Ethics and Halakha 6

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m basically coming to the concluding chapter of this part—values, morality—and really what I’ve done until now is try to clarify the concepts a bit and the basic tools. Meaning: what is a value, what is morality, the relationship between reason and emotion in the moral context, and how to think about conflicts. How can conflicts arise, and what do you do when there’s a conflict between two values? How can a person be committed to a value system? By virtue of what are we committed to a value system? We talked about value principles, about the fact that the principle that grounds my commitment has to stand outside the system in order to establish my commitment to it; it can’t be something that belongs to the system itself. I can’t be committed to a law because there’s a law saying one has to keep the laws. That law itself also requires an explanation or justification—why be committed to it? It has to be some principle that stands outside the system we’re talking about. All of that was really a set of introductions, and what I want to do now is finally get to the question that was the point of the whole thing, namely the conflict between Torah or morality and Jewish law, and see what we do with it. Basically there are, I would say, three planes of discussion here. One plane is the question of whether there’s a logical problem here. When I’m in a conflict between Jewish law and morality, then basically—this is what many people would say—that means I’m not committed to Jewish law. Otherwise what’s the problem? What conflict is there? God said it, end of story. The very fact that I’m in conflict here seems to people to contradict religious commitment. Others, by the way, from the other side, will say the same thing in the moral direction. Meaning, those who look at religious conflicts from outside—the criticism by secular people sees religious commitment as some kind of contradiction to moral commitment. These are the kinds of things that come up almost every day in public discourse, for example regarding commitment to the law of the state. Exactly the same logic. This terrible fear of people who listen to rabbis. I never really understood this, not that I’m one of those who listens so much to rabbis—I assume you’ve already gotten to know me—but I don’t really understand this fear, as if a secular person has nothing in his world except the law. Meaning, if the law says something, that’s what he’ll do; he has no other values, meaning he’s never in conflict, everything is fine. For some reason only religious conflicts bother certain people when they’re discussing whether to appoint someone to public office, or as a senior army officer, or in government, or a senior civil servant, and so on. What, a secular person has no values that might also place him in conflict when the state tells him to do something and his values tell him not to do it?

[Speaker C] It’s not so organized.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Religion—

[Speaker C] It’s something very organized, very serious.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And morality is something terribly organized. People who belong, say, to more radical left-wing camps are people who systematically refuse to carry out army orders. Fine? So what? Because they have some sort of moral corpus. I’m not even talking about whether they’re right or wrong, or critiquing them. I’m just saying: here’s an example of a person who isn’t religious at all. What does this have to do with being religious? Every person has some sort of moral system, I’d hope at least. And after all, all these discussions—again, Godwin’s law always comes in, eventually we get to the Nazis. Meaning, those discussions around the Nuremberg trials basically said to people: friends, where was your moral system when the law commanded you to do all sorts of things? People expected a person to activate his own personal system and not obey the law. In other words, we expect a person not to be some kind of robot of the law, and if the law is unjust then you won’t automatically do it—regardless of whether the law tells you to murder, or tells you whatever. This outlook—again, I don’t want to get into those issues because that’s not my subject right now—but I’m trying to clarify the point that there are people who think that being committed to two systems of values, systems that at least may conflict, is a logical contradiction. Meaning, it can’t be. If you’re committed to the halakhic world, to the rabbi, let’s call it that, then you’re not committed to the law.

[Speaker D] Assuming one of them is not moral.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean one of them isn’t moral? Assuming there’s a conflict between them. I don’t care whether moral or not moral. If there’s a conflict between them and you’re committed to both, that means you’re not fully committed to one of them, right? Because otherwise how can it be that you’re committed to something that stands in contradiction to it? In general.

[Speaker D] In general that’s true, but why—it shouldn’t be that way in a legal system based on basic moral values, apparently. Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are people who have other—it could be, yes. There are people who have additional value systems, or whose morality is a bit different from the morality the legislator had in mind. That happens too, right? And then they’re in conflict.

[Speaker E] A conflict within one system. Sure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We talked about that earlier—a conflict between values within morality, of course. There are also disagreements about the values themselves. We talked about all that. So again, there are people who look at such a conflict as absurd. By the way, a lot of religious people too, obviously. If you say that you’re in conflict, that something moral is bothering you, then apparently you’re not committed to Jewish law if you’re in conflict. It can’t be—after all, conflict means you’re not committed to Jewish law, because if you’re committed to Jewish law, then what conflict is there? Now, that’s one plane of discussion: whether there is—

[Speaker B] A logical problem in a person like that, who believes in Jewish law—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And in Jewish law itself if there’s a conflict? Of course there is, but Jewish law also solves it, so it’s not—

[Speaker B] But it solves it practically, not in terms of values.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so now you’re already getting to the question of what the answer is. I’m just laying out the planes of discussion right now. I agree. So the first plane of discussion is the logical plane.

[Speaker F] Whether a person can be committed to several things at once?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. The question is whether that’s logically possible.

[Speaker F] When they don’t all fit together. Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is whether it’s logically possible. That’s the first question, the logical plane. The second question is whether there’s a problem here that isn’t logical but philosophical. Meaning, fine, logically maybe it works out, but still it isn’t really possible to be committed to two systems of values if there are conflicts between them. Two systems of values with no connection between them, fine—but if there are conflicts between them, then you can’t really be committed to both systems of values, not because of a logical contradiction, but because practically it’s impossible. And the third plane is the completely practical plane. What do you do? Assuming I’ve overcome the logical impossibility—so yes, I can be committed to two systems of values—and I’ve gotten past the philosophical plane. I’ll sharpen that later; right now I just want to put the scheme on the table, that this too is philosophically possible. But now practically speaking, what do you do? Do you desecrate the Sabbath or not? In a case of saving a life versus the Sabbath, or in, I don’t know, killing Amalek, or saving a gentile by desecrating the Sabbath, or all those worn-out conflicts. So what do you do with them? Do you listen to this or to that? That—that’s the third discussion. Yes, yes.

[Speaker E] In that discussion, how can you be committed to two systems? Last time you talked about the overarching principle. Right. Now it could be that the argument is that for someone who keeps Jewish law, the overarching principle is obeying the will of God, because both systems really branch out from there. And someone who comes with, say, secular morality—then both democracy and morality come from moral principles. So in the end you have a dispute between human morality and divine morality, and therefore there’s a dispute about whom you obey. The secular person criticizing the religious person for being committed to Jewish law is really saying: for you, everything is Jewish law. So even if you have a conflict within Jewish law and morality, it’s all—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, who said that for me everything is Jewish law? No, it could be that there are people who say no, not everything is Jewish law. We’ll talk about that. Not everything is Jewish law—rather, I have Jewish law and I have morality, and I’m in conflict. And there are people who won’t accept such a situation. It can’t be. Apparently you’re not committed to morality.

[Speaker E] So maybe what they’re saying, or what they want to say, is that in the end your morality too is really just listening to the voice of God. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And you have another explanation for why one should be moral, and I have this explanation. Right. But I’m still committed to two value systems, and that—

[Speaker E] Connects to what you said about the overarching principle.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll connect to that in a moment. On that I completely agree. So really, on the logical plane it seems to me we’re already exempt from discussion—we’ve been there already. On the logical plane I think this is a mistake, a clear mistake, a conceptual mistake. It’s not even really a matter for debate. It’s obvious that you can be committed to two value systems, and there’s no problem with that. Why? As I introduced earlier when we talked about value principles, I said that when I’m committed to a value system, I can be committed to it in two ways: in a one-shot way, you might say, or in a particularized way—a particular value principle—which means that I examined each and every component of the system and came to the conclusion that I identify with it, that I’m committed to it. That’s a particular value principle. And there’s a sweeping value principle. A sweeping value principle means I examined the foundation of this system—for example, Jewish law is a command of the Holy One, blessed be He—and I understood that one must be committed, or must do, what the Holy One, blessed be He, says. Consequently, whatever He says, I have to do—but I didn’t examine each one separately. I brought that Talmudic passage in tractate Shabbat, page 88, where the Holy One, blessed be He, went around to the nations—actually there were a few examples I brought. The Holy One, blessed be He, went around to the nations and wanted to give them the Torah. That midrash. So they asked Him: what is written in it? When they ask what is written in it, they mean a particular value principle, right? They ask the Holy One, blessed be He: tell us, what’s in the Torah? He says: do not steal. Does that suit you? Great. Do not murder, does that suit you? Fine. And that’s how you’d have to go through all 613 commandments. If everything suits them, they’ll accept it, they’ll be committed. But the Jewish people say, “We will do and we will hear,” and that heretic said to Rava, “A hasty people, who put your mouths before your ears.” You put your mouths before your ears, yes? You put your mouth before listening. Why didn’t they hear first what it was about? Why didn’t they bother to ask? On the face of it, that’s very irrational behavior—let’s see what the deal includes; what are you signing on to blank? The answer is yes—why? Because my commitment to this system is not contingent on its content. It’s contingent on the fact that I trust the One who commands it. I think that I should obey the One who commands it. So that’s a sweeping value principle. That’s exactly the difference. Okay, now if there’s a particular value principle, then conflict cannot arise. It’s a logical contradiction. Because I examined each value on its own and came to the conclusion that I identify with it, and then I examined in the second system each value on its own and came to that conclusion too—but there are values that clash, so that can’t be. I examined killing Amalek? Great, looks great to me, I’m all for it. Wonderful system. Fine? Then afterward I examined the prohibition “Do not murder”—you may not murder any living human being? Any human being? Great, I’m all for it, terrific. There’s no such thing. Meaning, if you examined every one of the values individually, that’s a logical contradiction. So how can conflict arise? I’m speaking now on the logical level. If the value principle is sweeping. Meaning, if I say: I have to obey everything the Holy One, blessed be He, says. That seems very reasonable to me, very logical, I’m committed to it. Fine? Good. Now I’m also committed to being a human being—that is, to behaving morally. It turns out there’s also—some conflict has arisen. Such a conflict can arise. It can happen. And then I need to examine what to do with such a thing. So once I accept the sweeping value principle as the basis of my normative system, there is absolutely no obstacle to conflicts arising. There is no logical problem here at all. Logicians who talk about deontic logic—logic of norms—point out that ordinary binary yes-no logic doesn’t always work there. Or at least seemingly doesn’t work there. When you say that I can, an example I’ve given several times, I can support eating chocolate and oppose eating chocolate at the same time. Support eating chocolate because it tastes good, and oppose it because it’s unhealthy or because it makes you fat. Okay? There’s no contradiction in that. It’s exactly a reflection of what I said earlier. Meaning, I very much want to be healthy, and I also want to enjoy myself, and there’s no contradiction between those two desires—or usually there isn’t, though even that isn’t exactly right. In principle there is no contradiction between those two principles. And therefore on the logical level I can be committed to both. But true, on the practical plane—because it’s sweeping—I’m not in favor of eating chocolate, I’m in favor of enjoyment in general. And I’m in favor of preserving health, also in general. I didn’t examine every single step individually. And now suddenly it turns out that a particular act of enjoyment contradicts a particular principle of preserving health. Fine, so I’m in conflict. There’s no problem with that. If I had examined each and every item of the health instructions or the enjoyment instructions, yes? and identified with each one of them, that couldn’t happen. Either yes or no—again, it couldn’t happen. Okay, so that’s with respect to the logical plane. What do I mean by the philosophical plane? On the philosophical plane, you can go into the content of these systems, and that content can indeed create a problem of normative duality. I call it normative duality, meaning that I’m committed to two different normative systems. Why? Because if, for example, someone were to find a clause in Jewish law that says “There is none besides Him,” meaning that Jewish law determines things and nothing else can conflict with it—and assuming I find such a halakhic clause—then again, conflict cannot arise. Conflict cannot arise not because these are two different systems, but because the content of one of the systems forbids or doesn’t allow commitment to another system. Now, you can be committed to the second system, no problem—but then don’t tell me you’re committed to this one. Because this one forbids that commitment. And there are those who perceive halakhic commitment as something that is by its essence totalitarian. Meaning, it’s unwilling to see any other commitments next to it.

[Speaker D] And there are people who burn heads because of that. We know.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, no, there are also people who understand it that way within the Jewish world. No need to go that far. Usually, thank God, without burning heads—but yes, these principled conceptions also exist in the Jewish world. We’ll talk about them.

[Speaker C] Today that’s actually the prevailing opinion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be. I’m not sure. Could be. I think that many times people don’t define the issue correctly for themselves. That’s it—I’m not sure people always define this correctly, and that’s why I’m a little cautious about the Chazon Ish. Right, I’ll get to that Chazon Ish in Faith and Trust. Yes. I’m not sure that’s correct, but I accept the comment because we’ll get to that Chazon Ish. So a certain philosophical problem can arise. There are people who will say: look, if the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded Jewish law, then who are you to bring some moral principle and say I’m not obeying Jewish law? Even before getting into practicalities—where is there a clause saying that only Jewish law determines things and nothing else? Rather, on the theological level—how can it be that the Holy One, blessed be He, says something and you still hesitate? Now, a question of that sort is not on the philosophical—sorry, not on the logical—plane. On the logical level, yes, I hesitate. What’s the logical contradiction in that? None. But people say: it’s not plausible. Apparently you aren’t really committed to the word of God if you’re in such a conflict. So that’s what I call the philosophical problem, not the logical one. Meaning, the problem isn’t conceptual, it’s not that it’s impossible, but there are people who see it as something that really cannot be, simply cannot be.

[Speaker D] A question. Indirect causation in damages is exempt according to Jewish law, but obviously you can’t live that way in a normal world. Right, okay. So now if I obligate a person who left a car here on a slope below without the handbrake and it rolled down and threw some little girl down the street—am I contradicting Jewish law? Plain indirect causation in damages is exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not connected to this question. Indirect causation in damages is exempt, but a religious court can still obligate even where there’s an exemption. Doesn’t a religious court impose punishments that are not from the Torah?

[Speaker D] Also bloodguilt of the world? Wait a second, no no no, according to the strict law of Jewish law he’s exempt. It’s not a person, it’s damaging property. Wait, but that means there’s a whole system of norms or laws that doesn’t contradict—maybe it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but here I partly accept that comment, and we’ll get to it later. If I understand morality as some sort of second story that is also part of Torah, and which one is allowed to add, then it can be included within halakhic commitment. But here it seems to me it’s not even that, because here you can say there’s no contradiction. Jewish law exempts; it doesn’t forbid paying. It exempts—you’re not obligated to pay. Fine, so I can come and say: okay, but I still want to demand payment as a policy of the religious court. Yes, an enactment, more… here I think the conflict isn’t even that strong. Meaning, Jewish law—

[Speaker E] Says he’s exempt when I want him to be exempt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, you have to exempt him; you don’t have to exempt him; you don’t have to obligate him—meaning you’re not obligated. But if they make an enactment, or the king decides, or the authority, whatever—

[Speaker D] Clearly that’s the answer, but the question is how that fits with the idea that the Torah is supposed to be—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not a conflict. The Torah itself told the Sages to close up loopholes of that kind, so that too is part of Jewish law. It’s not because of morality that you pay there, but because that’s how a society has to be run. So there’s a loophole in Jewish law, and the Sages are supposed to close it. But we’ll get to these things. Okay, so that’s the philosophical problem. The problem on the third plane is: do you eat the chocolate or not eat the chocolate? Meaning, in the end you have to decide. So that really is, apparently, the question we dealt with in the earlier stages when I talked about conflicts—what do you do when there’s a conflict between values? Because conflicts can also exist within a single value system; there can also be conflict between two moral values. So it’s not something unique to two different systems of values. But here there is still something unique, and that’s why I define this third plane as another relevant plane, because the feeling is that even if I accept the logical and philosophical possibility and whatever you want of dual commitment, of dual normativity, still it’s obvious that Jewish law will always prevail. Because it’s God’s will, so there’s no question. You can be in conflict; I’m willing to accept someone who is also committed to morality. What I’m not willing to accept is someone who takes that seriously—meaning not just seriously, but to the point where it might perhaps even override Jewish law. The result of the conflict might also come out in favor of morality—not only that I find myself in a dilemma. To be in a dilemma is fine—so subordinate yourself and fulfill Jewish law despite the dilemma, and then you’ll be a true servant of God; according to the pain is the reward. But that is already a conception located on the third plane. You can be in conflict, but it cannot be that you would seriously take into account the possibility that something extra-halakhic would prevail over a halakhic consideration. That’s a claim on the practical plane, and that’s what distinguishes this conflict from conflicts, say, within the moral world, where you deliberate whether to go this way or that way, two sides, and you can’t determine in advance who is right; you have to decide somehow how to act.

[Speaker G] But the Torah’s ways are ways of pleasantness, and a lot of times you can say morally speaking: I understand that the Torah can’t possibly mean that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the next stage. I’ll get to it, okay? Yes.

[Speaker H] But that’s exactly the problem of wiping out Amalek. If an ordinary person were really to go and kill children and women and so on—that’s God’s command, but in my opinion 90% of people wouldn’t do it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, the question is whether that diagnosis is psychological or philosophical. Or temporary. There are lots of people who will tell you: look, psychologically I just can’t do it. I know I’d be a criminal, I just can’t. Fine? I’m not talking about that, because that’s a psychological question. I’m talking about what one ought to do on the principled level.

[Speaker D] But David murdered his brothers to become king, and that was accepted all over the world.

[Speaker H] No—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s talking about something else. He’s talking about a command, not about what’s socially accepted. No, a command to kill Amalek—if to kill—

[Speaker D] To kill Amalek if everybody killed. Fine, he’s asking what would happen—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Today—some particular Amalekite comes to you with certification from the… yes, like that Swedish professor floating around online. You don’t know this? Around Purim there’s some Swedish professor going around online whom they discovered was an Amalekite, and they kept him in a golden cage so that the commandment of wiping out Amalek could be fulfilled with him, and then it reached the High Court—and he says, no no no, in the meantime he repented, so no no no—like that other one with sanctifying God’s name, the one who ran away, yes. “Kill me.” Fine. So those are the three, three, three planes of discussion. But of course these three planes of discussion—and I think all in all, even though I’ve only surveyed them, it seems to me I’ve already more or less said what I think about them. The normative plane—the logical plane—I don’t think that argument is correct; it’s a misunderstanding. Meaning, if there’s a sweeping value principle, then obviously you can find yourself in conflict. On the philosophical plane, I think it is definitely possible to find yourself—maybe I’ll say one word about that before I continue, because on that I haven’t spoken yet. On the philosophical plane, it’s actually important to me to clarify a point that connects to things raised here. On the philosophical plane I actually tend to think it’s true that there is such a philosophical problem. That if I’m committed to Jewish law and to morality, that’s a problem. It’s a problem because there isn’t full commitment here to the word of God. But I want to adjust the definition of morality a bit. Meaning, if I understand morality the way Leibowitz says—as an atheistic category—then a problem really does arise. Because if you think about it a little, then at least conceptually—maybe even halakhically, I’ve gone back and forth on this quite a bit—but at least conceptually there’s an element here of foreign worship in partnership. You are committed to two different normative sources, and both obligate you. The Holy One, blessed be He, says one thing and you’re committed to Him. And now something else—I don’t know what this thing is; it’s abstract so it’s not a specific idol, so I don’t know exactly whether this fits the halakhic definitions of foreign worship, though I don’t think you need an idol with mass in order to commit foreign worship; I’m not sure about that. But there is another factor, or another—I don’t know what to call it—

[Speaker I] Only if you say internally that God gave us the option to do this.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, He didn’t give the option—

[Speaker B] It could be that He actually expects me to do it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so I’m saying—that’s why I said—if Leibowitz is right when he says that morality is an atheistic category, then a certain problem really does arise here. Now, very often, one of the… you know, there are books that came out against Leibowitz and point to contradictions in his thought and all kinds of things like that. And there really are many contradictions in his thought, and I don’t suppose he was especially bothered by them. But there’s an article by Goldman that really discusses this contradiction people asked about. Leibowitz is constantly preaching in public that we’re immoral and Judeo-Nazis and things like that, and at the same time he explains that morality is an atheistic category, and it’s a decree of Scripture, and he follows only Jewish law and nothing else interests him. Something here doesn’t fit. Meaning, morality is only for atheists? So Goldman explains—and to a considerable extent rightly, even though Leibowitz’s formulations are imprecise, as was his way—that that’s not correct. In other words, Leibowitz claims that it’s an atheistic category in the sense that it’s not part of Jewish law, maybe not even part of the Torah if you like—that’s a semantic question. But it’s certainly possible for a person to be obligated—a person can also be secular in the… I’m also a human being, and as a human being I’m obligated to morality, and I’m also a religious person who is obligated to Jewish law. As a religious person maybe I don’t need to be obligated to morality, fine? But I’m not only religious, I’m also a human being, and as a human being I’m obligated to morality, and as a religious human being I’m obligated to Jewish law. So the fact that this is an atheistic category doesn’t mean that I, as a religious person, can’t be obligated to it. Atheism is an absence; atheism is not something positive. It belongs to the basic human level, even before faith. But that level also exists in the believing person; it’s just that in his case there is also a second story, the story of faith. So therefore—one second—so therefore he is obligated to these two systems.

What I want to claim is one step further. Because here, if you present the model this way, then a kind of duplication really comes out—it’s idolatry in partnership. Because you’re obligated to two factors, and you accept both of them upon yourself as divine. We once spoke about accepting something as divine—you accept both of them upon yourself as obligating factors. There’s some kind of problem here. But if I understand—just a second, let me finish, because some of the questions may touch on what I’m about to say—if I really understand that both the first story and the second story are expectations of the Holy One, blessed be He, from me: the Holy One, blessed be He, expects me to behave morally, and the Holy One, blessed be He, expects me to act according to Jewish law. Then there is no problem of idolatry, but still, notice, that doesn’t mean morality is part of Jewish law. Rather, these are two different demands, two different normative systems, and the Holy One, blessed be He, expects both of them from me, including the conflicts that will arise between them and that I need to decide what is right to do. But if I assume on the theological level that both of these systems are rooted in God’s will, then the problem of idolatry in partnership does not arise. Okay? Even though… if you ask my opinion, I think that’s what’s correct. Otherwise there really is a problem here. What? So then he has no problem? What do we have here? “Sanctify yourself in what is permitted to you,” “cleave to His attributes,” “her ways are ways of pleasantness.” “You shall be holy,” yes. “You shall be holy” is a little different.

[Speaker G] And the question is: when the Torah says “You shall not murder,” is the Torah reinforcing human morality, or is the Torah saying no, there’s another basis for all this?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s an obvious question. I’ll say in one sentence—and maybe later I’ll say more about it. It seems to me that when it says “You shall not murder,” that has no connection to morality, though of course it relates to what I’m about to say in a moment about the relationship between these two systems, which I haven’t gotten to yet. The claim is that there is a religious dimension to the prohibition of murder. The moral dimension existed even before “You shall not murder,” in the seven Noahide commandments. So that’s clear. But whenever a moral principle is brought into Jewish law, people try to say that it has two laws, as it were. Meaning, it is a moral principle that one must not murder, and also “for in the image of God He made man,” “whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed.” The Holy One, blessed be He, basically expects us not to murder because we need to be human beings. Besides that, know that it’s not only a human, moral, universal transgression—it is also a religious transgression. I would have thought that there is the moral wing, and the religious wing is not eating pork and, I don’t know, keeping the Sabbath. Fine? He says no—even this particular moral wing, not all morality, but the thing that entered into Jewish law, means that it also has a halakhic aspect.

And for example, a practical difference: what happens if you narrow the case down—someone who kills indirectly, like hemming someone in before the sun, according to the passages in tractate Sanhedrin, or someone who kills indirectly, or things like that—he is exempt. Is someone who kills indirectly morally any better than someone who kills directly? Not at all. There is no difference whatsoever. He performs an act from which it is completely clear that the other person will die as a result, except that he does it with his left hand. So what? What difference does that make? On the moral level, it’s completely irrelevant. And therefore it’s clear that this exemption belongs only to the religious dimension of “You shall not murder,” because the religious dimension works with certain halakhic principles, the way all Jewish law works. But that says nothing about morality. Morally speaking, someone who murders a person is a criminal—not sort of a criminal, a real criminal—just like someone who murders him directly. What’s the difference? Morally it’s the same thing. Indirect causation is murder in every respect. He will certainly die—hemming him in before the sun, I do it this way, but he will certainly die and I do it. So what difference does it make whether I did it with my left hand or with my right? Yes.

[Speaker H] Not only morality—we once spoke about Rabbi Shimon Shkop, that there are property rights, legal norms, things that exist before Jewish law. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. And the Jewish law prohibition “you shall not steal” means that there is also a halakhic dimension here and not only the meta-halakhic, universal dimension—the “law” framework, as he calls it. Right, exactly the same structure. Yes.

[Speaker B] I still don’t completely understand this distinction you made. If we go in the direction of Yeshayahu Leibowitz, that the moral system exists before religion and ostensibly has no connection to Jewish law, and Jewish law is an additional layer that obligates, say, only religious people. Or whoever sees it as binding.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It obligates all Jews; there are just some who aren’t aware of their obligation.

[Speaker B] I can understand how they can both go together if they don’t contradict each other. But when there is a contradiction between them, how do you resolve it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? As I said earlier, it relates to the different planes—that’s why I divided the discussion.

[Speaker B] But if you accept both of them wholesale,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the contrary, precisely because of that, conflicts can arise. Conflicts can arise only when there is wholesale acceptance. If I accept individually each of the principles here and each of the principles there, then when there’s a logical contradiction, how did I accept both principle 17 of this system and principle 12 of that system? They contradict each other. If I say no—I don’t know what is inside the system—“we will do and we will hear,” I don’t check what is written in the Torah. I say: whatever the Holy One, blessed be He, said seems binding to me. Suddenly I discover that He told me to kill Amalekites. And the moral principle—I also accepted that, and really it’s enough for one of them to be accepted as an overarching value principle for there to be a conflict—but say I accepted that too as an overarching value principle, or individually, or something like that, then a conflict can arise, and there’s no problem with that. You’re asking: how can the Holy One, blessed be He, have this kind of schizophrenia, meaning that He wants both things? Fine. He wants morality, He wants Jewish law, and He Himself wants some solution when a conflict arises, and I ask myself what solution He wants. But He really does want both. It’s like someone telling me: enjoy yourself, do everything you can to enjoy yourself; and then he tells you: also do everything you can to be healthy. There is no contradiction. You really can want both things for me—that I should both enjoy myself and be healthy. But when I come to a conflict over whether to eat chocolate, I’m in a dilemma. There’s no contradiction in your wanting both. Okay? That’s exactly why I went through the two previous planes.

[Speaker D] One of the seven Noahide commandments is judges.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Judges, yes. What?

[Speaker D] Laws, yes. The commandment of laws, yes. According to what rules do they judge?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s a dispute about that. It’s commonly said that this is a dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides. In other words, Maimonides claims that they need to establish some system, and it doesn’t matter at all to the Holy One, blessed be He, which one—let them establish one; the main thing is that there be justice, order, that things should be run properly. And in Nachmanides there are those who see… What? Meaning they need to be tested for judgeship.

[Speaker E] That’s apparently what comes out of the Shakh. Strange.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, in the story of Shechem exactly. So okay, that is more or less the map. And it seems to me that if I have to say what I think about each of the planes, I’ve said it. In principle it’s possible; on the philosophical level there’s no problem with it as long as we don’t take Leibowitz’s model literally, the way he phrases it, but take it the way he thinks it—which isn’t always the same thing. And in the way he phrases it, he says this is an atheistic category and this is a religious category. So how are you obligated to both? That’s idolatry in partnership. Again, I’m not sure halakhically, but conceptually it’s very hard to accept such a thing. But on the other hand, you can say almost the same thing—he meant the same thing, just without precision in the definition—and say: no, these are two different systems, and they can be in conflict with one another, and the Holy One, blessed be He, expects me to fulfill both of them. Both. We brought the verses before, and there’s no problem finding sources for it, and I think that’s true and clear and agreed upon. So that, what?

[Speaker E] The question is whether it’s a religious category.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, that’s the second plane. Now the third plane is what to do. And here people’s usual assumption is that since the Holy One, blessed be He, said both of them, then the Holy One, blessed be He, also determines what to do. And if Jewish law said something specific, then the Holy One, blessed be He, certainly also took into account the fact that it isn’t moral. And if Jewish law says so, then one must do what Jewish law says, because in the end I’m doing what the Holy One, blessed be He, expects of me. Both systems are only expressions of the will of the Holy One, blessed be He. That’s not precise. It’s not precise, because sometimes morality can override Jewish law. And we find examples of this too; this is not just some provocative thesis of mine—we find examples.

The examples—for instance, I’ll bring one or two. The author of the Akeidah, for example, discusses the question of institutionalizing prostitution. Who is it? The author of the Akeidah or Pachad Yitzhak? Maybe Yitzhak Lampronti? One of the two; I don’t remember anymore. He discusses the question of institutionalizing prostitution. There are many advantages to institutionalizing prostitution—you can… I’m talking about institutionalizing prostitution, advantages in the halakhic sense right now, not in the… there are also discussions about it in the social-moral sense, where there are arguments both ways. But in the halakhic sense, if you maintain an orderly brothel and make sure that they immerse each time they become impure, and you verify that they are not married women, and that there is a rabbi who gives a certificate of kashrut to each such prostitute and certifies that she is not a married woman and that she immersed and that everything is in order, and of course she observes seven clean days including the fifth day—meaning, don’t miss anything—then everything is fine. So you save people from prohibitions punishable by karet. You save prohibitions punishable by karet and death penalties: married women and menstruation, extremely severe prohibitions. There is a lot of logic to institutionalizing prostitution.

And he says categorically: no, it is forbidden to do this. Why is it forbidden? There is some claim here that is not based on sources, a claim that arises from reason, and it really has to arise from reason. We spoke about value conflicts, so let me just note parenthetically: when there is a conflict between Jewish law and morality and I now decide which prevails, that consideration itself—is it a halakhic consideration? A moral one? Which system is responsible for making that decision? Clearly it has to be some system that cannot belong either to morality or to Jewish law, something more basic. We spoke about this—something a bit more basic within whose framework I need to rank the various value systems and decide which overrides which. And I said, we spoke a bit about how one builds a hierarchy of values and ranks them—the concept of what is fitting or good in general, not specifically moral or legal or halakhic or something like that.

In any event, he says: on the halakhic level, there is no doubt that it is worthwhile to institutionalize prostitution—you save many severe prohibitions, and overall it’s fine, right? Some prohibition against intercourse with an unmarried woman would be violated here; according to most positions that’s only rabbinic, not so terrible.

[Speaker C] But you’re legitimizing a transgression.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not legitimizing it—I write “forbidden” at the top. I write, like “smoking is harmful to your health” on cigarettes, I write “forbidden.” But know that if you do it, wear black, go to a distant place, and do what your heart desires—to minimize the damage. There, the second example just popped up—another example. Rabbi Ilai said: if a person sees that his inclination overpowers him, let him go, wear black, go to a distant place, and do what his heart desires. And there too they’re basically telling you: minimize the damage, and in this way you are allowed to commit a transgression. But yes—minimize the damage.

So, returning to the dilemma of institutionalizing prostitution, he says: it cannot be that a community institutionalizes prostitution; it is simply morally impossible—not because of the prohibition involved, but such a thing is simply impossible. So what about all the prohibitions—menstruation and married women and all that? There are terrible things here. What about all that? Fine, all that—with all due respect—but in this case morality overrides the halakhic consideration. Morality overrides the halakhic consideration. That’s what he says.

Another example. There is, or was, a debate—and today too there are some who debate it—whether in every case where a secular couple marries, one should use disqualified witnesses. There are a lot of advantages to that. Not to annul. There is no betrothal. Instead of annulling. There is no kiddushin, not that there is no marriage. Marriage there actually is, by the way. Kiddushin there isn’t. So if there is no kiddushin, then consequently the whole prohibition of a married woman disappears and everything is fine, wonderful. And since we know how common the matter of infidelity is today in married life, maybe it would be worthwhile to do it? Very similar to what Yitzhak Lampronti said. Almost no halakhic decisor agrees to this, except for some really exotic fringes. Almost no decisor agrees to this. Why not? Because it cannot be that the Jewish people should marry not according to the law of Moses and Israel. Now what is that? Is that written in the Torah? Is it a halakhic principle? Clearly they view it—I don’t know whether as moral—but as meta-halakhic. And that means: it cannot be; the Torah expects the Jewish people to marry in this way. Now true, we would gain halakhic benefits of great weight: mamzerut, adultery, prohibitions concerning a married woman, very severe prohibitions. Fine—but it just doesn’t fit.

[Speaker D] But what does “according to the law of Moses and Israel” have to do with morality? What is that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, that’s why I said: this is not a dilemma opposite morality, and still it’s a dilemma opposite a value outside Jewish law. Within Jewish law, where do you find that kiddushin is so important that it overrides the prohibition concerning a married woman? Where is that written? There’s no halakhic source for that. Rather, you take an extra-halakhic principle—and I said, in this case not necessarily specifically a moral one. Just as there are those who will say it’s also moral, because the Jewish home and so on, moral concerns, I don’t know, maybe yes maybe no. But it’s an extra-halakhic principle, and it overrides. It overrides Jewish law. Even though the cold halakhic consideration would say to do it; it is very logical to do it. What do you care? So they’ll live together with a rabbinic prohibition, like I said before, intercourse with an unmarried woman—maybe not even a rabbinic prohibition, perhaps it’s a concubine, which could even be permitted. There are all kinds of disputes, but never mind. In any case, that’s fine if she is designated exclusively for him, since this isn’t just temporary intercourse but they live together, only without the law of Moses and Israel. Maybe there is some nullification of a positive commandment of kiddushin if they live together without kiddushin; even that is a question whether such a thing exists or not. But these are minor matters. And we’re talking about tens of percent of people who fail in this, according to surveys on these matters. So if tens of percent of the Jewish people fail in this, then let’s spare tens of percent of the Jewish people prohibitions punishable by karet and death. Let’s spare that. A cold halakhic consideration undoubtedly goes in that direction. And still, almost no halakhic decisor agrees to it. Except for a few formalists—there are such people—but they’re odd, really exotic. A tiny minority.

[Speaker E] Well, that’s the whole issue of civil marriage in general. Yes, the same principle.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the same principle.

[Speaker E] And in general in this category, the whole issue of “It is a time to act for the Lord; they have violated Your Torah”—that’s also a consideration.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, “It is a time to act for the Lord; they have violated Your Torah,” נכון. Although here it’s a little different, because “It is a time to act for the Lord; they have violated Your Torah” can be interpreted as a principle by virtue of which the Sages enact a decree. Now, when the Sages enact a decree, I don’t connect it here. When the Sages enact a decree, the Torah itself told them: enact decrees, and “you shall not deviate,” and things like that. So you can call that an internal halakhic principle, an internal halakhic dynamic. But I’m talking about something where there is no such decree. A sage sits over the problem; he doesn’t have authority to legislate, he is not the Sanhedrin. But he makes a halakhic decision by virtue of a principle that is not halakhic. He decides to override a correct halakhic calculation by virtue of some principle outside Jewish law. And these are not absurd things; it can happen. And these are cases of “a transgression for its own sake.” We already once spoke about this matter of “a transgression for its own sake.” The Talmud says: “A transgression for its own sake is greater than a commandment not for its own sake.” And the Talmud brings there—and I always bring the example that actually is not brought there in the Talmud in this context, only associatively—the example after the passage about “a transgression for its own sake” in tractate Nazir, concerning Lot’s daughters.

Lot’s daughters saw that, from their perspective, the world had been destroyed—“there is not a man on earth,” the Torah says it, yes—except for us, “and we will preserve offspring from our father.” Fine? And the Sages praise them greatly for this. They praise them greatly for this, contrary to what people think. The condemnations of Ammon and Moab that came from it concern the names they gave, but for the act itself they receive extraordinary praise from the Sages. Why? Because one line earlier the Talmud says: “A transgression for its own sake is greater.” It doesn’t connect it, but it seems to me pretty clear; the connection is quite clear. “A transgression for its own sake is greater.” There are situations in which there is a moral price—or in this case again I’m not sure it’s moral, but the survival of humanity, yes. Maybe that’s not moral—that the world not survive, why is that a moral thing? I don’t know. Maybe. But it is some principle that is not a halakhic principle. You cannot find a halakhic clause that grounds it. Okay? A non-halakhic principle. And sometimes—fine—but that is a pathological situation. It cannot be that in such a situation I should go with formal Jewish law that never thought about such situations at all when it said there is a prohibition of relations with one’s father.

[Speaker D] “And live by them” too, yes…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but “and live by them” is a verse. So that’s no great trick. That’s why it’s like the decrees. Meaning, I’m talking about the opposite—about people who make… a consideration not because they have permission from a verse or a command from a verse, but they themselves say: in extreme situations where there is a cardinal, significant moral price, not something minor—in such a situation there is room to consider violating Jewish law and gaining the moral benefit, yes? There is such a thing. And it’s not that… the Sages themselves and the halakhic decisors do this. And this is what people often say in the name of the Chazon Ish as the fifth section of the Shulchan Arukh. Meaning, sometimes a halakhic decisor has to understand that there is another section of the Shulchan Arukh that is not written—the fifth section. There are four, after all, yes? That section that tells you when it is right to apply the first four sections and how it is right to apply them. But it is an unwritten section; it is ingrained in every decisor, or every decisor develops it, of course. There is no universal section like that, but there is some branch of considerations that is of that sort. That is basically what he means.

Okay, so that’s the introduction. Now let’s see what happens in practice. What happens in practice is that there are three basic approaches to the relationship between Torah and morality—perhaps they break down into more, but three principal directions. One direction is an approach that identifies Jewish law with morality, but it depends in which direction. There are those who identify morality with Jewish law—everything is Jewish law. Jewish law is what determines true morality. Morality is either identical with Jewish law or a subcategory of Jewish law. Meaning, you can say that there are elements in Jewish law that are not connected to morality but to ritual or other matters—sacrifices, food prohibitions—which perhaps are not connected to morality. But there is no morality unrelated to Jewish law. Meaning, all morality is swallowed up within Jewish law. Maybe not overlapping, but swallowed up.

[Speaker G] Why call it morality then?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? So no, that’s just a name, just window dressing. It’s an atheistic category; secular people call it morality. In truth there isn’t any—there is only Jewish law, basically; that’s what they say. And some of your moral principles are correct—yes, there is “you shall not murder,” “you shall not steal”—and Jewish law itself deals with that, and then indeed there is no conflict. If there are conflicts, maybe they’re internal halakhic conflicts between “you shall not murder” and Amalek, but fine.

[Speaker D] But anything that is written—anything that is not written in Jewish law is therefore not moral? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is not binding morally. Only Jewish law.

[Speaker D] Oh, only Jewish law determines what is morally binding,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And anything not written in Jewish law—yes, yes—there is no moral obligation. That’s the category Leibowitz ostensibly says; I said I don’t think he thinks this, but that is what he says. Morality is an atheistic category. There is none. From the standpoint of the religious person, Jewish law is the binding thing, and part of it also deals with the moral aspects of behavior, and perhaps all of it—we’ll see in a moment. So that is one identity. One identity says: there is no morality; there is only Jewish law.

There is also a second identifying approach, in the opposite direction. It says: there is no Jewish law; there is only morality. Meaning, Jewish law too is nothing but… and here it’s the reverse of what I said before, because here Jewish law is swallowed up within morality and not morality within Jewish law. There is really no such thing as Jewish law. I’m talking about believers who are committed to Jewish law; I’m not talking about someone outside. But they say that all the commandments of Jewish law—when I clarify what the Shakh and the Taz say, I’m really clarifying what morality says. It is the moral imperative. Rav Saadia Gaon? Maybe Rav Saadia Gaon, right. Rabbi Kook in a much later period also apparently thinks this way, at least as I understand him; I’m not a great expert on him.

[Speaker E] What? Even in matters between man and God? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At least, there are statements by Rabbi Kook here and there—I’m not an expert in his thought, so I can’t tell you what he thinks. There are statements of his where he clearly says that the whole purpose of Jewish law is only to create a moral person—all of Jewish law in all its branches. In my view that is absurd, but that is what he says. So this is basically the opposite conception. It is a conception that swallows Jewish law into morality, not morality into Jewish law. Again, this doesn’t mean—if we talk about Rabbi Kook—he was committed to Jewish law, meaning I’m not talking about people outside Jewish law. I’m talking about people who perceive Jewish law that way. In other words, they say: when I conduct halakhic analysis—and they do halakhic analysis like any other decisor—but in the way they perceive what they are doing, when you ask them what are you doing, they say: I’m clarifying what divine morality says to do in such a situation, okay? That does not change the method. He will continue to handle Jewish law the way people handle it. But the meaning of the matter for him is the clarification of Jewish morality or divine morality or something of that sort.

What happens with conflicts in such a situation? Conflict in both situations—let’s speak about both situations. In the situation where Jewish law swallows morality, then a conflict simply means a mistake. In other words, Jewish law has spoken. If you think morality says something else, that’s perfectly fine—but so what?

[Speaker E] Or you don’t understand,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, or you don’t understand, or it simply isn’t binding—it doesn’t matter; that’s already a semantic question. Because Jewish law determines what the binding morality is. Someone who thinks Jewish law is swallowed within morality—when he encounters a conflict, this is always those slogans that make my blood boil when I hear them—you always hear: yes, you don’t understand, there is a higher morality, and the truly right things are the things that Jewish law says, you just don’t understand. And really this is the supreme moral command. To leave the gentile to die on the Sabbath so as not to desecrate the Sabbath—that is the supreme moral command. You think that’s a moral outrage? You are simply mistaken. You don’t understand. We are not wise enough; we don’t know. The Holy One, blessed be He, knows, and He tells us that this is the most moral thing in the world.

[Speaker D] Uncovering the mound? What? Uncovering the mound so as not to… he doesn’t take a gentile out from under a collapsed mound.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Uncovering the… the mound, exactly. That sugya. Removing the mound. Yes. Use that with the communications regulator “over the airwaves.”

[Speaker D] Clown.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So these statements—why do I say they infuriate me? Because they basically empty the concept of morality of content. The concept of morality—and I spoke about this in previous sessions—morality by definition is universal. Otherwise you’ve simply emptied it of content. You can say that whatever the Holy One, blessed be He, says is morality by definition—fine, you defined it that way. But when we ask ourselves what we usually understand as morality, what we understand as morality is what we understand should be done, what is good to do, what every normal person ought to understand. Sometimes there are disputes; I’m not saying there aren’t. But broadly we understand where it comes from, and from there we derive our morality. When the Torah said to cleave to His attributes, and when the Torah said “just as He is compassionate, so you should be compassionate,” and so on, it did not assume that we would say, just as He is jealous and vengeful, so should we be jealous and vengeful. Even though that is written in the same list, right? Compassionate and gracious, slow to anger and abundant in kindness and truth, preserving kindness for thousands—jealous and vengeful at the end. Why? After all, one is supposed to cleave to the attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He. Because it is obvious to me by reason that no. Reason is present here. It is not that a verse tells me, do this, be compassionate, be gracious. Rather, I understand that it is good to be compassionate and good to be gracious, and I assume that the Holy One, blessed be He, behaves that way too, and therefore I should cleave to His attributes. What determines what is moral and what is not moral is our conscience. That is the simple conception of what morality is. And that is true for all human beings. There is no such thing as Jewish morality and gentile morality and nonsense. There is morality.

[Speaker C] “You shall not take vengeance”? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “You shall not take vengeance and you shall not bear a grudge.”

[Speaker C] What about the gentile? You can also be moral toward a gentile. That’s why you need to cleave to the Holy… to all the attributes of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s “you shall not take vengeance and you shall not bear a grudge,” okay, so what?

[Speaker C] So because of that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You do not cleave to that attribute. Well, that’s something the Holy One, blessed be He, can do, not you. Why? It’s written that one needs to cleave to His attributes, and one of His attributes is to be jealous and vengeful, so why not? Because He tells you no, through “you shall not take vengeance and you shall not bear a grudge.” Right. Okay.

[Speaker C] Although I’m not sure that this—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] falls under the definition of “you shall not take vengeance and you shall not bear a grudge,” this matter of not being—

[Speaker D] jealous and vengeful.

[Speaker C] And if you—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you don’t violate the halakhic prohibition of being jealous and vengeful, then is there value in being jealous and vengeful outside the boundaries of Jewish law? Suppose you’re not violating the halakhic boundaries, because there are definitions of exactly how one violates “you shall not take vengeance and you shall not bear a grudge.” Is there any point in being jealous and vengeful? After all, it’s justice; the Holy One, blessed be He, is jealous and vengeful. Well, it’s a fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, is like that. I’m asking whether there’s any point in my being like that. What do you mean, the Holy One, blessed be He, is like that? Pinchas too—the same thing, fine. Pinchas, with all the reservations. Maybe. But I think it is commonly thought not.

[Speaker D] So how can you remove the mound on the Sabbath if there’s a gentile there?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, wait. You’re already bringing me to the bottom line; I’m not there yet. Slowly, slowly, we’ll get there.

[Speaker H] Maybe the difference between the two methods is regarding a gentile. According to the first approach, the Torah obligates a Jew; it could be that obligations between man and fellow man don’t apply to a gentile. According to the second, if that’s the definition of morality, then it applies to a gentile too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, I completely agree. Right. And that is always the practical difference in all these places.

[Speaker C] Rabbi Kook applied it to all of Israel; he wasn’t talking about gentiles, but for him because of this morality…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I assume he was also talking about gentiles, at least I assume so. Yes, also to gentiles. In any event, the thing… I’ll give you an example. Rabbi Dessler writes in Michtav MeEliyahu: the Talmud says that one may alter the truth for the sake of peace, for several reasons. Okay? For the sake of peace. And Torah scholars alter their speech—in tractate, and in intimate matters, and there are a few other places in the Talmud where it says one may alter, lie, okay? Rabbi Dessler says such a thing is not a lie at all, because a lie means when you say something that one should not say, but here you are saying something that one should say, so it is not a lie. Now, that statement infuriates me, because he is basically emptying the concept of lying of content. He basically turns the concept of lying into a prohibition. This is exactly the identification of morality with Jewish law, do you see? I say: it may be permitted to lie, but do not ignore the moral price. Meaning, you are lying here. There is a moral price. There is a conflict. We spoke exactly about conflicts, because according to both of those conceptions there are no conflicts. But I say no, there is a conflict. It is forbidden to lie, but on the other hand I want to bring peace. Fine—so what should I do? You have to decide what to do in this dilemma.

[Speaker E] On a matter of piety, yes, exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So this ignoring of conflicts, this identification, dovetails with what I said before about those who are unwilling to see a conflict. Those who are unwilling to accept normative duality: that I am obligated to morality and I am obligated to Jewish law, and this can create… conflicts. And I’m not even sure which one will prevail in the conflict. And that’s all fine, and it’s all legitimate, and not only legitimate—it is demanded by the service of God. It cannot be otherwise. Someone who serves God and this doesn’t happen for him, in my opinion something is defective in his service of God. It’s the opposite of what people usually think. And these attempts… What?

[Speaker I] “Simple in his ways”—there are people at that level.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But no, that’s what I’m saying—it’s not a level. That is exactly the mistake. Someone who thinks that killing Amalek is moral—that’s not a higher level; it’s a distortion. It isn’t moral. It is a halakhic command that stands against morality, and now I’m in a conflict and need to decide what to do. We’ll still talk about the practical plane, but that’s exactly the point. Someone who says that at the higher level I don’t feel conflicts is really saying there are no real conflicts. The conflict comes from the fact that I simply don’t yet understand enough, I’m not yet on a high enough level. I claim that’s not true. It’s a mistake. It’s a distortion of the concept of morality. When you tell me that something is patently immoral, and then you say no, no, it’s higher morality, I just don’t understand—you’re basically saying: call what I call Jewish law morality. You are emptying the concept of morality of content. It’s just wordplay. What do you mean, I don’t understand? Explain to me what the problem is. I know what morality is. If it bothers someone, if it harms someone, if it causes suffering to someone. I don’t know exactly what. I took something from someone else. We know very well what morality is; it’s not some great mystery. Explain to me what harm it causes. If you explain it to me, then I understand. But you can’t say of anything that is patently immoral, no, no, it is moral but there is some higher morality. There is no such thing as higher morality. There is morality and immorality, that’s all. And there is no Jewish morality and no gentile morality; there is morality, period. People can argue over what morality says, what morality requires—there are arguments. But the concept of morality in its essence is universal. I do not accept these statements that you don’t understand, there is some higher morality, because these are hollow statements. There are things we don’t understand sometimes, maybe. Fine, I don’t know, here and there, maybe. But as a principled approach that resolves all contradictions this way, it sounds very problematic to me.

Those are the first two directions, the directions that identify things, just in opposite directions. One identifies everything as Jewish law, the second identifies everything as morality. As was already noted—and I see I won’t have enough time to get to it all—the “everything is Jewish law” approach is usually attributed to the Chazon Ish, and the “everything is morality” approach is Rabbi Kook. Okay? So I’ll bring two basic texts and we’ll discuss them next time. The Chazon Ish is from Faith and Trust, what was mentioned here before, and Rabbi Kook is on the binding of Isaac, in Olat Re’iyah on the binding of Isaac. He has a wonderful interpretation there, really. I think reading it is an experience. But in the end I don’t agree with his conclusion. Truly—I mean truly, I’m not saying this sarcastically. It’s beautiful. It’s what one calls the theme of Fear and Trembling by Kierkegaard, and then Rabbi Kook goes all the way with him and continues further, giving his own punchline, which is different from, in fact the opposite of, Kierkegaard—the conclusion of the binding of Isaac. It really is something very beautiful. Okay, we’ll talk about it.

[Speaker D] It’s a shame you don’t deal in literary criticism, because you don’t review good literature.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From time to time I do deal in that too—not literature, but books. Books, not literary works.

[Speaker D] It’s called “On the Slaughter.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I mean it—really, don’t take this as cynicism, I mean it sincerely. It’s an experience to read that thing. It really is a marvelous passage. In Olat Re’iyah in the prayer book, on the binding of Isaac. But I don’t agree with his conclusion. So what? On the contrary. There’s a book by A. B. Yehoshua called The Terrifying Power of a Small Guilt. A work of thought, not prose, not literature, that is. And there he talks about how modern literary criticism ignores the values present in the text it critiques. It critiques only the literary qualities, it’s a technical criticism. And it refuses to engage in value criticism. And he protests against this and says, what do you mean? You also have to critique the values expressed by this text. That is not necessarily criticism of the author—maybe the author presented some wicked person only in order to present his character—but you need to criticize the hero for being wicked. Fine? Don’t ignore the fact that he is wicked. Like all those films, like The Godfather and the like, where you create a certain identification with criminals—and there is much criticism precisely of that. In any event, here too I say: I critique Rabbi Kook regarding the content of his words, but the move and the creation are wonderful. Meaning, and I don’t agree with the conclusion—I’m not criticizing, I simply don’t agree. What he says is not disgraceful; I just don’t agree with him.

Those are the two conceptions. The third conception is the conception that says there is no need to identify anything with anything, what I said before. And you understand that once I find there are two, then clearly I can’t be either of those—you’ve already caught me, I have to find some other niche. So I’m there. I think these are two parallel systems, and then of course one has to understand what to do according to each of the methods, and how it works, and with that we’ll continue.