Individual and Community – Lesson 3
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Models of the individual and the public
- Maimonides in the laws of repentance and the two hats in judgment
- “Do not be intimidated by any man” as a halakhic test case
- Sanhedrin 6b: withdrawing from judgment and the boundary of “where the law is leaning”
- The Sefer HaChinukh’s expansion to public appointments and roles beyond judging
- Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh: an appointed judge versus an unappointed judge
- How far does “do not be intimidated” go against life-threatening danger: most decisors, the minority, and doubt versus certainty
- The Radbaz and public protection for an appointed judge
- Criticism of fitting Jewish law to state reality
- Two fundamental difficulties: die rather than transgress, and doubtful versus certain danger to life
- Public danger to life, war, and a suicide mission: the two-hat model in action
- A note from Makkot 11b: a commander who was exiled and does not leave even if “the people of Israel need him”
- Contemporary implications: police, hospitals, and state institutions on the Sabbath
- An illustration through the Foreign Ministry and sanctification of the new month
- Public needs as charity and the status of “giving life to the public”
Summary
General Overview
The text presents three models for the relationship between the individual and the public: a quantitative model in which the public is merely a large collection of individuals, a qualitative model in which the public is a unifying entity beyond the individuals, and a practical-combined model in which each person has “two hats,” as a private individual and as an organ within the larger organism. It demonstrates this model through the laws of “do not be intimidated by any man” in judging, the distinction between a private judge and an appointed judge, and the disputes over how far the obligation to stand firm in judgment extends in the face of danger. It suggests that the deeper rationale is “public danger to life” in the sense of the disintegration of the social fabric, and connects this to modern questions such as the functioning of police, hospitals, and state institutions on the Sabbath, while arguing that trying to translate everything into private life-saving concerns misses the point of proper public life.
Models of the individual and the public
The text defines a quantitative model in which the public is simply many individuals, and therefore there is no fundamental difference between many organized individuals and many unorganized individuals. It defines a qualitative model in which the public is an entity beyond the individuals or a force that gathers them into one unit, and argues that without some additional component beyond the collection of individuals, this is a fiction. It presents a practical model in which each person has two hats, a private hat and the hat of being an organ in the larger organism, and identifies this philosophically with the qualitative model but practically as an intermediate model between collectivism, which subordinates the individual, and individualism, which sees the collective as a fiction serving private rights.
Maimonides in the laws of repentance and the two hats in judgment
Maimonides in the laws of repentance is described as writing that on Rosh Hashanah each person is judged, and afterward the city, the state, and the whole world are judged, and the text explains that this double judgment stems from the two hats a person wears. It states that the judgment on the state is not a judgment on the citizen as an individual but on the general entity, and the citizen can be harmed or benefit from it because he also belongs to the larger organism. In this way, it presents the two-hat model as a solution to the question of what remains to be judged after all the individuals have already been judged.
“Do not be intimidated by any man” as a halakhic test case
The text cites the verses “You shall not show favoritism in judgment” and “You shall not be intimidated by any man,” and places “do not be intimidated” as a prohibition on a judge fearing a harmful person and on failing to render a true judgment even in the face of threats. It cites Sefer HaChinukh in commandment 495 and Maimonides in prohibition 276, as well as the wording of the Sifrei, which expands the prohibition even to fears such as “lest he kill me or my son” or damage property such as “lest he burn my grain” and “lest he cut down my trees.” From this it defines a far-reaching halakhic demand that seems to stand in tension with danger to life, while noting that most decisors qualify these statements.
Sanhedrin 6b: withdrawing from judgment and the boundary of “where the law is leaning”
The text cites Sanhedrin 6b in the name of Reish Lakish, that a judge may say “I will not deal with your case” before hearing the matter, or after hearing it but while he still does not know where the law is leaning, out of concern that “the strong one may end up pursuing him.” It states that once the judge knows where the law is leaning, he no longer has permission to withdraw, by force of “do not be intimidated by any man.” It adds from Sefer HaChinukh that one who withdraws once he knows where the law is leaning transgresses “do not be intimidated,” and if he distorts the law out of fear, he also transgresses “do not pervert justice.”
The Sefer HaChinukh’s expansion to public appointments and roles beyond judging
The text cites Sefer HaChinukh in commandment 284 regarding the prohibition against appointing as judge someone who is not wise in Torah because of other virtues, and presents the Chinukh’s novel extension that “included in this commandment,” anyone chosen by the community to appoint officials for any matter must appoint those who are worthy “and not be intimidated by any man.” From this it concludes that the idea of “do not be intimidated” is not only a law for judges but a principle for anyone in public office: to fulfill his mission and not recoil from pressures or threats. It presents this as a point that will be used later in the discussion.
Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh: an appointed judge versus an unappointed judge
The text cites Maimonides’ ruling in the laws of the Sanhedrin, chapter 22, and the Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 12, which reproduce Reish Lakish’s distinction between a weak party and a strong one. It emphasizes Maimonides’ addition: “And if he was appointed over the public, he is obligated to deal with them,” and interprets this to mean that an appointed judge cannot withdraw even before he knows where the law is leaning. It presents this as a major innovation by Maimonides in both directions: even an unappointed judge becomes obligated to continue once the direction of the law has become clear, and an appointed judge is obligated to enter the case from the outset with no possibility of evasion, noting that Rashba and the Shulchan Arukh seem to adopt this approach.
How far does “do not be intimidated” go against life-threatening danger: most decisors, the minority, and doubt versus certainty
The text describes a dispute over how to understand the wording of Maimonides and the Sifrei: whether this refers only to fears introduced by “lest,” which are not real mortal danger, or also to genuine danger. It presents the common position that danger to life overrides everything except the three cardinal sins, and therefore “do not be intimidated” does not require self-sacrifice, noting that many decisors limit the obligation to situations that are not actual mortal danger. It also presents decisors such as Tumim, Shevut Yaakov, and the Bach, who are stricter and speak of a prohibition on withdrawal “under any circumstances” once the judge knows where the law is leaning, while arguing that a full reading of their words shows they do not go all the way to certain death but deal with real risk and cases of doubt.
The Radbaz and public protection for an appointed judge
The text presents the view of the Radbaz that the obligation of an appointed judge to hear a case stems from the fact that usually the public will protect him, and therefore the threat is not really one of mortal danger. It concludes from his words that if the public does not protect him, or if the threat cannot be prevented, even an appointed judge may withdraw because of danger to life. It also formulates this as a moral-social logic: the demand that the judge endanger himself is intended to protect the public, and if the public does not fulfill its duty to protect him, it is hard to justify demanding self-sacrifice from him for the sake of a social fabric that does not protect its officeholders.
Criticism of fitting Jewish law to state reality
The text argues that the classical halakhic discussion reflects an exilic reality in which there was state and enforcement authority above the community, and therefore it was possible to rule simply that the judge’s life comes first and he may retreat from danger. It describes how in modern state reality one cannot accept a judicial system “without teeth,” in which a judge is permitted to flee from violent criminals, and presents this as a sharp gap between the historical formulations of Jewish law and the intuition of a functioning state. It illustrates that even with police protection there can still be real danger when violent organizations decide to harm a judge, and therefore the very possibility of writing into law that “the judge may flee” seems to him unthinkable.
Two fundamental difficulties: die rather than transgress, and doubtful versus certain danger to life
The text asks how it could be possible to require standing firm in judgment even in the face of danger to life if “do not be intimidated” is not among the three sins for which one must die rather than transgress. It adds a sharp difficulty regarding the position of decisors who distinguish between doubtful and certain danger to life, and argues that he knows of no halakhic area in which doubt is treated differently from certainty in this context. It cites the Talmudic discussion in Yoma about the source that danger to life overrides the Sabbath, where the Talmud rejects sources that do not also prove doubtful danger to life, and presents this as a fundamental Talmudic assumption that there is no principled distinction between doubt and certainty regarding the overriding of prohibitions.
Public danger to life, war, and a suicide mission: the two-hat model in action
The text proposes that the obligation of public officials to stand firm in the face of threat stems from the fact that the collapse of a system of justice and enforcement tears apart the social fabric, and this is defined as “danger to life of the public” even without any specific individual dying. It compares this to war, in which individuals are required to take risks for the sake of public life, and emphasizes that public life is not measured by pulse and breathing but by a society’s ability to continue existing in an orderly way. It explains that the distinction between doubtful and certain risk reflects the two hats: when the risk is not certain, society may demand that the individual take the risk as part of his public role, but in a suicide mission the public may not “erase” the person’s private identity and totally subordinate him, similar to military ethics that do not issue an order for a suicide mission but at most rely on volunteering.
A note from Makkot 11b: a commander who was exiled and does not leave even if “the people of Israel need him”
The text cites the Mishnah in Makkot 11b that one exiled to a city of refuge does not leave, not for testimony for a commandment, not for monetary testimony, and not for capital testimony, “even if all Israel need him, even if he is the commander of Israel’s army, like Yoav ben Tzeruyah.” It quotes Maimonides, who expands this and says that he does not leave even “to save a life by his testimony” or to save from an army, a river, a fire, or a collapse, and interprets this as meaning that “if he leaves, he has permitted his own death,” not merely that leaving is forbidden. It presents a major difficulty: how can it be that such a commander is not brought out when all Israel need his salvation? It cites Arukh HaShulchan, who suggests that even if nothing stands in the way of danger to life, “since if he leaves, his blood is permitted, one cannot tell him to permit his blood for the sake of others,” and adds another reason, that “since the killing of a person came about through him, it is unlikely that merit should come about through him,” concluding with “this requires further analysis.”
Contemporary implications: police, hospitals, and state institutions on the Sabbath
The text points to the phenomenon of religious people who avoid joining the police because of ongoing Sabbath work that is not mostly immediate life-saving activity, and mentions a preparatory academy that is trying to encourage religious enlistment in the police. It presents as a parallel problem the work of doctors and nurses in hospitals, where routine measurements, writing, and many actions are not immediate life-saving acts, and where it is sometimes impossible to function if one insists on postponing everything until after the Sabbath. It argues that the halakhic justification is not an artificial translation of every action into private life-saving need (“if he does not eat, he will not function, and then there will be danger to life”), but recognition that the normal functioning of a public system is a condition for the life of a society, and therefore itself receives the status of public danger to life.
An illustration through the Foreign Ministry and sanctification of the new month
The text cites, in the name of Yeshayahu Leibowitz, the question of how a modern state can allow itself to have the Foreign Ministry not operate on the Sabbath, since citizens and states need continuous response and there is no “call back after the Sabbath” in international reality. It refers as a central halakhic example to the participants’ remarks about desecrating the Sabbath for the mission of sanctifying the new month, where messengers desecrate the Sabbath for the sake of testimony and establishing the public calendar, and sees this as evidence that basic public functioning receives unusual halakhic weight. It formulates the principle that the need for a calendar and for proper social functioning is the need of a public organism, not merely of a collection of individuals.
Public needs as charity and the status of “giving life to the public”
The text brings a discussion about money collected for a specific purpose, such as a transplant, when the person in need has died, and presents the rule that the remainder is given to another charitable cause, citing that the Chatam Sofer elaborates that it may be given to public needs. It states that public needs such as paving roads and constructing buildings are considered charity because they are meant “to give life to the public,” not only to help poor individuals. It mentions a responsum of Rabbi Ovadia that permits deducting income tax from the tithe obligation, within a discussion of what is included as a charitable component and what counts as a public need, and presents this as part of the same principle of public life as an independent halakhic category.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re in the topic of the individual and the public, where up to now I’ve basically tried to define three—really, two—models, and the third is just a combination of them. One of them is a quantitative model, meaning that the public is simply a lot of individuals, and then in principle there shouldn’t be any difference, say, between a lot of organized individuals and a lot of unorganized individuals. It’s just a lot of individuals. There’s no significance to which “many,” or from what group they are, or whether they even belong to one group. The second model is the qualitative model—I don’t know exactly what to call it—something like that. In other words, the model that says the public is some kind of entity beyond the individuals that compose it, or basically that it gathers them all into a single unit. And I said that I think in order to gather them into one unit, there has to be something there beyond the collection of individuals; otherwise it’s basically some kind of fiction. And the third model is basically one that combines the two, and of course philosophically it isn’t really a third model—it’s the second model, the one that says there’s something in the public beyond the collection of individuals. But on the practical level it is a third model, because practically, when I started talking about this, I spoke about fascism versus individualism. In other words, the view of the collective as something that subordinates the individual to it, like oil on the wheels of the revolution—that’s the fascist collectivist conception. And on the other hand, the individualist conception says that the collective is a fiction meant to serve the individual, but really the individuals are what actually exist. And then the collective can’t make demands of the individual; quite the opposite: the individual—in the language of rights rather than duties, in the terms people use today—the individual demands that the collective serve him. Not the collection of other individuals, but the institutions, the collective, serve him. And the middle approach says that every person has two hats: one hat is his private hat, and one hat is his hat as an organ in the larger organism. We talked about Maimonides in the laws of repentance, where he writes that on Rosh Hashanah each person is judged, and afterward the city and the state and the whole world. And everybody asks: so what is left to judge if every single person has already been judged? What is there left to judge in the city or the state? So I said that this is basically judging him in two hats: one is the hat as a private person, and the second hat is that they judge the state—where the state of course contains the collection of its citizens. But we judge the state, not the citizen, and the citizen can of course either get hit or benefit from that general judgment, because he also has an aspect of being an organ in the larger organism. So that’s this two-hat model. What I want to do now is demonstrate this through a few halakhic references. I gave some examples regarding a communal offering whose owners died and all kinds of things like that, but I want to illustrate it through a few examples, and afterward—not today, obviously, but maybe later—move on to issues of left and right, or at least say a bit about that, like Ido asked. By the way, where is he? I didn’t see him last time either. Yehoshua?
[Speaker B] Yes. He was in England. Okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, and we’re talking exactly about the topic he wanted to discuss.
[Speaker B] No, actually he sent a text saying that today’s lecture is already something new, but you don’t know—you weren’t at the previous lecture.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, fine. So today I want to talk a bit about “do not be intimidated by any man,” because there’s a very interesting halakhic aspect there, and it seems to me—
[Speaker B] To me that that’s what he asked to discuss next time?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, okay, but this will be built a bit on our topic. In any case, the Torah says: “And I commanded your judges at that time, saying: Hear between your brothers and judge righteously between a man and his brother and his stranger. You shall not show favoritism in judgment; you shall hear the small as well as the great. You shall not be intimidated by any man, for the judgment is God’s, and the matter that is too difficult for you, you shall bring to me and I will hear it.” We learn a number of laws from here—for example, that proper judges must be appointed. Someone who appoints an unfit judge is as though he planted an idolatrous tree by the altar, and statements of that sort. “You shall not show favoritism in judgment” means the judge must relate properly to both litigants, showing favoritism to no one, neither the poor nor the rich, and so on. But I want to focus on “do not be intimidated.” “Do not be intimidated by any man.” So Sefer HaChinukh writes as follows, under the prohibitions in commandment 495—I’m really reading from Maimonides, prohibition 276. And commandment 276 is that the judge is warned not to fear a harmful person, someone who threatens, speaks arrogantly, and because of that not render against him the true judgment. The judge is warned not to be afraid and not to refrain from rendering judgment. So what should he do? Rather, he must render judgment and pay no attention to whatever harm that person may cause him. As the Exalted One said: “Do not be intimidated by any man.” You’re forbidden to fear anyone; you must render judgment, true judgment. And the wording of the Sifrei is: “Do not be intimidated by any man”—lest you say, I fear so-and-so lest he kill me or my son, or lest he burn my grain, or lest he cut down my trees, therefore Scripture says: “Do not be intimidated by any man.” So in the Sifrei it’s already spelled out more specifically. In other words, you’re forbidden not to judge, or to pervert the judgment—and later we’ll also see, to withdraw from the case—even if he threatens your life or your son’s life, and certainly if he threatens your property, “lest he burn my grain,” and so on. That’s quite far-reaching. In other words, we have here a commandment that stands even against danger to life. We know of things like that—here we see there’s another one, which is novel—and indeed most decisors qualify these statements.
The source of this is in Sanhedrin 6b. It says there: as it says in Proverbs, “The beginning of strife is like letting out water; before the quarrel breaks out, withdraw.” Before the quarrel has broken out, you can leave it. There it’s talking about leaving in the sense of making a compromise. Once the quarrel has broken out, you can no longer leave it. And Reish Lakish said: If two people come for judgment, one weak and one tough, before you have heard their words, or even after you have heard their words but you do not yet know where the law is leaning, you are permitted to say to them, “I will not deal with your case,” lest the strong one be found liable and then the strong one will pursue him. In other words, the strong one will pursue the judge. As long as he hasn’t really entered the case, or he still doesn’t know which way the law is leaning, he may withdraw. Once you have heard their words and you know where the law is leaning, you may not say to them, “I will not deal with your case,” as it says: “Do not be intimidated by any man.” So here there is already a certain qualification: only after you know where the law is leaning; before that, you may withdraw. Sefer HaChinukh also adds there, in commandment 495: “And one who violates this and does not wish to judge once he knows where the law is leaning, as we said, out of fear of the litigant, has transgressed this prohibition. And if he also perverted the law out of fear, he has transgressed this prohibition besides having transgressed the prohibition of ‘do not pervert justice.’” If he withdraws from the case because he’s afraid, then he has violated the prohibition of “do not be intimidated by any man.” If he stays but distorts the law out of fear, then he has violated both “do not be intimidated” and “do not pervert justice.” Okay? Both prohibitions.
[Speaker C] According to Sefer HaChinukh too, is it die rather than transgress? Yes?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sefer HaChinukh brings the same wording as Maimonides. Sefer HaChinukh usually follows Maimonides. The source is the Sifrei, as I said earlier. I just want maybe to note one more thing that will be important for us later. In the previous commandment, both in Maimonides and in Sefer HaChinukh, which is also learned from these verses—commandment 284—that the Great Court or the Exilarch is warned not to appoint as judge a person who is not wise in Torah because of other virtues he may have, and appoint him because of those. We’re talking even about positive qualities, not fear or favoritism, but virtues—yet he is not wise in Torah. And one is warned against this, and in appointments in Torah one should consider nothing other than the person’s diligence in Torah wisdom, and that he knows its commands and warnings, and his conduct and established character in proper deeds for this, and so on. That comes from “You shall not show favoritism in judgment,” from those same verses. But then Sefer HaChinukh says: “And included in this commandment as well, apparently”—here he says this is my own reasoning, but Sefer HaChinukh adds it—“that anyone whom the members of the community have chosen to appoint officials over them for any matter should devote all his attention and thought to appointing the worthy and the best of them for that office which the community needs, and not be intimidated by any man” to appoint someone unfit. Very interesting. He’s talking about the commandment of “You shall not show favoritism in judgment,” not “do not be intimidated.” “Do not be intimidated” is the next commandment. And in this commandment of “You shall not show favoritism in judgment,” he says not to appoint an unworthy judge, and also not to pervert justice. But within that he also inserts “and not be intimidated” into appointing someone else, so he brings “do not be intimidated” into that issue and expands it to all appointments, not only the appointment of judges. Any public role. In a public role, you may not appoint someone unfit. It stands to reason that the same reasoning you say regarding this commandment you’ll also say regarding the next commandment. When we say “do not be intimidated by any man,” that a judge may not recoil from judging according to Torah law even when threatened, this too wasn’t said only about a judge. It was said about anyone who holds a public office. In other words, you have to fulfill your public role. A judge is just an example. Because that’s what Sefer HaChinukh says here, and I assume the same applies there. We’ll come back to this later; I just wanted to point it out.
And in Maimonides this is indeed ruled as Jewish law in the laws of the Sanhedrin, chapter 22, the beginning of chapter 22, and also in the Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 12: If two people come before you for judgment, one weak and one tough, before you have heard their words, or after you have heard their words and do not yet know where the law is leaning, you may say to them, “I will not deal with your case,” lest the tough one be found liable and then pursue the judge. But once you have heard their words and know where the law is leaning, you may not say, “I will not deal with your case,” as it says, “Do not be intimidated by any man,” so that you should not say, this person is wicked—lest he kill my son or burn my grain, lest he cut down my trees. “And if he was appointed over the public”—Maimonides adds his own addition here. There’s no source for this, at least none that I know of—“if he was appointed over the public, he is obligated to deal with them.” What is this addition? What was he talking about before?
[Speaker C] About an ordinary judge they chose?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An ordinary judge, a mutually selected one, or just some ordinary Torah scholar, or an ordained judge whom they come and ask to judge. Not someone officially appointed, not a standing court that sits and is appointed to judge. So regarding such a person, Maimonides says all the laws we learned earlier apply. Even someone not appointed. If he’s an ordained Torah scholar and they come before him and say, please judge us, he may not withdraw—at least once he knows where the law is leaning. Before that he may, because he isn’t—what is he obligated for? He doesn’t have to stick his head into this trouble. Afterward Maimonides adds: but an appointed judge is obligated to deal with them. What does that mean, “obligated to deal with them”? Even before he knows where the law is leaning. An appointed judge cannot withdraw from the case. There’s no such thing. Two people come before you—you must judge them. Even if they threaten you, whatever you want—no excuses for an appointed judge. And that’s a big innovation in Maimonides. That this whole law stated in the Sifrei and in the Talmud and all of that is about a judge who was not appointed. That’s a major innovation in both directions. With regard to an unappointed judge as well, he too has to place himself in mortal danger or danger to his property, even though he’s not appointed, it’s not his role. So what did he do wrong by being a Torah scholar? Why should he have to take a risk to save someone else? So that’s a stringent innovation from that angle, and a stringent innovation on the other side regarding an appointed judge—an even bigger innovation—that an appointed judge, even before he knows where the law is leaning, may not withdraw in any way. He must judge. And that also seems to be how other medieval authorities (Rishonim) understand it; Rashba understands it that way, and that’s also how the Shulchan Arukh writes. In other words, all those allowances don’t apply to an appointed judge; there, there’s no such thing—he does not withdraw from judgment under any circumstances.
Okay, so here a very detailed discussion begins, a bit already among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), and even more among the later authorities (Acharonim), about how far this goes. In other words, to what extent—actual mortal danger? Is he obligated to die? Is this die rather than transgress? What are we talking about? So there are decisors who want to say—you can even infer from Maimonides’ wording—because when Maimonides wrote it, he wrote: you may not say, “I will not deal with your case,” lest the strong one be found liable and then pursue him. Right? In other words, he says, what is this “lest”? Don’t evade. Don’t come up with false claims in order to evade because of some fear or another. But if there really is such a concern—if this isn’t a false pretext—then many decisors say there’s no such thing; danger to life overrides everything. In other words, there are only three prohibitions that are not overridden by danger to life, and “do not be intimidated” is not among them. And so they infer even from Maimonides that this is not talking about a case of danger to life. That’s not the plain meaning of Maimonides. The plain meaning of Maimonides really is that this is forbidden not only in false pretexts but even where there is a real concern. Though even where there is a real concern, there is discussion among the decisors whether we’re talking about certain mortal danger or doubtful mortal danger. And even those willing to go as far as doubtful mortal danger—by the way, that’s a minority. Most decisors say that in a case of mortal danger you don’t have to. So that’s a bit difficult; we’ll see in a moment. But even those who say—it’s in Tumim and Shevut Yaakov and the Bach, several decisors who say that this also reaches danger to life—most of them in the end are speaking about doubtful danger to life, not certain danger to life. With certain mortal danger—if you’re definitely dead—then no. If it’s doubtful mortal danger, then yes, then you can’t evade. And of course one always has to discuss whether we’re talking about an appointed judge or not, exactly whom they’re talking about, and it’s not always clear. But there is some distinction here between doubtful and certain mortal danger.
I’ll just give you the Radbaz as an example so you can see the other camp. I think I had the quotation here—no, I don’t have it, so I’ll tell it to you from memory. The Radbaz basically says: why is an appointed judge truly obligated to deal with the case? Because he isn’t really in mortal danger. They’ll protect him. In other words, the public appointed him, so the public will guard him. So in his case it really is a false pretext; that’s why he may not withdraw. And it follows from his words that even an appointed judge, in a place where there really is concern for mortal danger, may withdraw. Everything in Maimonides’ distinction—what? The unappointed one—
[Speaker C] The appointed judge. What does it mean for an appointed judge to withdraw?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because if the public doesn’t do its job and protect him, or there’s some thug here from whom it’s impossible to protect him, or I don’t know exactly what—such a situation could happen. He’s just saying on the conceptual level that Maimonides’ distinction concerning an appointed judge, that he may not withdraw even when threatened—that’s because in his case the threats aren’t really threatening. He’s a public judge, not a private person, so presumably the public will protect him. But it follows from him that if the public doesn’t protect him, then in a situation of danger to life even an appointed judge withdraws. And that’s what many decisors say. The truth is, according to the Radbaz you can still understand it, because why doesn’t he withdraw? We’ll see that in a moment. He doesn’t withdraw because he has to preserve the social fabric; it can’t be that violent people are able to do whatever they want. Now if the public doesn’t protect him, then why should he sacrifice himself in order to protect the public? After all, what they’re demanding of him is that he risk his life to protect the public. Now when the public fulfills its duty and protects him—meaning, if the public doesn’t do that, then what? Fine, I’ll help you if you do what you’re supposed to do, and if you don’t do what you’re supposed to do, why should I help you?
[Speaker C] But doesn’t that take us a bit far from reality? I mean, if the public doesn’t protect him, then there’s no reason to listen to him anyway, because why would anyone listen to him? That’s how I think about a judge today. There are real threats, okay? Now he knows they’ll protect him, right? If he knew they wouldn’t protect him, would anyone even listen to him? I mean, why go to a judge if I can settle accounts without him?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why can you? We’re talking about a particularly violent person, not everyone—
[Speaker C] We’re talking about particularly violent people here in the country.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, particularly violent people.
[Speaker C] Apparently there’s no reason to bring them to court at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No need—you can try, they won’t come. Fine, exactly. So that side, from a halakhic perspective, maybe seems simpler—the side many decisors take. The side that where there is danger to life, you withdraw. Your life comes first. In other words, you’re not supposed to sacrifice yourself for others, certainly not when you’re judging someone else’s money and for that you have to lose your life. Even your own money—your money comes before your fellow’s. Certainly when it comes to life, to sacrifice your life for your fellow’s money is even more extreme. So really, from the halakhic perspective, it somehow seems that the prevalent opinion among the decisors—at least from my impression, I haven’t done a broad statistical survey—is that where it comes to actual mortal danger, everyone withdraws. But from a contemporary point of view, these decisors were living in a situation where of course there was no state, no full public responsibility. There may have been a community court, with some level of autonomy, but above that there were the courts of the kingdom and the king and the regime and so on—in other words, there was someone to run the world. You don’t have to sacrifice your life to manage this issue; there’s an organized police force and a government and they’ll handle it. So in that situation you can discuss at the halakhic level—danger to life, no danger to life, don’t judge, yes judge. But today it looks very, very problematic. When you allow a judge—I maybe wouldn’t want to be in his shoes—but on the other hand, how can it be that we allow a judge not to fulfill his role because there’s some violent person threatening him? That’s just not reasonable. How can there be a legal system like that, without teeth? It sounds totally unreasonable when you live in a state.
[Speaker E] To the point that the public must protect the judge.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, exactly.
[Speaker E] But still—you know—in Italy they murdered judges. So there really is a problem fighting the mafia.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but the judges—the question is whether they are permitted to withdraw. That’s what we’re discussing. Obviously if judges aren’t protected, the justice system is damaged. My question is whether that is a justified claim from the judge’s point of view: you’re not protecting me, or not protecting me enough. After all, they killed a judge here too once, right? The judge from some time ago—Aznar? Aznar? They killed some judge. No, not Strashnov. Azar, yes. Azar, sorry.
[Speaker E] Okay, never mind.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so even if they do protect, still, it can happen. In other words, there’s some concern here. And of course even concern for danger to life—you have to know, not every remote concern counts as concern for danger to life. But still, there can be a case where even if they guard him, it can happen. The police guard him, but if there’s some organization that has made it its mission to kill a judge, no police protection will help. In other words, if they seriously decide to kill him, they’ll kill him. And on the other hand, it’s obvious that we can’t—even more so, we can’t anchor this in Jewish law or in written civil law—if he ran away, maybe we’d treat the judge leniently. Maybe. Even that I’m not sure of. But to write into the legal system, “the judge may flee if he feels his life is in danger”? That sounds really bizarre. It’s so obvious that these are laws written in a different situation. Today you can’t even hear such a thing.
[Speaker C] Were all those decisors really from exile?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, clearly. Obviously. It was all written in exile.
[Speaker C] But it’s strange that Maimonides writes this in the laws of the Sanhedrin? What? In the laws of the Sanhedrin Maimonides writes this?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides writes that he must not flee.
[Speaker C] Ah, okay, so that really applies to a Sanhedrin setting.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but the commentators on Maimonides interpret—no, Sanhedrin there means all the laws of judges generally.
[Speaker C] Not specifically related—no, I’m saying, maybe this law of Maimonides is talking about a period when there is a Sanhedrin in Israel, and then it really is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A state reality—ah, no. But they infer from Maimonides’ wording that there it’s only false pretexts, but not really—fine, let’s just tie it to reality. Yes, I think the plain sense of Maimonides’ wording doesn’t look like that. And that approach really is an approach that—I think it’s very obvious that it was written in a different situation. But as I said, in Tumim and in Shevut Yaakov and the Bach, they speak at least about doubtful danger to life; some of them even lean toward actual mortal danger. Again, I don’t know whether any of them says: you will definitely be killed, one hundred percent, and you still have to sit in judgment. It’s hard to believe you can obligate someone to sit in judgment when he will certainly be killed. There’s a real risk, yes? Fine, doubt means something more or less balanced. Real risk counts as danger to life. It’s never one hundred percent certain anyway. If it were one hundred percent, I don’t know if they’d say such a thing. You can see, for example, the wording of Tumim. He says: the Bach raised an objection from the Sifrei, from which it is clear that even if he will be killed, nevertheless he may not refrain from judgment. He cannot avoid judging even if he dies. But once he has already entered the case—anyway, it doesn’t matter—he agrees that heaven forbid, because of fear or some terror, he should remove himself from the case; rather he is obligated to judge. And on this the Sifrei elaborated, that even if he will be killed he may not withdraw. And that is once he has entered the case. And so too I found in the responsum of Shevut Yaakov, that once he knows where the law is leaning, he is forbidden to withdraw because of fear under any circumstances. And that is correct. In other words, no fear allows you to withdraw. Fine, that’s—now when you read the entire responsum, both Shevut Yaakov and the Bach and Tumim, you see that this doesn’t go all the way to one hundred percent danger. In other words, again, there is some common sense apparently. I’ll come back to this later.
[Speaker C] But if the reality is that—what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s—
[Speaker C] One hundred percent that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does one hundred percent mean?
[Speaker C] No, no—I’m saying if it’s certainly ninety percent, ninety-five percent, I wouldn’t even bring the claim myself. Even if the judge decides that I’m right and the other guy isn’t, I don’t think he—seems to me he—fine, sometimes people in anger—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, and in anger too they’ll explain to you that it’s not worth getting angry—don’t fight him. I’m—fine. I don’t know.
[Speaker C] I just can’t picture the case in my head.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, it’s a hypothetical discussion for now. It doesn’t matter right now how often it actually happens.
[Speaker F] But these things will become clear to you during the trial.
[Speaker C] Then I withdraw the claim on the spot.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, okay.
[Speaker F] Can you withdraw a claim in Jewish law?
[Speaker C] Of course. Everything. He can waive it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Once you forgo it, that’s it, there’s no need to judge. If it’s civil law, meaning a case between two people. Fine. So here I really want to get into this a bit, and maybe I’ll say it on two levels. First, if we really take this law seriously, even in an actual case of danger to life, not only in doubt. Then indeed there’s a question: after all, this is not one of the three severe transgressions. So from a halakhic point of view I understand the rationale, but still, how is it anchored in halakhic thinking? In halakhic thinking this is not die rather than transgress; it isn’t counted as one of those prohibitions. That’s one question. A second question, which on the halakhic level is even harder: those who make a distinction between doubtful and certain danger to life. In doubtful danger to life, yes; but in certain danger he is allowed to withdraw. Where do we find such a thing in Jewish law? We don’t. At least I don’t know of it. In Jewish law there is no distinction between doubtful and certain danger to life. Everywhere that danger to life overrides something, doubtful danger to life overrides it too. Everywhere that danger to life does not override it, doubtful danger to life does not override it either. So decide: if this belongs to the severe prohibitions—just a second—then both in doubtful and in certain danger to life; and if it doesn’t belong, then in both doubtful and certain danger it should be overridden. Where do we find a difference between doubtful and certain danger to life? We don’t. I don’t know of any example of that.
[Speaker E] What?
[Speaker H] Until the act is actually carried out, is it considered doubtful? Until the moment of execution? What do you mean? Doubtful danger to life…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so I said, no, there are situations of life-threatening danger. Life-threatening danger means a situation where there is a very, very significant risk. I said, there’s never one hundred percent; there’s never one hundred percent. But a very, very significant risk is, for me, one hundred percent. Meaning, that’s life-threatening danger. And doubtful life-threatening danger is a situation where there is risk, but let’s say fifty-fifty if we want to quantify it. As in Jewish law generally, a doubt is an evenly balanced doubt. Something that isn’t balanced is not a doubt; it follows the rule of majority. Sixty-forty is not a doubt. Sixty-forty is a majority. A doubt is an evenly balanced doubt. Now of course, what is an evenly balanced doubt? You can’t be that exact. But usually what happens in situations of doubt is that you don’t know. And if you don’t know, then you assume the two sides carry equal weight. Or if there are five stores in town of one kind and five stores in town of another kind—if you can count stores, then maybe you really can create a situation of five versus five. But usually situations of doubt are a negative doubt, meaning I don’t know what the reality is, and therefore my assumption is that there’s this side and that side, so I’m in doubt.
[Speaker C] By the way, to travel to hear, I don’t know, a Torah lesson in some community in Hebron, in a reality that’s just complicated and explosive, okay? Now a person sits there, and for him it’s doubtful life-threatening danger. It’s not evenly balanced. Meaning, if you look at it statistically, I don’t know, chances are you’ll go in peace and come back in peace.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Still, a significant risk counts as life-threatening danger. We don’t follow the majority here; if statistically only twenty percent are killed on the way and not fifty percent, I assume that would also count as doubtful life-threatening danger. You’re right—that’s a correct point. In matters of life-threatening danger, it seems to me we don’t make those fifty-fifty calculations. That’s not what is called life-threatening danger. A dangerous illness—is a dangerous illness only one where fifty percent die? I don’t think so. Obviously not. Anyway, significant versus not significant, balanced in the sense of—let’s put it this way—it’s a concern such that fifty percent of people would not do the act because of it. Maybe that could be some kind of measure. I don’t know exactly what the measure is, I don’t know. Okay, so I really want to try to explain this a bit. I’ll start with the claim about definite life-threatening danger. And the claim, I think, is basically what appears here: if a person holds a public office—for example, a judge, but as Sefer HaChinukh broadens it, other public roles as well—and he recoils in the face of threats of one kind or another, we’re dealing with monetary law right now, okay? Not capital law or anything like that. That of course completely tears apart the social fabric; meaning, you can’t live like that. And therefore this is called life-threatening danger, life-threatening danger of the public. And since there is life-threatening danger of the public, therefore the judge has to give up his life, like in war. Meaning, when a soldier goes out to war, he has to give up his life. What does that mean, give up his life? It means he has to take significant risks that it is forbidden to take in other situations. In a moment we’ll talk about the one hundred percent case of giving up one’s life; that’s a somewhat different matter. So too with a judge: this is basically war. It’s a war for the life of the public. And the life of the public—and this is the important point—is not defined by pulse and breathing. No individual person will lose his life. Why not? Let’s say he won’t. No individual person will lose his life. Fine? There will only be monetary anarchy. Once there is monetary anarchy, you cannot run a society like that. Society falls apart, people scatter in every direction, there’s no such thing. Now if I understand the notion of a public as some kind of organism, then its disintegration is the death of that organism. That organism dies.
[Speaker F] The concern is only that people will scatter as human beings.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean scatter? You can’t run a society like that.
[Speaker F] So it could be that somehow they’ll manage together, but it will be very, very—it’ll be a huge problem.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s the gray area. That’s the gray area. But we’re talking about the black area. First I want to clarify the principle. After that we can discuss gray situations.
[Speaker F] It just seems to me—why say he still has to endanger himself if there’s some criminal threatening him, because otherwise it will lead to total anarchy?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, in the end that criminal will do whatever he wants here, certainly. Once the criminal does whatever he wants, I won’t be here. I won’t be here. There’s no such thing. Unless he appoints himself king and starts becoming, yes, a robber with permission, as people always say: the king is the robber with permission. Huh?
[Speaker D] According to this explanation, then even a judge appointed, say, in Sweden to be a judge in Sweden—he too would be under the same prohibition when he judges according to Swedish law?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, correct. I think this is a principle connected to the laws of the descendants of Noah, not specifically to laws unique to us. I think this reasoning is correct everywhere.
[Speaker F] And assuming a descendant of Noah has to give up his life in order to save the… in order to…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The public he belongs to, like in war.
[Speaker F] What happens in war? That every individual is obligated in a war of…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That a descendant of Noah is obligated in… yes, the accepted view in Rabbi Sheviv’s article in Techumin on this, if I remember—I read two articles, I think, I don’t remember how many—on the laws of war. And there you can see various things; he brings some sources, though the sources here are a bit—it’s hard to bring strictly halakhic sources here—but he says that war is some kind of universal institution. It is conducted according to universal laws of war, and all this is valid in Jewish law as well. And I think this is true internally too, not only externally. Meaning, even the king’s authority to send a soldier to war is anchored in Jewish law. Meaning, the king can send a soldier to war—a gentile king. He can send a soldier to war; that is, Jewish law recognizes this authority of the king. And then basically the claim is that where there is public life-threatening danger—or sorry, where there is danger of the public disintegrating—that has the status of life-threatening danger. Now I don’t know how necessary this is, or whether it’s really what I said earlier with the organism, as if the organism dies. That’s a somewhat crude metaphor, not important. But I’m saying, at the conceptual level, that’s at least what I mean. I’m not talking right now about whether to take this explanation completely literally, that this is called that the public dies and therefore it is life-threatening danger, and to fit it into the simple halakhic mold in that way. But basically what stands behind it is more or less this kind of reasoning. The claim is that the life of a public is a life not measured by breaths and pulse the way the life of an individual is. The public can die, or when the public is in danger regarding its normal functioning, that is called—it has the halakhic status of life-threatening danger. And that justifies demands on people like the demands made of them when they are in situations of life-threatening danger, when you see someone else.
[Speaker E] But still, what is the importance of that particular public? Here, the Mishkan Yisrael community might fall apart because…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, we’re not talking about such a case. Then go to another synagogue, that doesn’t…
[Speaker E] Justify life-threatening danger.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Go…
[Speaker E] To another synagogue.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right now I’m talking about the Jewish people, okay? I’m talking about a state, or about a place that isn’t… that has nowhere else to go. And there too, by the way, there would be—that too is the gray area. The question is how far? A city, yes? I don’t know, I don’t know where the line is. Really don’t know. There are gray areas, but first let’s at least try to understand the idea. After that maybe we can think about gray areas—not that I know how one decides there, but… afterward we can move to the gray. First let’s see the black.
[Speaker F] Wait, why? If the consideration is that you can’t go somewhere else, then we’re back to individuals, not the public.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand. We haven’t gone back to individuals, because the individuals only lost money. They won’t go somewhere else; they lost money.
[Speaker F] They won’t go somewhere else—earlier we said the issue was that they…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you’re saying suppose they can’t go somewhere else. So does that make it about individuals again? No, it doesn’t make it about individuals. Because this society is not functioning as a society. Because you can’t—it’s anarchy. So all of us are here, with nowhere to run, but this is not a society.
[Speaker F] By the way, it seems to me you could even bring support for this from the example of war. Because there too one could say: drill down, so to speak—just let the enemy… submit yourselves to enemy rule.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’ll lose taxes, this,
[Speaker F] And many people would accept that, would agree. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The public has a right to defend itself—not only the public, by the way, an individual does too.
[Speaker E] I was talking about “better red than dead.” Huh? “Better red than dead” was some kind of slogan… red means communist?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is red?
[Speaker E] Better to surrender to the communists
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Than to die.
[Speaker E] If nuclear war will kill all of us, then better to live under communist rule than to be dead.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but we’re not talking about a situation where I’m dead anyway. We’re talking about a situation where I enter into risk in war. I may die and I may not die. So even risk—I’m not supposed to enter it in situations where I can flee or go somewhere else.
[Speaker E] But here, since he judged it in relation
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To the physics of the matter—here, I’ll give you an example from an individual too, by the way. If someone threatens an individual with a gun and says: give me a shekel or I’ll kill you. Am I allowed to kill him? I don’t want to give him a shekel. I have a shekel; I don’t want to give it to him. So should I kill him under the law of a pursuer? I can give him a shekel and save myself.
[Speaker C] Yes, it’s like a burglar breaking in.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s say there’s no concern. I can give him a shekel and save myself. Why?
[Speaker E] It’s the same
[Speaker C] thing, the consideration is life-threatening danger. Life-threatening danger means you don’t need to give it to him because he’s threatening to kill you—it’s not your money.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, not your money? Give him a shekel and then you can save him by injuring one of his limbs. What’s the problem? Give him a shekel and you won’t have to kill him.
[Speaker C] It’s not life-threatening danger, so to speak—it’s like what the Rabbi said about halakhic territory, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let him do his calculations on his side.
[Speaker C] Right, let him give me the shekel.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So here it’s actually fairly clear, and several halakhic decisors say this too, that in such a case you can kill him. Even though you could give him a shekel and save both him and yourself. And a great risk?
[Speaker F] What? And a great risk? Suppose not over a shekel—suppose he says give me a shekel in order to save property, and I can’t kill him; I want to run away, and maybe he’ll shoot me and maybe he won’t.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For a shekel no one wants to take a risk. To save property? I don’t know, that’s a big question.
[Speaker F] No, that seems to me the fitting example for war. Here, it seems to me the reasoning is different: the reasoning is that he is the guilty one, so we don’t take him into account. But in the case of war, on
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] my side—no, but here I have a right to defend myself if someone opens a war against me.
[Speaker F] Not in terms of killing them—in terms of risk on my side, why are you endangering yourself in order to avoid subjugation?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, okay, I really don’t know. Interesting question whether I’m allowed to endanger myself in such a case.
[Speaker I] Meaning, you can either kill him or
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Spare his killing, and with a shekel get rid of him and save yourself.
[Speaker I] Yes, but you don’t want to.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, you can kill him. I once brought this example in connection with territory; I brought the example of Zimri, where the Talmud says that if Zimri had turned around and killed Pinchas, he would not have been executed for it. Right? If Zimri had turned around and killed Pinchas under the law of a pursuer, then he would have been exempt. The law of a pursuer. So the Rebbe of Gur asks—the Kli Chemda brings him at the end of the Torah portion of Balak—he asks there, why can he? He could simply stop sinning and then Pinchas would not kill him.
[Speaker F] At a certain stage, if he was exactly…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Stop, stop, stop—I’m stopping the sin, you’re right, I’m repenting. Fine? That’s what he tells him. So then he could have saved him by injuring one of his limbs, meaning by stopping the sin. Now here it’s not even paying a shekel—just stop sinning and that’s it. So the Rebbe of Gur asks: well then, why is he allowed to kill Pinchas? He can save himself and Pinchas without killing Pinchas, and this should count as “he could save him by injuring one of his limbs.” So the Kli Chemda discusses it there according to the Rivash: the one being pursued himself is not required to save him by injuring one of his limbs. That is only a rule for a third party. A third party who comes to save the pursued person—if he can do it without killing the pursuer, he should do that. But the pursued person himself—we don’t demand that of him. Do what you need in order to save yourself. That is the Rivash’s view. But according to the other halakhic decisors, he argues basically that yes, I could have stopped sinning, but I don’t feel like stopping. Do I owe him anything? I don’t want to stop sinning. I want to sin. I have accounts with the Holy One, blessed be He; the Holy One, blessed be He, will settle accounts with me. What does that have to do with you? You’re threatening me—it’s like with the shekel. You’re threatening me, so I’ll kill you; you are a pursuer. I don’t owe you that I should stop sinning. I owe the Holy One, blessed be He; leave that to me, I’ll work it out with Him. In that sense, even with an individual person there is some kind of attitude here of: I have the right to defend myself, period. Now here—why am I returning to the question you asked earlier? Am I allowed to endanger myself? Usually, when I turn around and kill Pinchas, chances are I’m taking a risk, because Pinchas is no fool either. He came with a spear. I could lose my life, right? And in fact, in order to preserve my right to sin—right to sin, yes?—I’m allowed to take risks.
[Speaker F] But that’s a weaker source, sort of a midrashic reading of the Torah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Forget the source—what do I care about the source? Do the calculation. Forget the Kli Chemda; do the calculation. He can stop sinning, so why is he allowed to kill Pinchas?
[Speaker F] It seems to me the simpler reading is that—at least one could say—the assumption was that it wouldn’t help him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why wouldn’t it help him?
[Speaker F] Because it’s too late, because Pinchas already acted, he won’t have enough time, something like that it seems to me
[Speaker E] That’s it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why too late? He says to Pinchas: stop, stop, stop, I repent—and then they’ll bring him to a religious court. The right to sin is a very questionable right, and still it stands. So then the right not to pay a shekel—if you demand a shekel from me, certainly I have such a right, and if I don’t want to pay, am I allowed to kill you? Fine. In any case, let’s get back to our matter. So what I want to claim, basically, is that since a situation in which there is no enforcement system, no effective judicial system, or any other governmental authority that is significant for the public fabric—yes, I’m not talking about supervision of kiosks perhaps, but something relevant to public life—then such a situation is called life-threatening danger. When the public fabric is about to unravel, no one may die, but it is still called life-threatening danger, and it falls under the category of life-threatening danger.
[Speaker E] Is it forbidden to be an anarchist because of “Do not murder”? What? Is it forbidden to be an anarchist because of “Do not murder”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the anarchy would באמת really dismantle society—depends what kind of anarchist you are. The anarchist view is against institutions, not against society. The anarchist view doesn’t want institutions; we’ll get along fine among human beings, we’ll live in peace and tranquility and everything will be fine. A bit naive, but they’re not saying that now we should dismantle everything and each person should live on a deserted island. Original anarchism, anarchist philosophy, does not say that. We’ll all live here together in peace and tranquility if those people up there don’t interfere with us—they only interfere. In any case, the more interesting question in this context is the question of doubt, the second question. What is the difference between doubt and certainty? I’ll bring a few more proofs or supports for this later—let’s call them supports—but first I want to complete the picture with the second question. I said that in Jewish law I don’t know of any difference between doubt and certainty. Whatever life-threatening danger overrides, doubtful life-threatening danger also overrides. Whatever yields before it—if it yields before doubtful life-threatening danger, then definite life-threatening danger also yields before it.
[Speaker F] Even in cases of one life against another life?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Even in cases of one life against another? There it may be not. Depends on the situation. If I am a third party, or I am the one endangered by doubtful life-threatening danger and I need to harm someone else in order to save myself, or harm someone whose status is doubtful in order to save myself from certain danger, then no. But if there is a person who can save one of two people, and one is in doubtful life-threatening danger and one is in definite life-threatening danger, then I think it is certainly reasonable to save the one in definite life-threatening danger.
[Speaker F] No, but even more than that: suppose there is an opinion that allows me to endanger myself in order to save another person?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is the Hagahot Maimoniot, but all the halakhic decisors reject it. He brings a Jerusalem Talmud on this in chapter 1 of the laws of murder. In any case, the difference here cries out for explanation. Because here we are not talking about—suppose the public counts as life-threatening danger? Fine. Then if I have to give up my life, then even in a definite case. If it is not in the category of life-threatening danger of the public, then even doubtful life-threatening danger should not be imposed on me. Here it’s not doubt versus certainty. Here it’s that for the sake of a certain value I have to surrender. What do I surrender? Only my doubtful life-threatening danger, my doubtful life, and not my certain life. Where does such a distinction come from? And in the Talmud in Yoma, when the Talmud searches for a source that life-threatening danger overrides the Sabbath, it brings several sources, and all of them except the last are rejected because they explain only that definite life-threatening danger overrides the Sabbath, and one cannot learn from them that doubtful life-threatening danger overrides the Sabbath. Fine—so what’s the problem? Then the law will be that definite life-threatening danger overrides the Sabbath, and doubtful danger does not. But it was obvious to the Talmud—this was a known law—that there is no difference between doubt and certainty. This was obvious to it a priori, even before the sources. It rejected the sources on the basis of the fact that it was obvious to it that if definite life-threatening danger overrides the Sabbath, then doubtful danger must also override it.
[Speaker F] Why—maybe it was obvious to them from the outset that doubtful life-threatening danger overrides the Sabbath?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But for those who brought these sources, was it not obvious?
[Speaker F] Why? Sometimes there’s a familiar law; everybody knows that it’s so.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then why did they bring those sources?
[Speaker F] So they search for the source of the law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but those tannaitic sages remained with it—the Talmud rejected it. The tannaim remained there; each one brought a source and stuck with it. The Talmud refused to accept those sources because they do not serve as a source for doubtful life-threatening danger. So what do you see? That there are tannaitic positions here saying that doubtful life-threatening danger does not override, only definite danger does. What’s the problem? The problem is that it was obvious to the Talmud that there is no difference between doubt and certainty. By the way, at least one of the sources also appears in Jewish law, even though it was rejected—it appears in another sugya in tractate Shabbat. So somehow it is clear to the Talmud—no matter from what source—it is clear to the Talmud that there is no difference between doubt and certainty. What is happening here? So here I think one can continue a bit further in the same direction, and here I think one can see the more complex model. Earlier I spoke about the public as something that demands: the individual sacrifice himself. This is the fascist conception, yes? The judge basically has to sacrifice himself so that the public will function properly. Fine, I call this fascism in the abstract, but I mean what I called fascism earlier—the conception that the collective basically stands above the individual. But the difference between doubt and certainty here is really illuminating, in this context. Because it seems to me that this is exactly what is being said there. I, as a judge, serve as a judge. Okay? I also am a private person, besides being a judge. I am not only an organ in the collective organism; I am also a private person. Now when you demand that I surrender myself for the sake of the collective, you are also subjecting my individual side. I am not only an organ in the collective; I am also an individual. So they tell me this: look, if you are in doubtful life-threatening danger, surrender yourself. Take the risk for this role. But definite life-threatening danger—we are not prepared to subordinate the individual for the sake of the collective. Maybe I’ll give an example that sharpens this more. Even in the ethics code of the IDF—I don’t remember if it’s written explicitly, but it’s clear, I just don’t remember whether it’s written in the ethical code or not—that for a mission which is certainly, certain in the sense I spoke about earlier, a very, very high risk—not doubtful life-threatening danger but actual life-threatening danger—you cannot give a soldier an order to go out. You cannot give a soldier an order to go on a mission that is life-threatening danger. That is an illegal order. He is not required to obey that order.
[Speaker E] A suicide mission.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A suicide mission, yes, exactly. That famous story of Beni Peled there in the Mitla Pass with the jeep, where he sent someone with the jeep so that the Egyptians would shoot at the jeep. He volunteered. He volunteered? Yes, yes, he volunteered. He asked who volunteers, and he did not give an order. You cannot give such an order. Fine? Now that too cries out for explanation. After all, when you send a soldier into battle, some soldiers will die. That’s clear. You take a risk when you go into battle. That, yes. But to send a soldier on a suicide mission—no. If he volunteers, that’s different.
[Speaker D] Like when we put someone with the car from here to there—a risk that he’ll die. Yes, right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the “neighbor procedure.” What? The neighbor procedure involves the other population, the Palestinians.
[Speaker D] But there too, because of the high risk.
[Speaker F] No, the neighbor procedure wasn’t a case of certain risk.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re simply taking someone who isn’t involved—that was the claim there.
[Speaker D] But the risk is obvious.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but it’s someone uninvolved—why in the world should he take a risk for you? That was the claim there. By the way, I don’t agree with that, but that was the claim there. In any case, maybe I’ll get to that too. So it seems to me that exactly the same point is here. When I send the judge on a suicide mission for the sake of the public, yes, for the sake of winning the war—we compared it earlier to war, okay?—I can’t send him on a suicide mission. But to take risks like any soldier. Meaning, you’re in a war, you have to take risks. And here I think—and here this dualistic conception enters very powerfully, I think. It says that with every person, I do not erase his individual identity before his collective identity. And I also do not erase the collective and see it only as serving the individual, because then you couldn’t send him even into doubtful life-threatening danger at all. So this is exactly the middle position. I say: I am not willing to subordinate the person to the collective even in definite life-threatening danger. “Go die for us.” That means you erased him as an individual. He is basically just one of our limbs. That—no. He is also an individual; you cannot ignore that. Okay? On the other hand, doubtful life-threatening danger, yes. There we do see the public as something whose life—its proper life, I mean not breathing, yes?—its life is something that has some status of life-threatening danger, and you are an organ in that organism, and you need to contribute your share so it can function. So even at the level of doubt, even at the level of doubtful life-threatening danger—but not certainty. I think this is an example of that distinction between the models. There is a two-hat model here. Yes? Your individual hat and your hat as an organ in the collective. Let’s think—there’s a remark here that I don’t really know what to do with. I have some suggestion, but I’m not comfortable with it. There’s the known law about a military commander who has gone into exile. If Joab there. What does the Mishnah in Makkot 11b say? It says this: “And he does not go out—not for testimony…” One who has gone into exile, yes? A manslayer by accident has gone into a city of refuge; he fears the blood avenger. It says: “And he does not go out, neither for mitzvah testimony nor for monetary testimony nor for capital testimony.” There is a commandment to testify in religious court, of all kinds. What are they? He does not have to take risks in order to testify in religious court for the benefit of others.
[Speaker F] He does not have to, or he is forbidden?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “He does not go out.” If he doesn’t have to, then apparently it is also forbidden, because a person may not enter into risk.
[Speaker F] No, but only if there is risk—there are realities where there is no risk.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning if, suppose, if
[Speaker F] There is no blood avenger, then is he allowed to go out? Unrelated to testimony, just because he feels like it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. No, he has the obligation of exile, but without a blood avenger he can go out. The conception is that it’s only because of his life-threatening danger.
[Speaker F] He can go out for testimony?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, for testimony he can go out. Then it says, “And even if Israel needs him.” And it goes on—not only testimony, but “Israel needs him.” “And even if he is the commander of Israel’s army like Joab son of Zeruiah, he never leaves there,” as it says, “to which he fled, there shall be his dwelling; there shall be his death; there shall be his burial.” He does not leave.
[Speaker E] So maybe it’s not because of protecting his life; maybe it’s because of his legal status.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The medieval authorities explain that this—it’s, I don’t remember whether the Talmud says it, but the medieval authorities explain that here—maybe even in Maimonides you can somewhat see this wording: “The exile does not leave his city of refuge forever, even for a commandment matter or for testimony, whether monetary testimony or capital testimony, and even to save a life by his testimony, or to save from the army, or from the river, or from the fire, or from a collapse. And even if all Israel need his salvation like Joab son of Zeruiah, he never leaves there until the death of the High Priest. And if he leaves, he has made himself permitted to death, as we explained.” Here you already see that if he leaves, he has not transgressed a prohibition. That is, the issue is not prohibition; rather, he has exposed himself to death. Meaning, it is permitted to kill him, and therefore he is not required to go out. And other medieval authorities wrote this even more explicitly: that he is not required because of the risk. After all, if exile were a commandment, why would the commandment of exile not be overridden by the life-threatening danger of all Israel? That’s absurd. All commandments are overridden by life-threatening danger. To endanger his life… maybe specifically in this case. What’s the idea behind it? Why? What is this commandment? Why don’t we count it among the commandments that yield before life-threatening danger? That’s not the point. The point is his own life-threatening danger. He does not have to take his own risk, even if all Israel need him. Now here there’s a question: this goes against what I said earlier.
[Speaker C] Yes, and it’s not certain they’ll kill him either.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Simply speaking, it is not certain they’ll kill him. Not to mention that I don’t understand at all how they allow the blood avenger to kill him. We need Joab son of Zeruiah now to command the army. Take this hysterical blood avenger, or this hotheaded one, put him in prison and lock him up there until the war is over.
[Speaker B] Tie him to a tree.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. What kind of thing is that? This law is so strange. I don’t know what to say about it.
[Speaker F] Maybe it’s not because of that. So maybe it really isn’t for the…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I don’t know. Then for what is it? I don’t know. He deserves the punishment of exile. So there is, by the way, there is in… in short, until the death of the High Priest. That’s simpler. Kill the High Priest. The life-threatening danger of all Israel means the High Priest should sacrifice himself. Yes. Arukh HaShulchan writes maybe something like this, that the halakhic decisors brought in the name of the Jerusalem Talmud that a person is obligated to place himself in possible danger in order to save his fellow. That is the Hagahot Maimoniot I mentioned. “But the medieval authorities omitted it because from our Talmud it is proven that he is not obligated to place himself in danger. Nevertheless, everything depends on the matter, and one must weigh the matter carefully and not protect himself too much.” And I remembered that Arukh HaShulchan brings proof from here against Hagahot Maimoniot, that you do not need to endanger yourself in order to save others. Here you see that even a commander who has gone into exile does not need to take a risk in order to save others.
[Speaker C] I think the Rabbi—it’s only the Rabbi. Meaning, what this Jewish law is trying to say is that suppose it’s not just one blood avenger, okay? And there is some very, very strong chance that from this huge group, this giant family, I don’t know, that… have you heard of them?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ramla? What are they called?
[Speaker C] The Jarushi family from Ramla? These great sages of Israel—that if this commander says, listen, I’m not coming back from there, okay? It’s so obvious that one of them will sacrifice himself for this. So that’s it, so I said, the law says: if that’s how you feel, then stay there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the explanation I also thought of, but again, it’s a bit forced because they don’t mention it. Simply speaking, it’s a blood avenger. And again I say: tie this blood avenger to a tree.
[Speaker C] Yes, but what about all these blood avengers there are?
[Speaker F] Look, Maimonides says he exposed himself to death.
[Speaker C] Don’t come with complaints afterward. Meaning, let him make his own calculation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but he exposed himself to death if he went out.
[Speaker C] Right, and if one of them really harmed him, then when they bring that person to religious court they’ll tell him: correct, I’m exempt. Yes. And because of that, he can make that calculation for himself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, but a judge cannot make that calculation.
[Speaker C] No, but the exile,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In doubtful life-threatening danger, a judge cannot make that calculation. Why can’t a judge?
[Speaker C] That’s a question, but that can be explained, because look,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you’re talking about definite life-threatening danger…
[Speaker C] Because he is in a city of refuge; he has a city of refuge, he’s completely protected. In contrast… right now he is in a state where he is fully protected.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if the judge runs away, he’s protected too.
[Speaker C] But that judge had the option… the judge can withdraw from the case before he even begins at all. Meaning, I want to resign, I don’t want to be a judge. Before he started? Yes. Okay. Once you entered it…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a commandment, there is a commandment. Meaning, anyone fit to judge has a commandment to judge.
[Speaker C] But I’m saying, still—you have that option to leave, not to enter this situation. Nobody—you’re not obligated to be a judge. Once you decided to be a judge, once you decided, pay the price.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not completely neutral; there is a commandment to be a judge.
[Speaker C] But here too there’s a commandment, Rabbi—isn’t that a bit forced?
[Speaker F] I could say that the military commander had the option not to be commander
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of the army from the outset.
[Speaker C] I don’t know. No, but he entered the situation. The military commander—once he went into exile he’s no longer commander. You just want him now, you want his help.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is he not an acting commander?
[Speaker C] Yes, he isn’t obligated
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to pick himself, the finest commander.
[Speaker C] Exactly. I don’t want—let’s not get into it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I don’t know. In short, it probably isn’t so
[Speaker C] impossible to explain.
[Speaker F] It seems to me there’s another possibility he suggested, that it really depends on the role and not just on the mere fact that you…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But again, it’s life-threatening danger. Here it’s real life-threatening danger. The judge—there it’s that they’ll take his… if you don’t take the money from the one who owes it—from here to get to… Here you’re talking about the Jewish people needing him as commander, meaning the assessment is that he’ll win the war for us. We’ll die without that.
[Speaker C] It’s hard—why is there no law allowing him to leave, and forbidding the blood avenger to harm him? That’s hard, maybe. Why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Assuming there is no such law—
[Speaker C] then it can be explained.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s definite life-threatening danger, I understand. If it’s doubtful life-threatening danger, I don’t see what the difference is
[Speaker C] between that and a judge.
[Speaker F] In the end, he’s commander; he can place soldiers
[Speaker C] to guard him, and that’s the end of the story.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which is why I say that this answer seems to me somewhat problematic.
[Speaker C] The situation is problematic, Rabbi, because if it’s such a reality that all Israel need him and he’s sitting there in the city of refuge, that blood avenger who would kill him regardless would also kill him there.
[Speaker E] No, how can you say the same thing about the death of the High Priest?
[Speaker C] That too is true—they could kill the High Priest too if the family is that violent.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but then they would be executed. The religious court would execute them; we’re not talking about a violent family, this is a blood avenger. We’re not talking about people beyond control.
[Speaker C] So that same religious court that can execute them should say that in this situation we permit him to remain out there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not written here, not clear. I assume the religious court has authority. Obviously if it decides to do that, it will happen. It will tell the blood avenger: gentlemen, lock him up for now, and now we are taking Joab son of Zeruiah and we need him for the war. If the religious court decides that, it is obviously permitted.
[Speaker C] But if that didn’t happen, then that’s the threshold. Fine, I don’t know.
[Speaker F] The second possibility is to say there is some sort of mystical, let’s call it, or psychological assumption, that even if technically Israel needs him, in the overall calculation it will ultimately be harmful. Meaning, if they put at the head someone they took out of the city of refuge. What will be harmful?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In what sense are you saying it will be harmful? We’re talking about a war where all Israel need him—what do you mean? This is a very extreme case.
[Speaker F] And in the end they’ll lose, say.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so here someone wants to argue
[Speaker F] It’s also forced, Arukh HaShulchan.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says: “Although nothing stands before life-threatening danger”—he asks this question about that commander—“however, one can say that since if he goes out, his blood is permitted, one cannot tell him to permit his blood for the sake of others.” This is the Arukh HaShulchan I remembered, who brought proof from here against Aglei Mayim that a person need not endanger himself to save another; here we see that if risk rests on him, then there is risk. And he adds: “Since the killing of a person came about through him, it is unlikely that merit will come about through him.” In simple terms, it just won’t help.
[Speaker C] Completely mystical. Yes, exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m saying—I very much understand what forces him to go there.
[Speaker C] And then the Rabbi’s difficulty remains, that’s all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nothing stands before life-threatening danger, so you have to say maybe it won’t help if he leaves there. Fine. “And one may doubt whether, if he wishes to leave for a life-saving commandment, we restrain him or not.” That’s what Arukh HaShulchan says. The commander wants to volunteer to leave anyway; he’ll take the risk. Do we restrain him? “And from reason it would seem that we do not restrain him.” Here too this implies that the issue is life-threatening danger, not prohibition.
[Speaker C] What—wouldn’t “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” the right to save all Israel, override that whole rolling-of-merit idea…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And what we learned in Makkot, that he does not leave there, means that we do not compel him to leave. And so it appears there in the Jerusalem Talmud, and this law requires further analysis.” Fine. In short, this whole business is a somewhat obscure chapter, but it’s a remark on what I said earlier, and now I want to speak a bit about what this actually means—what the more current implications are, let’s say, for us. Look, for example, there is a discussion… in short. For example, operating the police on the Sabbath. A painful topic. Religious people customarily do not enlist in the police—an ancient custom—and why? Because they know the police deal with all sorts of things, a large part of which are not life-threatening danger, and it involves Sabbath desecration, and you can’t do it without that, it doesn’t work any other way, so they don’t join the police. Now not long ago they set up some preparatory program. “The best to the police,” I don’t remember what it was called, something like that, run by Rabbi Barkiyahu, Ami Barkiyahu, and they deal precisely with these issues and try to bring in graduates of hesder yeshivot to enlist in the police. They won’t enlist. Commissioner. Fine. They took him against his will. I assume he doesn’t need to desecrate the Sabbath for just anything—only for things that are really life-threatening danger. No, for things that are truly life-threatening danger.
[Speaker B] He’s not used to desecrating the Sabbath.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, the question is how one can really permit an observant person—or any Jew, for that matter—to serve in the police when the conduct involves constant Sabbath desecration all the time, when most cases have nothing to do with life-threatening danger at all. The same is true in hospitals, right? A nurse or a doctor in a hospital desecrates the Sabbath at every step. How many of those things are life-threatening danger? A small minority.
[Speaker E] They have all kinds of procedures and things there on the Sabbath.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At Shaare Zedek. Yes, there are procedures. So you know Shaare Zedek, but at Sheba there are no procedures, everything is normal. At Shaare Zedek, there’s no electricity there—
[Speaker E] in the outlets at all on the Sabbath, only lighting. Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that they won’t turn things on. So that’s at Shaare Zedek; I don’t think that’s true in hospitals in general. What? I don’t think that’s the case in regular hospitals. At Shaare Zedek. I know Yossi knows Shaare Zedek, and that’s why.
[Speaker E] The technical aspects.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.
[Speaker F] If these things are necessary so that they can work there, then that too is a matter of saving life.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, so that they can work? A nurse comes to me in the morning—I was hospitalized once—a nurse comes to me in the morning with a digital thermometer to take my temperature. Nothing there was a matter of saving life. I was sitting there with some inflammation in my leg, I needed antibiotics, but you know, they take everyone’s temperature in the morning, they wake you up at five in the morning, everybody has to have their temperature taken. Fine, that’s life-saving for the animals. Exactly. It’s life-saving for the nurses. So what’s the permission to do that?
[Speaker F] I assume it’s some kind of permission based on—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It seems simple to me. Everybody does it; if you don’t do it, you can’t be a nurse there.
[Speaker F] So you could say that maybe it’s a matter of saving life, because otherwise you won’t be able to function at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Their problem? What do you mean, I can’t? What, I’m obligated to desecrate the Sabbath because you’re wicked? What does it mean, I can’t?
[Speaker F] Meaning if not, then indeed, you—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] can’t, so it’s forbidden. So that’s what I’m asking: is it really forbidden or permitted? That’s the question. Seemingly there’s no way to justify it. It’s outright Sabbath desecration. That’s my question.
[Speaker F] Maybe one could raise—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whatever, never mind, rabbinic-level perhaps, but even rabbinic-level is still something. So yes—doctors or police officers or all these kinds of things where, ostensibly, the permission is based on saving life—most of the work, and we know this in advance, it’s not that maybe sometimes you don’t know; no, that’s not true. We know in advance that many things are not a matter of saving life. Don’t write down the exact temperature, the precise temperature now in the morning—write it only after the Sabbath, or I don’t know exactly what, work something out for yourself, I don’t know, you can do all kinds of things. Of course you can’t function like that. But fine, the question is: how do you justify such a thing?
[Speaker C] You can’t function like that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. That is certainly the justification. And it’s permitted to go be a police officer, and you’re allowed to write and drive a car, you’re allowed to do everything. And if they call you about a thief—there’s no life-saving issue there—you can drive a car to catch that thief, if you manage to. Why? Because it’s exactly the same thing as the judge. Once you—understand that those religious guys who don’t join the police, like me for example—not because I’m religious but because I just had no interest in joining—but those who don’t join the police because of religiosity can allow themselves to do that only because there are others pulling their chestnuts out of the fire, because there are others who do do it. Let’s see what happens if all of us here are like that and there’s no police.
[Speaker B] Why wouldn’t there be?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem at all, nothing will happen, believe me, because we just won’t be here. By the way, Rabbi, that’s a missing category in my view, right? Why?
[Speaker F] The claim about reality wouldn’t be that there would be no police, but that there would be police and on the Sabbath they would deal only with life-saving situations; in other words, thieves would roam free.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, obviously—but then there wouldn’t be citizens and there wouldn’t be thieves and there wouldn’t be police, because we simply wouldn’t be here. That’s all. Nobody will live in a place where on the Sabbath his life and property are ownerless. Nobody will live in such a place. There’s no such thing. Society doesn’t function that way. Rather what? We always rely on there being Gentiles to do the work—the “Gentiles” in quotation marks, meaning those who are willing to join the police.
[Speaker C] Rabbi, is that—
[Speaker F] Doesn’t it come out—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] worse, for that matter?
[Speaker C] Isn’t that sending them? I don’t understand. I actually think it should be the other way around: you have to join the police because then you’ll be more—your Sabbath desecration will be less. Maybe.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because there’s less issue of desecrating less.
[Speaker C] No, I agree too; I’m only saying that the moment you rely on others to do it for you, you’ve sent them.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That—
[Speaker C] It’s like explicitly telling someone to turn on the light for you on the Sabbath.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not exactly, but yes, implicitly. I sent them implicitly. I’m saying the same thing in the hospital—nurses and doctors—and also in the police: basically people are always looking for these permissions based on saving life, and I think that misses this point. Once there’s a threat to the functioning of society—a hospital can’t function if you’re constantly writing like that, it’s impossible, it doesn’t work that way, you can’t write like that. It’s simply impractical. I remember when I was in operations in the army—for a certain period I was in the brigade operations room, in Brigade 7’s ops room, a nightmare I’ll never forget. Anyway, phone calls and radio communication keep coming in on the Sabbath all the time: what about the hot food? Right? Where’s the food coming from? And what about these wheels and the big wheels and the small wheels and all their nonsense. So you don’t know which phone to answer and which radio to answer. At first, on Friday evening, I tried telling the guys, I’m on shift now, I’m asking you not to call about things that aren’t operational. But there’s no such thing. It’s not practical. You can ask until tomorrow. It’s simply not practical. It’s impossible. The system can’t function that way. This one got stuck without food and that one—impossible. If you translate everything into saving life, maybe in the end you’ll somehow manage in some distant way. That’s what people usually do. If he doesn’t eat then he won’t function well, and therefore it will become a life-saving issue. Those are the usual translations. Sometimes it may even be true. I think that’s naïve. The permission is not saving life. The permission is that there’s no other way. There’s no other way.
[Speaker F] Why? Wait, if it’s not saving life, then why is there no other way?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no other way because operations have to function. You can’t—there’s no—
[Speaker F] Is it impossible that from time to time people will miss things?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s possible that from time to time people will miss things, but I’m saying in routine ongoing conduct it doesn’t work. Like Yeshayahu Leibowitz—Yeshayahu Leibowitz said this about Foreign Ministry embassies. How can it be that in a modern state the Foreign Ministry won’t function on the Sabbath? In the State of Israel there’s no one to reach on the Sabbath? Anywhere in the world one of our citizens gets into trouble, another state needs something urgent with our government, and the answer is: sorry, call after the Sabbath; on Sunday we’re on vacation here in the Land of Israel.
[Speaker C] What state? Today? What do you mean, today?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, a Jewish state that conducts itself according to Jewish law. Okay? Would there be no Foreign Ministry on the Sabbath? There isn’t—it’s not saving life, let’s say for the sake of discussion. There are also things that really are life-saving, but let’s assume not. It doesn’t work. You can’t function. You can’t be part of the family of nations like that. You can’t. It doesn’t work.
[Speaker F] Wait, but what you’re saying—after all, in reality, let’s say for argument’s sake that all Jews keep the Sabbath—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then—
[Speaker F] in that situation, then presumably these things wouldn’t be needed? What do you mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are other countries that need us. There are citizens who get into trouble in various places. Lots of things happen. Lots of things. One hundred percent. But once this is public, then even though the ordinary citizen who needs that service isn’t going to die—
[Speaker C] But then is it permitted?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? No, that’s what I’m saying. No, that citizen isn’t going to die. Again, if he’s going to die, fine—that’s saving life, that’s the straightforward translation.
[Speaker C] I’m not talking about if he’s not going to die then you don’t need it. If he’s a religious Jew too, then he also won’t need you. No, he will need you.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He can get into trouble in all sorts of places. The Gentiles around him aren’t Jews when he’s living or located somewhere.
[Speaker C] So that is saving life?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not saving life.
[Speaker C] No, no, not saving life.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not managing to understand the picture, Rabbi. They’re about to throw him in jail because he didn’t show them some certificate from some—no, it doesn’t work like that. If every Jewish citizen can know that anywhere in the world they’ll throw him in jail on the Sabbath for no reason just because they abuse him, then no, that can’t work.
[Speaker C] But if he’s a religious Jew it won’t bother him at all. Rabbi? It’ll bother him very much. No, that doesn’t seem right to me. If I’m thrown in jail, if I—
[Speaker F] If I’m thrown in jail and I need the embassy to testify that I’m an Israeli citizen and I came with a passport, am I allowed to call the embassy on the Sabbath?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying that you, as a private individual, maybe not.
[Speaker F] But if all the private—
[Speaker C] individuals don’t do it—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] there’s no reality in which no private citizen can apply, then you’re right. But that’s not the situation, because the situation—
[Speaker C] isn’t like that because not everyone is a religious Jew.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not only that. It’s not only that.
[Speaker C] Picture a scenario where everyone is strictly observant of Torah and commandments, and there would still be—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] a problem running a state according to Jewish law. I’ve never worked in the Foreign Ministry. I’m telling you: go interview once—I don’t know—the director-general of the Foreign Ministry, an ambassador, someone who knows how things happen. You’ll see what kinds of problems he runs into. I assume he runs into a huge number of problems I’m not even thinking about. The director-general of the Foreign Ministry? Oh yes? Okay, Dore Gold. Ah, Dore Gold. Okay. Never mind—again, I’m not getting into that argument now. You know, the Foreign Ministry, fine? Never mind, I’m speaking on the principled level. There is a situation in which a society can’t function. When a society can’t function, that is permission to desecrate the Sabbath. That’s the point. Not only where a person will die. A person won’t die. But society can’t function. Let’s say, for example, if a Jewish citizen can’t travel abroad, can’t be abroad on the Sabbath. Why? Because they’ll always abuse him on the Sabbath, throw him in jail, abuse him—he won’t go. He simply won’t go. Suppose that’s the situation. Okay? Then let’s talk about that.
[Speaker G] Is that the parallel to life-saving? Yes, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I accept that, I accept that it’s unpleasant. There’s some condition here: social life has to be conducted normally. But when it isn’t—when there’s damage to normal conduct—that has the status of saving life. Now I’m saying again, the question is where the line is, from when, how acute it has to be—you’d need to interview an ambassador, I don’t know what kinds of problems they encounter. But on the principled level, those are the problems that you—
[Speaker C] You can’t imagine. I’ve never been an ambassador. I can tell you, Rabbi, try reaching the Foreign Ministry when you’re in trouble on Friday evening when the—everyone isn’t religious and you still won’t get them, so relax, exactly. On a weekday too, relax, you won’t get them.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What can you do? But that’s normal functioning. I’m saying again, there’s no point getting carried away by the examples. What I really want to say is that the normal functioning of a society has the status of saving life. And therefore the attempt to translate every single thing into saving life in order to permit prohibitions or Sabbath desecrations is an attempt—
[Speaker E] Method comes before life.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s true in the spring of two cities. Right, you see it there too. Maybe I really will bring that passage next time.
[Speaker E] Why is that simple to me?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the public—you don’t have to give another city water to drink if you need the water for laundry. Now the question is how much they’ll die; there the medieval authorities (Rishonim) already discuss it. But yes, even at the level of a possible life-saving issue.
[Speaker E] And to what extent laundry is dangerous—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the assumption is that laundry is not—they still didn’t think laundry counted as life. They didn’t understand the issue of bacteria and things like that.
[Speaker C] In operations, would the Sanhedrin command answer on the Sabbath? Huh? In the period of operations?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it was necessary—I have no idea, the world wasn’t like that then.
[Speaker C] Less so, but surely there were even more complicated situations.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe yes, maybe no, so maybe yes. I don’t know.
[Speaker C] Then they would have had to send a messenger, and he would know he’d have to go through the Sabbath on the way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even for the sanctification of the month the messengers desecrate the Sabbath. Right? Certainly. What? It’s Mishnah and Talmud / Talmudic text in tractate Rosh Hashanah.
[Speaker C] Just going beyond the Sabbath boundary, and that’s desecrating the Sabbath?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Torah-level. They desecrate the Sabbath in order to present testimony for the sanctification of the month. Why? Because a calendar is a public matter. There has to be a calendar; people need to know when the new month is, when the holiday is, when—wonderful example. Yes. The normal functioning of a society is considered saving life. Now again I’m saying: you can take this very far. I don’t know where the line is, I don’t know, and I also don’t have any interest right now in clarifying the details precisely. What I want is to show the principle. The principle is that there is some kind of status to society where—again, I’m saying—it reflects the same conception that society is something different from a collection of many individuals. There is something in this organism, in the organic functioning of this society, because many individuals do not need to function; many individuals are simply many individuals. Functioning is when there is some organism here that functions. It is a certain kind of many individuals, not merely quantitative. And that thing has life like an organism, and if it doesn’t function then it dies. And it’s like an organism, it’s something alive. Okay? And Jewish law relates to it as a kind of saving life. There are many examples of this—for example, charity, surplus charity funds. Some halakhic decisors say: where should surplus charity go? Suppose charity was collected for some purpose—we actually once had this happen—we collected for someone’s transplant and he died. What do you do with the money left over? So the rule in Jewish law is that you give it to another charitable purpose. But the decisors write—the Chatam Sofer goes on at length about this—you can give it to public needs. Now “public needs” doesn’t mean charity for the poor. Public needs: paving roads, I don’t know, building necessary buildings—that’s public needs. Public needs are considered charity. Why? Because that gives life to the public, just as reviving a private individual does; it brings the public to function in normal life, and that’s called giving it life.
[Speaker F] In any case, generally speaking public needs are considered charity? Like tithing, for example?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, Rabbi Ovadia writes that in a responsum. He says you can count income tax toward the tithe.
[Speaker F] What do you mean, toward the tithe? It’s much more than a tithe.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A quarter? Half? Now he says—and now the arguments begin—what exactly has to be deducted. Because income tax is used for many things, also for Sabbath desecration, also for all kinds of other things. Fine, so those are already discussions. Some of the decisors want to say: only the charitable element within taxes.
[Speaker F] The charitable element, obviously. Wait, wait, wait, wait.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Some decisors say only the charitable element. Meaning National Insurance or aid to the poor—not all National Insurance is aid to the needy. The aid to the needy, to whatever extent you can estimate what percentage that is, only that do you count. Some say no: public needs. Public needs are charity. That’s this Chatam Sofer and several decisors—they bring many decisors on this point that public needs are charity. And of course—
[Speaker F] According to that, only poor people would have to give charity.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Everyone who—
[Speaker C] earns—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] more than seven or eight thousand doesn’t need to give charity at all. From the poor they take it by compulsion anyway. Yes, according to that view, correct. To give a tithe.
[Speaker C] Charity is a slightly different category. And tithing. You’d have to say a formula of intention while holding your paycheck stub.