Now when I strike them, I strike private individuals; you can’t strike only the collective. That’s exactly the point.
[Speaker G] Why can’t you disperse it, the collective?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, disperse it? Disperse? No, that’s fine—that’s also harming
[Speaker G] the collective.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s also harming the individuals. It’s also harming the collective, and it’s also harm to people.
[Speaker E] What justifies killing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? No, I’m telling you, it justifies killing when there’s no other way. If you can save him by striking one of his limbs, then the law of the pursuer does not apply. Only when you need to kill in order to be saved, then you may kill them. What—if you can disperse them, disperse them. But dispersal is also punishment. It doesn’t matter; it’s the same logic, that’s not important.
[Speaker H] You punished the
[Speaker D] collective.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. No, you punished the collective, but the individuals also lose out. What, a neighbor wants to live with his neighbors, with his friends—that’s punishment, what do you mean. Okay.
[Speaker C] So there’s a bit of a problem with Maimonides’ accounting, because then judgment should have started from the whole world, then the state, then the city, and only then gotten to the individuals. Because if you come out righteous in individual judgment, that may not help you at all, because as part of the collective you’ll pay dearly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it will help you.
[Speaker C] Why? I’ll disperse you; you’ll be punished.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I’ll be punished on the collective aspect, but on the private plane I’ll remain alive. What’s the problem?
[Speaker C] That’s exactly the point of Sodom. There—you see—they didn’t remain alive on the private level. As a collective I had to punish all of Sodom, and therefore I bring down even the righteous there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand, what do you mean “bring down”? Kill. Right, it depends. If they were found completely righteous in their own judgment, maybe that would be factored in and they wouldn’t be killed but only dispersed. I don’t know—it’s a balancing of the two things together, what will happen to them. That’s what happens in Sodom. Why not the righteous?
[Speaker B] The righteous of Sodom are people who rebelled against the wickedness of Sodom, not just people sitting at home.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe, I don’t know, I have no idea who those righteous people were. There weren’t even ten there, not even five. Lot was the only one who was saved. Lot.
[Speaker B] If there were righteous people, that would mean people who rebelled against the wickedness of the city, not—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, except that Lot—the only one who was ultimately saved there—was saved because of Abraham and not because of what he did, so apparently nobody there rebelled. There were no collectively righteous people there; there were only individually righteous people. And the fact is that the individually righteous weren’t saved because they were righteous. Why was Lot saved because of Abraham? He should have been saved by his own merit; he was righteous, he didn’t sin with the sins of Sodom.
[Speaker D] Why? He wasn’t all that righteous either. He didn’t sin with the sins of Sodom. Fine, but he also wasn’t righteous.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So why did he
[Speaker D] need
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to be saved because of Abraham—why not by his own merit? Because now he was required—I’m just using your example—to reveal also the aspect, the collective responsibility.
[Speaker D] Wait, and if you do reveal the collective responsibility, then you’re not part of the—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then it could be that insofar as it’s possible to deal with the collective without harming you, they’ll do that. I don’t know if that’s possible, but insofar as possible they’ll try to do that, I assume. Why?
[Speaker B] Why does Abraham want to save Sodom for the sake of a minority, if the Holy One, blessed be He, judges by the majority? What? According to Maimonides the Holy One, blessed be He, judges by the majority. If most of the city is righteous—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then he wanted to remove them—you know what, it’s not connected to the collective issue. He says that once—maybe it’s a little bit connected to balancing, because every person, if Sodom is destroyed, even if he survives as we said before, still he’s damaged, he’s hurt. Fine? He says, look, if there are ten righteous people then maybe it’s already worth not harming even their collective aspect, because ten righteous people—that’s already significant harm. If there’s one, then save him and that’s it. I don’t know, these are already intermediate calculations; I don’t know how to make those calculations. Let me maybe give another example. The Minchat Chinukh writes regarding the commandment of Hakhel. He says there—it has a very interesting structure, maybe we need to look at it inside sometime. It seems very clearly that he views it as a collective commandment. The commandment of Hakhel is not a commandment on each individual Jew to come to Jerusalem; rather, it is a commandment on the collective to come to Jerusalem. Only how does the collective come to Jerusalem? Of course each of the individuals has to come. Like a quorum. Yes. Okay? The question is whether it’s like prayer with a quorum—maybe I’ll comment on that too—but yes, that could be what it means. So now what—for example, one implication: women are also obligated in Hakhel. Why? It’s a positive commandment dependent on time. So they learn it from the general phrase—even in a place where an exclusion was stated, the Talmud says, fine—but okay, they learn it from the inclusions. But why indeed is this an exception? That still needs explanation. What’s the explanation? The explanation is that if it were an individual commandment, then in individual commandments women are exempt if they are time-bound, a positive commandment dependent on time. But here the commandment is not on the private individual at all—it’s on the collective. Everyone who belongs to the collective is commanded in it. What does that have to do with women or men? Collectives are not exempt from positive commandments dependent on time. I’ll give an example: I think the Minchat Chinukh disagrees with the Sha’agat Aryeh, if I remember correctly. What about children? Children also have to be brought—the little ones, okay? Usually the reason is “to give reward to those who bring them”; the Talmud in Chagigah on page 3 says there, why are the children brought? In order to give reward to those who bring them. But the Sha’agat Aryeh writes there—he constructs some idea—that they should own land. Everyone who owns land has to come to Hakhel, as in appearance offerings. So the minors too need to have land. And then he starts calculating how they could have land, since if their father is still alive and he brings them there, they won’t inherit land, and a minor has no land of his own except by inheritance. So how can it be that they bring the minors, since they have no land?
[Speaker D] If they have no land then there are all sorts of
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] calculations there—it doesn’t matter—but the principle is, if the father died then in short, it’s a whole story from the haftarah. He makes some very pilpulistic calculation there, but his assumption all along is that the minors need to have land. Why? Because he assumes the minors too are obligated in the commandment, and it’s not just in order to give reward to those who bring them. Because if it were just in order to give reward to those who bring them, then what does that have to do with it? Whoever is obligated in the commandment needs to have land—but the minors aren’t really coming because they themselves are fulfilling the commandment; they’re coming in order to give reward to the parents. There’s a commandment to bring them. So let the parents have land—what does that have to do with the children? He understands that the children too are obligated. Why? Because everyone who belongs to the collective is obligated, like women. That’s his conception. Now that’s on one side. You can see it in the Minchat Chinukh very clearly. Now at the end of the Minchat Chinukh he writes that someone who did not come to Hakhel has nullified this positive commandment and his punishment is great—or has nullified this prohibition. Now here it’s very strange. Usually, if a given positive commandment is fulfilled, how can it be that someone nullified it? Most of Israel came to Hakhel and fulfilled the commandment, so the commandment was fulfilled. Now I didn’t come, so I nullified the positive commandment of Hakhel? Who is obligated in this positive commandment? We said earlier: the collective, right? The Jewish people. The Jewish people fulfilled this positive commandment; the positive commandment was fulfilled. So in what sense did I nullify the positive commandment? What does it mean that I nullified the positive commandment? The positive commandment was fulfilled; the one commanded fulfilled the positive commandment. I wasn’t commanded; the collective was commanded. So what’s the problem? The majority was there, the greater part as the whole, no problem, there was Hakhel. So in what sense did I nullify the positive commandment? What?
[Speaker E] Maybe he applied it quantitatively.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why maybe was it applied quantitatively?
[Speaker E] Because the commandment is on the individuals, on all the individuals—the men and the women and the children—not on the public.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but that’s exactly the point—he says not like that. If it were quantitative, then women too would be exempt.
[Speaker E] It explicitly says the men and the women and the children.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but why? It’s nice that it says so, but why?
[Speaker E] It could be for other reasons.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe. If indeed this is the assembly of the people, I’m saying, according to those views that women and even the minors themselves—with land—are also obligated, then the collective conception is unmistakable. Now the question is: according to that conception, how can someone nullify this positive commandment?
[Speaker D] Because, say, women would be obligated because the commandment of Hakhel is intended to strengthen faith / belief in Torah, and women also need to believe in Torah, and therefore they are obligated. One can find many explanations for what could cause them to be obligated in it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then say that. Say that women are obligated because it strengthens faith / belief or something like that.
[Speaker D] That’s already the reason for the commandment. Meaning, they are obligated because I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] think he brings—we’d have to see his wording, I don’t remember his wording exactly—he brings that this is a collective commandment, and therefore—no, no, I’m saying this is my translation; we need to see his wording. I’m saying that his whole line of thought basically says: this is a collective commandment, therefore everyone is obligated.
[Speaker D] I thought that was the explanation the Rabbi came up with
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in order to explain the matter of the land. I’m also saying that the land strengthens the point. No, it’s not written there in that language in the Minchat Chinukh; we need to see it there inside. But I’m saying that according to the collective conception, then what does it mean that the person who didn’t come nullified the positive commandment, if the majority came and did the commandment? The answer is that in collective commandments there are several ideas. In collective commandments there is a double aspect—and these are the same two hats we talked about earlier. On the one hand, the commandment—the one commanded in it—is the collective. But of course if the collective were commanded and it were the one responsible to do it, it wouldn’t get done. The responsibility to carry it out is imposed on the individuals. The individuals, like the people of Shechem. The individuals are responsible for seeing that the collective carries out what it is obligated to do. The responsibility is on the individuals. In the commandment, who is commanded? The collective. In other words, this way: if the commandment is fulfilled, who fulfilled this commandment? The collective. But the nullification of the commandment is on the individuals, because each individual has to do what he can to make sure the collective does what it needs to do.
[Speaker B] Who is this
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] collective that he has to care for? The Jewish people.
[Speaker B] Meaning, who is it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He himself is the Jewish people. Right—he is part of the Jewish people, like Shechem, and every one of the individuals has responsibility to see to it that the Jewish people arrive. Now I can’t take responsibility for the entire Jewish people; I can bring myself, maybe encourage others to come, whatever—but of course my sphere of influence is limited. But obviously if none of us acts because each one says, “It’s just me; what do you want from me, that the Jewish people should go? What does that have to do with me? I’ll stay here; most of the nation will come; there will be Hakhel”—then of course everyone will stay and there won’t be Hakhel at all. So the Torah says no: the responsibility rests on each of the individuals, even though when I ask myself who fulfilled the commandment, the collective fulfilled it. The commandment was fulfilled even if I wasn’t there, because the collective fulfilled it. And it is the one that fulfills the commandment, but the responsibility rests on the individuals. Another example I’ll give you in this context—it’s not connected to collective and individuals, but just so you can see the mechanism exists—there is the Kehillot Yaakov in Sukkah, where he talks about Queen Helene there, about the law of training, that she seated her children in the sukkah, and all sorts of things there on page 3. He brings there a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot, both in Berakhot and in Megillah, regarding the law of training. The question is whether the law of training is a command that the minor himself is commanded in, or whether it is a command on the father to train his son. A practical difference, for example, is whether the child can discharge someone else’s obligation in Grace after Meals. Because if he himself is commanded, then he can discharge someone else’s obligation—perhaps someone else who is obligated rabbinically.
[Speaker B] Wait, the child isn’t commanded in Grace after Meals; he’s commanded in—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He is commanded rabbinically in Grace after Meals.
[Speaker B] That’s the law of training.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, training is rabbinic. He is commanded rabbinically in Grace after Meals.
[Speaker E] After all, the father isn’t commanded; rather, the child is the one commanded rabbinically.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so he—it says in the Talmud—can discharge only someone who is obligated on a rabbinic level. Okay? By contrast, if he isn’t commanded at all, then he can’t discharge even someone who is obligated on a rabbinic level. And that’s the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot: whether a minor can discharge someone who is obligated on a rabbinic level. Okay? Now, the Kehillot Yaakov says both laws are correct. So there is also an obligation on the father and also the obligation of the commandment on the son. Now, what’s the idea? You have to look again at this practical difference; I’m not going into all the details of the Minchat Chinukh right now, but look there—this explains it, I think, very well. There too it’s the same thing. The one who fulfills the commandment when this minor recites Grace after Meals is not the father, it’s the son. Because the commandment is incumbent on the son, according to Rashi’s view. He says that according to Rashi there are these two laws. According to Tosafot there is only the law on the father. And according to Rashi, who says this is the law on the child, obviously it’s not only the child; there is also a commandment on the father to educate the child. So in Rashi’s view it’s both the father and the child—it’s two laws. What’s the idea here? Exactly the same as with education. Education, yes, the commandments of education are like what happens there with Hakhel. What does that mean? It means that the child is the one who fulfills the commandment; the father is the one responsible to make sure the commandment is fulfilled. Because the child still isn’t responsible for his own actions—he doesn’t yet have responsibility, he isn’t mature yet, he hasn’t reached the age of commandments, he doesn’t have that responsibility. Why isn’t he commanded in the commandments? Because he doesn’t have responsibility. But who fulfills the commandment? If he does it, the one who fulfilled the commandment is him. He recited Grace after Meals, he discharged someone else’s obligation. But the father—if he didn’t make sure, if
[Speaker C] the child didn’t recite it, the father is the offender.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the child recited it, the father has no commandment. The father has no… maybe you… yes, he has the responsibility to make sure it happens. But if the child didn’t recite it, then the responsibility falls on the father, because you don’t impose responsibility on the child. Exactly the same thing as with the individuals and the collective. The collective fulfills the commandment, but the responsibility that the commandment be fulfilled by the collective is imposed on the individuals. That’s another example. Another example I’ll maybe bring…
[Speaker B] What about a quorum?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A quorum—I said there it’s a bit… in the Mishnah Berurah there’s a discussion in opposite directions, what he says about… let’s say I’m in a prayer quorum and I leave before the Torah reading. I’ve already finished the Amidah, Shema—the Torah reading is a commandment for the congregation. Fine, so I leave. Let the congregation that’s there read from the Torah—what do they want from me? I’m an individual, I’m leaving. It’s not a commandment on me. The question is whether I’m allowed to leave. In the Mishnah Berurah it simply says in one place that it’s forbidden, and elsewhere exactly the opposite. No, no—not that I’m breaking up the quorum, I’m leaving by myself. I’m the eleventh or the twentieth, it doesn’t matter. A quorum remains, they’ll read from the Torah and I’m leaving earlier. Did I fail to fulfill something? After all, Torah reading is an obligation on the congregation. Right, as an individual you don’t read from the Torah.
[Speaker E] So what really is the problem?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there’s a contradiction in the Mishnah Berurah. One side says you can leave. Why? Because it’s a commandment on the congregation. Another side says you can’t leave, and usually they say you can’t leave because it’s a commandment on the individual. But in the Mishnah Berurah there’s a contradiction, because in one place you see that it’s a commandment on the congregation and nevertheless he says you can’t leave. And my answer is the same answer. You can’t leave because there is a responsibility on the individuals to make sure that the congregation they make up fulfills the commandment. Because if each of the individuals could leave, then also those who are among the ten who are needed to do this could leave, so there’s no… there won’t be a congregation, and then there won’t be anyone obligated. What’s the problem? If each one can leave, then we’ll all leave. So the congregation won’t fulfill it either. It’s exactly the same logic. So you have to impose responsibility on the individuals, exactly like the responsibility of the people of Shechem—it all goes in the same direction. If you don’t impose responsibility on each individual, even though from his own standpoint he really wasn’t obligated—he isn’t the one who is obligated—but if you don’t impose responsibility on the individuals, the collection of individuals is the congregation. There’s no way—you can’t address the congregation except through the individuals who compose it. So the responsibility is imposed on the individuals. Another example, maybe—I’m trying to get a bit more in in the last few minutes.
[Speaker E] For three in a prayer quorum you can only join; you can’t leave it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good. Mishnah Berurah—there are disputes about this; some say you can leave too. There are… there’s a question here about Mount Sinai and the giving of the Torah, because we are oath-bound from Mount Sinai, as the Talmud says, oath-bound from Mount Sinai, and the model for why we are obligated in the commandments is an oath. That’s how it is in Nazir, in a few other places, in Nedarim, in Shevuot, in various places—the Talmud says we are oath-bound from Mount Sinai. Therefore an oath does not take effect regarding the commandments, because a person is already oath-bound from Mount Sinai. So on the face of it, even though I only saw the Ran do this, most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) take it in the direction of one prohibition not taking effect on top of another prohibition, but from the Ran at least it sounds like he understands it as one oath not taking effect on top of another oath. Meaning, it’s not that one prohibition does not take effect on top of another prohibition and “oath-bound from Mount Sinai” is just a turn of phrase; rather, one oath does not take effect on top of another oath. It’s a law within the laws of oaths. Meaning, you can’t swear twice—neither against nor in favor.
[Speaker C] The Talmud says that explicitly—why only the Ran?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud says “oath-bound from Mount Sinai.” The question is how the medieval authorities (Rishonim) understand it. “Oath-bound from Mount Sinai” could mean that you have here the rule that one prohibition does not take effect on top of another prohibition. But the Ran says no—an oath on top of an oath simply does not take effect; it’s a law in the laws of oaths. And then that means that his model for why we are obligated in the commandments is a model of an oath. We swore at Mount Sinai to fulfill them. Okay? And then all sorts of questions come up—it doesn’t matter, lots of questions come up in this context, what exactly that obligates and so on. But there’s one question I want to focus on here. There is a responsum of the Rosh brought in the Shulchan Arukh in Yoreh De’ah, the laws of vows. The Rosh says that oaths and vows are only things a person imposes on himself. Parents cannot swear to bind or vow to bind their children. There’s no such thing—except for the vow of Samson, which is something else, Samsonite Nazirite status is a special law. Other than that, I mean. Samuel—Samuel too is also Samsonite Nazirite status. It’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but that too is Samsonite Nazirite status; at least according to some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), Samuel too is Samsonite Nazirite status. That’s in the Mishnah in Nazir—there is Samsonite Nazirite status. In any case, there indeed the parents impose it, or the Holy One, blessed be He, even imposes it through the parents—it depends how you understand it there. The angel came and told them that the child would be a Nazirite in the case of Samson. In any case, regular Nazirite vows, vows, and oaths—there’s no such thing. Parents can’t do that. On yourself, yes; on someone else, no. And then the question is: how does the Sinai oath obligate us? Our forefathers—our forefathers did it.
[Speaker B] The oath was, my brother, to bury him—Jacob made his brothers swear to bury him in the Land of Israel; he made the children of Israel swear. So the meaning is: he asks them, “Accept the oath upon yourselves,” and they say yes. That’s what it sounds like.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They accepted it upon themselves, but what about their children? By the time Joseph was brought up, they had died—they weren’t around anymore, the brothers weren’t alive. So why, really, did the children have to bring up Joseph?
[Speaker B] There were those who are here and those who are not here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that mean? What is this “those who are here and those who are not here”?
[Speaker B] What does it mean? “Here with us today”—so it’s as if he is here now. What do you mean, “as if”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “As if” isn’t enough—I’m not here. What does “as if” mean? I don’t know what that sentence means. So I’ll tell you what it means. I’ll tell you what it means. What it means is that the one who swore at Mount Sinai was not at all those who stood there. The one who swore at Mount Sinai was the Jewish people. And the Jewish people are obligated by that oath. Now, the individual members of the Jewish people are constantly changing, so what difference does that make? But the one who swore there was the collective, not the individual. The ones who inhabited the collective at that time of course said the oath with their mouths—it doesn’t matter, if there even was such a thing—but that was only as the current bearers of the collective. When they are replaced, nothing happened, just like Rabbi Soloveitchik brings in Baal HaTeshuvah—he brings that Tosafot in Arakhin, or in Me’ilah there on page 9. There’s some one-line Tosafot there that says regarding a sin-offering whose owners died: if it is a communal sin-offering, there is no such thing as a sin-offering whose owners died, even though all those who consecrated that sin-offering have already died. So why not? Because “one generation goes and another generation comes, but the earth stands forever.” Meaning, the collective has significance even if all the individuals who composed it have already been replaced. Like the ship of Theseus—we talked about it last time—or the cells in our body, all of which are replaced, and still I’m the same person. That’s at least the accepted view, even though maybe not a single original cell is still you from what was there at the beginning. So what does that actually mean? That there is significance to the collective entity. And here I don’t think the quantitative explanation can help. A quantitative explanation won’t explain all these things.
[Speaker E] Also, every new person born into the Jewish people joins the oath.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How does he join the oath?
[Speaker E] But parents can’t make their children swear.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And he accepts upon himself the yoke of the commandments.
[Speaker E] He doesn’t accept the yoke of the commandments, he doesn’t accept it, he doesn’t want to accept it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So then he really isn’t part of it? What do you mean, he isn’t part of it? And he’ll be punished—if he doesn’t accept the yoke of the commandments, then he won’t be punished? He is obligated in the commandments; it doesn’t depend on what he accepts. “Accepting the yoke of the commandments” is just words, you know. It’s like at the redemption of the firstborn: “Which do you prefer?” Do you want your son or do you want the money? Let’s see you prefer the money and not your son. They ask you that—it’s a symbolic question.
[Speaker F] Among the Amish they have an option to leave.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the Amish—it’s actually something very interesting what happens there among the Amish, but אצלנו there’s no such thing.
[Speaker E] Among the Druze there too we hear that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, among us there’s no such thing. So what does that mean? That the quantitative model cannot explain all the phenomena.
[Speaker E] Someone who leaves the Jewish community completely, even in times when there was authority to punish,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] there was
[Speaker E] leaves completely, would go into exile overseas.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They would hang him—what do you mean? Of course, of course he is liable to death, or liable to whatever you want.
[Speaker E] He was theoretically liable to death, but nobody would chase after him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter who would chase after him—he is liable to death. Whether they chase after him or not is a question of whether they have the budget for it. Fine? What difference does it make? Priorities. But he is liable to death. He’s an offender. The question is why he’s an offender. He didn’t swear; his parents swore. What does that have to do with him? Now the Rosh himself writes that the same is true about a community. He says: how did bans come about in communities, when they establish communal ordinances and place a ban on anyone who violates the ordinance? How do they place a ban? The fact that the parents imposed a ban—how does that obligate me? I didn’t swear, I didn’t vow, I didn’t do anything, I didn’t commit to anything. So now I violate an ordinance that was enacted a hundred and fifty years ago. What does that have to do with me? The Rosh says—this is basically what the Rosh says—that in a community it does work. Even though the Rosh himself there, in that same responsum—it’s the same responsum—says that parents can’t do it for their children, but a community can. And that also appears in the Shulchan Arukh, in the Rema in Yoreh De’ah. Why? Because a community is a collective entity. And the one that imposed the ban there was the community; it wasn’t a collection of people. Now, of course the community is embodied in the collection of people, but the entity that imposed the ban, the entity that swore at Mount Sinai, was the collective entity. And whoever joins or is replaced into that collective entity is oath-bound within that entity.
[Speaker E] And if someone leaves the community and moves to another community and violates its contract?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is how you define the community—whether it’s possible to leave or not. So the Holy One, blessed be He, apparently defined this community as a community that cannot be left. Never mind. But still, the fact that people come to me with claims, that they see me as obligated, means that the one who undertook the obligation here was the community and not the individuals. The question of whether it’s unjust that I can’t leave—maybe it is unjust, never mind. But the ontological definition—the definition, I’m saying—you see that there is a conception here in which the community is an entity that plays on the field. Meaning, it undertakes obligations, it can swear to things, it does things like any other individual entity does. Okay? And we also see all the obligations. Once it is a collective entity, then there is responsibility on the individuals to make sure that the collective entity acts. And about that—about this model of the two hats—I’ll talk more about that.