Tractate Yoma – Elul 5783 – Lesson 4

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because if there’s no inclusive case and no additive case, then what are you really telling me? That it’s one prohibition. So if that’s true, then even when they come simultaneously, it will be one prohibition, one prohibition. The dispute about simultaneity begins from the dispute about inclusive and additive. That’s less important for us here, because we’re going to have to get into the rule that one prohibition does not take effect on top of another prohibition. Right, the Talmud here has a common foundation. Yes. Right, they have a common foundation, and again, I’m not going now into the laws of one prohibition not taking effect on another prohibition. For us, what matters is a side point, but that’s what the Talmud says. Okay?

Now, let’s suppose Passover fell on the Sabbath. Okay? Would you say that the prohibition of cessation of labor on Passover takes effect on the prohibition of cessation of labor on the Sabbath because on Passover there is also the prohibition of leaven and matzah? There’s no connection, right? Really, if you tell me the Sabbath prohibitions, the labor prohibitions of the Sabbath, on top of labor prohibitions on Passover — that yes, because here there’s an additive element, this carries court-imposed death, but it’s the same prohibition, prohibition of labor here and prohibition of labor there. But you can’t say that Passover takes effect on the Sabbath because Passover has the prohibition of leaven and matzah. You see here from the Talmud that when the Talmud understands that Yom Kippur is called an inclusive case relative to the Sabbath, and Rashi even explains it, that means it’s the same kind of prohibition. The fact that there is affliction here is not like leaven on Passover. The prohibition on Yom Kippur is altogether a more comprehensive cessation. This is an excellent source for Maimonides’ view. Okay? That essentially Yom Kippur is some kind of more comprehensive cessation.

Now let’s look for a moment at the positions. He is liable for one sin-offering on Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath when there is no inclusive or additive element. Okay, whether that’s Rabbi Akiva or Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, whichever one, it doesn’t matter, one of them. Okay, so for what is he liable? For Yom Kippur or for the Sabbath? Why one sin-offering? One sin-offering. Yes. So which is more severe? Both carry a sin-offering obligation. I would have said: go this way, and it pushes it off; go that way, and it pushes it off — you shouldn’t be liable for any sin-offering. You want to obligate me in a sin-offering for the Sabbath? Who says? Maybe it’s Yom Kippur. You want to obligate me for Yom Kippur? Who says? Maybe it’s the Sabbath. You can’t prove on the basis of which one I should be liable, because neither preceded the other; they both take effect simultaneously from the moment the day becomes sanctified. So seemingly I could even raise the possibility that he shouldn’t be liable for a sin-offering at all. I’m not liable for one sin-offering, but it’s not defined: one sin-offering for what — for the Sabbath or for Yom Kippur? And simply put, it’s one sin-offering for both of them. But how can that be? If these are two different things, how do you bring one sin-offering for two different transgressions?

So what difference does it make whether it’s simultaneous or not simultaneous? Why either there’s no inclusive case or there is an inclusive case? So decide which one it is. If it had been one after the other, okay, and you don’t have the law of inclusive or additive, no problem — you bring the sin-offering for the first prohibition. That’s clear, because you only transgressed that one; the second prohibition never took effect, according to the one who holds that there’s no inclusive or additive. But here, where the implication of the Talmud is that it’s simultaneous, and only the dispute about the rule of inclusive and additive projects onto the case where two prohibitions come together, a question arises here that doesn’t arise in the case of inclusive and additive. Because there, if you told me I’m liable for one sin-offering, it would be obvious to me what for: for the first prohibition. But here, where both prohibitions took effect simultaneously, then yes, you’re telling me he’s liable only for one sin-offering — but for which one? There’s no first one here.

What? After all, this is a question of astonishment — for what are you obligating him in the sin-offering? Why in the world would “the frequent and the infrequent” determine which sin-offering he is liable for? Where is there any rule that the frequent and the infrequent exempts from a sin-offering? Either bring two sin-offerings or bring none. Why? So what if it’s frequent? That’s also written with a shin. So what? What? Huh? Should they both exempt him? Yes. We’re talking about an unwitting transgressor too. If you’re not talking about an unwitting transgressor too then you’re not… No, that’s not simple either. If he had been warned for both, what then? He already received warning for both. No, no — what do you mean? Ah, from the standpoint of death? Fine, but I’m saying if both had the same punishment, then even in the deliberate case there would be the same problem. Yes, there the punishments are different.

So for our purposes, there are two sin-offerings here, and because here it’s simultaneous, this is a rare case, where the dispute about inclusive and additive is actually expressed also in a situation where two prohibitions come together. And in such a situation, I say: either you tell me that in the simultaneous case I don’t care about inclusive and additive — bring two sin-offerings; after all, you transgressed two prohibitions. Or you tell me: bring no sin-offering at all, because you can’t obligate me for the Sabbath, because maybe it’s for Yom Kippur; you can’t obligate me for Yom Kippur, because maybe it’s for the Sabbath. Go this way and it pushes it off, go that way and it pushes it off. But in the end, you bring one sin-offering. For what? For the Sabbath or for Yom Kippur? For both? But then how… You transgressed two different transgressions, and you’re liable for one sin-offering for both?

Now, if in the case of inclusive and additive one prohibition doesn’t take effect on another, then you also didn’t transgress two prohibitions. Because the second transgression — let’s say for the sake of argument that one prohibition doesn’t take effect on another — that also means there’s no second transgression. For purposes of punishment too, there is no second transgression. But here there is no first one, because the two happened simultaneously from the moment the day became sanctified. There is no first one. So this is very strange. For what is he liable for a sin-offering?

So here there’s an interesting point. There is an interesting Or Sameach, a very delightful Or Sameach, on Maimonides in chapter 1, law 2 of the laws of the Yom Kippur service — not the laws of resting on the tenth day. The laws of the Yom Kippur service. All the festivals, by the way, also have a third collection of laws. There’s a collection of laws about the sacrifices connected to the festivals. What? There? What are you advising the Holy One, blessed be He, now? I didn’t understand. What’s the question — what do we punish for? You want to bring in “the frequent and the infrequent” where it wasn’t said? What do you want to do with this “the frequent and the infrequent”? From the standpoint of Jewish law it doesn’t work like that. Okay. Fine. So, punchline: let’s all be vegans. Fine.

In any case, for our purposes, let’s look for a moment at Maimonides in the laws of the Yom Kippur service, chapter 1 law 2: “The service of all these fifteen animals sacrificed on this day is performed only by the High Priest.” On Yom Kippur the High Priest serves; on other days it’s an ordinary priest. Whether he is a priest anointed with the anointing oil or one elevated by garments, it doesn’t matter — the point is, he’s the High Priest. “And if it was the Sabbath” — Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath — “even the additional Sabbath offering is offered only by the High Priest. And likewise the other services of this day, such as burning the incense and preparing the lamps.”

The big novelty — what I underlined here — is that if Yom Kippur falls on the Sabbath, then there are the sacrifices of the day and the additional offerings of the Sabbath, because you bring the additional offerings of the Sabbath too, if it falls on Yom Kippur, because of the Sabbath aspect in it. Okay? But the additional Sabbath offerings — I would have expected an ordinary priest to bring them. The service of the day of Yom Kippur would be done by the High Priest, and the additional Sabbath offerings, like every other Sabbath, would be done by an ordinary priest. What? The frequent and the infrequent. Fine, that’s the frequent and the infrequent; we have an expert on the subject, you can ask him. Right. Same thing. What’s the question? No, because the daily offering of Yom Kippur is the daily offering of Yom Kippur. Not relevant. But an additional offering is the additional offering of the Sabbath. No — Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath is a coincidence and a commandment in one case. Yom Kippur is one of the days of the week just as it’s one of the days of the year. Every day of the year has two daily offerings; on Yom Kippur there are two daily offerings. You could say there was room to say otherwise, but here it’s much easier to understand that the two daily offerings are sacrifices of Yom Kippur. But the additional Sabbath offering — what’s the connection? You bring it on the Sabbath; if it hadn’t fallen on the Sabbath it wouldn’t come. Fine. Okay. No, I won’t argue because I’m right. It doesn’t matter whether I flow in that direction or in this direction. Fine, everything flows, said Heraclitus.

So the claim is that when Yom Kippur falls on the Sabbath and they bring the additional Sabbath offerings, they too are brought by the High Priest. Seemingly this is the Yom Kippur service, not every service done on Yom Kippur. Fine, maybe, I don’t know.

The Or Sameach proposes the following explanation. The Or Sameach, by the way, is in chapter 4, not here, but he refers to Maimonides here: “And behold, our master’s view above in chapter 1 is that even the additional Sabbath offering is by the High Priest, even though this is coincidental and not one of the sacrifices of the day.” By coincidence Yom Kippur fell on the Sabbath; it could have fallen on another day. “It seems that our master inferred from the wording of the Talmud in Menachot: ‘The additional offerings together with the morning daily offering,’ etc., regarding all additional offerings, even those of the Sabbath.” Yes — like the daily offering, so too the additional offerings, including the additional offerings of the Sabbath, not only the additional offerings of Yom Kippur. “And perhaps our master had this explicitly in some source.” He doesn’t know Maimonides’ source, but perhaps he had some source that disappeared from him.

“And this seems reasonable, for they said in the chapter Kol HaTadir in Zevachim: ‘Does the New Moon, for its own additional offerings, help, but for the additional offerings of the Sabbath it does not help? See there.’ Behold, they become sanctified with the sanctity of the New Moon.” Yes, if the New Moon falls on the Sabbath, then the additional offerings of the Sabbath are also considered sacrifices of the New Moon. “So too here, the additional offerings of the Sabbath become sanctified with the sanctity of Yom Kippur, and its commandment is with the High Priest, like the daily offerings.”

“And we find something even greater in the chapter Tamid Nishchat in tractate Pesachim: that the sacrificial fats of the Passover offering when the fourteenth falls on the Sabbath are offered on the festival.” Yes, if the eve of Passover falls on the Sabbath, then the fats are offered on the festival because they are the fats of the Sabbath and are offered on the festival. “This shows that a Passover offering brought on the Sabbath is called the fats of the Sabbath.” If these weren’t considered Sabbath fats, you couldn’t offer them on the festival. But the fats of the Passover offering — true, the Passover offering comes on the Sabbath, but it’s a Passover offering; it’s not one of the additional offerings of the Sabbath. Why is it called the fats of the Sabbath? You see that Passover on the Sabbath — the sacrifices there too — are considered a sacrifice of the Sabbath, and its fats are Sabbath fats and are offered on the festival. In a moment we’ll see.

“This shows that a Passover offering brought on the Sabbath is called the fats of the Sabbath, even though it is a coincidental matter dependent on the calendar fixing by the court, it is called the fats of the Sabbath, and the sanctity of the Sabbath helps it. All the more so here, where Yom Kippur’s offerings override, and their service is by the High Priest, like the daily offerings.” So he says: regarding Passover too you see the same thing. What? The additional Sabbath offerings override Yom Kippur? Why are the additional Sabbath offerings brought at all? Are you allowed to desecrate Yom Kippur in order to offer the additional Sabbath offerings? To desecrate the Sabbath, of course you’re allowed — that’s built in — but here there is also the prohibition of Yom Kippur. Right? So he says that here it’s a fortiori compared to the fats of the Passover offering on the Sabbath.

Anyway, that is his conclusion. Just as with Passover that falls on the Sabbath, so too with Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath: just as Passover on the Sabbath is called Sabbath fats, Yom Kippur on the Sabbath is called Yom Kippur. By the way, the direction is interesting. Yes — in Passover on the Sabbath, it becomes a Sabbath sacrifice. In Yom Kippur on the Sabbath, it becomes a Yom Kippur sacrifice, not a Sabbath sacrifice. What exactly is the direction here? I think the direction has to do with the question of what the law is; I’m not sure what is primary — exactly. There is some law here that is positive, and it always overrides the negative law. Meaning, the sacrifices of Yom Kippur: on Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath, from the Sabbath aspect of it, an ordinary priest could do it, and it’s merely permitted that an ordinary priest do it — the High Priest can also do it. By contrast, on Yom Kippur it has to be the High Priest. Therefore when Yom Kippur falls on the Sabbath, it’s quite clear that it will have the Yom Kippur laws of the High Priest. By contrast, Passover that falls on the Sabbath — the Sabbath fats are offered on the festival, and Passover doesn’t have this special law of Sabbath fats. So again, the positive law overcomes the negative law. I think that’s the direction.

But in any case, you see here this joining of the two festivals — they accumulate together. And then he has a very interesting conclusion: “Therefore it seems to me that the sanctity of Yom Kippur takes effect also on the Sabbath, to sanctify it in cessation from all eating.” What does that mean? On the Sabbath of Yom Kippur, even the laws of the Sabbath are derived from the fact that we are on Yom Kippur. It’s not a combination of Yom Kippur and the Sabbath; rather, the Sabbath and Yom Kippur change, and in effect receive some mixed character, a character of both of them together. “For the sanctity of Yom Kippur also helps for the Sabbath, that it be sanctified in affliction of the soul.” On a regular Sabbath it is sanctified through eating and Sabbath delight, honoring the Sabbath and delighting in the Sabbath, etc.; on Yom Kippur that very thing is the sanctity of the Sabbath — affliction. Okay? So this goes in both directions. Notice: Yom Kippur too has some kind of broader cessation — it’s really a kind of expanded Sabbath — and the Sabbath too receives the character of Yom Kippur. The laws of the Sabbath change and the laws of Yom Kippur change.

“And therefore it seems” — here is his conclusion — “that on Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath, if there is a dangerously ill person who needs to eat, I rule that he does not recite kiddush even for the Sabbath. For that is the sanctity of the Sabbath then: that one not eat on it. And this is obvious.” Meaning, there is a major dispute among the later authorities: first, what happens with a sick person on an ordinary Yom Kippur — does he have to recite kiddush? That’s disputed. There most later authorities say no. But on Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath there is an argument, because from the Sabbath aspect you should recite kiddush, even if not from the Yom Kippur aspect. The Or Sameach wants to claim that even on Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath one does not recite kiddush. Why? Because on that Sabbath there is no law of eating at all and no law of kiddush over food. Even from the Sabbath aspect there is no law of eating, so this is no different from ordinary Yom Kippur. Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath is no different from ordinary Yom Kippur; there is no kiddush to recite on such a Yom Kippur. Because the Sabbath takes on a different character when it appears together with Yom Kippur. So that is basically his claim.

Okay, so there is a famous story about the Sochatchover, the Avnei Nezer, that when he was a child his father sent him to eat on Yom Kippur. He came back — I don’t remember whether it was Yom Kippur that fell on the Sabbath or an ordinary Yom Kippur, doesn’t matter, one of the two. He came back, and his father asked him: tell me, did you recite kiddush? Suddenly — Yom Kippur. So his father says, fine, but you ate — what do you mean? On a festival you have to recite kiddush. Maybe it was Yom Kippur that fell on the Sabbath, I don’t remember, because there are later authorities who say this even about ordinary Yom Kippur. And then the Sochatchover said to him: right, but my whole obligation to recite kiddush is only by virtue of education. What? So that I know what to do when I grow up. When I grow up, I won’t eat. When I grow up, I won’t eat, so there is no law of education to recite kiddush.

By the way, that itself depends on the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot. Is education incumbent on the father — in which case, simply, it really is to educate the child, to accustom him to do it? No, he assumed he already knew. Now he told him. So if you say it’s an obligation on the father to educate the child so that he will know what to do when he grows up, then the Sochatchover is right. That’s a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot, because Rashi claims that it is a law on the child himself: that the child has a rabbinic obligation to fulfill commandments. Okay? And there it’s not clear that education means habituation or knowing what to do as preparation for adulthood; rather it’s an obligation in commandments even at a young age. You have a rabbinic obligation in commandments. And then it could be that he really did need to recite kiddush. Fine, one can sharpen this further. In any case, for us, that is basically what the Or Sameach is claiming. I’m bringing this up — I’m repeating it now. No, no, fine. Maybe “Korat HaBayit”? No.

If I really… what is he basically saying here? He is basically saying: when we have a combination of two such days — Passover and the Sabbath, Yom Kippur on the Sabbath — then it is not a combination of two days, but a day of a third type, a new day whose characteristics combine those two days. Wait, wait, wait. In a moment, in a moment — maybe that is exactly the conclusion. So the claim is basically that when two such festivals take effect one on top of the other — yes, Purim that falls on Passover for example, or something like that, if you intercalate the year in Nisan and it suddenly becomes Adar, so Passover turns into Purim. Fine. In any case, this combination of two days basically creates some day of a third type, whose characteristics are some blend of the characteristics of the two days, but it is not a conjunction of the two days. It is a day of a third type, and the way to understand the laws that apply to it is some blend of its two aspects. But those are two aspects of one day. So that is basically his claim.

There is — yes, in the Rogatchover’s language you could call this a neighboring composition or an alloyed composition. A neighboring composition is a chemical compound or a physical mixture, as they call it. A compound or a mixture, yes, exactly. Meaning, the question is whether you take these two things and mix them, but each still exists independently and they are only mixed — they are neighbors of each other; that he calls a neighboring composition. Alloyed composition means that they are fused and become one thing. The one thing is not disconnected from its two components; of course they somehow shape or crystallize the features of the new creation, the blend, but right now it is already one blended entity.

Now, if indeed there is — the Or Sameach talks about this in many contexts. For example, he asks: what is a High Priest? Is a High Priest an ordinary priest plus something extra, or is it something else? Say, a High Priest who married a divorced woman — did he transgress two prohibitions or one? From the aspect of the ordinary priest within him, he transgressed the prohibition of marrying a divorced woman, and from the aspect of the High Priest within him, he transgressed the prohibition of marrying a divorced woman — did he transgress two prohibitions? Or not? A High Priest is an upgraded ordinary priest; it’s not a combination of two priests, it’s one priest that contains elements of an ordinary priest, but he is one priest.

There are various contexts. By the way, you find this in the Talmud in the phrase “the status of tam remains in place.” In tractate Bava Kamma, when there is an ox forewarned as dangerous, the Talmud raises the possibility that the first half-damages should be paid from the body of the ox, and the additional half for the forewarned ox should be paid from general assets. Why? Because the forewarned ox pays full damages, but half of that is the ordinary ox. “The status of tam remains in place”; it only becomes forewarned, so another forewarned component is added. Or perhaps a forewarned ox is something entirely new, and all of it is paid from general assets, and that is the Jewish law.

In any case, what does that mean? It means that in Jewish law there are three festivals here: there is the Sabbath, there is Yom Kippur, and there is Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath. Three festivals. True, from the standpoint of the written Torah and halakhah, the Oral Torah tells us what the law is on Yom Kippur and what the law is on the Sabbath. The law on Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath we need to synthesize out of those two data points, but that is just the way we construct it. In the end, it is three different days. The way we construct the features of the third type of day is a synthesis of those two days, but that is only how we construct it; in the end it is a third type of day. Okay, that is basically the claim.

Now, if that is really so — for example, with Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath — in the Talmud it appears as an initial assumption; in the Jerusalem Talmud it is also the conclusion. What happens with sounding the shofar on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath? The Talmud says that on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath it is “a remembrance of shofar-blasting,” not actual shofar-blasting. That implies that on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath one essentially does not need to sound the shofar; there is no shofar-blowing on Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath. The whole matter of shofar-blowing was never said regarding it. In the Jerusalem Talmud that is the conclusion there; in the Babylonian Talmud it is only rabbinic in the conclusion, in the initial—

[Speaker B] assumption, exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath — according to the Jerusalem Talmud and the initial assumption of the Babylonian Talmud — one does not sound the shofar at all. The law of shofar-blowing was never said regarding it. It is not overridden because of a rabbinic decree lest one carry it four cubits. Exactly. By the way, even so, that’s a dispute between Magen Avraham and Rabbi Akiva Eiger whether one fulfills the commandment, but I’m saying that according to the initial assumption it’s clear that one does not fulfill it — there’s no need to argue; it’s obvious.

So again, you see that this is some kind of day of a third type. It is not a combination of the Sabbath and Rosh Hashanah. If it were a combination of the Sabbath and Rosh Hashanah, then in principle you would need to sound the shofar, only perhaps because of the laws of the Sabbath it gets pushed off — rabbinically, whatever. If you tell me no, this is not a day of shofar-blasting at all, it is a day of remembrance of shofar-blasting — it’s a different kind of day, not ordinary Rosh Hashanah — then the law of shofar-blowing was never said here at all. It’s not a combination of Rosh Hashanah and the Sabbath; it’s Rosh Hashanah that falls on the Sabbath — a day of a third type.

That’s another discussion; in the Temple and outside the Temple it’s a different story. I’m talking about the place where they don’t sound the shofar. Okay? So the claim, in the end, is that if Yom Kippur falls on the Sabbath, then it is basically a day of a third type. If so, right? I asked earlier: why bring one sin-offering? Either bring two or bring none. What is this sin-offering brought for — for the Sabbath or for Yom Kippur? According to what emerges here from the Or Sameach, it could be — and then maybe this is even proof for the Or Sameach from the Talmud, at least according to one opinion in the Talmud — that indeed Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath is one day. You can discuss whether what he did is permitted or forbidden, and that you will learn from the laws of the Sabbath or from the laws of Yom Kippur. But once you finish that discussion, you have one day to which this law applies. It has no two sides. It’s not that if you do labor here, then you transgressed Yom Kippur and transgressed the Sabbath. Rather, you transgressed Yom Kippur-that-falls-on-the-Sabbath. The combination of Yom Kippur and the Sabbath only tells you what laws apply here, and here you can discuss it from the Sabbath aspect, from the Yom Kippur aspect. But after you’ve finished the discussion, that’s only the way to reach the conclusion. After you’ve finished and arrived at it.

And then indeed the question that Doron raises here comes up: if so, then it does not seem there is room at all to discuss the laws of one prohibition not taking effect on another prohibition. But it could be that this itself is what is being said here. This itself is the conclusion. The conclusion is that here they are liable for one sacrifice because it is one day, and really there is no place for the rule that one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition. Okay. Because of Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath. And intentionally, this question—

[Speaker B] Am I forbidden — did I even receive the sin-offering because of the Sabbath or because of Yom Kippur?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You were going to say: both together?

[Speaker B] What did I receive the sin-offering for? For both.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. If you also want to answer, then answer. But the answer I’m giving is: because of both. If you don’t want to accept that answer, that’s your right, but that’s the answer I’m giving. Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath is not two things; it is one thing. Think about Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath in mathematical terms, say: the space of festivals is spread out by some basic set of festivals. Okay? The combination of the Sabbath and Yom Kippur actually creates a third festival. It’s just that you can create it by combining the Sabbath and Yom Kippur. But this combination is not a conjunction meaning that now there is both Sabbath and Yom Kippur; rather, there is a day of a third type that has projections on the Sabbath axis and on the Yom Kippur axis. And there are various halakhic ramifications to that. But at the end of the day, it is one type of day. And if I reached the conclusion that labor is forbidden on it, then labor is forbidden on it — that’s all. Why? Because it is Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath. Okay?

In principle, if I wanted to go far with this, I would even say that one should count this as an additional prohibition. Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath has another prohibition of labor. There is the prohibition of labor of Yom Kippur, there is the prohibition of labor of the Sabbath, and there is the prohibition of labor of Yom Kippur-that-falls-on-the-Sabbath. But again, because in essence this is a particular case of Yom Kippur — a special Yom Kippur — it may be that for purposes of counting the commandments one would not count it, but I’m only saying in principle, to sharpen the point, that there would even be room to count it separately. Okay.

Now I move on to a few additional ramifications. What are you saying? Why is there a zero? A little intelligence, friends. Simply because I made a list, and in addition there was something earlier that didn’t get included: one, two, three, four — so I added zero. Yes.

[Speaker B] I would have

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] put in irrational numbers, it doesn’t matter, square root of two, whatever. Yes. Fine. Okay, so that’s a famous Harry Potter thing, no? Platform four and three-quarters — how does it go there? Something like that. Who said you have to count only with natural numbers?

[Speaker B] One and sub-section and clause.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, okay, fine, we have another mistake. Fine. You know, Rabbi Medan — I once heard him say that he knows twenty-two explanations for why we read the Scroll of Ruth on Shavuot. But he knows only one explanation for why we read the Scroll of Esther on Purim. Because if there are twenty-two explanations, that means none of them is really convincing. Yes. Fine.

So I want to go through the differences between Yom Kippur and the Sabbath a little, in order to try to position it as I said earlier. So first of all, the punishment — we saw that, right? On the Sabbath it is stoning by the court; on Yom Kippur it is only karet and there is no death penalty. Regarding a positive commandment concerning labor, we apparently saw a dispute between Rashi and Maimonides. Maimonides says there is a positive commandment; Rashi in tractate Shabbat on 114 says there is no positive commandment — that’s also how the Avnei Nezer understands him — and I think that’s the plain simple reading. So that too could be a difference, because on the Sabbath, according to everyone, there is also a positive commandment of ceasing from labor. And on Yom Kippur, regarding ceasing from labor — I’m talking now about labor, not affliction — there may be no positive commandment. Maimonides, true to his approach, holds that the afflictions and the labors are all cessation. So it is very unlikely that for labor there would be only a negative commandment, while for conversation — sorry — for labor there would be only a negative commandment and for affliction there would be two.

[Speaker B] That’s only on Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath. Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath has—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] a positive commandment.

[Speaker B] What do you mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a positive commandment. Right. From the Sabbath aspect, that will project onto the combined day, right, granted. Ah, now I remembered — you reminded me — the Rogatchover has responsa Tzofnat Paaneach. In siman 2 of the responsa, he discusses someone who cooked on a festival that fell on the Sabbath. On a festival you’re allowed to cook.

[Speaker B] On the Sabbath it’s forbidden to cook.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And he discusses whether such a person would transgress — he would transgress also on account of the festival when it coincides, because in principle you’re forbidden to cook on a festival that falls on the Sabbath. True, the prohibition is because of the Sabbath aspect in it, but now that it’s already forbidden, the question is whether he also transgresses because of the festival aspect in it. Okay? Now, this somewhat resembles what I said before, but it’s not the same thing. Because according to what I said earlier, clearly it would be forbidden, but the prohibition would be one and not two. A festival that falls on the Sabbath is one day. From the Sabbath aspect I understand that cooking is forbidden here, but once there is a prohibition to cook, the prohibition is on a festival-that-falls-on-the-Sabbath. There aren’t two sides here.

On the other hand, he does understand that one can project onto the other, so it does somewhat resemble this direction. Although simply speaking what he assumes is that according to Nachmanides, on a festival this whole law of cessation wasn’t said at all, and then it is unlikely that you transgress because of the festival. But if we understand, according to other medieval authorities, that on a festival one really should have ceased from everything, only they permitted it for the sake of food preparation — then in a place where there is no need to permit, because in any case he cannot cook because of the Sabbath aspect in it, then clearly they also did not permit it on account of the festival. Why would they permit it? There is no reason to permit. And fundamentally even food-preparation labors are forbidden on a festival according to those views. I think that’s the simpler explanation in the Rogatchover. There, you reminded me, so fine.

[Speaker B] The Sabbath and Yom Kippur, both take effect on the same day.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Sabbath takes effect on…

[Speaker B] Not on… you can’t have the same day. Not on the Sabbath itself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re eating the sin-offering too.

[Speaker B] I’m not, no, no, no — he’s talking about the showbread.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] About the showbread. I don’t remember at the moment, but I don’t think they eat it on Yom Kippur.

[Speaker B] Fine, okay, doesn’t matter, I don’t remember at the moment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We can try to check that. I don’t remember at the moment. I don’t recall that they eat it on Yom Kippur.

[Speaker B] Do you want to add?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. In any case, we spoke about the positive commandment. There is another ramification regarding one who causes damage and one who injures. Someone who causes damage and injures on Yom Kippur — what happens? On the Sabbath there is “he receives the greater punishment,” right? He is liable to death, and therefore he is exempt from monetary punishment. It’s a bit strange that money here is treated as punishment, because if money is simply compensation, what does “he receives the greater punishment” have to do with compensation? Compensate me for the damage you did to me. But you see that the rule of receiving the greater punishment also applies to monetary penalties. You see it in many places.

On Yom Kippur there is no death penalty, only karet, right? Now there is a tannaitic dispute whether the rule of receiving the greater punishment applies to karet. When there is no humanly imposed punishment, do we still say “he receives the greater punishment”? According to the tanna who holds there is no such rule for karet, then again there will be a difference here between Yom Kippur and the Sabbath. Since on Yom Kippur it is only karet, there will be no rule of receiving the greater punishment, and you will be liable to pay as one who caused damage and injury. And on the Sabbath, where there is also a death penalty, that rule will apply. According to the tanna who says that the rule applies also to punishments of karet, then there will be no difference. Okay, that is a practical ramification.

But of course there is the Talmud in tractate Shevuot 33 that talks about someone who set his fellow’s stack aflame on Yom Kippur, and that is discussed in the Talmud itself. But this difference, of course, is not an additional difference; it is a consequence of the difference in punishment — that on Yom Kippur there is no death penalty and on the Sabbath there is a death penalty. So there’s no reason to bring this difference in addition. They already said there’s a difference with regard to punishment, and all the derivatives of that difference obviously follow along.

Cutting vegetables is the third topic, or the fourth. Yes, there’s also zero. So cutting vegetables is the fourth difference; we already saw that in previous lectures. The question is whether it’s because there is no positive commandment on Yom Kippur, or because there is an obligation to become agitated, or the opposite, they didn’t want us to get too agitated — the Ritva and Rashi that we saw. So we saw that too.

Food-preparation labor, of course, is a difference between the Sabbath and Yom Kippur, but here there is a question, as I said earlier, why.

[Speaker B] But there is a Mishnah where it says in the Mishnah: if Yom Kippur falls on the Sabbath, these can eat and they eat during the day; the loaves are distributed in the evening and not the next day.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re answering his question now; we’re not there anymore. Here, here. Fine, fine. No, I…

[Speaker B] Friends,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] let’s continue because we’re getting bogged down.

Regarding food-preparation labor: on Yom Kippur it is certainly forbidden just as on the Sabbath; that is clear. The question is why, as I said earlier. Is it like a festival, only since one doesn’t eat there there is no reason to permit food-preparation labor, but fundamentally it is like a festival? But that, of course, assumes that even on a festival food-preparation labor is fundamentally forbidden; they permitted it in order to eat, and on Yom Kippur there is no need for the permission because one doesn’t eat. So that means that indeed Yom Kippur is basically like a festival, but the festival too is like the Sabbath, because on a festival too what was done… all the labors, including food-preparation labor. So that somewhat empties this difference of content. By contrast, if I understand that food-preparation labor is forbidden on Yom Kippur simply because it is like the Sabbath — not because one doesn’t eat on it — then it could really be forbidden because of the cessation-law of Yom Kippur, like the Sabbath, not because one doesn’t eat there, and therefore there is no need for a permission.

Regarding carrying and boundaries, it’s a bit more complicated. The Talmud in Yoma 66 brings: “And he shall send it by the hand of a timely man to the wilderness” — a timely man, even on the Sabbath. For what practical law? Rav Sheshet said: to say that if the goat was sick, he carries it on his shoulder. If the scapegoat was sick, then the timely man would carry it on his shoulder. According to whom? Not like Rabbi Natan, for if like Rabbi Natan, he says that a living being carries itself, and then you don’t need permissions: if it was sick, you can drag it, do whatever you want — a living being carries itself; there is no prohibition. Even say it follows Rabbi Natan — a sick one is different. A sick one does not carry itself, okay? Therefore one needs a special permission for one that is sick.

Rafram said: this means that carrying and the laws of eruv apply to the Sabbath, but carrying and the laws of eruv do not apply to Yom Kippur. There is no prohibition of carrying, and therefore also no laws of eruv on Yom Kippur, only on the Sabbath.

[Speaker B] Like on a festival? Yes. Like on a festival?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Uh-huh. Fine, that’s what Rafram says. Seemingly, this is saying that Yom Kippur is like a festival, right? No source is brought here in the Talmud, but from what Rafram says it seems specifically from here that Yom Kippur is like a festival, at least regarding carrying. You see the picture already starting to get a bit more complicated.

Rashi there says: two mil he would go—

[Speaker B] walk, yes,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] he can’t acquire a Sabbath boundary during Yom Kippur itself; the boundary is acquired at twilight. But before that, he strolls beforehand. No, they made booths for each and every one; they made booths along the route. Well, yes. They made the booths ahead of time, but he didn’t acquire his cessation there in advance.

[Speaker B] They made them from the previous year’s booths.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. Meaning, Rashi says: from the fact that it was necessary to teach “a timely man, even on the Sabbath,” one can infer that there is no prohibition of carrying on Yom Kippur. For if Yom Kippur were like the Sabbath regarding carrying, why would I need a verse to permit his burden on the Sabbath? After all, when Yom Kippur falls on a weekday it too would be like the Sabbath. What does he mean? That when Yom Kippur falls on a weekday, clearly it must be possible to do this; otherwise it would be impossible to take the goat outside the boundary, right? It was twelve mil. So you couldn’t take the goat out. If there is a law of the timely man on an ordinary Yom Kippur that falls on a weekday, that means that on ordinary Yom Kippur we override the prohibition of carrying for the sake of the timely man, right? So on Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath too, you wouldn’t need a source to permit it. Just as ordinary Yom Kippur is permitted, so too on the Sabbath. From here there is proof that on ordinary Yom Kippur there is no prohibition of carrying, and that was why we needed a special permission here for Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath, because from the laws of the Sabbath there was room to forbid it, and they say no, here we permit it. Ordinary Yom Kippur needs no permission at all, because clearly there is no prohibition of carrying on Yom Kippur. Okay, that’s what Rashi says.

There is a Mishnah in tractate Keritot 13: “There is someone who can eat one act of eating and be liable for four sin-offerings and one guilt-offering: an impure person who ate forbidden fat, and it was leftover sacrificial meat from consecrated offerings, on Yom Kippur.” It reminds one of that old comedy sketch: driving without a license on the sidewalk against traffic. Yes, and then he hit the kiosk — I’ve forgotten the rest, of course. So Rabbi Meir says: if it was the Sabbath and he carried it out, he is liable — so again I can make it five sin-offerings, not four. They said to him: that is not part of the count. Meaning that—

[Speaker B] it’s unrelated to the eating.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. On Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath, you see that one is liable for carrying, right? “Not part of the count,” but in principle you are liable for carrying. So Rafram says — the same Rafram appears there too — “and let it teach: if he carried it out, he is liable. Why does it teach: if it was the Sabbath?” Rafram said: this means carrying and eruv apply to the Sabbath, but carrying and eruv do not apply to Yom Kippur.

[Speaker B] There’s proof from here, yes, again for his view.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What kind of proof? Perhaps carrying and eruv do apply to Yom Kippur, and this is what it means: if it was the Sabbath and he carried it out, he is liable also because of the Sabbath and Yom Kippur. So the Talmud rejects Rafram; it says… what you’re saying isn’t necessarily proof. It could be that it needed to teach that he is liable also because of Yom Kippur and not only because of the Sabbath, but Yom Kippur still has a prohibition of carrying, even on ordinary Yom Kippur. And therefore Rafram’s words are not necessarily wrong, but his proof is not a proof. I’m saying this intentionally because the halakhic authorities were divided over whether they rule like Rafram or not. And so here in the Talmud itself there is room to discuss whether it rejected Rafram’s position or only his proof, while his position could still remain.

But for our purposes here, this seems a bit against what the Or Sameach says, right? Because he would be liable both because of the Sabbath and because of Yom Kippur; he would be liable—

[Speaker B] for two.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay? And in any case, of course, this fits the tanna who obligates two sin-offerings for the Sabbath and Yom Kippur that we saw there, right? Simultaneously. And therefore everything I said there according to the Or Sameach is only according to the tanna who obligates one sin-offering, and I asked what it is for, and then I brought the Or Sameach. So it will probably depend on the tannaitic dispute there.

In any case, as Jewish law, yes, in the end — “rather, Rafram’s statement is nonsense.” I’m not entering now into all the details. “Rather, that statement of Rafram is nonsense.” And again the question is: is the nonsense the proof of Rafram, or is the nonsense the law of Rafram? So the medieval authorities disagreed about that. Tosafot in Yoma implies that Rafram’s words were rejected. Yes — “rather, Rafram’s statement is nonsense” — meaning it claims that Rafram’s words were rejected. And in the Talmud in Yoma it seems that Rafram’s words remain as Jewish law. But in one Talmudic passage and another, Rafram’s words are brought without being rejected. So the question is what the relation between the sugyot is.

Tosafot in Keritot says: “In the second chapter of the goats of Yoma there is also what is here, and it does not reject, perhaps the scapegoat is different as it rejects here; rather, this is just the normal way.” Those are Tosafot’s words. So the passages are the same passages, and in the end the Jewish law is not like Rafram. Okay? They rejected Rafram. In Shaagat Aryeh, siman 70, he wants to claim no — that only the proof was rejected, but Rafram’s words remain, remain even in the final conclusion. Okay? I won’t go into all those details now.

In any case, one who permits carrying on ordinary Yom Kippur — not Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath, of course — still raises the question: why? What is his source? Why does he permit it? Simply, it is because he understands that Yom Kippur is like a festival and not like the Sabbath, right? He doesn’t need a special source for that. What, does he bring a source? One could awkwardly say that from the fact that the Talmud needed the verse “a timely man, even on the Sabbath,” from that perhaps one could infer that on ordinary Yom Kippur, no, and that itself would be the source that on Yom Kippur there is no prohibition of carrying. But that doesn’t really hold water, because I would say: “a timely man” — and then it said “even on the Sabbath” — “a timely man” comes to teach you that on Yom Kippur it really is permitted. The move to the Sabbath already assumes that on ordinary Yom Kippur there is no prohibition of carrying; it doesn’t sound like that was your source. Fine.

[Speaker B] Maimonides in this context — what does he rule?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That there is a prohibition of carrying. Like the Sabbath. We saw that, we saw in Maimonides: there is no difference between Yom Kippur and the Sabbath in anything, except for cutting vegetables and that this one is stoning and that one is karet. Maimonides — and almost all the medieval authorities — rule that there is a prohibition of carrying. There is the Shaagat Aryeh and, I think, Rashi in one place, from whom it appears that he rules no, that there is no carrying on Yom Kippur. And according to those medieval authorities, apparently Yom Kippur really is like a festival. So why is food-preparation labor forbidden? Because there is no reason to permit it, since one does not eat there.

[Speaker B] But in principle it’s like a festival.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said, it’s like a Jewish holiday, except that a Jewish holiday itself is almost like the Sabbath, since even on a Jewish holiday labor for food preparation is in principle forbidden—just that they permitted it for the sake of food preparation. So in principle all labors are forbidden, and on Yom Kippur there’s no need to permit that. So it’s true that Yom Kippur is like a Jewish holiday and not like the Sabbath, but the difference between a Jewish holiday and the Sabbath itself has already become fairly narrow. With regard to carrying, the difference remains intact; there it’s a clear difference. Okay? Because carrying is not forbidden on a Jewish holiday, while on the Sabbath it is, and if Yom Kippur is like a Jewish holiday, then with regard to carrying that really is a better indication than labor for food preparation. Because labor for food preparation—whether it was permitted or not permitted—meaning, obviously it was not permitted on Yom Kippur, and that doesn’t depend on whether it is a Jewish holiday or not a Jewish holiday; we won’t permit labor for food preparation. Okay? Therefore it’s a less good indication. Carrying is a better indication. Because with carrying you can’t say, since he doesn’t eat, therefore they didn’t permit him to carry. There is no carrying prohibition on a Jewish holiday if it’s not… Although there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who hold… Sorry, according to this, on Yom Kippur, according to the view that there is no carrying prohibition on Yom Kippur—I’m speaking about that view—then this is not relevant. Why is there no carrying prohibition on Yom Kippur? After all, you don’t need that permission for the sake of food preparation. According to those views, that can’t be said at all. Okay? Okay. Now that’s regarding carrying. Regarding kindling, you know that there are Sabbath labors that do not appear in the Torah. Right? We learn this either from the analogy to the Tabernacle or from the thirty-nine categories of labor that appear in the Torah, it doesn’t matter, there are various sources for it—but they do not appear in the Torah. Which labors do appear in the Torah? A few isolated ones. There is carrying, and there is kindling mainly. There is also a bit of “you shall cease from plowing and harvesting,” but the Talmud in Moed Katan 39 learns that about the Sabbatical year, even though the plain meaning of the verses is about the Sabbath. Okay.

[Speaker B] Gathering wood?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Gathering wood—the question is what exactly the wood-gatherer did, right. But in terms of the commandment, the wood-gatherer is a story. In terms of the commandment, there is carrying and there is kindling. And therefore in fact regarding both carrying and kindling there is a discussion of why the Torah writes them. So with carrying, several medieval authorities (Rishonim) write that because it is an inferior labor, therefore the Torah writes it, because had the Torah not written it, we would not have prohibited it. Carrying doesn’t create anything; it’s an inferior labor. It doesn’t matter—there are also several explanations of what an inferior labor is—but it is an inferior labor. With kindling—it’s the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but with kindling it is a dispute among the Tannaim. Whether kindling was singled out as a mere prohibition, or singled out to divide the categories. Meaning, why does the Torah write the labor of kindling? There is one opinion that kindling was singled out as a mere prohibition, meaning to say that it is only a prohibition, not a labor prohibition, and there is an opinion that it was singled out to divide the categories. What does “to divide” mean? That one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each labor separately; one does not need to perform all thirty-nine labors in order to become liable for a sin-offering, but rather for each labor separately one becomes liable for a sin-offering, and the writing of kindling comes to teach that point. Now, Tosafot in two places writes that according to the one who says that kindling was singled out as a mere prohibition, then the labor of kindling is not a Sabbath labor but a separate prohibition newly introduced on its own: “You shall not kindle a fire in all your dwellings on the Sabbath day.” Performing labor includes thirty-eight primary categories, okay? And labor—it does not include kindling there, and “You shall not kindle a fire in all your dwellings” adds another prohibition. But it is a prohibition, like the resting of one’s son and daughter, like perhaps rabbinic rest if you want, or something—but no, rabbinic rest is a positive commandment, but not—

[Speaker B] He violates the law of Sabbath labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, it’s not a labor prohibition. There is no stoning; it’s a prohibition. There are lashes for it, but there is no stoning for it. What does it mean that there is no… what does it mean that it’s not labor? What is Tosafot’s novelty? Right—kindling was singled out as a mere prohibition—seemingly that is written in the Talmud. It is not written in the Talmud, because what is written in the Talmud, that kindling was singled out as a mere prohibition, could have been understood as an explanation toward leniency and could have been understood as an explanation toward stringency—a novelty toward leniency and a novelty toward stringency. One could have said that kindling is among the labors, and were it not for “You shall not kindle a fire in all your dwellings on the Sabbath day,” I would each time impose stoning. The verse comes to say: no, it’s not stoning, it is only lashes—that is a leniency. But without the verse, I would impose death. Tosafot does not learn that way. Tosafot says that without the verse I would not impose anything at all for kindling. The verse innovates that kindling too is prohibited. True, not a labor prohibition but a simple prohibition—a prohibition punishable by lashes, yes—but it is a novelty toward stringency, a novelty that it is forbidden. It is very hard to understand that.

[Speaker B] Why? Baal HaTurim said exactly this on that verse. He said that I would have thought it was permitted because of food preparation. What? Like on a Jewish holiday, he said, I would have thought that on the Sabbath I would permit kindling like on a Jewish holiday, just as the Torah permitted on a Jewish holiday. Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there is no food preparation on the Sabbath.

[Speaker B] Fine, but the same idea. What idea?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the idea? If it’s the same idea, then permit all labor done for food preparation.

[Speaker B] I don’t know, but that’s what he says.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be, I don’t remember.

[Speaker B] In any case, for our purposes it’s very—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] difficult, very difficult, this whole matter—why treat kindling as something that is not labor? Is it worse than gathering sheaves or I don’t know what, certainly more than carrying, not to mention. Why do you need to write kindling in order to introduce that it is forbidden at all? That is very strange. The simple understanding—and this is what the Shaagat Aryeh writes—is the opposite. Clearly kindling would have been forbidden even without the verse. The verse comes to be lenient and say: this is not a labor prohibition, it’s only lashes. But Tosafot does not learn that way. Tosafot says that it would not have been forbidden. What follows from this for Yom Kippur? What would I say on Yom Kippur? “You shall not kindle a fire in all your dwellings on the Sabbath day” was said about the Sabbath. If I have no source to prohibit kindling… on Yom Kippur it should have been permitted according to Tosafot. The Shaagat Aryeh indeed says no—what are you talking about? The opposite. I have no verse that is lenient on Yom Kippur. Therefore on Yom Kippur kindling was not singled out as a mere prohibition, even according to the view that on the Sabbath kindling was singled out as a mere prohibition. Even according to that view, on Yom Kippur kindling would be a prohibition carrying liability for karet and a sin-offering. Okay? Because there I have no verse that is lenient. But according to Tosafot, where the verse comes to be stringent and without the verse kindling would not have been forbidden at all, it would seemingly come out that kindling should have been permitted there. And that is the Shaagat Aryeh’s proof against Tosafot. The Shaagat Aryeh proves that on Yom Kippur, according to all opinions, kindling too is prohibited. He proves this from Talmudic passages in section 71 of Shaagat Aryeh. Okay? By the way, the Shaagat Aryeh on the other hand holds that Yom Kippur is like what I mentioned earlier—that Yom Kippur is like a Jewish holiday without the permission for food preparation. There simply is no permission for food preparation there, but fundamentally it is like a Jewish holiday. So then, for example, regarding carrying it should come out that it is permitted, as I said above. But regarding kindling—regarding kindling he says that kindling must be forbidden because with kindling on Yom Kippur I have no source, and therefore it should remain under the basic law, like on an ordinary Jewish holiday. Another thing concerns the resting of one’s animal. There too it is very similar to “kindling was singled out as a mere prohibition.” Kindling according to Jewish law was singled out to divide the categories, but we were discussing the view that kindling was singled out as a mere prohibition, and then it is a separate prohibition that is not one of the labor prohibitions. With the resting of one’s animal it is quite similar. This too is a prohibition not from the labor prohibitions, but there is still a prohibition here. Plainly it is a positive commandment—“so that [your animal] may rest.” There are also some discussions about this, but it is a Torah-level prohibition that is not a labor prohibition. Now, if that is so, then it was said about the Sabbath and not about Yom Kippur, and in a place where that additional prohibition was not introduced, it should not exist. Therefore “so that [your animal] may rest” should not apply on Yom Kippur. What is the idea behind this? That the rest required on the Sabbath is not the cessation required on Yom Kippur. Meaning, the laws are the same laws, but the motivation is a different motivation, like what we discussed—if you remember—about Tisha B’Av and Yom Kippur. That Tisha B’Av and Yom Kippur, or Tisha B’Av and the other fasts—in both you have to fast, but on Yom Kippur it is for repentance, and on Tisha B’Av it is because of mourning. Okay? So very often you have the same law but for a different reason. Now here too, with the Sabbath and Yom Kippur, there is room to discuss it. True, here too there is an obligation to cease and there too there is an obligation to cease, but on the Sabbath the obligation to cease is “so that [your animal] may rest,” and therefore there too there is the resting of one’s animal, which is an extension of the obligation of rest. On Yom Kippur there is no idea of resting. For that reason—the encounter with the Holy One, blessed be He, as we discussed, no matter from what other reason—but what does that have to do with the resting of one’s animal? Here there is no idea of “so that [your animal] may rest.” And therefore, if there is no verse and logic does not say that on Yom Kippur there is also this idea, then there would definitely be room to say that there is no law of the resting of one’s animal on Yom Kippur. I did not find a clear source for this, but it is a practical ramification that could also exist. As for driving one’s animal while carrying a load, here the question is how I understand this whole idea of driving one’s animal while carrying a load. Driving one’s animal while carrying a load and the resting of one’s animal are not the same thing, or at least according to most medieval authorities (Rishonim) they are not the same thing. Driving one’s animal while carrying a load is basically doing an action through the animal. The resting of one’s animal is when the animal itself does a forbidden act. So much so that the Talmud discusses what happens if the animal nibbles grass on the Sabbath. It goes and nibbles grass on the Sabbath, so it violates the prohibition of reaping.

[Speaker B] But that’s for food preparation, isn’t it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, the Talmud says that’s exactly the novelty, but in principle the Talmud says it would be forbidden. I would have had to prevent it from doing that. Why? Because that isn’t the issue—it’s not like plowing through an animal; plowing through an animal is a prohibition that I do, only I do it through the animal. That is driving one’s animal while carrying a load, exactly. And the resting of one’s animal is an obligation on the animal to rest, like the donkey of Pinchas ben Yair. Okay? It is the obligation that the animal rest. Of course the obligation is not on the animal, it is on the person, but the obligation on the person is that his animal not perform labor, not that he himself not perform labor by means of his animal. Okay? So about the resting of one’s animal I already spoke earlier, but here, with driving one’s animal while carrying a load, it is really an extension of the labor prohibitions of the person, and here there is more room to say that this would apply on Yom Kippur too. Because what do you need to cease from on Yom Kippur? No matter for what reason, then cease in all the forms of cessation that exist on the Sabbath. This is not “so that [your animal] may rest”; it is not connected to the rest we discussed with the resting of one’s animal. Regarding division of labors, one can make the same discussion. The Talmud says: there is division of labors on the Sabbath, and there is no division of labors on a Jewish holiday. Division of labors means: if you did two labors in one lapse of awareness, the question is whether you are liable for two sin-offerings or not. On the Sabbath you are liable for two sin-offerings, right? On a Jewish holiday there is no sin-offering. No, no—“kindling was singled out to divide the categories” is the question of when you become liable. Does “kindling was singled out to divide the categories” mean that for each labor separately you are liable? Here I am talking about division of labors—it is a different concept. If after “kindling was singled out to divide the categories” I now understand that for each labor separately you are liable, and now I did two labors in one lapse of awareness, am I liable for two sin-offerings? That is called division—division with respect to sin-offerings. What? I don’t remember at the moment what source the Talmud brings; it’s a Talmud in Makkot, 21, yes?

[Speaker B] That on a Jewish holiday there is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] division of labors on the Sabbath and no division of labors on a Jewish holiday. And no division of labors on a Jewish holiday? Yes. So what happens regarding Yom Kippur? So they do connect it to “kindling was singled out to divide the categories,” and I am very skeptical about that. Very skeptical; I need to check it. I see that they do connect it to “kindling was singled out to divide the categories,” because division with respect to sin-offerings is not connected to “kindling was singled out to divide the categories”; it is a different concept. Fine, I need to look at it. Because “kindling was singled out to divide the categories” only says for what one becomes liable; it doesn’t matter how many lapses of awareness there are here. What does he say? “There is no division of labors on a Jewish holiday” means that you have to do all the labors on a Jewish holiday in order to receive lashes? There is no such opinion. Obviously one labor on a Jewish holiday is enough to receive lashes, so “kindling was singled out to divide the categories” applies on a Jewish holiday too. There is division of labors on a Jewish holiday in that sense too. The whole question is division with respect to sin-offerings. Meaning, if you did two labors in one lapse of awareness, the question is—or not in one lapse of awareness, because there are no sin-offerings on a Jewish holiday, but under one warning. Okay? If under one warning you did two labors, are you liable for eighty lashes or forty? So if there is division of labors, then you are liable for eighty. If there is no division of labors, you are liable for forty. No, that is not connected to “kindling was singled out to divide the categories.” To the best of my understanding—now I see that they write that it is—in my opinion it is not connected to “kindling was singled out to divide the categories.” “Kindling was singled out to divide the categories” is not about division for sin-offerings and division for punishments. It is about the question of when you become liable for punishment. Do you have to perform all thirty-nine labors at once—if you do one, do you not deserve punishment at all? Do you have to violate all thirty-nine in order to receive lashes, in order to be executed on the Sabbath, or in order to receive lashes on a Jewish holiday? That is “kindling was singled out to divide the categories.” Yes. “To divide” means that for each and every one you are liable. “Kindling was singled out as a mere prohibition,” of course, does not mean there is no division of labors; it means that the division into labors is obvious, and therefore it is not needed for that. So there is no dispute that in the end you are punished for each labor separately. The question is only why—is that obvious by logic, or is it derived from kindling? Okay? But that is division in a different sense from the division we are talking about regarding division with respect to sin-offerings. Division with respect to sin-offerings is not a discussion of what you need to do in order to become liable. Obviously if you do one labor you become liable. Rather, if you did two labors in one lapse of awareness, the question is whether you become liable for one or for two. It may be that they learn it from the same verse; I don’t know exactly. That’s the idea. No, that’s not the idea, absolutely not, absolutely not—no connection. No connection. If there were no “kindling was singled out to divide the categories,” there would be no room at all to discuss division with respect to sin-offerings, because you would have had to do everything in order to become liable. You would have had to do everything in order to become liable; if you didn’t do everything, you would not be liable at all.

[Speaker B] If—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] if you did two labors in one lapse of awareness, you would be liable for one in any case, whether the labors are divided or not, because you have to do all thirty-nine in order to become liable. Fine, in any case there is someone who is an apostate with respect to desecrating Yom Kippur—desecrating Yom Kippur, yes? What happens—does someone who is an apostate with respect to desecrating the Sabbath count like an apostate to the entire Torah? Okay? That is the law. What about someone who is an apostate with respect to desecrating Yom Kippur? By the way, the Shulchan Arukh, in Even HaEzer 123, rules that a scribe who wrote a bill of divorce deliberately on Yom Kippur—the bill of divorce is invalid. Why? Because the scribe is an apostate. And an apostate scribe invalidates the bill of divorce. Why is he an apostate? Because he wrote it on Yom Kippur. Okay? So the bill of divorce is invalidated.

[Speaker B] Wait, and if he wrote it on a Jewish holiday?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand.

[Speaker B] If he writes this bill of divorce on a Jewish holiday.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be that too—what does that have to do with it? There is a difference, because on a Jewish holiday he is not an apostate; he is a transgressor. But an apostate is only someone who desecrates the Sabbath. And the Shulchan Arukh writes that desecration of Yom Kippur too is like desecration of the Sabbath—he too is an apostate.

[Speaker B] But if it’s a Jewish holiday?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then he is not an apostate; he is a transgressor, but he is not an apostate. And what invalidates the bill of divorce is when the scribe is an apostate, not when he is a transgressor. Okay? And this is like someone who wrote—like a gentile who wrote a bill of divorce. Okay? So basically the Shulchan Arukh assumes that Yom Kippur is like the Sabbath in this respect, that the scribe becomes an apostate. Now this is a little strange, because even if I understand that Yom Kippur is like the Sabbath, clearly, for example, Jewish holidays are not like the Sabbath in this respect, right? And Yom Kippur is. Now why? That the definitions of labor on Yom Kippur and on the Sabbath are the same—that is true. But the idea behind Yom Kippur and the Sabbath is a different idea. The Sabbath is a remembrance of the act of creation; the apostate is denying the act of creation, denying the Holy One, blessed be He—I understand that. But what does that have to do with Yom Kippur? Therefore this is very strange. You see in the Shulchan Arukh that the similarity he sees between Yom Kippur and the Sabbath, the halakhic similarity, also reflects some kind of conceptual similarity.

[Speaker B] The Or Sameach in his book—Minchat Aviv, Kedushat Aviv?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not Minchat Aviv—Kedushat Aviv.

[Speaker B] He discusses exactly this. There is a question whether there is a covenant of the Sabbath on Yom Kippur—he discusses that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be, I don’t remember, but it needs to be—

[Speaker B] Also conceptually he accepts the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is, for example, regarding a Sabbath candle on Yom Kippur, so there too one really sees the connection somewhat to creation of the world. Somehow apparently there is—

[Speaker B] You see—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the halakhic decisors do see some conceptual connection between Yom Kippur and the Sabbath. It’s not only the halakhic similarity between them. I don’t know. It’s a kind of covenant.

[Speaker B] If he doesn’t come on Yom Kippur and doesn’t repent and all that, then what is he doing here? It’s a kind of covenant-violation in the same sense as the covenant of the Sabbath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is—I just want to finish. I see this has taken me a long time, so I just want to finish with one point. The Or Sameach notes a linguistic point in Maimonides. He says that in contexts of affliction the term used is “Yom Kippur,” and in contexts of labor he uses the term “the tenth.” That’s what he calls the day—“the tenth” or “Yom Kippur.” Okay? Then he adds that for deliberate violation through labor it is “the tenth,” but for unwitting violation through labor it is “Yom Kippur,” as with affliction. And he wants to argue that someone who deliberately performs labor on Yom Kippur presumably did not repent. So if he did not repent, then for him it is called “the tenth,” not “Yom Kippur.” Yom Kippur is when it atones for you. If you did not repent—

[Speaker B] It’s just the tenth—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of Tishrei, for which there is a law to observe it, but Yom Kippur for you—the Yom Kippur of the pollsters, as people always say—that is not your Yom Kippur. Or Sameach. So there are other things in Or Sameach that fit with Meshekh Chokhmah and vice versa. The Or… So basically what the Or Sameach, beyond the linguistic precision, really wants to argue is that in Yom Kippur there are really two… It is a combination of two days: the tenth and Yom Kippur. Okay? Even in the Torah itself, after all, we saw that this is the entry into the holy, and “on the tenth of the month” you shall do this thing. There really is something detached from “the tenth” in Yom Kippur, and they also do it on the tenth as part of the day’s service. So there are really two aspects of Yom Kippur: cessation from labor like the Sabbath, which is the festival of the tenth, and the day of entry into the holy and atonement and repentance and affliction is part of it—that is Yom Kippur. In both, one must cease, for different reasons. The entry into the holy requires cessation in that way, and the regular cessation of the tenth is like the Sabbath. If that is so, then perhaps it is a little easier to understand why there is also a conceptual connection between Yom Kippur and the Sabbath, and this does not affect all the discussions we had earlier, because they deal with Yom Kippur and not with the tenth. The tenth really is the Sabbath dimension, and then there is Yom Kippur, which is a different discussion. And the similarities that we see, like the Shulchan Arukh drawing between Yom Kippur and the Sabbath, may be because of the laws of the tenth and not because of the laws of Yom Kippur. It is written in the portion of Emor—look at the verses here—here it says twice a prohibition of doing labor on Yom Kippur, in the same unit, not in different places. “And you shall do no labor on that very day, for it is a Day of Atonement, to atone for you before the Lord your God. For every person who is not afflicted on that very day shall be cut off from his people. And every person who does any labor on that very day, I will destroy that person from among his people. Again: You shall do no labor; it is an eternal statute throughout your generations in all your dwellings.” Now, the first “you shall do no labor” is because “it is a Day of Atonement, to atone for you before the Lord.” There is… without explaining too much, it could be that this belongs to the laws of the tenth and not to the laws of Yom Kippur.

[Speaker B] Maybe also the phrase “all labor” is said on the Sabbath, in terms of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] food preparation—not—

[Speaker B] “servile labor.”