Learning from Experience – Lesson 8

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s why I say this is exactly scientific methodology. The only thing is that the range of options we’re willing to take into account when we build our scientific theory is broader than contemporary science. Contemporary science won’t take astrology into account. But in principle, even contemporary science ought to recognize that if we’ve done the eliminations and checked things and it really works, then it would have to admit that there is such a thing as what we call fate. We talked about jaundice, right, the example of jaundice. Meaning, a rational person is supposed to accept that if there is good evidence and we’ve eliminated all the theories that we think are relevant and nothing worked out, then we need to recognize that apparently there’s something here we don’t know. Call it fate, it doesn’t matter. Therefore this is completely scientific. Or completely scientific logic, again. The logic here is really logic of elimination and scientific generalization. Now what we see here in the Talmudic text is basically two things, or three. First, they do induction. Second, induction is done only if in the background we have a theory we arrived at through abduction, which grounds the induction. Third, if there are several theories, each theory will give us a different induction, right, a different generalization. The theory that the source causes it will give us a law that this woman—whoever marries her, and actually enters marriage, not just gets engaged—will die. That’s the theory. In contrast, the theory that fate causes it says that whoever gets engaged to this woman may also die. So we see that the generalization changes if the underlying theory changes. In other words, the abduction determines the induction. A fourth point is that we shape our practical policy according to the scientific theory we arrived at, according to the abduction. Okay? All that we see here in the Talmudic text. In other words, in a nutshell, this is basically everything we’ve seen until now. Okay? And that’s really what’s here in the Talmudic text. Now look at a nice example of this. Maybe I’ll say—I’ll maybe add one more sentence. When I say “fate causes it,” there may be another way to understand that. That is, it could be that when Rav Ashi says “fate causes it,” he’s not proposing an alternative theory, but saying: forget it, I’m not looking for theories, I’m doing induction without abduction. If three husbands died, if three husbands died, then the fourth husband will also die even if I have no explanation whatsoever. And he doesn’t mean to say that there’s such a thing as fate, some mystical force that causes husbands to die. He doesn’t mean to propose a theory. On the contrary, he means to say: even if you don’t have a theory, go with the induction even without abduction. If three husbands died, assume that more will continue to die—not because there’s some theory at the base, or not because you know how to point to the theory. Presumably there is some theory for why they die, but you don’t need to have some plausible theory in order to make the induction. Even if you don’t have a plausible theory, yes, according to Rav Ami of Geronya—Rav Ami of Geronya—if you don’t have a plausible theory, you don’t make a generalization. If there is no source, you don’t make a generalization, right? If the woman didn’t marry but only got engaged, and three times her husbands died—only fiancés, without marriage—what would Rav Ami of Geronya say?

[Speaker A] That there had been intercourse before marriage?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, the assumption is that there wasn’t. Yes, that’s also a possibility, but the assumption is that there wasn’t. He would say it’s coincidence, right? He says: if I have no plausible theory explaining the three cases, you can’t rule out that this is just a coincidence that happened three times. It can happen. By the way, this is exactly Nassim Taleb, right, Taleb’s black swan. Meaning, he basically says—and we’ll talk more about this later—but he says, look, think for example about someone like Warren Buffett, some investor in the stock market—or actually I don’t think he invests in the stock market, I think he invests in various businesses—and he succeeds over many years in an exceptional way. Very few people apparently—so they say, I haven’t checked, but that’s what they say—very few people really succeed consistently over so many years like Warren Buffett. Now Nassim Taleb says that this doesn’t at all mean he has special talent, not at all necessarily. It may be purely statistical. What does that mean? Say a thousand investors enter the market. Okay? Over the course of a week, nine hundred of them will succeed over a week. How many will succeed over a month? Seven hundred. How many over a year? Four hundred. How many over five years? One hundred.

[Speaker A] And how many over fifty years?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One. That one is Warren Buffett. Now notice, I’m talking about a thousand investors all with the same abilities—not that one is some genius economist, no. They all have the same level of ability. But statistically, this one wins, that one loses; the lottery works out so that with odds of one in a thousand, even an amateur investor will succeed over fifty years. So if a thousand investors enter, one of them survives fifty years and succeeds. So the fact that you have a Warren Buffett doesn’t prove that Warren Buffett is talented. There has to be one such person. It just happened to be Warren Buffett; it could have been anyone else. I brought here—or maybe I didn’t, I’ll bring it later—but the illustration is from a thriller by John Verdon called Think of a Number. He says: imagine a person gets an envelope, opens it, and sees inside a letter and another small envelope. He reads the letter, and it says this: Hello. Know that I have supernatural powers. That’s what the writer tells him: I have supernatural powers. In the enclosed envelope there is a number between one and a thousand. I want you to guess the number, guess a number between one and a thousand, and afterward open that envelope and you’ll see that inside it is exactly the number you guessed. So in short, the person guesses, say, I don’t know, 712, opens the small envelope—712. Unbelievable, exactly what he guessed. Later in the letter it says: listen, if I guessed correctly, then you understand that I have supernatural powers. Send me ten thousand dollars and I’ll make you a millionaire. Well, the guy of course sends ten thousand dollars; he has a supernatural power at his disposal, he’s guaranteed to become a millionaire. At the end of the book, the solution to the mystery is that the man sent a thousand such letters, or ten thousand such letters, and he put random numbers inside the small envelopes. And of course, if he sends ten thousand letters, then let’s say that when people guess numbers, assuming uniform distribution and each number has probability one in a thousand, then ten people will guess correctly. Okay? Those ten people who got such a letter, chose a number, and found that their guessed number was indeed inside the envelope—each of them will send him ten thousand dollars. Well, a hundred thousand dollars is not a bad deal when he has no ability to guess at all, of course. Nothing at all—it’s simply statistics. Understand, this is exactly the same as Warren Buffett, or as Nassim Taleb’s explanation of Warren Buffett. Not necessarily that he’s right, but it’s a very interesting perspective. Meaning, many times we’re sure we have wonderful evidence because the case, as they say, doesn’t stop repeating itself—something that keeps happening, so we make an induction that it will probably keep happening. Warren Buffett has been successful for fifty years—what, in the coming years he won’t succeed? The answer is no. There is no indication whatsoever from the first fifty years that it will continue. Because if those first fifty years indicate that he has special talent, then presumably he’ll keep succeeding, because he’s talented. But if those fifty years are coincidence, then there is no indication in those fifty years of success that he’ll also succeed in the next ten years. It’s coincidence. From here on, evolution or probability can choose another successful coincidence, or choose no one at all. What’s the difference between these two situations? The question is whether I have a theory behind the induction. If I have a theory, the theory is that Warren Buffett is talented. If that’s the theory, then it’s reasonable to think he’ll continue succeeding. But if I have no theory—something is happening here that no talent can explain. If someone wins the lottery fifty years in a row, no talent can cause that. So fine, either it’s fraud—but let’s say we checked it thoroughly and it isn’t fraud. I have no theory, so apparently it’s coincidence. So in the absence of a theory, I won’t say he’ll guess the lottery right in the next drawing as well, even though he guessed fifty drawings correctly. Because if I have no theory, then the assumption is that it’s coincidence. If it’s coincidence, then there is no indication that next time it will happen. You see that to do induction, to generalize from what I saw to what will happen next, depends on whether I have a theory. If I don’t have a theory, I don’t make any generalization.

[Speaker C] No, but I understand what you’re saying—Nassim Taleb isn’t claiming that when you have no theory, you should say it’s coincidence.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, of course not.

[Speaker C] He also presents the possibility that it’s coincidence. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says that you need to consider the possibility that it’s coincidence. If I could do a calculation to know the probability that by chance a person would succeed for fifty straight years in investments—if that probability came out very, very small, then maybe I would prefer the theory that Warren Buffett really is talented, or very, very small relative to the number of people in the market. Right—if there’s one out of, I don’t know, a thousand people in the market who keep going for fifty years in a row, because someone who doesn’t succeed also doesn’t continue for fifty years, right, you have to remember there are very interesting tricks here in statistical inference. But let’s say I have enough people who continue for fifty years, and Warren Buffett is one out of a thousand. But if the probability that this would happen is one in a million, then even if he’s one out of a thousand, who says it’s statistics? It could be his talent. Clearly what Nassim Taleb says is not conclusive. He’s only saying: pay attention, there’s also such an option—take it into account too. Okay? Now, if I go back to our example, what does Avimi of Geronya say? The same thing. He says: if you have some possible theory explaining why the husbands died—because the source causes it—then that’s perfectly fine, then that’s the theory. But if three husbands died from the engagement stage, not from marriage, I have no theory, because they never encountered the woman’s source, so apparently it was just coincidence and there’s no need to worry about next time. Okay? What does Rav Ashi say? Rav Ashi says: I have another theory—fate causes it. Earlier I presented this as an alternative theory; now I want to suggest a new explanation of Rav Ashi’s view. Maybe Rav Ashi is not claiming there is an alternative theory, but is saying: we make inductions even without a theory. If this happened three times, it will probably continue, even if I have no sensible theory. Now I want to say again: clearly Rav Ashi does not mean to claim that there is no theory at all, because if he wanted to claim that there is no theory at all and these three times were coincidence, then there would be absolutely no reason to be concerned about next time. There is no correlation at all between the cases that happened and the case that will happen. Rav Ashi only wants to claim that even if you didn’t find a theory, necessarily there is some theory in the background. You just didn’t figure it out; you’re not clever enough. Remember Semmelweis and Card, the examples I brought there with childbed fever and Napoleon’s victory? That’s exactly the case. You have nothing sensible that can explain the findings. So you go like a blind man in the dark, searching for some theory, firing shots in the dark, because you can’t find a theory. But it’s obvious to you that something has to be there. So Rav Ashi says yes, but if I didn’t find one, I found no explanation at all, am I going to be hospitalized in Semmelweis’s ward? Or she’s going to? Of course not. I have no sensible explanation why specifically in his ward people die—maybe it’s coincidence? Yes, but maybe not. Maybe there is an explanation there and I just haven’t figured it out, so if I value my life, I’m not going to be hospitalized with Semmelweis. That’s what Rav Ashi is saying. Rav Ashi is not claiming that fate is an alternative theory. Rav Ashi is claiming: I make induction even if I have no abduction. Even if I haven’t come up with a theory. But again, he’s not saying there is no theory—on the contrary, his assumption is that there is a theory. I just haven’t managed to think of anything sensible, like with jaundice.

[Speaker C] So what is the basis of the dispute? The weight of coincidence?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that is, yes, exactly. If something happened three times, you have two possibilities: either it’s coincidence—a small chance that something happened three times and it’s coincidence—but the second possibility is that there is a theory and I just didn’t hit on it. Now, a theory that doesn’t fit at all with the accumulated logic up to now—that too has a small chance of existing, right? Nothing I know so far explains it, can even explain it. I don’t even know what to check. Okay? A small chance. So now you have a dilemma: which option do you choose? Is it coincidence, or is there nevertheless some theory I haven’t found? Avimi of Geronya prefers the second possibility; Rav Ashi prefers the first.

[Speaker G] But maybe it’s only in a case where something serious could happen, then you…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, obviously it’s also a function of the consequences. If the consequences involve life-and-death issues, then of course we will worry about the more severe possibility even if it is less likely. That’s obvious. I’m being very schematic here for the moment, but I’m trying to show you that all these ideas we’ve talked about until now are really here in the Talmudic text. Now look: there’s the Mekor Chaim on the laws of Passover, Orach Chaim, section 467. Mekor Chaim is by the Malbim, I think, or Chavot Yair—I already don’t remember. In any event, the Mekor Chaim on the laws of Passover discusses there a three-time presumption regarding leavened food. The first passage isn’t important right now. He says: “Therefore it seems to me that we do not say a three-time presumption except where there is some causing factor such that it makes sense it should be so, where rational analogy requires it to be so. But in something that occurs by chance, where there is no reasonably plausible causing factor, there is no presumption for coincidences.” What is he saying here? You don’t do induction unless you have abduction. If there is a causing factor that plausibly gives rise to the phenomena I encounter—I have a theory—then I say that this is probably a general law and I have to assume it will continue. But if not—if I have no plausible theory explaining it—then no, there are no presumptions. Even if it happened three times, the assumption is that it’s coincidence. I don’t take it into account; there is no presumption for coincidences. In short: you don’t do induction without abduction. That’s basically what he says in our language. And a clear proof of this, says the Mekor Chaim, is from tractate Yevamot regarding a lethal woman, where according to the one who says: if the source causes it, there is no law of a lethal woman in the case of engagement. Right? According to Avimi of Geronya’s view, if his theory is that the source causes it, then if three husbands died from engagement, he is not concerned about the fourth husband. Why? From the standpoint of induction, it happened three times, so be concerned about the fourth time. No—one does not make induction unless there is abduction in the background. If you have no sensible explanation, you don’t make induction. And similarly there is no status of killer in the man. It follows that wherever there is no plausible cause, there is no presumption. If there is no cause that is plausible—yes, a theory explaining what causes these phenomena—then there is no presumption, no three-time presumption. And another proof is from Niddah 16, where they dispute whether fixed cycles are Torah-level or rabbinic. Yes, if a woman sees blood, say, three times on the same date or in some pattern of three repetitions, there is a dispute whether one must be concerned the fourth time—must one be concerned on the fourth occurrence of that same date in the month or something like that. But the question is whether this is Torah-level or rabbinic. Jewish law rules that it’s rabbinic, but it’s a dispute in the Talmudic text. And what is this—a three-time presumption on a Torah level? How can one say that menstrual cycles are rabbinic? After all, here we have a three-time presumption. So how can one say that cycles are rabbinic? For we allow going out on the Sabbath into the public domain with an established amulet. What is that? An amulet that healed people three times; one may go out with it on the Sabbath. Because there is a presumption that it really is an effective amulet. It’s a good remedy. If it healed three times, that’s not coincidence; it indicates that the amulet is established. Yes, like an ox with established goring behavior. So it must be that this is what they disagree about: whether there is a plausible causing factor. The question is whether, when a woman sees blood on the same date in the month three times, is there some logic to the theory that the state of the moon—because the date in the Hebrew month is basically the state of the moon—whether there is a connection between the moon’s phase and the woman’s seeing blood. That’s the dispute. If we understand that this theory is a plausible theory, or at least more plausible than the possibility that it just happened three times by chance, then I assume that’s the correct theory, and if so then cycles are Torah-level. That is the view of the one who says cycles are Torah-level. The one who claims that this theory is not plausible—because what does the moon’s phase have to do with a woman seeing blood?—for him, it’s coincidence, and therefore the concern is only rabbinic, but in essence on the Torah level there is no real concern. By the way, I’m a bit doubtful about his conclusion, because according to that, it should have been—after all there are several kinds of cycles: a monthly cycle, an interval cycle, and an average cycle. Meaning, intervals, or always thirty days, or yes, whatever it may be. So the dispute whether cycles are Torah-level or rabbinic concerns all three kinds of cycles. Now if the dispute is about whether the date in the month is plausible or not plausible, why should those same authorities also dispute whether fixed intervals are plausibly fixed or not? That is an entirely different dispute. It might be worth arguing about that too, but why make this dispute depend on that dispute? When they speak about whether cycles are Torah-level or rabbinic, the dispute is about all types of cycles. So it’s a bit hard for me to accept what he says, but never mind—I only want to bring him as support for what I described earlier: that we don’t do induction unless there is abduction in the background. And the abduction in the background asks: is it plausible that there is a theory explaining this? If it is totally implausible, then it’s probably coincidence. Let’s return, for example, to the jaundice case. I saw someone healed of jaundice by putting pigeons on his navel, let’s say. Okay? Now I have no theory explaining this. It doesn’t sound sensible to me. So I try it again. And wow, it heals another person, and another one—three times it healed. Now I have to start weighing things, because to say this happened three times by chance is implausible. On the other hand I also have no plausible theory explaining it. So now I have to examine how implausible it is that there is some theory I haven’t discovered, versus how implausible it is that this was coincidence. Again, I don’t know how to make the calculation, of course, but that is essentially the consideration one has to weigh when forming a view about such a case. Okay? That’s basically what is written here. Now, these things actually bring us to a well-known insight of Rabbi Chaim of Brisk. He brings the Talmudic text at the beginning of Chagigah regarding the signs of an imbecile. “The Sages taught: who is an imbecile? One who goes out alone at night, and spends the night in a cemetery, and tears his clothing.” Yes, three signs of an imbecile: someone who goes out alone at night wandering around, someone who sleeps in a cemetery, and someone who tears his clothing—just tears his own clothes. It was stated there, a dispute of Amoraim. Rav Huna said: only when they are all present together. Meaning, in order to decide that someone is an imbecile, you need all three signs; one alone is not enough. Rabbi Yochanan said: even one of them. One sign is enough—this one or that one or the other one. Rav Huna says no, only if all three are present. What are the circumstances? If he does them in an imbecilic way—if it’s clear he’s doing this out of some kind of insanity—then even one sign is enough, even one alone. And if he does not do them in an imbecilic way—if he doesn’t look deranged, his body language doesn’t, there are no signs of some kind of madness—then even all of them would not suffice. So the Talmudic text says like this: really, he does do them in an imbecilic way; he is indeed doing this in a way that looks odd, looks unreasonable. And still, if he does them in an imbecilic way, we asked, then one sign should suffice. Why do we need three? It says no, we need three—why? It says as follows: if he sleeps in a cemetery, perhaps we can say he does it so that an impure spirit may rest upon him. Why does he sleep in a cemetery? He wants an impure spirit to rest upon him. So he’s not crazy; he just wants impure spirits to rest on him. Yes, the assumption of course is that there is such a thing as an impure spirit resting on him and so on; it’s not madness to think such a thing exists. And if he goes out alone at night, if that’s the only sign, perhaps some fit seized him. And if he tears his clothing, perhaps he is deep in thought—he was absorbed in thought and absentmindedly tore his clothing. Since he did all of them, he is like one who gored an ox, a donkey, and a camel, and thereby became established as dangerous toward all. Suddenly there’s an analogy to an ox with established goring behavior; we’ll soon see that analogy. But what is really written here? You need all three signs because each sign could have an explanation. Right? If he went out alone at night, maybe some fit seized him. If he slept in a cemetery, maybe he wanted an impure spirit to rest upon him. If he tears his clothing, maybe he is deep in thought. So each of these signs could also have some rational explanation; it needn’t be that he does it because he’s an imbecile. Therefore you need all three signs. Rabbi Chaim asks: why aren’t two enough? Two should suffice. Or alternatively, even if there were three, it could still be that he slept in the cemetery because he wanted an impure spirit, he went out alone at night because of the fit, and he tore his clothes because he was deep in thought. So who says he’s an imbecile even if all three signs are present? The answer is: if he had two signs, then indeed there is no presumption that he is an imbecile. Why? Because it could be, say, that he both went out alone at night and tore his clothing. Fine—it could be that he is deep in thought and therefore tore his clothing, and a fit seized him and therefore he went out alone. So in any case it’s not because he’s an imbecile. Therefore with two there is no presumption that he is an imbecile. Rabbi Chaim asks, fine, so why with three yes? Even with three you can still say that the third one too happened for its own third special reason. He says no: two things can happen by chance from two different causes. But three things—it’s clear there is some one cause threading through all three, namely that he is an imbecile. Basically what Rabbi Chaim says is this: suppose we have all three signs here. And by the way, this is exactly the common denominator from what we saw in the previous class. What does Rabbi Chaim say? He says: I see someone going out alone at night. Fine, so I say okay, he’s probably an imbecile. Why suddenly? It could be that some fit seized him. What can you infer from going out at night, since that can happen because of a fit? So I say: sleeping in a cemetery will prove otherwise. He also slept in a cemetery, so it can’t be because of the fit. No—sleeping in a cemetery could be because he wants an impure spirit. Right? So I say okay, then let the fact that he tears his clothing prove it. No—tearing his clothing could be because he is deep in thought, yes, absorbed in thought. So now I have three examples, and I have two possible explanations for the appearance of the three examples. One explanation is a single explanation threading through all three cases: he is an imbecile. Because he is an imbecile, he did all three things. The second alternative is that each of these symptoms has a different explanation: here it’s a fit, here he wanted an impure spirit, and here he was absorbed in thought. Two explanations—which is better?

[Speaker C] The first, obviously.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The first. Why?

[Speaker C] Occam’s razor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Occam’s razor, right. It’s the simpler explanation. Why assume he did acts characteristic of an imbecile, but each time not because he was an imbecile, rather because of some particular reason that just happened to seize him? It is much more reasonable that these three cases actually happened because of the same factor itself, because of the common denominator among them. He’s probably an imbecile. Yes, if something is green on the outside and red on the inside and has watermelon seeds, then it’s probably a watermelon. If you see a green fruit, I don’t know what’s inside it. If you see that it’s also red inside and green outside, who knows, maybe it has different seeds. But if it’s green outside and red inside and has watermelon seeds, then it’s a watermelon. In other words, the point—and this is how science works. We talked last time about the common denominator. I let go of this phone and it falls to the earth. Then I let go of the pen and it also falls to the earth. Then I let go of the microphone and it too falls to the earth. Fine, maybe each one has its own reason why it falls. This one because it’s an electronic device, that one because it writes, and this one because I don’t know what, because it has a mesh with holes. Nonsense—it’s possible. But more plausibly, Occam’s razor prefers that all of them fall because they have mass. They have a shared property causing all three. That is exactly scientific generalization.

[Speaker C] So why, when he did only two things, don’t we say that there too?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, that’s the dispute between Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Rabbi maintains that two things are enough. You don’t need three. And according to Rabbi, I think here too in Chagigah two signs of an imbecile would indeed suffice. In Jewish law, in most cases, we rule like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—the Talmudic text makes some distinctions, not important now—but in most cases we rule like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and therefore a presumption is established after three times. But Rabbi really says that two are enough, and why? Because with one case, you have either one explanation—that he is absorbed in thought—or that he is an imbecile. Those are two explanations equally simple. But if two things happened, then there is already an advantage to the explanation that he is an imbecile, because for the two things there are already two different independent explanations causing them, as opposed to one explanation based on a single parameter—that he is an imbecile. That’s already preferable. Rabbi says, correct—but apparently that is Rabbi’s view. Therefore Rabbi says that even with two there is a presumption. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel claims that in order to create a presumption—we are, after all, removing something from its prior status, and that’s why I remind you of the wayfarers of Usha. We move from one presumption and reveal another presumption. In order to remove something from its prior presumption, you need significant evidence. It isn’t enough that one explanation be just a little preferable. It has to be a significant preference. Three times is a significant preference. That’s what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says. But apparently Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would say that only where this comes to dislodge an existing presumption. If in fact I have no prior presumption about him—there’s a mental institution nearby and I see a person walking in the street. In that city half the people are residents from the institution and half are not. Now I see a person: there’s a fifty percent chance he’s mentally ill and a fifty percent chance he isn’t. For such a person, two times doing things characteristic of an imbecile would suffice. You don’t need three. Because I’m not trying to remove him—I’m not acting against the normal presumption. When I see an ordinary person, the presumption is that he is normal. In order to remove him from the presumption of normality, you need three examples, because I need a much stronger preference for the explanation that he is an imbecile over the explanations that this happened coincidentally. But if I’m not trying to remove him from a prior presumption, then a slight preference between two possibilities is enough, and I’ll always take the one that is slightly preferable.

[Speaker C] And in inferences like an a fortiori inference and inference from a paradigm case and so on, is the preference significant or only slight? I didn’t understand. When one makes an a fortiori inference or an inference from a paradigm case, is the preference of one model over another weak or strong?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, with an a fortiori inference, the rule is that we do not impose punishments based on an inference. Because when you want to punish, that is already significant, and there you need a significant preference. If you’re only saying that something is forbidden—let’s be stringent and forbid it anyway—it may still be that there is a refutation of the a fortiori argument. But to forbid, you can still forbid on that basis. To punish is something else. Okay? So Rabbi Chaim’s claim in the end is that these three-time presumptions are basically just Occam’s razor applied to the different abductions. The question is: what is the theory underlying the phenomena we see? We perform all the possible abductions, choose the simplest among them, and then go with it; we make the induction that follows from the simplest abduction. Will every engaged husband die? Will every married husband die? Will he die if he climbs a tree? That is already the induction we make after deciding what the best, simplest theory is. Exactly as we saw in the previous class with a fortiori, common denominator, and all those things. We choose the simplest abduction, and then fill in the missing slot according to that abduction. And that is the generalization we make on the basis of that abduction. Okay? And the Talmudic text here really—as we just read—really compares it: “he is like one who gored an ox, a donkey, and a camel, and became established as dangerous toward all.” What does that mean? The Talmudic text is already comparing this to the presumption established by testimony about an ox, right? How does an ox become established as dangerous? If it gores three times, it becomes established. What happens if it gores once an ox, once a donkey, and once a camel? The Talmudic text says it becomes established as dangerous toward all. It is prone to gore anyone who passes before it. Okay? What does that really mean? Because if it gored an ox, a donkey, and a camel, again I have two ways to interpret it. One possibility is that each one was coincidence. One time it gored an ox—but only once; it didn’t gore three oxen, so I have no proof that it is dangerous to oxen. One time it gored a donkey—I have no proof that it is dangerous to donkeys. One time it gored a camel—I have no proof that it is dangerous to camels. It could be that each of these was coincidence. That is one possibility. The second possibility is no: it gored all of them because by its nature it is an ox with established goring behavior, and it is not dangerous only to a particular type of animal. It is dangerous to gore any animal it encounters. Because otherwise, if it were a specific type, that wouldn’t work—here it gored three different animals. So those are the two explanatory possibilities. The possibility that it is dangerous to all is simpler than the possibility that by chance it gored an ox once without being prone to that, by chance it gored a donkey once without being prone to that, and by chance it gored a camel once without being prone to that. Those are three coincidences. And if I have three coincidences as against one explanation that stitches together all three cases, I will obviously choose the second option. That is Occam’s razor. That is what Rashi writes there: “Like one who gored an ox, a donkey, and a camel,” in Bava Kamma 37, “for it becomes established as dangerous toward all, and we do not say that it must be established by three instances in each species.” We do not require it to gore three oxen, three donkeys, and three camels in order for it to be dangerous to donkeys, dangerous to oxen, and dangerous to camels. “Since its three gorings were attested in three species, it is not particular about one species.” It should probably say “one” there, not “another.” “So too here, these three things did not come upon him all at once, but all are due to imbecility.” Yes, if the alternative is that I have one explanation accounting for the three cases, or that we are dealing with three cases each of which is mere coincidence, with no explanation, which just happened for no reason—mere coincidence—then I will prefer the first option, because it is simpler. Okay? Exactly the same thing as with an ox, a donkey, and a camel.

[Speaker A] So basically the claim is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The claim is that apparently—at least that’s the accepted view—we do not make inductions unless in the background we have some abduction that is plausible. Not that we are certain it is correct, but it offers us a plausible explanation. Once one plausible explanation is offered for the three cases, that is preferable to assuming that all three happened by chance, with no explanation. Okay? Now, how plausible does that explanation need to be? I don’t know. Some sort of explanation. Because “the source causes it” is not a super-plausible explanation. It only says that maybe there is something in the woman’s source, and that is enough to prefer it to the possibility that three coincidences occurred here. So one has to understand that the intuition with which we try to evaluate possible explanations has limited weight. There has to be some intuitive weight to the possible explanation, but one has to understand: it doesn’t need to be a very strong intuition that it’s true. It’s enough that it’s not absurd, that I have some way to attach it to a plausible explanation. Because the alternative—that these are three coincidences—is very implausible. Now, that is the first chapter of this topic. Now I want to move on to the second chapter, or at least begin it. When discussing these three-time presumptions, the later authorities discuss that there are really—one can divide them into two kinds. One kind is presumptions that serve as evidence, and a second kind is presumptions of formation or habituation. What do I mean? Look, for example, at an ox with established goring behavior. After it gores three times, it becomes established as dangerous. This can be understood in two ways. One possibility is that those three times testify that it has a naturally dangerous disposition, because otherwise each of these gorings happened by chance. That’s implausible. So apparently it has some dangerous disposition, and that’s why it committed the three gorings. That means the three gorings constitute evidence that it has a dangerous disposition. Another possibility is to say no: an ox that gores three times becomes dangerous—it gets used to goring. That turns it into one with established goring behavior. It’s not evidence that by nature it is dangerous; rather, it implants in it a dangerous nature. Now look—the apparently simple understanding is the first.

[Speaker C] No, or the opposite.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, yes. Eliav already understands why that isn’t correct, because that is exactly the question you asked earlier. What you asked earlier was basically this: if the first understanding were correct—if the three times the ox gored were an evidentiary presumption—then I would have to assume it was dangerous from the start. Before, I didn’t know it; after it gored three times, it becomes clear to me that this ox is probably dangerous by nature. And if that were so, then I should have to go back and pay the earlier victims full damages as well. I simply didn’t know it was dangerous; now I know. Now that I know, it turns out that it was always dangerous. Therefore, apparently, it makes more sense to say that the presumption of dangerousness is a presumption that creates dangerousness. It does not testify that it has a violent nature; it creates in it a violent nature. So what, after three times that it gored, now it already has a violent nature. The heart follows the actions, as they say.

[Speaker E] And the liability falls on the owner and on his negligence, and his negligence can arise only after three times—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because in the first two times he didn’t know. Okay. Indeed we’ll see later that the later authorities and the medieval authorities discuss these presumptions of goring regarding an ox with established goring behavior: is this an evidentiary presumption or a presumption of habituation? And there are definitely views that say it is an evidentiary presumption, and in truth that is the simple reasoning. The question why it doesn’t apply retroactively can definitely be answered by saying that the owner, after all, did not know that his ox was dangerous, so you cannot come to him with claims about why he didn’t guard it. He was under compulsion. Ordinary oxen are presumed guarded. So because of that, you can’t obligate him, even though it’s true that the ox was dangerous from birth. But if the owner does not know, and you want the owner to pay, then it is not enough that the ox be dangerous; I also need a claim against the owner as to why he didn’t guard it. Okay? So there are explanations even for the view that says that the gorings of the ox are evidence and not habituation. In any case, I’m only using this in order to present to you two possibilities, or two kinds of presumptions. One kind is where I have three pieces of evidence that combine to prove something about reality: an ox that is dangerous, that I bought the land, that the woman has a fixed cycle, and so on. Or presumptions of habituation that say, for example, if the woman saw blood three times on the fifth of the month, it may be that her body has already gotten used to emitting blood whenever the moon is in exactly that phase corresponding to the fifth of the month. Then it’s actually habituation and not evidence. Or the ox—after three times that it gored, it got used to being violent. So it isn’t evidence; it’s habituation, and so on. So in many presumptions one can discuss whether it is an evidentiary presumption or a presumption of habituation. There are presumptions where it is clear that it is one of the two. There is a Kehillot Yaakov on tractate Taharot, section 47, where he discusses at great length three-time presumptions and the question whether they are habituation or evidence. He brings that he asked his brother-in-law, yes, the Chazon Ish, and the Chazon Ish answered him that there are presumptions of this kind and presumptions of that kind. Because the later authorities conduct here a sweeping discussion, a conceptual inquiry of the later authorities, asking whether every three-time presumption is an evidentiary presumption or whether all these presumptions are presumptions of habituation. And why do they conduct the discussion so sweepingly? Because the Talmudic text itself compares three-time presumptions from one case to another. For example, the wayfarers of Usha compare an ox with established goring behavior to the presumption regarding land. The Talmudic text in Chagigah that we saw compares an ox with established goring behavior to the signs of an imbecile. So you see that the Talmudic text itself understands that our position regarding three-time presumptions should be uniform across all the examples. But if some were habituation and some were evidence, then what proof is there from one to the other? It could be that evidence arises after three times and habituation after two, or vice versa, or maybe there is no habituation at all. Who says that if there is a presumption for evidence there is also a presumption for habituation, and vice versa? You can’t learn one from the other. And that is aside from the question of who says one can learn from habituation at all. So why, if Rabbi says it’s two times and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says it’s three times, does that have to apply in all the examples?

[Speaker C] No, that’s not because of that. It’s the definition of habituation. The definition of habituation starts from three times. It’s not because an ox starts with three times, so a woman—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean by definition? The question is whether it became habituated or did not become habituated.

[Speaker C] Yes, but what are we assuming?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but why assume the same thing in every case? How would you do that?

[Speaker C] If

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Reality is different—think logically about what the reality is. It could be that in some cases reality would favor two times within a presumption, and in other cases it would be three. Here it’s habituation, here it’s observation. Even within habituations, maybe here people get used to something quickly and there they get used to it slowly. This itself—and I’m already hinting ahead—this itself says to me that all these discussions among the later authorities are incorrect. They’re based on a mistake, because it’s clear that the number three is a formal number. After all, there’s no end to the matter. Obviously you get somewhat used to something after two times, more after three, even more after four, five, six. At some point you have to draw the line. Where do I draw the line? It’s not really a question of whether I got used to it or didn’t get used to it; it’s not a question of one or zero. You draw the line somewhere that Jewish law determines, because you need some criterion. So Jewish law determines that three times is the criterion. If something needs to happen several times in order for us to assume that this is the general rule—whether for habituation or for observation—then I’ll assume three. After three times, that’s what I assume. It’s a formal halakhic rule, and therefore you can compare from one area to another, and even compare observations to habituations.

[Speaker C] But why make that kind of threshold?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem, no problem.

[Speaker C] Why set that kind of formal threshold for all customs?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because you need a tool for the judge to work with.

[Speaker C] Right, so say that for a woman it’s X times, and for an ox—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The simpler thing is to set the same threshold. Right? Let’s see—this is like the case that at age three her virginity is restored. Right, the famous Jerusalem Talmud that the Shakh brings: at age three her virginity is restored. What happens if the religious court intercalated the month? Then she’s not yet three.

[Speaker C] Right, that too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he says no, then her virginity will not be restored, because the religious court determines nature; Jewish law determines nature. With all due respect, that’s nonsense. Clearly that’s not true. Rather, what’s going on is that halakhically we set a formal threshold that up to age three her virginity is restored. Obviously, factually, there are girls for whom it would be restored until age two years and ten months, and there are girls for whom it would be until age three and a half. We need to set a threshold for our halakhic assumptions, so we place the threshold at age three. And what they’re saying here is that age three is age three—I don’t care whether it comes from a court determination or not—because we need a formal threshold, that’s all. There is no reason whatsoever to interpret it as though the religious court determines reality. That’s just unnecessary mysticism; there’s no reason to assume it. Okay? So here too it’s the same thing.

[Speaker H] It doesn’t determine reality; it determines halakhic status.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What I’m saying is: it determines halakhic status, not reality.

[Speaker H] So if so, if he determined that her virginity is restored, then she’s considered like a woman injured by wood or some other similar status—it doesn’t totally change everything.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I assume her virginity is restored, and that’s it. Therefore, from my standpoint, halakhically her virginity is restored, because I’m not going to start checking each woman individually. The question is: what is the basic presumption, what is the presumption from which we proceed, what is the point of departure? The point of departure is that up to age three her virginity is restored. What does age three mean? Age three according to the calendar established for that year, because that’s the simplest thing. Now what does that mean? Does it mean there’s some kind of thing in nature here? No. After all, even age three without any court intervention—it never really happens exactly at age three. A little before, a little after. We set some formal threshold because we need to function halakhically, that’s all. So too, in presumptions of three times, in my opinion that’s how it works. Therefore all the pilpulim of the later authorities here, in my opinion, are simply incorrect. Okay, we’ll stop here and continue next time. Any comments or questions?

[Speaker C] Rabbi, I just wanted to remind you that a question came up here from Ezra, that your model is rather too formal. It’s too formal, and I don’t know if you remember—Ezra Brick, something like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ezra Brick, yes.

[Speaker C] Brick. So he asked that the model doesn’t represent the data properly—it’s too formal, with one and zero. And which model? The model of a fortiori reasoning. Right, of a fortiori reasoning and the analogy-based derivations and so on.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He asked that you can’t—

[Speaker C] use one and zero for halakhic data.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And why not? What do you mean? Liable or not liable—that’s just the notation one or zero.

[Speaker C] I don’t know, I’m just reminding you of his question because you said you’d come back to it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand the question. What, one is liable and zero is exempt—what’s the problem?

[Speaker C] I don’t remember anymore—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, but—

[Speaker I] Rabbi, may I ask a question? Yes. My question isn’t related to today’s class. By the way, thank you very much for the class, it was very enlightening. My question is about the authority of the Sages, and I’ll define it more specifically in terms of the authority of the Talmud—the Talmudic text. That is, if a person sees himself as understanding the topic or the Jewish law, then he can disagree, for example, with medieval authorities (Rishonim), with the Chazon Ish if he wants, with the Kuzari, with Maimonides—there’s no binding force there. But the Talmud has formal authority. Okay. I tried corresponding with the Rabbi about this several times; I wasn’t able to understand it, so I’d like to try to understand it now. I’m trying to understand why today, if I think otherwise, it still obligates me. Suppose I do understand that I have an obligation to God because He created me and I belong to Him. I don’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—but why do you think… And suppose I think not?

[Speaker I] If I think not—what? That I’m not obligated to listen to God?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Then I really—

[Speaker I] What do you mean? Then I really don’t listen to Him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That you won’t listen is obvious; that’s true by us as well. But the question is whether there is a claim against you. Yes.

[Speaker I] Why? I can’t explain it, I just find that understanding within myself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but it’s the same understanding here. What do you mean? The point is: if the public undertook an obligation—if the public undertook an obligation—then the party that undertook it here is the public, not you personally. And therefore everyone who belongs to the public stands obligated. That’s why even those who were not at Mount Sinai are obligated by those commitments that we undertook at Mount Sinai, even though I wasn’t there. Like Israeli law, like any—

[Speaker I] Wait, wait, wait, let’s see. That really is a good question. Why am I obligated by what my forefathers accepted at Sinai? I didn’t accept anything, I didn’t sign anything.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said that the answer is that the one who undertook the obligation here was the collective, not you. The collective is the entity that obligated itself. And once the collective—

[Speaker I] Wait, and if I choose—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I choose to leave the collective? What?

[Speaker I] If I choose to leave the collective, why is there still a claim against me?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a claim against you because you cannot leave the collective; you are part of the collective. Why? If I choose—if I choose to be called Moshe and to be one meter eighty, what can I do? I’m one meter ninety-five, not one meter eighty.

[Speaker I] No, there’s an understanding that if I committed to something, I have to fulfill it. If I joined something, maybe I can’t leave it. But if my father made a decision… what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Also assuming that I have to be a private individual—but no, I can also be a collective entity. Every legal system in the world assumes that.

[Speaker I] Fine, I can understand that, but that’s because several people made a decision together. I don’t understand how someone else made a decision and it obligates me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You didn’t understand: every legal system in the world—when parliament made a decision, it obligates even five hundred years into the future, unless a new parliament repeals it. Now, I didn’t choose that parliament from five hundred years ago, and that law obligates me.

[Speaker I] Fine, I see myself… I see myself today as obligated… no, I don’t see myself. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t see myself.

[Speaker I] Today I’m obligated to state law only because of the categorical imperative.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m asking: but if I don’t see myself that way, is there still a claim against me?

[Speaker I] No, but if you live here, you’re subject to the laws of the state.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course I’m subject—the law will put me in jail.

[Speaker I] Law and order.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, law and order? The claim is that I am obligated. Law and order addresses you as obligated. Why? Why? Because you undertook it. Me?

[Speaker I] Who—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] undertook it five hundred years ago? You, as part of the public, yes. A public is also an entity. A public can undertake obligations. That’s it, that’s the explanation. If—if—

[Speaker I] if that isn’t acceptable to you, then there’s no explanation. That’s the explanation I can give.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand that a public can undertake obligations; I don’t understand how that can carry over to their descendants. You didn’t understand: when a public undertakes an obligation, it means that everyone who belongs to that public is obligated. What Tosafot says: “One generation goes and another generation comes, but the earth stands forever,” Tosafot in Me’ilah 9a. What does that mean? There is no communal offering whose owners died. The entire public that brought the offering died. Now only their descendants are alive. That is not an offering whose owners died. Its owner still exists. Why? Because the people alive now are the same public that set aside the offering a hundred years ago. It’s the same public. A public does not die. The limbs that compose it are replaced—the private individuals—but the public remains.

[Speaker I] The idea—the idea that accompanies the public.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The public exists, and it remains obligated in what it obligated itself to. That’s it, that’s the explanation. If—if that isn’t acceptable to you, then there is no explanation. That’s the explanation I can give.

[Speaker I] So basically the Rabbi can make a claim against me if I decide that I don’t think what they accepted was a correct decision. No—I mean a negative attitude, seeing me as someone who isn’t doing the right thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but you know, if you believe this in—

[Speaker I] Okay, I—I need to think about it, I—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] don’t—

[Speaker I] can’t manage to understand it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you believe this, if you believe this, then—

[Speaker I] I’ll assume you’re coerced, fine. But you’re coerced and still a transgressor. Yes. No, but I’m trying to understand; I can’t understand it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. A very simple assumption—you can agree with it, or you can disagree with it. The assumption is that in the world there are also collective entities and not only individual entities, and collective entities are legal entities in every respect, like a corporation.

[Speaker C] Rabbi, it’s like the example of the ship—if you replace all the planks—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Ship of Theseus, yes. Okay.

[Speaker I] You can—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] agree, you can disagree, but that—that’s the explanation. I, I—

[Speaker I] choose to keep thinking about it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I—

[Speaker I] still don’t make decisions that quickly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Very good, a blessed activity.

[Speaker I] Okay, may I ask one more small question? Or is that… yes, is that okay, is that acceptable?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, everything’s fine.

[Speaker I] I wanted to ask about the prophets, and I’ll explain my question. Regarding the revelation at Mount Sinai, we have testimony… Rabbi, can you hear me?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, I’m with you.

[Speaker I] Regarding the revelation at Mount Sinai, we have testimony passed down from generation to generation, father to son, of six hundred thousand men besides women and children—in short, a very large public. Apparently there was no event like that in history, testimony of an encounter with God. It’s probably the most plausible event that God revealed Himself to people; it’s strong. Now regarding a prophet—let’s take as an example a prophet we relate to less, Jesus. We don’t accept him for a very simple reason: he didn’t prove himself. Meaning, I can’t conduct my life in such a way that anyone who comes and says God spoke to him, I listen to him—even just because of that approach. So my question regarding our prophets is this: true, there is a command, there is a command in the Torah that someone who performs such-and-such a sign, we will listen to him and be obligated to listen to him. My question is not at the level of the command, okay? I understand that that is formal authority even if he did not actually speak truth. My question is in terms of probability: is there really a high probability to think that they were true prophets?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And I’ll tell you two things. First, it doesn’t change anything, because the prophets established nothing that is relevant to us; Jewish law comes from the Torah. Laws from prophetic tradition are marginal—very few things. That’s regarding their significance for us. But beyond that, if the Torah says there will be prophets, and afterward prophets come and say that the Holy One, blessed be He, appeared to them, and we test them, then why assume it isn’t true? I don’t understand—the Torah said beforehand that this would happen.

[Speaker I] Wait, I’ll tell the Rabbi why. I watched America’s Got Talent, and what people did there—if that person had come up to me alone in the street and told me that God spoke to him, I would have believed him because of those wonders. I have no doubt about that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the reasoning I gave you before says something else. It—

[Speaker I] raises the probability that there were prophets, but not that I really trust that every one of the prophets we have spoke truth.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you know in advance that there are prophets because the Torah itself tells you so, and the Holy One, blessed be He, tells you, “I will prophesy to people,” then now when a person comes and says, “Look, the Holy One, blessed be He, prophesied to me,” and he is also tested through various signs, I don’t see a reason to cast doubt on it. If now someone came without the Holy One, blessed be He, having said this in advance, then I would refuse even to listen. By the way, this is somewhat connected to what we discussed today. Suppose that prophet performed signs three times; then the question is whether I have… is this coincidence, or did he really prophesy? Or maybe some ability, some talent, whatever—or did the Holy One, blessed be He, really prophesy? So that’s a good question; you have to decide which of the two explanations is more plausible. But if the Holy One, blessed be He, told me in advance, “Look, I’m going to prophesy to people, and you need to obey them,” then why assume there’s a problem here? The Holy One, blessed be He, will not let people speak in His name if they are not truly speaking, since He Himself requires us to listen to them.

[Speaker I] No, but there were false prophets; people have the ability to lie—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and to do—

[Speaker I] sleight of hand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, because if that had happened—if that had happened three times—then it probably would have been true. False prophets are people for whom it apparently didn’t work; they weren’t tested properly.

[Speaker I] Okay, why think that? One could also understand that quite simply a false prophet could have—like, there could have been a false prophet who managed to slip through.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can understand many things, but you know, we say “it can be resolved with difficulty,” not “it can be challenged with difficulty.” You say, “One could understand…”

[Speaker I] No, I really do understand the Rabbi’s argument, only I also think that in a period when people’s knowledge was so limited, it could be that there was a sufficiently talented person—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what you said earlier too, but I answered that. If the Holy One, blessed be He, says in advance that He will prophesy to people, and if we test them then we must obey them, and now a person arrives whom we tested, then one must obey him. That’s what is written in the Torah. So the Holy One, blessed be He, presumably must ensure that people do not speak falsely in His name, because He commanded us to obey them. That’s all.

[Speaker I] I understand. Presumably He saw to it that there was a good system.

[Speaker C] Yes, yes. Elihav? I wanted to ask about Occam’s razor. Suppose, for example, that we have one parameter, alpha, that explains all the data, okay? And that’s one model. In a second model we have three parameters—alpha, beta, gamma—that explain all the data. But actually alpha is less plausible than the three other parameters. When you identify the parameters—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. So if you identify them—I intentionally built the model, and we’ll still get to identifying these parameters, I’m still planning to comment on that. But I built the model without identifying the parameters at all, so you have no way to compare which is a relevant parameter and which is not. You just count.

[Speaker C] Okay, but suppose you do identify them—you have alpha, which is an implausible parameter—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If alpha is not a plausible parameter, then certainly it could be a theory that I would not accept.

[Speaker C] Even if on the other side there are three parameters? Yes. So your model is not entirely formal?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, for example, at the a fortiori reasoning that the rule-formulators often bring. Come—am I obligated to put fringes on a doorpost? If a four-cornered garment, which is exempt from mezuzah, is obligated in fringes, then a doorpost, which is obligated in mezuzah—should it not certainly be obligated in fringes? Now make a table, analyze it—the a fortiori argument says yes, correct, we should obligate the doorpost in fringes. So why don’t we do that? Because it’s obvious to us that there is no one parameter shared by the doorpost and fringes. Meaning, where we identify the parameters, or where we don’t really find some intuitive factor that would be a plausible cause—exactly what we discussed today in class—then indeed we won’t go with it. But I’ll still comment on the identification of parameters; that’s still in the plan.

[Speaker C] Okay, and one last question—what Elkhanan said reminded me of this question. Why, in essence, are we not liable to death at the hands of Heaven for all the commandments in the Torah? There is a law that one is liable to death at the hands of Heaven for a commandment that a prophet commands us, right? So why are we not liable to death at the hands of Heaven for all the commandments in the Torah, since it was Moses who gave them to us?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Death at the hands of Heaven applies to commandments that only a prophet commands us.

[Speaker C] Right, so Moses—Moses brought them to us.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—commandments that only a prophet commands us, not Torah commandments from the Holy One, blessed be He. Commandments from prophetic tradition. Either from prophetic tradition, or a local command of a prophet—that is, a temporary directive.

[Speaker C] No, but a prophet’s commandment has the status of Torah-level law, doesn’t it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, prophetic tradition. There are disputes among medieval authorities (Rishonim) about how to relate to prophetic tradition; there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who argue that with prophetic tradition as well, in a case of doubt one should rule stringently, but it is not Torah-level.

[Speaker C] So it’s only laws that the prophet innovates, so to speak?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. And he cannot innovate laws that are permanent, because a prophet is not permitted from now on to introduce anything new.

[Speaker C] Okay, thank you.

[Speaker A] Okay, Sabbath peace, all—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the best.