Tractate Yoma – Elul 5783 – Lesson 2

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, last time we talked about… well, last time I talked about the meaning, you could say maybe the conceptual meaning, of Yom Kippur, as a kind of encounter with the Holy One, blessed be He, an entry into the innermost sanctum, where the atonement that comes out of that day is either a condition for entering the innermost sanctum, as seems to come from the plain meaning of the Torah, or a result. It’s a result of the fact that we entered, that in effect we come out atoned for. It’s a bit reminiscent of what Rabbi Soloveitchik says in On Repentance, where he talks about this as being like the atonement of a mikveh, not the atonement of repentance. Yes, according to the side that says the very essence of the day atones, that’s certainly so. Okay, so today I want to get a bit more into the actual content itself, but still at the first stage from a kind of general perspective. I told you that as we learn, I suggest that you go through the chapter, run through the chapter, at least its first part, because I’m not going to follow the order of the chapter, just by topics, as much as we manage. We have seven meetings total for this whole thing, so whatever we manage to get through. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part, from the beginning until page 82, is the prohibitions and commandments of Yom Kippur. Right, the afflictions, the labor, adding time onto the affliction, eating and drinking, and the afflictions, and so on. The second part is three pages, from 82 to 85, dealing with saving life, desecration of God’s name, severe transgressions, and so on. And the third part, from 86 until the end of the chapter, is repentance, atonement, confession, prayer, immersion, and so on. We’re focusing on the first part, and even that we won’t finish. So within that part I want to talk about the prohibitions and the commandments of Yom Kippur, a bit about a few principles if I have time, about a partial measure—I don’t know—“inclusive” and “adding onto,” I probably won’t get to, about warnings and their meaning, about the rules of preventing a commandment, which are somewhat connected here to the issue, the definition of prohibitions of eating, causing a minor to consume something prohibited. Whatever of that we manage, I’ll be happy. Okay, we’re starting with the prohibitions of Yom Kippur, and I maybe want first just to glance at the verses. Can you see? Yes. Good. Okay. I hope that at some point this will also come up. There it is. Did I ruin it? Great. The only thing that works systematically is Murphy. Other than that, nothing works in this world. What? Make it bigger? Okay. I forgot that we’re pensioners. And they also told me I need to share on Zoom. Slowly, slowly I’ll learn. Okay, so in Parashat Emor, the first source—three places. Parashat Emor is the first source, Parashat Pinchas, and Acharei Mot, that’s what we saw actually. Parashat Emor, then: “And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: But on the tenth day of this seventh month, it is Yom Kippur, a holy convocation it shall be for you, and you shall afflict your souls, and you shall bring a fire-offering to the Lord. And you shall do no labor on that very day, for it is Yom Kippur, to atone for you before the Lord your God. For every soul that shall not be afflicted on that very day shall be cut off from its people.” Right, so there is “you shall afflict your souls,” which can already be interpreted as a positive commandment. There is excision here, which is not a warning and not a positive commandment, but a punishment. “And every soul that does any labor on that very day, I will destroy that soul from among its people”—that’s again basically excision, but it’s excision for labor. “You shall do no labor, an eternal statute throughout your generations in all your dwellings.” And the last verse, which is actually the central one here: “It is a Sabbath of complete rest for you, and you shall afflict your souls; on the ninth day of the month in the evening, from evening to evening, you shall observe your Sabbath.” So “it is a Sabbath of complete rest for you, and you shall afflict your souls.” What is “a Sabbath of complete rest”? It’s not entirely clear. The question is whether “a Sabbath of complete rest” is an opening to “and you shall afflict your souls,” and in fact “a Sabbath of complete rest” is speaking about the affliction, or whether “a Sabbath of complete rest” speaks about ceasing, about the prohibition of labor, and besides that there is also an obligation of affliction.

[Speaker B] “A Sabbath of complete rest” is to distinguish it from Sabbath, or that even food preparation is forbidden? But a relevant question is, in relation to what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So you’re talking about labor. That assumes that “a Sabbath of complete rest” is talking about labor.

[Speaker B] Sabbath, I mean, but I—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, that’s assuming it’s talking about labor. But from the verses, from the verses, it’s not entirely clear whether it’s talking about labor or affliction, and in any case we clearly see here that Yom Kippur has two aspects. One aspect is the aspect of ceasing from labor, like all the festivals, which we already know is like Sabbath and not like an ordinary Jewish holiday—we’ll still see that—and that is cessation from labor. And the second aspect is affliction. Meaning, prohibition of labor and prohibition of eating and drinking, and maybe the five afflictions, depending on whether that is Torah-level or not Torah-level, but in principle let’s call it labor and affliction. So why, what is “a Sabbath of complete rest” referring to? It’s not fully clear from the verses. But what is clear from the verses is that these two aspects both exist. There is “you shall afflict your souls,” which is the affliction, and there is “you shall do no labor on that very day,” which is the labor. Still, notice: “you shall afflict your souls” is a formulation of a positive commandment, and “you shall do no labor”—yes, “you shall do no labor” is a formulation of a prohibition. In other words, what appears straightforwardly in the Torah is a prohibition regarding labor and a positive commandment regarding affliction. A prohibition regarding affliction and a positive commandment regarding labor—it’s not clear exactly whether there are such and where they come from. In Parashat Pinchas: “And on the tenth of this seventh month, there shall be for you a holy convocation, and you shall afflict your souls; you shall do no labor.” Again, “you shall afflict your souls,” “you shall do no labor”—the two aspects appear, and in the same form. “You shall afflict your souls” appears as a positive commandment and “you shall do no labor” appears as a prohibition. And “shall be cut off”? That’s a punishment. Right, there is a punishment. Maybe—that’s a good question. Who says? We’ll see more. Maimonides, for example, thinks not. Or Nachmanides—not Nachmanides, that’s the Talmud. “We have heard the punishment; from where do we know the warning?” the Talmud asks. Meaning, it’s not enough that a punishment be written for us to know that there is a warning. A warning also has to appear. But I know that only in passing. So that’s the second source, and again I say, notice the two aspects appear, labor and affliction, and both appear in the same way: labor as a prohibition and affliction as a positive commandment. Third source, in Parashat Acharei Mot, what we read last time, yes, we saw the first part; the ending from verse 29, what appears here in the second part. “And it shall be to you an eternal statute: in the seventh month, on the tenth day of the month, you shall afflict your souls, and you shall do no labor, the native and the stranger who sojourns among you. For on this day he shall atone for you to purify you; from all your sins before the Lord you shall be purified. It is a Sabbath of complete rest for you, and you shall afflict your souls; an eternal statute.” And again the same dilemma: the structure is very similar, but “It is a Sabbath of complete rest for you, and you shall afflict your souls”—is that repetition, or is “a Sabbath of complete rest” the labor and “you shall afflict your souls” the affliction? It’s not entirely clear from the verses. That’s it, and after that, to atone for Israel from all their sins, that’s less important for our purposes. So basically, as I said earlier, we can see here these two aspects. One appears as a positive commandment, the other as a prohibition. Why “a Sabbath of complete rest”? So as was already noted here, on the simple level it comes to distinguish it from a Jewish holiday. By the way, regarding Sabbath too it says “a Sabbath of complete rest.” Meaning, “a Sabbath of complete rest” on Yom Kippur is not as opposed to Sabbath; it’s as opposed to a Jewish holiday. The cessation on a Jewish holiday is lighter; the cessation on Yom Kippur is like on Sabbath. But there is still room to discuss why it is like Sabbath. One can assume that the cessation on Yom Kippur is like cessation on Sabbath. For example, Nachmanides—his position is well known—that on a Jewish holiday what is prohibited is only occupational labor, not labor for food preparation. Meaning, labor for food preparation is not some special permission for the needs of food, but rather it simply was never prohibited. What was prohibited is only a partial prohibition, only occupational labor, not labor for food preparation. Not all the medieval authorities agree, but that’s at least how Nachmanides formulates it. Then I say: on Yom Kippur it’s like Sabbath, where the cessation is complete cessation, including food-preparation labor. There is still room to wonder why. According to Nachmanides it seems pretty clear that here the permission of a Jewish holiday was not said. Meaning, it’s like Sabbath. According to the medieval authorities who do not go with Nachmanides, who understand the permission of labor for food preparation on a Jewish holiday as a permission—that is, basically everything is forbidden, but we are allowed to do labors for food needs—here there is room to wonder. Because on Yom Kippur the fact that labor for food preparation was not permitted can be explained simply by saying there was no need for it, because we’re not eating. Meaning, in principle on an ordinary Jewish holiday too everything is forbidden, including labor for food preparation. On an ordinary Jewish holiday they permitted it because we eat; on Yom Kippur we don’t eat, so there’s no reason to permit it, and it remains forbidden. Then it comes out that Yom Kippur is not really like Sabbath. Then in terms of the obligation of cessation, Yom Kippur is like a Jewish holiday. It’s just that the permission for food preparation makes no sense to grant on Yom Kippur because it isn’t needed. On the other hand—one second—on the other hand, according to this view, one should notice that a Jewish holiday itself is like Sabbath. Since even on an ordinary Jewish holiday, the entire permission for food-preparation labor is only a permission, but basically the cessation is like Sabbath. So true, Yom Kippur is like a Jewish holiday, but in fact a Jewish holiday is not essentially different from Sabbath. Okay, that’s one side, right?

[Speaker C] Maybe “a Sabbath of complete rest” works with—not with labor but with affliction?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker C] To say that because it’s “a Sabbath of complete rest,” after all you’re forbidden to eat. And therefore also the labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore also the labor. Yes. Right. That connects the two sides of Yom Kippur. A second possibility is to say no: on Yom Kippur, even if I say that on an ordinary Jewish holiday food-preparation labor is only a permission—I wouldn’t call it “overridden” versus “permitted,” just, right? It’s not a permission in the sense of fully permitted, but also not in the sense of merely overridden; I’m not getting now into that distinction between fully permitted and overridden—but it is some kind of permission, even if permission ab initio. But that’s a permission on a Jewish holiday. On Yom Kippur there’s no reason for that permission, that’s obvious. But beyond there being no reason to permit, there may also be reason to forbid, because it’s like Sabbath. Then there are two reasons why labor for food preparation was not permitted on Yom Kippur. First, because there’s no need to permit it. Second, because even if there were a need to permit it, I still wouldn’t permit it, because the prohibition is not a prohibition like a Jewish holiday but like Sabbath. Now we know there is a difference in severity. On Sabbath it is a capital prohibition; on a Jewish holiday there is no capital prohibition; on Yom Kippur—sorry—there is no prohibition carrying stoning. In that sense it is somewhat similar to a Jewish holiday. There is excision. So it’s not like a Jewish holiday, but there is no stoning. So in that sense it is like a Jewish holiday. Therefore I’m saying: with Yom Kippur there is room to hesitate a bit whether its “Sabbath of complete rest,” which says that it is basically like Sabbath with regard to—I’m talking now about labors, assuming that “a Sabbath of complete rest” means labors—the question is why it is really like Sabbath. Is it only a technical matter because there was no need to permit, or is it essentially like Sabbath, and therefore actually different from the cessation of a Jewish holiday? Okay, in the Talmud we’ll see later that the Talmud derives from the words “a Sabbath of complete rest” either as a textual support or as an actual derivation—this is a dispute among the medieval authorities—the afflictions beyond eating and drinking. “A Sabbath of complete rest” is about the five afflictions. So it seems at least from there, even if it’s only a textual support, and certainly if it’s an actual derivation, that “a Sabbath of complete rest” speaks about affliction, not labor. Okay? Then it has nothing at all to do with what we said before—unless the permission or lack of permission regarding labor for food preparation is because of the obligation of affliction. Then it could be that they say “a Sabbath of complete rest” even though it speaks about affliction. But if we want to say that it is really like Sabbath regardless of the question of there being no reason to permit, then there is room to discuss whether that can be learned from Sabbath through the words “a Sabbath of complete rest,” because in the Talmud the words “a Sabbath of complete rest” are applied to affliction and not to labor. Maimonides, in the Laws of the Resting of the Tenth—these are famous things in Maimonides—really has a certain approach that in some way connects cessation with affliction, and that means that it’s not really correct to ask whether “a Sabbath of complete rest” refers to cessation or to affliction. It refers to both. Both together: we cease both from labor and from pleasures. It is one inclusive cessation that has two components, but those two components join together into one whole whose meaning is complete cessation on that day. What does “complete” mean? From labors and from pleasures, yes.

[Speaker C] But eating and drinking—is that Torah-level?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll see in a moment. No. But we’ll soon see why not. I don’t know if in a moment, but shortly. Okay. In Maimonides too it really appears that the prohibition of labor is not because there is no permission for eating, but rather there is here a kind of prohibition like Sabbath; there is an obligation of complete cessation on Yom Kippur, and that is the basis both for the prohibition of labor and for the prohibition of affliction. So let’s take a look for a second at Maimonides at the beginning of the Laws of the Resting of the Tenth; his formulation is very interesting. Let’s see it quickly.

[Speaker C] Maimonides, the Resting of the Tenth.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. The very term “Resting of the Tenth” already says something, right? The Laws of the Resting of the Tenth in Maimonides are the laws of Yom Kippur. You know that in Maimonides, the laws of the festivals—at least some of the festivals—are divided into laws of the sacrifices and laws of the day, which are two separate halakhic collections. For example, there are the Laws of the Passover Offering and there are the Laws of Passover, meaning leaven and matzah, the Laws of Leaven and Matzah. Also on Yom Kippur, the laws of the day’s sacrifices won’t appear here. But the laws of labor and affliction on Yom Kippur are called the Laws of the Resting of the Tenth. Labor barely appears, because he says it is basically the same as Sabbath, except for one small difference, and that’s it. He hardly needs the prohibition of labor, but that doesn’t matter. He doesn’t need it because there’s no need—he says it’s like there. But the place where he addresses the prohibition of labor is here, in the Laws of the Resting of the Tenth. So first of all, we see that the general title of these laws is Resting of the Tenth. And that includes both labor and affliction. The title itself already says something. But look also at the content of his words. Affliction is—

[Speaker B] comes through eating—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] eating, drinking, and all the rest, the whole issue of eating.

[Speaker B] But the matter of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] eating, the additional afflictions, whether that is rabbinic or Torah-level, I still hope we’ll get there. Maimonides says this: Laws of the Resting of the Tenth. Included in them are four commandments: two positive commandments and two prohibitions. And these are their details: to cease from labor on it, that’s one. Two, not to do labor on it. You see? A prohibition and a positive commandment—a prohibition. Okay. That already answers your question, Haim. To afflict oneself on it—that’s a positive commandment. Not to eat and drink on it—that’s a prohibition. Meaning, Maimonides understands that there is full symmetry. There is affliction and labor, and in each of them there is both a positive commandment and a prohibition. Okay? We’ll still talk about that. Halakhah 1: It is a positive commandment to cease from labor on the tenth day of the seventh month, as it says, “It is a Sabbath of complete rest for you.” And anyone who does labor on it has neglected a positive commandment and violated a prohibition, as it says, “And on the tenth of this month you shall do no labor.” So what does it mean, “Anyone who does labor on it has neglected a positive commandment and violated a prohibition, as it says, ‘you shall do no labor’”? “You shall do no labor” is the prohibition. And where is the positive commandment stated?

[Speaker B] “It is a Sabbath of complete rest.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So it seems he derives the positive commandment from the words “It is a Sabbath of complete rest.” And notice what he’s dealing with: labor, not affliction. Meaning, “It is a Sabbath of complete rest” is the source for the positive commandment regarding labor, at least that’s how it seems from Maimonides. And the prohibition is stated explicitly: “You shall do no labor.” And what is one liable for if one does labor on this day? If one did it intentionally and willingly, one is liable to excision, and if one did it unintentionally, one is liable for a fixed sin-offering. Right, that touch—what’s called touching fire. He is liable for a fixed sin-offering. So that’s the difference from Sabbath, where here there is no stoning, and the difference from a Jewish holiday, where here there is excision. Halakhah 2: Every labor for whose intentional violation on Sabbath one is liable to stoning, for its intentional violation on the tenth one is liable to excision. And every act for which one is liable to a sin-offering on Sabbath, one is liable to a sin-offering on Yom Kippur. Everything forbidden to do on Sabbath, even though it is not actually labor, is forbidden to do on Yom Kippur. On the simple level, it seems Maimonides assumes here that rabbinic restrictions on Sabbath are Torah-level, like Nachmanides writes in Parashat Emor, and you see this in Maimonides elsewhere too. And if one did it, he is given disciplinary lashes, just as he is given on Sabbath. By the way, disciplinary lashes are not only for rabbinic matters. They can also be for Torah-level matters when there is no fixed punishment. And everything forbidden to carry on Sabbath is forbidden to carry on Yom Kippur, and everything forbidden to say or do ab initio on Sabbath is likewise forbidden on Yom Kippur. The general rule is: there is no difference between Sabbath and Yom Kippur in these matters except that intentional labor on Sabbath incurs stoning, while on Yom Kippur it incurs excision. Meaning, Sabbath and Yom Kippur are the same thing. And from this formulation too—which actually is not Maimonides’ formulation, he takes it from the Talmud—but from this formulation too you can see that the complete cessation on Yom Kippur is not technical because there is no need to eat. It’s like Sabbath. The full cessation of Sabbath applies on Yom Kippur too, even though on Sabbath eating is permitted.

[Speaker C] What? But this is only a hint—although “a Sabbath of complete rest” is written regarding both, the wording applies only to doing labor and not to affliction.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because regarding affliction we have an explicit command: “you shall afflict your souls.” You don’t need—this refers to both.

[Speaker C] We said that according to Maimonides “a Sabbath of complete rest” is about both.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll see in a moment. I haven’t said that yet. I only said it based on the title.

[Speaker C] Now we’re getting a bit more tangled. That means not necessarily.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because since regarding affliction there is a positive commandment, “you shall afflict your souls,” stated explicitly, there is no point in bringing “a Sabbath of complete rest” as the source for the positive commandment of affliction, because the positive commandment of affliction is written explicitly, and that’s a general thing. By contrast, regarding labor you don’t have something explicit. So he brings the general “a Sabbath of complete rest” for labor. We’ll see later that he writes this.

[Speaker C] Why “a Sabbath of complete rest”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because he wants to say that this whole story is all cessation. That is important.

[Speaker C] But the phrase “a Sabbath of complete rest,” “a Sabbath of complete rest” hints at Sabbath. As far as the hint to Sabbath goes, that belongs only of course to this issue.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Maimonides says it doesn’t. “A Sabbath of complete rest” means comprehensive cessation. Regarding labor it’s like Sabbath, and regarding affliction it’s only on Yom Kippur. But that’s there—we’ll see in a second; we haven’t read everything. So that was Halakhah 2. Halakhah 3: It is permitted to trim vegetables—we’ll talk about that later. A prohibition that is apparently rabbinic, maybe a Torah-level positive commandment, not clear. What? That’s in the afternoon, from the time of the afternoon prayer onward. To trim vegetables—that’s a discussion in tractate Shabbat. Doesn’t matter right now; it’s a discussion there whether Yom Kippur is like Sabbath or not. We’ll get to that, because from there arises the issue of the positive commandment. Halakhah 4, which is important for us: There is another positive commandment on Yom Kippur, and it is to cease from eating and drinking on it. Okay? The expression is very interesting: to cease from eating and drinking. Meaning, Maimonides apparently understands that not eating and drinking is part of the obligation of cessation. When it says “a Sabbath of complete rest,” that probably includes also the aspect of affliction, as it says, “you shall afflict your souls.” At this stage this is a positive commandment, right? By tradition they learned that affliction of the soul means fasting. And anyone who fasts on it has fulfilled a positive commandment, and anyone who eats or drinks on it has neglected a positive commandment and violated a prohibition. Now here it gets very interesting—why has he violated a prohibition? As it says, “For every soul that shall not be afflicted on that very day shall be cut off.” That’s excision. Since the punishment written is excision for one who did not afflict himself, we learn that we are warned regarding eating and drinking. And anyone who eats or drinks on it unintentionally is liable for a fixed sin-offering. Okay? Right, this goes against the principle that Maimonides himself writes, that you can’t derive a warning from a punishment, and this is a Talmudic discussion: “We have heard the punishment; from where do we know the warning?” We’ll discuss it. Halakhah 5: And likewise they learned by tradition—and this is a big question, what exactly Maimonides means by “by tradition.” Is it rabbinic? Is it Torah-level? Tradition? A law given to Moses at Sinai? What exactly is it?—that it is forbidden to wash on it, to anoint, or to wear shoes, or to have sexual relations, and it is a commandment to cease from all of these, just as one ceases from eating and drinking. Again, you see? This is an expansion of the concept of cessation. The expansion is the Oral Torah. An expansion of the concept of cessation. Okay? Besides eating and drinking, which are Torah-level, there is also by tradition this addition of the other afflictions, but it is an expansion of the concept of cessation. Meaning, everything is cessation—both affliction and labor. As it says, “a Sabbath of complete rest”: “Sabbath” with regard to eating and drinking, and “complete rest” with regard to these. One second—what does “a Sabbath of complete rest” mean? Remember what you asked earlier? Here Maimonides says explicitly that “a Sabbath of complete rest” is about affliction. “Sabbath” means the affliction of eating and drinking, and “complete rest” means the other afflictions. So this already appears to be Torah-level. “By tradition,” but it seems to be Torah-level. Okay? So “a Sabbath of complete rest” above seemed to be the source, at least for the positive commandment, of labor, and here it seems that it is—

[Speaker C] for affliction.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whether it’s a prohibition or a positive commandment is a different discussion; here he’s talking about a positive commandment. But about the affliction. Okay? Why? Because the Sabbath-rest, and this is not because “a Sabbath of complete rest” appears twice, one for labor and one for affliction—it appears in the same way. Simply speaking, the meaning is that “a Sabbath of complete rest” is repeated twice, and many other things are repeated twice as well. “A Sabbath of complete rest, and you shall afflict your souls.” “A Sabbath of complete rest” means a total cessation. And “you shall afflict your souls” comes to say that the cessation that “a Sabbath of complete rest” is talking about is not only like Sabbath-rest from labor, but also “you shall afflict your souls.” That is the meaning of “a Sabbath of complete rest”: some broader kind of Sabbath, not only like refraining from labor as on the Sabbath, but also “you shall afflict your souls.” Okay? At least that seems to be the implication of Maimonides’ language. Afterward he says: just as labor ceases on it both by day and by night, so too affliction ceases both by day and by night. Again, cessation regarding labor and cessation regarding affliction. He is very, very insistent on the symmetry between labor and affliction, that everything is really subsections of cessation, and one must add from the ordinary to the sacred at its entrance and at its departure. As it says, “you shall afflict your souls,” meaning to begin fasting and afflicting oneself from the evening of the ninth, close to the tenth, and similarly at its conclusion one remains in affliction a little into the night of the eleventh, close to the tenth, and so on. In other words, according to Maimonides the extension applies both to labor and to affliction—to the whole concept of ceasing. An added cessation, okay? Both regarding labor and regarding affliction. That too is not such a simple discussion. What? Yes, both of them—this is already both labor and affliction. Aha. And for both of them there is no stoning, no death penalty. Eating and drinking? Right, obviously. Eating and drinking. Only eating and drinking. Not wearing shoes, marital relations—not the Tosafot. The Tosafot are either Torah-level or rabbinic, but there is no karet for them. Yes, and labor. Okay, so here I want to make some general comment before we continue. What does it mean that affliction and labor are both part of the commandment of cessation, of the obligation of cessation? There is some general obligation of shutting things down, okay? And that obligation includes labor and affliction, or cessation from pleasures and cessation from activity, from labor. The Talmud in Pesachim—I’ll do this briefly; you can look at it later in the summary I’ll send—the Talmud in Pesachim 54 says: “There is no difference between the Ninth of Av and Yom Kippur…” What? Can you hear? 54b. Yes, okay, oral Torah for the time being. That’s it. Torah—both were given at Sinai but with a delay. First oral Torah, afterward written Torah. That’s the correct order. “There is no difference between the Ninth of Av and Yom Kippur except that with regard to this, uncertainty is forbidden, and with regard to this, uncertainty is permitted.” What does “uncertainty is permitted” mean? Is it twilight? No—here it’s about fixing the month, and likewise if they observe two days. It doesn’t matter right now, but the main point is that they compare the Ninth of Av to Yom Kippur. There is a full comparison between them. What is the significance of that? Even Sefer Ha-Chinukh, after all, also brings the laws of the Ninth of Av within the commandment of Yom Kippur; he discusses the Ninth of Av there too. There are differences, of course, in severity—the Ninth of Av is not Torah-level; there are also some differences in the laws—but in principle there is some comparison here. I’m not going into the details right now. What? Wait, we’ll see in a moment. “In a place where they were accustomed to do labor on the Ninth of Av, they may do labor”—that is the Mishnah there in Pesachim. “In a place where they were accustomed not to do labor, they may not. And everywhere Torah scholars refrain. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: a person should always conduct himself as a Torah scholar.” Make yourselves Torah scholars. You know, I once heard from Rabbi Berl Povarsky—he said that regarding the four species, you know how they compare them to commandments and deeds, and Torah and deeds, Torah without deeds, deeds without Torah, and neither of them. So he said that the lulav, myrtle, and willow are bound together with a little tie. In Jewish law you don’t actually need a binding for the lulav, but we do it anyway stringently, also because of the Sages and for beautification, but the etrog remains outside. Torah scholars need to be with the rest of the public, but outside the little tie. Meaning, not totally mixed in. Anyway, everyone is supposed to make himself into a Torah scholar. To make yourself—you make yourself a Torah scholar. I don’t know whether that means being outside the little tie. But in any case, that’s what the Mishnah says. And Tosafot there asks: with “there is no difference between the Ninth of Av and Yom Kippur,” why doesn’t it count labor, which is permitted on the Ninth of Av in a place where that is the custom? There is another difference between the Ninth of Av and Yom Kippur: on the Ninth of Av, in a place where they have the custom to do labor, they may do labor. On Yom Kippur there is no such thing as “if they have the custom to do labor, they may do labor,” right? So why wasn’t that added to the list of differences between the Ninth of Av and Yom Kippur? It seems to Ri that in another place in the tractate they conclude regarding the permissibility of labor in the context of “there is no difference between the Ninth of Av and a public fast.” In other words, it is written indirectly in another form. That is how Tosafot answers. What is more interesting is the question itself. It’s a very strange question. In a place where they were not accustomed to do labor on the Ninth of Av—he says, according to the view where there is such a custom, no, not according to a view, but in a place where they were accustomed to do labor, then it differs from Yom Kippur. In a place where they were not accustomed to do labor, then it is like Yom Kippur? I’m not talking about severity. In terms of severity, obviously there is a difference between the Ninth of Av and Yom Kippur. I’m talking about content. What labor is one not supposed to do on the Ninth of Av? Simply speaking, the meaning is labor that distracts one from the fast, right? This has nothing to do with the thirty-nine primary categories of prohibited labor and their derivatives. Torah-level, rabbinic-level—it doesn’t matter—but that’s not the point at all. So what is the connection? Even in a place where they had the custom not to do labor, they still should have said that there is a difference between the Ninth of Av and Yom Kippur regarding labor. It should not depend on whether this place had the custom or did not have the custom to do labor. From Tosafot it sounds like in a place where they had the custom not to do labor, the Ninth of Av is like Yom Kippur. Only in a place where they had the custom to do labor is it not so. In other words, the labor being discussed is the thirty-nine primary categories of labor and their derivatives. Everything written in the laws of Sabbath has to be applied also on the Ninth of Av in a place where they had the custom. According to this, by the way, our places are places where they had the custom not to do labor. Because obviously nobody has the custom to observe the Sabbath labors on the Ninth of Av. There are those who had the custom not to do labor that distracts from the fast—that’s another matter—but as for Sabbath labors, nobody has the custom to do them. Okay, now this is not something Tosafot invented; there is such a tradition in Ashkenaz. Several medieval authorities (Rishonim) bring this view, that on the Ninth of Av one does not do the labors of Sabbath in a place where they had the custom not to do labor. That is what this is talking about—Sabbath labors, not labors that distract from the fast. In Terumat Ha-Deshen, siman 153, “ordinary labor,” and so on—it doesn’t matter; there are some nuances there, I didn’t bring the source here, it’s not important. And Mordechai brings in the name of Raavyah: “Whoever does labor on the Ninth of Av is as though he did so on Yom Kippur.” What’s the connection? Labor on Yom Kippur is a prohibition of labor because of cessation, and it is clear that he means that on the Ninth of Av too it works that way. And therefore Terumat Ha-Deshen reads that statement as referring to food. The Talmud there is talking about food, and yet they bring it regarding doing labor, not regarding eating. But they write it about doing labor. So it seems—and you can see this in several early Ashkenazic authorities—that there really was such a conception, and I think this Tosafot is one of its expressions: that the prohibition of labor spoken of regarding the Ninth of Av is a prohibition of labor like cessation on Sabbath and Yom Kippur. It is the same thing as Yom Kippur. Therefore there is no difference between Yom Kippur and the Ninth of Av at all. Tosafot asks: in a place where they had the custom to do labor, why didn’t they mention that difference? But if they did not have the custom to do labor, then they do not do it—and the meaning is to cease entirely, as on Sabbath and Yom Kippur. What? Fine, in any case that’s true; it has nothing to do with Tosafot. In any event there is a difference between Yom Kippur and the Ninth of Av regarding punishment. That is clear, that’s fine. In any case, what does this actually mean? Look also at Maimonides, maybe first—chapter 5 of the Laws of Fasts: pregnant women and nursing women fast and complete the fast on the Ninth of Av, and bathing is forbidden, whether in hot or cold water, and anointing for pleasure, and in a place where they had the custom not to do labor, they do not, and everywhere Torah scholars refrain from labor on it, and the Sages said: whoever does labor on it will never see a sign of blessing. Okay, so here there is a bit of room for hesitation; in the comparison between the Ninth of Av and Yom Kippur, in the halakhah where he compares the Ninth of Av to Yom Kippur, he brings the prohibition of labor. Again, it somewhat seems—I don’t know if one can infer from this—but still it somewhat seems that way from this matter. Also in his Commentary on the Mishnah in Ta’anit he says: all the commandments that apply to a mourner apply on the Ninth of Av, and its fast has the status of the fast of Yom Kippur, meaning that bathing, anointing, marital relations, and wearing shoes are forbidden, and one adds from the ordinary to the sacred, and doing labor on it is very disgraceful. The comparison between the Ninth of Av and Yom Kippur includes, among other things, that doing labor on it is very disgraceful. Again, it somewhat seems that he is talking about labor in the sense of Sabbath labors, okay? Otherwise what is the connection at all? Fine. You can see this in more and more places; there is Rashi in Shabbat… Fine, so basically the claim is—I’m doing this very briefly because I don’t want to waste the time—the claim is that there is some comparison between the Ninth of Av and Yom Kippur, and the comparison is regarding cessation in the same sense as on Yom Kippur. Cessation from labor—on the Ninth of Av there are also the five afflictions, unlike the other fasts, right? The five afflictions—what does that mean? That the Ninth of Av really has, rabbinically or from the words of the prophets, a comparison to Yom Kippur in all its aspects. And more than that: on the Ninth of Av, the state of cessation is even much more absolute than on Yom Kippur—even learning is forbidden. Nothing. Yes, the boredom of the Ninth of Av is something that makes you want to tear your hair out from boredom, right? It’s crazy, this thing. Yes, it’s crazy, this thing—you can’t do anything, there’s nothing, you can’t do anything. No labors, no pleasures, no learning, no nothing. You can learn those boring aggadot there in Gittin, I don’t know what. You can’t do anything that really has any kind of vitality to it. And even the aggadot in Gittin you are not learning under the law of Torah study; you learn them as part of mourning.

[Speaker D] Rabbi, regarding that, they used to give classes on Job and Moed Katan…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Classes? Fine, after midday that’s something else; it may be that they indeed permitted learning there… no, even after midday it could be that Torah study is permitted too… fine… after midday is something else. But the claim is that there is some kind of cessation also on the Ninth of Av, and it is a very comprehensive cessation, in the same sense that Maimonides defines the “cessation of the tenth” on Yom Kippur, and maybe even broader. Again, for everything, “the precepts of God are upright, rejoicing the heart”—for everything one can bring explanations. Simply speaking, the Ninth of Av and Yom Kippur are entirely different in idea. Yom Kippur is repentance; it is not connected to mourning. The Ninth of Av is mourning. Okay, but the fact is that at least in the bottom line, at least practically, it looks very similar, and even more so. Each thing for its own reason, and one has to understand the significance of that. So once I suggested an explanation of the matter. The Talmud says that even in a fast there is an element of repentance. No, obviously there is an element of repentance, but the base is a base of mourning.

[Speaker D] There is also some element of festival in it… what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, in the Ninth of Av. On the Ninth of Av there really is an aspect of festival, although in the Talmud it seems—the Talmud derives that the New Moon is called a festival from the verse “He proclaimed against me an appointed time to crush my young men.” The Talmud says from this that the New Moon is called a festival, not that the Ninth of Av is called a festival. Even though the plain meaning of the verse is about the Ninth of Av. Why? Because what they did there was to intercalate the month so that the sin of the spies would fall exactly on the Ninth of Av. Okay? So really, what they did was to intercalate the month; therefore they derive from here that “He proclaimed against me an appointed time” means: He intercalated the month so that it would fall on the Ninth of Av. The Talmud in Ta’anit, the parallel passage, speaks about the Ninth of Av. It says like this: “On the Ninth of Av”—written Torah, soon the Ninth of Av will come—“it was decreed upon our ancestors that they would not enter the land.” From where do we know this? As it is written: “And it came to pass in the first month of the second year, on the first of the month, that the Tabernacle was erected.” And the Master said: in the first year Moses made the Tabernacle; in the second, Moses erected the Tabernacle and sent the spies, and so on. From where do we know that? “Three days…” On that day they turned away from God, and the rabble, and so on—that came out to the twenty-second of Sivan; it goes through the whole calculation there. And it was taught: on the twenty-ninth of Sivan Moses sent the spies, and “they returned from spying out the land at the end of forty days.” Then one day is missing. Those forty days, subtract one, come out to one day short. It then falls on the Ninth of Av. Abaye said: the Tammuz of that year they made full. Why? So that the sin of the spies would fall exactly on the Ninth of Av. As it is written: “He proclaimed against me an appointed time to crush my young men.” And it is written: “And all the congregation lifted up their voice and the people wept that night.” Rabbah said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: that night was the night of the Ninth of Av. The Holy One, blessed be He, said to them: you wept a needless weeping, and I will establish for you a weeping for generations. There is something very strange here.

[Speaker C] But that’s not intercalation—doesn’t it bother you? What? That they intercalated it before they returned…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, never mind, they intercalated it in advance. It doesn’t matter. But I’m saying on the conceptual level: “you wept a needless weeping”—what is special about the Ninth of Av? What is special about the Ninth of Av is that the sin of the spies—“you wept a needless weeping,” and therefore for generations—and we know all the traditions that all the disasters throughout the generations happened on the Ninth of Av. Some did, some didn’t, and we place them there anyway, never mind, so that the whole business works out. But still, the idea is that because of the needless weeping that happened then on the Ninth of Av, throughout all the generations it comes back and hits us in the face. But here we see otherwise. And that is how the Talmud concludes there: “you wept a needless weeping and I will establish for you a weeping for generations.” But here in the Talmud it does not say that. Because here the Talmud says that the Holy One, blessed be He, arranged it so that the weeping would come out on the Ninth of Av. That means the distinctiveness of the Ninth of Av was already there beforehand. And the Holy One arranged that the needless weeping would fall on the Ninth of Av. But I had thought that the Ninth of Av was fixed that way because they wept. It somewhat reminds me of what Rabbi Soloveitchik comments—though it already appears in Nachmanides—on “Because of this the Lord did for me when I went out of Egypt,” regarding Passover, matzah, and bitter herbs: only when Passover, matzah, and bitter herbs are lying before you—then “because of this,” Passover, matzah, and bitter herbs, “the Lord did for me when I went out of Egypt.” But usually it is the other way around: we do this because of what the Holy One did for us when we left Egypt. But the verse does not say it that way. It says that the Holy One brought about the Exodus in order that we should do Passover, matzah, and bitter herbs. Yes, there are all kinds of reversals, interesting reversals in the Torah that one has to pay attention to. In any case, here it seems that in the Ninth of Av there is some kind of—I don’t know exactly—some essential point in time, such that this had to fall there even before they wept a needless weeping. The needless weeping got directed there, and only then can one say to us: you wept a needless weeping, I will make for you a weeping for generations. But really this day is a kind of fixed game. It is actually a day that was appointed in advance to be this way. Why? I think the point is—why, I don’t know—but what does it mean? It means that if there is one thing in the course of the year, one date in the course of the year, that is called an appointed time, it is the Ninth of Av. “Appointed time” comes from meeting, from coming together, right? “Establish a meeting place”—that is a place where people meet. “The house appointed for all the living”—there too people meet, a bit less pleasant, but still. In other words, “appointed time” means a meeting. Right? The festivals mean a meeting with the Holy One; that is what “appointed time” means. Okay? If there is one place where the thing is defined as a meeting with the Holy One, it is the Ninth of Av. All the other festivals—something happened on that date; consequently it became some sort of meeting with the Holy One, and it became an appointed time of meeting, it became a festival. The Ninth of Av is, in its essence, an appointed time, and because of that there were meetings. Not because there were meetings did it become an appointed time. It was an appointed time, and therefore there were… it is a date whose whole idea is to meet with the Holy One. Therefore in the future the Holy One will make the Ninth of Av for us a day of joy. Why? Because in its essence it is a meeting. We made that meeting problematic, so the meeting came out problematic. In the future it will remain a meeting, because the meeting-ness of that day is essential. It is not connected to whether we cried or did not cry. That only determines the character of the meeting. In the future the meeting presumably is supposed to be joyful. Okay? But the very fact that what we have here is a meeting—that is essential, it does not depend on history. I once heard this used to explain Nachmanides, who says that the counting of the Omer is not a positive commandment dependent on time. Nachmanides in Kiddushin 34 brings examples of positive commandments that are not time-dependent, and one of them is the counting of the Omer. That is very strange. The counting of the Omer is ostensibly the quintessential time-dependent commandment. So I once saw an explanation—in Seridei Esh there is a similar formulation; I don’t remember where I first heard it—but the claim is that basically we are counting from the Exodus to the giving of the Torah. That is the counting of the Omer. If the Exodus had taken place in Cheshvan, we would count in Cheshvan. There is nothing essential about Nisan, Iyar, and Sivan because of which one counts the Omer then. It could have been in Cheshvan, Kislev, and Tevet—whenever we would have left Egypt. Therefore this is not called a positive commandment dependent on time, since the time is not essential; the time is incidental. Therefore it is like… huh?

[Speaker D] And sanctifying the moon too—why isn’t that a positive commandment dependent on time? After all, it’s not the time that causes it but the fullness of the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think cosmological events are what we call time. What depends on cosmological events is called time. This too depends on sunrise and sunset, the time-bound commandments throughout the day.

[Speaker D] From the standpoint of the Sages, cosmology is time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no such concept as an abstract timeline, no such thing. Cosmology is time. The sun rises, sets, the moon fills, wanes.

[Speaker D] Meaning it’s not time in the sense of the fifteenth of Tishrei or the fifteenth of Nisan?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Whenever the moon fills—sorry, not fills, empties—there is a new moon and then the month begins. That is time. Time means dependence on the heavenly bodies; that is what time is called. But here there is no dependence on the heavenly bodies. That is to say, it could also have been in Cheshvan. It is like asking why Grace after Meals is not a positive commandment dependent on time. Suppose I eat every morning at eight, okay? Why is Grace after Meals not a positive commandment dependent on time? Because true, it always happens at the same time, but the time does not cause it; I happened to eat. I happened to eat at eight, therefore I have to bless at eight, but it is not that the time caused this obligation; rather an event caused it, and every event happens in time. The question is whether the time here is essential or incidental. An interesting question is why Passover is considered time-dependent. If Passover could also have been in Cheshvan and we would have counted the Omer in Cheshvan, then Passover too ought to be a positive commandment not dependent on time. There is room here to think it through. But the counting of the Omer depends on Passover; Passover depends on time; but the counting of the Omer does not depend on time. Fine, there is room to engage in some pilpul here. In any case, this is relevant to us. What I want to say here regarding the Ninth of Av is that here this point appears in its pure form: it really seems that on the Ninth of Av the historical events are a result of the character of that day, and not that the character of that day is the result of the events that happened on it. Meaning, if there is something that is essentially called an appointed time—“He proclaimed against me an appointed time to crush my young men”—an appointed time. Normally when one says “appointed time,” what does one mean? The Ninth of Av. Why? Because the Ninth of Av is in its essence defined as a meeting. The other festivals had a meeting happen on them, so in the end it became a meeting; it could have been otherwise. But a date that in its essence is a meeting, that in its essence is an appointed time—that is the Ninth of Av. Now what does this mean? It means that essentially the character of the day—well, not “it means”; I am suggesting—that the character of the day dictates the scope of the cessation. When you meet, on a day designated to be a meeting with the Holy One—as the Sefat Emet, I think, said on “It is He who made us, and not we ourselves,” he says that if not ourselves, then not ourselves. There is a textual reading there with an aleph-vav variation. Never mind, let’s not become Hasidim. But for our purposes, what he means to say is that in order to meet with the Holy One you need some kind of shutting down. That much is true; it has nothing to do with Hasidim. There are things that even though Hasidim say them, they are still true. That can happen sometimes. So the claim is that in order to meet with the Holy One, you need cessation, and according to the intensity of the meeting or the depth of the meeting, so is the breadth of the cessation. When there is an essential meeting, the cessation has to be absolute. When there is a somewhat less essential meeting, there will be less cessation. Less essential still, less cessation, and so on. Sabbath, for example, is fixed and established; a festival is sanctified by Israel who sanctify the times. But Sabbath is fixed. Fixed and established. Sabbath is a more essential meeting than a festival, so it requires a broader cessation. Fine? Yom Kippur—you enter the innermost place, that is the meeting with the Holy One, right? That’s what we spoke about in the previous class. Therefore, since the essence of the day is meeting with the Holy One, it requires a broader cessation than Sabbath. That is the “cessation of the tenth.” One needs cessation both from labor and from affliction; one needs a fuller cessation. The Ninth of Av is the most essential meeting there is; there the cessation is absolute. Only tearing out hair remains for whoever is there; there is absolutely nothing left to do there. Okay? So the claim I want to make is that the concept of the “cessation of the tenth”—I’m returning to Yom Kippur; I only used the Ninth of Av here to show the principle, now I’m returning to Yom Kippur—why are both labor and pleasures included in the cessation, the “cessation of the tenth”? Because really there is one whole complex here whose point is the shutting down of everything we do in the ordinary way. What we do is labors, pleasures, eating—yes, these are the ordinary activities a person does in the world. We are supposed to suspend everything we do because we are, in essence, meeting with the Holy One. When you meet with the Holy One, the world is supposed to be suspended. Yes—“no bird chirped,” and so on, when the Holy One revealed Himself at Mount Sinai. It doesn’t matter right now whether that is aggadah or not, but what is the aggadah trying to say? It is trying to say that meeting with the Holy One requires a certain silence. Okay? And in that sense—yes, I heard: “there is a voice that comes out of silence.” Rashi says there in Kings, on “The Lord was not in the storm,” yes, but rather “a still small voice.” So Rashi says: I heard that there is a voice that emerges from silence. Meaning, the voice of the Holy One. “The Lord was not in the storm,” not in the fire, but a still small voice. Not in the wind, yes? Why? Meeting with the Holy One requires a silencing of everything around, because the world in its essence conceals the Holy One. He is actually behind it. Everything that happens in the world, the Holy One is behind it. But when the world is functioning, you do not feel that. Therefore people also arrive at denying the existence of the Holy One, because you see a world going on according to its way—why assume there is something else in the picture? Because He is behind it. Okay? In order to meet Him, in order to see or become aware of His existence, and yes, to meet Him in a more intimate or direct way, you have to silence all of reality. And the deeper the meeting, the broader the silencing. That is basically the claim. And therefore the “cessation of the tenth,” or “a Sabbath of complete rest,” yes, the broader cessation in labor and in afflictions, is basically meant to enable a meeting with the Holy One, and with that I connect it to what I said in the previous class. What I said in the previous class is basically some sort of meeting in the two goats. But in general Yom Kippur is the procedure for entering the sacred or meeting with the Holy One. Not like Nadav and Avihu, as the portion of Acharei Mot begins: “Speak to Aaron,” yes, “for with this Aaron shall enter the holy place.” Not like Nadav and Avihu, “when they came near before the Lord and died”; “with this Aaron shall enter the holy place.” How does one enter the holy place properly? Not like Nadav and Avihu. And the whole procedure that appears there is really the Yom Kippur service. It is a service of entering the holy place. And in the end it says that on Yom Kippur one must do it, but it is not presented as the service of Yom Kippur at all; it is simply the proper way to enter the holy place. As part of that there needs to be repentance and atonement and affliction and everything else, because this is that silencing that is required in order to enter the innermost place. And I spoke about the goat sent to Azazel, where in the end you also silence all the fantasies—yes, what we spoke about there concerning Alice, yes, Alice in Wonderland—that you silence all the fantasies, and thus allow us to enter and meet with the Holy One, to enter the holy place, to understand that other things are really some sort of imagination. Fine. So I—yes.

[Speaker C] I want to understand, still, what the relation is if I look at the pilgrimage festivals, for example. The three pilgrimage festivals—and you said “he shall not appear before the face of the Lord,” meaning the meeting is stronger on the festivals than on Yom Kippur.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because people go up to Jerusalem. What is it? Because they go up to Jerusalem.

[Speaker C] Yes, but it says there, “he shall not appear” and “to appear before the face of the Lord.” Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there the meeting is a result. There the meeting is a result. As I said earlier, that could have happened in Cheshvan. The date that in its essence is a meeting is the Ninth of Av or Yom Kippur. On Yom Kippur you don’t do this because of an event that happened. From the outset they tell you: on Yom Kippur you must enter the holy place. It is a meeting that was set, not an accidental, incidental meeting that happened because the Holy One had to save us from Egypt, or I don’t know what, or chose this or that date for some event. Rather, it is a date whose essence is meeting. And that is only Yom Kippur and the Ninth of Av and the Sabbath, because it is fixed and established. And what about Rosh Hashanah? Rosh Hashanah is remembrance; it is not a meeting.

[Speaker B] You don’t go inside.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no reason—that’s exactly the point, the opposite. When you ask what the reason is, you are assuming that in its essence this day is not a meeting, but rather that something happened on that day that caused us to meet with the Holy One, and then for generations we remain with that day as a day of meeting. On the Ninth of Av it works the other way around. This day from the outset is intended to be a day of meeting. Okay? Afterward, as a result, all kinds of things in history got attached to the—yes, in the language of the ethical teachers, let’s call it the special quality of this day. It has some special quality of meeting with the Holy One, and therefore things rolled into this day. And this can be for mercy or for judgment. It can be for good or for bad. Right—what we chose. We chose to weep a needless weeping; we established this meeting as a weeping for generations. But in the future that will change—but what will not change is the fact that we meet; what will change is that it is a meeting of weeping. That is what will change, and therefore it will become a day of joy. Fine, all these things are a bit on the border of aggadah, maybe even on the wrong side of the border, but I ask your forgiveness. This time I even sinned in Hasidism; I really am going downhill.

[Speaker D] In what respect? What did we just say that was Hasidic?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t hear—“not we,” and “returning a lost object” literally, and all these kind of intellectual little interpretations—I’m not… Fine, in any case, it seems to me there is something to this, I don’t know, you decide. Okay, wait, what’s going on with my life, this guy? Oh. Fine, all right, let’s bring—

[Speaker C] all my students. Fine,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] so we saw, we saw in Maimonides that there is a positive commandment and a prohibition, a positive commandment and a prohibition regarding affliction and regarding labor. Regarding affliction and regarding labor. I want—someone here pointed out earlier, I don’t remember who already—the question why affliction is basically a positive commandment and not a prohibition. So I want to linger a bit, a bit, on that point. I’ll give an introduction, a short introduction to positive commandments and prohibitions. Okay? This is important because on Yom Kippur there are several aspects that are a little subtle in this matter, and I think many people make mistakes on this topic. The commandments are divided into positive commandments and prohibitions—at least from Maimonides onward, they divide the 613 commandments into 248 positive commandments and 365 prohibitions. Earlier enumerators of the commandments included also categories of scriptural sections and other things. Regarding the difference between a positive commandment and a prohibition, I’ll speak in a moment, but first I want to talk about positive commandments. There are four kinds of positive commandment. There is an obligatory positive commandment; that is the regular positive commandment: if you fulfill it, you have fulfilled a positive commandment; if you do not fulfill it, you have transgressed by neglecting a positive commandment. Not a prohibitive transgression—it is a transgression of neglecting a positive commandment. There is a merely fulfillable positive commandment. What is a merely fulfillable positive commandment? If you want to—

[Speaker C] You do it, but it’s not obligatory. Tithes and offerings?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is fully obligatory. Tzitzit? Tzitzit? Also not. Fully obligatory. A merely fulfillable positive commandment is one that can be fulfilled but cannot be violated. An obligatory positive commandment is one that can be fulfilled and can be violated. A positive commandment that can be fulfilled and can be… but cannot be violated. If you did it, you have a commandment; if you didn’t do it, nothing happened. Now the question is what this positive commandment is, what these types of positive commandments are. It is very tricky. Regarding settling the Land of Israel, for example, Igrot Moshe writes that it is a merely fulfillable positive commandment. Whoever moves to the land has a positive commandment; whoever does not, nothing happened. Rabbi Avraham Shapira argued with him bitterly on exactly this point, and he claimed that there is no such thing in the Torah as a merely fulfillable positive commandment. There is no such thing in the Torah as a merely fulfillable positive commandment. Every positive commandment that you are supposed to do—if you did not do it, you have a transgression, a transgression of neglecting a positive commandment. No, no. So what are the merely fulfillable positive commandments people usually talk about? These are commandments that have a minimal threshold of fulfillment. For example, Torah study. Reciting Shema morning and evening is obligatory. Rashbi—yes, a chapter in the morning and a chapter in the evening, or reciting Shema morning and evening—that is obligatory. Everything beyond that is merely fulfillable. If you studied, you have the positive commandment; if you didn’t study, you have no neglect of a positive commandment. You’ll ask: then what is neglect of Torah study? Never mind, that is a class in itself. Another example: charity. One should not give less than one-third of a shekel per year. That third of a shekel is obligatory, that is mandatory. If you did not give a third of a shekel, you neglected the positive commandment of charity, and perhaps also transgressed the prohibition “do not harden and do not shut your heart.” But—“do not shut your hand and do not harden your heart.” But someone who did not give beyond one-third of a shekel—someone who gives beyond one-third has the positive commandment of charity. Someone who does not give beyond that, nothing happened. All right? So that is called a merely fulfillable positive commandment, but it is not entirely merely fulfillable. There is a minimum that is obligatory; beyond that, you can also give more, and that part is merely fulfillable. Perhaps with terumah one can explain it a bit on those lines. Okay. Are there commandments that are entirely merely fulfillable?

[Speaker B] So that is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Avraham Shapira’s claim, whereas Igrot Moshe maintains that, for example, settling the Land of Israel is entirely merely fulfillable. The dispute is about whether there exists a commandment that is entirely merely fulfillable. What people usually call a merely fulfillable commandment is really a commandment with a minimum threshold, and beyond that it is merely fulfillable. Why did I say that tzitzit, for example, is not a merely fulfillable commandment? Because tzitzit can be violated. A merely fulfillable commandment cannot be violated. If you wear a four-cornered garment and do not attach tzitzit, you have neglected a positive commandment. How is that different from any other commandment? Because it is a conditional obligatory positive commandment—sorry, obligatory and conditional. Meaning: given certain circumstances, you are obligated to do it. If those circumstances do not exist, you are not obligated. But that is also true of Grace after Meals. Nobody would say that Grace after Meals is a merely fulfillable positive commandment, right? Grace after Meals—if you ate and were satisfied to the point of satiation, you have to bless; if you were not satisfied, you do not have to. So what is this “merely fulfillable positive commandment”? What suddenly? It is obligatory, only conditionally obligatory. Someone who was satiated is obligated to bless. If he was satiated and did not bless, that is neglect of a positive commandment. A merely fulfillable positive commandment is one that cannot be violated, not one that is not always violated. It cannot be violated even if you want to. All these commandments are conditional obligatory positive commandments. Fine? These are commandments that can be violated, and therefore they are obligatory positive commandments—but they are conditional on certain circumstances occurring. Only in those circumstances are you obligated, and in those circumstances, if you did not do it, you neglected it. Fine? That is a merely fulfillable positive commandment. Moving on. What is the third type? Simple combinatorics, right? There is fulfillment and there is violation. So if a positive commandment can be fulfilled and can be violated, it is an obligatory positive commandment. A positive commandment that can be fulfilled and cannot be violated is a merely fulfillable positive commandment. So what now? A positive commandment that can be violated and cannot be fulfilled. A negating positive commandment. What is that? You said it earlier. An implication-prohibition from a positive commandment. Not a prohibition repaired by a positive commandment. An implication-prohibition from a positive commandment. “You shall remove leaven from your houses”? That is a major dispute; I think that is an obligatory or merely fulfillable positive commandment, but it is not an implication-prohibition from a positive commandment. But for our purposes—for example, eating produce of the Sabbatical year. “And the Sabbath produce of the land shall be for you to eat,” and not for commerce. Right? When you eat Sabbatical produce, you have not fulfilled a positive commandment. If you did something else with it that is not eating, like commerce, you have violated that positive commandment. This is a positive commandment that cannot be fulfilled, but if it is not observed, you have a violation. Fine? This is called an implication-prohibition from a positive commandment, or if you want, a positive-commandment prohibition—it doesn’t matter, you can call it this or that. There is a claim in Nachmanides—claims made in relation to Nachmanides—that there is indeed a commandment in the eating; I am not at all sure that is true. Some people think that if he says “it is a commandment,” that is what he means, but it is entirely possible that he says “commandment” because a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. As a category: checking signs of purity, in Maimonides. What does it mean to check signs of purity? If you ate without checking—okay, there are quite a few prohibitions inferred from positive commandments. “To the foreigner you may lend on interest”—even though Maimonides says it is a commandment to lend on interest to a foreigner, in the straightforward sense this is a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment. “To the foreigner you may lend on interest” means that one who lends on interest to a Jew and not to a foreigner—apart from the prohibition of interest, he has also neglected the positive commandment of “to the foreigner you may lend on interest.” That does not mean that if you lend on interest to a foreigner you have fulfilled a positive commandment. Fine? And so on. So that is a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment. So we said: there is an obligatory positive commandment, conditional or not; there is a positive commandment that can be fulfilled and can be violated; there is a merely fulfillable positive commandment that can be fulfilled and cannot be violated; there is a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment that can be violated and cannot be fulfilled; and the fourth type, the crown of all of them, is a positive commandment that can neither be violated nor fulfilled. What is that positive commandment? There are positive commandments 95 and 96 in Maimonides’ Book of Commandments, and there he speaks about annulment of vows or impurity, and there he says—I call it in my own language a definitional positive commandment—that if one annuls vows in the way the Torah says, the vow is annulled. There is no commandment to annul vows and no prohibition if you did not annul vows. There is a definition of how vows are annulled, how one acts so that the vow will be annulled. That definition is called a positive commandment.

[Speaker C] A divorce document? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not a divorce document. Maybe in a moment I’ll comment on a divorce document. That annulment is called a positive commandment in Maimonides, positive commandment 95. And 96 is about impurity—for example, the definition that if someone touches a corpse, he becomes impure. For an Israelite there is no prohibition against becoming impure, and of course there is also no commandment to become impure—there is nothing. There is also no commandment to guard oneself from impurity.

[Speaker D] In Jewish law there is a law regarding corpse impurity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a law that if you touch, you are impure—that’s all, it’s a definition. All the halakhic consequences of that definition are commandments in their own right. Meaning, if you became impure and then entered the Temple, or ate sacred food, or ate terumah or something like that while impure—all of those have their own commandments. Therefore the commandment that says that if you touch a corpse you become impure is not coming to say that you are forbidden to enter the holy place and so on; for that there are separate commandments. The definition itself, of your status as impure, is in Maimonides’ eyes a positive commandment.

[Speaker D] Yes, Nachmanides asks about that explanation—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t remember—does Nachmanides have objections there on those commandments?

[Speaker D] From 96 to 180, maybe—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be, I don’t remember at the moment.

[Speaker D] He argues—he asks him that according to this, he should have counted the blemishes of priests.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, okay, fine, that is a difficulty one can answer somehow. Fine, never mind, but that is what he argues—that you empty the commandment of its practical content.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but in Maimonides there are positive commandments that you can neither fail to fulfill nor actively nullify—that’s the definition. There’s a simple intuition here: why is this actually called a commandment? The translation of the term “commandment” into our language is “law.” The Book of Commandments is the book of laws. Now, in a law book there are laws that are definitional clauses. A minor, for this purpose, is anyone who has not reached age 13 or has not produced two pubic hairs. That would appear in a law book as a clause in the law book; it’s a law. And that law doesn’t tell me to do anything—it only defines a concept that other laws will deal with. Okay? A minor is exempt from criminal liability. But the definition of a minor is also a clause in the law book. As far as Maimonides is concerned, I think all the commandments are basically laws. Now, in a law book there are also definitional clauses. Maimonides writes explicitly: this commandment imposes nothing on us—not a prohibition, not an obligation, nothing—and still it is a positive commandment. Why did he classify it specifically as a positive commandment? That’s a different question, but for him it is a positive commandment. So there are four types of positive commandments. Okay, that’s the first introduction. The second introduction is the relation between a positive commandment and a prohibition. Maimonides, in the sixth root or the ninth root—yes, Maimonides’ “roots” are his rules for counting the commandments; they appear before the Book of Commandments. In the ninth root Maimonides says that we do not count commandments that appear several times in the Torah. For example, the commandment to keep the Sabbath appears 12 times in the Torah. We count one commandment, not twelve. Because we count the thing commanded, not the command itself. There are 12 commands, but the thing commanded is one, the content is one. Okay? That is the ninth root. The root… yes, maybe one more sentence: in the second part of the ninth root Maimonides discusses a general prohibition. A general prohibition is, for example, “Do not eat over the blood,” a prohibition from which five or six things are learned: not to eat on the day a death sentence is issued, a warning relevant to the stubborn and rebellious son, not to eat before prayer—by the way, Maimonides brings it there and it seems that he holds this is Torah-level. Doesn’t matter; several things are learned from it. Maimonides says: we count it once. We count one prohibition, no more, even though several things are learned from it. And the Be’er Chafur asks on Maimonides that there is a contradiction between the first part of the root and the second part of the root. Because in the first part of the root Maimonides says that what determines things is the content, not the commands. And in the second part of the root Maimonides says that what determines things is the command, not the content. One command with several contents is one commandment; that means the commands determine it. In the first part Maimonides says: 12 commands with one content, one commandment—so the content determines it. So which is it, the content or the command? What’s the answer? Both. Obviously. For a commandment to be counted, it needs an independent command and it needs independent content. If one of those two is missing, it is not a counted commandment. Okay, therefore these two parts of the root are really both included in one root, because both are really saying that for a commandment to be counted it needs command and content. That’s what is written there. Okay, that is the ninth root. In the sixth root Maimonides adds a qualification. If I have a positive commandment and a prohibition on the same matter, that is counted. The positive commandment among the positive commandments, and the prohibition among the prohibitions. That’s what Maimonides writes in the heading of the sixth root. For example, the commandment of Sabbath observance: there is “do not do any labor,” and there is “rest.” Okay? Now, as for rest—we’re not talking at the moment about rabbinic rest restrictions, but about the labor prohibitions—they exist both as a positive commandment and as a prohibition. Okay? Maimonides says: since this is not duplication between two positive commandments or two prohibitions, but duplication between a positive commandment and a prohibition, there we do count both. And he adds: we count the positive commandment among the positive commandments and the prohibition among the prohibitions. Right? One who did labor on the Sabbath both nullified a positive commandment and violated a prohibition. Very good. Yes, that’s why I’m bringing this introduction. So Maimonides says that when the duplication is in commandments of different types, then the duplication rule of the ninth root does not apply. Here we do count two commandments. The question is, first: why? But a more fundamental question is: what exactly is the definition of a prohibition and of a positive commandment? After all, if a prohibition and a positive commandment can both have the same content, then in what sense is this a prohibition and that a positive commandment? They tell me to rest on the Sabbath, and they tell me not to do labor on the Sabbath. Understand—they are telling me the same thing in two formulations. So why should I care that these are two different formulations? Why is this a positive commandment and that a prohibition? What is the difference between a positive commandment and a prohibition? So there is an article by Aharon Shemesh, of blessed memory—he was here in the Talmud department here, died relatively young—and he has an article in Tarbiz, and he claims—academic archaeology of the Talmud, never mind that now—he says that in the early generations, in the early strata of the Talmud, the distinction between a positive commandment and a prohibition was a practical distinction. If it imposes on you an obligation to act, it is a positive commandment; if it forbids something to you, or imposes an obligation of refraining, then it is a prohibition. Meaning, the content or the act determines the character of the commandment—whether it is a prohibition or a positive commandment. In the later strata of the Talmud it became linguistic. If the Torah formulates it as a positive command—“and you shall afflict yourselves”—that is a positive commandment, even though what it imposes on me is not to eat. That’s a prohibition. Or rest on the Sabbath: what it imposes on me is not to do labor, but since the language is positive language—not “do not do any labor” but “rest on the Sabbath” and “on the seventh day you shall rest”—then it is a positive commandment and not a prohibition. Meaning, the criterion is a linguistic criterion. He says that the later passages in the Talmud have

[Speaker B] indications

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of what is an early passage and what is a late passage—doesn’t matter now, that’s the doctrine of the people across the street. I don’t deal with that. But I’m saying in principle—no, not because it’s wrong, it just doesn’t interest me; everyone with his own areas of interest. But the claim is that it changed from a practical definition to a linguistic definition. Now for our purposes, leave all the archaeology aside. In our Talmud and in the halakhic decisors it is completely clear that the practical definition is not the definition. If the practical definition determined things, there would be no sixth root in Maimonides, because once there is duplication between a prohibition and a positive commandment, according to the practical definitions this is simply two prohibitions or two positive commandments, depending on the content. For example: “you shall not place blood in your house” and “you shall make a parapet for your roof”—again, a prohibition and a positive commandment about the same thing: put a parapet there so there won’t be blood, or whatever, but it’s a positive and negative formulation of the same thing. So that ought to be two commandments. Which two? Positive commandments or prohibitions? Two positive commandments or two prohibitions?

[Speaker D] Simply speaking it seems they’d be positive commandments, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You have to make a parapet so that there won’t be danger in the house. So that is apparently two positive commandments. “You shall not place blood in your house” means: build a parapet.

[Speaker C] Positive commandment, positive commandment, reason.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter, as an example, not important right now. By contrast, regarding the Sabbath I would say this is two prohibitions, right?

[Speaker C] So

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] there cannot be a situation where there is a duplicate positive commandment and prohibition such that the sixth root would be needed at all. Because always, whenever there is a prohibition and a positive commandment with the same content, they would in fact be two prohibitions or two positive commandments. If Maimonides writes a sixth root, it’s clear that he assumes this can be a prohibition. By the way, Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perlow really does disagree on this point. He claims that Rav Saadia Gaon disagrees on this point—I don’t understand how, but that’s what he claims—that really no, in terms of content this is two prohibitions and two positive commandments. But in Sabbath rest it is one commandment. Yes, but in other commandments where that is not true. Never mind, you also see in the Talmud that it’s not like that. So I really don’t understand this Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perlow. In Maimonides it’s clear, it’s the plain meaning of the Talmud, it’s all the medieval authorities (Rishonim), it’s not… what? Yes, that’s also how it is in the Talmud. What is “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood”? That’s a prohibition, right? Various commandments are counted as prohibitions. What does it impose on me? To act, to save someone who is in distress. I see someone drowning, I have to try to save him, right? That imposes on me an obligation to act. So why is it a prohibition? Because the content

[Speaker C] is action.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Fine, so it’s a prohibition.

[Speaker C] Now, the positive commandment changes. What? The positive commandment changes in every event.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter, but what it imposes on me is an obligation to act in each event as needed, and that is still an obligation to act and not to refrain. Okay? On the contrary, the commandment always… not all the situations. The formulation of a prohibition tells me: don’t do something, refrain. The formulation of a positive commandment says: don’t refrain, act. Meaning, a positive commandment in the simple practical definition is fulfilled through positive action and transgressed through passive omission. A prohibition is fulfilled through passive omission and transgressed through positive action. Right? That is basically the difference. But all this is only if the definition is practical. But if the definition is linguistic, that is not true. Here, “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood” is fulfilled through positive action even though it is a prohibition. Sabbath rest is fulfilled by refraining even though it is a positive commandment. So there is something here—it is not always duplicated. Sometimes it’s not duplicated; in “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood” it’s one thing. In the duplicated places it is certainly like that. One side there is always like that in the duplicated cases. So what is the definition? Before the question, understand—I’ll say more than that. Maimonides says—first of all, in the sixth root he says first of all that we count two, two commandments. But second, he adds: the positive commandment among the positive commandments and the prohibition among the prohibitions. Why does he need to add that? Because that too is a novelty. He says: besides the fact that I count two commandments here, know that the positive commandment is really a positive commandment, and the prohibition is really a prohibition. That’s not so simple. That too is a novelty. Because one might have said: fine, we count it as two because the Torah changed the wording, but really both are prohibitions, because all it’s telling me is not to do labor. And Maimonides says no: we count both because there really is a reason that this is a positive commandment and this is a prohibition. It’s not just that we happen to count both. Meaning, that is exactly what the root is coming to say—that Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perlow is not right. Meaning, the positive commandment is really a positive commandment even though it imposes on me an obligation to refrain, and the prohibition is a prohibition. Now, what is problematic here—and I once wrote this in some article—is that Aharon Shemesh is right as an academic. Meaning, the academic wants to focus on the factual domain; he says: factually, I’m telling you, in the early strata the definition is practical, in the later strata the definition is linguistic. But obviously there cannot be a definition that is only linguistic. Because I ask myself: why did the Torah formulate the language this way here and that way there? After all, if you tell me that in terms of content it’s the same thing, then why did the Torah choose to formulate it this way here and that way there? Clearly, the Torah’s choosing to formulate things in different ways is because there really is some sort of difference here. What, they just held a lottery? This one we’ll formulate in the passive, that one in the active—just random draws? Different formulation expresses different content. But practically it’s the same thing. So how can there be different formulations for the same thing? Or I’ll put it in the language of logic: what is the difference between telling me to put on phylacteries and forbidding me not to put on phylacteries? Double negation in logic cancels out, right? If “it is not true that it is not true that X,” that’s like saying X. But “it is not true that it is not true that X” is basically a prohibition. And X is a positive commandment. How can it be that two things that are logically equivalent—one is a positive commandment and one is a prohibition? There is here

[Speaker B] emphasis, emphasis.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what is emphasis? What, what? Emphases are… words.

[Speaker B] It’s supposed to be different.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In what way is it different?

[Speaker B] I think it’s not equivalent. Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because

[Speaker B] to rest on the Sabbath requires you to be in a certain state.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, not to do

[Speaker D] labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you need to be in a state. Look, first of all, on the logical level that’s actually right—it is not equivalent. If they tell me, for example, don’t—say, don’t eat pork. Fine? So they’re saying: I don’t want you to eat pork. Fine? Or: I want you not to eat pork. Is that the same thing? No. The operation

[Speaker B] same thing. No, absolutely not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not commutative. The wanting and the negation are not commutative. You can’t switch their places in the sentence. To say “I want you not to eat pork” is not the same thing as “I don’t want you to eat pork.”

[Speaker D] Because if not

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right—if I don’t want you to eat pork, it could be that I’m indifferent to it, and it could be that I want you not to eat. To say I want you not to eat—that’s a prohibition. To say I don’t want you to eat—that could be something neutral. Meaning, on the logical level there is no equivalence here. Whoever thinks there is equivalence here—“not want not” is not the same as “want.” Because “not”—those who know some mathematics, yes? When operator A inverse B A—this is not B. Only if B and A are commutative. If B and A are commutative then A inverse A cancels and B remains. Fine, that’s just a note for the mathematicians. But for our purposes, it is not logically equivalent. Now, in human language, the difference is the question of what the Torah really wants. A positive commandment is a commandment in which the Torah points to a state that is desirable in its eyes. When the Torah wants us to rest, it is basically telling me: the state of rest is a desirable state in my eyes. Now suppose there had only been a positive commandment to rest on the Sabbath. If I did labor, that would not be such a terrible thing. Because it would not be a negative act; I just wouldn’t be in the positive state that the Torah wanted me to be in. But if the Torah says there is a prohibition on doing labor, what it is basically saying is: the state of doing labor is a negative state. Therefore this is a severe transgression. You are going head-on against the Torah’s will. When I don’t do what the Torah wants me to do, that is a passive transgression. Notice, it’s the same thing—both are not doing labor. When I do labor, if on the Sabbath there were only a positive commandment to rest on the Sabbath, let’s say, then that would still impose on me not to do labor. If I do labor, then I am not resting. But the value of the matter is different. Because if this is a positive commandment to rest, then when I did labor I didn’t do something negative; I simply was not in the positive state.

[Speaker B] Even though

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I acted actively, but in terms of value, that action is not something negative; it is only not something positive. By contrast, if there is a prohibition on doing labor, then when I do labor I have gone head-on against the Torah’s will. I was in a state that the Torah defines as negative. Not merely not—in short, it’s not that I’m not righteous, I’m wicked. If the Torah defines it as a positive commandment, then if I did labor I’m not righteous. But when the Torah says “do not do labor,” it is basically telling me: if you do labor, you are wicked.

[Speaker C] What place does the positive commandment have then?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Once there is a prohibition, what place does the positive commandment have? The Torah says there are both things. If you rest, it’s not—because if the Torah tells me “do not do labor,” only a prohibition. Let’s say I didn’t do labor. There is nothing positive here; I simply wasn’t in the negative state. I don’t deserve reward. I’m not righteous, I just wasn’t wicked. The Torah says no: if you refrain from doing labor, you are also righteous and you deserve reward. That is why there is reward for positive commandments and not for prohibitions.

[Speaker D] Because

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For positive commandments you deserve reward because you were righteous. For prohibitions there is punishment, and for positive commandments there isn’t. Because with a prohibition, when you violate it you are wicked and you deserve punishment. With a positive commandment, if you nullified a positive commandment you are not righteous, but you do not deserve punishment for not being righteous. Punishment is given only to the wicked. Okay? Therefore, you have to spend all your money in order not to violate a prohibition. Because in order not to be wicked, you have to spend all your money. In order to be righteous—up to a fifth. There is no such basic obligation to be righteous. It is very nice to be righteous, it is good to be righteous, but that is not a basic obligation. And if you are not righteous, fine—not a great disaster.

[Speaker C] So they’re not only linguistic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, the language reflects that difference. The linguistic difference is real. But the language does not stand on its own. The language reflects—the Torah: a positive commandment is pointing to a positive state. A prohibition is pointing to a negative state. That is the definition of a positive commandment and a prohibition. Now understand that essentially this goes back to the old conception, because basically—think about the positive commandment to rest, okay? Suppose I did labor. Did I transgress through positive action or through passive omission? Through passive omission. Even though I did labor, I did an act. But my transgression is a passive transgression, because I was not in the positive state. So therefore, essentially, this is a transgression of passive omission, not a transgression of positive action. Physically, of course, it happened through positive action, but essentially I did not clash head-on with the Torah’s will. The clash with the Torah’s will is passive, not active. I did not do what the Torah wanted. Yes, assuming there is a positive commandment, yes. By contrast, regarding the prohibition: if I did labor and there is a prohibition on doing labor, that is a head-on clash with the Torah’s will; that is positive action. It is positive action on the conceptual level, not on the physical level. What? So there aren’t two layers? No, there are two layers.

[Speaker C] No, in terms of what I was about to say, that in the end this is…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in the early layer they identified passive omission and positive action with the physically passive omission and physically positive action, and in the later layer it underwent abstraction. Exactly—and they broadened that same… it’s the same idea, but it has very large halakhic implications. I’m just saying, that’s the claim. The claim is that this process is not a revolution—abandoning what was before and replacing it with another definition. It is a more refined, more abstract version of that same early distinction that existed, and I think that is a paradigm, by the way, for all such processes. All the processes that academics or researchers of that kind always point to—I think, I haven’t checked everything, but for many things this is true. These are processes that take the initial outlook, which was cruder, simpler, and it undergoes refinement, it undergoes abstraction, but it’s the same idea; it just becomes abstract. That’s really what happens here. Therefore, for our purposes now, if I summarize: basically a positive commandment says to me, be in the positive state. If you are not there, that is not a head-on clash with God’s will; it is a passive clash with God’s will on the conceptual level, it is passive omission, and therefore there is no punishment for that, though of course you will not receive reward if you did not perform the commandment. In a prohibition, if you violate it, that is a head-on clash with the Torah’s will; you are wicked. You did something the Torah said not to do, not that you failed to do something the Torah said to do. Okay? So here you are wicked and deserve punishment. If you refrained from it, you don’t deserve reward; you are not righteous, you simply avoided being wicked. Therefore you don’t deserve reward. Okay? So reward and punishment are expressions of, or consequences of, this essential difference between a positive commandment and a prohibition. That is the definition of the difference between a positive commandment and a prohibition. I’ll give you an example that…

[Speaker B] On the one hand you have all those acts where on one side you have a positive commandment, on the other side a prohibition, meaning to bring out…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That both sides are there. It tells you: this is a positive state, and opposite it is a negative state; there is no neutrality here. If you don’t do it, you’re wicked; if you do it, you’re righteous. You can’t be average with respect to labor and the Sabbath. If you did labor, you’re wicked; if you didn’t do labor, you’re righteous.

[Speaker B] There’s no neutral state.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. If there were only a positive commandment, you could be either average or righteous. If there were only a prohibition, you could be either wicked or average.

[Speaker C] Sometimes there’s also a state with a prohibition—say, he withstood a test, he withstood a test.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not connected, that’s conceptual. I’m speaking halakhically; halakhically there is nothing there. He intended to eat pork and lamb came into his hand—the Brisker Rav, in the stencil on Nazir, writes that this is literally a prohibition. That cannot be right; obviously it’s not literally a prohibition. Anyway, for our purposes, maybe I’ll give an example that sharpens the point, and with that I’ll stop because I see we need to finish already. Wait, I’ll get there, I’ll get to Yom Kippur, and this whole introduction is for that. Yes. But I just want to give an example that sharpens it more. You know, there was a legal philosopher named Robert Nozick, an American Jew. Robert Nozick?

[Speaker D] Yes, and he argued…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What was he? Mainly a legal philosopher, yes. So he asked the question: what is the difference between enticement and extortion? The law prohibits extortion but permits enticement. If I tell a person: look, if you do such-and-such, I’ll take a hundred shekels from you by force. If you don’t do it, then no, everything’s fine. Is that allowed? Forbidden. Extortion, right? Forbidden. Now if I say to him: look, if you do such-and-such you’ll receive a hundred shekels, and if you don’t do it, then you won’t receive. That’s enticement; it’s permitted. Every employment contract is like that, right? You make a contract with him: do the work, you’ll get a hundred shekels; don’t do it, you won’t get paid. That’s permitted. What’s the difference? In both cases I’m creating for him a distinction involving a difference of a hundred shekels; the potential gap is a hundred shekels. Okay? Why is this permitted and that forbidden? Because this is zero versus one hundred, and that is minus one hundred versus zero. Meaning, there is a zero state. The zero state is that my money is mine. That’s the state that is, of course, legitimate. Now, you cannot offer me a deal where even one side of it violates my rights. The state of enticement says: look, the zero state will remain zero; we have the right to preserve the zero state. You want to get a hundred shekels from me that you’re not entitled to? If you want, do work. Both sides of that deal are legitimate sides. I’m allowed not to give him money if he doesn’t deserve it, and I’m allowed to give him money if he does work; everything is permitted. In extortion, true, he can also remain with his money if he does what I want, and that is of course permitted. But if he doesn’t, I’ll take a hundred shekels from him, and that is forbidden—I can’t take a hundred shekels from him; it’s his. Okay? That’s a deal in which at least one side is illegal. Now, in order to define the difference between enticement and extortion, I actually have to define that there is an objective zero state. Because if the question were only a question of differential gap, just the spread between the potential outcomes, then it wouldn’t matter—there would be no difference between enticement and extortion. In both cases I’m offering you two possibilities whose difference is a hundred shekels. But clearly the location on the axis matters; there is an objective location. It’s not only a matter of the difference. If it’s zero versus one hundred, that’s permitted; if it’s minus one hundred versus zero, that’s forbidden. Meaning, there is some objective state that defines the zero. All deals have to take place above the axis. Below the axis I can’t operate. This is exactly the situation with positive commandments and prohibitions. A positive commandment and a prohibition basically mean this: look, there is the zero state, the average person. If you want to be average, be average. If you want to be righteous, do this. If you are below the zero state, you are wicked. And therefore the difference between a prohibition and a positive commandment is that a prohibition is extortion and a positive commandment is enticement. With a positive commandment they’re basically telling me: look, if you do this you’ll get reward; if you don’t do this, nothing will happen. With a prohibition they’re telling me: look, if you do this you’ll get lashes; if you don’t do this, nothing will happen. The Holy One, blessed be He, is allowed to extort us. Yes, but I’m saying, that’s basically the idea. The idea is that here it’s extortion and there it’s enticement. And the whole reason why we got confused and thought that a positive commandment and a prohibition are the same thing is because we thought everything was only differential. We didn’t understand that there is an objective zero state, the average state.

[Speaker B] Okay? Fine, let’s stop here. What? It’s a case of an added penalty.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, that’s not terrible,

[Speaker B] if there’s both a prohibition and a positive commandment together.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes? Right. A penalty is forbidden to impose. That’s it, we’re done.