Tractate Yoma – Elul 5783 – Lesson 5

Table of Contents

• The framework of the positive commandment and prohibition on Yom Kippur, and the count of the afflictions
• The Mishnah’s wording, “forbidden,” versus “liable to karet,” and explaining it as referring to a half-measure
• The concept of “prohibition” in Jewish law, and the claim that there is no rabbinic prohibition without an authorized enactment
• A baraita about karet applying only to eating and drinking, and the Talmud’s suggestions for reading the Mishnah
• “A Sabbath of complete rest” as the source for expanding affliction, and the meaning of “the rabbis attached it to this verse”
• The passage in Nedarim about washing as affliction, and the claim that Yom Kippur affliction is “present affliction”
• Rabbeinu Tam’s proofs from the leniencies regarding the four afflictions, and the discussion of “override” versus “it was never prohibited in the first place”
• Passages in Yoma: “To whom do the five afflictions correspond,” verbal analogy, and the distinction between passive omission and positive action
• A dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim): rabbinic versus Torah-level, and the view of the She’iltot
• The Ran: Torah-level because “Scripture handed it over to the sages” versus rabbinic, and the difficulty from children
• Maimonides: “by received tradition,” the positive commandment of “a Sabbath of complete rest,” and punishments

Summary

General Overview

The text focuses the learning on the afflictions of Yom Kippur, moving from the general framework to the details of the laws of affliction, and it sets up a basic division between eating and drinking and the other four afflictions. It establishes that the Talmud explicitly assigns karet only to eating and drinking, and asks about the halakhic status of washing, anointing, wearing shoes, and marital relations: are they Torah-level or rabbinic, and do they involve both a positive commandment and a prohibition? It analyzes the language of the Mishnah and the Talmud regarding “forbidden” versus “liable to karet,” brings the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish concerning a half-measure, and compares various sources in Yoma, Nedarim, and other passages that paint a non-uniform picture. It presents the view of Tosafot and Rabbeinu Tam that the four are rabbinic, as opposed to views that treat them as Torah-level by force of “complete rest,” and concludes with an analysis of Maimonides and Sefer HaMitzvot, including indications that the positive commandment includes all of them, while the prohibition and punishments are focused mainly on eating and drinking.

The framework of the positive commandment and prohibition on Yom Kippur, and the count of the afflictions

The text states that the explicit verse gives a positive commandment of affliction—“you shall afflict yourselves”—and a prohibition on labor—“you shall do no labor”—and that the other components are derived in ways not written explicitly. It says that according to most views there is both a prohibition and a positive commandment both for affliction and for labor, and it brings exceptional views: Tosafot Rid, according to whom labor has only a prohibition, and Behag and Rav Saadia Gaon, according to whom labor has only a positive commandment. The Mishnah counts six afflictions: eating, drinking, washing, anointing, wearing shoes, and marital relations; while in the Talmud they are counted as five because drinking is included within eating, whereas in the Jerusalem Talmud there is a reference to six. It establishes that eating and drinking are one category and the other four afflictions are another category, and emphasizes that karet is explicit only for eating and drinking, while for the other afflictions there is no karet.

The Mishnah’s wording, “forbidden,” versus “liable to karet,” and explaining it as referring to a half-measure

The text brings the Talmud’s difficulty with the Mishnah’s wording “forbidden,” because in the case of eating and drinking there is karet, and it offers the answer of Rabbi Ila / Rabbi Yirmiyah that the Mishnah is needed for a half-measure. It defines a half-measure as eating less than a large date or drinking less than a cheekful, and cites the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish: Rabbi Yohanan holds that a half-measure is forbidden by Torah law, while Reish Lakish holds that it is permitted by Torah law. It explains that according to the standard approach, the quantitative measure is a condition for punishment, not for the prohibition itself, while there is also an alternative view in which the measure is a condition for the prohibition, and a half-measure is a newly defined prohibition of its own. It says that the Talmud initially assumes that according to Reish Lakish a half-measure is entirely permitted, and in the end concludes that Reish Lakish agrees it is forbidden rabbinically, so that the wording “forbidden” will make sense.

The concept of “prohibition” in Jewish law, and the claim that there is no rabbinic prohibition without an authorized enactment

The text states that in Jewish law there are prohibitions that carry no punishment by a human court, and uses that to explain the distinction in rabbinic language between “forbidden” and “liable.” It sharply criticizes the use by a contemporary halakhic decisor of the claim “if it’s not Torah-level, then it must be rabbinic” without any source of an enactment by a religious court, and says this is a factual claim that requires an authorized institution that actually established the prohibition. It emphasizes the principle that “in Jewish law, you don’t need reasons to permit; you need reasons to forbid,” and argues that this is a model case for many mistakes in modern halakhic ruling, giving as an example a discussion about the mourner’s Kaddish where, in his view, the starting assumption of prohibition is missing, so there is no basis from which the discussion can even begin.

A baraita about karet applying only to eating and drinking, and the Talmud’s suggestions for reading the Mishnah

The text cites a baraita: “Even though they said it is forbidden in all of them, they said liable to karet only regarding one who eats, drinks, or performs labor,” and infers from it that the term “forbidden” applies even where there is karet, though it is not exhaustive. It presents two directions in the Talmud for reconciling this: one is that the text is abbreviated, and “forbidden” refers to a half-measure, while a full measure is liable to karet; the other is the interpretation that “it teaches forbidden regarding the others,” meaning the other afflictions. It argues that both approaches preserve, to some degree, the tension around the question whether “forbidden” can properly be said even of something that carries karet, or whether it does not belong there at all.

“A Sabbath of complete rest” as the source for expanding affliction, and the meaning of “the rabbis attached it to this verse”

The text cites Rashi on the derivation from “complete rest” as extending affliction beyond eating and drinking, and explains that Rashi compares this to the Sabbath, where “rest” serves to include prohibitions that are not full-fledged labor. It argues that the expression “the rabbis attached it to this verse” does not necessarily mean rabbinic law, because there is also a kind of textual support for Torah-level law when the source is not explicit and the sages link it to a verse. It emphasizes that most Torah-level prohibitions are not written explicitly in the Torah, and that the sages function in two roles: as interpreters who generate Torah-level laws, and as legislators who generate rabbinic laws; the distinction is not chronological but essential. It presents Nachmanides’ view regarding certain Torah-level Sabbath restrictions that shape the character of the day, and compares that to the possibility that the Yom Kippur afflictions too may be expanded on a Torah level through “complete rest.”

The passage in Nedarim about washing as affliction, and the claim that Yom Kippur affliction is “present affliction”

The text brings the Talmud in Nedarim, chapter 8, about someone who swore “to afflict himself,” and whether that includes washing, and the difficulty raised there from Yom Kippur: if refraining from washing is considered affliction, there ought to be karet for washing on Yom Kippur. It brings Rava’s answer, which distinguishes between Yom Kippur, where what is required is “something recognized as affliction right now,” and vows, where even “something that will lead to affliction” counts. It concludes that refraining from washing is not immediate affliction but leads to future affliction, and therefore there is no karet for it. It stresses that this creates a difficulty, because the language of “affliction” appears both in the positive commandment—“you shall afflict”—and in the karet verse—“whoever will not be afflicted”—and from here the possibility arises that the four are not included in Torah-level affliction at all, and their prohibition is rabbinic. It cites Tosafot in Nedarim, who explicitly resolves this by saying that “the verse of affliction is only a textual support,” and the other afflictions are rabbinic.

Rabbeinu Tam’s proofs from the leniencies regarding the four afflictions, and the discussion of “override” versus “it was never prohibited in the first place”

The text cites Rabbeinu Tam in Tosafot, who states that all the Yom Kippur afflictions besides eating and drinking are rabbinic, and proves it from various leniencies, such as washing when one is soiled with mud or excrement, anointing for someone with sores, and using consecrated oil in a certain way—because if these were Torah-level they should not have been permitted. It presents the opposite possibility, that these leniencies are not cases of setting the rule aside because of need, but rather cases that were never included in the prohibition to begin with, because the prohibition is only “for pleasure,” and anything not done for pleasure is outside the prohibition. It sets this against the question of “since he derives benefit,” which weakens the claim of “unintentional” in acts of enjoyment, and suggests that Rabbeinu Tam relies on that in order to conclude that these are rabbinic.

Passages in Yoma: “To whom do the five afflictions correspond,” verbal analogy, and the distinction between passive omission and positive action

The text cites Yoma 76, where the question is asked, “To whom do these five afflictions correspond?”—that is, to the five occurrences of “affliction” in the Torah—and notes that drinking is included within eating. It also cites Yoma 74, a baraita on “you shall afflict yourselves,” which teaches that this does not require active afflictions like sitting in the sun or in the cold, and derives from “you shall do no labor” that affliction is a matter of passive omission rather than positive action. It combines this with a discussion about trimming vegetables, and cites the Ritva, who argues that trimming is permitted because it adds distress by involving oneself with food without eating it, and explains that this still fits passive omission because the affliction is not the act of trimming itself but the condition it creates. It brings the continuation, “affliction that is loss of life,” which identifies the primary affliction with eating and drinking, and stresses that this creates a difficulty with respect to washing, anointing, and marital relations, which are not hunger-affliction and are not “loss of life”; from this he raises the possibility that their source is “a Sabbath of complete rest” or some other mechanism that is not hunger-affliction.

A dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim): rabbinic versus Torah-level, and the view of the She’iltot

The text says that many of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) at the beginning of the chapter take the four to be rabbinic, and cites the old Tosafot as inferring this both from the absence of karet and from the leniencies. Against this it presents the She’iltot, which explicitly states that all the afflictions—eating, drinking, washing, anointing, wearing shoes, and marital relations—are Torah-level, and even uses the phrase “He warned us,” which indicates a prohibition. It cites from the She’iltot the question of how it is permitted for a sick person to wear socks or wrap cloth around his feet, and presents its answer as depending on the distinction that the main prohibition of wearing shoes is because of “comfort,” and where there is no comfort there is no prohibition. It concludes there with “and so is the Jewish law,” according to the framework it lays out.

The Ran: Torah-level because “Scripture handed it over to the sages” versus rabbinic, and the difficulty from children

The text cites the Ran, who explains that the Mishnah’s “forbidden” refers to a half-measure in eating and drinking, and that regarding the other afflictions “there is a prohibition, but there is no karet.” He also brings the opposing view, that the other afflictions are rabbinic and the verses are only textual support, with proof from the leniencies and from the expression “to whom do they correspond.” He objects that the wording of the baraita, “they only said liable to karet,” implies that there is a Torah-level prohibition in the other afflictions too, not merely the absence of karet, and therefore he tends toward viewing the whole thing as Torah-level. He explains that since they come from the expansion of “complete rest” and not from an explicit verse of affliction, “Scripture handed it over to the sages,” and they therefore were lenient and permitted anything not done for pleasure; he attributes this also to Maimonides. He raises a further difficulty from the baraita that children are permitted in all these matters except wearing shoes, and argues that if this is Torah-level it is difficult because of the exposition “do not eat them” meaning “do not feed them,” which warns adults regarding children. He notes that permission in eating and drinking can be explained by danger to life, but in the four other afflictions there is no loss of life, so the matter does not fit simply.

Maimonides: “by received tradition,” the positive commandment of “a Sabbath of complete rest,” and punishments

The text cites Maimonides in Laws of the Resting of the Tenth Day 1: “And so too we have learned by received tradition that it is forbidden to wash on it, or to anoint, or to wear shoes, or to have sexual relations,” and immediately adds, “and it is a commandment to refrain from all these… as it says, ‘a Sabbath of complete rest.’” He interprets “Sabbath” as referring to eating and drinking, and “complete rest” as referring to these others. It emphasizes that Maimonides rules that one is liable to neither karet nor a sin-offering except for eating and drinking alone, while for washing, anointing, wearing shoes, and marital relations there is only disciplinary flogging. It notes that the absence of a sin-offering raises the question whether there is a full prohibition here, and suggests the possibility that since there is no case of “its intentional violation carries karet,” there is no case of “its unwitting violation brings a sin-offering,” even if there is a prohibition; or alternatively, that there is no prohibition here, only a positive commandment. It cites the wording of Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 164, which explains “you shall afflict yourselves” as affliction involving loss of life, namely eating and drinking, and adds, “and so too the tradition teaches that it is forbidden” regarding the four other afflictions. In that way it indicates that the verse itself is focused on eating and drinking, while the other four join in by force of tradition and the cessation implied by “a Sabbath of complete rest.”

Good morning. Today I want to touch on the afflictions of Yom Kippur. We’re gradually narrowing the focus, from the broad framework inward to the details. We started with the general perspective, a bit about the meaning of Yom Kippur, entering the holy. After that I talked about the Torah-level commandments regarding Yom Kippur: the positive commandment and the prohibition with respect to affliction, and the positive commandment and the prohibition with respect to labor. Then we went a bit more into the details: where do we even derive the positive commandment regarding labor, and the prohibition regarding affliction, since they aren’t written explicitly in the Torah. What is written is only the positive commandment of affliction, “and you shall afflict yourselves,” and the prohibition of labor, “you shall do no labor.” In the end, according to most approaches, there is both a prohibition and a positive commandment, both for affliction and for labor. We did see, however, that there are exceptional views according to which labor has only a prohibition. As for a view that affliction has only a positive commandment, I don’t think there is one, because there is karet there, and the Talmud says that the karet of Yom Kippur is not among the two cases where karet accompanies a positive commandment alone—namely Passover and circumcision. So there the medieval authorities are forced to accept the fact that there is a prohibition regarding affliction, even though its source is not all that clear. But regarding labor, I said that most say there is a positive commandment; there are Tosafot Rid, Behag, and Rasag—they apparently say that there is only, sorry, according to Tosafot Rid there is only a prohibition, and according to Behag and Rasag it is only a positive commandment. In any case, in the Mishnah at the beginning of the chapter it appears that there are six afflictions: eating, drinking, washing, anointing, wearing shoes, and marital relations. And in the Talmud it’s classified as five afflictions because drinking is included within eating. So eating and drinking are the same thing, and the other four together make five afflictions. In the Jerusalem Talmud there is some reference to it really being six. But for our purposes, we’re really talking about eating and drinking together as one. The question whether they combine with one another is a different question, but that doesn’t touch on whether they are two separate prohibitions, only whether they are two different ways of violating the prohibition. So it could be that eating and drinking would not combine, even though eating and drinking are one prohibition. But for our purposes eating and drinking are one category, and the other four afflictions are another category. Regarding karet, it is explicit in the Talmud that karet applies only to eating and drinking. For the other four afflictions there is no karet. What is there regarding the other four afflictions? Is it rabbinic, Torah-level, a prohibition, a positive commandment? About that we’ll talk today. But this is basically the division of all the afflictions into two subcategories. So maybe we’ll begin with the Mishnah. “On Yom Kippur it is forbidden to eat and drink, and to wash, and to anoint, and to wear shoes, and to have marital relations.” Right, so that’s what we saw: the six, or five, afflictions. There in the Talmud they say the following: Gemara—“Forbidden? It is punishable by karet!” What do you mean, it’s forbidden? “On Yom Kippur it is forbidden to eat, to anoint,” and so on. It isn’t just forbidden—it is punishable by karet. Rabbi Ila, and some say Rabbi Yirmiyah, said: “This was only necessary for a half-measure.” “This was only necessary for a half-measure.” Fine according to the one who says that a half-measure is forbidden by Torah law. So it’s talking about a half-measure. What does that mean? Someone who eats or drinks less than the required measure—a large date’s bulk for eating, or a cheekful for drinking. So someone who eats or drinks less than that, that’s what in Jewish law is called a half-measure. The main source for the topic of half-measures is also in Yoma. I assume we won’t manage to really get into it—maybe we’ll still see what I do in the next two sessions; we only have two more sessions. But regarding a half-measure I’ll already say here: there is a dispute between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan. Rabbi Yohanan says that a half-measure is forbidden by Torah law; Reish Lakish says that a half-measure is forbidden rabbinically, or that a half-measure is not forbidden by Torah law. Here the Talmud says that he still says it is forbidden rabbinically. What does it mean that a half-measure is forbidden by Torah law? Then what is the meaning of the measures if even a half-measure is forbidden by Torah law? The meaning is that punishment is not given for less than the required measure. In other words, the measures are a condition for punishment, but the prohibition exists even for a half-measure. That is the accepted view. There are views that say—say that even the prohibition does not exist for a half-measure. In other words, someone who eats, say—and by the way, “half” doesn’t specifically mean half but anything less than the required measure—so someone who eats three-quarters of an olive of pork has not violated the prohibition of eating pork, but rather has violated the prohibition of a half-measure. That is a novel prohibition in its own right, and then it means that the measure was stated both as a condition for the prohibition and as a condition for punishment. And the prohibition of a half-measure is a novel prohibition learned from “all forbidden fat”; the Talmud here talks about that. The accepted view is not like that: eating pork in less than the measure for pork is still the prohibition of pork, but if there is no required measure then there will be no punishment for it. All right? But there is a Torah prohibition here—that is Rabbi Yohanan’s position. Reish Lakish says no, the measure is a condition for the prohibition, and therefore if you ate less than the required measure there is no prohibition, and of course also no punishment. So about that the Talmud says: if that’s the case, what it says in our Mishnah—“On Yom Kippur it is forbidden to eat and drink,” and so on—what does “forbidden” mean? After all, there is a punishment of karet here. The Talmud assumes that regarding something punishable by karet, the expression “forbidden” is not appropriate. Why not? Is it not forbidden? It is forbidden. But generally, when there is punishment, you should say “liable.” In other words, one who eats and drinks on Yom Kippur is liable to karet, or liable to lashes, or liable to whatever punishment applies to that prohibition. When they say “forbidden,” usually that comes to say that there is no punishment, but there is a prohibition. You know that in different legal systems there is no such thing as a prohibition without a punishment. That is, every prohibition in the law book has a sanction attached to it; if there is no prohibition there is no sanction. All right? In Jewish law it isn’t like that. In Jewish law there are prohibitions that do not have any human punishment attached to them—possibly heavenly punishment, but not human punishment. That’s one of the paradoxical aspects of the law of “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood.” Right? Hanan Porat passed the law of “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood,” and of course the whole discussion there was not really about the law, because the law itself interested nobody. What interested both the supporters and the opponents was pushing another verse into the law book. That’s really what they wanted to do. That was basically Hanan Porat’s motivation, and that was also, of course, the motivation behind some of the opposition. In other words, the argument was not about the actual content. But the great absurdity is what Czechoslovakia did—no, that’s another discussion—but the great absurdity in introducing it was that before they put it into the law books, the legal situation in the State of Israel was actually exactly like Jewish law. Why? Because socially it was obviously not okay, right? But there was no punishment because there was no law forbidding it. Everyone understood that it was not okay not to save someone, right? The law was not legislated because people saw some problem that people weren’t saving people; it was legislated in order to insert a verse. So everyone understood that it was not okay, but there was no punishment. That is exactly the situation in Jewish law. What did Hanan Porat do in order to insert Jewish law into the law books? He turned it into a law, and now it’s not okay and there is a punishment attached to it—in other words, now it is no longer like Jewish law. Okay? In other words, that’s usually the absurdity that is very, very typical of these ridiculous debates about Hebrew law and introducing it into civil law and so on. Anyway, for our purposes, the term “forbidden” is not suitable when dealing with Torah prohibitions—at least Torah prohibitions that have a punishment attached to them. Therefore the Talmud asks: since there is a punishment of karet here, how can it say “forbidden”? It should have said “liable to karet” or “punishable by karet.” Now, I’d already say here before continuing: fine, but the punishment of karet is only for eating and drinking, whereas the other afflictions are just prohibited. Whether Torah-level or rabbinic we’ll still see, but there is no punishment, so regarding the other afflictions the term “forbidden” does make sense. So when all the afflictions are brought together in one list, you could say that they took the lowest common denominator, right? Why is that difficult? So what if it is punishable by karet? Maybe the Talmud at that point thought that karet applies to everything, and only afterward was it clarified that the punishment of karet applies only to eating and drinking and not to the other afflictions. But the Talmud doesn’t answer that. The Talmud doesn’t answer here: no, the punishment of karet is only for eating and drinking, and the other afflictions aren’t. The Talmud says no, it is talking about a half-measure. So if so, it seems the Talmud is talking about all the afflictions as if there were a punishment of karet, and therefore it is forced to say that we’re talking about a half-measure. That’s not likely, because that should have entered here somewhere in the continuation of the discussion. Therefore it seems quite clear that the Talmud knows from the outset that karet applies only to eating and drinking and not to the other afflictions. There is also the point that eating and drinking are the prohibition. All right, that’s another discussion—you’re talking about karet, not prohibition. Fine, we’ll still talk about that, we’ll still talk about that, but for now that’s the given. That’s the given and it is agreed upon. There’s no dispute about it. So in the Talmud here I would have expected that when it says, why was the language “forbidden” used, it would say: because of the other four afflictions. You need to give the lowest common denominator. It somewhat seems from the Talmud’s question that the Talmud understands that the problem with the terminology “forbidden” regarding something that has punishment attached to it is that this terminology is not correct, not merely that it’s not sufficient. In other words, if it were merely not sufficient, then fine. But regarding the other afflictions, that is the correct terminology, and since it is relevant also to something that has punishment attached to it, and regarding the others it is the only possible term, then when I want to speak about the whole list I use the term “forbidden.” Okay? Therefore there should have been no room for the question. But the Talmud here apparently understands that the term “forbidden” simply does not apply to something that has punishment attached to it—not just that it doesn’t say everything, that it doesn’t exhaust the matter, because after all there is also punishment. No, it simply doesn’t apply. “Forbidden” is something else. That’s a bit strange—why not? In our language, at least, we use the term “forbidden” for Torah prohibitions, rabbinic prohibitions—this is the term we generally use. I don’t know. All these terms, by the way, appear in Maimonides in the eighth root—just a note in parentheses. Maimonides in the eighth root, for example, talks about the terminology of “commandment,” and from his perspective there he says that in Arabic there is no common term for negative commandments and positive commandments—sorry, there is no term for “commandment” that is shared by positive and negative commandments. That’s what he says there. And in Hebrew there is—it is called a “decree.” Not “commandment,” but “decree.” In other words, “commandment” means a positive commandment. So “prohibition” is something else, and there is a negative commandment, and there is “decree,” which is the general term for both. And in Arabic there is no inclusive term for both, and that’s somewhat telling—well, that’s a very interesting remark, because the fact that there is no term in the language perhaps really testifies to a lack of distinction on the cultural level too. In other words, they do not understand that these are even two categories that belong to the same conceptual framework. Yes, often a lack in language is not just because it has not yet developed enough, but because there is a different conception of the relationship. Positive commandments are one thing, negative commandments are another, and there is no reason to connect them to the same category; there is nothing shared that joins them together. Fine, not important, but for our purposes, I remembered Maimonides here simply because it seems to me that in the early stages of Jewish law I don’t really know which terms—like commandment, prohibition, negative commandment, decree—which terms were actually used for which purpose. And it may be that for some reason the Talmud here understands that “prohibition” is a term that doesn’t belong at all to things that have punishment attached to them, not just that it doesn’t say the whole picture. Because otherwise this question really is a strange one. Fine, for our purposes: “Fine according to the one who says that a half-measure is forbidden by Torah law. But according to the one who says that a half-measure is permitted by Torah law, what can be said?” Why does it matter whether it is forbidden by Torah law or not by Torah law? The Talmud at this stage assumes that according to Reish Lakish, who says that a half-measure is permitted by Torah law, there is also no rabbinic prohibition. There is nothing. It is permitted. So automatically you cannot say “forbidden” regarding a half-measure. You assume there is a prohibition, only without punishment. But if there is no prohibition at all, then “forbidden” is not applicable. That is the assumption at this point. Another note in parentheses: many times among halakhic decisors there is this sort of habit that they discuss a certain case. It is not forbidden by Torah law because it does not meet the standards of Torah law, the criteria of Torah law—so it is forbidden rabbinically. As if that were a ruling. What does it mean “so it is forbidden rabbinically”? For a rabbinic prohibition to be valid you need there to have been a sitting of a court, a Sanhedrin, or an authorized institution, that established a prohibition on that thing, right? Without that, even if you think it is proper to forbid it or that it is not right to do it—that may all be true—but a halakhic prohibition does not exist unless there is a Torah source or an enactment of an authorized institution. You cannot decide that because it does not meet the Torah standard, therefore it is probably rabbinic. If it said in the Talmud that it is forbidden, and you understand that it cannot be Torah law because it does not meet the Torah criteria, then you say: fine, so apparently the Talmud means that it is a rabbinic prohibition. But halakhic decisors do this all the time with things like riding a bicycle on the Sabbath. All right? Riding a bicycle on the Sabbath—pas nisht, it can’t possibly be permitted, so it must be forbidden rabbinically. What does “forbidden rabbinically” mean? If you tell me it falls under some decree, say, then we can discuss whether it does or does not fall under it. You cannot decide on your own that something is forbidden rabbinically. The claim that something is forbidden rabbinically is first of all a factual claim: there was a sitting of a court that established a prohibition on that thing. Without that, there is no rabbinic prohibition. By the way, the Hazon Ish—of the group? What? Muktzeh? No, muktzeh is the simplest case of all. Muktzeh appears clearly in the Talmud, and even the development of the prohibition in the chapter “All Sacred Writings,” “All the Vessels.” Rabbinic. Fine. What’s the problem? I don’t understand. No, I’m not objecting. It’s a rabbinic prohibition and it has a source; a court forbade it. In the days of Nehemiah son of Hacaliah, as the Talmud says in the chapter “All the Vessels,” it even describes the development of the story, how it happened. And there it’s clear that there was an authorized institution that established a prohibition, so it is a rabbinic prohibition, perfectly fine. The assumption is that anything that appears in the Talmud as a rabbinic prohibition, apparently there was some sitting of a court that forbade it. We do not always know when and where it was, but if the Talmud says so, then apparently it was forbidden. So therefore I’m not speaking about the Talmud, or inferences from the Talmud made by commentators on the Talmud. I’m speaking about halakhic decisors who discuss some question even nowadays and say: look, it is not forbidden by Torah law, but it’s pas nisht, it can’t be permitted, so it is forbidden rabbinically. There is no such thing. There is no such thing. It is simply false to say such a thing. There is no rabbinic prohibition unless there was an institution that established a prohibition on it. You can say it is not proper to do it; you can say it may lead to problems; whatever you want—recommend not doing it. But you cannot say that there is a rabbinic prohibition. There is a point here that people don’t pay attention to, and it is a very important point. It is a kind of adding to the law, adding to rabbinic law. Yes, you are adding a rabbinic prohibition on top of the existing rabbinic prohibitions. You cannot do such a thing. Okay? There is no such thing. And a decree upon a decree? A decree upon a decree is a policy of the institutions that are actually authorized. When there is an authorized institution, it can establish a decree upon a decree. Its policy is that it does not do so. I’m not talking about policy; I’m talking about a formal rule. If something was not established as a prohibition, then it is not forbidden. You know, the principle of legality says that whatever was not forbidden is permitted. Right. For the authorities it works the other way around—whatever was not permitted is forbidden to them—but for the citizen, whatever is not forbidden is permitted. In Jewish law you do not need reasons to permit. You need reasons to forbid. And if there is no reason at all, then it is permitted. And this is a foundational rule for a great deal of nonsense that is written in various halakhic rulings. People start discussing—once I saw about the mourner’s Kaddish. An article about—today I’m full of side remarks, yes—about mourner’s Kaddish. There was once an article in Makor Rishon, I think, by rabbis from Beit Hillel or things like that. It made me laugh terribly. I wrote a response to the newspaper about them. First of all, explain to me what the discussion is about. You bring one source that says it is permitted, another source where they had the custom to do it, another where the custom was not to. What exactly is the discussion? In other words, is there some prohibition you are talking about? Tell me what the prohibition is, and then discuss whether the prohibition applies here or doesn’t apply here. You cannot discuss something unless there is some reason to forbid it. If there is no reason to forbid it, it is permitted. That’s all—that’s my answer. There is no reason to forbid it, therefore it is permitted. That’s it. What else needs to be said? Why write a whole responsum? A whole responsum needs to be written when there are clauses on the table and you have to discuss whether they exist here or do not exist here, and then reach your conclusion. If there are no clauses, there is no discussion. And this is a serious disease in halakhic discourse nowadays. For example, Kaddish. What? Since when—this whole Kaddish business, yes. Fine, but that is its own whole affair: what happens with a matter of sanctity that is said with ten, why Kaddish is there at all, and what is the meaning of this rule that a matter of sanctity requires ten. What—if I said it without ten, did I violate a prohibition? Which prohibition did I violate? Am I forbidden to say Kaddish just like that? I want to recite Kaddish to myself. Is that forbidden? What exactly is the problem? This whole story is a mystery to me. Fine, never mind, let’s get back to our point. So the—anyway, what does the Talmud here assume, why did this whole story arise? The Talmud here assumes that according to Reish Lakish, who says that a half-measure is not forbidden by Torah law, then it is permitted. Because if we did not find a sitting of a court that established a prohibition on it, and Reish Lakish thinks there is no Torah prohibition, then clearly it is permitted. That is the Talmud’s assumption. Therefore the Talmud says: “But according to the one who says that a half-measure is permitted by Torah law, what can be said? For it was stated: regarding a half-measure, Rabbi Yohanan said it is forbidden by Torah law, Reish Lakish said it is permitted by Torah law. Fine according to Rabbi Yohanan, but according to Reish Lakish, what can be said?” Reish Lakish admits that it is forbidden rabbinically. In other words, Reish Lakish claims that it is forbidden rabbinically. Yes, meaning there was such an enactment. But the simple assumption first of all is that if there is no Torah prohibition then it is permitted—not that if there is no Torah law then it is forbidden rabbinically. There is no such thing. Okay? Reish Lakish says no, no, this is a rabbinic prohibition. There was some sitting of a court that forbade it, and it is forbidden rabbinically. Therefore the term “forbidden” applies to it. For our purposes, what this says is that the term “forbidden” applies both to things that are Torah-level and have no punishment attached to them, and to things that are rabbinic. But things that are Torah-level—a half-measure is Torah-level according to Rabbi Yohanan—and that’s fine. And according to Reish Lakish too it is rabbinic, once we’ve reached the conclusion that it is rabbinic, and that’s also fine. In other words, the term “forbidden” applies either to something rabbinic, or to something forbidden by Torah law without punishment. Okay? But for something that has punishment attached to it, even heavenly punishment—karet, on Yom Kippur that is heavenly punishment—even there the term “forbidden” does not apply, and apparently—not as I said earlier—not only is it language that is insufficient or doesn’t exhaust the matter, but it is actually incorrect. The term “forbidden” does not apply to things that have punishment attached to them. Because otherwise, again I say, the Talmud wouldn’t have had to ask this question here, because they used the expression “forbidden” because of the other four afflictions. What difference does it make that with eating and drinking it doesn’t say everything? It doesn’t say everything, but it is still correct there. And regarding the others you have no other expression, so you say “forbidden.” It seems from the Talmud that the term “forbidden” simply does not apply at all. Wait, where does it say—why does it say there “forbidden” in the Mishnah even though it means liable? “Since the latter clause uses that language, the first clause also uses that language.” First of all, we’d have to check the sugyot there; I don’t remember at the moment, but we’d have to check them. If there are such sugyot, then apparently there is a difference between the sugyot. And in this sugya it takes a different approach. And in the five afflictions you said “forbidden” even though he is liable. No, yes. Later there in the Talmud: “And everywhere that it teaches punishable by karet, does it not teach forbidden?” What is this? It puts into focus exactly the assumption I said earlier. After all, regarding a prohibition that has karet attached to it, it’s true that the term “forbidden” doesn’t say the whole picture because there too he is liable, but it is not true that the term “forbidden” does not apply. In other words, the Talmud above, as I said before, assumed that the term “forbidden” not only doesn’t say the whole picture, but doesn’t apply at all, because otherwise it should have said that the language “forbidden” was used because of the other four afflictions. Here the Talmud puts that under a question mark, saying why not? The term “forbidden” also applies to something that has punishment attached to it. “For it was taught: although they said ‘forbidden’ regarding all of them, they only said punishable by karet regarding one who eats and drinks and performs labor.” It says in a baraita, yes, speaking about all the afflictions, that although they said “forbidden” regarding all of them, the punishment of karet is only for eating and drinking. This implies that prohibition is a concept that applies to all these things. And even in things that are not—and in eating and drinking, where there is—where we’re not talking about a half-measure but a full measure—even there “forbidden” applies. After all, with a half-measure there is no karet, fine, but the language of prohibition also applies to those very things for which there is a prohibition with karet attached. “Liable” says more, that’s true, but “forbidden” is also correct; it just doesn’t say everything. That is essentially the question. So the Talmud gives two directions here. “This is what it means: when they said ‘forbidden,’ they said it only regarding a half-measure.” “This is what it means: when they said ‘forbidden,’ they said it only regarding a half-measure, but for a full measure it is punishable by karet. And even though it is punishable by karet, the karet applies only to one who eats and drinks and performs labor.” It’s a kind of “the text is deficient and this is what it teaches”—yes, they add more words into the Mishnah. They are basically saying: “On Yom Kippur it is forbidden to eat and drink; when they said ‘forbidden,’ they said it only regarding a half-measure, but for a full measure it is punishable by karet. And even though it is punishable by karet, the punishment of karet applies only to one who eats and drinks and performs labor.” So according to this direction, we still remain with the conception that “forbidden” cannot be said of karet, right? We’re just adding words so that the whole thing can somehow work out. Second direction: “And if you wish, say that when it teaches ‘forbidden,’ it is referring to the others,” that is, to the other afflictions—which is seemingly what I said earlier. In other words, the prohibition is on the others. So what about eating and drinking? Wait, where is this taught—in the baraita or in the Mishnah? That’s the question. In the simple reading, probably in the Mishnah. “When it teaches ‘forbidden,’ it is referring to the others.” The baraita refers back to the Mishnah. Once in the Mishnah you understand that “forbidden” refers to the others, the baraita says: and regarding all of them, they are not punishable by karet except for eating and drinking. But that doesn’t answer the Mishnah. So in the Mishnah what does it say—that “forbidden” speaks only about the other things, and what happens with eating and drinking? No, they’re also forbidden, but that doesn’t mean that—after all, it says—the wording of the Mishnah, let me show you again the wording of the Mishnah, it’s strange: “On Yom Kippur it is forbidden to eat and drink, and to wash, and to anoint, and to wear shoes, and to have marital relations.” It says “forbidden” there about everything. What will you say about the baraita? So they create for us an understanding that if punishment is written then the word “forbidden”—how did the Talmud say it? “‘Forbidden’? It should have said liable to karet.” We retreat from that, but not entirely—we don’t fully retreat, because they say that “forbidden” refers only to the other four afflictions. But that still doesn’t contradict the point that if something is punishable by karet, then we weren’t talking there about punishable by karet. In the Mishnah we were talking about what is forbidden and permitted. No problem. So say that it refers to all of them—not the afflictions—but even there they still don’t say that it speaks only about the afflictions. On the contrary, I’m showing you that even in the second direction they still maintain that the term “forbidden” does not apply to eating and drinking, to something with karet attached. They just do some kind of—I don’t know exactly—some kind of distortion there, that “forbidden” is written only about the other four afflictions. Either way, however you read the Mishnah, we still remain with this conception that “forbidden” does not apply at all when we’re talking about things that have karet attached to them, yes. One could have said that this is just a continuation of what we said earlier: eating and drinking refer to a half-measure, and “forbidden” in its plain sense regarding a full measure applies only to the other four afflictions. Then it would be very similar to the previous direction, just the other way around. In other words, in the previous direction the baraita comes to teach the exclusion of the four afflictions from karet, all right? Here they are teaching the prohibition also in eating and drinking, but basically saying the same thing. It’s really some kind of addition into the Mishnah: eating and drinking in a half-measure are forbidden, the other four afflictions are simply forbidden altogether, and the punishment of karet is only for eating and drinking. Fine, I don’t know, these things are really a bit strange. In any case, Rashi writes as follows: “Shabbaton—and it is written with respect to affliction. And just as the shabbaton said regarding the Sabbath was used by the sages as a support for the other kinds of labor that were not in the Tabernacle and are not full-fledged labor, so too the shabbaton regarding affliction, as it is written ‘It shall be a shabbaton for you, and you shall afflict yourselves,’ comes to add to the affliction of eating and drinking.” Like “Sabbath, shabbaton” regarding the Sabbath comes to add other prohibitions that are not among the labors—Torah prohibitions that are not among the labors, prohibitions of rest—so too “Sabbath, shabbaton” of Yom Kippur comes to add to the afflictions. All right? His assumption is that it is similar to labor on the Sabbath. And still—as I already discussed—even despite the comparison to labor on the Sabbath, “Sabbath, shabbaton” on Yom Kippur definitely for Rashi speaks about affliction. You might have said: if you compare it to the Sabbath, why not say that “Sabbath, shabbaton” of Yom Kippur speaks about prohibitions of labor, not prohibitions of affliction? No, it’s clear that it speaks about prohibitions of affliction. And still, from the standpoint of the logic, “Sabbath, shabbaton” works in the same way as the logic of the Sabbath, where it speaks about labor. Okay? An extension, yes, an extension to things that are not labor prohibitions but some kind of additions. Now, how should this be understood? The simple reading would be to say that this is a rabbinic prohibition—“the sages supported it with this verse,” right? But Rashi in Shabbat 114—I don’t remember whether I read him inside, but those who saw the summary could see—in Shabbat 114 it seems that “rest restrictions” are a Torah prohibition on the Sabbath, like Nachmanides. So what does “the sages supported it with the verse” mean there, “the other labors”? The expression “the sages supported it” does not necessarily mean that it is a rabbinic law. That needs to be understood. Because many times when sages establish a Torah prohibition, you ask where they got it from. They got it from “Sabbath, shabbaton.” It is a Torah prohibition. You know, almost none of the Torah prohibitions that we have are actually written in the Torah. Also the distinction between a Torah prohibition and a rabbinic prohibition—usually, ask people what a Torah prohibition is and what a rabbinic prohibition is. They’ll say: a Torah prohibition is something written in the Torah, and a rabbinic prohibition is something the sages created. Of course that is not true. Among the Torah prohibitions we know, the overwhelming majority, overwhelmingly, overwhelmingly, are not written in the Torah. Very few Torah prohibitions are explicitly written in the Torah. That’s what’s called something even the Sadducees would agree to—yes, something written explicitly, without needing interpretation. The sages are the ones who have two roles: they are the ones who interpret the Torah, meaning they basically determine the Torah prohibitions, and that is the sages in their role as interpreters. And the sages in their role as legislators establish the rabbinic prohibitions—enactments, decrees, safeguards, and all these things. So when we say “the sages supported it with a verse,” that can also be interpreted as a Torah prohibition that they support, or understand, from the phrase “Sabbath, shabbaton.” But it may still be a Torah prohibition. The term “support” in the Talmud and among the medieval and later authorities appears in at least two different meanings. Many times “support” in the accepted sense means: this is a rabbinic prohibition, and there is a scriptural support—we connect it somehow to a verse, as a mnemonic or according to the spirit of the matter, and the medieval authorities have different expressions for why this is done. But there are times when “support” is not that. It is a Torah prohibition, and the question is: on what do they base it, where does it come from? Does it come from this verse or that verse, because the source is unclear? What is the source for this Torah prohibition? So the sages attached it to this verse. But either it is a tradition, and that tradition was merely attached to the verse “Sabbath, shabbaton,” but there is a tradition saying that this is forbidden by Torah law, and we connect it to the verse. That is a support made for a Torah prohibition, not for a rabbinic one. Okay? There are also such supports explicitly in the Talmud in several places—supports for Torah prohibitions, not only for rabbinic prohibitions. Therefore here in Rashi one could have understood simply that this is a support and thus a rabbinic prohibition. And there are medieval authorities—Tosafot, for example—who say that the four afflictions are rabbinic. But in light of Rashi in Shabbat 114, from which it seems that he learns “shabbaton,” “rest restrictions,” on the Sabbath as Torah-level, then it seems likely that here too when he says “the sages supported it with the verse” he means to say: this is Torah-level, only the sages attached it to this verse, perhaps because it is a tradition or something like that. In Maimonides here, in his commentary to the Mishnah, he indeed uses the language of support, or hints, or things of that sort. And with Maimonides, as is known, in the second root—perhaps I’ll say a word about that because it will come up for us later as well—Maimonides in the second root has a position. It doesn’t appear in the Mishnah from the labor of the Tabernacle, which implies that it is not Torah-level. Again? I can’t hear. Rashi compares—Rashi compares to the labors that are not full-fledged, that were not in the Tabernacle, and says that this is not Torah-level. No, it is Torah-level, like Nachmanides’ view. No, there are prohibitions that are not labor prohibitions but are still Torah-level. For example, an animal’s resting. An animal’s resting on the Sabbath is a Torah prohibition and it is not a labor prohibition; it wasn’t in the Tabernacle. There are Torah prohibitions learned from “shabbaton,” “rest restrictions,” and not from “you shall do no labor,” because “labor” means the labors that were in the Tabernacle. And that is Nachmanides in Emor, and Ritva in Rosh Hashanah 31, and several medieval authorities speak about that. It also seems that way in Maimonides when he speaks in the laws of muktzeh—speaking of what someone mentioned before, muktzeh—according to Maimonides it seems that muktzeh has its basis in Torah law. And in Rashi on 114 it also seems that it is Torah-level. Torah-level not as one of the labor prohibitions—obviously it’s not stoning—but it is apparently also a positive commandment and not a prohibition. But still it is Torah-level. And if that’s so, then here too, when Rashi compares it to afflictions that are not the standard afflictions of eating and drinking, for which there is karet, it seems that here too “shabbaton,” “rest restrictions,” adds a Torah prohibition. What was not in the Tabernacle—I’m talking about labors. But here he says “labors of the Tabernacle that are not full-fledged labor,” so he wants to exclude them from Torah law. No, no, he excludes them from the Torah labor prohibition, but not—not necessarily. After all, an animal’s resting. That’s not a Torah-level rest restriction. Fine, but here too it’s written. It says “shabbaton,” “rest.” All the other things have verses, here not. Yes, it does. Since it is rabbinic, he compares it, that “shabbaton” too—But I’m answering: it is written, here too it is written. It is written in “shabbaton,” “rest.” “Sabbath, shabbaton”—from those words there it is written that such labors, which do not enter into the labor prohibitions because they were not in the Tabernacle, are forbidden not within the framework of labor prohibitions—it is not a prohibition of stoning or a sin-offering—but they are forbidden by Torah law. That’s what Nachmanides says in Emor. It is written; here too it is written. “Sabbath, shabbaton”—that word, “Sabbath, shabbaton,” that’s where it is written. “Rest restrictions”—you must rest on the Sabbath. So Rashi says that the “Sabbath, shabbaton” written regarding affliction is the same thing as “Sabbath, shabbaton” written regarding labor. “Shabbaton,” “rest restrictions”—those are definitely rabbinic rest restrictions. No, that’s not definite. Again, you’re repeating—no, it’s a dispute among medieval authorities. Nachmanides and Ritva and apparently also Maimonides and apparently also Rashi say no: some of what we call “rest restrictions” are at least in part Torah prohibitions. There are rest restrictions that are rabbinic, of course, but there are prohibitions of rest—say, what violates the basic character of the Sabbath, as Nachmanides writes—what fundamentally violates the character of the Sabbath, even though it does not involve labor in the sense of the Tabernacle, is a Torah prohibition. For example, opening stores, conducting commerce on the Sabbath. What is the prohibition in doing business? You’re not writing, say. It’s only perhaps because one might come to write, with the commerce and money and so on—a rabbinic prohibition. Yes, but that so deeply gives it the character of a weekday—it really turns the Sabbath into a weekday. That is a Torah prohibition. It is not called resting. Even though it’s not one of the labor prohibitions and there is no stoning for it and it doesn’t have all the stringencies of labor prohibitions on the Sabbath. Yes, so that’s what I started saying now. In the second root, Maimonides says that only things written in the Torah are Torah-level. Things learned from interpretations, or even a law given to Moses at Sinai, are “of the sages.” Now there are huge disputes about this—from the Tashbetz onward, all the late medieval authorities and almost all later authorities understand that Maimonides does not mean the legal force of those prohibitions. Rather, this is only an interpretive matter, that the sages basically created those prohibitions, and therefore it is called “of the sages,” but they are Torah prohibitions. And if so, then it’s like what I’m saying here. “The sages supported it by a verse” means they created it, but in essence it is a Torah prohibition. But in my opinion that is not correct; I wrote a book about it. In other words, in my opinion that is not correct. I think Maimonides really means genuinely rabbinic. Except that for Maimonides there is a whole spectrum, a whole continuum, of levels of rabbinic prohibitions. There are rabbinic prohibitions that are enactments and decrees; there are rabbinic prohibitions that are prohibitions not written in the Torah but received through a law given to Moses at Sinai, or interpretations, or something like that; and there are prohibitions written explicitly in the Torah. There are several levels, even within rabbinic law. If it is rabbinic with scriptural support, rabbinic without support—those too are two different levels of rabbinic prohibition. But still, Maimonides means a rabbinic prohibition. In any case, at least according to the accepted interpretation of Maimonides, the one I mentioned earlier, then here clearly what is written—“the sages supported it”—can certainly also be interpreted the way people interpret Maimonides. “The sages supported it”—so it is “of the sages” in the sense that the sages are the ones who created the prohibition. But from the standpoint of legal force, it is a Torah prohibition. It’s just that the sages are the ones who created it because it is not written in the Torah—it is their interpretation. Therefore, for example, there is “do not deviate.” The dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides regarding “do not deviate.” Maimonides says that the force of all rabbinic laws comes from “do not deviate.” Right? Or reasoning, not important now—the prohibition is “do not deviate.” Nachmanides says no, only Torah laws. Rabbinic laws do not. What is meant by Torah laws? So why do I need the force of “do not deviate” for Torah laws? Because we are talking about sages as interpreters. Maimonides speaks about sages as legislators—that is rabbinic law—and he says that “do not deviate” is the basis for their authority to legislate. Nachmanides says no. Their authority to legislate is not learned from there—not important right now from where, that is a complicated question. But what is learned from “do not deviate” according to Nachmanides? Their authority to interpret. What does that mean? The sages’ interpretation creates Torah law—they interpret the verse. Once they have interpreted it, that is what is written in the verse, so that is Torah law. Only now I can say, fine, that’s their interpretation, it isn’t written in the verse, so I don’t agree; I think the interpretation of the verse is different. For that there is “do not deviate.” You have to accept the interpretation of the Sanhedrin, of an authorized institution, that has the authority of “do not deviate” with regard to interpretation, not with regard to legislation. And we see that on this Maimonides of course agrees too. As for legislation, that is the dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides. So you see that the sages act with two different hats. They create laws through processes of interpretation, and then the laws created are Torah-level; and they create laws through a process of legislation, and then the laws are rabbinic laws. The difference between Torah laws and rabbinic laws is not chronology—when they were created, whether it was at Sinai or later. There are many Torah laws that were created later. And there are also rabbinic laws that were created back then—for example, enactments of Moses our teacher. Chronology does not determine the difference between Torah-level and rabbinic. What determines the difference is which hat the sages were wearing. Was this law created through an act of interpretation, or was this law created through an act of legislation? That is the dispute. Maimonides says no. Maimonides says this is extension, not interpretation. Most medieval authorities say that it is interpretation, and therefore they indeed say that it is Torah-level and disagree with Maimonides. Nachmanides cries out against Maimonides in the second root, saying that the whole book wasn’t worth that move. He lists the four afflictions—after all, he has the commandments, Maimonides’ Book of Commandments—so the four afflictions appear there as law. I’ll get to that in a moment. We’ll get to Maimonides’ view. He mentions them there; he does not count them separately, but within the framework of the positive commandment of affliction he mentions them too. They are not counted separately, but they are mentioned within the framework of the positive commandment of affliction, and they are not mentioned in the prohibition. That seems to be the case, that is usually how people learn him, although you could say perhaps he added other things that are attached rabbinically because he didn’t count it separately. In other words, if he had counted it separately, then it would be clear. Okay? Perhaps. In any case, in light of Rashi in Shabbat 114, it seems his intention is a Torah prohibition. The Talmud in Nedarim 80 discusses an oath—someone who swears to afflict himself—whether that forbids even washing. Okay? An oath, not in the laws of Yom Kippur, but in the framework of the discussion there, the Talmud brings proof from Yom Kippur. “And the sages said that washing involves affliction of the soul, because if she does not wash…” If she doesn’t wash, there is affliction of the soul in that. For example, for a woman: vows that involve affliction of the soul, or matters between him and her, the husband annuls them on the day he hears them. Okay. Now: “But I will raise a contradiction: although they said it is forbidden regarding all of them, they only said punishable by karet regarding one who eats and drinks and performs labor.” The baraita we just saw. Okay. “And if you say that not washing is considered affliction, then on Yom Kippur if she washed she should be liable to karet!” Right? What are you telling me, basically—that washing has affliction of the soul in it? If so, washing should be included in the obligation to afflict oneself on Yom Kippur too. And if so, there should be karet on Yom Kippur for washing on Yom Kippur. So why is it said only regarding eating and drinking and not washing? Rava said: “The context of the verse regarding Yom Kippur, where it says ‘you shall afflict yourselves,’ means something where the affliction is evident now. Washing is not an affliction that is evident now. Regarding vows, where it says ‘every vow and every binding oath to afflict the soul,’ it means something that can lead to affliction, and if she does not wash it can lead to affliction.” The Talmud says there are certain actions that I do now where the act itself does not involve affliction, but if I don’t do it, or if I do do it, later I’ll come to affliction. Someone who doesn’t wash now is not suffering, but being unwashed for a long time—that is affliction. Okay? So what was forbidden on Yom Kippur is only afflictions that are affliction now, not things that bring one to affliction or bring one to not be afflicted. Okay? In an oath it is not like that. In an oath, things that lead to affliction are also included. That’s what the Talmud says. So what we see here is that on Yom Kippur there is no prohibition of karet for this, because in itself it is not affliction, it only brings me to a state in which I will be afflicted. Therefore there is no karet for it. Of course this raises the question—what? It sounds very strange. If I don’t eat for five minutes, I’m also not hungry yet, I don’t feel any change. No, but if you eat, then you enjoy it now. You’re not only preventing future affliction. Apparently, yes. So the Talmud here—what? I can’t hear. The Talmud’s tanna says no. Washing—it is only not washing for a long time that is affliction, but there is no enjoyment in the washing itself. There is actually room to discuss this. Someone immersing in a spring in summer—after all, it says that is enjoyment. Right? The Talmud there says commandments were not given for benefit. I don’t know, that really is a question. That’s simply what the Talmud assumes here. So what about anointing? The affliction is also washing and anointing. Okay, anointing is immediate enjoyment. Fine, at the moment we’re talking about washing; I don’t know what they would say about anointing. There are those who say anointing is like drinking. The Brisker Rav has a little pamphlet on Yoma—Yoma and three tractates, a little pamphlet by the rabbi of Brisk. And there he argues that anointing is forbidden on Yom Kippur with karet, because anointing is like drinking. Even though that is a great novelty; according to most views it is not so. “Anointing is like drinking” was said only for very specific things. In any case, for our purposes, the Talmud here understands—so what is washing, then? Washing is one of the other four afflictions. Is it affliction or not affliction? It isn’t entirely clear. Why was it excluded from karet? Because regarding karet it says “you shall afflict yourselves.” Okay? “You shall afflict yourselves,” meaning something that is supposed to be current, present. That’s how the Talmud learns it—again, there is room to discuss why, but that is how the Talmud learns “you shall afflict yourselves.” But the term affliction appears both regarding karet—“the soul that is not afflicted shall be cut off”—and regarding the positive commandment, “you shall afflict yourselves.” Now if the affliction spoken of on Yom Kippur does not include washing, then it should have been excluded not only from karet but also from the prohibition—from both prohibitions, in fact, both the positive commandment and the negative commandment. The negative commandment isn’t even written explicitly. The positive commandment is written, and there too it also says affliction. And if that is not included—if future affliction is not included in affliction—then it is not included in the positive commandment of “you shall afflict yourselves.” And the Talmud itself says that regarding karet too it is not included—“every soul that is not afflicted shall be cut off.” Now the negative commandment is not written at all regarding affliction. It is learned through some combination of the positive commandment and karet—it doesn’t matter right now, we talked a bit about it and we’ll see more later. In any case, if this is not included in the term affliction regarding Yom Kippur, then the obvious conclusion, seemingly, is that it is rabbinic. In the Talmud according to the verse it’s not speaking about karet—it’s speaking about the prohibition. “You shall afflict yourselves”—that’s not—it should have said “every soul that is not afflicted.” נכון, this is the positive commandment. Right, right, it’s the positive commandment. That implies this is about affliction and the prohibitions. Right. The term affliction, and especially the verse that appears here, appears in all the contexts of Yom Kippur, not only regarding karet. Also regarding the positive commandment. And again I say: the prohibition is learned from the karet and the positive commandment, so presumably the same thing should apply to the prohibition too. There isn’t something different in the prohibition. Okay? And then the conclusion called for by the Talmud here is that the other afflictions are not forbidden by Torah law at all. It is not just that they were excluded from karet; their entire prohibition is rabbinic. Okay? And if so, I return to our Mishnah: “On Yom Kippur it is forbidden to wash, to drink, to wear shoes, to have marital relations,” and so on. Eating and drinking—that means a half-measure. According to Reish Lakish that is forbidden rabbinically; according to Rabbi Yohanan it is forbidden by Torah law. And the other afflictions are forbidden rabbinically, at least for now. So in effect what is written as “forbidden” in our Mishnah is all speaking about rabbinic prohibitions according to Reish Lakish, or about prohibitions without punishment and rabbinic prohibitions according to Rabbi Yohanan. Okay? But that is not agreed upon. Tosafot there in Nedarim writes as follows: “But I will raise a contradiction: although they said it is forbidden regarding all of them”—marital relations, wearing shoes, washing and anointing and eating and drinking—“they only said punishable by karet regarding eating, since that is affliction, as it is written: ‘every soul that is not afflicted.’ And if you say that refraining from washing is considered affliction, then washing too should incur liability on Yom Kippur.” And he says: “This is difficult, because in the last chapter of Yoma it asks: and if you say the affliction is refraining from marital relations, but it says ‘you shall afflict yourselves’”—they thought perhaps marital relations too are included in the affliction of Yom Kippur—“so the Talmud says no, ‘you shall afflict yourselves’—what is an affliction involving loss of life? You can die from it. That is only eating and drinking. The affliction of marital relations is not like that, unless you are Attila king of the Huns, about whom it says he died in action.” “What is an affliction involving loss of life? You must say this is eating and drinking. If so, then washing too—even if it is called affliction—one should not be liable for it.” Okay? So he is basically assuming that here in the Talmud it means only excluded from karet but there is still a Torah prohibition, whereas there he says we see that there is no prohibition at all. I assume that what Tosafot means is that here in the Talmud it seems this is excluded only from karet but there is still a prohibition. Therefore, he says, what we have with vows, where washing is considered affliction, is also true for Yom Kippur; only from karet was it excluded, but the prohibition of Yom Kippur is like in an oath, where washing is also included. So he says no: there we see that is not correct. Only affliction involving loss of life is included, and washing is not an affliction involving loss of life. According to the way we read the Talmud, this isn’t difficult. In our Talmud it doesn’t say this was excluded only from karet; it says it was excluded from karet, but that same exclusion should also exclude it from the negative commandment and the positive commandment. In terms of reasoning, that’s true. But it is true that in the plain sense of the Talmud, the Talmud says only that it was excluded from karet, not that it was excluded from the prohibition. Okay? Tosafot is right in terms of reading the Talmud. The conclusion I drew earlier is that if it isn’t affliction, then just as it was excluded from karet it is also excluded from the prohibition—but that is not written in the Talmud. So Tosafot says further: “And our teacher Rabbeinu Shmuel had another difficulty: why did it ask there? If washing is not called affliction, then why does it need that verse there? The prohibition there too should have been derived from this verse of affliction.” If it is not called affliction, then just as it is excluded from karet it should also have been excluded from the prohibition, yes? And again we see that he assumes that in that sugya it is not excluded from the prohibition but only from karet. “And one can say that certainly it is not a Torah-level affliction, and the verse of affliction is merely a scriptural support because it is called affliction; and that is also the conclusion here.” So these are really forbidden only rabbinically, all these afflictions. Not the way we read the plain meaning of the Talmud, that it is a Torah prohibition and only excluded from karet. No—it is a rabbinic prohibition. Okay? And if so, there is no contradiction between the sugyot, and everything is rabbinic. That is Tosafot’s position. There is also Tosafot in our tractate on 77 and in Niddah and elsewhere. Rabbeinu Tam explains that all the afflictions of Yom Kippur are only rabbinic, and the verse is merely a scriptural support, except for eating and drinking. He says later—and he has a proof. What is the proof? “If one was dirty with mud and excrement, he may wash normally and need not worry. One who has sores on his head may anoint himself normally and need not worry; he may anoint himself normally. It was also said: a priest who anointed himself with oil of terumah, his Israelite granddaughter may roll against him and need not worry.” If this were Torah law, it would be forbidden under all circumstances. In short, there are all kinds of leniencies regarding the other four afflictions that we do not find in eating and drinking. Various situations of need permit them. And if this were a Torah prohibition that was only excluded from karet, but the prohibition itself still remained a Torah prohibition, it is not plausible that they would permit it. Why would they permit it just because there is some need? Not a matter of saving life, but some other kind of need. Therefore Rabbeinu Tam says this is probably a rabbinic prohibition. So “they prohibited and they permitted”—they forbade it, so they can also permit it in such and such circumstances. What? Maybe it falls out of the category of affliction because it is for relief of pain—Right, we’ll see in a moment; you’re right, we’ll see that in a moment. But that’s how Rabbeinu Tam learns: that because they permitted the four afflictions in other contexts, it shows this is a rabbinic prohibition. Now, Rabbeinu Tam’s assumption when he brings that proof from the fact that they permitted the four afflictions in other contexts is that this permission is a kind of override. Since there is a need, we permit it, even though in principle such a thing should have been forbidden. But because there is a need, we permit it. Fine—if so, a Torah prohibition would not have been overridden for needs of that sort. For danger to life, yes; but not for needs of that sort. But if we understand, as you suggested before quite rightly, that this is not override but permission built into the definition—these things are not included, it is not considered violating the fast. You are not doing it for pleasure. Only when you do it for pleasure have you violated the fast. If you do those actions not for pleasure, then you have not violated the fast. So then even if it is a Torah prohibition, you can say that is the definition of the prohibition: when you do it for pleasure. If you are not doing it for pleasure, one might still perhaps forbid it rabbinically, or perhaps not forbid it at all—it doesn’t matter. But even if it is forbidden rabbinically, then “they prohibited and they permitted,” and in a case of need it is permitted. Okay? And if it is not forbidden at all, then all the more so there is no problem. Rabbeinu Tam assumes that all these permissions are a matter of override—we override because there is a need. So he says: a Torah prohibition would not be overridden. But we will see that there are medieval authorities who say these are Torah prohibitions. What will they answer to Rabbeinu Tam’s proof? They will say that it is simply not included in the prohibition in the first place. Things of pleasure are an infringement of the duty to afflict oneself; if you are not doing it for pleasure, that is not an infringement of the duty to afflict oneself. Now there is some room here for discussion. I mentioned earlier the one who immerses in a spring in summer and is under a vow not to benefit. He may immerse in a spring in winter but not in summer, because in summer he also enjoys it. Okay? Or he immerses for the sake of the commandment, but he also derives pleasure, and commandments were not given for benefit; but in summer he also enjoys it besides performing the commandment, and therefore it is forbidden. So here too there would be room to discuss: fine, you’re anointing or washing or something like that for another reason, but in the end you are enjoying it. So what if you’re doing it because of another reason and not for the enjoyment? Still, you are enjoying it too. Fine, here there is room to discuss perhaps “unintentional”? And with “unintentional” there is a case of inevitable result, and since he derives benefit—there’s no such thing in unintentional cases. If one is occupied with forbidden fats or forbidden sexual relations, he is liable because he derived benefit. Yes, so in unintentional cases too, when you are talking about an act whose prohibition involves benefit, “unintentional” does not help because he derived benefit. The claim is that “unintentional” works like an accidental act, and deriving benefit erases the lack of intent. Fine, so there is room to discuss this somewhat, and this is really an argument in favor of Rabbeinu Tam. Rabbeinu Tam says: fine, you are right that these things maybe are not done for pleasure, so perhaps they are not included in the Torah prohibition of affliction. But in the end there is pleasure there. Even if you are not doing it for pleasure, there is pleasure. And there is no “unintentional” or accidental involvement here or anything like that, because he derives benefit. So how did they permit it? They permitted it probably because it is rabbinic. So perhaps that is Rabbeinu Tam’s argument. At the beginning of Tosafot in Avodah Zarah page 77—or not in Avodah Zarah, on 77—there is a view brought that says it is indeed Torah-level, that the other afflictions are Torah-level. But that is Tosafot’s conclusion, at least—that it is rabbinic. There are parallel sugyot that also deal with the afflictions. On page 76, for example, the Talmud there says: “These five afflictions—to what do they correspond?” Rav Hisda said: “They correspond to the five afflictions written in the Torah.” Five times the language of affliction is written in the Torah: “on the tenth,” “but on the tenth,” “a shabbaton,” “a shabbaton,” and “it shall be for you.” In other words, five verses in which the term affliction appears. “There are five, but we learned six.” Perhaps. I don’t know. Okay, there is room to hesitate. In any case, it seems that whether this is only support—which according to Tosafot would mean it is rabbinic—or whether it is really Torah-level, they still understand that the term affliction in the Torah includes these afflictions too. So it is not correct to say these are not afflictions at all, and only eating and drinking are affliction. Maybe they are afflictions in the future-oriented sense—they bring me to a state where I will be afflicted—but the term affliction applies in some way also to these four things. “Sabbath, shabbaton” on the Sabbath, where they also include—does “Sabbath” also come to affliction there? No, no, “Sabbath, shabbaton” here speaks about Yom Kippur. No, but on the Sabbath it says—There it’s about labor; it’s not relevant. There it’s about labor. On Yom Kippur it says “Sabbath, shabbaton,” and from there they learn rest restrictions of affliction. Okay? So that’s another source. Again I say: not sure it contradicts. Maybe it’s a dispute between sugyot, maybe one came and clarified the other. In any event, we see that it is included in the language of affliction. One could have said that it is included in the positive commandment of affliction but not in the prohibition; therefore there is no karet, and that is really the most natural thing. If you are one of those who say there is a Torah prohibition here but it was excluded from karet, then what is that Torah prohibition? Is it only the positive commandment or also the prohibition? And also the prohibition, just without karet? The simplest thing is to say that it is only the positive commandment, because it is affliction. Affliction is the positive commandment, right? And under affliction they included, because of “Sabbath, shabbaton” or because of the five occurrences of affliction, that these afflictions too are included in the obligation to afflict oneself—the positive commandment, yes, to afflict oneself. Why was it excluded from karet? Because there is no prohibition here, and on Yom Kippur karet comes with the prohibition. Still, in terms of the Torah’s wording it isn’t simple, because in the Torah’s wording the prohibition too is simply that you did not afflict yourself. There is no different expression in the prohibition; there is no explicit prohibition in the Torah at all. But karet speaks of affliction, and the positive commandment speaks of affliction. What I said earlier. Therefore I say: on the one hand, if you tell me it was excluded from karet, it is natural to say it was excluded from the prohibition as well, and therefore there is no karet; and the positive commandment remains, as we see here, with the term affliction. Fine? But in terms of the Torah’s wording this is somewhat difficult, because affliction appears in the same way both in the positive commandment and in the prohibition, so why exclude it from the prohibition and not from the positive commandment? What? Affliction of the soul. “And the soul that is not afflicted shall be cut off.” You say they derive it not from the word affliction but from affliction involving—And then the claim is basically “and the soul that is not afflicted shall be cut off,” and so there is still—That is an interesting point. There is still room to discuss. So it is clear this is not said regarding the positive commandment—that I agree. But regarding the prohibition it really isn’t simple, because “the soul that is not afflicted shall be cut off” is the karet, not the prohibition. On the other hand there is no explicit prohibition. The prohibition, as we saw, some derive from the very existence of karet, or from some verbal analogy essentially, or something like that. But it is not written explicitly. So there is room to discuss whether the exclusion of the four afflictions from karet is because I understand that there is also no prohibition. The positive commandment, yes, but not the prohibition. And you are only explaining why with the positive commandment yes and with the prohibition no—because it is not included in the term affliction, but rather not included in the term affliction of the soul because it is not something involving loss of life. And one could have said it was excluded only from karet, and there is here both a prohibition and a positive commandment. Since there is no loss of life here, we said. Yes, yes, that’s what the Talmud said. Yes, so therefore it doesn’t contradict what you suggested—I hear it, it’s a correct suggestion, I think—that it is not excluded from the word affliction but from the phrase affliction of the soul, in the sense of something involving loss of life. So everywhere the Torah says affliction, it would still be included. Only karet was said only regarding something involving affliction of the soul, and that is only eating and drinking. What? So that does not contradict this whole story. Right. In the sugya on page 74b there is also a discussion that touches on this. “The sages taught: ‘You shall afflict yourselves’—could this mean that one should sit in the sun or in the cold in order to suffer? You need to afflict yourselves—go and do it, roll around in the snow. Go make suffering for yourself; you need to afflict yourselves. The verse therefore says: ‘and you shall do no labor.’ Just as labor is by passive omission, so too affliction of the soul is by passive omission.” All right? In other words, you are not required to perform an active act of affliction. Just as in labor the obligation is passive omission, so too with affliction the obligation is passive omission. In other words, don’t enjoy. You don’t need to do actions that torture you; rather, only do not do actions of enjoyment. That is essentially the claim. Regarding trimming vegetables, I remind you that we saw in Ritva, for example, that he argues that what they permitted in trimming vegetables is because trimming basically brings us distress: we are dealing with food and cannot eat it. Most medieval authorities do not learn that way. Most understand that they permitted trimming so there would not be distress—you can prepare the meal for after the fast during the fast itself after minhah so that you won’t have to delay after the fast and can eat immediately. But Ritva says no—they permitted trimming because this is part of the distress of Yom Kippur, that you deal with food and do not eat it. Now if so, that somewhat contradicts what is written here in the Talmud. Because there we see some active action that causes me affliction, and that is something I am supposed to do on Yom Kippur. And here it says no, you don’t need to do active acts of self-affliction; you only need not do acts of enjoyment. That he shouldn’t prepare—that’s not affliction. What do you mean it’s not affliction? When a person trims vegetables, he doesn’t do it in order to afflict himself; he does it in order to prepare. But it afflicts me. But it afflicts me. And Ritva says they do it because it afflicts us. But there are two things here. First, it does not say one is obligated to trim. It says one may trim. So already that is not a frontal contradiction to what is written here in the Talmud. One may trim; they did not permit a rabbinic prohibition because there is some affliction here—that is an extra. It is not that there is a Torah obligation to do actions that afflict me. But it is true that if there is something that afflicts me, at least it may be that the sages would recommend doing it or at least permit doing it. That is one point. Second, I think that in essence trimming is affliction by passive omission, not by active performance. The action I do is an active action—I trim vegetables. But the affliction is not created by the trimming action; the affliction is created by the state in which I am occupied with food and meanwhile, after all, I am forbidden to eat, so that afflicts me. So it is not an active action that afflicts me. It is not like sitting in the sun and the sun frying me. There the action itself is what causes me the affliction. There I do something that in principle ought to have been forbidden, and since it has a byproduct of affliction they did not forbid it. But it is not that there is some action that brings suffering upon me. Therefore this does not contradict the Talmud here even according to Ritva. The Talmud continues: “And if you wish, say further: behold it says ‘and I will destroy that soul’—an affliction that involves loss of life; and what is that? Eating and drinking.” So we see that the affliction imposed upon us is only affliction involving loss of life, which is eating and drinking. Therefore sitting in the sun is not one of the afflictions. Of course this raises the question: then what about washing, anointing, and all those things, which are also not afflictions involving loss of life? Fine, so here one would have to say perhaps they were included through “rest restrictions” or something like that. But from here it actually seems that what is not included in affliction of the soul is not forbidden at all—it is not just excluded from karet, it is not forbidden at all. Which is a bit at odds with the sugya we saw earlier, where the four afflictions were only excluded from karet. And you rightly noted that this is because it is not affliction of the soul, but it is still affliction. But if so, then sitting in the sun is also like that, right? At least according to the “if you wish, say further.” Yes—what is “if you wish, say further”? “And if you say the verse is speaking about forbidden sexual relations, behold it says ‘and I will destroy that soul’—an affliction involving loss of life; and what is that? Eating and drinking.” And then we see that sexual relations—or marital relations—is not really an affliction involving loss of life, and there is no karet for it; perhaps also no prohibition, as we discussed earlier. In the school of Rabbi Yishmael it was taught: “Affliction” is said here, and “affliction” is said elsewhere. Just as there the affliction is hunger, so here too the affliction is hunger. In other words, there is a verbal analogy. And then the verbal analogy actually removes us entirely from the broader notion of affliction—it is hunger affliction, and here too it is hunger affliction. Still the question remains: what is the difference between sitting in the sun and washing? Neither involves loss of life, and neither is hunger affliction. So I say: however you exclude it—whether you exclude afflictions that are not loss of life, or whether you exclude afflictions that are not hunger—you should have excluded washing, marital relations, and all these things just as you exclude sitting in the sun. So why are those forbidden? One would have to say perhaps because of “Sabbath, shabbaton,” and that hints that there is here only a positive commandment. Because it is not connected to afflictions but to “Sabbath, shabbaton,” some kind of rest perhaps not connected to affliction at all, but simply as part of this resting of Yom Kippur that we discussed earlier—but not from the section of affliction, rather from the section of rest. At the end of the previous class I talked about two laws in Maimonides, if you remember—what the Or Sameach cites, the Meshekh Chokhmah. In short, the sugyot here are split-up sugyot, and I’m sure researchers make a whole feast out of this. So there are several ways to understand the relationships among the sugyot, but it is not entirely clear what the relationship is—whether there is a contradiction between them, whether there is a dispute between the sugyot, whether there is no dispute, what the difference is between the sun and the four afflictions, and so on. Meanwhile, what we have seen explicitly is only the view that the four afflictions are forbidden rabbinically. Right? In the Talmud itself we saw another possibility; in Tosafot perhaps in the initial assumption there is also another possibility, but in his conclusion—So look in Tosafot Yeshanim as well, same thing at the beginning of the chapter: “On Yom Kippur it is forbidden to eat and drink, and washing and anointing”—seemingly this implies that all these afflictions except for eating and drinking are rabbinic, since there is no karet for them, only for eating and drinking. In other words, he understands that being excluded from karet also means being excluded from the prohibition—not only from the negative commandment, but apparently also from the positive commandment. Completely. It just is not in the section of affliction on Yom Kippur. And as we saw, this is very sensible in terms of the Torah’s language, because in the Torah’s language all of it is called affliction. So if it is excluded from karet because it says “the soul that is not afflicted,” then it should also be excluded from the negative commandment and the positive commandment. “And also because we permit a king and a bride to wash”—all the proofs Rabbeinu Tam brings. “However, all these can be pushed aside,” yes, “however, all these can be pushed aside, because karet applies only to eating and drinking, in which there is loss of life.” Exactly what you described earlier. It is not because it is not included in affliction, but because it is not affliction involving loss of life. And affliction involving loss of life was excluded from karet, but the prohibitions remain. Which prohibitions? In the simple reading, both. No, Torah-level. Both positive and negative commandment, because only karet was excluded, but there is still the positive commandment and the negative commandment because there is affliction here; the obligation of affliction includes this too. Karet is only for affliction involving loss of life, but one could say that with the positive and negative commandment—at least, both positive and negative—there are in the four afflictions. “And they too are forbidden by Torah law regarding washing the whole body and anointing the whole body. Therefore the sages did not enact restrictions in these cases,” and so on. “And as for the fact that we derive them all in the Talmud from ‘shabbaton,’ ‘rest restrictions,’ and that this is only support—the main source of the verse is what we expound later: to what do these five afflictions correspond?” Fine. So here he addresses the contradiction between the sugyot. He says “Sabbath, shabbaton” is only support, and “the afflictions” are the real source. And again I say: not necessarily meaning support in the sense that it is rabbinic. He may mean that “Sabbath, shabbaton” is forbidden—what is forbidden? What was included by “Sabbath, shabbaton”? From the five afflictions we understand that these four things were included. “However, from the fact that it uses this language, ‘these five afflictions correspond to what,’ and does not say ‘from where are they derived’ or ‘how do we know them,’ the language is ‘correspond to what’—that is language of homiletics. If they had asked ‘how do we know’ or ‘from where are they derived,’ that would mean you are seeking a real source for a Torah law. But if you say ‘to what do they correspond,’ that is only support. Just support, merely support. Yes, yes, ‘mere support’ means rabbinic. Yes: ‘it implies that those verses are only mere support.’ ‘And know this, because it derives afflictions from it, and eating and drinking, and necessarily it cannot be derived from that verse.’ It derives afflictions from it and eating and drinking, and necessarily it cannot be derived from that verse. Fine—that’s the question of where that verse itself comes from. If the verse of karet speaks about affliction, and all the afflictions include the other four afflictions as well, then there should also be karet for them. So why isn’t there? Because they are not included in that verse. Fine, I don’t want to get into all the details right now. For our purposes, in the end the conclusion does seem to me to be precise—his conclusion is: “It does seem to me to infer from all this, as I explained, that the five afflictions are only rabbinic.” So in the meantime he too joins Tosafot in saying that the afflictions are only rabbinic. But look, for example, at the Rosh and Tosafot and Tosafot HaRosh and Ritva and Meiri and others at the beginning of the chapter—they all write that this is rabbinic. Ran writes that it is by Torah law and says that this is also Maimonides’ opinion; we’ll see that in a moment. In the She’iltot he writes as follows: “For the Holy One, blessed be He, warned Israel to sit in fasting on the tenth of Tishrei, even if it is on the Sabbath. And it is forbidden to eat and drink and wear shoes and wash and anoint and have marital relations, all by Torah law.” Here it is clear that everything is by Torah law. More than that—when he says “warned us,” a warning means a prohibition, a negative commandment. It is not a positive commandment. “Warning” means a prohibition. And he ties all the afflictions to that warning he is speaking about. What does that mean? That everything is apparently forbidden by Torah law, both in the negative commandment and in the positive commandment. The four afflictions were only excluded from karet because there is no affliction of the soul there. So “affliction of the soul” is only a criterion excluding from karet. But the prohibition is not only Torah-level—not like Tosafot and the other medieval authorities who said it is rabbinic—but apparently includes both the prohibition and the positive commandment by Torah law, which is a rather exceptional view. There are other medieval authorities who say there is a Torah-level positive commandment here, but in the She’iltot it sounds like it is also the prohibition and also the positive commandment. So how did they permit all these Torah prohibitions, and so on? We already discussed earlier: this is not an override but a built-in permission. In other words, it simply is not included in the prohibition. Here in She’iltot 168 he writes the same thing—first of all, that it is Torah-level. “The children of Israel are obligated to sit in fasting on Yom Kippur and afflict themselves, as it is written: ‘And on the tenth day of this seventh month is the Day of Atonement,’ and so on. And it is forbidden to eat, drink, wash, anoint, wear shoes, and have marital relations. Rav Hisda said: these five afflictions that are taught correspond to the five afflictions written in the Torah.” And these are they: “but on the tenth of the month,” “and on the tenth of the month,” “shabbat shabbaton.” In other words, it seems from him that everything is Torah-level; he brings it all as full derivations from Torah law. “But one must ask: one who is delicate, or whose foot hurts, or whose feet ache—is he permitted to go out in a sock, or to wrap a cloth around his foot and go out, or not?” What bothers him is what bothered Rabbeinu Tam. Rabbeinu Tam brings proof from the fact that they permitted various leniencies that this must be rabbinic. Here he says it is Torah-level. So how did they permit those leniencies? What do you mean? Same thing. Mud too is the same issue. How did they permit all those leniencies if this is a Torah prohibition? That is exactly the question. “Do we say,” in short, here is the key I think: “Do we say that the reason for shoes is because pleasure is what was forbidden, and this person does not derive pleasure; or perhaps the Torah simply said ‘shoe,’ and any kind is forbidden?” Here there is a key to saying that although it is Torah-level, all that was permitted has to do with pleasure. Wearing shoes not for pleasure was therefore also never forbidden. So even though it is Torah-level, Rabbeinu Tam’s question—how could they permit it?—is not difficult, because it is not override but permission built into the definition. It was simply never forbidden. “And so is the law.” I read this only in snippets because I want to move toward the end. Ran writes as follows: “On Yom Kippur it is forbidden to eat and drink”—the Talmud explains that all of these are called affliction, and regarding Yom Kippur five afflictions are written, and these five are six because drinking is included in eating. And the Talmud explains that where it teaches ‘forbidden’—which implies that even though there is a prohibition, there is no karet—this refers to a half-measure. That means eating less than a large date’s bulk and drinking less than a cheekful, which are the required measures, as will be written before us with God’s help. But one who eats a date’s bulk or drinks a cheekful is also liable to karet. As for all the others—washing and anointing, wearing shoes, and marital relations—there is a prohibition, but there is no karet.” It’s not entirely clear what he means, but in the simple reading “there is a prohibition” means a Torah prohibition. Because he excludes only from karet; otherwise he would have had to say this is a rabbinic prohibition, and therefore obviously there is no karet. “There is a prohibition” in the simple reading means a Torah prohibition; there is just no karet. All right? “And there are those who say further that these are only rabbinically forbidden”—that is the view of Tosafot and the medieval authorities we saw. “And even though in the Talmud they derive them from verses, they are only mere support.” “And that is why we are lenient with them”—this is Rabbeinu Tam’s proof, that from the fact that they are lenient with them, apparently it is rabbinic—“for they said a king and a bride,” and so on. “And if anointing and washing were Torah-level, how could we be lenient with them like this? Rather, they are certainly rabbinic, and that is also why the Talmud says: these five afflictions correspond to what?” That is only language of support, and it does not say “how do we know.” Yes, all this is in Tosafot. “And I have a difficulty,” I move to the next paragraph, “up to this point is the view of Tosafot. And I have a difficulty from what is taught in the Talmud: although they said ‘forbidden,’ they only said punishable by karet regarding one who eats and one who drinks and one who does labor. And if it is true that these other afflictions are only rabbinically forbidden, how can it make sense to say regarding them ‘they did not say punishable by karet,’ since there is not even a Torah prohibition there?” What does it mean? “They only said punishable by karet” regarding eating and drinking. No—say “and they did not say there is a prohibition except regarding eating and drinking.” If the Talmud says “they did not say punishable by karet,” that implies that the prohibition and the positive commandment do exist; only the punishment of karet exists for eating and drinking, but the others have the prohibition fully. “Therefore it would seem to me that all of them are Torah-level.” Up to this point I would say both prohibition and positive commandment are Torah-level, because all that was excluded was karet. “Except that since they are not among the afflictions explicitly written in the verse in the Torah, but come from the inclusion of ‘shabbaton,’ as is in the Talmud, they were treated more leniently; and Scripture handed them over to the sages, and they were lenient according to what they saw fit, and they permitted anything not done for pleasure.” So he says it is Torah-level, but Scripture handed it over to the sages—like what Nachmanides says about Hol HaMoed there. Since Scripture handed it over to the sages, the sages can determine what is forbidden and what is permitted, but once they determine it, the prohibition is a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic one. It is not entirely clear whether this is also about the negative commandment—sorry, whether the Torah prohibition is only a positive commandment or also a negative one. Here he speaks about prohibition generally; he doesn’t enter into the distinction between positive and negative commandment. There would be room perhaps to say—because he is speaking about the prohibition, yes, because when you say “forbidden,” you are speaking about the prohibition, not about the positive commandment to afflict oneself. And therefore when the whole discussion is about prohibition, and you say karet was excluded, it implies the prohibition exists—that would be the negative commandment. What about the positive commandment? The positive commandment is not discussed here at all. But he says this comes from “shabbaton,” “rest restrictions,” from “shabbaton,” “Sabbath, shabbaton,” and that is definitely the positive commandment. Right? So seemingly there is here both the positive and the negative commandment; only karet is excluded. “And so too is the opinion of Maimonides, of blessed memory, in chapter 1 of the laws of resting on the tenth, that all of these are Torah-level.” And he apparently understands that this means both the negative commandment and the positive commandment. “However, this does not sit well with me,” Ran continues, “that which is taught later: children are permitted regarding all of them except wearing shoes, and in the Talmud it explains that they are permitted in all of them just as adults are permitted to wash and anoint them, as we will explain there with God’s help. And these certainly are done for pleasure. And if you withheld these from them for one day, they would not be in danger”—this is not danger to life. “If they are Torah-level, how can this be permitted? For it says ‘you shall not eat them,’ and we read it as ‘you shall not feed them,’ warning adults regarding minors.” He says: if this were a Torah prohibition, then how am I allowed to feed these things to minors with my own hands? “Children are permitted regarding all of them except wearing shoes,” meaning all the afflictions. How can they permit children all the afflictions except wearing shoes if this were a Torah prohibition? With a Torah prohibition there is a derivation in the Talmud in Yevamot. The Talmud says “you shall not eat them,” and derives from this “you shall not feed them.” What does that mean? A minor who eats forbidden foods on his own—the court is not commanded to separate him; that is the law. There is a dispute in the Talmud; practically, the court is not commanded to separate him. In other words, if he is eating a prohibition on his own, I am not obligated to stop him. By the law of education, perhaps his father is, but never mind, I’m not getting into those details now. But I am forbidden to hand it to him and make him eat. What is called feeding by hand. That I may not do. To give him a prohibition directly—no. If he does it on his own, I do not have to stop him. And this is learned from “you shall not eat them—you shall not feed them.” It appears in three places, and they derive from it—there’s a necessary linkage there—and they derive from it that there is a prohibition on giving minors a Torah prohibition directly. People don’t know this so much: there is a prohibition on giving minors a Torah prohibition directly. A Torah prohibition, according to most opinions—according to almost all the medieval authorities, it is a Torah prohibition. To give a one-year-old child—not one who has reached the age of education and nothing like that. Now, so he says: then how is it permitted to anoint them or wash them if this is a Torah prohibition? Fine, here we have danger to life. What? Danger to life, exactly. One might ask—you were about to ask—fine, and eating and drinking, how can we give them that? That is certainly a Torah prohibition, right? And that too we give them. Except there it is danger to life. But with these afflictions, these are afflictions that do not lead to loss of life, as we saw, right? So if that is so, there should not have been a need to permit giving those to children either. With eating and drinking it’s because of danger to life. I’ll just say parenthetically: even with eating and drinking this is difficult. Eating and drinking are not danger to life. Let him eat—prepare food so he can eat on his own. We’re talking about a three-year-old, he can already take it himself, say. Someone who is nursing is another matter, maybe. So not all feeding on Yom Kippur—and we permit feeding on Yom Kippur—not all feeding is danger to life. What, every minor who does not eat something immediately is in danger of death? So this permission is a bit strange—the way he says that eating and drinking are obviously because of danger to life, and the whole difficulty is only about the other afflictions. On that issue, maybe if I have time I’ll note something in the coming classes. I’ll just say briefly: there really is a difficult discussion about this, and I do not know a good answer to it in the later authorities. I may get to it in one of the coming classes if I have time—we’ll see. I’ll just say briefly: in Divrei Yechezkel there is a claim that there is a difference between a prohibition and a positive commandment. The Magen Avraham claims that with positive commandments there is no prohibition of “you shall not feed them,” only with negative commandments. With positive commandments there is no “you shall not feed them.” And there are those who distinguish between things that are time-bound and things that are not time-bound—not important right now. Now, Divrei Yechezkel claims that on Yom Kippur—I mentioned Nachmanides in Kiddushin, I think, in one of the first classes—Nachmanides argues that there are certain prohibitions that in essence came to support a positive commandment. For example, “do not place blood in your house” came to support the positive commandment of “make a parapet for your roof.” And what is the practical difference? That if it were time-bound, women would be exempt even though there is a prohibition. Why? Because the whole purpose of the prohibition is to reinforce the positive commandment. But someone exempt from the positive commandment because it is time-bound—then they would be exempt from the positive commandment—so there is no sense in also applying the prohibition to them; that is Nachmanides’ argument there. Now Divrei Yechezkel says this is the case on Yom Kippur. On Yom Kippur the essence is really the positive commandment, right? “You shall afflict yourselves”—that’s what is written in the Torah. The prohibition, even if we derive it in some way, comes to reinforce the positive commandment. The idea is to afflict oneself on Yom Kippur—the positive commandment—that is the essence of Yom Kippur. And if the prohibition comes to reinforce the positive commandment, then it is permitted to feed minors directly, since if they are not obligated in the positive commandment—after all, from the standpoint of the positive commandment, I may feed them directly, as the Magen Avraham says; with a positive commandment there is no prohibition of “you shall not feed them”—and the prohibition here is only to support the positive commandment. Just as women would be exempt from a time-bound positive commandment, so too the prohibition, and so too feeding minors, would be permitted, since this isn’t really a standalone prohibition. It is a prohibition that comes to reinforce the positive commandment. Of course there is room to challenge him: then why must women fast on Yom Kippur? After all, if the prohibition comes to support the positive commandment, and that positive commandment is time-bound—Yom Kippur is time-bound—then women ought to have been exempt. I don’t know. I do not know a good answer for how it is permitted to feed minors on Yom Kippur. I don’t know a good explanation for it. Minhat Hinukh says it is danger to life; Ran here also hints that it is danger to life. It is not really danger to life. All commandments—all commandments, a minor without understanding is exempt. I am talking about a minor with understanding; that is under the law of education. But a minor without understanding whom I feed directly by hand—that too is forbidden even if he has no understanding. Yes. And to say that here understanding is part of the essence of the prohibition—that is, he doesn’t violate a prohibition at all if he has no understanding. With other things, lack of understanding is only an exemption; he does violate a prohibition, except he is exempt because he lacks understanding. Here, if he has no understanding then he isn’t really fasting, so it is not even called that he violated a prohibition. I don’t know—maybe we’ll think about it. In any case, that is the Ran, and he also hints at Maimonides’ position. I just want to finish with Maimonides. Maimonides in chapter 1, law 5, writes: “And so too we learned from the oral tradition that it is forbidden to wash on it, or to anoint, or to wear shoes, or to have intercourse.” What does “from the oral tradition” mean? In the simple reading, it does not seem like a rabbinic enactment. It is probably some interpretation or tradition. So in Maimonides’ method, laws given to Moses at Sinai and interpretations are “of the sages,” but “of the sages” not like enactments and decrees, rather “of the sages,” as I said earlier, in some intermediate sense—which according to most interpreters of Maimonides is actually Torah-level. I do not think so, but in any case it is not rabbinic in the sense of an enactment or decree. And therefore he says: “And it is a commandment to refrain from all these, just as one refrains from eating and drinking, as it says: ‘a complete rest.’ Sabbath refers to eating, and complete rest refers to these.” Here it already seems that from the standpoint of the positive commandment this is really a positive commandment. From the standpoint of the prohibition, he says “from the oral tradition,” and there is room to discuss what he means. From the standpoint of the positive commandment, it is really a positive commandment. “And one is liable to karet or a sacrifice only for eating and drinking. But if one washed, or anointed, or wore shoes, or had intercourse, they give him disciplinary lashes.” What is interesting here is the sacrifice. One is not liable to karet—but why not liable to a sacrifice? If there were a prohibition here, then presumably there should have been a sacrifice too. They were excluded from karet, all right, the other afflictions. But if there were a prohibition there, then presumably there should have been a sin-offering. Good. Now that is really not such a simple question, because it is clear that the four afflictions are not a separate prohibition. It is the same prohibition as eating and drinking, just on another level. And here there is room to discuss it: there is no sin-offering for a prohibition for which there is no karet. Exactly—where its intentional violation incurs karet, its inadvertent violation incurs a sin-offering. Where its intentional violation does not incur karet, its inadvertent violation does not incur a sin-offering. Now here in the prohibition itself there is karet when you eat and drink—it is the same prohibition. But regarding the other four afflictions, you violate that prohibition without karet. And it may be that here indeed, if there is no karet then there is also no sin-offering, even though the prohibition still exists. So here Maimonides remains open: one can say there really is a prohibition here, and that still does not contradict the fact that there is no sin-offering, or perhaps there really is no prohibition here, and then that is easier. You hear? Disciplinary lashes are rabbinic. No, disciplinary lashes—I already said in the previous class—disciplinary lashes apply to anything that has no Torah punishment. Also Torah prohibitions, for example positive-commandment prohibitions, Maimonides says receive disciplinary lashes. Or a half-measure receives disciplinary lashes. In his commentary to the Mishnah he says that the afflictions came through tradition—it’s like “from the oral tradition,” never mind right now. I just want to finish. In the Book of Commandments, as I mentioned earlier, in positive commandment 164, commandment 164 is that we were commanded to afflict ourselves on the tenth of Tishrei, and this is His saying, may He be exalted: “you shall afflict yourselves.” And the interpretation came in the Sifra: “you shall afflict yourselves”—an affliction involving loss of life; what is that? Eating and drinking. “And so too the tradition came that washing, anointing, wearing shoes, and marital relations are forbidden.” This is very interesting. In other words, from the verse itself he interprets this as only eating and drinking—not only with respect to karet, but also with respect to the prohibition. But from tradition we learned nonetheless that the other afflictions are also forbidden. So what exactly is that now—that the tradition interpreted the prohibition, or that the tradition added a prohibition as a matter of received tradition? I don’t know exactly how to interpret that. Again, the status of the prohibition regarding the four afflictions in Maimonides is not entirely clear. “And refraining from all these actions is obligatory from His saying there: ‘it shall be a complete rest for you, and you shall afflict yourselves,’ as if to say that there is an obligation of special refraining from labors and actions, and refraining specifically from the body’s food and sustenance. Therefore it says ‘complete rest.’” Again, regarding the positive commandment, as we saw in the laws. Regarding the positive commandment, he includes them in the positive commandment. Regarding the prohibition, there too his wording is not entirely clear what he means. Just to finish, look that in prohibition 194, where he speaks about the prohibition of Yom Kippur, the four afflictions are not mentioned there. That somewhat hints that apparently there really is no prohibition; it is something “from the oral tradition” or something like that. But there is Torah law here in the form of a positive commandment. Because the Ran, if you remember, brought Maimonides as a view according to which this is apparently Torah-level, and in the simple reading that would mean both negative and positive commandment. But in Maimonides himself it is not entirely—What you said about the infant: a very young infant who cannot eat by himself—if he does not eat, he is in mortal danger. Right. So what is the novelty? The novelty is that there is a commandment to feed him. In other words, even though it is Yom Kippur and there is a prohibition of eating, since there is danger to life here, there is a commandment to feed him. In Maimonides himself it is not entirely clear whether this is on the side of permission or on the side of commandment, but generally we rule that saving life is a full-fledged commandment. Therefore, one who feeds an infant on Yom Kippur not only does not commit a transgression, but fulfills a great commandment of saving a Jewish life. And that is also true regarding a sick person in danger, whom we feed according to what is needed, and we are not stringent with him at all. Anywhere there is even a doubt of danger to life, it is a commandment to desecrate Yom Kippur for him, and there is no need to get permission from a religious court. One who acts quickly is praiseworthy. Therefore, with such an infant who cannot eat on his own, it is our duty to feed him and provide all his needs, and that is the commandment under discussion, which overrides the fast. And that is what Maimonides wanted to emphasize here: that this action is a positive commandment and not merely the removal of a prohibition.