Individual and Community – Lesson 4

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In general, all in all, there are just more details, and there are a lot of details here, and the essential model—let’s call it that—says that there is something in the collective that isn’t in the individual. “There is nothing in the collective except what is in the individual”—that’s one of the interpretive principles by which the Torah is expounded—but here there is. There is something in the collective that goes beyond the individual. I brought several examples of aspects that would be hard to explain in the quantitative model, because the quantitative model—that was the example I brought of what Rabbi Eliyahu ruled regarding an officer who needs to unload a weapon on the Sabbath: is he allowed to turn on a flashlight? Army regulations were that an officer had to unload soldiers’ weapons after guard duty—at least they were then, I don’t know if they still are—and the regulations were that he had to use a flashlight to check the chamber if it was at night, meaning it wasn’t enough just to put in a finger or something like that. So someone asked Rabbi Eliyahu whether this could be done on the Sabbath, to turn on a flashlight, and he said yes. And the argument was that clearly there is no sufficiently significant danger here that would permit Sabbath desecration. If someone had asked me such a question, clearly it’s forbidden. Meaning, the risk is completely negligible. But if what you’re ruling is heard by, I don’t know, many officers—hundreds, I don’t know how many, it’s hard to estimate—but a lot of officers and soldiers, then obviously you have to multiply the probability by the number of people, and that already becomes some kind of chance or risk that has to be taken into account.

[Speaker C] That’s the consideration? I thought the consideration was that the moment you’re acting as part of a public, then in principle you’re not judged by your specific act right now, but by what will happen if everyone acts this way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But not everyone will act this way if I’m asking a personal question—that’s exactly the difference. If I’m asking a personal question, then not everyone will act this way. I’ll do what I’m told, fine, what does that have to do with others? The moment the instruction is an instruction given by someone who is heard by a broader public, not a person being asked a private question by a private individual, then it becomes public behavior, and then what you’re saying is correct. But in the end, the difference between a ruling for the public and a ruling for the individual in this case is a quantitative difference—or at least the quantitative model is enough to explain the difference—because it’s enough to say that there are very many officers here who won’t turn on the flashlight, and as a result there will be some significant risk that justifies desecrating the Sabbath. You don’t need to assume anything here beyond the quantitative model. We talked about a burning metal ember in the public domain—people often bring that as an example of desecrating the Sabbath for public needs, where the threshold is lower than desecrating the Sabbath for the needs of an individual, because a burning metal ember in the public domain doesn’t have to be blazing in the public domain; it simply endangers more people than such an ember in the private domain. And therefore the quantitative model is probably sufficient to explain the difference in standards for saving life. That’s regarding the quantitative model.

[Speaker D] There were examples where, incidentally, almost any risk—even a very remote one—of danger to life, you’d have to say, if you multiply it by the amount, by all the years, all the generations, many people will pass through and run into it—someone certainly—even if the risk is one…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One in a million, one in a lot…

[Speaker D] Right. So if you’re issuing a ruling about an action—even if it’s one in a million—then that brings a lot of things under the category of saving life.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The moment you put it out as a general instruction—but most things are not a general instruction.

[Speaker D] It’s a halakhic ruling, let’s say, to be careful not to go down stairs, but that’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not a halakhic ruling, because that’s exactly the point. People don’t—it won’t go into the Shulchan Arukh that one should not go down stairs on the Sabbath. If someone asked me personally, I’d tell him: you can go down, and something might happen to you, but the risk is very small. If I were writing a clause in the Shulchan Arukh saying it is permitted to go down stairs on the Sabbath, maybe there would be room to discuss it.

[Speaker D] You should go down by elevator, because stairs are dangerous, because one person out of millions will fall down the stairs.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So I’m saying, if I had to write some kind of Shulchan Arukh, there would be room for that argument.

[Speaker D] But Rabbi Eliyahu’s ruling isn’t the Shulchan Arukh; it’s a ruling in response to a question, not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But his assumption—again, I’m not discussing the question itself; maybe he was wrong, it doesn’t matter—but his conception was that—and this is certainly true—that there is a difference between if they ask him and if they ask me. If someone comes and asks me, then I’m saying something to the person who asked me, and he’ll do or not do what I told him. I told him. But that doesn’t have some mass impact. Meaning, it’s not that once this gets published, everyone will behave this way because I said so. But with him there is a broader public that will do what he says. So there is room to factor in the quantity. The interesting question is why they don’t write in the Shulchan Arukh not to go down stairs on the Sabbath. I don’t know, it’s really an interesting question. There may be solutions to that too.

[Speaker D] Or maybe people just take risks, are willing to take risks. Like, danger to life doesn’t override… there is danger to life that people are willing to accept.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but is that a smaller risk than turning on a flashlight? I’m not sure. Turning on a flashlight—I’m not sure.

[Speaker D] Multiply…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It by the number of people, not by the number of officers. Meaning, generations and all kinds of things like that. I don’t know. There’s also the idea of “the Lord protects the simple.” Meaning, a sort of… no, it’s a principle that halakhic decisors bring in Jewish law. Meaning, if there are things that the public is not concerned about, then it doesn’t enter the category of danger to life. Or however they formulate it. What?

[Speaker E] There’s also a world that has to function with all this.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Okay.

[Speaker F] About ten years ago, my wife started working as a nurse. She happened to spend a few months at Schneider. Around that time I was exposed to these discussions about Sabbath observance in an institution. I saw two approaches. The approach of the Tzomet Institute was to try to reduce, by means of all kinds of halakhic-technical solutions, the possible desecrations. Writing with a special pen, and so on and so on. I called the hospital rabbi, who sounded to me not at all from Religious Zionism, probably a Haredi rabbi, who completely rejected the whole approach and said that the entire operation of the hospital is one huge case of saving life, and on the Sabbath its law is like a weekday. If you start making one change here, one change there, one change here, one change there, in the end someone will be harmed by it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A completely different approach. Yes, although even that still needs… even that is still a quantitative model. Meaning, in the end he translates it into a risk to someone’s life. He is just claiming that in a public system like that, even something that doesn’t look dangerous on its face can in the end be translated into danger to life. Right? Now, on the other side of the coin, the essential model—I brought several halakhic examples that seem to me to reflect something beyond the quantitative. I spoke about Maimonides with the judgment on Rosh Hashanah, where they judge the individual, the city, the state, and the whole world one after another. And his commentators ask: if all the individuals have been judged, then what is there to judge in the city? And I said there that there is a judgment on the city itself, because the city too is an object that stands in judgment before the Holy One, blessed be He. And in the end, of course, punishment or reward that comes as a result of that judgment will land on the heads of individuals. But the individuals wear two hats: the hat of individuals, and the hat of limbs in a collective. And they are judged in both of those hats, and in several such hats: limbs in the urban collective, in the national collective, in the collective of all humanity. A perhaps clearer example is the giving of the Torah, the oath at Sinai. Did I mention that? I already don’t remember. There the Talmudic text proposes a meta-halakhic model for why we are obligated in the commandments, so the Talmudic text calls it “already sworn from Mount Sinai.” And this has implications—for example, if I swear concerning a commandment, then they discuss it in the categories of an oath upon an oath. Because I am fundamentally already sworn to fulfill all the words of the commandment or not to violate prohibitions, and if I now swear to violate a prohibition or I now swear to fulfill a commandment, then this is an oath upon an oath, and therefore it does not take effect.

[Speaker C] Could it be that this is the only source for the obligation of the commandments?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—not a source. It’s a model. My model for obligation in the commandments is as if I swore there. It’s like the social contract. After all, it doesn’t say anywhere that they swore at Mount Sinai. There is no source for that. Which is why the commentators really do ask about the Talmudic text: where did they swear there? In the plains of Moab there is something like an oath, but not at Mount Sinai.

[Speaker C] But why is the assumption that this… maybe the intention is that there is some reality of an oath there, not that this is a definition of the observance of the commandments.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So why do you assume there is a reality of an oath here? There was no oath. “All that the Lord has spoken we will do.” Yes, so that’s a covenant, not an oath. We said we would do it. Where was God’s name there? After all, an oath has rules—how do you do it? You need oath language, you need to mention God’s name. None of that was there.

[Speaker G] Again, it’s not described anywhere.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “All that the Lord has spoken we will do.” No, fine, but they didn’t swear in God’s name. When I swear by something, I swear in God’s name.

[Speaker C] In His name to do something, when I mention God’s name.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When I swear, do I have to mention God’s name? If I just say: I swear that such-and-such? Then that is already called implied forms. That’s already implied forms. In principle you need God’s name. Now if you don’t mention it but you use the language of an oath, then basically your intention is to swear in God’s name, so it comes in as implied forms, and that’s also an oath. In any case, on the plain level it isn’t mentioned, and it seems that this is how the Talmudic text sees our model for obligation as an oath. An example of this is the social contract, which is used in philosophy of law and philosophy of morality as a model for why human beings are obligated to the legal system they are within, or to the moral system they are within. So the claim is that there is some social contract that all of us are signed on to, though none of us ever signed it and there is no such contract. But for all kinds of philosophical and legal or meta-legal reasons it is important to discuss our obligations within some model. When you want to discuss what is included in that obligation and what is not included in that obligation, if it conflicts with something else, what do you do? Then you need a legal structure within which you discuss it. So you say, okay, if this is a track of an oath or a public commitment or something like that, let’s see what it means when it clashes with another commitment, or with my life, or I don’t know, some conflict. If I don’t have a model within which I operate, I have no way to resolve conflicts, or no way to think about the matter. So very often they create a model even though it is fictitious. The assumption is that really all of us ought to sign such a contract, since after all we are part of humanity, and everyone who is part of humanity ought, as it were, to be signed onto such a contract—so let’s assume he really did sign. It’s a kind of legal fiction. Let’s assume he really signed, because this is the proper way to think of ourselves as truly signed to this kind of contract. Then we have some tool for discussing conflicts, understanding the definition, how far it goes. In legal rulings in the world of law, they use the social contract as a model within which the discussion is conducted. Test cases—when is a person obligated to behave according to legal and moral rules when he is in conflict or tension with something else—very often they use the social contract as the model within which the discussion is held. Meaning, if you have a public commitment that you signed and against it stands something else, does it obligate or not obligate? Then you can discuss it, because now it is already a more defined question. If you just say, I am obligated to obey the law—why am I obligated? Obligated in what sense? When this stands against something else, how do I discuss it? Meaning, what kind of obligation is this? I need a legal platform in order to conduct the discussion.

[Speaker D] A basic moral obligation. Why do I need to be obligated by something in order to be obligated?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: you don’t have to.

[Speaker D] That’s what I’m saying—you don’t have to. There is an assumption here that they swore, or that the Holy One, blessed be He, obligated them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He obligated us, okay. And now, if I swear about that, does it take effect or not? You have no way to discuss it. You have no way to discuss such a question. You need to give a halakhic pattern to that obligation itself, even though again it has no historical basis. That’s at least how I understand it. The commentators there ask where the oath was, and there are forced answers; I don’t even remember what they answer. There are various strained answers. I don’t think that’s right; I don’t really think the claim is that there was a historical oath. By the way, most medieval authorities really do explain “already sworn from Mount Sinai” differently. They want to claim that it is only a metaphorical expression to say that an oath does not take effect concerning a commandment. And where does that come from? Well, that’s also not a simple question. I think that when the Talmudic text says “already sworn from Mount Sinai,” it means that this is the model, the meta-legal fiction within which we discuss our obligation to fulfill the commandments. In any case, for our purposes, what that means is that we are sworn from Mount Sinai. Then the question arises—the Mishneh LaMelekh asks, or actually I think the Mishneh LaMelekh asks something a little different—how can they obligate us to keep oaths when the oath is to keep the system of commandments? After all, the obligation to keep oaths is itself part of the system of commandments. Now if this oath is the oath by whose force I am obligated in the system of commandments, then this whole business has no way to get started. Meaning, it is something whose tail is in its own mouth. But beyond that, I no longer remember whether he asks that or others ask it.

[Speaker F] Belief in God is also something circular like that. There is a commandment to believe in God.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But who commands it?

[Speaker F] So by what force do you fulfill the commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s the question about Maimonides: how can there be such a commandment? But in truth, the straightforward plain meaning is that there is no such commandment. It’s not a commandment; it’s a condition for being commanded. Maimonides, who counts it among the commandments—there really is a question how he…

[Speaker C] Counts it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe in the first root, I don’t remember, but Maimonides counts it—that is the well-known point, that I do remember. I think even Maimonides does not necessarily mean commandment in the regular sense of a positive commandment, but rather some kind of declaration that opens the Book of Commandments. Meaning, yes, like when you open a law book at the beginning: every citizen of Israel is obligated by the laws legislated properly by the Knesset, or something like that. So there is some sort of declaration, a basic norm, what is called a grundnorm—in Kelsen’s jurisprudential terms—that there is some basic norm from which all the other norms emerge. So in the halakhic world too there is some basic norm that says that the Holy One, blessed be He, is God, and what He commands must be done. And that basic norm appears as positive commandment number one in Maimonides. In Maimonides there are commandments that command nothing, neither commanding to do nor prohibiting to do anything. And here—for example in positive commandments 95 and 96 as well, two consecutive commandments—Maimonides, positive commandment 95 is the positive commandment of annulment of vows. And Maimonides says there: know that this commandment commands you nothing and forbids you nothing. There is no commandment for you to annul vows, and no prohibition against annulling vows, and no prohibition against not annulling vows. It’s not… this is a halakhic definition. A halakhic definition that if the husband annuls his wife’s vows on the day he hears them, then the vow is annulled. And then of course she is free and does not need to observe it, and so on. And if he did not annul it, then not—then the vow takes effect. So this is just a halakhic definition. The prohibition against violating a vow that was not annulled is a prohibition counted separately. There is such a prohibition in the system of commandments. So what is this commandment of annulment of vows? So Maimonides says: this is a halakhic procedure. Meaning that in the system of commandments there are commandments that are nothing but definitions. Like 95. And 96 is the commandment of impurity—the commandments of impurity begin there; there are several. The commandments of impurity: that one who touches a corpse or is under the same roof as a corpse becomes impure. What does that mean? It doesn’t mean anything. Meaning, the prohibition on one who is impure entering the Temple or eating sacred foods appears separately in the count of commandments. Not connected. The definition of when I am impure and how I become pure—when I immerse in a ritual bath, and sunset, and all the things that are needed, and so on—these are all definitions that define my status; they are not forbidden or permitted. An Israelite is allowed to be impure and allowed not to be impure. A priest is commanded not to become impure, but for an Israelite there is no… there is no prohibition in this, and certainly not a commandment. So why is this in the system of commandments? So Maimonides says that you should know that in the system of commandments there are also things that command you nothing. He explains this in those two commandments. And what is the idea behind it? The idea—first of all in parentheses, I don’t remember who asked about “I am the Lord your God”… the comparison to… the claim is that the Book of Commandments is basically, translated into halakhic language, a law book. A law book. Meaning, commandment means law. Now within a law book there are also laws that command nothing; there are laws that define a legal status. An adult for this purpose is anyone over such-and-such an age and of sound mind and whatever exactly. Or divorce? Divorce is a somewhat more delicate question. For example, in the Sefer HaChinukh it says that someone who violates this and divorces his wife not according to Jewish law has nullified this positive commandment—the positive commandment of divorce: “and he shall send her from his house, and she shall depart and become another man’s wife.” Meaning, this is a positive commandment that can be nullified. The annulment of vows cannot be nullified. Meaning, a commandment that cannot be nullified.

[Speaker C] It would have been possible to annul vows without that counting as an annulled vow, without…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then fine, you simply violate the prohibition of vows.

[Speaker C] That’s not his problem. If you sort of do a kind of… let’s say you tell her that the vow is annulled, like with the divorcee… with the divorcee too, there you can say she wasn’t really divorced.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, that’s what I’m saying. And that’s what the Sefer HaChinukh says. Not true, not true. You divorced her, but you violated a prohibition.

[Speaker C] What do you mean you divorced her? If she then has relations with another man, she won’t be forbidden?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not connected. There is divorce… okay, that’s a whole line of analysis that would have to be done. There I don’t know of such a statement. It could have been similar, but it isn’t—at least I don’t know of a source that compares it. In annulment of vows, this is a procedure. Maimonides says explicitly: it’s impossible to violate this. Impossible. Even if you pretend to annul vows but don’t actually annul… this is Rashi at the beginning of the portion of Matot—now I remember. Yes, Rashi there who brings from the Sages, Midrash Rabbah…

[Speaker I] Not in Midrash Rabbah, in the Sifrei.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are two versions there. If the father says—or if the husband says to the woman—that he annulled her vow, but in truth he did not annul it, and she violated the vow, then he enters in her place for punishment, because anyone who causes his fellow to stumble enters in his place for punishments. And already there you see that the prohibition on him is not that he pretended to annul the vow, but that in the end she violated the vow because you caused her to stumble, and so the prohibition passes over to you. But there is no law there saying that because you pretended to annul the vow, therefore you violated a prohibition. At least I don’t know of such a thing. In divorce, the Sefer HaChinukh says yes. And my claim there in divorce is simply that the moment you are in a situation where you need to divorce—hard-heartedness or all kinds of things—once you have reached the conclusion that you can no longer continue living together, there is a commandment to divorce the woman. If you don’t divorce her, you have nullified a positive commandment. Okay, that’s another discussion. Let’s close the inner parentheses and move to the outer parentheses.

[Speaker F] The oath—the oath that you gave. Yes, that’s it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m just closing the parentheses on the previous point: “I am the Lord your God”—I think the halakhic law book contains all the legal clauses that an ordinary law book contains. So in an ordinary law book there are clauses that are not clauses that command me something or forbid me something—for example, definitional clauses. The definition of terms for purposes of the law is such-and-such. And that too is a clause in the law book. In the same way, the opening clause of the law book—the basic norm—also appears in the law book, and from the perspective of the Book of Commandments it will appear as positive commandment number one, even though it is not necessarily something that comes to command. Now at the beginning of the Mishneh Torah it looks a little different; I won’t get into that now.

[Speaker G] Those who were sworn—isn’t it that He held the mountain over them like a barrel and said to them: if you accept it, fine, and if not, there will be your burial? Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, made them swear against their will.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He made them swear against their will? Who can make me swear against my will? I’m not swearing—what do you mean?

[Speaker G] The Holy One, blessed be He. That’s also why the concept is “those who were sworn,” not “those who swore.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a hint there that they were sworn, but the Holy One, blessed be He, demands of them to do it—fine. Still, they also said “we will do and we will hear,” as is known, that there is coercion and there is willingness there. But it is not mentioned there that there was an oath. I think the simple explanation is that this is a legal fiction, a meta-legal fiction, like a social contract. Therefore all kinds of definitions of an oath do not necessarily have to be fulfilled there. But here really—this is where I want to get to the point.

[Speaker D] You’re undermining that very point about the essence of this, if the definitions of an oath don’t have to be fulfilled.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the definitions of how an oath is created do not have to be fulfilled. They didn’t swear. After all, you need verbal articulation in order for there to be an oath. But now, once I treat it as an oath, then now it is an oath in every respect—as if you swore, and everything obligates like an ordinary oath. And then they ask there: after all, the oath of fathers does not apply to sons. It says in the Shulchan Arukh, from a responsum of the Rosh, that the oath of fathers does not apply to sons. There is no such thing—someone cannot make someone else swear. Meaning, I can swear in my own name; I can’t obligate or make swear or impose a vow or ban on someone else. I can impose a ban or swear only on myself. So that’s on one side. On the other side, says the Rosh: what about a community that imposes a ban regarding a certain ordinance? The community bans whoever violates that specific ordinance, that he should be under ban—something like that. A ban is a kind of vow; it’s like a vow or an oath or something like that. And the Rosh asks: how can that be, since you can’t place a ban or vow on someone else? I can vow regarding myself, not place a vow on someone else. So he says there that in a community it’s different; in a community it’s possible. I think the Taz almost explains explicitly what I’m saying, and I think this is the simple explanation: basically, the entity that is sworn here is not the people who populate the community at the stage when the ban was imposed, but the collective. Meaning, the community is the one that is sworn here, or the one under vow here, or under ban. Therefore even if all the people who lived at that time have died, and now the members of the community are different people, they are still sworn by virtue of the original oath, because the entity that was sworn is not the people at all; the entity that was sworn is the collective. And anyone who belongs to the collective automatically finds himself sworn. So in such a situation, it is not that one person made another person swear; the collective swore concerning itself, obligated itself. And an entity—in this case not a human entity, not a person, but a human collective—can obligate itself or make itself sworn. And once that is so, now the collective is sworn. It is sworn whenever the collective exists. When does it exist? Whenever there are people who populate it. It doesn’t have to be specifically the people who were there originally; it can also be many hundreds of years later. An example: when the Knesset legislates, then even if all the legislators and all the citizens who elected them have long since died, as long as the law has not been changed, the law remains binding. It binds us too, even though we didn’t vote for those legislators, and they themselves are no longer here—there are already other legislators. That doesn’t matter. Why? Because the entity that was obligated by this law when it was legislated was not the collection of citizens standing there, but the collective that elected them. And collective means the State of Israel, or the citizens of the State of Israel, or any other state, it doesn’t matter. And once the collective is the one that is obligated, then whenever that collective still exists, it is still obligated. And it doesn’t matter that now it is populated by different people. If they decide to change the law, then it is void. They did not personally accept that earlier law.

[Speaker E] Of course they did, otherwise they would change it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what are you talking about? They still haven’t had time yet. What do you mean, they don’t want to do it? Not in order to change the law. I don’t feel like it, I’m not obligated. Why do you need to change it? Why do you need a procedure? The law doesn’t obligate at all.

[Speaker E] It necessarily obligates.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why does it obligate?

[Speaker E] Because for the same reason they accepted the previous law, so…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the ones who obligated themselves were the voters and legislators who were there then. What does that have to do with me? Why does that obligate me? Why do I need to cancel the law so that it won’t obligate me? It doesn’t apply to me at all.

[Speaker E] It definitely does apply, because there is some sort of continuity here. If it were really like that in…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where does that continuity come from?

[Speaker E] Because it’s not that there were people and now there’s another group completely unrelated to the first group. Rather, there are people who came in between and grew up into the new law, okay? And when they’ve reached the present situation—true, if it didn’t suit you, you would change it. No, I’m telling you, to change it now—why, the situation still hasn’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When they still haven’t changed it.

[Speaker E] When they haven’t changed it, that means… it would have been possible to issue a regulation and change it in five minutes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning because…

[Speaker E] Because it does suit them, it definitely suits them. No, what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because there’s some declaration here that it suits them? What are you talking about? You know, there’s a law that’s completely clear is no longer relevant, and everyone is against it, and there’s even a majority in the Knesset against it. As long as it hasn’t been changed, that law is binding. Maybe they won’t enforce it—public interest, public matters and so on—but it binds. It binds because the law addresses the collective; it doesn’t address the collection of people who were there then. And the collective remains obligated and standing as long as it hasn’t been changed.

[Speaker G] As an individual, you’re also allowed to leave the collective.

[Speaker E] You can’t leave the collective.

[Speaker G] You can. If it’s the Jewish collective, you can. If…

[Speaker E] If it’s the collective of the State of Israel, you… I don’t think so. You can do some… I think, I don’t know, in my opinion you can. Yes, leave the place. You can leave the place, but the moment you committed an offense here, the place will bring you here—it’s not…

[Speaker C] The state will fight you or something like that. Exactly. It doesn’t seem to me that it’s so… I don’t know what it looks like.

[Speaker E] You can leave the place and then do abroad things that are forbidden by the law here, and then there’s no claim against you. Maybe stop with that too. Anyway, so I’m saying—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that this conception does indeed seem like the substantive model, not the quantitative model. Because here, if the public really were just a collection of people and there were nothing beyond that collection of people, then who are we talking about when we say that it is obligated by this law or by this oath at Mount Sinai or something like that? There’s an assumption here that some factor exists that functions on the legal map. In other words, this collective is a legal entity that can be sworn, can be obligated, and exists beyond the collection of… what?

[Speaker I] It has to have legal personality.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, meaning—

[Speaker I] This collective has to have legal personality, not just be a collection of people.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s what I’m saying. So basically that means there’s a substantive model here and not a quantitative model. Meaning, you don’t see the Jewish people as simply the collection of people who are here now, and that’s what’s called the Jewish people. Rather, there is some factor called the Jewish people, and the collection of people who are here now are those currently inhabiting it. But that’s not its definition. Others will come, and none of us will still be here, and it will still be that same Jewish people.

[Speaker C] Now according to this law of the public oath, is the intention really that this is a law—sort of a law from the laws of oaths—meaning that someone who violates this ban is violating the positive commandment of an oath? But how can that be? After all, if the public is not—“he shall not break his word”—for every person? No.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “He shall not break his word”—the collective. That’s exactly the point. No.

[Speaker C] But a man… never mind.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “A man” means each one. And why a woman too? It says “man”—so why a woman too?

[Speaker C] Everyone—but the collective too, as it were?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. Every entity that takes something upon itself. What do you mean “of course”? Meaning, that’s how the Sages interpret it, or at least that’s how the Rosh interprets it: that there is also the Sinai oath. That’s its straightforward meaning. The claim is that there is another factor on the legal map. Everything said about an ordinary legal personality, an individual one, is said also about collective personality. Or at least, can also be said about collective personality.

[Speaker J] This is where Professor Dombrinsky’s criticism of the responsa Mishpetei Eretz Kodesh to Rabbi Sherlo comes in. He addresses the claim—one of the claims Rabbi Sherlo brings—that we do not disconnect from Knesset Israel; we do not say that everything Knesset Israel…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is: who is Knesset Israel?

[Speaker J] Yes. He says it’s not the concrete Knesset Israel; it’s exactly the opposite. It’s not the specific individuals who are here today. The goal should be a state where you can say, “Here I am, here I am, and I will prepare here the name,” and…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By the way, that’s a very interesting question. It really is a very interesting implication, because here too it’s not unambiguous in the other direction. Even according to the substantive model, I think there is some weight to what the current Knesset Israel does, okay? Now I don’t know whether Rabbi Sherlo is right. No, I’m only saying there are two sides to the coin here.

[Speaker I] Why is there weight? What? Why is there weight?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? Because I’m not obligated only to the historical Knesset Israel while ignoring the current Knesset Israel. This multi-generational Knesset Israel has many facets; so now the question is what it says. On the one hand it says eternal things, on the other hand there is also meaning to what it is doing now. “Do not separate from the community” is not only not separating from the commandments we accepted upon ourselves at Mount Sinai as a community in some eternal sense. “Do not separate from the community,” here, one who separates from the ways of the community, what Maimonides defines in the laws of repentance, is also someone who does not do the things customarily done in the community now, even though they are not some halakhic matter that we are obligated in from Mount Sinai and that all generations necessarily observed. You are separating from the ways of the community. So that too is a kind of separation from the community, even though perhaps in the intergenerational perspective it may really be negligible. And that depends on the square—you know, if it’s exponential like on a chessboard with the grains of wheat placed on the chessboard, then on every square there is the number of grains that exist in all the squares up to it. Meaning that if the ratio of the geometric series is two, then the sum of all the squares up to that point is the same thing—up to one, which doesn’t matter—as the next square. So it could be that even on the quantitative level, if you’re talking about the present generation in terms of from when you double the population—I don’t know how many years it takes to double a population, call that a generation—then it could be that the number of people alive now is equal to the number of people who existed until now since the beginning of time.

[Speaker C] No, that doesn’t work with the Jewish people, because the Jewish people haven’t grown in proportion to the growth of the world.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I didn’t do the calculation, but—

[Speaker C] The percentage of the Jewish people in the Roman period out of the total human population was greater.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The percentage, yes—but the number. What difference does the percentage make? The number. The question is whether you do an integral over the number of all the Jewish people until today—or not until today, until fifty years ago, so that we take some ratio by which we multiply the population. I don’t know how long that takes. I’m not sure, but never mind, we won’t get into that now. In any case, for our purposes, the claim—I got to this issue from Rabbi Sherlo’s example. Fine. I understand that on the other hand, clinging to the metaphysical or historical Jewish people while ignoring the current Jewish people is also a kind of problem from the other side. There are many who act in the name of the Jewish people, and they take us to various places because they’re sure that’s what the historical Jewish people want, and they don’t care that the current Jewish people aren’t really there. Now in some respects I don’t know where the line is drawn; in some respects I agree with them. A decree that was never accepted by the public at all—I just saw someone sent me a statement by Menachem Elon, the late judge, saying that today, it seems to me, customs are less binding because today most of the public are not obligated to Torah and commandments. Therefore today, in effect, a halakhic custom is not binding as it once was.

[Speaker I] On whom is it not binding?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On no one. Even on one who observes—no? Because there is no public that practiced that custom. What do you mean there isn’t? But the religious public practices it. Fine, but the public of the Jewish people as a whole does not practice it, because it is not obligated at all in Torah and commandments.

[Speaker I] A custom can often be local.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, say a custom of the entire public. If you’re in a local custom, then perhaps the custom of the place obligates you. But a custom of the Jewish people as a whole—there are many…

[Speaker I] Such customs, people observe them just as they observe commandments. Whoever observes Torah and commandments also observes the custom.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he will observe the custom, but he does not have to observe the custom. Elon argues that he does not have to observe the custom. Again, I saw this second-hand; I didn’t see the source. Someone quoted me something he saw in Elon’s name—I don’t know exactly what he wrote it about. But the claim is that a custom that is not the local custom—the local custom obligates me because I am part of the place. Let’s say a halakhic custom that the entire commandment-observant public practices—the question is whether such a thing is called a custom that the public accepted upon itself. So he says no. He argues no, because today the public—most of the public—do not observe Torah and commandments, so there is no such thing today at all as a public custom. There is a custom of a certain place; maybe in my synagogue they practice such and such, fine, so as part of the synagogue I should do that. But a custom of the public as a whole—today there is no public as a whole that practices it, so therefore it is not binding. That is his argument. And here I actually tend to identify with the other approach, meaning: fine, what difference does it make? Still, those who bear this obligation in our generation did practice it. So from my standpoint it is indeed a custom that has weight. Okay, I don’t know where the line is. When can you act in the name of the historical Jewish people against the concrete Jewish people, and when is the concrete Jewish people actually what determines what the Jewish people say, or want, or do? And there are those who go out to conquer the Land of Israel on Rocinante at the head of all the armored corps, only behind them there’s no one. Meaning, they go out to conquer the Land of Israel in the name of the historical collective of Israel, but no one from the current collective of Israel is there. Yes, and it’s a kind of Don Quixote.

[Speaker D] And who is included—who is included—in the historical collective of Israel or the current one?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, meaning, those who observe Torah and commandments, yes?

[Speaker D] If so, then you solved the problem.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The metaphysics—after all, they are talking about the metaphysical Jewish people; they are not talking at all about the concrete Jewish people. They speak about the Holy One, blessed be He, and His Divine Presence. Meaning, they are not speaking about a concrete people. Even if you counted across the generations and saw that most of the Jewish people did not observe commandments through the generations, say, if that turned out to be true—I don’t know.

[Speaker I] What? There were many changes through the generations.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Changes—it doesn’t matter; that makes no difference to them, because the metaphysical Jewish people are basically what He is, basically what He does. So once—I think we talked about this when I spoke about Religious Zionism in some context. I said that what characterizes both Religious Zionism and anti-Zionist ideological militancy—Satmar, say, if we take that—what characterizes both sides is the attachment to metaphysics and the ignoring of the concrete. Meaning, one sees the state as the beginning of the flowering of our redemption, and the other sees the state as some demonic Other Side kind of thing. Everyone sees everything except the state. Meaning, they see all sorts of things behind the state—various demons, or on the contrary redemptive messianic angels and so forth—but they do not look at the state as a concrete entity. It’s here. People made it. Fine—what do you think about it? No problem. But leave the demons aside. Why do you care now what metaphysical entities stand behind this state, if any? How do you know at all that there are metaphysical entities there? And somehow people really see—there are those who think this is of the essence of the religious outlook: not to see the world concretely, but to see the… the spirits and demons standing behind it, and to discuss that. And to discuss it, yes. This Nachmanides on Joseph—why didn’t he reveal himself, why didn’t he send a messenger to his father when he was in Egypt? Because he wanted to fulfill the dreams. Yes, he wanted to fulfill the dreams. Meaning, he does not act according to what is required and what the world says, but according to what the hand of God really wants to unfold here. He doesn’t leave to the Holy One, blessed be He, what He does; rather, he does it in His name. So anyway, I don’t know where the line passes—when we relate to the historical entity and it overrides the concrete entity, and when the opposite is true. In any case, these are examples of the substantive model. And last time I gave another example of “do not be intimidated by any man.” I said there that this was already connecting me to what I wanted to talk about today, and I see I’m not getting to it. A judge who has to endanger his life in order to judge—at least from the point when he knows which way the law inclines. And even the halakhic decisors who are prepared to accept the Sifrei we brought there in its plain sense, that it’s talking even at the level of danger to life, it speaks about possible danger to life, not certain danger to life. And I asked: where in Jewish law do we find that possible danger to life is overridden, but certain danger to life is not overridden? Desecrating the Sabbath is the same: the Talmud assumes as obvious that if possible danger overrides the Sabbath, then certain danger also overrides the Sabbath, and if not both then not both. Meaning, no—the Talmud is not willing to distinguish between possible and certain. And I said that what is there, I think, is basically the principle, like the army principle in IDF ethics, that you cannot—or in armies generally, I think in all armies it’s like this—you cannot give a person an order to commit suicide. You can give a person an order to do something very dangerous; that’s the nature of war. But you cannot give a person an order to commit suicide. Why? Because a person wears two hats. First, he is an organ of the collective; and second, he is also an individual who has some independent existence. And as an organ of the collective he must take risks, because he is part of the collective, and if no one takes risks, we will all die. So therefore you must take risks, even though you could have fled to Australia and stayed alive. And we all could have fled to Australia and stayed alive. And the claim was that the existence of the collective is some kind of life-and-death matter, and therefore it justifies possible danger to the life of the individual in order to prevent the danger to life of the public, the disintegration of the public. But it does not justify certain danger to the life of the individual. Because certain danger to the life of the individual is a fascist conception. It is a conception that says I subordinate my existence as a private person to my collective obligations. And that is not right; Jewish law does not see this as subordinate to that. These two things exist in parallel, and each must be discussed on its own terms. Sometimes one comes at the expense of the other, but there is no absolute subordination. Meaning, I wear both hats, as we saw there in Maimonides, and this is really an expression of… on the one hand a substantive conception of the relation between organ and collective. Because if I existed alone in the world, what would the problem be? So I’d go to Australia and I wouldn’t need to go be a soldier and not even endanger my life in possible danger to life—I could stay alive and everything would be fine. What justifies endangering my life? Rather, I do indeed see the existence of the collective as a kind of existing body that has danger to life, and that justifies transgressions or self-sacrifice in order to… in order to save the life of the collective. On the one hand. On the other hand, that’s not the only model. There is also my existence as an individual. And I said that from this one can infer all sorts of very significant or very current conclusions. And here we got to a hospital, or police work on the Sabbath, with all the differences. Meaning, because in a hospital, like Ido brought earlier with that example of the hospital, there it is still basically on the quantitative plane. Because true, a hospital is some sort of organ, and you need to take a more long-term view in order to permit a nurse to write down a patient’s temperature on Sabbath morning. Fine. Temperature overall is not a critical parameter for the overwhelming majority of patients. There are some for whom it is, and then… then there’s no problem, no question. But I’m saying: to set a fixed procedure that by every bed they record the patient’s temperature—that’s a procedure involving many Sabbath violations that individually are not justified. But if… fine, but if you now start thinking one yes, one no, suddenly you’ll miss someone for whom you really should have written it down, and then you get to danger to life. But notice: in the end we still come down to considerations of danger to life of an individual, only the consideration is more long-term. It’s a bit like a glowing piece of metal in the public domain. The model is still a quantitative model. I don’t need to assume here that there is something in the public beyond the particulars, only that once you have such a public procedure, then at the level of particulars in the end it will also lead to danger to life, and therefore it needs to be stopped right at the beginning. Why is this not… this is still quantitative thinking.

[Speaker H] Why is it not also because of the nature of the institution itself—that it deals generally with saving lives—and therefore I’m not looking at it quantitatively; it has a type of life-saving activity without needing to enter into the details?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, if there is such a consideration, then it really is a different consideration. But if the consideration is like what Ido said, that in the end you’ll miss a patient whose temperature really did need to be written down in the morning—

[Speaker H] I’m not sure that’s what he meant.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s what he said. I don’t know what he meant, but that’s what he said. You can interpret… I don’t know what he meant. But in any case, if you say such a thing—as they usually explain this type of activity—then you are still on the quantitative plane. And what I wanted to argue, for example, regarding the police—for in a hospital it really is a bit different, maybe I’ll come back to that—in the police, for example, on the Sabbath, the police on the Sabbath operate, and most of their activities are not connected to danger to life at all. So basically one should have said that for activities not connected to danger to life, it is forbidden to desecrate the Sabbath for them in the police. You would come only where there is… concern for danger to life. But in such a situation, of course, it would be impossible to maintain the police, and therefore the society too, because no one would live in a place where… his property is ownerless every Sabbath. His property or his body, as long as it’s not life. Yes, no, everything… free-for-all assaults, every… anyone who wants does whatever he wants once a week. Yes, Sabbath as a total free-for-all.

[Speaker F] Like the law of border towns.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Right, the law of border towns is the same there too. There too there are halakhic decisors who want to argue that in the end it comes to danger to life. And I don’t think that… I don’t think that’s the explanation there. At least in several places there is evidence that this is not the explanation there. The Magen Avraham remains with it unresolved there, because there are places he cannot explain that way. And I think that there the explanation really is another explanation. It cannot be that on the Sabbath they will be able to conquer towns from us freely and we’ll have to flee so that… no problem, we’ll stay alive, we’ll just run away. They’ll take our property and go, and then on Sunday we’ll come back and start working again. There’s no such thing. Now, what does “there’s no such thing” mean? We’ll stay alive. So what’s the problem? Why does that justify desecrating the Sabbath? And die of hunger?

[Speaker I] No, it’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Those are the quantitative translations—that’s what I’m saying. If in the end you arrive at danger to life of the individual person or of individuals, you are still in the quantitative model. But there, at least in some of the places, I can… show that the quantitative model is not enough to explain it. And the same thing also with the police. We talked about Joab son of Zeruiah—even Joab son of Zeruiah, someone exiled to a city of refuge, a commander exiled to a city of refuge—there perhaps there is some more far-reaching claim. Meaning, I am not only translating this into danger to life of individuals in the end, but the claim that society would not be able to exist in such a way. And once society would not be able to exist in such a way, that itself is danger to life. We talked about the Foreign Ministry. But Leibowitz—at least his claim was that there is no such thing, a state cannot function without there being some communication channel to it on the Sabbath. Things come up that you can’t—it doesn’t work. Now these things are not matters of danger to life in the sense that someone will die in the end—not necessarily. Because if that were so, then again we’ve returned to the quantitative model. Rather, it is some kind of functioning of a state within the family of nations. Meaning, it’s impossible—again, apparently one needs to examine the reality; maybe it is possible, I’m not committing myself that this factual determination is correct. But there are situations in which it is impossible, and in such a state no one will be able to live. Live—not breathe, but he will move elsewhere; that state will not be able to exist, okay? It will lose its right to vote in the UN, I don’t know what. Okay, losing our right to vote in the UN is not danger to life. Does that justify desecrating the Sabbath? If there is some rule that says a state where it is impossible to reach anyone there for 24 hours every week cannot sit in the UN—that is not a state the UN recognizes as a state, let’s just say—so what does that mean? Does that justify such a thing or not? So again, there will be those who translate this in the end—me being in the UN may also save lives somehow, perhaps. I’m not sure. But I’m not sure one needs to reach that kind of consideration. There are international treaties there.

[Speaker B] What? Every plane flying from country to country is required, among other things, to prepare a route and receive permission to land at an alternative airport that is far enough away that the same malfunction won’t affect it. So Israel basically has treaties with Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and so on. Now if there’s a plane flying on the Sabbath to Greece, we need to allow it the option of landing in Israel. An airport has to be open on the Sabbath. If we don’t do that, they won’t open that option for us. So what—won’t we fly? Won’t we leave Israel by plane? Right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, the direct action may involve danger to life, and therefore it’s permitted. But I’m saying: we also have the option not to sign a treaty with them, not to allow them to fly, and we won’t fly and we’ll remain in Israel and not leave. So does that justify desecrating the Sabbath? The answer is yes, because a state cannot be conducted in a way where there is no possibility of leaving it. Meaning, it’s not practical.

[Speaker H] What about the integration of the State of Israel into national sports, and whether the Israeli team should play on the Sabbath?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If that would prevent us altogether from competing in any framework, I don’t know—maybe yes. But I don’t know how far that goes.

[Speaker F] The danger of the slippery slope threatens the lenient ones too, not only the stringent ones.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, the danger of the slippery slope threatens the lenient ones mainly. Again, obviously you can also bring this to absurdities. I don’t know where the line is, I don’t know—but this kind of consideration is a relevant kind. There is such a kind of consideration. How far does it go? I don’t know. Common sense? I don’t know. I don’t know where the line is. Okay, now I’ve reached the point, yes. So I want to show another implication of this matter through the question of harming innocents. This is an article I published in Tzohar, and that article actually began as some sort of response. There was issue 13 of Tzohar—issue 13—that I took and simply read through, and in almost every article this aspect appeared: seeing the individual versus the collective. In almost every article—it was quite amazing. Suddenly I realized that almost all the articles, from completely different angles, each from a different angle, in almost all of them this dilemma appeared: seeing the individual as standing on his own versus the more general perspective.

[Speaker F] Tzohar—is that the Tzohar rabbis’ journal?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Now it has reopened; it had been closed for a few years, now it has reopened. So I wrote an article that first of all surveys these articles a bit and why each one of them actually—because it wasn’t phrased that way originally—but why each of them is really speaking in some respect about the relation between the individual and the collective. And then I moved to the dilemma of Operation Defensive Shield. That was an operation that was on the agenda, and there was—I’ll remind you of the story—that it was in Shechem, I think. I think it was in Shechem, or Tulkarm, I no longer remember where. They entered there into… Jenin, Jenin, Jenin, yes. So it was in Jenin that there was a very big hesitation, and this was in real time—meaning, before the decision was made everyone already knew about it; it wasn’t some closed-door deliberation. Terrorists had barricaded themselves there in what…

[Speaker C] By “everyone” you mean the public?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the public. Meaning, it was known that they were now deliberating this question. There were terrorists there who had barricaded themselves in a not very large area—what, 50 by 50 meters, I don’t know, 100 by 100 meters, something on that order—a few buildings in some neighborhood, I don’t know, a little neighborhood inside Jenin. And the hesitation was whether to bomb it from above or to enter on the ground. Now, of course, if you bomb it from above, then people who are not combatants can also be harmed—uninvolved people, as they’re called today. And if you go in on foot, then our soldiers can be harmed. So you can be more surgical, but our soldiers can be harmed. And there was a very big dilemma. In the end they decided to go in on foot, and 20 guys were killed there—reserve soldiers were killed there. They set all kinds of traps and booby traps there, explosives by the doors and whatnot, and some 20 guys were killed there. It was terrible. And all this because of the decision to go in on the ground and not bomb from above. And I was really very angry about that decision. One of our guys in the yeshiva was an officer there in—I don’t remember whether it was in that same neighborhood, but in that Operation Defensive Shield he was there—and he told me that there was literally a terrorist there holding a weapon and a baby, as if in one hand a baby, in the other hand a weapon, in the other hand a weapon—and that’s what he saw in front of him. And he said to me: listen, I didn’t know what to do in such a situation. Meaning, what am I supposed to do? I can hide—if there were danger to his life, I assume he would react—but I can hide, just not hit the terrorist or not get there, not threaten him, or send a missile at him and eliminate him with the baby—what do I do in a situation like that? A very difficult question. And what sharpened the matter even more for me—I’m only saying this for literary flourish—was that after that operation ended, the head of the Halakha Branch of the Chief Rabbinate came to the yeshiva in Yeruham. And he wanted to speak, gave a lecture in the study hall on the lessons of Operation Defensive Shield, as it were—halakhic aspects, lessons from Operation Defensive Shield. I said, wow, the Chief Rabbinate is repenting, the military rabbinate—they’re finally starting to deal with relevant things instead of supplying wine and checking the Sabbath boundary. What?

[Speaker B] At least that they did.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wine and the Sabbath boundary—no, I’m not belittling that. I’m only saying that that can also be done by a junior religious NCO; you don’t need the head of the Halakha Branch for that. And then he starts talking there in the lecture, and I was appalled. Afterwards on Purim I absolutely slaughtered him—not in his presence—on Purim I made mincemeat of it, because the man started saying: we have new lessons from Operation Defensive Shield. What are the new lessons? I say, okay, there are terrorists, babies—here, that was what was on the table. That’s what people were talking about. It’s not that I happened to be bothered by something; that was the issue people were discussing. He says: you get an order that you have to mobilize because there is an operation, and the question is whether you are allowed to take your toothbrush in your hand and put it into the kitbag, or whether you need to take the brush with your mouth and put it in that way, making a change from the normal manner, and pack it in an unusual way and put it into the kitbag. Those are the new lessons of Operation Defensive Shield from the Halakha Branch of the military rabbinate.

[Speaker C] But the rabbinate is in a bind because this isn’t a war; they don’t really decide, they can…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Avoid it? What do you mean they don’t decide? First of all, first of all, they do decide, in the sense that they express a halakhic position. Now maybe the Chief of Staff will listen to it and maybe he won’t listen to it. But it’s very far from simple, because if he doesn’t listen to it, then I as a soldier am unwilling to do it because it’s against Jewish law. I’m unwilling to do it. So what will you do now? Can you court-martial me? Who said? It’s like telling me to desecrate the Sabbath. No, it’s against Jewish law. It’s not so simple that they don’t decide. They put themselves into a niche where they don’t want to decide. And then that fellow, that officer, came to me before that grotesque episode. He came to me after that operation and said: listen, we heard everyone—what they think, what should be done and what shouldn’t be done. We didn’t hear what the rabbis say. What does Jewish law say about this matter? That we didn’t hear. Everyone brought his opinion—the journalists and the professors and the ethicists and everyone. Where are the halakhic instructions? Tell us what Jewish law says in a situation like this. He said: listen, we were there and it was very significant for us. We wanted to know what to do. There was no voice and no answer.

[Speaker F] They’re trying to remove a Jewish atmosphere from the Chief Rabbinate because of that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. I said I understand why they choose to fold back into those areas. On the other hand, fine, they pushed them out one way or another, and they can still fight for their place—or they’ll push them out or they won’t push them out—and the religious soldiers will decide whether they accept it or don’t accept it. It’s not so simple. Meaning, if you are emphatic, if you say this is forbidden, then—as I once mentioned—I had some argument once with Ravitzky. His daughter and ours are good friends, so once we ate a Sabbath meal together. So I had an argument with him—there was also a story involving one of the Gaza operations. There was an operation—one of the operations in Gaza—I no longer remember which. And they remained there, and they finished fighting at some point on the Sabbath. They finished the mission, got the order—or the General Staff came to the conclusion—that it was over, they should leave. But there were a few bodies of our soldiers in the hands of the terrorists there in Gaza. Now the dilemma was whether to leave—because it is forbidden to fight on the Sabbath and this was no longer danger to life—to go out, but then on Saturday night they would need to reenter in order to retrieve the bodies, or try to retrieve the bodies. That’s how it was presented then; I don’t know, today it sounds funny—what’s the problem, they’ll hide the bodies and you won’t find them if you go in on Saturday night. But never mind, that’s how it was presented then. And reentering could cost more casualties. You go out and then reenter, and you have to conquer the area again. Or keep fighting even though it’s no longer danger to life, in order to save the bodies. I told him that if I had been the Chief Military Rabbi, then I would have said: leave, and don’t go back in on Saturday night. Leave the bodies there. Because there is no justification whatsoever for endangering soldiers’ lives in order to save bodies. No justification in the world. Morally too. Fine, I don’t accept that justification. So this dilemma of whether… But the Chief of Staff comes to me as Chief Military Rabbi, let’s say, whoever the Chief Military Rabbi was, and says: listen, these are the two options. They came to the Chief Rabbi about it too, by the way. They came to the Chief Military Rabbi; he had to make the decision. Whether to leave and go back in Saturday night?

[Speaker D] It sounds strange that the rabbinate commands soldiers.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, but he had to make the decision. It was in the media. We heard it in the media. Whether to leave and go back in, or continue fighting on the Sabbath. And I said that if he had asked me, I would have said: neither this nor that. Leave and do not go back in. Don’t tell me what I’m supposed to answer. You tell me either this or that? I’m telling you neither this nor that. A third option. You ask me what Jewish law says? Then you can’t tell me either this or that. I’m telling you: leave. That’s Jewish law. Do whatever you want, but that’s Jewish law.

[Speaker F] But the price could be a higher price—there could be release of terrorists, release of… what, for the bodies?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no terrorists are released. Exactly—not justified. Don’t release them. What are you talking about? For bodies? If they were alive, I don’t know whether it would be justified.

[Speaker F] And that’s a decision for the political echelon.

[Speaker H] The political echelon determines that it wants the bodies. It wants them? The Chief of Staff has to decide how to implement that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem. But I’m telling you that this is forbidden, and let the political echelon issue the order.

[Speaker H] But actually I suspect that Jewish law in such a case perhaps does leave it, passes the responsibility to the levels on the ground—that perhaps Jewish law in principle cannot enter and deal…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. I disagree. I disagree. That’s a fairly common statement, but I disagree with it. I disagree with it. I do agree that you need to hear the different sides.

[Speaker H] Then there’s a problem within the army.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, then there’s a problem.

[Speaker H] That every soldier—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —will run things according to what—

[Speaker H] —his rabbi told him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If they order me to desecrate the Sabbath for nothing? Just for nothing—if they order me to desecrate the Sabbath? So what? We’ll leave it to the political echelon—they decided that now the Sabbath has to be desecrated. And I think there is absolutely no justification for that, so I will not desecrate the Sabbath. Now in my eyes, endangering life is a prohibition just like desecrating the Sabbath. Now discuss what Jewish law says—when it’s justified and when it isn’t, fine. But I’m saying: you ask me what Jewish law says? That’s what Jewish law says. I’m not playing on your field. So Ravitzky said—I brought him that example afterwards—he said: fine, but at least gain the better of the two. So give them advice for the less bad of the two options the Chief of Staff presented to you. Don’t go for the best option in your opinion; at least gain that he’ll do the better option of the two he presented. So I told him that it’s like the story, the urban legend I once heard from Rabbi Galinsky, I think—already of blessed memory by now—who told about some rabbi in South America, yes, to whom some Jew from the community came and said: listen, every year I start eating kosher on the first day of Elul. That’s my custom. And now the question is whether to start on the first day of the new month or the second day of the new month.

[Speaker C] And he finishes on Yom Kippur—

[Speaker J] Apparently.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On Yom Kippur he eats only kosher.

[Speaker C] The first day of Elul is always the same thing, no? What? He was a Yekke. Fine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because should he start on the first day of the new month or the second day of the new month? The second day from the declaration of the new month, never mind. So should he start on the first day of the new month or the second day of the new month? They advance it? Yes. So he told me: I would tell him to start on the first day—let’s gain another day. Let’s gain another day of eating kosher. And I said that what I would answer him is: you need to eat kosher all year. That is what I would answer him. I would not tell him which of the two bad options is the less bad. That is a policy of halakhic guidance. So it’s somewhat similar to this discussion: you present me with two possibilities, both of which are not the correct halakhic possibilities, and you ask me which of them is preferable? I don’t answer you. Both are forbidden. The option that should be done—that’s what Jewish law says. I am not an adviser to sinners on how to sin minimally.

[Speaker H] And again, yes, why here don’t you say the thesis you kept talking about when you spoke about the police and said that basically the same thing—that the question of whether there is danger to life or not, the danger to life should be determined by that system, since it cannot exist without you giving it the authority?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m not talking about the question whether there is or isn’t danger to life. There isn’t danger to life—there’s no question about that.

[Speaker H] When the police carry out actions, you yourself say there’s no danger to life there, but you think that because it’s a system that cannot function otherwise, then it is the one that determines.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the army certainly can function differently—what do you mean? It’s not an interference with its functioning. No, this isn’t the difference between the police and the army; it’s a difference between the questions. Here we’re not talking about the army’s routine functioning. I’m not saying that every time you go on patrol on the Sabbath you should press the gas with your left foot. Press the gas with your left foot just for the sake of making a change. Fine, that might have been similar to the police, because you need to function in the normal way. But here we’re talking about an exceptional step, a one-time step, not routine functioning.

[Speaker D] The routine functioning here—isn’t that carrying out orders?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Carrying out orders, yes. But the question is what the orders are. I’m the Chief Military Rabbi, I’m not a soldier. I’m the Chief Military Rabbi, and I’m also responsible for the orders. By the way, you carry out orders, but… fine. Now I’m saying: you ask me what Jewish law says? This is what Jewish law says. You don’t want to do it? No problem. But what do you want from me? You’re giving me an order to act contrary to Jewish law—I’m not doing it. That’s all.

[Speaker D] If you issue a different directive, the soldiers will be in a dilemma,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then let them do what they think is right. I’m saying it’s forbidden.

[Speaker C] That’s what I’m saying.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So now you have to weigh whether you issue the order that it’s forbidden or the order that it’s permitted.

[Speaker C] What do you mean? It’s always—you know—it’s always the tendency, the tendency—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —to put the religious soldiers in a situation where maybe they can’t function. Maybe not—what do you mean they can’t function? I’m saying it’s forbidden, that’s all. Whoever is in a dilemma will be in a dilemma. That doesn’t make it permitted just because he’s in a dilemma. No, what do you mean? But if carrying out orders over time, carrying out orders… We’re not talking about over time. I don’t buy these scare stories. This slippery slope, that every time you refuse an order it dismantles the army—no, it doesn’t dismantle the army. You need to know when to refuse an order: when some very significant red line has been crossed for you, not every time your sense of smell doesn’t like something. That’s true. But fine, that doesn’t mean every time—after all, the secular outlook also accepts refusals of orders as legitimate in circumstances where a red line has been crossed, certainly. What do you mean? A black flag, a black flag—I’m not talking about that. A black flag is simple, it’s simple, I’m not talking about that; that’s mixing categories. No, I’m not connecting it to a black flag at all. A black flag is obvious, because a black flag means that the order itself is unlawful. Whoever gives that order will go to prison, not the one who carried it out. I’m talking about not carrying out an order and going to prison—I would go to prison, not the one who gave the order. Conscientious objection—conscientious objection is not a black flag.

[Speaker I] But that conscientious objection isn’t religious.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s what I’m saying—what difference does it make whether it’s religious or not? A secular person is allowed conscientious objection, but a religious person isn’t?

[Speaker I] No, the secular person also shouldn’t go in.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, shouldn’t go in?

[Speaker I] It’s not a question for the Chief Rabbi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you’re asking me from the standpoint of Jewish law. This is what Jewish law says.

[Speaker I] Conscientious objection—someone will come—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A secular person will come and say, what, I have no problem with desecrating the Sabbath or risking lives for bodies—that’s fine.

[Speaker I] No, no, not desecrating the Sabbath. No—you’re saying that you wouldn’t do either one, neither on the Sabbath nor after the Sabbath, not go in at all. Right? That’s no longer religious, that’s conscientious.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, it’s not religious? In my view, that is the halakhic / of Jewish law understanding. That’s not Jewish law. It is Jewish law. A secular person can say: in my worldview, I do think lives should be risked in order to recover bodies; that’s my morality, I’m not bound by Jewish law. Fine, what can I do? So that’s his morality. In my view it’s not morality either. You’re right that in my view, even as a secular person I wouldn’t agree to it, not only as a religious person. Fine. A secular person can come and say, okay, but in my view morality is different.

[Speaker I] And there are those who would think that way, and there are those—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, that’s why I’m saying: given that, then first of all, beyond an order over which a black flag flies—which is a question of whether the order is lawful—there is the matter of conscientious objection. Conscientious objection means: I’m not willing to do this; for me this crosses a moral red line that I’m not willing to cross—put me in prison. And the fact that meta-legal thought recognizes conscientious objection—what does that mean? It means that, all in all, we need to take into account that what stands before us are people, not robots. And it’s true that when there are serial refusals, that endangers the functioning of the army in general.

[Speaker D] It recognizes conscientious objection—I don’t understand what it means that it recognizes it. That it—that it… recognizes its legitimacy. The person doesn’t… recognizes its legitimacy.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So know that—it seems you didn’t know, so now you know.

[Speaker D] Is every such thing legitimate in itself? There are a lot of things in between. The severity of the punishment determines it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not only the severity of the punishment. Afterward the person may be considered a criminal with moral turpitude, disqualified from public office. No. There are legal consequences to this too. Meta-law intervenes here within the law. You’ll go to prison because you committed an offense and the order was lawful. But they see this act as… what kind of criminal offense is it? Not obeying an order in the army—I don’t know what they call it. Disobeying an order.

[Speaker C] Someone who was discharged from the army is disqualified from serving in public office?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m giving an example of a consequence. I’m not getting into the question of which consequences there are. The fact that this has legitimacy means: provided that you pay the price. There are also cases where they may lighten your punishment because of that. Absolutely.

[Speaker D] I don’t understand where you get the idea that this has legitimacy. Based on what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Open some legal literature and look.

[Speaker D] That they say there, it’s okay for you to go to prison.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is freedom of conscience, and there is a manifestly unlawful order; there are meta-legal categories. A manifestly unlawful order is not a meta-legal category, it’s a legal category, since the order is unlawful. I’m talking about an order that is lawful, but in meta-law they say it is legitimate to refuse.

[Speaker H] But there’s a huge difference between conscientious objection and what you’re going and saying—because of Jewish law I’m not doing it. Why? Because conscientious objection is your personal problem. The moment you said Jewish law, you’re applying it to a huge number of people. Right. That’s it—then the functioning of the army stops.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The functioning of the army doesn’t stop. On this issue, on this specific issue, a person who believes all this—you, privately, between yourself and yourself. I don’t accept that claim. People raise it—I don’t accept it at all. When a person says, I refuse, I don’t know, to serve in the territories—that’s a personal decision. But hundreds of people made that same personal decision.

[Speaker H] I don’t know, does the army recognize that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does it mean, recognize that? Conscientious objection. What does recognize mean? Conscientious objection is legitimate. By the way, pacifists are exempted from service. It’s on the table. For example—that’s conscientious objection. You can make distinctions between anything and anything.

[Speaker H] No, between entering service and being in it and then…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What difference does it make? There’s an obligation to enlist; that too is a legal obligation. Why do they waive that obligation in favor of civilian service? Fine—why? But there is an obligation to enlist, so why exempt him? No—there is recognition of conscientious objection. A person… And that’s exactly the point we talked about earlier. A person is also an individual; he’s not just an organ in the collective. And once he is an individual, the public has to recognize that he has red lines too, even if in the eyes of the public those aren’t the red lines. In the eyes of the public the order is lawful. But I respect the fact that there is a person, and that person is you.

[Speaker H] So what will you do with that platoon—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that, out of conscientious objection, won’t go in?

[Speaker H] The army and the commander in the field think that this is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —what needs to be done.

[Speaker H] Not that he thinks, the system—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —thinks so, and it won’t be able to do it. It won’t be able to do it. Yes, that order… that platoon won’t go in. That’s what I think.

[Speaker H] Because you were going in a different direction all along with the police and all that, even though you’re talking about Jewish law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s exactly the point. Of course I’m making the distinction, because here the army can function. These are the scare stories they always threaten you with: if you refuse an order the army collapses. The army does not collapse. And you can refuse orders—it’s just that you need to weigh it, to do it in cases that are acute enough to justify it. Because it matters to you too that the army not fall apart, obviously. That matters to me in the background. So I make my calculation. And conscientious objection is not every time my sense of taste is offended, but when some really very significant red line is crossed for me. So they recognize that I have the right to refuse on grounds of conscience. And if you send a platoon of guys for whom this is a matter of conscience, then take into account that they won’t do it. They won’t do it. Either send another platoon or don’t carry out that mission. In my view, if enough of the public—by the way, if a significant part of the army refuses this order—then very good, the army shouldn’t do it. Because that means the commander here is acting against the view of the majority of the public that sent him. And it’s perfectly fine that this order not be carried out; I have no problem with that.

[Speaker C] That’s an extreme case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but I’m talking only about such cases.

[Speaker C] But then I’d say—it seems to me that maybe the specific example of an operation in order to recover the bodies may not, in principle, dismantle the army. But if I understand the principle behind it, the principle behind it is that any order to go out on any military mission whatsoever—I mean a real military mission, to battle, to a place where there are terrorists who can shoot at me, where people can die—and I don’t think there is halakhic / of Jewish law justification for it. That’s elastic, because there isn’t really—there will be many rabbis who say…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is elastic, and you yourself have to take its elasticity into account, because you don’t always understand all the contexts and all the implications. So take that into account. But if you’re sure about it, don’t do it.

[Speaker C] So again, then it seems to me that such a principle is a principle by which no army can function, because almost every military action has opinions this way and that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t accept it, I don’t accept that claim. I don’t accept that claim. That is exactly the claim by means of which they wanted to silence everyone who thinks differently. And if you do that, the army… not true, the army doesn’t fall apart. Our army is made up of adults. Some won’t carry out the order, some will carry out the order. Usually it’s a small minority that won’t carry out the order, and that’s perfectly fine. So they won’t carry it out.

[Speaker C] But if people—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —will think before every battle whether in their opinion it’s justified to go into this battle? Let them think, if it’s justified in an unequivocal sense—let them think. When I had in front of me some guys who were about to go to officers’ course in Yeruham, and I gave them a kind of preparatory talk beforehand—they had gone through various instructors there at the yeshiva and all sorts of things as part of the preparation before going out—I told them that I would not want to go into battle with soldiers when I know that they would never refuse me an order. Usually this approach that says not to refuse an order because it will dismantle the army creates a bad army. It creates a bad army, where a commander doesn’t have to think twice about the order he gives.

[Speaker H] Yes, but the commander also comes from those same soldiers, and I expect that he too will know exactly to give the right order.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore he also has his dilemmas.

[Speaker H] Of course.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He has his own dilemmas as a commander, obviously. It’s not only the soldiers who have dilemmas. Of course, what kind of question is that? Everyone has his own dilemmas, and we have to take into account that we are not operating with an army of zombies, of robots.

[Speaker D] In the IDF there’s no concern that they’ll be too obedient? In your opinion, the concern is that they’ll be too obedient?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I think that in the IDF they are very obedient.

[Speaker D] Yes, the IDF—everything, every order is voluntary, from personal experience.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. I was also in the IDF, and that’s not my impression. I think the IDF is a very obedient army in operational contexts. In operational contexts, the IDF is very obedient. There’s some terrible hysteria toward anyone who even raises the possibility of refusing an order or not doing something—they immediately pounce on him as if he’s about to dismantle the army. And in my view that’s exaggerated. By the way, it gives a good balance; it’s not terrible that such a thing exists, because really, obviously, you need to make sure it’s not over every little thing. But on the other hand, a person needs to know that the responsibility is on him. If you did something that should not be done, and you received an order, the moral responsibility is also on you. The moral responsibility, not the legal one. Not the court—the court will determine whether the order was lawful or unlawful. I’m talking about a case where the court says the order is lawful. But I claim that I bear moral responsibility if I carry it out. That’s the Nuremberg argument. Yes, where they say, we were following orders. Now again, an extreme case. But fine, what I’m saying is: there it’s a black flag. But the construct of a black flag was created afterward. The Nazi soldier didn’t know that construct; it was created in the Nuremberg trials. So you see—that’s problematic. And the great innovation there was that they judged people for obeying the law. But on the other hand, you can’t do without it. Why? Because a person has responsibility. The fact that you received an order does not exempt you from responsibility, including personal responsibility—not only responsibility before the court, but personal responsibility before your conscience. If your conscience…