Ethics and Halakha 8
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Two categories: morality and Jewish law, and the source of obligation
- Beyond the letter of the law, the Sefer Mitzvot Katan, and the paradox of counting commandments
- The story of the humble man and the distinction between commanded action and moral action
- Why “moral” commandments were included after all: transformation of form and halakhic formality
- The Torah as a system that is not only moral: Rashi on Genesis and non-halakhic sections
- Expectation versus command, punishment and religious court versus heavenly judgment
- “You shall be holy” and “Do what is right and good”: Maimonides’ and Nachmanides’ interpretations
- A midrash about the Patriarchs, eruv tavshilin, and the distinction between morality and legal reasoning
- Rabbi Lichtenstein: morality as Jewish law, and flexibility as the reason for lack of detail
- What is “Jewish law” and what is a “commandment”: the example of women and positive commandmentsthat are time-bound
- The Maggid Mishneh, the trait of Sodom, and the law of the adjacent property owner
- A dispute with Rabbi Lichtenstein over reading the Maggid Mishneh and over the counting of commandments
- Terumah, generosity of the heart, and the flexible boundaries set by the Sages
- “He Who Punished,” changing expectations, and exacting judgment with the righteous
- “Love your fellow as yourself,” the laws of mourning, and the distinction between commanding the heart and practical enactments
- The counting of the commandments and Maimonides’ roots
- Conflicts between morality and Jewish law and how to decide: incidental and essential
Summary
General Overview
The text presents a view according to which morality and Jewish law are two different categories with different tendencies, even though both are grounded in the will of God, and suggests that morality requires an objective source beyond inner feelings but is also revealed through conscience and through general verses such as “Do what is right and good” and “You shall be holy.” The text distinguishes between a halakhic command and a moral expectation, explains the paradox of counting “beyond the letter of the law” as a commandment, and argues that some of the “moral” commandments that entered Jewish law underwent a transformation of form and became formal definitions that do not overlap with the moral dimension. Later it presents Rabbi Lichtenstein’s position, according to which moral obligations are fully Jewish law, only they are not formulated in detail because of their flexibility, and the text disputes this through a reading of the Maggid Mishneh and by comparison to flexible commandments that were nevertheless counted. In the end, it establishes a framework for deciding conflicts between morality and Jewish law by distinguishing between incidental clashes and essential clashes, while emphasizing that an expectation can sometimes override, but not in the face of an explicit essential command.
Two categories: morality and Jewish law, and the source of obligation
The text states that Jewish law aspires to religious values and morality to moral values between one person and another, and that there is no necessary overlap and conflicts can even arise. The text argues that moral obligation needs an external source in order to have objective meaning and not just be internal feelings, and therefore its foundation is the will of God, even though morality and Jewish law remain distinct. The text suggests that one knows the will of God in morality through His planting conscience in a person and through general verses such as “Do what is right and good” and “You shall be holy,” which express an expectation of conduct beyond Jewish law, and emphasizes that these two verses do not appear in the counting of the commandments.
Beyond the letter of the law, the Sefer Mitzvot Katan, and the paradox of counting commandments
The text brings that the Sefer Mitzvot Katan, in commandment 49, counts acting beyond the letter of the law as a commandment and bases this on Rabbi Yohanan’s statement, “Jerusalem was destroyed only because they judged in it according to Torah law,” together with the Talmud’s explanation, “that they based their conduct on Torah law and did not act beyond the letter of the law.” The text formulates a paradox according to which counting beyond the letter of the law as a commandment turns it into the letter of the law, because the obligation cancels the “beyond.” The text suggests that the Holy One, blessed be He, leaves certain areas outside halakhic obligation so that the act will be done מתוך internal understanding and not merely in response to a command, because the motivation itself is part of moral perfection, and explains that the paradox reflects the desire to preserve a voluntary moral space.
The story of the humble man and the distinction between commanded action and moral action
The text brings a joke about a young man in the matchmaking world who rejects all the women he meets, is sent for a year to work on his character traits, and returns saying, “Now that I’m humble, all the more so none of them was suitable for me.” The text explains that the story illustrates a person who behaves “morally” only because there is a command, checks off obligations, and does not really repair his inner character. The text uses this as a possible explanation for why “beyond the letter of the law” was not included in the counting of the commandments by most enumerators.
Why “moral” commandments were included after all: transformation of form and halakhic formality
The text asks why some commandments that appear moral were counted after all, and suggests that they received formal halakhic definitions that do not overlap with the moral definition. The text illustrates this with “You shall not murder” and argues that morally, indirect causation and unusual performance do not change the severity of the result, but Jewish law defines a formal act of murder, and therefore an indirect act may not count as a halakhic “act of murder” even though it is equally immoral. The text concludes that when a moral obligation enters Jewish law, it “undergoes a transformation of form” and becomes a halakhic obligation whose aim is religious, as part of the service of God and “keeping His commandments,” and not as a system whose primary goal is moral.
The Torah as a system that is not only moral: Rashi on Genesis and non-halakhic sections
The text argues that the Torah has non-halakhic parts, and that this is already evident from Rashi’s opening question, “Why didn’t the Torah begin” with “This month shall be for you,” based on the assumption that the Torah should have contained only commandments. The text says that the very existence of the book of Genesis and the non-halakhic portions shows that the Torah is not limited to commands, and that its purpose is not solely moral, otherwise the question of why Genesis is needed would never arise. The text warns against the opposite extreme, according to which the Torah “doesn’t care about morality,” and identifies this view with Leibowitz and with “certain Haredim,” and states that this is a mistake, even though there is a correct distinction in it insofar as Jewish law is to some extent detached from morality.
Expectation versus command, punishment and religious court versus heavenly judgment
The text defines Jewish law as the realm of command and morality as the realm of expectation, and states that there is a difference between “to command” and “to expect.” The text argues that command is a condition for punishments by a religious court by virtue of “there is no punishment unless there was prior warning,” whereas in heavenly judgment the Holy One, blessed be He, has no need of warning and can judge by the heart. The text presents morality as defined not by the commandments but by conscience, “as every gentile knows,” and adds that disputes and interpretations exist in Jewish law too, so the existence of a command does not eliminate human disagreement.
“You shall be holy” and “Do what is right and good”: Maimonides’ and Nachmanides’ interpretations
The text notes a dispute regarding “You shall be holy” between Maimonides and Nachmanides, and says that Maimonides, in the fourth root, interprets “You shall be holy” as “You shall keep all My commandments,” without any addition beyond that. The text argues that “Do what is right and good” is understood in its plain sense as directed toward being moral and not “being holy,” unless one identifies the two concepts. The text says there is a possible interpretation to see “Do what is right and good” as a summary of observance of the commandments, but presents that this is not Nachmanides’ or the commentators’ interpretation, and emphasizes that there is no “conclusive demonstration” in interpretations of this kind, following Nachmanides’ language: “The wisdom of our Torah is not like the wisdom of astronomy and mathematics, whose proofs are conclusive.”
A midrash about the Patriarchs, eruv tavshilin, and the distinction between morality and legal reasoning
The text is asked about the midrash that the Patriarchs “kept the entire Torah,” “even eruv tavshilin,” and argues that there is no clear moral explanation for that, and therefore midrashim are not always explainable within this framework. The text distinguishes between morality and other things that “come from within us,” and illustrates this with “the burden of proof rests on the claimant,” which the Talmud explains with “if you wish, say it is a verse; if you wish, say it is reasoning” and “someone who is in pain goes to the doctor.” The text states that this reasoning is legal reasoning and not moral reasoning, so not every inner intuition is morality, even though morality indeed comes from within.
Rabbi Lichtenstein: morality as Jewish law, and flexibility as the reason for lack of detail
The text presents Rabbi Lichtenstein’s claim, in an article on Daat, that there is no difference in force between moral obligations and halakhic obligations, and that moral obligations are “Jewish law in every respect.” The text describes that in his view there are things not included in formal Jewish law because they are difficult to define, and therefore the Torah formulated them as broad rules and not as detailed binding norms. The text sees in this a major emptying of the distinction between morality and Jewish law, and describes that the question of how this applies to a non-Jew is answered through expanding interpersonal obligations and the seven Noahide commandments, while mentioning Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s words about stealing from a gentile as a problem on the legal plane even when the discussion continues under “You shall not steal.”
What is “Jewish law” and what is a “commandment”: the example of women and positive commandments that are time-bound
The text raises a conceptual difficulty in distinguishing between a good act and an optional commandment through the discussion of women and positive commandments that are time-bound, and the blessing “Who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us.” The text argues that if women are not commanded, then it is not an “optional commandment” in the full sense, even though some later authorities want to define it that way, and brings an implication from the Raavad about women placing hands on offerings in relation to “a positive commandment overrides a prohibition.” The text uses this to show that a practical consequence of defining something as Jewish law is its ability to override a prohibition and to generate legal implications, and not merely whether the act is “good.”
The Maggid Mishneh, the trait of Sodom, and the law of the adjacent property owner
The text brings as a central source the language of the Maggid Mishneh in Laws of Neighbors, chapter 14, regarding “the law of the adjacent property owner” and “we compel regarding the trait of Sodom,” and quotes: “Our perfect Torah was given for the repair of human character traits… ‘You shall be holy’… ‘Do what is right and good’… and it would not have been proper in all this to command particulars… and human character traits and conduct vary according to time and persons. And our Sages wrote some useful particulars… some of which they made full law, and some of which are for the outset and by way of piety.” The text explains that compelling against the trait of Sodom raises the question of how a religious court can compel something that is not an explicit halakhic obligation, and presents the possibility that this hints at an obligation, but rejects it by arguing that the compulsion is limited to certain rabbinic enactments and not to every “Sodom-like” behavior. The text argues that the Sages can bring things from the realm of morality into Jewish law through enactment, but if they did not enact them there is no authority to compel merely because it is “the trait of Sodom.”
A dispute with Rabbi Lichtenstein over reading the Maggid Mishneh and over the counting of commandments
The text argues that Rabbi Lichtenstein’s reading of the Maggid Mishneh would lead to the conclusion that “Do what is right and good” should have been counted as a Torah-level positive commandment, because flexibility does not prevent counting, and it gives the example that commandments like “Love your fellow as yourself,” “fear of God,” and “love of God” are flexible and yet are counted. The text states that the Maggid Mishneh concludes, “and all of it is from the words of our Sages,” and therefore his meaning is that the particulars set by the Sages are rabbinic laws, not that the details of morality are Torah law by virtue of a broad Torah principle. The text suggests that “Do what is right and good” is an expectation of going beyond the letter of the law and not a flexible version of “the letter of the law,” and emphasizes that going beyond the letter of the law means stepping beyond what the law requires, not a situation in which “there is no sharp line.”
Terumah, generosity of the heart, and the flexible boundaries set by the Sages
The text compares the move to terumah, where “one grain of wheat exempts the whole pile,” and links this to the desire that terumah come “from generosity of the heart,” in Rashi’s words at the beginning of the portion of Terumah. The text describes that the Sages nevertheless set flexible measures of one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, and one-sixtieth as “a good eye,” “an average eye,” and “a bad eye,” in order to establish boundaries without entirely canceling the space of choice. The text parallels this to levels in the commandment of charity and presents it as a model in which the Sages sometimes harden expectations in order to correct laxity while preserving degrees of freedom.
“He Who Punished,” changing expectations, and exacting judgment with the righteous
The text brings “He Who Punished” as an example of a mechanism that is not a full legal obligation but an expression of the fact that the conduct is not moral, and that one can “violate” it even though there is no full compulsion. The text argues that God’s expectations change according to the person and the level, and brings “with great righteous people the Holy One, blessed be He, is exacting to a hair’s breadth” as proof that such exactness belongs to the moral sphere and not to the uniform legal sphere of the religious court. The text states that a religious court must apply uniform law, whereas the Holy One, blessed be He, “examines the kidneys and the heart” and judges each person according to his circumstances and level, and adds that changes of reality between eras also affect the correct norms because the circumstances are different.
“Love your fellow as yourself,” the laws of mourning, and the distinction between commanding the heart and practical enactments
The text brings Maimonides at the beginning of chapter 14 of the Laws of Mourning, where he lists bringing a bride into the home, accompanying the dead, visiting the sick, and more, and says, “all of these are laws of the Sages and are included within the general principle of ‘Love your fellow as yourself.’” The text interprets this to mean that “Love your fellow as yourself” is a command directed at the heart, and the Sages obligated practical expression on the rabbinic level, so that one who acts without inner love fulfills the rabbinic law but not the Torah-level command. The text uses this example to argue that flexibility does not prevent a commandment from being counted, and therefore the fact that “Do what is right and good” is not counted teaches that it is not a command but an expectation.
The counting of the commandments and Maimonides’ roots
The text rejects the explanation that “Do what is right and good” is not counted because it is a “general commandment,” and distinguishes this from the paradox of commanding faith. The text says that it has no concrete explanation from Maimonides’ roots for why “Do what is right and good” should not be counted if it is a command, and therefore it simply concludes that it is not a command. The text argues that the Maggid Mishneh and Nachmanides are trying to explain the verse but are not saying what Rabbi Lichtenstein “reads into them,” and therefore the division between expectation and command remains the central explanation.
Conflicts between morality and Jewish law and how to decide: incidental and essential
The text states that conflicts between morality and Jewish law are not surprising because these are two languages and two purposes, and compares deciding between them to deciding between considerations of health and considerations of pleasure. The text gives examples of commandments perceived as non-moral, such as wiping out Amalek and the prohibition on saving a gentile on the Sabbath, and notes that the binding of Isaac is not general Jewish law but a private command to Abraham. The text distinguishes between essential clashes, in which the command already includes a built-in moral problem and therefore prevails, and incidental clashes, such as saving life versus the Sabbath, in which there is no clear rule as to which prevails, and concludes by emphasizing that an expectation is not necessarily weak and can sometimes override a command, but not where there is a direct command that relates essentially to that very case.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re getting close to the end of this series on values and morality. I want to try to present a certain view of Rabbi Lichtenstein in his article on this issue of the relationship between morality and Jewish law. I’ll just remind you of the background, where we got to. I said that I think these are two different categories, morality and Jewish law; they have two different tendencies. Jewish law aspires to religious values, that’s what I called it, and morality to moral values, yes, universal ones. I don’t know, “universal” may not be the best term; it could be that the religious is universal too, you can discuss that. But moral in the sense we’re talking about, between one person and another, doing good and so on. And that doesn’t necessarily overlap; sometimes there are even certain conflicts. That’s on the one hand. On the other hand, I argued that I think moral obligation, since it requires some external source in order to have objective meaning and not just be internal feelings, so moral obligation is indeed founded in the will of God, and therefore both things are from Him even though they are different, and that’s the principle. Now the question is: how do I know that morality is His will, that He wants me to uphold morality? So here you can go in a few principled directions. One direction is the claim that if He planted it within me, apparently that’s what He wants from me. Meaning, in the end He created me, He made me this way, so He also planted within me the moral feeling, the conscience, so apparently that’s what He wants me to do. And beyond that there are the verses: “Do what is right and good,” “You shall be holy,” verses that basically say there is an expectation of us to behave in a moral way that goes beyond Jewish law. “You shall be holy” is more about going beyond the letter of the law and a bit less about morality, meaning it’s not exactly the same thing, but “the good” points to a moral expectation. These two verses express it, meaning they don’t appear in the counting of the commandments. Neither “Do what is right and good” nor “You shall be holy.” Here in the Sefer Mitzvot Katan he does bring it. The Sefer Mitzvot Katan, in commandment 49, writes: to act beyond the letter of the law, as it is written, “that they may do,” and Rabbi Yohanan said: Jerusalem was destroyed only because they judged in it according to Torah law. “So should they have judged by corrupt law and not Torah law?” Right? The Talmud asks: then by what law should they judge if not Torah law? Rather, because they based their conduct strictly on Torah law and did not act beyond the letter of the law. So the Sefer Mitzvot Katan really does count acting beyond the letter of the law as a commandment, as one of the 613 commandments, yes exactly. So I think I mentioned this indeed, that there’s a kind of paradox in counting these things within the framework of the commandments, because then it turns going beyond the letter of the law into the letter of the law, because now you are obligated to do it because it’s a commandment, and if you are obligated to do it then it’s no longer beyond the letter of the law. And I spoke a bit about why there really might be some reason that the Holy One, blessed be He, has an interest in this—“why God has an interest” is a bit presumptuous—but I suggested a possible explanation for why the Holy One, blessed be He, may want things from us and nevertheless not include them as an obligation within Jewish law, because there are things He wants us to do not out of obedience to a command but because we understand that this is the right thing to do, the proper thing to do, and sometimes the motivation itself is part of moral perfection. If you do it only because of a command, that itself damages your moral character. But if you do it because you understand that this is what it means to be a decent human being, then your morality is more whole. So it wasn’t included in the counting of the commandments in order not to harm that. So the paradox is only a reflection of that point. The paradox says: if they wanted this to be beyond the letter of the law, then you can’t include it in the counting of the commandments, because if it were included in the counting of the commandments then it would stop being beyond the letter of the law. But that doesn’t solve the question of why, really, why the Holy One, blessed be He, created this category called beyond the letter of the law. So what I said is that He created this category because sometimes there are things that need to be done—you need to do them, sorry—not out of obedience to a command but because of the motivation. And I think I mentioned the famous joke about that young man who met women for matchmaking and rejected all of them—I think I mentioned this—he rejected all of them, and then the mashgiach tells him: what, none of them is suitable for you? You’re so arrogant. Sit for a year, work on your character traits, study ethics, and after that come back to the chapter “A man betroths.” Fine. So he worked enthusiastically on ethics, and after a year the parade of girls returns, and once again he rejects them all. The mashgiach asks him: what did you do during the year? Did anything change? So he says to him: a year ago, when I was arrogant, none of them suited me, so now that I’m humble, all the more so none of them suits me. That’s his answer. What this story basically expresses is what a person looks like when he behaves morally because there is a command to be moral. Meaning, that’s exactly the reflection, right? This person became humble because he understood that’s how one ought to be, and he really thinks that now he’s actually something special, because now he’s also humble on top of all the other virtues he had before. He’s not really working inwardly on humility; he’s checking off the obligation to be humble. And once there’s an obligation to be humble and he fulfills commandments, then he checks off that obligation too. That’s roughly what it looks like, and that may be the reason why this was not included in the counting of the commandments according to most of those who count them. What about the Sefer Mitzvot Katan? I don’t know. They say that the Sefer Mitzvot Katan counts desires and not only commands. I don’t know exactly.
[Speaker B] There’s the opposite question: if so, why did some of the moral commandments get included?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. So here it seems to me that one can answer that in a few ways, maybe they even combine; it doesn’t necessarily contradict. First of all, what entered the framework of the counted commandments has very halakhic, formal definitions. It doesn’t overlap with the moral command. For example, “You shall not murder.” What, obviously from a moral standpoint, murdering indirectly and murdering not indirectly are the same thing. You do an act where it’s clear that this thing will happen, and the result is that a person dies. So what? You do it this way? So what? Why should I care? On the moral level it’s irrelevant whether you do it with the left hand or the right hand, unusually, indirectly, or in all sorts of ways of that kind. There’s a difference in definitions. Obviously morally it’s not okay, but the halakhic definition is a more formal definition. The question is why. And I think that’s a hint to this point, and in various other places like “You shall not steal” and other things of that sort. I think it’s a hint to this point that when moral obligations enter Jewish law, they undergo a transformation of form. Meaning, they really do not remain moral obligations; they become halakhic obligations. And the halakhic obligation and the moral obligation really are two different things. In “You shall not murder” there are two dimensions: there’s the moral dimension—be a human being—and there is the will of God, that in this matter you respond to the command not to murder, part of serving God, part of drawing close to the Holy One, blessed be He, part of “keeping His commandments.” So the commandments deal, in a certain formal sense, with: don’t perform an act of murder. If you do it indirectly, unusually, whatever, then you didn’t perform an act of murder. That doesn’t mean you’re moral—you are just as immoral—but the commandments have a different purpose. Therefore, even when moral elements enter the system of commandments, the fact is that they do not preserve the moral definitions; meaning, they become something more formal. By the way, many times when people deal with this, those who discuss it aren’t careful to distinguish, and many times they say: what, you’re immoral, how can that be? There’s “You shall not steal,” after all you did this and you did that. And people don’t notice that there is “You shall not steal,” and there is the moral issue of not stealing, and those are two—not necessarily the same thing.
[Speaker C] Why not? What? Why not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, why not?
[Speaker C] Why not say that when we say “You shall not steal,” it really means don’t steal? “You shall not murder” really means don’t murder?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, no—that’s not what it means. That’s not what it means. The moral “do not steal” and “do not murder” come from the fact that this is planted in your nature, this conscience that says you must not do this. That’s all. The Torah—its goal is not moral; its goal is religious. Even for the sake of religious goals, some of the things that should or should not be done, positive commandments or prohibitions, belong to the area we usually call morality, but the goals there are not moral goals; the goals are what the Derashot HaRan calls “the non-divine aspect of the matter”—yes, meaning there’s some… in my language I call it a religious goal. And a religious goal is not the same thing as moral behavior; these are two different things.
[Speaker C] When we say “You shall be holy,” when we say—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Do what is right and good”—those are not commanding verses. Those are verses that describe an expectation. That’s exactly what I just said: it’s not part of Jewish law. There are parts of the Torah that are not halakhic. After all, we talked about this—that, one second, we talked about how in Rashi’s very first comment on the Torah, he asks: why didn’t the Torah begin with—why did it begin with Genesis and not with “This month shall be for you the beginning of months”? People pass quickly over that question, but the question is much more interesting than the answer. And the answer, let’s say, isn’t… not worth a million dollars. But the question is a powerful question, really a question of astonishment. What kind of question is that? Why shouldn’t it start with Genesis? What’s wrong with Genesis? What’s better about “This month shall be for you” than Genesis? Why is the assumption that it should have started with “This month shall be for you”? Rashi’s assumption is that the Torah should have contained only commandments, only commands. And then he asks: wait a second, why are there parts of the Torah that are not commands? And then he answers what he answers, never mind. Okay? But there’s an assumption here that there is something in commandments that is different from the morality you learn from Genesis, or from all the other lessons taught by the non-halakhic portions. So here you see explicitly this point that the Torah’s goal is not moral—or not only moral—because if its goal were moral, then why ask why the book of Genesis is needed? The question should be why “This month shall be for you” is needed. Okay? I think you can see this very clearly in a number of places. And again, one must not take this to the opposite extreme. There are people who take it to the opposite extreme and say that the Torah is not interested in morality, the Torah says you should operate by the rules, behave according to the Shulchan Arukh and its subsections, and then everything is fine; it doesn’t matter whether something is moral or immoral, that’s an atheistic category, as Leibowitz says, it’s irrelevant. And some Haredim too, at least on the other side, say the same thing. And I think that’s the opposite mistake. They grasp something correct—that there is something in Jewish law that is detached from morality. But that doesn’t mean it is anti-moral, and it doesn’t mean the Holy One, blessed be He, doesn’t care that I be moral. He just says it in another sector of the Torah, not in the halakhic sector, but in the sector of the stories, or of “Do what is right and good,” or of “You shall be holy.” You have two different parts of the Torah, each addressing a different category, but both categories come from Him. We do both because of that. I said that if moral obligation comes from some source other than the Holy One, blessed be He, then there is at least a whiff of, if not more than that, a kind of dualism, what’s called associating something with idolatry. Again, I’m not sure that’s the halakhic category, but the idea is certainly here, I think, because then you have some obligation or source of normative validity beyond the Holy One, blessed be He. Meaning there’s some sort of dualism here. And I think that is problematic on the theological level. Therefore it seems to me that the more correct model is that both are the will of God, and still they are two different languages. Different languages with two different purposes, different tendencies, and therefore it’s no wonder that conflicts arise—we talked about that. It’s no wonder that conflicts arise. On the other hand, there are verses in the Torah that do not belong to the halakhic part of the Torah, I’d say presumptively they do not belong to the halakhic part of the Torah, and they really do tell us that the Holy One, blessed be He, expects moral behavior from us, while He commands the halakhic behaviors. There is a difference between commanding and expecting. To expect from us is to say: I want you to do this, but I did not command it. And Jewish law is what the Holy One, blessed be He, commands. The Holy One, blessed be He, plus the interpretations—never mind—but it is command.
[Speaker D] But if that’s not true, wait—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I stopped him for a second.
[Speaker D] I understand this distinction, but the question is: we usually understand, in the simplest way, commandment and punishment, period. The Holy One, blessed be He, expects something from us, and then what? Let’s say I didn’t do it—could it be that he’ll also be punished for that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know.
[Speaker D] But if it’s only an expectation, it’s very hard to come and punish. Why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Don’t you expect things from your child without telling him? You didn’t say anything to him, okay? But you expect him to be a decent person. Now he wasn’t a decent person—won’t he be punished? Sometimes yes, depends how much, but sometimes yes. Meaning, command is not a condition for punishment in Heaven. Command is a condition for punishment by a religious court. Maimonides—not only Maimonides, generally speaking—“there is no punishment unless there was prior warning.” Meaning, punishments imposed by a religious court require a command in the Torah. Meaning, someone who isn’t a decent person is not punished by a religious court, unless it’s punishments outside strict law, and even then there still has to be warning, a warning of the Sages not to act that way. But they don’t just punish a person without warning. But in heavenly judgment, the Holy One, blessed be He, does not need warnings. He knows what was in your heart, and He can decide whether to punish you or not. I think reward and punishment are an existential matter.
[Speaker E] Don’t the commandments dictate to us how to be, what is moral and how to be moral?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t think so. Maybe you weren’t here in the previous sessions, I think we talked about it. No, I don’t think so. Commandments and morality are two different categories. The role of the commandments is to define what the Holy One, blessed be He, commands us, and they don’t necessarily have a moral purpose.
[Speaker E] So what defines what’s moral and what isn’t?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] My conscience. Like every gentile knows. Or a non-religious person, doesn’t matter, anyone. Not whatever I feel like—what I think is right; that’s not the same thing. What I think is right. Whatever I feel like is not the same thing.
[Speaker E] But what I think—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —is right maybe isn’t what you think?
[Speaker E] Fine, so we’ll have an argument.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are no arguments in Jewish law? In the realm of command? If the Holy One, blessed be He, had commanded, there wouldn’t be arguments?
[Speaker E] And who decides? The majority?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m asking: if the Holy One, blessed be He, had commanded, there wouldn’t be arguments? Jewish law is the part that the Holy One, blessed be He, did command, right? Aren’t there arguments? Of course there are arguments. There are always arguments; human beings have different views, we are always interpreting. The command is not always clear in and of itself. There are always interpretations and extensions, and people with different views reach different conclusions—what can you do. So do we do it by majority?
[Speaker E] No, not by majority.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to what I think—that’s what I’ll do. Why the majority? If the majority is mistaken, then I’ll do what I think.
[Speaker E] And if I think that murder is moral?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In your eyes? I think you’re mistaken, and therefore I’ll try to prevent it. Yes.
[Speaker E] Okay, these are things we really discussed a bit.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.
[Speaker B] So then, going back to my previous question, some of the commands that seem moral were presented as laws, but “Do what is right and good” was not presented as a law but as a Torah command. How is it different from “keep the commandments”? Maybe “Do what is right and good” really means to keep the other commandments?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So first of all, maybe that’s possible, but let’s say Nachmanides and the other commentators do not explain it that way. And it could be that that’s a possible interpretation. It seems to me I may already have mentioned that regarding “You shall be holy,” I said that it’s not exactly morality but rather beyond the letter of the law; there’s a dispute between Nachmanides and Maimonides in the glosses to the fourth root. Nachmanides writes that “You shall be holy”—sorry, Maimonides writes in the fourth root, not in the glosses—in the fourth root Maimonides writes that “You shall be holy” means “keep all My commandments.” That is what “You shall be holy” means. There is nothing beyond that. In contrast to what Nachmanides says about beyond the letter of the law and so on, Maimonides says, right, it means “keep all My commandments.” But “Do what is right and good”—“You shall be holy” I’m more willing to accept that interpretation, because holiness is somehow connected to the religious concept, yes, “the divine dimension of the matter,” as the Ran and the Kuzari call it. But “Do what is right and good,” in the simple understanding, means not to be holy but to be moral—unless you identify those two concepts.
[Speaker B] Because that’s a possible interpretation. No, but not because I identify them, but because it’s a verse בתוך the Torah, so just as if it—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —sums up “keep the commandments,” I’m going back to Rashi’s first comment. Stories in the Torah and the book of Genesis too—does he say that also tells you to keep Jewish law? What is it doing? What connection does it have to Jewish law? Obviously there are parts of the Torah outside Jewish law. You can’t deny that.
[Speaker B] Right, but once you say “and you shall do,” what does that mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be that this verse too is a verse that speaks on the level of—fine, I can’t decide.
[Speaker B] You run and mark the target all around it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t decide. I’m saying this is a possible interpretation; either you accept it or you don’t. On interpretations of the kind Nachmanides says, “the wisdom of our Torah is not like the wisdom of astronomy and mathematics, whose proofs are conclusive.” I don’t have a conclusive proof, but it seems to me this is also the accepted interpretation, and I think this is what the tradition brings to us, and it seems to me a completely reasonable interpretation. So maybe yes, one could have interpreted it differently. Those who claim that morality has no meaning apart from command will probably interpret “Do what is right and good” that way. I don’t agree with that interpretation, but again, I don’t have a decisive proof.
[Speaker C] How do you explain the midrash that says the Patriarchs kept the entire Torah? If you were saying this comes from morality, then you could understand it, but if you say these are two completely separate things, how do you explain that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, first of all, midrashim are something I don’t always know how to explain. Yes. And second, yes, over there the midrash says even eruv tavshilin. Does eruv tavshilin also have a moral reason? I don’t see one. At least I can’t see the moral reason. So if you were telling me they kept the entire Torah including “You shall not murder” and “You shall not steal”—
[Speaker D] Fine, but there too I agree—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that there’s a moral dimension, that’s not a great novelty. Usually, by the way, the moral dimension is broader than the religious one. Meaning, someone who keeps the moral dimension also keeps the Jewish law. The reverse is not true. Okay?
[Speaker B] But eruv tavshilin? What? The midrash doesn’t say. Yes, so maybe they accepted the—
[Speaker C] But morality, after all, you explain morality as something that comes from within. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t say that everything that comes from within is morality. I said morality comes from within; I didn’t say that whatever comes from within is morality. No, those are two different things. No, I once wrote an article about this.
[Speaker D] Meaning, the claim that, for example—here’s an example—“the burden of proof rests on the claimant.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, the Talmud itself says, “if you wish, say it is a verse; if you wish, say it is reasoning: one who has a pain goes to the doctor,” right? Someone wants to take money out? Let him bring proof. So that’s reasoning. Okay? Is that reasoning moral reasoning—that the burden of proof rests on the claimant? I don’t think so. It’s legal reasoning, not moral reasoning. You can discuss exactly what it means and where it comes from, never mind, but in the simple sense it is not moral reasoning. Meaning, there are things that come from within us that are our reasoning, and they do not belong to the moral realm. We have legal conceptions, we have intuitions also in scientific and factual areas. There too our intuitions work. Meaning, what comes from within us does not overlap with morality. True, morality comes from within us—that I did claim earlier—but not everything that comes from within us is morality. Okay, so against that background I want to bring what Rabbi Lichtenstein says. Rabbi Lichtenstein argues something a bit different. I don’t agree with it, by the way, but it’s an interesting claim. He argues—this is an article he wrote on Daat—and basically the core of what he says is that there is no difference between the obligations of “Do what is right and good,” the moral obligations, and the religious halakhic obligations. There is no difference at the level of binding force. Meaning, the moral obligations have the same halakhic force; more than that, the moral obligations are Jewish law in every respect. I said earlier that maybe there is also no difference in force, only that it’s not the same type; it’s different. Okay? This is a halakhic obligation and this is a moral obligation. This is being a decent human being and this is being a servant of God. Two different things. Rabbi Lichtenstein says that not only do they have the same force, but both are Jewish law. So why are there things not included in formal Jewish law? Because they are hard to define.
[Speaker C] That’s basically the Chazon Ish. What? That’s like the Chazon Ish.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Chazon Ish, I think, is even more limited. We talked about this last time; maybe he’s speaking only about a certain type of things, what the Sages established. Rabbi Lichtenstein is talking also about things that aren’t written at all, things the Sages didn’t establish either. You learn them from there and all that. So the claim is that the reason the Torah didn’t count them or didn’t command them is only because these things are so flexible and so dependent on circumstances and on the person and on this and that, that you can’t command them. But that’s only a technical matter. Meaning, on the principled level, given particular circumstances and a particular person, the moral obligation that is correct for that situation is a halakhic obligation in every respect, exactly like the obligations we are commanded in. That’s basically his claim. And he somewhat empties the distinction between morality and Jewish law of content. Or maybe more than somewhat. He basically says that this—
[Speaker D] How does that relate to someone who is not Jewish?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?
[Speaker D] If we start from the assumption that moral obligations apply to the whole world… okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If that’s a moral obligation even for someone
[Speaker D] who isn’t Jewish, and that
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] turns into a halakhic issue, then toward a non-Jew too it would become a halakhic issue?
[Speaker D] That between-man-and-his-fellow plus the seven Noahide commandments is expanded quite a lot. Fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, we once talked about Rabbi Shimon Shkop, right? He says that even though there’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) whether robbing a non-Jew is forbidden by Torah law or only rabbinically forbidden, right? He says that according to everyone it’s forbidden by Torah law. It’s forbidden by Torah law because of the legal layer. If property belongs to a non-Jew, you can’t take it; it’s his property. But that’s a legal prohibition. The dispute remains in place regarding “you shall not steal.” Okay? It’s still a halakhic discussion, but it doesn’t enter under “you shall not steal.” So what he’s basically saying is that there’s no difference between morality and Jewish law. That’s really his claim. In that sense it goes back a bit to Rabbi Kook, I think. Meaning, in that sense… I don’t know if exactly Rabbi Kook, because he doesn’t claim that all of Jewish law… there at least in that article he doesn’t claim that all of Jewish law has only moral purposes and nothing else, and Rabbi Kook does claim that. So that’s an identification in a very strong sense. But he does claim that morality is included within Jewish law; it’s part of Jewish law. That too is some kind of identification. We talked about the different types of identification like that.
[Speaker F] Doesn’t he use the word Jewish law as a command of God? What? Doesn’t he use the term Jewish law as God’s command? I…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think he sees any difference, from his standpoint, between those two things.
[Speaker F] But wait,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m saying, though, that it’s God’s will, not God’s command. Those are two different things. It’s not a command; I’m not fulfilling a commandment by doing it.
[Speaker F] He argues that you are fulfilling a commandment by doing it. But if it’s something that’s kind of God’s will in a certain scenario, maybe from his standpoint he’s trying to sort of…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, again. You could… we need to try asking ourselves what the definition of a commandment is as opposed to not a commandment. What difference does it make? Bottom line, He expects it of me, as you asked, and He’ll punish me if I don’t do it, so what’s the difference? It enters into definitions like when a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. There are definitions of what a halakhic command means. Penalties imposed by a religious court of course require a halakhic command. There’s some… I think all those are just symptoms. There’s something beyond that, and it’s a little hard to put your finger on exactly what the definition is—whether this is Jewish law or not Jewish law. Right? Let me just give you an example—I may have mentioned this once, I don’t remember anymore. There are women—there is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) whether they may fulfill time-bound positive commandments. Meaning, according to most medieval authorities (Rishonim) they may, and there is another dispute whether they may even recite a blessing over such a thing. Ashkenazim and Sephardim, all that well-known stuff. Now, what does it mean when they fulfill a time-bound positive commandment? Is that a non-obligatory but meaningful commandment? There are later authorities (Acharonim) who want to argue that for women this is a commandment in every sense, just a non-obligatory one. They aren’t obligated, but if they do it, it’s a positive commandment like any other. And my feeling is that there’s a bit of a conceptual miss here. Because if they are not commanded, then it’s not even a non-obligatory commandment. Even non-obligatory commandments are still things we are supposed to be commanded in, just commanded in a non-obligatory way rather than as a positive requirement. So then what is it? It’s a good deed, it’s beyond the letter of the law, I don’t know. But it’s not a non-obligatory commandment. Ask me what the difference is—I don’t know. I don’t know what the difference is. But a non-obligatory commandment is part of Jewish law, and that’s why I brought this example here.
[Speaker G] It could be there’s a practical difference as to whether they recite a blessing or not.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be. Maybe the practical difference could be whether they recite a blessing or not. I think that even according to the one who says they don’t recite a blessing, that still doesn’t… and according to the one who says they do recite a blessing, it’s still not a non-obligatory commandment, because the explanations there are that it’s because we were commanded, not because they were commanded. They recite the blessing because the Jewish people were commanded: “who sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us.”
[Speaker D] One implication, for example—the Raavad
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] says at the beginning of Sifra regarding laying on of hands, women’s laying on of hands. That’s also where this whole discussion starts, whether women can fulfill a commandment they are not obligated in. So the Raavad says—they discuss there, after all, that if you’re not obligated to do laying on of hands on sacrifices, then there’s a prohibition involved, because you’re basically making use of the sacrifice. You’re not allowed to make use of a sacrifice; it’s holy. So if you are commanded to do laying on of hands, excellent, and if not, then not. So he says that even someone who does it in the category of “one who is not commanded yet performs” — then, for example, a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. He argues that even with a commandment of this kind, in the case of women, they could perform a positive commandment they are not obligated in at the expense of a prohibition that they are obligated in. That really is some kind of view from which it appears that there is a halakhic obligation here. That’s one implication—whether it’s Jewish law or not. I said, with regard to a positive commandment overriding a prohibition, for example. Because if I say it’s just a good thing, it’s hard to assume it would override a prohibition. Okay, good, so that’s just a comment about what is Jewish law and what isn’t Jewish law. So I still think there are two such categories; we just need to define a bit better what exactly the difference is between them. So basically what Rabbi Lichtenstein says is that there’s no difference, really, between morality and Jewish law except that morality is harder to define. That’s all. But on the principled level we are commanded to do it, the level of obligation is the same, it’s part of Jewish law, it’s all the same. Just what? It’s just hard to define. Since it’s hard to define what obligates when, they didn’t insert it into a specific definition, but rather wrote in a general way, “and you shall do what is right and good.” And he says we find things like this. There’s an example—two examples maybe—the Maggid Mishneh in the laws of neighbors, in chapter 14. There he talks about the law of the adjoining owner, right, the trait of Sodom. The trait of Sodom—the Talmud in Bava Batra talks about the fact that “we compel regarding the trait of Sodom.” The trait of Sodom basically means something immoral but that Jewish law does not obligate or forbid, right? So the Talmud says we compel in such a case, even though there’s no halakhic obligation as such. On that the Maggid Mishneh says the following. This itself actually raises all the questions I’ve been talking about here. What does it mean to compel someone regarding the trait of Sodom if in fact I’m not obligated to do it at all? So why does a religious court compel me to do something that is really supposed to be voluntary? Supposed to be something I decide on my own initiative? So it seems a bit like it is some kind of obligation. This law itself already hints somewhat in the direction Rabbi Lichtenstein is talking about.
[Speaker C] The trait of Sodom is because it affects others. That’s why it concerns other people. Right, but still it’s permitted for me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no halakhic prohibition. So why are they forcing me? It’s moral. So if a religious court compels me, then it really does seem there’s some kind of halakhic obligation here. It’s not just that people expect me to be a mensch.
[Speaker B] But look there in the Talmud—it’s an enactment of the Sages.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So that’s why I think the proof is actually from there, because clearly they do not compel in every case of the trait of Sodom. Clearly. The Talmud there talks about very specific things that the Sages established as an enactment, and therefore in those cases they compel. The reason is that it’s the trait of Sodom to act that way, but that’s just the rationale of the text. It’s not because the mere fact that something is the trait of Sodom justifies compulsion. Not every person I see behaving with the trait of Sodom can be forced by a religious court not to do so. If it’s his right, it’s his right. “What’s mine is mine and what’s yours is yours” — that’s what he wants. What do you want from him? He’s allowed to.
[Speaker D] But that also leads to the other side, that religious courts can’t compel in every case, because the Sages enacted something that’s just some…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they can compel too. The claim is that there are rabbinic enactments only because it’s the trait of Sodom, even though the Torah didn’t include it in Jewish law, the Sages nevertheless did include it in Jewish law. The Sages needed to rely on
[Speaker D] the fact that it’s the trait of Sodom in order to enact it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, why “needed”? They could.
[Speaker D] Why does it matter at all that it’s the trait of Sodom?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. The claim is that not only can the Sages enforce ordinary enactments, but they can designate certain things as the trait of Sodom and insert them as rabbinic enactments even though the Torah itself doesn’t forbid them. The Torah itself doesn’t forbid them. After all, this isn’t a case of… if it were something new that came into existence only now, the Torah didn’t forbid it because it didn’t yet exist; now there’s a new reality and the Sages intervene. Here, the trait of Sodom was already a problem at the time of the giving of the Torah. So if the Torah wanted to prohibit it, why didn’t it prohibit it? So the Torah says no, the Sages have the ability to insert into Jewish law also things that come from the moral sphere. I think that’s what’s written there—that things from the moral sphere can enter Jewish law if the Sages decide so. And if they don’t decide so, then not. This is… now the Maggid Mishneh writes, he explains it this way. This is at the end of the laws of neighbors, actually: “It is explained in the laws, and so too he wrote, of blessed memory, regarding the law of the adjoining owner, that our perfect Torah gave general principles for the refinement of a person’s character and conduct in the world by saying, ‘You shall be holy.’ And the intent is, as the Sages of blessed memory said, ‘Sanctify yourself regarding what is permitted to you,’ so that one should not be immersed in desires. And likewise it said, ‘And you shall do what is right and good,’ and the intent is that one should conduct himself with good and upright behavior toward other people. And it was not fitting in all this to command particulars, because the commandments of the Torah apply at all times and in every era and in every circumstance, and one must necessarily act accordingly, while human character and conduct vary according to time and individuals. And the Sages of blessed memory wrote some beneficial particulars that fall under these principles, and of them some they made into full law, and some as an ideal from the outset and as a path of piety.” So the Maggid Mishneh is basically saying… from what period is he approximately? He’s one of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), one of the commentators on Maimonides… what? 1300 and… earlier, I think… the 14th, 15th century? The 14th century. I think from the later medieval authorities (Rishonim). What he’s saying here is the source, one of the sources Rabbi Lichtenstein brings. What he’s saying here basically is that indeed the Torah didn’t write it because the particulars change according to circumstances and according to people—exactly what Rabbi Lichtenstein writes there. But it implies from this that really this is Torah law in every sense, except that the Torah didn’t write it because it’s flexible. I don’t agree with Rabbi Lichtenstein’s interpretation even here, even though this is a source very close to him. What?
[Speaker I] Could it be flexible for better and for worse?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, flexible for better and for worse?
[Speaker I] Could morality also change for the worse?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it can’t change. Rather, circumstances can dictate different norms—not that we behave better or worse, but that under different circumstances the commands will be different, because moral behavior depends on circumstances. So you can’t possibly imagine all types of circumstances and every kind of circumstance.
[Speaker J] So if in the army it’s considered moral to “complete equipment,” then it’s completely permitted?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t say that. If in the army it’s accepted that it’s moral to “complete equipment,” that doesn’t mean it’s permitted. If in the military circumstances there’s genuinely a moral logic to permit it, then yes. But that’s not—you’re making a leap between what people happen to accept and what is actually correct in those circumstances. I think he’s talking about what is correct in the circumstances, not what people think. If what people think is what determines things, then the Torah wouldn’t need to command anything at all—what would there be to command? Just see what people do and that’s what should be done. That’s not what he means. He only means that this is a command to each person at his own moral level.
[Speaker K] What people think, what people do.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, and even what they think—I’m not sure that’s the right criterion, because they could be mistaken. I’m saying what is right, but that changes according to the circumstances, not only what people do. Because in different circumstances there are different kinds of behavior—what do you mean? That’s obvious. In a different society, very often the correct moral norms will be different. It’s a function of the circumstances in which you operate. Since that’s the case, you can’t set things in stone here, because it’s more flexible. So that’s seemingly what is written here. Except that then I had an argument with someone not long ago—he wanted to argue in favor of this approach. According to that, I would indeed count “and you shall do what is right and good.” Because “and you shall do what is right and good” is basically a commandment which, true, we won’t define in all its particulars—we as Sages or as interpreters of the Torah won’t define all the definitions because it changes—but why not count the commandment of “and you shall do what is right and good”? It’s a halakhic commandment in every sense. Know that the Holy One, blessed be He, not only expects it, but commands you to do what is right and good. You ask, what is right and good? Whatever your conscience tells you according to the circumstances—try to assess what is right and good in these circumstances. There are such commandments, after all. There are—it’s not as though you can’t find commandments like that. What is “and you shall love your fellow as yourself”? “And you shall love your fellow as yourself” is a commandment that is very flexible regarding what it obligates, how far to go, each person according to his level, each person according to the circumstances. It’s certainly something flexible. What is fear of God? Love of God? I don’t know—a lot of things, there’s a lot of flexibility in this matter. And still the Torah commands, and indeed the definitions are not completely unequivocal, and that’s perfectly fine—there are such commandments. My claim is that “and you shall do what is right and good” is not one of them. Not that there are no such commandments, but rather that “and you shall do what is right and good” speaks about going beyond the letter of the law. Whereas according to Rabbi Lichtenstein’s interpretation, it’s not beyond the letter of the law at all—it’s the letter of the law itself, except the line there isn’t exactly a straight line. Fine, but it’s still the law; it’s not some weaker thing, not something voluntary. It’s something hard to define, so they leave it to you to understand for yourself what should be done in each situation. But the concept of beyond the letter of the law—that’s not what he’s saying. More than that, when the Maggid Mishneh concludes, he says: “And the Sages wrote some beneficial particulars that fall under these principles, and of them some they made into full law, and some as an ideal from the outset and as a path of piety.” Some things the Sages determined to be obligation; some they determined to be a pious practice—but they pointed it out to you and said, know that it is pious to do this. And all of it is from the words of the Sages. And both of those things are rabbinic. Why? The opposite. Once the Sages determined that this is indeed the thing that obligates, well then that is the command of “and you shall do what is right and good.” Here the Sages have already decided to set things in stone. So what’s the problem? That’s “and you shall do what is right and good.” Will you tell me there’s no such halakhic category? I’ll bring you a counterexample showing that there is. Maimonides at the beginning of chapter 14 of the laws of mourning writes there—I may have mentioned this once—that there is a collection of rabbinic commandments: bringing in the bride, accompanying the dead, visiting the sick, all kinds of things like that, interpersonal commandments. And all of them are laws from the words of the Sages, and they are included in the principle of “and you shall love your fellow as yourself.” So is that from the Sages or is it Torah law? What kind of thing is that?
[Speaker D] The content is from the words of the Sages. Maybe that’s also what the Maggid Mishneh meant.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does it mean that the content is from the words of the Sages?
[Speaker D] How to recognize, or what is right in your period.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But bottom line, is it Torah law? But it’s all from their words. What is “the content”? Then he should just say it’s all Torah law, but the content—he himself said the content is from the words of the Sages. He said that saying “the Sages wrote some particulars” and that “the content is from the Sages” is saying the same thing twice. Meaning: the Sages said some particulars, and those become rabbinic laws.
[Speaker B] You also call them particulars—generally useful particulars. Right. There’s an issue here of their usefulness, of what they are useful for.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—the question is, useful for what? Useful for moral behavior, or useful for understanding what the Torah means in the general statement “and you shall do what is right and good”?
[Speaker B] It’s useful to me if it’s utilitarian.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Either way.
[Speaker B] In any case, look—for indirect murder. Does Rabbi Lichtenstein say that it’s not included in murder because it’s hard to define?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t know what he would say. I have many difficulties with his position. Maybe that’s one of them too, yes. I don’t know, I don’t know what he would say. So I’m saying that according to this view, it would be expected that “and you shall do what is right and good” would be a counted Torah-level positive commandment. Maybe indeed that is Nachmanides’ view, since he counts the commandment of “and you shall do what is right and good.” The problem is that the Maggid Mishneh says he’s talking about going beyond the letter of the law. That’s not a correct definition of going beyond the letter of the law. The correct definition would be that in this law there is no line. You can’t be inside or outside the line because there is no sharp definition, no straight line, of what is inside the law and what is outside the law. It’s not a correct definition to call that beyond the letter of the law. Beyond the letter of the law means saying that you went outside the line of law—that’s not what the law obligates, but it is still expected of you. That is the correct definition of beyond the letter of the law. Therefore I disagree with Rabbi Lichtenstein. I disagree with him even regarding his interpretation of the Maggid Mishneh, which really is close to what he says. Because in the end the Maggid Mishneh says: we compel regarding the trait of Sodom, in the sense I mentioned earlier. The Sages determined that there are things that obligate, and they become rabbinic laws, but “and you shall do what is right and good” is an expectation. And the novelty is that the Sages turn expectations into commands. And now that also answers your question: what’s the novelty in the Sages making an enactment out of the trait of Sodom? They can make any enactment they want. There’s a problem here: when you turn it into a command, you ruin it—like we said with humility, right? When you turn it into a command, you ruin everything. After all, why did the Torah leave it as not a command? I explained earlier: it left it as not a command because it wanted it to come from us and not as compliance with a command. Now the Sages come along and shoot themselves in the foot—they basically turn it into a command. So the Maggid Mishneh rightly wants to note: true, but sometimes when the Sages see that something is weakening, or that they nevertheless need to make some determination, they will impair the Torah’s preference and establish this law as a rabbinic law.
[Speaker D] Isn’t it simpler… what do you mean, they won’t stop you from
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if you don’t live up to it, are you sinning? Yes, exactly—but we have now established it as law, and there’s nothing to be done about it anymore. It’s a bit similar to terumah. I don’t remember if I spoke about this once; if not, maybe it’s worth talking about. Terumah—the measures, one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, one-sixtieth. There are several places where you can see that this is Torah law, not rabbinic law. There’s an explicit Talmud in Chullin, but the question is whether it remains that way in Jewish law or not. And in Maimonides you can see that it remains as Torah law, not rabbinic law. But it’s clear that the Sages are the ones who set it. So how does that work? The Torah says “one grain exempts the whole heap.” Meaning, one grain can be separated as terumah; there is no set amount. Why? Because terumah, as Rashi writes at the beginning of the Torah portion of Terumah, has to come from generosity of the heart. When it comes from generosity of the heart, it can’t be a command. If it’s a command, then you do it because there’s a command. If the Torah wants this to be terumah that comes from generosity of the heart, it can’t command it. But on the other hand the Sages come and see that some boundaries nevertheless need to be set here, so they set them. But by the way it’s interesting that they set very flexible boundaries. They set a boundary with three levels: one-fortieth, one-fiftieth, and one-sixtieth—stingy eye, generous eye, and average eye—because they don’t want to give up entirely on what the Torah wanted to leave to our own generosity. So even when they already establish it as law, they still leave degrees of freedom within it so that each person can determine what level he wants to reach.
[Speaker H] Like the eight levels of charity. You can give charity, but there are different levels to it. Right, right.
[Speaker L] Where does the law of “He Who punished” fit in? Like, it’s not moral.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “He Who punished” is not even an obligation—it’s simply immoral. Yes.
[Speaker L] It’s immoral?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly—and it remains immoral.
[Speaker L] And there’s also no obligation to do it, meaning…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean there’s no obligation? There is an expectation of us to do it, but no command. If you don’t do it, then you haven’t violated any command. Someone who promises and doesn’t carry through—I wouldn’t trust you. Fine. That’s exactly the category I’m talking about: you violate the expectations of the Holy One, blessed be He, not His commands. That’s why I say…
[Speaker M] Wait, so you’re saying that “He Who punished” is basically a kind of statement that this is immoral?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s what
[Speaker M] the Talmud says, and that’s
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the plain sense of the Talmud, the plain sense of the Talmud.
[Speaker M] It doesn’t obligate?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, he transgresses in the sense of “He Who punished,” but there’s nothing to be done, fine. He transgresses in the sense of “He Who punished,” and if he decides to transgress, then he transgresses.
[Speaker E] Is it not true that what the Holy One, blessed be He, expects from you, He expects the same from me? We have different personalities, different levels, and maybe He expects from each person according to what he is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s a person with abilities or
[Speaker E] moral insights or tendencies
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] more refined or higher moral tendencies, so maybe more is expected of him. With great righteous people the Holy One, blessed be He, is exacting to a hair’s breadth. On the halakhic level, what does a hair’s breadth mean? Either you violated Jewish law or you didn’t—what difference does it make whether you’re righteous or not? When we say that with righteous people the Holy One, blessed be He, is exacting to a hair’s breadth, I assume the intention is moral matters. That if you are on a high level, then you are also expected to behave accordingly. And therefore expectations are indeed a function of who you are. Now of course, the fact that you reached a high level—for that you get separate credit. But once you’re there, now behave accordingly. It’s not that it’s not worthwhile being righteous because then you’ll get hit—they’ll use him as a whipping boy. Rather, the point is that if you have become righteous, you deserve credit for that compared to someone who didn’t get there. But after you’re already there, then yes, they’ll also come to you with claims about fine points. These are claims, but it’s not a legal matter. Not legal—the Holy One, blessed be He, that’s not a religious court. That’s exactly the point. A religious court is universal. The law has to be uniform for all people. The Holy One, blessed be He, examines the innermost heart, and each person stands before Him in judgment according to who he is. Also, the circumstances in which I operate are different. All kinds of changes over time—maybe we talked about this—the change in values or in forms of relating, from the Talmudic Sages to our reality today. Very often the old approach is no longer correct because the reality is different, not because I’m on a higher or lower level; we’re talking about a different reality. The attitude—what kind of relationship there should be between men and women—in the Sages’ perspective is not the same as what it should be today. Because the reality is different, not because I’m on a higher or lower level. That’s a separate question, whether it’s better or worse. But that’s the situation. And once that’s the situation, now you need to act in accordance with that situation.
[Speaker C] Now let’s return to the question. You asked a fundamental question, you said something there, and you spoke about how it comes from “and you shall love your fellow as yourself,” Maimonides in the laws of mourning. Yes, you went into details and asked what happens. That’s actually what happened—that Maimonides saw that things there were maybe weakening, or not Maimonides, the Sages saw. The Sages saw, and then… so now what happens? Then it’s the Sages.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I’ll explain—I didn’t complete that description. “And you shall love…” What does Maimonides say there? It can sound contradictory. On the one hand, it’s included in “and you shall love your fellow as yourself,” and yet it’s from the words of the Sages. So is it Torah law or rabbinic law? “And you shall love your fellow as yourself” is a counted commandment. So there—you see, that’s exactly my example, that there are counted commandments even though they are flexible, and the Sages intervene and determine the definitions or part of the definitions. So the fact that it’s a flexible commandment is not enough; that’s not a sufficient reason not to count it. That’s another claim against Rabbi Lichtenstein. The fact that “and you shall do what is right and good” is flexible—that’s not a reason why it isn’t counted. There are flexible commandments that are counted. So what happens with “and you shall love your fellow as yourself”? In “and you shall love your fellow as yourself,” the Sages pour the content into the commandment. Let’s say—this is at least how I understand Maimonides—that “and you shall love your fellow as yourself” is a command regarding the heart.
[Speaker G] You need to love your fellow.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the command. It’s not connected to actions at all. The Sages come and say: we also require you to express this in practical ways. But that is rabbinic, not Torah-level. True, if you visit the sick and you do so as a result of loving him, then you thereby express love toward him, so you have fulfilled the Torah law of course because you loved him, and also the rabbinic law because you visited him. What happens if someone visits the sick like that humble person we mentioned? He’s humble because it says in the Shulchan Arukh that one must be humble. He visits the sick because there’s a commandment to visit the sick, but he hates the person—he hates him. Fine, what does he do in such a case? He fulfilled the rabbinic command, but not the Torah command. He fulfilled the rabbinic command because the Sages required an action—to visit the sick. But here it would not be the Torah commandment of “and you shall love your fellow as yourself” at all. When you do it with the proper feeling, then you fulfill the Torah law as well. So there is a rabbinic commandment, and it is included within the Torah law, of course, because you are thereby expressing fulfillment of the Torah-level commandment. And the same should have been true of “and you shall do what is right and good” according to Rabbi Lichtenstein’s interpretation. The same thing. “And you shall do what is right and good” should have been—if Rabbi Lichtenstein were correct—“and you shall do what is right and good” should have been a counted positive commandment. And when the Sages determine that “and you shall do what is right and good” means the law of the adjoining owner, then the law of the adjoining owner would become part of “and you shall do what is right and good.” And if the Sages didn’t determine it, then it remains flexible in one way or another. That’s all. But that’s not what is written; it’s not a counted commandment. “And you shall do what is right and good” is not counted. Even the Maggid Mishneh, who talks about there being flexibility here, says yes—but as a result of that, it’s all rabbinic, not all Torah law. The Sages did not determine everything because it’s flexible. Why didn’t the Torah count it? It’s not because of the flexibility. It didn’t count it because it wanted to leave it beyond the letter of the law, because it’s something else. Morality and Jewish law are two different things. The Torah does not speak about morality; the Torah speaks about Jewish law. Morality remains outside. Not the Torah—the halakhic system. Yes, the Torah’s command does speak about morality, but the Torah in its non-halakhic parts speaks about morality. So it expects morality and commands Jewish law. And this belongs to the realm of expectations, not the realm of commands. I think that’s the correct explanation in the Maggid Mishneh as well. And therefore when the Sages determine something, it becomes rabbinic Jewish law, but it is not included in the commandment of “and you shall do what is right and good”; rather, it remains rabbinic. And that’s why he says “and all of it is from their words”—that’s what the Maggid Mishneh says.
[Speaker F] Yes, so basically maybe for the first time here there’s guidance for how a person rises to the… to investigate whether this really is what the command… what is expected of him from the standpoint of Jewish law—to do this rationally, aside from just doing it from his moral intuition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t have… what do you mean rationally? There are considerations. No, no, in morality too there are such things. In morality you begin from different starting points.
[Speaker F] The analytic side always comes in afterward. But on the side of Jewish law everything really comes more from the mind.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, in the moral realm too, everything comes from the mind.
[Speaker F] Yes, that’s Rabbi Lichtenstein.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I talked about that at the beginning of the series—whether morality is in the heart or in the mind.
[Speaker F] So from the standpoint of morality it’s all from reason.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, unequivocally—just that the starting points are different. In the halakhic realm, the assumptions on which your analytic part works are certain assumptions and principles. Those assumptions and principles in Jewish law are basically the commands of the Torah. And in morality they are values that you understand to be correct. From there onward, now, you can do a very deep and very sophisticated analysis and reach your conclusions both in morality and in Jewish law. There are problems that are complex, and you need to activate analytical ability in order to arrive at the result. Yes.
[Speaker N] Now your question is really from the standpoint of the count of the commandments, so it could also be that the answer is from the standpoint of the count of the commandments. Because within the framework of counting the commandments there are many things that can be Torah law that we still don’t count, because it’s a general commandment or because of the wording or all kinds of things—but that belongs to the count of the commandments.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you have to give me a concrete suggestion if you want to make that claim. Come tell me why in fact it isn’t counted. A general commandment? A general commandment is unrelated. Because “general commandment” is the fourth root I mentioned earlier—a general commandment is one that includes the whole Torah. Morality does not include the whole Torah. Morality is something broad, but it doesn’t include the entire Torah.
[Speaker N] First of all, I’m not sure. For example, say Maimonides in the Guide for the Perplexed also says that the purpose of the Torah is basically to benefit man, so why can’t we also say that “and you shall do what is right and good” falls under that category of something good for all humanity? But it’s not a matter—meaning there are all kinds of things here. Now, in that article too, I assume this is a translation—Rabbi Lichtenstein wrote an old article in English, I think it’s… right, in his book, I don’t remember. Maybe Does Judaism Recognize an Ethic Outside of Judaism? Outside of Jewish law. Most likely that’s the translation. Okay. In any case, in the end what is he really saying? That it depends more on whether you define Jewish law broadly or narrowly. So all your questions, to a large extent, as far as I can tell, also identify the count of the commandments with Jewish law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—that’s what I’m saying, I absolutely do not identify the count of the commandments with Jewish law. When you come and attack him from the side of the count of the commandments, that’s…
[Speaker N] No, so I’m saying: I don’t identify the count of the commandments with Jewish law either. I just wrote a book about this—it’s now in editing—on Maimonides’ roots and why commandments are not counted, and in most cases it has no connection to Jewish law except for… except for two of the first roots.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The first roots—no root has anything to do with Jewish law. And now explain “and you shall do what is right and good.”
[Speaker N] And therefore I told you no, therefore
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I told you: bring me a concrete reason why it isn’t counted. I haven’t found one. If you gave me a reason, then you’d be right. But I don’t know of one. But this reason—general commandments—is wrong. Look at Maimonides in the fourth root. It’s not correct. Regarding “you shall be holy,” by the way, that’s exactly the dispute. Why does Maimonides discuss “you shall be holy” in the fourth root?
[Speaker N] Why doesn’t he discuss “I am the Lord your God” in the same way?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, Maimonides does include it. Why is that relevant?
[Speaker N] Maimonides does include it and Nachmanides does not include it. For what reason? Because he’s mistaken.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—and not because it’s a general commandment. It has nothing to do with a general commandment at all. “I am the Lord your God”—what does that have to do with keeping the Sabbath? It’s not a general commandment, that’s not the issue. The issue is whether there is any sense in commanding the existence of the Commander. After all, it’s paradoxical, because if you don’t acknowledge the existence of a Commander, then you also won’t do that commandment either.
[Speaker N] No, fine, that’s true, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not “commandments that include the whole Torah”; those are two entirely different principles. But here it’s not correct. What paradox is there in commanding a moral command? There is no paradox at all. Look, the Sefer Mitzvot Katan does it—what’s the problem? There’s no paradox there at all. Therefore I say: if I had found an explanation for why this isn’t included in the count of the commandments, there definitely would be room to make your argument. But from Maimonides’ roots I don’t find such an explanation. There isn’t one. At least I didn’t find one. No explanation was given for this issue, and therefore I argue that the conclusion is that “and you shall do what is right and good” isn’t counted simply because it isn’t a command. There’s no need to look for an explanation for why it isn’t counted. It isn’t a command. It’s an expectation. And what I’m arguing is that here the Maggid Mishneh tries to explain it, Nachmanides on “and you shall do what is right and good” also tries to explain it, and Rabbi Lichtenstein brings his proofs from there—and I think these explanations do not say what he reads into them. They don’t say that.
[Speaker N] The Maggid Mishneh there is very close, and in very similar language, to Nachmanides. Not on “you shall be holy”? On “and you shall do what is right and good”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not on “you shall be holy,” on “and you shall do what is right and good.” “You shall be holy” is a little different. Nachmanides on “and you shall do what is right and good” is, in my opinion, the source of the Maggid Mishneh; it’s simply taken from there.
[Speaker N] Meaning, at the basis of the proposal, or it could be that the whole criterion of Maimonides’ commandment count is not necessarily what can be attacked here. It could be—maybe Rabbi Lichtenstein is speaking, I just don’t remember—not necessarily according to Maimonides’ rules.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s what I’m asking—so then what’s the problem? Why can’t you count it like “and you shall love your fellow as yourself”? Explain to me—what’s the problem? That too is a commandment that is this kind of flexible thing, meaning that it depends on the circumstances and the person. These are commandments where the Sages insert details and determine some of them as obligations and some of them as optional. Exactly like what’s happening here. So why can “and you shall love your fellow as yourself” be included, but “and you shall do what is right and good” can’t be included? If that’s the reason not to count it—if you claim that the Maggid Mishneh is explaining here why it isn’t counted, and you claim the reason is because of the flexibility—then what’s the difference? I don’t understand. And more than that, I’m saying it’s not true, because if it were flexible then the result would be that it’s Torah law, not that it’s all from the words of the Sages, which is what the Maggid Mishneh says. I think that explanation of the Maggid Mishneh is not right. He got angry at me—Rabbi Lichtenstein he was willing to accept, but not the Maggid Mishneh.
[Speaker B] What does the Maggid Mishneh say regarding conflicts between morality and Jewish law?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. I’m not sufficiently familiar with his overall view. If I read this article, that’s not the same as really knowing his thought. I’m sure there are articles that deal with conflicts too—we’d have to see. I don’t know.
[Speaker C] Did you talk with him—did you speak with Rabbi Lichtenstein about this?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I hardly ever had the chance to speak with him. What? Anyway, so that’s regarding what Rabbi Lichtenstein says, and the point important to me to clarify is that there really is a different thesis here. Meaning, he wants to argue against the distinction I wanted to make between expectation and command. There is God’s command, and there is what He expects from me. Rabbi Lichtenstein does not accept that distinction. In other words, everything is command, everything is command. Just what? There are commands that can’t really be formulated as commands—it’s too flexible, too circumstance-dependent, impossible. The moment you command something it becomes terribly rigid, that’s all. And the dispute here around the Maggid Mishneh, and likewise with Nachmanides—I won’t read him inside now because I think he’s the source for the Maggid Mishneh—I think this dispute really is also around that very point, and in my opinion they are not writing what he says they are.
[Speaker O] But if it really isn’t according to your thesis, that this is command and that is expectation, how do you make a decision when there’s a conflict between something moral
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that is an expectation and something that is just? I devoted a chapter to the conflicts. I think that’s where I said what I said. I said these are two different categories, just like how you decide regarding chocolate between health considerations and enjoyment considerations. How do you decide? I don’t know. How do you measure health against enjoyment? The fact is that there is some scale that underlies all normative systems, because otherwise we couldn’t decide.
[Speaker O] But if it’s all command, it’s easier.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously. But I’m saying, enjoyment and health raise the same question. And the fact is that we decide such conflicts all the time. So that’s what we discussed when I spoke about conflicts.
[Speaker E] Is it possible that there’s a commandment that is not moral?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, I also talked about that. Meaning what? Wiping out Amalek, the prohibition against killing, the prohibition against saving a non-Jew on the Sabbath, for example—in our eyes that’s very immoral, but it’s a religious kind of command.
[Speaker H] Yes. The Binding of Isaac?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Binding of Isaac, yes, except that that’s not exactly Jewish law; it’s something specific to Abraham. So what?
[Speaker E] So what do we do?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then we’re in conflict. Where we discussed it—that’s all things I talked about, meaning these are things we already dealt with.
[Speaker H] Where’s the book? Bring us the book. And there’s no book.
[Speaker E] Still
[Speaker C] there’s no book.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, I wrote about all the conflicts.
[Speaker H] In the meantime, write a book.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not about morality. A book about morality will still take time. I hope it’ll come out at some point, but it’s not…
[Speaker C] There’s still nothing in writing yet, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think so, no, no, nothing organized, I’m not sure. In any case, to keep it brief, I’ll just stop here. We’ll probably need another session to finish this topic. So maybe next time we’ll finish the issue of morality and Jewish law, but what I want to sharpen is really the distinction between expectation and command, where both of them—by the way—don’t necessarily tell you which is stronger, as I said earlier regarding conflicts. There will be situations in which the expectation outweighs the command. If it’s something so fundamental, even if it isn’t included in a command, it could be that it overrides commands. In places where there is a clash with a direct command that speaks about such a case—I discussed this when I spoke about conflict—then that’s not reasonable. Suppose the Holy One, blessed be He, says to kill Amalek; it’s not that a situation arose in which killing Amalek suddenly became immoral. It’s a command that in its essence is immoral, so there, if the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded it, then He presumably also took into account the moral problem involved in it. But saving a life on the Sabbath, for example, is an incidental clash. The Sabbath does not generally contradict preserving life, and preserving life does not generally contradict keeping the Sabbath. So I have no problem with there being two such commands in the Torah. But suddenly, in certain situations, it turns out that if you keep the Sabbath you will harm life. If you preserve life, you will violate the Sabbath. That is an incidental clash. And in incidental clashes there is no clear answer as to which prevails, the command or morality. In essential clashes, if the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded something and something immoral is essentially involved in it, then apparently He also took that issue into account, and one must say that it prevails. So that’s what we discussed when I talked about how conflicts are decided—incidental clashes, essential clashes, and all kinds of things like that. Okay, we’ll stop here for today.