Ethics and Jewish Law 7
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Identity approaches and their implications
- The third approach: two distinct systems whose source of obligation is the will of God
- Determination versus discovery in morality, and the analogy to the law of gravity
- Leibowitz and the critique of an “atheistic category”
- Conflict between morality and Jewish law, and the possibility that morality prevails
- “You shall do what is right and good,” “You shall be holy,” and the distinction between enumerated commandments and extra-enumerative demands
- Rabbi Lichtenstein and the claim that morality is not counted because it is hard to define
- Degree of obligation: Jewish law as a basic duty and morality as a spectrum, yet morality can still override
- Abraham and Sodom: “Shall the Judge of all the earth not do justice?” and God’s commitment to morality
- A concrete command versus a general command: Amalek and the room for moral judgment
- The example of invalid witnesses in the marriages of secular Jews: a meta-halakhic consideration that decides the case
- The Chazon Ish: “moral obligations” and Jewish law as decisive, and the example of schoolteachers of young children
- The Mussar movement and the desire “to bring everything into Jewish law”
- Rabbi Kook and the Binding of Isaac: the binding of morality, and the twist of “Do not stretch out your hand against the boy”
- Did Abraham fail, the comparison to Sodom, and the educational lesson of “going through an Akedah”
- Identity in Rabbi Kook versus identity in the Chazon Ish
Summary
General overview
The text presents three approaches to the relationship between morality and Jewish law: identifying Jewish law with morality, which leads to correcting Jewish law in light of morality; identifying morality with Jewish law, which leads to claiming that whatever appears immoral is in fact moral, only we do not understand it; and a third position, according to which these are two distinct systems that are not identical. The central claim is that morality is an extra-halakhic category not derived from Jewish law, but the obligation to both Jewish law and morality is rooted in the will of God, and therefore real conflicts between them are possible and require a decision. From there, the text examines different readings of Leibowitz, Rabbi Lichtenstein, Maimonides, and Nachmanides, and in the end presents the Chazon Ish and Rabbi Kook as test cases, seen as two opposite directions of “identity.”
Identity approaches and their implications
The text describes a tendency to identify morality and Jewish law, but distinguishes between two opposite directions: one who identifies Jewish law with morality refuses to accept any contradiction, and therefore will adapt or change Jewish law so that it accords with morality, sometimes reaching Reform-style conclusions. One who identifies morality with Jewish law argues that Jewish law itself is morality, and if there seems to be a clash then it is a problem of understanding, and true morality is whatever Jewish law requires. The text argues that the two declarations look logically similar, but in practice produce a different “melody” with opposite implications.
The third approach: two distinct systems whose source of obligation is the will of God
The text proposes that there is no identity between morality and Jewish law, but rather two different categories independent of one another, while the Holy One, blessed be He, expects us both to observe Jewish law and to be human beings, and that is “not the same thing.” The text cautiously adopts Leibowitz’s formulation that morality is an “atheistic category” in the sense that it does not arise out of Jewish law, but rejects a formulation according to which it is disconnected from the Holy One, blessed be He, in a way that creates an “odor of idolatry” and normative dualism (“association”). The text distinguishes between “wanting to be moral” and moral obligation, and argues that morality means obligation, similar to the claim about Ahad Ha’am, who kept the Sabbath for cultural reasons, and therefore that was not really Sabbath observance.
Determination versus discovery in morality, and the analogy to the law of gravity
The text formulates a dispute over whether a person “determines” morality or “discovers” it, and prefers the language of discovery: a person does not generate morality but uncovers what is right, just as one defines the law of gravity after discovering it. The text argues that the question whether society or the individual “defines” morality matters only if one assumes morality is created by human beings, but if it is a discovery of objective truth then the question loses its significance. The text rejects the claim that morality changes and is therefore subjective, and compares this to the fact that manifestations of the law of gravity also vary depending on circumstances, and Jewish law too changes according to circumstances, so change is not the root of the difference.
Leibowitz and the critique of an “atheistic category”
The text explains that Leibowitz called morality an “atheistic category” in order to say that it is not derived from Jewish law, not in order to deny obligation to it, and therefore there is no contradiction in the fact that Leibowitz rebukes conquest and moral wrongs. The text argues that saying morality “does not come from the Holy One, blessed be He, at all” is problematic because it creates two sources of authority, but on the other hand it does not accept the conclusion that if morality does not come from God then there is no obligation to anything.
Conflict between morality and Jewish law, and the possibility that morality prevails
The text argues that the “clear-eyed” reading of Jewish law is not identity but the existence of real conflicts between morality and Jewish law, like conflicts within any value system. The text rejects a situation in which the solution to the clash is to declare that everything Jewish law says is “automatically moral,” because that empties the concept of morality of content, and instead suggests that in some cases “the moral injustice cries out” to the point of overriding halakhic obligations. The text cites “A transgression for its own sake is greater than a commandment not for its own sake” as a principle that allows situations in which the Holy One, blessed be He, expects an act of transgression, and formulates this as a kind of “conscientious objection within Jewish law” in the context of the discussion.
“You shall do what is right and good,” “You shall be holy,” and the distinction between enumerated commandments and extra-enumerative demands
The text uses “You shall do what is right and good,” “You shall be holy,” and “to cleave to His attributes” as evidence of a divine expectation of moral behavior that is not identical with formal Jewish law. The text emphasizes that the overwhelming majority of those who enumerate the commandments do not count “You shall do what is right and good,” nor “You shall be holy,” and cites Maimonides in the fourth principle, where he interprets “You shall be holy” as a duplication of “observe the commandments,” and therefore it is not counted. The text cites Nachmanides, who interprets “You shall be holy” as going beyond the letter of the law, and then asks why Nachmanides himself does not count it, answering that if it were counted it would become the letter of the law and empty the content of “beyond the letter of the law.” The text concludes that something defined outside halakhic obligation cannot be brought into halakhic obligation, and therefore such commands are not counted.
Rabbi Lichtenstein and the claim that morality is not counted because it is hard to define
The text attributes to Rabbi Lichtenstein the claim that morality is hard to write into Jewish law because it is difficult to formulate sharp, binding boundaries, and therefore it remains as overarching principles not formulated within formal Jewish law, yet equally binding, in a style reminiscent of Dworkin in law. The text rejects this by arguing that in Jewish law there are commandments that are hard to define and still are counted, such as love of God, fear of God, and even belief in God as Maimonides’ first positive commandment, as well as “Love your neighbor as yourself.” The text cites Maimonides at the beginning of chapter 14 of the Laws of Mourning, who counts acts such as accompanying the dead and bringing in a bride as rabbinic enactments but “included in ‘Love your neighbor as yourself,’” and presents the tangle that results from combining Torah-level and rabbinic categories, while rejecting the attempt to explain this as a sharp definition added by the Sages to a vague command.
Degree of obligation: Jewish law as a basic duty and morality as a spectrum, yet morality can still override
The text argues that there is a difference in level of obligation: Jewish law is what is required of everyone, while morality operates as a spectrum in which a person decides at what level to place himself, without deciding “what is moral” but only to what extent he will live by morality. The text adds that the Holy One, blessed be He, expects of a person “as much as possible” according to his ability, and still presents situations in which morality overrides Jewish law when the moral wrong is glaring. The text connects this to the statement about the Chazon Ish concerning “the fifth section of the Shulchan Arukh” and to the example of saving a non-Jew on the Sabbath in a case where there is no issue of appearances, where one says: “I’ll save him, and then I’ll look for a justification in Jewish law, and if not, may God save me.”
Abraham and Sodom: “Shall the Judge of all the earth not do justice?” and God’s commitment to morality
The text presents Abraham’s argument over Sodom as an example showing that the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself is committed both to morality and to the word of God, and the interpretive question is whether the Holy One, blessed be He, had already taken those considerations into account from the outset or whether Abraham “bargained” and influenced the decision. The text states that both readings still allow one to say that morality binds the Holy One, blessed be He, and that this does not change the discussion about the principled obligation. The text also cites Moses our teacher and “for I regret that I have made them” as a case where the Torah itself says that the Holy One, blessed be He, changes His mind.
A concrete command versus a general command: Amalek and the room for moral judgment
The text distinguishes between a situation in which the Holy One, blessed be He, gives a concrete instruction, “in this case, do this,” and a general command such as “blot out the memory of Amalek,” and argues that with the general command there is still room to ask about the moral consideration and enter into conflict. The text warns that the thought that “do it” means the Holy One, blessed be He, has already taken all considerations into account does not necessarily follow from the case of Sodom, and presents the danger that the approach may look like a Reform foundation, while answering that the criterion is not “dangerous or not dangerous” but truth, and that the Sages themselves recognize “a transgression for its own sake.”
The example of invalid witnesses in the marriages of secular Jews: a meta-halakhic consideration that decides the case
The text brings a halakhic example about the proposal to “place two invalid witnesses” at the marriage ceremony of a secular couple in order to prevent the marriage from taking legal effect, and thus prevent mamzerut and the prohibition of a married woman, and argues that although this is “the most reasonable thing from a halakhic standpoint,” almost no halakhic decisors agree to it. The text explains this as the intervention of a meta-halakhic or moral consideration that blocks the formal halakhic ruling, among other things because of opposition to the idea that the Jewish people should live without wedding canopy and betrothal, and presents this as proof that Jewish law does not stand alone without external considerations.
The Chazon Ish: “moral obligations” and Jewish law as decisive, and the example of schoolteachers of young children
The text quotes the Chazon Ish, Faith and Trust, chapter 3: “Moral obligations are sometimes one body with the rulings of Jewish law… and Jewish law is what decides the forbidden and the permitted in the moral teaching.” The text cites the example from Bava Batra 21b about schoolteachers of young children and competition that harms the livelihood of the city’s teachers, and describes how the Chazon Ish sketches a situation in which, if Jewish law had allowed blocking the competitor, the struggle would appear free of transgressions, but since Jewish law ruled “he cannot prevent him,” then the haters violate “you shall not hate,” “evil speech,” “you shall not be like Korach,” and “you shall not take revenge.” The text suggests that the simple reading is an identification of Jewish law and morality, but argues that the example is based on a rabbinic ordinance established out of a social-value judgment, and therefore it does not prove that every halakhic rule is necessarily moral, only that when an authorized institution sets a norm, it is binding in this sphere as well. The text adds that one can read the Chazon Ish as making a practical claim, namely that once a halakhic ruling has been determined there is no room to keep wavering, but this does not require saying that the matter thereby “becomes moral,” and emphasizes that the Chazon Ish himself is also associated with a basic intuition of “it just isn’t right” beyond formal halakhic accounting.
The Mussar movement and the desire “to bring everything into Jewish law”
The text argues that the formal Mussar movement sometimes speaks of the “spirit of Jewish law” and often explains that moral behavior is a clause of a commandment, for example through “Love your neighbor as yourself,” and in that way expands the boundaries of Jewish law to include “being a mensch.” The text objects to this and formulates a position according to which being a mensch is the will of God but is not identical with Jewish law, and therefore these are two systems.
Rabbi Kook and the Binding of Isaac: the binding of morality, and the twist of “Do not stretch out your hand against the boy”
The text presents Rabbi Kook in Olat Re’iyah on the Akedah as someone who parallels the test to Kierkegaard’s description in Fear and Trembling, in which Abraham is the “knight of faith” willing to bind reason, morality, and feelings before the divine command. The text emphasizes that Rabbi Kook goes all the way with Kierkegaard but adds a twist through “Do not stretch out your hand against the boy,” and quotes Rabbi Kook that the absolute command to refrain from bloodshed and the natural feeling of a father’s love for his son “remain in full force” and do not descend from their stature by even a hairsbreadth because of the supreme vision revealed in the word of God. The text concludes that according to Rabbi Kook, natural and moral recognitions are “holy” and are a divine expression, and therefore the word of God cannot truly contradict them, and the Akedah serves as an experiential lesson teaching that a divine command cannot instruct moral wickedness.
Did Abraham fail, the comparison to Sodom, and the educational lesson of “going through an Akedah”
The text raises the question whether, according to this line, Abraham should have refused the Akedah, or whether he failed, and cites a claim attributed to Spanish commentators by Ravitzky that Abraham failed, and rejects that as “absurd.” The text asks why Abraham argued in the case of Sodom but not in the Akedah, and notes that there are various interpretive answers, while focusing on an educational idea heard from Rabbi Blumentzweig: in the generation and in education there is a tendency toward “too good to be kosher” and toward the notion that Jewish law always demands an Akedah, whereas Rabbi Kook sets out a path in which one first works out of obedience and Akedah and only later arrives at a deeper understanding of harmony, while an education that skips straight to the position that there is no tension ends with “you do whatever you want.” The text adds a personal reservation that the harmony does not always hold, that sometimes “we are left with the Akedah,” and sometimes there will even be an “anti-Akedah” in which morality overrides Jewish law.
Identity in Rabbi Kook versus identity in the Chazon Ish
The text summarizes a common perception according to which the Chazon Ish belongs to an identity in which “morality is really just Jewish law,” while Rabbi Kook belongs to the opposite identity in which “all Jewish law is moral,” but sharpens the point that both still hold an identity approach. The text argues that in Rabbi Kook the identity is more radical, to the point of claiming that the entire purpose of Jewish law is the shaping of the moral character of the individual and society, and the text rejects this by arguing that there is a “religious level” beyond morality, and questions such as blessings over food and the prohibition of pork do not seem to be merely moral demands. The text states that in Rabbi Kook’s model Jewish law is “swallowed up within morality,” so that if a halakhic rule seems immoral one must understand it in a way that accords with morality, whereas in the Chazon Ish’s model morality is “swallowed up” under the halakhic decision in situations of authoritative determination.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A summary of the point where we were last time: we started talking about the relationship between morality and Jewish law. We finally got to that too. I said there’s an initial tendency to identify these two systems, but even within the tendency that identifies them, there are two opposite directions. There are those who identify morality with Jewish law, and there are those who identify Jewish law with morality. And many times that leads to opposite conclusions, even though on the face of it they’re saying the same thing. Someone who identifies Jewish law with morality, then basically—of course—he’s not prepared to accept that there’s a contradiction between Jewish law and morality, and if that’s so, then somehow he’ll always explain that the non-moral laws don’t need to be observed, or something like that; he’ll change Jewish law in a way that makes it fit morality. Or else we just don’t understand that it’s moral.
[Speaker B] That’s the opposite side, that’s the opposite side.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Someone who identifies morality with Jewish law, then he’s basically saying: what is Jewish law? What is morality? Morality is basically Jewish law, and therefore if there’s something that seems to us like a clash, then apparently we just don’t understand—but really that is the truly moral thing, only we don’t understand it. Okay. So on the logical level it’s seemingly saying the same thing, but practically it’s a different melody, and it has a lot of opposite implications. And what I wanted to argue for was a third approach, which says there doesn’t have to be identity at all; morality and Jewish law are two different categories—like Leibowitz said, that morality is an atheistic category. And I think what he meant to say is that it’s independent of Jewish law. An atheistic category—we talked about this once, I think—that to assume that moral obligation has nothing to do with the Holy One, blessed be He, that has a whiff of idolatry to it, at least it seems to me, because there’s some kind of duality here. Basically, you’re accepting upon yourself two different sources of authority: the Holy One, blessed be He, and also something or someone else, yes, some thing standing at the basis of moral obligation. And therefore you basically have two parallel normative sources, which is more or less, it seems to me, what is called association. I think the more precise formulation should be that these really are two different and independent systems, but both of them—the obligation to both—is rooted in obligation to the word of God. Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, expects from us both to observe Jewish law and to be human beings. And that is not the same thing. And that is not the same thing. But with that reservation, I do accept Leibowitz’s claim that morality is an atheistic category. It’s not an atheistic category; it’s an extra-halakhic category. Meaning, it doesn’t depend on Jewish law. And I think, to some extent, it seems to me people also saw this—Leibowitz didn’t mean that if it’s an atheistic category, then he shouldn’t have observed it, because he was a believing man. And people always asked: why are you rebuking people over the occupation and over moral injustices? He was an angry prophet all his life. If morality is basically an atheistic category and he’s only committed to Jewish law and to the word of God, then why does he care about morality? Clearly he meant to say that it’s a category that does not arise out of Jewish law; it stands independently of Jewish law. But that doesn’t mean he wasn’t committed to it—he was committed to it as well.
[Speaker C] There’s also another approach that says it too is the word of God, and you can say that it’s atheistic in the sense that I’m obligated to it, but it doesn’t come from the Holy One, blessed be He.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I know. So that’s why I’m saying that if I say it doesn’t come from the Holy One, blessed be He, at all, then in my opinion that’s problematic.
[Speaker C] But on the other hand, if it doesn’t come from the Holy One, blessed be He, then I’m not obligated to it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if it isn’t moral, then I’m not obligated to anything. If you want—fine—go take a bath. You’re not obligated to anything. I want to be moral.
[Speaker C] No, you—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wanting to be moral is not morality. Morality means that you are obligated to be moral. Someone who wants to be moral—that’s like Ahad Ha’am keeping the Sabbath. Ahad Ha’am kept the Sabbath so that the Sabbath would preserve our culture and our national cohesion and so on—that’s not called Sabbath observance.
[Speaker C] So you also choose your commitments to Jewish law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t choose—what does that mean, choose? I think this is what obligates me, and from that point on I am obligated. Obviously I have to decide what obligates me, but not that I create what obligates me—I discover it. Who created the fact that it’s also an obligation?
[Speaker B] What? The fact that you decided that you’re obligated because of Jewish law, because the Holy One, blessed be He, expects it, and you yourself determine the framework of obligation. It seems to me a little… you determine morality—what it means to be a human being. Not that I determine it. But I’m saying, when you say “I determine,” I call that “I discover,” not determine. I discover what counts as moral. The Holy One, blessed be He, determined morality for you not through Jewish law, but through what? Through what you understand morality to be,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He planted it within you.
[Speaker B] How are you punished for that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the heavenly court. I know how I’m punished for that.
[Speaker B] So what’s the difference between Jewish law and morality? For everything you’re punished from above.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] True. But in Jewish law you’re also punished below; you’re punished—
[Speaker D] Also by sword and blade.
[Speaker B] Yes, right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Punishment is an indication of the difference; it’s not the difference itself. That’s one of the indications that there is a difference. These are two different systems. We are obligated to both of them because of the will of God; that does not mean they are two identical systems.
[Speaker C] There’s no logical leap between them, meaning there’s—again—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Now when there’s a clash, then yes, those are the passages we also talked about a bit and will talk about more.
[Speaker E] How does morality fit with what you explained once, that before the Torah was given there is what’s called reason, basic reasoning. Even if “You shall not steal” hadn’t been written in the Torah. Right. Does that fit? Why not? I’m just asking.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t see why not—on the contrary. You see that my reasoning has some kind of standing even when it isn’t written in the Torah. On the contrary, that practically says exactly that.
[Speaker B] But moral rules and their boundaries change; they can change over the years. For example, slavery in America existed a hundred years ago. I feel that people were moral then.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be. That’s a bit a question of how you define morality—whether morality is an objective definition or a definition according to circumstances. Again, it’s still objective even according to circumstances. We talked about this once with Bach’s musical talent; I brought that example once. But you can argue about that. You just have to remember that Jewish law also changes. So that doesn’t really distinguish between Jewish law and morality. Meaning, Jewish law also changes in light of circumstances. We don’t conduct ourselves today the way Abaye and Rava did, right? That’s pretty clear. And it’s fine that we don’t, because the circumstances are different and we need to act accordingly. Therefore the fact that it changes—I’m not sure that’s the root of the difference. Rabbi Lichtenstein has an article in which he wants to argue—I think it’s “Jewish law and procedures as foundations of morality.” I never understood that bombastic title; I think it’s in that article. There he wants to argue that this is the root of the difference. Meaning, if everything comes from the Holy One, blessed be He, then why didn’t He just write everything into Jewish law already? Why divide it into two different systems? Why not just write everything into Jewish law and that’s it? So he says morality is hard to write into Jewish law, because it’s hard to define sharp and binding definitions, unlike Jewish law. And therefore it was left as some kind of overarching principles, in the style of Dworkin in jurisprudence, for those familiar with it—left as overarching principles that are not formulated within the framework of formal Jewish law, but are equally binding. So that’s Rabbi Lichtenstein’s claim. I’m not inclined to agree with that statement. In Jewish law there are quite a number of determinations that did enter Jewish law and are still hard to define. What is love of God? What is fear of God? Even belief in God is not entirely clear what it is, and that is Maimonides’ first positive commandment. So I don’t think it’s true that things that… What is “Love your neighbor as yourself”? Can you define that? After all, Maimonides…
[Speaker B] But that’s what a person defines for himself, and morality is something of society. Maybe that’s the difference.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t think that’s right. We talked about this once. Because again, I think you’re confusing two things: what does it mean that a person… What does “defines for himself” mean? Does it mean he generates it? Or does “defines for himself” mean he exposes what it is? But it exists somewhere on an objective plane.
[Speaker B] He doesn’t expose how he carries out what—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it matters a lot. That’s an abyssal difference. Because that’s like saying: I define the law of gravity. Okay? So what are you saying—that by defining the law of gravity I actually created it, and there’s no such law in the world? Or am I saying that when I define the law of gravity, I mean that I discovered that there is such a law and now I’m defining what it is? Those are two different things. The question is whether I generate it or uncover it. And now, in the moral context too, what you said can be interpreted in both directions. I don’t know which one you meant. It could be interpreted to mean that we actually determine it—that without us it wouldn’t exist, we decided on it.
[Speaker B] Could you say the difference is not on the level of content, but between the individual and the collective?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. What I want to say is no.
[Speaker B] Morality is the collective or the individual or between the person—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m trying to argue against that. I think it’s not right. Let’s not argue because I don’t have the strength to argue. No, no, doesn’t matter, so don’t argue. I’ll state my position and then you can decide whether you want to state yours as well. The whole issue of… If I’m talking about whether I generate this thing—it comes from me—if I hadn’t… defined it, then it wouldn’t exist, there isn’t something out there, it comes from me, I created it. Then there’s room to discuss whether I’m the one who creates it or society is. Depends who created it. But if I’m talking about uncovering it, not generating it—meaning, it exists there—it’s like asking who determines the law of gravity, me or society? Whoever discovered it? The law of gravity is in the world; it is either true or it isn’t. So what difference does it make who discovers it? In the end, the question is whether it’s true or not. So if you see the matter this way, the question of who defines the moral law—society or the person—has no significance. In the end, the moral law is what is correct. How do you see it? Fine—activate your moral tools, your moral intuitions, and try to uncover what it is, what it says.
[Speaker B] The law of gravity doesn’t change over time, and morality does change over time.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The law of gravity can also change over time. Once the mass is different and everything is different, you’ll see different manifestations.
[Speaker B] And still according to the law of gravity.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And there too it will still be according to the same law, only the circumstances change. I’m saying it’s the same thing; in my opinion it’s completely parallel.
[Speaker C] I haven’t been here for over 170 years, but did you establish or give validity to the basic claim you’re using right now—that morality too is divine? Fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I mean, I’ll say it best on two levels, both of which I think I did already say, but of course you can argue. I’m only saying that whoever argues is an idol worshiper—but that’s okay, you’re an idol worshiper, you really believe in… No, I’m not saying that as a winning argument. Rather, if that’s really what you think, then fine, so you believe in… What can I say to someone who really worships idols? Leave aside someone worshiping wood and stone—not that issue. Of course there is some other source; that’s what he thinks.
[Speaker C] But the mainstream claim at least, I think, says something else. It says that morality is basically some kind of hybrid of Jewish law, just detached from the Creator of the world. Meaning, the Creator of the world gave us Jewish law, and embedded in it—embedded in it—are many moral understandings.
[Speaker B] But I don’t want Jewish law.
[Speaker C] But I’m fine with the understandings—
[Speaker B] And everything around it, yes yes yes.
[Speaker C] Between the lines there are a lot of moral things, or they are derived from halakhic behavior, and therefore someone who behaves according to Jewish law will generally also behave according to what secular people call morality. A religious person here doesn’t know what morality is, doesn’t recognize the term.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but the question is whether there is an overlap in content.
[Speaker C] So wait, that’s the atheists. I’m going with Leibowitz now—that’s completely atheistic. No, but you’re saying the difference—
[Speaker D] But there can be halakhic behavior that is immoral.
[Speaker C] I don’t care! I don’t care! So what—but that’s… that’s Jewish law, that’s what is binding.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so you’re in the identity approach. You’re in the identity approach; I presented two such approaches.
[Speaker C] I didn’t say identity. I don’t know the term morality except as the definition of morality being the will of God.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly what the identity approach says. There are those who say there is no such thing as morality; morality is basically Jewish law, there’s nothing else beyond it.
[Speaker C] Ah, you don’t know the term—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So here, I’ll describe it for you. Morality means what human beings generally think is good to do.
[Speaker C] Human beings think it’s good to brush their teeth. Fine, so that’s not morality.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s equivocation. “Good” appears here with different meanings. I mean good in the sense of pleasant, and there is good in the sense that it is a duty to do it—a duty—
[Speaker B] A moral duty that you can be judged for—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you don’t do it. That’s what you believe, but don’t say you don’t understand what I’m saying. I understand, but that’s the problem—it’s… We discussed this over three or four lectures.
[Speaker B] It’s the identity approach.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The identity approach says there is no such additional category; this is Jewish law, Jewish law comes to tell you what morality is, and that’s it. Fine. So that’s what I’m talking about. In another second we’ll get to the Chazon Ish, yes, I’m trying to get to the Chazon Ish.
[Speaker F] That’s the Chazon Ish.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In another second I’m trying to get to him, but I don’t think that’s the Chazon Ish; but we’ll see in a moment. So in short, what I want to claim is that, at least it seems to me, if you don’t want to get tangled in forced or artificial territory, the picture that emerges from Jewish law is not a picture of identity. Those who try to say there is identity are trying to impose some kind of identity on Jewish law because they’re uncomfortable with this dissonance between Jewish law and morality—how can it be that Jewish law is not moral? So they somehow try to create identity. So there are those who deny—these deniers—who say there is no morality, there is only Jewish law, and this morality is an invention. Or the secularization of religious ideas, yes? People talked a lot about that: in the age of secularization, we preserve—or people preserved—religious norms and often tried to anchor them in some alternative foundation, while still keeping those same things. Slowly people also free themselves from that. But yes, there’s such a process—but it’s a psychological process.
[Speaker G] And there is something that in a certain sense gives authorization to do that, like “you shall do what is good and right in the eyes of God.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I’m getting to that, I’m already getting to that. Meaning, I agree. So I’m saying—one second—I’ll get to that in just a moment. So that’s one direction. The second direction is not a denying direction; it says there is morality, and on the contrary, it’s impossible that Jewish law should not be moral, therefore Jewish law must be changed. Reform claims are often like that. And what I basically want to say is that if you look at Jewish law with open eyes, there is no identity. You can tell me stories that this is a higher morality that I don’t understand, but really everything is moral. Fine—but then you’ve emptied the concept of morality of content. So what difference does it make? In the end, you do what Jewish law says and that’s that. You might perhaps say that something of the moral content remains in those places where Jewish law does not say something contrary, or says nothing. In those places you will indeed follow your moral command. In that sense there is some significance to this identity approach, because it does recognize morality where there is no clash. It just says Jewish law must fit, so if Jewish law says so, obviously that’s moral too. That’s a sub-approach within the identity approach, because it does recognize morality where there is no conflict. I want to present something more radical. I claim that even when there is a clash, there are two sides. Morality says this and Jewish law says that, and now I am in conflict. And you have to decide—just as there are value conflicts within morality or within Jewish law, there can be value conflicts between morality and Jewish law, and we’ve already talked quite a bit about that. Now, when I said before that this is the will of God, you asked whether I had established that earlier. So I said, first, there’s this argument about idolatry. Again, I’m saying, I can’t prove to a person that idolatry is wrong; I can only say it does not seem to me to be a coherent Torah outlook.
[Speaker C] And moral obligation…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Yes. If I’m obligated to morality. And the second argument is indeed “You shall do what is right and good,” or “You shall be holy,” or all these commands, which are commonly understood to mean basically: behave like human beings. Or cleave to the attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He, or things of that sort—whereas cleaving to the attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He, is an enumerated commandment. Unlike “You shall do what is right and good,” which the overwhelming majority of those who enumerate the commandments do not count, and neither do they count “You shall be holy.” I think we once talked about the knave paradox, no? Did we talk about it? Regarding “You shall be holy,” Nachmanides says that “You shall be holy” means to go beyond the letter of the law. Now, in his additions to Maimonides’ Book of Commandments, Nachmanides does not count “You shall be holy” among the commandments. In Maimonides it doesn’t appear; Maimonides explains why it doesn’t appear. In the fourth principle he says that “You shall be holy” does not appear because it is a commandment that includes the entire Torah. He says basically that “You shall be holy” means observe the commandments. That’s how Maimonides interprets the verse—like “You shall keep all My commandments and do them.” We don’t count that either. There’s no point; the commandments have already been stated. You don’t need to say again that commandments must be observed—like having a law in the lawbook saying you have to obey the laws. That has no meaning, so we don’t put that into the lawbook. So Maimonides claims that “You shall be holy” is not counted for that reason. So that’s clear. Meaning, that command is understood in a way that already contains duplication; the commandments are already listed in the book. But Nachmanides pours independent content into it. He says “You shall be holy” means: go beyond the letter of the law. Don’t eat too much, cut back a bit on sex and on eating and on all kinds of pleasures and various things—go beyond what the strict line of the law requires. So why doesn’t he add it in his additions to his own enumeration of the commandments? Another positive commandment of “You shall be holy”? Here there’s no duplication anymore; that’s not Maimonides’ argument. The answer is that if he had added it, then it would no longer be beyond the letter of the law—it would be the letter of the law. Meaning, you have to go beyond the letter of the law—the verse tells you that. Now if that entered the letter of the law, it would empty this commandment of content. And what—
[Speaker B] Maybe the letter of the law without limits? What? Maybe the letter of the law without limits? Meaning, “You shall be holy” is kindness. Kindness is something you can’t count—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Just as kindness in fact is also not enumerated. There is no commandment to perform kindness. There is a commandment to lend.
[Speaker B] Also beyond the letter of the law, beyond the letter of the law—everyone does what he thinks.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I want to go further than that: you’re also not obligated. It’s a higher moral level, but it is not included in halakhic obligation. Otherwise, take the other place I mentioned earlier—“Love your neighbor as yourself”—that also has no sharp definitions.
[Speaker B] In the confession for sin on Yom Kippur? Yes. “For the sin of a haughty eye and feet running to do evil”—what sin is running?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Presumably that’s a moral sin.
[Speaker B] It’s not a halakhic sin. It’s a moral sin—a sin.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe that strengthens even more what—
[Speaker B] Of honoring parents and teachers…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Honoring parents and teachers may already enter Jewish law, but—but yes, that’s reinforcement, more reinforcement for what I said earlier: that the Holy One, blessed be He, expects from us both things—both morality and Jewish law. And we are destined to be judged for both. That is, that’s clear.
[Speaker B] There’s that psalm, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, at least that’s right.
[Speaker B] After that come the sins for which one is liable for burnt offering and sin offering and guilt offering—they’re really the legal ones.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. It looks like a summary there, but right, it’s not just a summary—it looks like the summary, it’s the end, yes,
[Speaker B] But it’s not those that…
[Speaker C] Yes, you’re right, I think there’s something here—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s telling us something.
[Speaker C] What? In mathematics it’s pretty clear. Jewish law sets the boundary: from here it’s permitted, up to here it’s forbidden, from here it’s permitted—there’s a mathematical line here. Now, someone says… there can be an additional commandment or an additional instruction that says: take epsilon. How much epsilon? You decide. A little to the right—epsilon—and that’s fine. And that can be counted as an additional commandment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. And that’s exactly why I’m asking: why isn’t it counted?
[Speaker C] That wouldn’t prevent others from being commandments?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I understand. So I’m asking: why isn’t it counted?
[Speaker C] No, you said… that if it were counted then it—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Would make everything redundant. No, no—not make everything redundant. According to Nachmanides, if Jewish law also obligated that, then I’d also have to do that because Jewish law obligates it.
[Speaker B] Right. A different reason according to Maimonides—according to Maimonides it’s because it makes everything redundant. What? Can’t there be a commandment to do more than a commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Certainly not. Because then that would become what is required. If it’s a commandment, then it becomes required.
[Speaker B] Like you said—there’s epsilon.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Never mind—this epsilon, this epsilon, this epsilon cannot be a commandment. Unless it is a commandment, in which case it’s what’s required. You want me to go beyond the epsilon? So what have you gained? You just moved the line by an epsilon. You moved the line by an epsilon; you didn’t change anything.
[Speaker C] Because “you shall be holy” still speaks about what is beyond. There is no line, because each person…
[Speaker B] “You shall be holy” is the thought—that’s the epsilon.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Nachmanides says it’s not the thought, it’s the act. You’re supposed not to indulge excessively in… I understand what Nachmanides is saying as opposed to Maimonides. I’m only saying that one could say that “you shall be holy” is the very fact that you think about it, and that is the epsilon, and everything you do beyond that… then that really could have been counted. Right. But I brought Nachmanides’ example not in order to show that this is the content of the verse “you shall be holy.” You can argue about Nachmanides’ interpretation. I brought it to show the logic. And the logic is that if Nachmanides holds that there is a command here to act beyond the letter of the law, he cannot count it. And one can argue and say this is not a command of going beyond the letter of the law; it’s a command about intention, it’s a command about—never mind—something else. Then it also could have been counted, fine. But I’m saying the logic is this: when there is something that by definition lies outside halakhic obligation, it cannot enter into halakhic obligation. And therefore in the end, “and you shall do what is right and good” and “you shall be holy” are not counted. Nobody counts them, even though they obey them. No, wait—that’s it. Now, Rabbi Lichtenstein in his article there wants to argue that this is because it isn’t fully defined, and that’s why it isn’t counted. But essentially, for our purposes, it’s like an enumerated commandment. And it obligates exactly like the enumerated commandments. It doesn’t enter the 613 because there isn’t a sharp boundary here. And I said I don’t agree with that. I don’t think he’s right.
[Speaker G] There are other commandments that have no fixed measure.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, exactly, exactly—that’s why. What I said earlier. There are quite a few things that have no fixed measure and are still counted. “Love your fellow as yourself”—Maimonides himself gets tangled up with this at the beginning of chapter 14 of the Laws of Mourning. Maimonides writes that the Sages commanded a person to accompany the dead, to bring in a bride, to visit the sick, and so on and so on, and all of this is included in “love your fellow as yourself,” and it is rabbinic. There, it sounds like this: on the one hand, it is included in “love your fellow as yourself,” which is Torah-level, and on the other hand, it is rabbinic. So there are those who explain there—again following, basically, what Rabbi Lichtenstein wants to take from the Maggid Mishneh at the end of the Laws of Neighbors and from Nachmanides on the verse “and you shall do what is right and good”—it’s almost the same thing. And he wants to claim that this in fact obligates exactly like a Torah law, but it can’t… he isn’t talking about “love your fellow as yourself,” okay? But those who want to apply it to “love your fellow as yourself” want to bring this distinction there too, and they want to say that “love your fellow as yourself” is not defined, and the Sages came and gave it new definitions. I don’t accept that there either. But beyond that, one must remember that “love your fellow as yourself” is an enumerated commandment. If this kind of command is not counted, then I would expect that “love your fellow as yourself” also would not be counted, and the Sages would define for us more or less various actions, and the rest would remain up to our decision beyond the line of… but that’s not beyond the letter of the law, even though it’s hard to define. That means there is no such rule that whatever is hard to define is not included in the count of the commandments. So what, then, is the difference between morality—say, “and you shall do what is right and good”—and Jewish law? So yes, there is a difference in the level of obligation. It’s not true that there is no difference in the level of obligation. There is a difference in the level of obligation. Jewish law—you are obligated. Morality—I don’t know, that already depends on what level you want to place yourself. It’s not your decision what is moral. What is moral is given; you don’t decide it. You decide on what level you want to behave. Do you want to be moral at this level, at that level? Fine, decide. But the Holy One, blessed be He, expects you to be as much as possible—as much as you can manage, the more the better. Now that is indeed a difference in the level of obligation, okay? And despite that, and despite that, there are places where—that is, Rabbi Lichtenstein’s scheme I do accept in the sense that morality is hard to define with a line. I only argue that this is not the reason it isn’t counted, because there are things that were counted and are like that. Okay, so then what happens? Really, sometimes when there is a clash between Jewish law and morality, morality can prevail. It is not automatic that Jewish law prevails over morality.
[Speaker I] How? If the level of obligation of morality is lower, then why would it prevail?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what I said was—the halakhic obligation is more limited… there is moral obligation. And the moral obligation is such-and-such, and it is not inside Jewish law because of the range of possibilities, where each person decides on what spiritual level… Jewish law is what is required of everyone, okay? But there are situations where the moral wrong is so glaring that it overrides even halakhic obligations. Very basic things—what the Chazon Ish himself, we’ll get to him in a moment, talks about as the fifth section of the Shulchan Arukh. He says there are sometimes things that are simply not done—you can’t do such a thing, even though according to the halakhic calculation, seemingly…
[Speaker C] He talks about—he was asked whether to save a non-Jew on the Sabbath in a situation where there’s no issue of outward appearance. Right, I don’t remember exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When was that? A letter from a year ago, a year and a half ago.
[Speaker C] He writes explicitly—he writes, “I would save him, and then I’d look for a justification in Jewish law, and if not, may God save me.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I once heard that in the name of Rabbi Lichtenstein.
[Speaker C] Oh, that was Rabbi Lichtenstein?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so that one I know. But even so, there are contradictions in what Rabbi Lichtenstein said on this matter. I heard from his students several denials, and I don’t know how
[Speaker C] accurate it is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, right.
[Speaker J] How does “Shall the Judge of all the earth not do justice?” arise in this context? Because on the one hand, it’s as if the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself—there is the word of God, and He said to do such-and-such, and yet it seems as if the Holy One…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] blessed be He acted immorally. So if He demands of us to be moral, then certainly He too is supposed to act morally.
[Speaker J] And in the end, at the base of Abraham’s claim is that He is indeed obligated—not only are we obligated, but the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself is also obligated to this. That’s one side. On the other hand, in the end it seems that He supposedly already took morality into account in the word of God.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine—morality is the word of God.
[Speaker J] No, in the beginning of the discussion it seems that there are two systems: there is the word of God, and Abraham confronts it with “Shall the Judge of all the earth not do
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] justice?”—with some separate moral system. No, on the contrary—even at the beginning of the discussion, no. Abraham our forefather’s whole claim is that it is not two systems. Two systems, yes—but both come from the Holy One, blessed be He. And how can it be that You act immorally?—that is what he asks Him. That is, the Holy One, blessed be He, is also bound by morality.
[Speaker J] On the one hand, He could say to him: You don’t understand, and this is the word of God…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and leave me alone with your justice.
[Speaker J] Okay. But in the end, in the conclusion of the passage—which is what they say about the Binding of Isaac, and therefore we’ll get to the Binding of Isaac when the gun that appears in the first act appears in the second act—the smoking gun.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The gun, exactly.
[Speaker J] But in the end, it’s as if the Holy One, blessed be He, said: Listen, in the word of God I already included all the judicial or moral considerations that a Torah scholar might mistakenly think otherwise about.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When the Holy One, blessed be He, makes a decision—not when He writes a verse—when He makes a decision, then presumably, at least at first glance—by the way, there it turns out in the end that apparently not.
[Speaker J] There is no righteous person in Sodom.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but there are—there just aren’t enough righteous people in Sodom.
[Speaker J] Fine, you know, I don’t know.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But it looks like some kind of negotiation where he brings Him down: forty, thirty, twenty.
[Speaker J] But in the end—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] if in the end it turns out that from the start this was what the Holy One, blessed be He, meant, then it really is a fixed game. Or maybe it really is some kind of…
[Speaker J] move in which you understand it. I don’t know whether it is completely two systems, or whether in the end this proves that the Holy One, blessed be He, in the word of God already took morality into account.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I wouldn’t formulate it the way you formulated the two possibilities at the end. There are two ways to read this, the argument between Abraham and the Holy One, blessed be He. One possibility is that the Holy One, blessed be He, from the outset meant only five righteous people—that is, if there are not five righteous people then He will destroy it, but if there are five righteous people then not. Abraham just didn’t understand. Fifty, forty, thirty, until he comes down. As if He says: you didn’t understand. The second possibility is that the Holy One, blessed be He, really intended to destroy Sodom in any case, and Abraham got Him to, like some merchant, managed to bargain Him down and get less out of Him. Okay. In both of these readings, I am still willing to see—I can still see—that morality binds the Holy One, blessed be He, exactly as Jewish law binds. That is, because the expectation from Him is to be moral. The only question is whether the Holy One, blessed be He, learns this during the argument or whether He already knew it in advance. That is a theological question, but it does not touch our discussion.
[Speaker J] And that is really what affects our discussion. This argument basically means that every time there is Jewish law, which is the word of God, I, like Abraham, need to stand against the Jewish law and say, wait, this is not moral. That—I agree with.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m only saying—
[Speaker J] the question is whether both come from the Holy One, blessed be He, though.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is, the fact that these are two systems is obvious—on the contrary, I completely agree that these are two systems. But both these systems come from the Holy One, blessed be He; they are grounded in the Holy One, blessed be He. And if you ask Him, then He is obligated to both.
[Speaker J] Or there are not two systems, and what Abraham says is…
[Speaker D] really…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So we’re back to the same question. But I’m saying, from there you can’t prove anything. You can interpret it this way or that way; I don’t see how one can derive one direction from there.
[Speaker D] Because regarding Abraham and Sodom, it turns out that Abraham simply didn’t know the facts. He said, surely there are ten righteous people there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s one possibility, yes. The second possibility is no. It could be that he persuaded the Holy One, blessed be He. And what about Moses our teacher, who pleads before the Holy One, blessed be He, and prays and changes His mind? The Holy One, blessed be He, changes His mind. “For I regret what I have done”—the Torah itself says it. The Holy One, blessed be He, changes His mind. You can argue about how that can be theologically; all fine. But it joins a whole list of places where the Holy One, blessed be He, changed His mind. Here too it could be that way. I don’t know how to read it, but I’m saying whether you read it this way or that way, in the end it is clear that the Holy One, blessed be He—the Holy One, blessed be He Himself is obligated both to morality and to Jewish law. Either way, it doesn’t matter. Whether He learned it during the argument or whether it was revealed that in fact from the start it was so—it doesn’t matter to me. That is already a theological question of how to read it: whether I am willing to accept that the Holy One, blessed be He, regrets or not, or missed something. Right? Fine—that’s another discussion. But either way, however I read it, it seems to me there is here a statement of clear obligation of the Holy One, blessed be He, in both directions. After all, on that basis I come to Him. Otherwise the Holy One, blessed be He, should have answered him in the name of Leibowitz: morality is an atheistic category; I am not interested at all in how many righteous people are in Sodom. Let the whole city be righteous—I want to destroy them all. And that’s my halakhic decision.
[Speaker J] You said that in one reading there are two separate systems that you confront with one another. In the second, you say that when the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded what He commanded, He already took all the considerations into account, and you have no external system by which you can criticize the halakhic system.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand. There.
[Speaker J] There in the Torah, because there it is a decision. And therefore today as well.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because there it is the identity between morality and Jewish law.
[Speaker J] Because there it is the word of God, and don’t come to me with claims, because the Holy One, blessed be He, already took everything into account.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I don’t think that even if you read it there that way, I don’t think it is correct to apply that to the issue of Jewish law and morality. The destruction of Sodom was not Jewish law; the Torah had not yet been given at all. That is, it was not a halakhic ruling. But what was it?
[Speaker J] I’m generalizing the concept of the word of God to include Jewish law as well.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m saying that this generalization is not necessary. Now, if you want to remain with the identity approach—there are such people. I’m not claiming they are absurd; I think they are wrong. They do not pass the simple test of common sense. But fine, of course one can read it that way if one insists. I don’t think that is what it says. Beyond that, when the Holy One, blessed be He, reveals Himself and tells you: my friend, here is this Amalekite before you, kill him—not a general verse of “you shall blot out the memory of Amalek”—then there the Holy One, blessed be He, presumably already took all the options into account, because He is telling me what to do. But when the Holy One, blessed be He, gives me the command “you shall blot out the memory of Amalek,” I can still ask myself: wait, okay, that is the halakhic command, I understand, but there is also a moral consideration. And now it may be that there is a conflict and I will have to decide what to do. That is different from the Holy One, blessed be He, giving me a concrete instruction about a case.
[Speaker J] Here you’re saying the problem is a technical one—that the word of God is not sufficiently clear in that case.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course! But that is exactly what I’m saying. It is not an accidental conclusion; it is what I claim. Because the word of God is actually given in two different systems. And when you want to decide what to do concretely regarding an actual act, that is not a simple question. Because even if there is an explicit commandment, that still doesn’t mean I will fulfill it. And there is also from the Holy One, blessed be He—not a commandment but an explicit expectation—“and you shall do what is right and good.” And sometimes there is an argument, a conflict, that will tell me no, you will not do this even though it is an explicit commandment.
[Speaker J] Which is similar to conflicts within Jewish law or conflicts within morality.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly. Therefore I say that the fact there is a general command is different from a situation in which the Holy One, blessed be He, says: in this case do such-and-such. He does not tell you “do such-and-such”; “do” already means I took all the considerations into account.
[Speaker E] What you’re saying is very dangerous. Okay—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I already said—
[Speaker E] that it’s dangerous.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And whether it’s dangerous or not is not a criterion for truth. Hm?
[Speaker E] Is this the basis of the Reform movement?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So be it. Okay, the Talmud itself speaks of “a transgression for its own sake is great”—we already talked about this. “A transgression for its own sake is greater than a commandment not for its own sake.” That is, there are situations in which the Holy One, blessed be He, expects me to be a transgressor. Conscientious objection in Jewish law. I’m not prepared to do what Jewish law says, because it contradicts morality. And the Holy One, blessed be He, expects me to do that. That is the topic of a transgression for its own sake.
[Speaker D] King Saul and what happened to him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, because King Saul apparently made the wrong decision. But that doesn’t mean there are no such decisions. That’s the whole idea. I even brought examples of this in Jewish law, regarding institutionalizing prostitution. I think we talked about this, right? There are decisions where from a halakhic standpoint it is clear that this is what should be done. Put disqualified witnesses there when a secular couple gets married—it is certainly the most logical thing from a halakhic standpoint. Put two invalid witnesses there so the marriage won’t take effect, there won’t be mamzerim, there won’t be a prohibition of a married woman, everything will be wonderful—almost everything will be wonderful. Almost no halakhic decisor agrees to that. Why not? The halakhic calculation says so. Why not do it? Because on the meta-halakhic, moral level, it is impossible.
[Speaker C] I think it’s exactly the opposite. I think everyone is happy when it happens, but to say it—that contradicts Jewish law. It’s exactly what you said earlier. On the personal level, absolutely not; it’s a matter of impression.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t erase Jewish law. Someone who keeps Jewish law—I marry him according to the law of Moses and Israel. What do you mean? And someone who doesn’t keep Jewish law—I try to minimize his transgressions.
[Speaker C] And what is the moral problem with that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? The problem is that the Jewish people would live without canopy and betrothal. It’s really a conception…
[Speaker C] Better than mamzerim?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it depends. Some of them as a result would end up with mamzer status and prohibitions, but another part would not. You can’t say that the whole calculation, as you said… no, but if you made that calculation only on the halakhic level, not on the meta-halakhic level, it seems the clear result is not to marry them. Even though it harms some people for whom there will not be mamzerim and they will not commit adultery and nothing of the sort. Why? Because the prohibitions on one side are among the most severe prohibitions there are: the prohibition of a married woman carries a death penalty, mamzer status ruins the child for life and his descendants and his descendants’ descendants. And here there are a few who will live without canopy and betrothal—big deal, a rabbinic prohibition. And maybe the neglect of a Torah-level positive commandment according to some opinions. That’s all—so what? What’s the problem with that? The problem is that people are not willing—rabbis are not willing—for people to live without canopy and betrothal. That is some sort of conception. I don’t know whether to call it—not entirely morality in the sense of harming another, but a meta-halakhic conception, let’s say, or something like that. But there is some kind of… yes, exactly. But there is… you see that here there is some type of consideration that is meta-halakhic and intervenes within Jewish law, within halakhic decision-making; sometimes it overrides it. It is not true that Jewish law stands before everything—first of all Jewish law and that’s it. Okay, fine, I really have to get to those people already because every time I don’t manage to get to them. I want to discuss Rav Kook on one side and the Chazon Ish on the other and see what they say. It is commonly thought that the Chazon Ish belongs to one identity approach and Rav Kook belongs to the opposite identity approach, but both hold an identity approach. Okay. Let’s start with the Chazon Ish. “Moral duties,” Faith and Trust, chapter 3. “Moral duties are sometimes one and the same body as halakhic rulings.” Yes, that is already a statement: moral duties are one body with halakhic rulings. So that really is… sometimes, sometimes… yes, that’s it, “sometimes” is an interesting word. “With halakhic rulings. And Jewish law…” One could have said that sometimes means because there are laws that simply do not touch moral issues—not eating pork or something like that. An excluded group. One could discuss it. “And Jewish law determines what is forbidden and permitted in the Torah of morality.” Even stronger, right? How so? They said in Bava Batra 21b that with teachers of children there is no claim of “you are cutting off my livelihood.” Thus, if there are teachers in town making a living from their labor, and suddenly other teachers come from another city, and human nature being what it is, people are not satisfied with the old thing, everyone jumps to the new arrivals and the town’s teachers are harmed. Yes, basically competition. Competition in schoolteachers. The deprived ones spread their hatred in their hearts toward the new pursuers, and from hatred of the heart they go on to seek flaws and false accusations against them, and they train their tongue in slander about them, and from one evil to another they go on to spread false rumors and arouse the compassion of the townspeople against the cruelty of the new arrivals, until they intensify quarrels and disputes, and at times they take revenge on them whenever they can. Yes, it reaches not-simple conflicts. And behold, all their deeds would have been cleansed of all sin and transgression if the Jewish law were in accordance with them, that they could prevent the newcomers, and the newcomers would be the sinners endangering themselves despite the Jewish law that was said to Moses our teacher, peace be upon him, at Sinai. There would be no prohibition of dispute, no prohibition of slander, no baseless hatred, and there would be a commanded war to uphold religion. That would be if the Torah had not permitted competition from new teachers. But as it is, it does permit it, he says. “But now that Jewish law has ruled that the jealousy of scholars increases wisdom, and this principle is loftier than the livelihood of individual people”—that is more important than the life or livelihood of private individuals, because behold, the arriving guests acted according to Jewish law, and those who rise against them spill innocent blood. When they hate them in their hearts, they violate ‘you shall not hate your brother in your heart’; when they speak evil about them, they violate the prohibition of slander; when they gather groups for quarrels, they violate ‘do not be like Korah’; when they take revenge against them without any benefit, they violate ‘you shall not take revenge.’ And when the Talmud said there, ‘And Rav Huna concedes regarding teachers of children that one cannot prevent them,’ many moral laws are included in this halakhic ruling, which arise from the consequences of the halakhic ruling.” So what is the Chazon Ish actually saying here? Seemingly this is really the identity approach, right? He says: our natural morality recoils, as it were—or may recoil. I think today I’m no longer sure that’s true. My morality, for example, doesn’t recoil at all; I think it’s perfectly fine. But his assumption is that natural morality recoils at harming the livelihood of the first teacher. What?
[Speaker C] Encroaching on someone’s domain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, apparently it’s like encroachment. So it harms the livelihood of the first one. On the other hand, we want competition because it benefits the public. So there is some tension here, and Jewish law ruled that we prefer competition—to allow competition. In Torah study.
[Speaker C] What? In Torah, not in tomatoes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s another question already, but maybe. In any event, in Torah, okay? So if that is so, then the Chazon Ish says that now the moral principle itself has changed, because once the halakhic determination is such, then the whole moral picture is overturned. That is, Jewish law determines what is morally right and what is morally wrong. In my picture, what would I have said? Jewish law determines this and yet it is still not moral, and I am in tension between Jewish law and morality, and now I have to decide what to do. Say that’s the non-identity model, right? That’s the model I propose. And this Chazon Ish, seemingly, is a basis for the identity conception. Now sometimes, as I said earlier, what he says—that they are sometimes one body with halakhic rulings—I don’t know how far that goes, because sometimes, as I said, there are parts of Jewish law that simply do not touch moral questions, and so that’s the “sometimes.” But one has to pay close attention to what halakhic ruling is being discussed here. The Chazon Ish says: because the Jewish law given to Moses our teacher at Sinai says that competition is permitted. What does that mean, a law to Moses from Sinai? That’s news to me. This is a rabbinic law. It is openly a rabbinic law. It’s a Talmud in Bava Batra; the whole thing is a collection of rabbinic laws, ordinances of the Sages, how we manage society, damage among neighbors, competition, guilds, all those things there at the beginning of Bava Batra—and all of that is rabbinic enactments. What is this phrase, “a Torah law given to Moses at Sinai”? It’s simply not true. He surely means to make some ideological statement or some halakhic statement; I don’t think he thought this was literally a law to Moses from Sinai. He meant to say that this is Jewish law, and from here on the moral hesitations cease. But notice: this is a law that was not derived from verses, nor from a law to Moses from Sinai, or interpretations, or whatever. So from what, then? Why did the Sages determine this? It didn’t come from a verse, because they thought this is the right way to act. Fine—so obviously this is a moral determination. The question from the start was only a moral question, not a halakhic one, because from a halakhic standpoint it was an open question: allow competition, don’t allow competition. In the original law of the Torah, the derivations, whatever—from strict law there is nothing to say about such a thing. But a problem arose, so the Sages had to decide what Jewish society should allow or not allow. They sat over the matter and decided that competition is preferable. What were the considerations there? One brought a verse and another brought a derivation and another brought a rabbinic enactment? What suddenly? They thought about what is reasonable or what is moral to do, right? That’s what they thought. Now once the Sages have ruled, then their ruling is valid also regarding morality—that’s what he says here. This is a completely different statement. He says that if the Sanhedrin sits on a moral question and reaches a moral conclusion, that is binding by “do not deviate” just like a halakhic ruling, because the Sanhedrin has the authority to legislate.
[Speaker B] And that’s also Aharon Barak, who thinks that way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, fine.
[Speaker B] He’s the reasonable person, and here…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But they don’t think it’s because of the reasonable person, but because of “do not deviate”—the Holy One, blessed be He, authorized them. Maybe Aharon Barak also thinks the Holy One, blessed be He, authorized them?
[Speaker G] I think what he’s saying is that if specifically—that’s what they discussed—if they thought that on one side there is morality, what is morally good, and on the other side there is the matter of spreading Torah, yes, that there should be more, and they determined—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that this overrides—
[Speaker G] that, morality, or that Torah is more important.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m willing to accept that formulation, but still they also took the moral question here into account, and their decision is what to do with the moral question. Now once that is their decision, then I also agree that one must obey them; it is legislation of the Sanhedrin like any enactment, like anything else. Once it is an enactment of an authorized institution, it is binding, like when the Knesset legislates. So when the Knesset legislates a law in the area of morality, that is the binding law from the standpoint of state law, also in the area of morality, because once it legislated, it legislated. That does not necessarily make it moral—that is already something else—but it is the binding thing. But from here to infer the conclusion that according to the Chazon Ish there is no—rather, that there is identity, meaning that all halakhic rulings always express morality—I am not at all sure one can infer that from this Chazon Ish.
[Speaker G] But he asks why they reached that conclusion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I said: because they thought competition is more important than harming the livelihood of others, of individuals. Fine, that’s our dilemma too. Everyone who thinks about this issue understands that there is such a benefit and there is damage and harm to individuals versus benefit to the public. Fine—that’s basically a classic dilemma. So one can call this dilemma a moral dilemma, as I said. One can call it, as you said—and I fully accept this—that it is morality versus social good, not good specifically in the moral sense but in the religious sense, spreading Torah. Fine. But still, the dilemma was—and at least one horn of the dilemma was—the moral problem, and on that the Sages determined that the rule is that we allow competition. After the Sages determined it, then obviously that is the halakhically binding determination—I agree. But how can one derive from here some general determination that says every halakhic determination is necessarily also moral? That really does not follow from here.
[Speaker J] Are you asking about the Chazon Ish—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] or about the interpretation given to the Chazon Ish? No, I’m asking about the interpretation given to the Chazon Ish.
[Speaker J] No, so I think that still within the interpretation given to the Chazon Ish—okay, so he chose a bad example, but the heading he gives…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but now I’m returning to the “sometimes” that you noted at the beginning.
[Speaker J] No, before the “sometimes,” the heading he gives in general is that bodies of Torah are themselves morality. They are the “sometimes.” So you are indeed returning to…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. I said that when I read the “sometimes” alone, by itself I’m not sure how far it goes, but afterwards I see what example he brought, so maybe he just brought an unsuccessful example—but the principle of charity, you know, Dworkin’s principle, says that we interpret things in the way that is most favorable to the author. Fine, that’s the assumption. I’m saying: why assume he made a mistake rather than assume he said exactly what he really wanted to say? And what he wanted to say is this example; he brought this example because he meant this example.
[Speaker C] Exactly—he brought this example. He says something very clear. He says, know that sometimes it seems to you that it overlaps, sometimes it doesn’t overlap. But know that morality—you can hesitate as much as you want. Once the Sanhedrin has ruled, that is morality; stop thinking, you no longer have a dilemma there. We are the ones who write morality as we go.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is an identity approach—I said earlier—there are those who derive it from his words.
[Speaker C] He says: the one who struggles is not you, it is the Sanhedrin. And it has determined, and from now on that is your track. Don’t enter into dilemmas there. It’s a matter of guidance that he’s saying here.
[Speaker D] The moment you say don’t enter into dilemmas, then the moral consideration—as if—you are released from moral consideration.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, I…
[Speaker C] There is a moral consideration, but the halakhic consideration prevails. As long as the Sanhedrin has not determined it. Once it determined it, that’s it—that’s that. Now move on to the next dilemma.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so if that’s so, that’s what I wanted to say: that the Chazon Ish does not say there is identity between halakhic determination in general and morality, but rather he says that in every conflict Jewish law will prevail over morality.
[Speaker C] No, it’s only that Jewish law—the Sanhedrin determined the Jewish law, okay—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It determined the Jewish law and it will prevail over the moral consideration—and by the way, that still doesn’t mean it is morality.
[Speaker C] By the way, in this matter the ruling is very interesting, because morality prevails here. Morality does prevail; I’ll tell you why. Because not harming a person’s livelihood, according to many people, is like murder. Harming someone’s livelihood is very severe halakhically. Improving the level of Torah study is something much softer. And so what was chosen here? It was chosen to commit a severe prohibition for the sake of some particular principle.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not a prohibition—they established a rabbinic enactment, but—
[Speaker C] Harming someone’s livelihood is considered a severe sin. Fine, but here sending a person to war is a severe sin because he might die there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But it’s for the benefit of society; we need it, what can you do. There are many times when a small need, when it concerns all of society, overrides severe harm to an individual person. Society does this; there’s no choice. So it doesn’t matter—the Sages made their decision. I’m only saying that from these words of the Chazon Ish I don’t know whether one can really—I don’t think one can—derive the identity approach. The Chazon Ish, very often—and this is what I said earlier—speaks about the fifth section of the Shulchan Arukh, and he says Jewish law is not what you derive from the formal accounting of the sources. There is sometimes some basic intuition—call it moral or something else, it doesn’t matter—that overrides the formal halakhic calculation. And that is what the Chazon Ish says. And by the way, he does this at every step, even when he doesn’t say it. You see it in his halakhic judgment all the time. Fine, so therefore I’m not sure it is correct to attach this statement to the Chazon Ish. But within these words another plane of discussion is exposed. One can accept the parallel approach that I am proposing, of morality and Jewish law as two parallel planes, but still claim that whenever there is a clash, Jewish law will always prevail, because Jewish law is something more definitive. Where is morality significant? Where Jewish law has nothing to say, or where it does not clash, or something like that. As I said earlier. That is another discussion. I think even that is not correct. But first of all, it seems to me that one can definitely see in the Chazon Ish that these are indeed two categories that do not overlap—it is not true that they overlap. As you say, in the bottom line don’t hesitate, go straight with Jewish law. But he does not say that thereby it becomes moral. He only says that this is what must be done; this is what Jewish law says, because they also took that into account. That is already a softer statement. I want to argue that even that is not correct, and I think the Chazon Ish himself also says that even that is not correct, because sometimes the halakhic calculation is not what I will do; rather, what I will do is based on my sense of what is right.
[Speaker H] What about people in the official Mussar movement? What was with them?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not connected here. The official Mussar movement—in its own language—they often speak about the spirit of Jewish law, not necessarily morality, and when you see the explanations, for example, often they explain to you that behavior—what we call moral behavior—is really a clause of a commandment. On the contrary, they often defend their conception by saying that this too is Jewish law and this too is a commandment. After all, “love your fellow as yourself” is also a commandment no less than eating pork. So why are you not strict about that? That is always a classic moral argument. It really tries to bring everything into Jewish law—just to expand the boundaries of Jewish law. To say that Jewish law is not only ritual things or such matters, but also being a decent human being. And I want to argue: no, that is not Jewish law, but it is the will of God. That is, these are two different systems. Fine, that’s one side. For anyone who still wants, allow me to also look at Rav Kook. Rav Kook is usually perceived as holding the opposite conception. And in Olat Re’iyah, part one, on the section of the Binding, I said I think this is a very, very beautiful passage. So he goes and throughout the whole way he interprets Abraham our forefather’s trial in parallel to Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, that really there is here a trial to see the extent of Abraham’s self-sacrifice. How much would he be willing to bind for the sake of the will of God. And that binding includes the binding of reason and of morality, of natural feelings and of everything—and of his son, of course. That is, he binds his whole world because of the divine command. And Kierkegaard stops here. So that is the lesson of the Binding, or that’s it. Therefore Abraham is the knight of faith, in his language, because Abraham was in fact the one who was prepared to bind everything—morality, reason, feelings, everything—for the sake of the service of God. That is the true knight of faith. Rav Kook goes with him all the way, but in the end there is a twist in the plot, because it says: “And he said: Do not send forth your hand against the lad, nor do anything to him, for now I know that you fear God, since you have not withheld your son, your only one, from Me.” Kierkegaard of course ignores the final part, the fact that the angel says, “Do not send forth your hand against the lad.” And Rav Kook says about this: “The voice of the Lord is in power,” through His angel who does His word. He says that the absolute command—both from the side of justice, to refrain from the wickedness of shedding blood, and from the side of nature, to abstain from anything that harms the fatherly feelings full of love for his beloved son—remains in force. Don’t think it does not remain in force, that I am instructing you to violate natural feeling or morality—such a thing cannot be. The sacred and steadfast recognitions—intentionally “sacred,” meaning your natural recognitions are sacred; they too are from the Holy One, blessed be He. It is not the human against the divine; the human too is an expression of the divine. “Inscribed in spiritual nature and material nature did not descend from their level by even a hair’s breadth because of the supreme vision revealed in the word of God.” That is, it is impossible that the word of God, the instruction from the Holy One, blessed be He, should harm those recognitions ingrained in us—moral recognitions, natural feelings, these simple things. “By way of the offering, the matter of the offering and the deepest self-sacrifice to the living God, which is holy and mighty in truth, in every desire and sincerity of the soul’s will. Therefore, ‘do not send forth your hand against the lad,’ in all the force of the simple and upright prohibition in the matter.” “Do not send forth your hand against the lad” is not a scriptural decree the way Kierkegaard would interpret it; rather it is the true instruction, it is reason, by the force of the simple and natural command: do not send forth your hand against the lad. Not because I am now playing games with you—first I took you there, now I took you here—so that you should always obey My voice, from some sort of feeling like that; on the contrary, to bind Abraham our forefather, to shake him in all directions, to show him that only I control the matter. This is the exact opposite conception. That is, Rav Kook also sees there are jolts this way and that, but the jolts are only twofold: first to go against, and the second to show that going against cannot be.
[Speaker C] So he failed the test?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait one second. And that is exactly—it would mean he should have refused the sacrifice. I’ll answer that in a moment. The question really arises then: why did the Holy One, blessed be He, need this? Let Him immediately explain the idea to him. Or on the other hand, I can ask it the way you asked: if so, then did Abraham our forefather miss something at the beginning? Did he fail the test? He should have understood that such a command cannot contradict morality and reason and so on.
[Speaker C] So how can that be?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here and there there are indeed some who want to interpret that Abraham failed. I think that’s absurd, but fine. Ravitzky brings it—he claims that there are many Spanish commentators who claim that Abraham actually failed the trial of the Binding. That’s in Derushim, section 4. Nonsense. Is that a derivative of what you’re saying?
[Speaker C] It’s a derivative of what you’re saying. If morality overrides everything, he should have said: I understand—I’m not accepting it. I’ll explain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m saying, why does the Holy One, blessed be He, still shake Abraham back and forth in this way? He does it in order to teach him this lesson through experiential learning. He says to him: you think that serving God is like Kierkegaard. That’s really what Abraham thought, okay? Now it’s true that when the Holy One, blessed be He, commands, you have to obey. That’s how you have to obey. There’s no sin there. Your mistake was that you really thought the Holy One, blessed be He, could mean such a thing. And then what? Now, the Holy One, blessed be He, did say it, so what do you mean, how could it have been interpreted otherwise? It couldn’t have been interpreted otherwise. But the Holy One, blessed be He, says to him: very good that you listened to My voice. This isn’t a failure; it’s a success in the trial of the binding of Isaac. But know that this whole business was really experiential learning. Experiential learning in order to teach you that there is no such thing—there is no command that contradicts the natural feelings of morality. Anyway, that’s what Rabbi Kook says. But Abraham was supposed to understand that already in Sodom. That’s exactly what our forefather Abraham did in Sodom. No, the Holy One, blessed be He—that’s the question—to replace it, and he comes…
[Speaker F] And he came and said to him—no, I understand. Not to him—he didn’t refuse, he…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Clarified, he argued.
[Speaker F] Yes, that’s something else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but after the Holy One, blessed be He, would say to him, fine, He would say to him—you can’t… He argued. The big question is why here he didn’t argue, and there he did. So there are several answers to that; the commentators already deal with it. There are several answers. Here it concerns him, here it concerns others. There are several distinctions—not many, but there are a few distinctions. That’s the question: why didn’t he argue? But fine, to argue with morality—in principle you could have done that here too. But in the end you still had to fulfill it. Fine, after you are ready to fulfill it and I really see that you are a servant of God, then now I can tell you that in practice you don’t have to bind him at all. Meaning—and I think that as an educational method, and this I heard from Rabbi Blumentzweig in Yeruham.
[Speaker D] In Sodom, after all, he argued when He said, “The outcry of Sodom and Gomorrah.” But in the binding of Isaac He doesn’t tell him, listen, you did something wrong. No, fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t want to get into the difference between the two passages because I want to finish here. You can distinguish between them on several parameters. I just want to say that I once heard this from Rabbi Blumentzweig, head of the yeshiva in Yeruham, and this is really some kind of educational lesson, also for our generation. A lot of times we find ourselves with this feeling, and I completely identify with it. This feeling that basically this “too good to be kosher” idea is a distortion. Meaning, this outlook that says that if it’s kosher, it can’t be pleasant. Meaning, if it’s good, it can’t fit Jewish law. If it’s nice for me, convenient for me, then it can’t be—Jewish law always demands a binding of Isaac from me. Okay? There’s some such feeling.
[Speaker J] For him, the leading halakhic decisor of the generation—that’s the binding of Isaac.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be. The Chazon Ish of tension. Yes. He’s like that; he lived that tension. So in our generation a lot of times the feeling is that there’s no such tension. We’re already after the binding of Isaac. We… it works out. That’s dangerous education. It’s dangerous education because from that kind of education you really end up basically doing whatever you want in the end. Forget it—so what difference does Jewish law make? You do whatever you want. It’s a little connected to what we talked about yesterday. You’re basically just doing what you want. Now that’s dangerous. So Rabbi Kook says: look, that’s true, but in order to reach that stage you have to go through a binding of Isaac. Meaning, when you educate a child at a young age, you tell him: you’ll do this because that’s what the Holy One, blessed be He, said. Not because it’s morality and because… It’s not right to educate a child that way. He needs to reach that in the end. Meaning, first of all, you will bind yourself. You will do what the Holy One, blessed be He, said because that’s what the Holy One, blessed be He, said, and we do what He said. Afterward, when you mature more, I may be able to try to show you, at least in some areas, that there’s also some moral rationale behind it, and so on and so on. I would add—and here I disagree with Rabbi Kook—that it’s not always like that. And sometimes we remain with the binding of Isaac. Sometimes it will remain, and sometimes, by the way, there will be an anti-binding-of-Isaac. Sometimes when morality clashes with Jewish law—and it’s not true that there are no clashes, there are clashes—then morality will prevail. And not Jewish law. So I’m saying, I continue with what Rabbi Kook says, but what he is really saying is the identity approach. And here I do think the identity approach is written, and it’s written not only here; it’s written in many places in Rabbi Kook: that basically the more… Rabbi Kook says even more than that. Rabbi Kook says that the entire purpose of Jewish law is only the shaping of the moral character of the person and of society. There is no other purpose. Meaning, it’s… all of Jewish law is only morality. That’s a more radical statement. He even… when I spoke about identity, I said that Jewish law cannot be immoral, but it can be non-moral. Meaning, it can be—there are laws, for example the prohibition against eating pork doesn’t pertain to morality. It’s not anti-moral, but it doesn’t pertain to morality. Rabbi Kook says no, all the laws pertain to morality, and they have only one goal, a moral goal. He says this in several places. Fine, that’s a very radical approach; I completely disagree with it.
[Speaker B] And what—the Holy One, blessed be He, needs you to pray to Him?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Holy One, blessed be He, requires other things besides my being moral. He also doesn’t need me to be moral; He could have just not created us, and then…
[Speaker B] No, but does He
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] really need the blessings over food? I have no idea why. I have no idea whether He needs it or I need it. It could be that I need it. No, but that’s not in the moral realm. I need it for my religious dimension. I also have religious needs, not only moral needs.
[Speaker J] That’s what we talked about, the levels. Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? About Maimonides…
[Speaker J] Maimonides talks about two levels. Meaning, the order of the state, which may be morality,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and the intelligibles—maybe that’s more what he’s talking about, no matter. Yes, there is something here beyond morality. If you understand that the whole role of morality is only to organize society and the relations between individuals, then it’s absurd not to create the world and not to demand morality. What, after all it’s only a means. It’s a means so that society will behave properly.
[Speaker J] The question is whether according to Rabbi Kook morality is…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but if that’s the case, then once again we’ve emptied it of content. Fine then, so everything that I call Jewish law, you call morality. Why?
[Speaker J] From the perspective of the Holy One, blessed be He, it could be that from His point of view that’s also morality.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but I also think that’s also morality, if there really is such an obligation of gratitude; that’s a different discussion. But if there is, yes, I would also call that morality. And there are refinements that have nothing to do with gratitude. Even if there is gratitude, why did the Holy One, blessed be He, choose to use it? To tell me don’t eat pork, and then by force of gratitude I’m obligated not to eat pork. Why did He command that? There’s some reason. That reason doesn’t seem to me to be a moral reason. So what is it then? Seemingly that means He has other reasons besides moral reasons. And therefore there can also be a clash. But I’m saying, here you can perhaps see—I think more clearly than with the Chazon Ish on the other side—this approach of identity, but this is an identity that goes in the opposite direction. For Rabbi Kook, the identity is that all of Jewish law is moral, yes? And for the Chazon Ish it’s that all morality is really only Jewish law. Meaning, what Jewish law says—that is morality. What people want to claim from the Chazon Ish. Fine. Now let’s see—I said perhaps the most extreme expression, or the most prominent expression, of
[Speaker B] this identity, we said, is found in Rabbi Kook. Where basically Jewish law is—there’s some matter here of a kind of, I call it absorption. Morality is absorbed into holiness. Morality is absorbed into Jewish law. Or actually, sorry, Jewish law is absorbed into morality; that’s more accurate. Jewish law is absorbed into morality in the sense that all of Jewish law is basically a moral demand. And therefore if Jewish law creates something that appears immoral, then there’s a problem here. That doesn’t mean, God forbid, that you change the law, but it does mean that you have to understand the law in such a way that it will accord with morality. That is the expression of natural morality in Rabbi Kook. Now, let’s see it inside the paragraph.