Tractate Yoma – Elul 5783 – Lesson 6

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A prohibition of eating—and everywhere in the Torah, eating includes benefit as well—so why do we need a third verse? I think what is being said here, maybe that’s what you meant, is that we needed a third verse because I might have thought this was only a prohibition of eating. But once the third verse came and said that there is also a prohibition of benefit, we go back to understanding that this thing is really eating that includes benefit, an ordinary prohibition of eating. Meaning, the third verse only comes to remove the initial assumption that I would have thought this was only a prohibition of eating, okay? But after we remove that initial assumption, it goes back to being a regular prohibition of eating, which also belongs to the prohibition of benefit. It’s just that we needed another verse to teach me that here too the category is the standard category. It only comes to remove the initial assumption; it’s not that in the final conclusion you learn the eating from this verse. In other words, if you ask now where the prohibition of benefit comes from, the answer is: from the second verse, not the third. The second verse. We just need the third verse to tell me that the second verse is not speaking only about eating but also about benefit. Okay? And we already mentioned the reason why the Merciful One did not write “eating” with regard to meat and milk: because whenever “eating” is mentioned, one is liable only if he benefits through his eating. However, if he opened his mouth and swallowed one of the prohibited things raw, or while it was so hot that it burned his throat and caused him pain as he swallowed, and anything similar, he is exempt—except for meat and milk, where he is liable for eating it even if he does not benefit. We already saw that, right, even if it is not in the normal manner of benefit. As they mentioned. And likewise with mixed vineyard produce, as we will explain later; understand all these principles and remember them. So now he says—and here it really is a bit self-contradictory—why indeed did the Torah choose such a twisted route to tell me that there is a prohibition of eating and benefit with meat and milk? Just write: do not eat, and I would know that there is a prohibition of eating and benefit. Why did it do this through the redundancy of saying three times, “Do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk,” from which I wouldn’t be sure that I know to include benefit as well, but maybe only eating, and then I need a third verse to say also benefit? Go the normal route, as you always say: say, “Do not eat meat and milk,” and that’s it. What? No, cooking has its own separate verse. Make a second verse that says “Do not eat,” and of course that will include benefit too—why do you have to do it in such a convoluted way?

[Speaker B] Maybe in order to rule out the initial assumption of authorities who would say that if you don’t benefit, then…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he says—the Rambam writes here why they did it this way: in order to tell you that here you are liable even if it is not in the normal manner of benefit, because it is not written in the language of eating. But again, if so, that contradicts what he said above. I don’t have a good answer to that; I’ll just explain why I think it’s a contradiction. Because what did I explain above? I explained above that once you have the third verse, then the third verse reveals that the prohibition of eating here is actually in the ordinary category of a prohibition of eating, and therefore it also includes benefit, right? That’s basically… Now what is the ordinary prohibition of eating according to Rabbi Avahu? It is basically a prohibition of benefit, not a prohibition of eating.

[Speaker C] A kind of prohibition of benefit,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, a prohibition of benefit, where eating is just the example the Torah chose, but what it’s really saying to you, loosely translated, is: do not benefit.

[Speaker B] Not exactly—it doesn’t split under “do not cook,” not exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, I’m talking about an ordinary prohibition of eating, not meat and milk. Okay? So he says: the Torah is just taking the example of eating because that’s the common example, but in practice it is forbidding me to derive benefit. That is basically a prohibition of benefit, an ordinary prohibition of eating. Okay? And now what happens with meat and milk? If with meat and milk you tell me that, sorry, if one eats it not in the normal manner of benefit he is still liable, then what you are really telling me is that the prohibition of eating is not an example of a prohibition of benefit—it is an independent prohibition, and besides that there is a prohibition of benefit. Meaning, say you ate it not in the normal manner of benefit: you violated the prohibition of eating, but you did not violate the prohibition of benefit, because it was not in the normal manner of benefit—you’re not benefiting, it’s burning you. Okay? But then it comes out that once there is a third verse prohibiting benefit, it did not reveal that the second verse is the ordinary category of a prohibition of eating that includes benefit. The opposite. It really remains a prohibition of eating that is different, and therefore it is unrelated to that issue. And besides that there is the prohibition of benefit. And the prohibition of eating there in the second verse—what is the second possible way to say it? That the prohibition of eating is not a prohibition on benefit, where eating is just a typical form of benefit; rather, the prohibition of eating is a prohibition on the act of eating. That is what is forbidden. If that were the definition, then eating it not in the normal manner of benefit would also be forbidden, because I performed an act of eating. Right? I didn’t benefit, but I performed an act of eating. Right? Now from the Rambam here it comes out that this really is the definition of the prohibition of eating in meat and milk. It is not a prohibition on benefiting by means of eating or some other way. It is a prohibition on performing the act of eating, carrying out an act of eating. Besides that, there is also a prohibition of benefit. That exists too. Now if you eat it not in the normal manner of benefit, then you have not violated the prohibition of benefit, because there is no benefit, but you have violated the prohibition of eating, says the Rambam. That is why here they used not the language of eating but of cooking. Right? But if so, then it follows that the prohibition of benefit and the prohibition of eating in meat and milk are not the same prohibition; they are two different prohibitions. The prohibition of eating is a prohibition on the act of eating, and the prohibition of benefit is a prohibition of benefit. If you ate it in a way that is in the normal manner of benefit, then you violated two prohibitions. You both ate and benefited, and it is not the same prohibition—it’s two different prohibitions. Because eating here means the act of eating; it is not benefit from eating. Okay?

[Speaker B] An exceptional case,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But then why doesn’t the Maimonides count three prohibitions here? He said he doesn’t count them because benefit is included within eating; he just needed the third verse to reveal that to me. He’s dancing at two weddings. Meaning, there is something problematic here. In other words, if you tell me that in the final analysis benefit merely emerges from eating, then once again I come back to this: what was said here is basically an ordinary prohibition of eating, so then even if it is not in the normal manner of benefit you should still be liable. Fine. I have no good answer to that. I don’t know how the Maimonides explains this issue. I just want to make one more comment now. In the Maimonides, in the laws of leaven, chapter 1, law 2, the Maimonides writes: leaven on Passover is prohibited for benefit, as it says, “No leaven shall be eaten”—there shall be no permitted eating from it. That is Hezekiah’s reasoning, not Rabbi Avahu’s. We saw that the Maimonides rules like Rabbi Avahu in several places. And here he brings Hezekiah’s source for the prohibition of benefit regarding leaven. What is the idea here? So the commentaries on the Maimonides struggle a bit with this. The Kesef Mishneh wants to argue that the Maimonides’s method is always to bring the source that fits better, not necessarily the source that remains in the final conclusion of the Talmudic passage; rather, if there is something that just fits better for him, he brings that, because it isn’t really correct to relate to the sources the Maimonides brings in his book as some statement about the Talmud’s final conclusion—that according to the Talmud’s conclusion this really is the source in his view. No, no. If it sounds better, or is remembered better, or fits the verse more exactly, then he will bring it, even though it is not really the true source. That is what the Kesef Mishneh argues. But I once wrote a long article on this issue, and my claim was different. I wanted to argue that leaven and the sciatic nerve are both exceptional prohibitions of eating—maybe exceptional prohibitions of benefit too. Why? Because why is it really forbidden to eat leaven on Passover? On the simple level—and that’s also how it seems from the Torah—the reason it is forbidden to eat leaven is because our forefathers, when they left Egypt, did not eat leaven. As part of the attempt to remember what happened in the Exodus from Egypt, we tell the story of the Exodus, we have the Passover Seder and everything, and we also do not eat leaven, or we eat matzah. Simply because our forefathers did not eat leaven; rather, they ate matzah. Meaning, the idea here is that there is nothing inherently reprehensible in leaven. There is nothing… It’s just that this is what happened at the Exodus from Egypt, so on Passover I want to remember the Exodus from Egypt, and therefore I do not eat leaven. Yes, this goes against all those Hasidic homilies—which admittedly do appear a bit already in the Sages—that leaven is something from which a person’s soul recoils, that it is the ferment in the dough, something disgusting, and one must distance himself from it. According to that approach, ideally one should have distanced himself from leaven all year long. Maybe from the standpoint of Jewish law only on Passover is it required, but ideally one should distance himself all year. I’ve never heard anyone anywhere wanting to make such a claim.

[Speaker B] I—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think all of these things are just homiletics. At the end of the day there is nothing whatsoever reprehensible about leaven. Nothing. Rather, what happened was simply that our forefathers in the Exodus from Egypt ate matzah and not leaven. During those seven days of Passover we are supposed to behave as they behaved there. That’s how we remember it, the Exodus from Egypt. Now what does that really mean? It means that the prohibitions of eating and the prohibitions of benefit that we saw until now are basically founded on the idea that the object is repulsive. And the Torah does not want me going near a repulsive object. It says: do not eat, do not benefit, keep away from this thing. Everything starts from the repulsiveness of the object. And then as a result I say: do not eat, do not benefit, and all sorts of things of that type. But in leaven there is nothing repulsive in the leaven itself. Everything is fine. This is a law about the person, not a law about the object. The Torah tells me: you—do not eat leaven for these seven days, not because the leaven is repulsive, but simply because that is how we remember the Exodus from Egypt. Okay? Therefore, in such a case the prohibition of benefit will not be learned from the prohibition of eating. For a prohibition of benefit I need a separate source. And what does that source tell me? Our forefathers also did not benefit from leaven in the Exodus from Egypt. Okay, so I too should not benefit from leaven in the Exodus from Egypt—but not because it is included within the prohibition of eating. The prohibition of benefit is included in the prohibition of eating when you are talking about a repulsive object. They’re telling you: keep away, do not benefit, do not eat, do not do anything. Keep away from it—it is not for you, this object. So I say: once they tell me not to eat, I understand that they really mean not to benefit, to keep away. But in a place where there is no problem at all with the object itself, and rather what you need to do is what our forefathers did in the Exodus from Egypt—to remember what our forefathers did—then in principle it could be that I only need not to eat, but there is no problem with benefiting, because the problem with eating is not the benefit in the eating but the act of eating. Right? I am forbidden to perform the act of eating because our forefathers did not perform an act of eating with leaven. There is no problem with the benefit of eating; there is no problem here with benefiting from this thing. Consequently, if there were a prohibition of eating, I would not automatically be able to derive from it a prohibition of benefit. Therefore the Maimonides says: it says, “it shall not be eaten,” and that comes to teach you that there is also a prohibition of benefit. And apparently the idea is that the prohibition of benefit too is a remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt: just as you do not eat because they did not eat, do not benefit because they did not benefit. But these are still two different things. It is not that because of the eating there is also a prohibition of benefit; rather, each of these two things separately is simply our way of remembering what happened in the Exodus from Egypt. That’s all. Now what happens in such a case? In such a case, first of all, you need a separate source for the prohibition of benefit, even if a prohibition of eating is written. You need a separate source for the prohibition of benefit. Therefore the Maimonides brings a source for the prohibition of benefit here and does not say that it comes out of the prohibition of eating. More than that: the Maimonides later there in law 7 of the same chapter—sorry, one more point before law 7—the Maimonides splits the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of benefit into law 1 and law 2. Usually, in various places, the Maimonides writes: prohibited in eating and benefit. He writes them together; it is one prohibition. Here the Maimonides writes in law 1 the prohibition of eating, and in law 2 the prohibition of benefit. Two different things. And he also brings—you see the source—the leaven on Passover, that is law 2: leaven on Passover is prohibited for benefit, as it says, “No leaven shall be eaten.” As if this were a new section. First I talked to you about a prohibition of eating; know that here there is also a prohibition of benefit. Why? Because there is a verse. It is very hard not to feel that the Maimonides is trying to make a sharp distinction between the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of benefit in leaven. This is not an ordinary prohibition of eating. And what is the idea? Because it is a prohibition whose root is historical. It is not a repulsive object; it is not a law about the object; it is a law about the person because of the historical events that I am supposed to remember. Something whose root is a historical event is a prohibition on the act of eating and not on the benefit of eating. With a repulsive thing, they tell me: do not benefit from a repulsive thing. So even when they forbid me to eat, what they are really forbidding me is benefiting through eating. But with leaven on Passover, it is not repulsive, and in principle there is no problem with benefiting from it. You are forbidden to perform the act of eating with it. Therefore, for example, on Passover the Torah forbids “No leaven shall be eaten” and “no sourdough shall be eaten.” Now sourdough is not fit for eating; according to the Tosefta it is not even fit for a dog to eat. So why must it be forbidden—why is it forbidden on Passover? Something unfit even for a dog to eat—there is no… Now how does the Torah forbid both sourdough and leaven? Because it causes other things to become leavened—the Maimonides writes that. Because it leavens other things. But so what if it leavens other things? That is benefit. No, no, no—what are you talking about? Benefit? There is a prohibition of eating regarding sourdough. There is a prohibition of eating regarding leaven and sourdough.

[Speaker F] It says so explicitly in the Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sourdough appears in the Torah; this is not the Sages. What is the idea? So in truth later authorities discuss this issue somewhat, and there in the article my claim was that since on Passover the prohibition is the prohibition to eat leaven, to perform the act of eating on leaven, it is not a question of benefit. Therefore even if you do not benefit—after all, sourdough is not fit for a dog to eat. So there is no benefit at all; it is not food at all. As long as it is defined as leaven, it is forbidden to perform an act of eating on it—just like the Maimonides’s case of not in the normal manner of benefit with meat and milk. Therefore in principle there is also this prohibition regarding sourdough. Why? True, one does not benefit from it because it is not fit for a dog to eat, but you performed an act of eating on something that is leaven. Why is it leaven? Because it leavens other things, as the Maimonides explains. But that only explains why it is leaven. Even if it is leaven, if it is not fit for a dog to eat it should have been permitted—why should I care that it is leaven? The claim is that this is not because… it is like the case of not in the normal manner of benefit in meat and milk. Meaning, if you eat something that is leaven—you performed an act of eating on something that is leaven—you violated a prohibition. Okay? Even if you did not benefit. Because the prohibition is not benefit from the thing, as we said before, but performing the act of eating on something that is leaven. That is really the point. Therefore there is a prohibition of eating sourdough too, not only leaven. And after that there is the matter of a partial measure. In law 7 there, chapter 1, law 7 in the laws of leaven and matzah, the Maimonides writes that it is forbidden to eat even less than the minimum measure of leaven, and he brings a verse for it. Now the commentaries there ask: why do you need a verse? A partial measure is forbidden in all Torah prohibitions. There is a source for it—“all fat, all blood”—or no matter, or “it is fit to combine,” as a matter of reasoning; in any case, this is the Talmud in tractate Yoma, where a partial measure is forbidden in any event. So why do you need a source for the fact that a partial measure is forbidden on Passover? The simple answer is that a partial measure—the Sefat Emet writes at the beginning of tractate Shabbat that the law of a partial measure exists only in prohibitions of objects, but not in prohibitions of actions. For example, if someone throws two cubits on the Sabbath instead of four, or one cubit instead of four—is there such a thing as a prohibition of a partial measure here? Throwing four cubits in the public domain is a Torah prohibition. But throwing one cubit—the question is whether this is something like a partial measure. The answer is no, says the Sefat Emet. Why not? Because it is an action, not because it is not an action. Prohibitions of actions do not have partial measures, because if you did not perform the action, there is no prohibition. What happens with prohibitions of eating? If you ate half an olive-bulk of pork, or a quarter olive-bulk of pork, okay? You ate pork, just not enough. You ate pork, just not enough. You benefited from the pork, just not enough. Okay? Therefore it is forbidden. Okay? Even a partial measure is forbidden because it is fit to combine with something else, so it is clear to you that every part of it is pork. But with an action, if you performed only part of the action, that is not an action at all. You didn’t do the action at all. There is no half.

[Speaker C] So then what about a partial measure on Yom Kippur? After all, our whole Talmudic discussion of a partial measure is about Yom Kippur, which is also a prohibition on the person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, we’ll get to that in a moment. There too there is a prohibition of benefit; we’ll see in a moment.

[Speaker C] There is a partial measure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Right, exactly. Exactly. The claim is that we need the special derivation for the prohibition of a partial measure regarding leaven because leaven is a prohibition on the act of eating, not a prohibition on benefit from eating. And prohibitions of actions do not have the ordinary law of a partial measure. Therefore you need a source for the prohibition of a partial measure, and so on. One can show many, many more implications of this point. In that article I elaborated on the subject.

[Speaker B] Another interesting example: with meat and milk there is also a partial measure. What? With meat and milk.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With meat and milk I don’t remember a clear source, but it is commonly assumed that there is, and one has to understand why. It may be that there is a parallel source like the one we find regarding leaven. With the sciatic nerve, in fact, everyone asks about the Maimonides: why does the Maimonides say that regarding the sciatic nerve there is no prohibition of benefit? There is no prohibition of benefit, but there is a prohibition of eating.

[Speaker J] It isn’t fit for eating—dry.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but then the Talmud itself ties it to the question whether it is like wood or not—whether the nerve is like wood or not like wood. The Maimonides rules that it is not like wood, and nevertheless he says there is no prohibition of benefit. That contradicts the Talmudic passage from within itself. In tractate Pesachim. For our purposes, again without getting into details, what I want to argue is that the sciatic nerve is like leaven.

[Speaker B] It’s a historical prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a historical prohibition. There is nothing defective about the sciatic nerve, nothing that says don’t eat it. It is a remembrance of what happened with Jacob and the angel; basically it is a historical prohibition. By the way, the Pri Megadim really writes that there is no prohibition of a partial measure with the sciatic nerve, and everyone is astonished by him. But according to what I am saying here, it is clear why there isn’t, because it is a prohibition of action. On Passover you have a special source that innovates the prohibition of a partial measure, but the ordinary prohibition of a partial measure does not exist in prohibitions of action. With the sciatic nerve there is no such source, so we remain with the fact that it is a prohibition of action to which a partial measure does not apply, and therefore there is no prohibition.

[Speaker H] What about Yom Kippur?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, we’ll get there, we’ll get there. In a moment. In a moment—but soon.

[Speaker H] So the claim—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The claim is that…

[Speaker H] Will you let me go already to next year?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To next week. No, no—I hope, I hope I’ll finish with this. So the claim is basically that there are historical prohibitions that are really prohibitions of action. There is a question—I’m not going into it now because I want to finish this today, as I told you. According to the Maimonides, one does not receive lashes for benefit that is not by way of eating. Even according to the Maimonides, although he says that every prohibition of eating is basically just a prohibition of benefit, and eating is only an example of a prohibition of benefit—for benefit that is not through eating, one does not receive lashes.

[Speaker D] One does not receive lashes, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now that is strange, because according to the Maimonides there is no difference between eating and benefit, so why for eating do you receive lashes but for other benefit you do not? After all, all eating is just an example of the prohibition of benefit. What difference does it make? Benefit is benefit in any form. So there are a few directions here. The Maggid Mishneh wants to claim that that is because it is not in the normal manner of benefit. Things that are foods—if you benefit from them in some other way, then it is not the normal manner of benefit, and therefore you do not receive lashes. Fine, maybe. The Minchat Chinukh, I think, writes that this is because it lacks an action. There is no… If you do not eat but rather benefit, say by smelling or something like that, that is considered lacking an action. Perhaps even when you benefit by means of an action, since the prohibition is on the benefit and not on the action, it may still be considered lacking an action. In any case, this is not a simple question with the Maimonides—why one does not receive lashes for benefit. So this thesis in the Maimonides is probably correct, but it has quite a few difficulties. Now basically I want to summarize for a moment. What I want to say is that there are three prohibitions… three prohibitions that we… prohibitions of eating and benefit that we find in…

[Speaker C] Can’t you show that summary? Ah, yes, I can show that summary—that will also help us run through it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Usually I turn it off because I want you to listen to me and not look, but here we can, really. Is it there? Okay. So I’m saying: there are basically three kinds of prohibitions. There are the ordinary prohibitions of eating, which are really prohibitions of benefit, where eating is just one kind of benefit. I would define it even more strongly: these are prohibitions not on the act of eating, but on the benefit you derive from eating. And therefore it is really a prohibition of benefit. Okay? In these prohibitions the object is repulsive; you are supposed to distance yourself from it in every way—not to go near it, not to benefit, not to eat, nothing. By the way, there are medieval authorities who rule like Hezekiah against the Maimonides—I’m doing this a bit quickly. There are medieval authorities who rule like Hezekiah against the Maimonides, but even according to their position, apparently the prohibition of eating is a prohibition of benefit, because the fact is that if it is not in the normal manner of benefit, one does not receive lashes. They probably understand the dispute between Rabbi Avahu and Hezekiah differently. They claim that according to Hezekiah, a prohibition of eating does not include within it the prohibition of benefit, because when the Torah prohibits eating, then it means eating. But what is eating? Eating is benefit by means of the act of eating. And therefore even according to Hezekiah there is some condition that you must benefit in order to violate the prohibition of eating. It’s not… yes, according to the Maimonides probably not; that is only according to Rabbi Avahu. But according to the other medieval authorities, it could be so even according to Hezekiah. So in short: ordinary prohibitions of eating involve a repulsive object, and you must distance yourself from it—not in eating and not in benefit. There are historical prohibitions, like the sciatic nerve, leaven, and the like—or even meat and milk—which are prohibitions on the act of eating. On the act of eating…

[Speaker I] Why is meat and milk not an object-based prohibition? An object that is meat and milk.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is why it is not said in the language of eating, the Rambam says; and if it is not in the normal manner of benefit, it is still forbidden, because the prohibition is on the action and not on the benefit you derive from the eating. So these are prohibitions that are basically prohibitions on the person, to perform an act of eating. They are not prohibitions that the repulsive thing should not be eaten or benefited from, but that you should not perform an act of eating. And the third type is really the prohibitions of eating on Yom Kippur—and now I’m beginning to get to Yom Kippur—which are really prohibitions on the person’s benefit; the object itself is not repulsive. The object itself is not repulsive, but these are prohibitions of benefit for the person. But they are not prohibitions of action; rather, they are prohibitions of benefit. Because what is the law on Yom Kippur? On Yom Kippur—and that is why I gave all this introduction—you have to understand that Yom Kippur is a category unto itself; it is different from the two categories we have seen. Because on Yom Kippur the object itself is not repulsive, but the prohibition is not on the act of eating. It is obvious that the obligation is an obligation to afflict yourself, which has to do with me—what I feel. I feel that if I eat, the problem is not that I performed an act of eating; the problem is that I am not afflicted. Right? So there is a kind of intermediate state here on Yom Kippur: on the one hand the object is not repulsive, but on the other hand there is indeed a prohibition on benefiting from the thing, and not on performing an act of eating on the thing. Okay? The prohibition really—more than that—there are those who say it is different from all ordinary prohibitions of eating, because here benefit really is the essence of the prohibition, not the act of eating; the act of eating is not even the condition. You just have to avoid benefiting, while eating is the thing that brings you to benefit.

[Speaker B] Is this what we would say—that on the person rests an obligation regarding himself? What you want to say is that the commandment here appears in positive form: “You shall afflict yourselves.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I discussed that in previous classes. I said, the question is whether there is really a prohibition here. There are those who want to argue that there really is no prohibition, and then this is not a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment; it is a positive-commandment prohibition.

[Speaker E] Like affliction on Yom Kippur—I am in a prohibition on the person to afflict himself—we are inside the category that it is forbidden to benefit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you eat on Yom Kippur—if you eat on Yom Kippur—then it damages your fast. The problem is not the act of eating, as with leaven on Passover, where you are forbidden to perform an act of eating on leaven just as our forefathers did not eat leaven. Rather, on Yom Kippur it really is connected to benefit, but unlike the ordinary prohibitions, where the prohibition is on benefit from eating, on Yom Kippur it is a prohibition on benefit because it breaks the fast. Okay? It is not because the object is repulsive and one must distance himself from it, but because there is a law to afflict oneself. That’s all.

[Speaker B] In that case, is the law in this case the prohibition of a positive commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to most views, yes. According to most views there is both a prohibition and a positive commandment. We said there are those who want to argue that there is only a positive commandment, but that is a bit difficult, because karet applies to the prohibition. It is not one of those karet penalties that come on a positive commandment.

[Speaker B] Like the matter of circumcision and Passover? It’s a positive commandment but has karet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The same with the Passover offering.

[Speaker B] That’s what I’m saying—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That with circumcision and Passover there is karet for failing a positive commandment, but the fact that they bring only those two and not Yom Kippur—what do you see from that? You see that with Yom Kippur it is not of the type of karet on a positive commandment, because otherwise they should have brought Yom Kippur too. Apparently there is also a prohibition there. That is the claim. Where do we derive the prohibition from? We already discussed that. It is a complicated question. Fine. Now those are the three prohibitions. Now there is another discussion about what kind of benefit I am supposed to derive from the forbidden eating: benefit to the throat or benefit to the intestines. A dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish. Okay? According to Resh Lakish you need benefit to the intestines. According to Rabbi Yohanan, benefit to the throat. The practical differences they bring are various practical differences that need to be understood exactly how they work. For example, if he divided a limb from a living animal in his mouth into two parts and ate them one after the other, or divided them outside, there might be a difference. In the end, practically speaking, does a full olive-bulk pass through your throat? Then you have benefit to the throat. But it might be that you do not have benefit to the throat—it might be that only half an olive-bulk passes through your throat and then another half olive-bulk, so perhaps there would not be benefit to the throat, but in the stomach there lies a full olive-bulk, so then you have benefit to the intestines. There are various practical differences between benefit to the throat and benefit to the intestines. And the Rambam brings this in the laws of forbidden foods: if he divided every such limb and ate it little by little, if what he ate contains an olive-bulk of meat, he is liable. If not, he is exempt. If he took an olive-bulk from the limb in its natural state—meat, sinews, and bones—and ate it, even though it was divided inside his mouth before he swallowed it, he is liable. Okay? This is brought in the Talmud as the law according to Rabbi Yohanan, meaning that one requires benefit to the throat and not benefit to the intestines. What is the difference between the concepts of benefit to the throat and benefit to the intestines? On the simple level, the benefit of eating is benefit to the intestines—satiety, right? Benefit to the throat leaves room for hesitation, and these possibilities do come up among the later authorities. One can say that it too is a kind of benefit: that you enjoy eating something tasty—not the satiety in it, but the fact that the act of eating itself has something enjoyable in it. Why do people eat fast, sometimes? People eat fast—there is some kind of pleasure in eating fast; I don’t know why. Even though in terms of satiety that does not necessarily make you more full. Clearly there is also pleasure in the process of eating and not only in the result that you are full. What? Not necessarily, not necessarily. It comes from the act of eating overall—I’m saying there are arguments both ways. What?

[Speaker B] He says benefit to the intestines—that when a person eats fast—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who said?

[Speaker B] Why? Because then there will be enough in the intestines.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There will be enough in the intestines if you eat slowly too. In the end there will be in the intestines as much as you want. And if you eat slowly, then there won’t be enough in the intestines? They always tell me, you know, eat slowly, enjoy the food. I eat fast in order to enjoy the food. Fine, never mind. I’m saying there are arguments both ways. There are later authorities who want to argue that benefit to the intestines is also a kind of benefit, just a different kind of benefit. Taste, for example, or whatever, things like that. And then the dispute is only over which kind of benefit is the benefit we are supposed to derive from eating.

[Speaker B] Why don’t they relate to the concept of benefit in the Talmud? Usually it doesn’t mean pleasure—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in the sense of pleasure,

[Speaker B] but rather in the sense of utility?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, not here. Here it really means pleasure. It may be that even the benefit of utility, ultimately, is perhaps also pleasure, because you enjoy the fact that you produced utility. But there is another way to explain it: according to Rabbi Yohanan, perhaps real pleasure is not actually required. “Benefit to the throat” is just the description; he uses the term “benefit” because Resh Lakish says “benefit to the intestines.” So in response he says: no, no, it is benefit to the throat. He does not really mean a different kind of benefit; rather, he means the act of eating. “Benefit to the throat” just means you performed an act of eating on an olive-bulk of forbidden food, and therefore you violated the prohibition. It is not that what defines the prohibition is the benefit; maybe there is a condition that you benefit, but the prohibition itself is the act of eating. And according to Resh Lakish, the prohibition is the satiety or the intestinal benefit that is created as a result of the eating. There are all sorts of discussions here: is this the definition of the action, or is the benefit just a condition for the action? Is the benefit the definition of the prohibition? That depends on what we saw above. If according to the Rambam a prohibition of eating is a prohibition of benefit, okay? If so, then you would basically expect benefit to be the essence of the prohibition. Now the Rambam rules like Rabbi Yohanan, that we require benefit to the throat. So that probably means that according to the Rambam, at least, benefit to the throat is not merely a definition of the act of eating, but another kind of benefit. Okay? But if someone says no, it could be that benefit to the throat is really only a definition of the act of eating. One must also understand that sometimes Jewish law can define some prohibition as a prohibition on an action even though the goal of the prohibition is some kind of result. I’ll give you an example: procreation. In procreation, the goal is that one should have at least a son and a daughter, right? But that is not in my hands. I can do what efforts I can, but in the end what comes out is what comes out. So there is room to say that the obligation placed on me is to perform the actions that can lead to a son and a daughter—not that the result itself must occur, but rather that the commandment is on the action. But that does not mean that the Torah’s goal is that I do the action. The Torah wants me to have a son and a daughter. But since that is not in my hands, and all that is in my hands is only to perform the actions that can lead there, then from a halakhic standpoint the commandment is defined as a commandment on the actions and not on the result. And that gives an option sometimes to say: I really want to prevent you from benefiting, but benefit is created through an act of eating. So it may be that I define the prohibition as a prohibition on the act of eating even if the rationale of the verse—the thing I want to prevent—is the result of the benefit that you derive through that action. Therefore one can define the prohibition here in various ways: whether it is a prohibition on the action or a prohibition on the benefit, even if the goal is to prevent the benefit. Fine. Now, regarding prohibitions of eating—we saw that there are basically three types. There is also a prohibition of drinking. Yes, drinking is included within eating. Okay? Drinking is included within eating; everywhere it says it is forbidden to eat, it is apparently also forbidden to drink. There is room to discuss the nature of the prohibition of drinking—whether there too it is benefit to the throat, benefit to the intestines, and all the discussions we saw regarding prohibitions of eating also exist regarding prohibitions of drinking.

[Speaker B] Why don’t they combine if it is the same thing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, that is exactly where the discussion starts. First of all, the legal measures are different. Usually for drinking it is a quarter-log; on Yom Kippur it is a cheekful; and for eating it is usually an olive-bulk, while on Yom Kippur it is a large date. Okay? So first of all, the measures are different, but that still does not necessarily mean that the prohibitions really are different. It could simply be that the accumulated benefit from drinking requires a quarter-log, while the accumulated benefit from eating requires an olive-bulk. That does not mean there is a different character to the prohibition. On Yom Kippur, by the way, the measures are different both for drinking and for eating. And again this hints to us that this Yom Kippur prohibition really is a different type from the ordinary prohibitions of eating. Because on Yom Kippur, as I said, the goal is not to damage your state of affliction—that is the point. The focus is really the person, but not his action—the action the person performs—but his state. Is he afflicted or is he… Therefore on Yom Kippur there is certainly some dimension here of benefit from the thing. But why is the measure a large date and not an olive-bulk? Exactly because of this. At the end of the day, when you eat an olive-bulk, you have eaten. But when are you considered no longer afflicted? When you have eaten the amount of a large date. Because that is already calming to the mind—it settles your mind—and then you are no longer afflicted. An olive-bulk is already significant eating, but it does not settle your mind. Since it does not settle your mind, it is still not a sufficient measure to impair your affliction. So the difference in measures between Yom Kippur and the other prohibitions points to some difference in the nature of the prohibition: that on Yom Kippur this is not a prohibition of eating; it is an obligation of affliction. And whatever is forbidden to eat is only eating of a kind that can impair the affliction. In ordinary prohibitions of eating, it is eating of a kind that brings some kind of benefit—not calming the mind. Calming the mind is impairment of the affliction. Benefit is different from calming the mind. For example, regarding the measures: if you have benefit, that means you enjoyed it, but it does not mean that now you are no longer hungry. You can enjoy it very much and still be hungry. There is no connection. When do you reach the point of no longer being hungry? With a large date, because that settles your mind, and then you have impaired the affliction.

[Speaker B] But now—we said that on Yom Kippur it is basically a prohibition of benefit?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. So I said: it is a prohibition of benefit, but not an ordinary prohibition of benefit like the other prohibitions. Because what is forbidden to you is not benefiting from the thing; the object is not repulsive. There is no problem that you benefited from the object. The problem is that you reached a state in which you are not afflicted, and that happens only with the amount of a large date. There is, for example, a dispute about what happens if blood was congealed, or if one melted forbidden fat and swallowed it—that is, you take forbidden fat, which is really food, melt it, turn it into liquid, and drink it. There are major disputes here about what measure is required: whether it is the measure of a quarter-log or the measure of an olive-bulk. Is that called eating or drinking? There are discussions here whether melted fat is considered a beverage or considered food. In other words, with melted fat, the question is whether this changes the action I am performing—I am drinking and not eating—or whether it changes the object on which I perform the action—it is a beverage and not food. The practical difference, for example, is what measure causes one to violate the prohibition with melted fat. If it is a beverage, then perhaps the measure is a quarter-log and not an olive-bulk. If it is food, then its measure is an olive-bulk. But if the difference is only the question of what action I am performing—it is food, I am just drinking the food. I am drinking the food. When I drink melted fat, am I drinking food or drinking a beverage? That is a dispute among the medieval authorities. You’ll be able to see it afterward in the summary. If the result is in the affliction, then why do we

[Speaker B] not allow combination with drinking?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud in Yoma, on page 81 in our chapter, says: one who eats and drinks, they do not combine. You can’t combine eating and drinking. The big question is: what does “combine” mean here? For what purpose are you combining them? Say you ate half an olive-bulk of food and drank half a revi’it, or half an olive-bulk. Do they combine into what measure? They have different measures. So even if I were to say they do combine, it’s not at all clear what that means. But it says they do not combine. Who is the Tanna? Rav Chisda said: this dispute is taught in Rabbi Yehoshua, as we learned: Rabbi Yehoshua stated a rule: anything whose impurity and measure are the same combines. If its impurity is the same but not its measure, or its measure is the same but not its impurity, or neither its impurity nor its measure is the same, they do not combine. “Its impurity” means when it becomes impure; that’s not important for us right now, that’s in the laws of ritual impurity. But from here they learn that with eating and drinking on Yom Kippur too, since their measures are different, there is a dispute over whether they combine or do not combine. Rav Nachman said: you can even say this follows the Rabbis. The Rabbis only said that there with regard to impurity, but here it is because of settling one’s mind, and this does not settle his mind. Drinking does not settle his mind, only food does, and therefore there is no point in combining the two. That hints a bit that the prohibition of drinking and the prohibition of eating are different prohibitions. The prohibition of eating is that it settles his mind. Drinking does not settle his mind, and therefore there is nothing to combine between them at all. The big question is: so what does, in fact, count? After all, the obligation is to afflict oneself, to fast, so where does the prohibition of drinking come from? I think the meaning here really is not that drinking doesn’t settle the mind, but that these are two different kinds of settling the mind. That’s why they do not combine. The settling of the mind that food gives is to make you satiated. The settling of the mind that thirst gives is to make you no longer thirsty, to quench you, okay? And therefore there is no point in combining food and drink. If both of them produced a sense of satiety, then there would be room to combine food and drink. But if each one fills a different function in me, then it makes no sense to combine them. Not because their measures are different; each one does something else, so what is there to combine? Think about half-satiated and half-quenched—does that mean you’re now not afflicted? You are still afflicted. Only if you are fully satiated or fully quenched are you not afflicted. In other words, the “settling of the mind” written here is apparently true of drinking as well, not only of eating on Yom Kippur. It’s just a different kind of settling of the mind. This is settling the mind from thirst, and that is settling the mind from hunger, or the reverse: relief from the affliction of thirst and relief from the affliction of hunger, of eating. So the point here is that the reason they do not combine is not because of their different measures, as people usually say, but because of the function they fill. Fine, they discuss here whether to get into all those details now. In any case, what we see here is that both eating and drinking are about—meaning, they are prohibited because they undermine my being in a state of affliction on Yom Kippur. And therefore this prohibition has a different character. I’m not going into all those discussions now; look later if you want. That’s it. Now, there are several later authorities (Acharonim) who argue that on Yom Kippur, according to everyone, the basis of the prohibition is digestive benefit. We rule in Jewish law like Rabbi Yochanan, that with food prohibitions it is benefit to the throat. The Chatam Sofer, for example, writes this; the Sefer HaChinukh is uncertain about it, and the Chatam Sofer writes that on Yom Kippur it is digestive benefit according to everyone. Even Rabbi Yochanan would agree that digestive benefit is what determines things on Yom Kippur. A practical difference would be if he split it outside the mouth, inside the mouth—all the things we discussed, I mentioned them earlier. What is the idea behind this? Again, the same thing. Since the whole idea is that you need to settle your mind. And when you need to settle your mind, it doesn’t mean that you need to enjoy yourself. If you need to enjoy yourself, then you can discuss whether benefit to the throat is enjoyment or digestive benefit is enjoyment. But if what you want is settling the mind, that means you no longer feel afflicted. That is certainly digestive benefit and not benefit to the throat. Benefit to the throat is simply the taste, for example, or whatever—it’s a kind of enjoyment that has nothing to do with the feeling of satiety. When you enjoy the taste, that has nothing to do with satiety. When you’re talking about satiety, so as not to be in a fasted state, that depends on digestive benefit. Now, this whole idea sounds very logical conceptually.

[Speaker D] There’s no difference there either—if a person is hungry, the moment he eats and puts it in his mouth, hasn’t the hunger already been quieted?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe for that moment, but afterward he—

[Speaker D] And with drinking, certainly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m talking right now about food. With drinking, I actually think there really would be no difference between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish over benefit to the throat and digestive benefit; that seems obvious to me. Because here there really isn’t the dimension of satiety, exactly as we saw there.

[Speaker B] What practical difference does it make?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A feeding tube. What? If they give him a feeding tube on Yom Kippur. Right, there’s really no benefit to the throat in that case, right, exactly. Is that considered digestive benefit? Huh? No, there is benefit. What do you mean by “digestive”? It doesn’t have to be literally in the intestines. He feels some kind of satiety; it satisfies him. He doesn’t feel hungry as a result of the feeding tube. That’s how it seems to me, at least.

[Speaker B] No, no, no, it’s much more complicated, because you have no enjoyment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The tube goes into the intestines—never mind, I’m also talking about an infusion. Not the infusion—the infusion goes into the bloodstream. But even if it goes into the blood, if in the end he feels that he’s not hungry, then seemingly that’s digestive benefit, no? So those are all the discussions here.

[Speaker G] And if food is administered, same thing. But I’m saying, if in the end it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Solves the feeling of hunger, then you can say it’s not the normal way of deriving benefit, but still, the feeling of hunger has been solved. And if that’s the whole issue on Yom Kippur—that one has to afflict oneself—then the moment you solved the feeling of hunger, you are no longer afflicted. And I would say, according to Maimonides, that someone who eats in an unusual manner on Yom Kippur—that’s irrelevant. Meaning, if in the end he becomes satiated, then why should I care? It’s like meat and milk for Maimonides, where even in an unusual manner you are liable, okay? Because in the end you are no longer afflicted. Meaning, there is a difference between the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur and the prohibition of eating in the rest of the Torah. So that’s what I said: the Chatam Sofer and the doubt raised in Minchat Chinukh—that perhaps the basis of the prohibition on Yom Kippur is digestive benefit, because you have to be afflicted. Yes, exactly. Here, the Ketav Sofer brings in the name of the Chatam Sofer, his father, that with drinking it depends on benefit to the throat according to everyone, because basically it is the quenching of thirst, not the feeling of satiety that develops afterward. So that actually fits with what we said. Now, there are a few practical differences that come out of this distinction we talked about between Yom Kippur and the other prohibitions. The first practical difference is the measure I mentioned: a large date’s bulk, as opposed to an olive-bulk throughout the Torah. Why? Because a large date’s bulk calms the feeling of hunger; it doesn’t just give you enjoyment. With an olive-bulk, it is enough that you enjoyed it, no matter how full you became.

[Speaker B] What’s the ratio between an olive-bulk and a large date’s bulk? Twice? Double?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A large date’s bulk, yes.

[Speaker B] For drinking it’s a cheekful.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say that less than the measure is not called eating; it doesn’t have the status of an act of eating. And if you drink a cheekful, which is less than a revi’it, then seemingly you haven’t performed an act of drinking. But that’s not what matters, because the moment your feeling of thirst weakens a bit, then essentially you are no longer afflicted. And that is again the opposite indication, that here what is required is not an act of drinking or an act of eating as in ordinary food prohibitions. The whole question is what it does to the person: are you quenched to some degree—even a bit—and then you are already no longer afflicted, even if this would not count as an act of drinking. Because the act itself is not really what matters here; what matters is what it does to the person. Although in several places you see that the measure of a large date’s bulk is treated by the Sages as a formal measure like all Torah measures. Because according to what I’m saying now, the measure of a large date’s bulk is not a formal measure like an olive-bulk; rather, it’s simply that with a large date’s bulk you are already full, or at least a bit full, you already feel full. So it is only the Sages’ estimate of how much one has to eat in order to feel full. The measures given by the Torah are usually formal measures. If you eat pork, how much do you have to eat to violate the prohibition? An olive-bulk. Why? Because less than an olive-bulk doesn’t make you full? Or does make you full? Or you don’t enjoy it? Or you do enjoy it? You do enjoy it and you are not full—it makes no difference. There is a formal measure that says: from here onward, you receive lashes—an olive-bulk. Here it’s an essential measure, not a formal one. The large date’s bulk has the result that you are no longer afflicted, so I would expect that it would not be viewed as one of the standard Torah measures, but rather they simply tell you: you have to afflict yourself, and from that prohibition of affliction you can derive that the measure will be a large date’s bulk. For example, from the prohibition of eating pork, can you derive that the measure should be an olive-bulk? How? Why not half an olive-bulk or two olive-bulks? There’s no way to derive that.

[Speaker B] All the measures in the Torah—the Talmud—but how do you know?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How would you derive it from the prohibition of eating pork? The definition of eating. And how do you know that that is the definition of eating? Why? Where does that come from? Because there is a halakhah given to Moses at Sinai: measures, interpositions, and partitions are a halakhah given to Moses at Sinai. So you say: I need a Sinaitic halakhah that the measure for the prohibition is an olive-bulk. But it could have been half an olive-bulk or two olive-bulks; the prohibition of eating pork in itself would not have given me the measure. I need a halakhah that gives me the measure, that cuts it off, that sets the threshold from which one receives lashes. On Yom Kippur, it is simply the Sages’ estimate of when you are already no longer afflicted, or no longer fully afflicted, and they estimate that this is at a large date’s bulk of eating. So seemingly I would expect that a large date’s bulk would not be one of the entries on the list of measures given as a halakhah to Moses at Sinai; it’s an estimate, the Sages’ estimate of when one is full. But there are several places where you see that it is indeed one of the measures learned from a halakhah to Moses at Sinai. First of all, the verse “a land of wheat and barley,” which is brought as an alternative—after all, in the Talmud there are two possibilities for where the measures are learned from: either from “a land of wheat and barley,” or from a halakhah to Moses at Sinai. And in “a land of wheat and barley,” in one of the places they learn from there the large date’s bulk of Yom Kippur. Okay, so it seems that this really is a formal measure given by a halakhah to Moses at Sinai. Rashi there in Sukkah, regarding the large date’s bulk, explains why the measure on Yom Kippur is a large date’s bulk, and not—because it doesn’t say “eating” there. Right, it doesn’t say that. Rather, what do we require? Something that removes him from affliction. Exactly what we said before, yes, that settling of the mind. One more thing: in the Talmud in Beitzah, the Talmud says that according to Beit Shammai, leavening agent is with an olive-bulk and leavened food with a large date’s bulk, and according to Beit Hillel both are with an olive-bulk. Yes, that is basically the first Mishnah in Beitzah. So the Talmud says that from the fact that the Torah wrote both leavened food and leavening agent, wrote both, it is proven that the measure of leavened food is larger—it is a large date’s bulk—and the measure of leavening agent is an olive-bulk. Leavening agent is an olive-bulk and leavened food is a large date’s bulk. Yes, what did I say? The leavening agent is the smaller one and the leavened food is the larger one, because the leavening agent is more concentrated. Yes. So why specifically a large date’s bulk? The Talmud says: because that is the next measure we find. We know that leavened food has to be more than leavening agent. Now how much more? I don’t know. I look through the list of measures that exist in Jewish law. The next one after an olive-bulk is a large date’s bulk. Again, what do you see? That a large date’s bulk is a measure; it’s not just an estimate of how full you become. It’s on the list of measures—there is also a large date’s bulk. So you can see this in several places. The same thing regarding eating in an unusual manner on Yom Kippur—I mentioned this earlier—there are later authorities (Acharonim) who discuss this matter and disagree on the question whether one who eats in an unusual manner on Yom Kippur is exempt. According to what I said earlier, simply speaking he should be liable. Because if in the end you are satiated, you have left the state of affliction, so you violated the prohibition. It is not a prohibition on the act of eating, where you can say that since you are eating in an unusual manner, you are exempt. And in fact the Sha’agat Aryeh writes that eating in an unusual manner on Yom Kippur does not exempt. Because in the end there is settling of the mind, and therefore there is no reason to exempt. Rashi also seems to say this. What happens if someone ate before Yom Kippur less than a large date’s bulk, and then completed it on Yom Kippur within the time of eating a half-loaf—completed it to a large date’s bulk? The Ketav Sofer discusses this. Yes, let’s say I ate three-quarters of a large date’s bulk right before Yom Kippur; Yom Kippur began, and I ate another quarter within the time of eating a half-loaf. I completed a large date’s bulk during Yom Kippur. Now if indeed I ate on Yom Kippur and in the end reached the satiety of a large date’s bulk, then I am no longer afflicted. So what difference does it make that part of the eating was done before Yom Kippur? After all, the prohibition is not on the act of eating; the prohibition is on the state created by the eating. And if during Yom Kippur, as a result of the eating, I reached satiety that took me out of affliction—

[Speaker B] So if you eat double before—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yom Kippur—then because he isn’t afflicted, what? There are in fact some discussions about that too. There are people who want to argue that the addition before Yom Kippur is for this purpose, like the added period before the Sabbatical year, so that something should not take root during the Sabbatical year. So too, with the addition before Yom Kippur, you need to add time so that by the time the day begins you are already afflicted. Because otherwise, if you ate until the very last moment, then there would be a moment on Yom Kippur when you are not afflicted. Fine, but I think that with that additional time, this is not the simple explanation. Here, the Sdei Chemed—I brought it here—the Sdei Chemed argues that even if you ate everything before the fast, but you entered the fast not afflicted, you violated the prohibition. Not right next to the fast—that’s exactly the point. That’s his claim: if you enter the day and you are not afflicted, then you already violated the prohibition, which I think is pretty far-reaching. What?

[Speaker B] How is that different from two Yom Kippurs? It’s a bit like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now there is also the issue of half a measure; maybe I’ll finish with that issue of half a measure. So I mentioned the law of half a measure regarding leavened food and the sciatic nerve and all those prohibitions that are prohibitions of action. What about half a measure on Yom Kippur? After all, the law of half a measure, the dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, is brought regarding Yom Kippur, in our chapter. That’s the source there, page 81. Okay? So you see that on Yom Kippur there is a law of half a measure according to Rabbi Yochanan, that it is forbidden by Torah law, and that is how we rule in Jewish law. There is an act being done here. What about half a measure on Yom Kippur? So the Talmud—the law of half a measure, the dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, is brought regarding Yom Kippur, in our chapter; that is the source there, page 81. Okay? So you see that on Yom Kippur there is a law of half a measure according to Rabbi Yochanan, that it is forbidden by Torah law, and that is how we rule in Jewish law.

[Speaker B] So there is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here—you remember that I brought Maimonides in Laws of Leavened Food and Matzah, chapter 1, law 7, where he brings a source for the law of half a measure on Passover, and does not learn it from the general law of half a measure. So the Mishneh LaMelekh asks: why? He says: we hold like Rabbi Yochanan, and so ruled all the decisors, that half a measure is forbidden by Torah law. According to this, one should wonder about our teacher: why do I need a verse regarding leavened food on Passover? We hold for all prohibitions in the Torah that half a measure is forbidden by Torah law. Moreover, if from the verse, then the opposite should have been said, for “it shall not be eaten” implies a full measure of eating. Maran already asked this in Kesef Mishneh and left it unresolved. Yes, he also doesn’t understand the source; never mind. And I saw in a responsum of Rabbi Maharlanach, section 51, that he was troubled by Maran Kesef Mishneh’s question, and he answered that the prohibition of leavened food is not like forbidden fat. With forbidden fat, after all, they learn “any amount of fat is fat,” and from there they derive half a measure. From there they learned that half a measure is forbidden, because forbidden fat is always prohibited and never had a time when it was permitted. Not so with leavened food, which is permitted before Passover. Therefore a separate verse is needed for leavened food to prohibit half a measure. And that rabbi further inferred from this that on the fourteenth of Nisan from the sixth hour onward, there is no Torah prohibition on less than the full measure. So Maharlanach argues that you can’t learn the law of half a measure from forbidden fat to leavened food on Passover, because forbidden fat is a prohibition not dependent on time; it never had a time when it was permitted—fat is always prohibited. Leavened food on Passover, before Passover it is permitted, during Passover it is prohibited. So perhaps there there would be no law of half a measure, and therefore you need a separate source that there is also a prohibition of half a measure on Passover. Now this is very puzzling, because the whole discussion of half a measure is stated regarding Yom Kippur. Yom Kippur too is a time-dependent prohibition. This food was permitted to eat before Yom Kippur, and on Yom Kippur it is prohibited. So what does Maharlanach want? Meaning, he says that with leavened food on Passover, you can’t derive it from forbidden fat because it’s a time-dependent prohibition. Well, the whole Talmudic discussion of half a measure is about Yom Kippur. That too is a time-dependent prohibition. It seems to me that maybe one can understand him in light of what we saw above: Yom Kippur, true, is a time-dependent prohibition, but it is not a historical prohibition like leavened food and the sciatic nerve. Meaning, it’s not a prohibition on an act like leavened food and the sciatic nerve, but a prohibition on the benefit. And once it is a prohibition on the benefit, then the concept of half a measure applies to it. So half of the benefit is a prohibition of half a measure. Okay? With leavened food on Passover, the claim is that what is prohibited is the act of eating, not the enjoyment I derive from the act of eating. And the fact that leavened food is time-dependent is not the reason; it is the sign. It is a sign that leavened food is not intrinsically repulsive; rather it is a memorial to a historical event, and the proof is that before then it is permitted and afterward too it is permitted, and only on Passover is it prohibited. Therefore half a measure needs a separate source, because without that I would not prohibit half a measure. In other words, the time-dependence is a sign and not a reason. Now on Yom Kippur there is also time-dependence, but there the time-dependence does not indicate what it indicates on Passover. Because on Yom Kippur the prohibition is indeed on the benefit, not on the act of eating. And the whole reason there is no half a measure in prohibitions of action is that half a measure does not apply to prohibitions of action. But with leavened food on Passover… on Yom Kippur the prohibition is a prohibition of benefit, so why shouldn’t half a measure apply there? So there, half a measure does apply.

[Speaker B] Interesting. Very nice. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, we’ll stop here. I more or less finished it a bit quickly; I’ll send you the summary if you want to see a bit more of the details.