Tractate Yoma – Elul 5783 – Lesson 7

Table of Contents

• Opening and aggadah: “He spent His wrath on wood and stones”
• Women’s obligation in the afflictions of Yom Kippur versus time-bound positive commandments
• The expositions of “the citizen” in Sukkah versus Yom Kippur, and the contradiction around inclusion and exclusion
• Rava’s answer: “These are halakhot, and the Rabbis attached them to verses,” and the meaning of asmachta
• “Which is the verse and which is the halakhah?” and “Why do I need the verse?”: Sukkah as time-bound and Yom Kippur from Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav
• Positive commandment and prohibition on Yom Kippur: does women’s obligation in the positive commandment follow from the prohibition?
• Saadia Gaon and Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perla: the content determines it, not the wording, and the possibility of “only a prohibition” or “only a positive commandment”
• Abaye and Rava: why a halakhah is needed for Sukkah, and what the initial assumption was that would obligate women
• The linkage of leaven and matzah: there is no overlap in content, so a special source is needed
• Nachmanides on a parapet, and three situations regarding overlapping positive commandments and prohibitions
• The Talmud’s answer on Yom Kippur: “It was needed only for the added affliction,” and the implications for the positive commandment
• “Divrei Yechezkel,” feeding a minor on Yom Kippur, and the possibility that the prohibition supports the positive commandment
• Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perla on Maimonides: doubt whether there is a prohibition fulfilled in affliction, and proofs from lashes
• Women’s obligation in the other afflictions, and how it depends on the various approaches to prohibition/positive commandment in the other afflictions
• Tosafot in Kiddushin and the Ritva: the dispute whether women are obligated in a positive commandment when it comes together with a prohibition
• The reason for women’s exemption and Avudraham’s suggestion versus the approach of Tosafot
• Moving to minors: three fundamental laws
• A minor in the sukkah: “a minor who does not need his mother” as the measure for education, and the asmachta of “all” to include minors
• Queen Hileni: proof of the force of rabbinic education and the need to obey the Sages
• The dispute in understanding education: an obligation on the father or on the child, and two complementary laws
• “Education” as the language of beginning versus preparation for the future, and the example of a child making kiddush on Yom Kippur
• An analogy to public commandments: Hakhel and Torah reading as obligations on the community and responsibility on individuals
• Education on Yom Kippur: “education by hours” versus “completion,” and the question whether the commandment is actually being fulfilled

Summary

General Overview

The text establishes that women are obligated in the afflictions of Yom Kippur even though this would seemingly be a time-bound positive commandment, and it clarifies the source of that obligation through the contradiction between the expositions of the word ezraḥ and ha’ezraḥ in Sukkah and in Yom Kippur, using the concept of asmachta even for a Torah-level law based on tradition. The text suggests that the focus of the discussion is the relationship between a positive commandment and a prohibition when their content overlaps, and what that means for women’s obligation in the positive commandment of Yom Kippur and in the added affliction, and it brings different views of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), including Nachmanides’ novel idea that in certain cases a prohibition that “reinforces” a positive commandment may exempt women even from the prohibition. It then moves on to minors and divides the issue into three laws: education, which is rabbinic; the prohibition against directly feeding or causing a minor to violate a prohibition, which according to most opinions is Torah-level; and the rule that the religious court is not commanded to separate him when he eats on his own. It explains that the law of education itself may be understood either as an obligation on the parents or as an obligation on the child, or even as two aspects of the same responsibility.

Opening and aggadah: “He spent His wrath on wood and stones”

The text opens with a side question about “the battalion commander’s office” and immediately connects it to the phrase “He spent His wrath on wood and stones” as a transitional remark, without developing the point, and then sets the goal of discussing women’s obligation and the obligation of minors.

Women’s obligation in the afflictions of Yom Kippur versus time-bound positive commandments

The text presents fasting on Yom Kippur as a positive commandment and notes that there is no explicit prohibition in the Torah against eating, even though “it’s pretty clear there is a prohibition,” and that the warning is apparently learned through a type of exposition like a verbal analogy. The text raises a difficulty: if affliction is a time-bound positive commandment, women should be exempt, yet the Talmud assumes that women are obligated just like men, and there are special leniencies mentioned for a pregnant woman, a bride, and a king. The leniency for a bride regarding washing proves that the obligation covers all five afflictions and not just eating and drinking.

The expositions of “the citizen” in Sukkah versus Yom Kippur, and the contradiction around inclusion and exclusion

The text brings the Mishnah in Sukkah that exempts women, slaves, and minors from the sukkah and obligates “a minor who does not need his mother” under the law of education, and the baraita’s exposition: ha’ezraḥ excludes women, and kol, “all,” includes minors. The text sets up the contradiction with another baraita: ha’ezraḥ includes women citizens, who are obligated in affliction. It explains that there are really two questions here: what ezraḥ means on its own, whether it includes women, and what the definite article does, whether it excludes or includes, with different emphases in Rashi and the Ritva.

Rava’s answer: “These are halakhot, and the Rabbis attached them to verses,” and the meaning of asmachta

The text brings Rava’s answer that these laws are “halakhot” and the verses are only asmachta, and emphasizes that here asmachta does not mean rabbinic law, but a Torah law whose source is tradition, such as a halakhah to Moses from Sinai, and the verse is just attached to it. The text says that even after accepting “asmachta,” an internal question remains about the exegetical logic, and asks how it is still decided whether the definite article includes or excludes.

“Which is the verse and which is the halakhah?” and “Why do I need the verse?”: Sukkah as time-bound and Yom Kippur from Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav

The text presents the Talmud’s question of which source is the verse and which is the halakhah, and adds another difficulty: why is any verse and halakhah needed at all? In the case of sukkah, women are exempt anyway because it is a time-bound positive commandment. The text notes that for Yom Kippur too there is another source: Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, and the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught, from the verse “man or woman,” which equates a woman with a man “for all punishments in the Torah.” It explains that the Talmud includes under the term “punishments” even karet.

Positive commandment and prohibition on Yom Kippur: does women’s obligation in the positive commandment follow from the prohibition?

The text suggests that equating women to men regarding punishments proves that there is a prohibition carrying karet, and therefore women are obligated in the prohibition, but then the question arises whether they are also obligated in the positive commandment of “and you shall afflict yourselves,” or only in the prohibition. The text raises the possibility that the Talmud does not distinguish, because when a positive commandment and a prohibition overlap, women are obligated in the positive commandment by force of the prohibition. But it raises a difficulty from Jewish holidays, where women are exempt from the positive commandment of resting even though there is also a prohibition, and explains that in order to claim this kind of extension there has to be overlap in content between the positive commandment and the prohibition.

Saadia Gaon and Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perla: the content determines it, not the wording, and the possibility of “only a prohibition” or “only a positive commandment”

The text mentions in the name of Saadia Gaon, as explained by Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perla, that the division between positive commandment and prohibition depends on the content of the commandment, not the style of the verse, and therefore “and you shall afflict yourselves” can be considered an issur, a prohibition, even though it is phrased in positive language. The text later develops Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perla’s position that under a certain possibility there is no explicit prohibition in affliction at all, and it also presents his criticism of Maimonides’ proof from the Mishnah in Keritot, arguing that the Mishnah there could be understood as distinguishing between active violation and passive omission, not as a formal classification of positive commandment versus prohibition.

Abaye and Rava: why a halakhah is needed for Sukkah, and what the initial assumption was that would obligate women

The text brings Abaye’s answer that really sukkah is the halakhah and the verse is only asmachta, because there is an initial assumption that would obligate women under “you shall dwell as you live,” just as in a home a man lives with his wife, so a special exemption is needed. The text notes that once such an exemption exists, a question arises whether the exemption is because it is time-bound or whether it is a unique exemption, with a possible practical difference regarding reciting a blessing and women’s fulfillment of sukkah. The text also brings Rava’s answer, which suggests an initial assumption from the festival of matzot through the verbal analogy “fifteenth, fifteenth,” and explains according to Rashi that women are obligated in matzah even though it is time-bound because of the linkage: “whoever is included in ‘do not eat leaven’ is included in the positive commandment ‘eat matzah.’”

The linkage of leaven and matzah: there is no overlap in content, so a special source is needed

The text emphasizes that the connection between leaven and matzah does not arise from overlap in the content of the commandments but from the scriptural linkage itself, because one can avoid leaven without eating matzah beyond the first night. The text concludes that from here one cannot prove any sweeping rule that a positive commandment is drawn after a prohibition, because on Passover a special source is required in any case.

Nachmanides on a parapet, and three situations regarding overlapping positive commandments and prohibitions

The text brings Nachmanides in Kiddushin on the commandment of building a parapet, where he argues that sometimes the prohibition comes to reinforce the positive commandment, and therefore if women are exempt from the positive commandment because it is time-bound, they may also be exempt from the prohibition. That gives a novel third possibility of exemption from both. The text lays out three possible situations when a positive commandment and a prohibition overlap in content: obligation in both by force of the prohibition, obligation in the prohibition alone with exemption from the positive commandment, or exemption from both when the prohibition is merely reinforcing the positive commandment.

The Talmud’s answer on Yom Kippur: “It was needed only for the added affliction,” and the implications for the positive commandment

The text brings the Talmud’s explanation that the need for “the citizen” on Yom Kippur is only for the added affliction, because the added period was excluded from punishment and warning, and the initial assumption would therefore be that women are not obligated in it, so a special inclusion is needed. The text emphasizes that this move raises the question whether the added affliction is an independent positive commandment or just an extension of the positive commandment of Yom Kippur, and suggests that in order to understand the initial assumption one has to say that the addition is viewed either as a separate framework of obligation or as a dimension “of the day” that is imposed on men but not on women.

“Divrei Yechezkel,” feeding a minor on Yom Kippur, and the possibility that the prohibition supports the positive commandment

The text presents a practical difficulty: how can minors be fed on Yom Kippur despite the prohibition against directly causing a minor to violate a prohibition? It rejects the solution of danger to life as doubtful when it comes to feeding beyond what is necessary. The text brings the Divrei Yechezkel, who suggests, following Nachmanides, that the prohibition on Yom Kippur supports the positive commandment, and therefore where the issue is only a positive commandment there is no prohibition of directly causing a minor to violate it, according to Magen Avraham. It notes that this would have led to women’s exemption as a time-bound commandment were it not for the inclusion of “the citizen,” but it also points out that the Talmud itself does not follow this path when it challenges from “man or woman… for all punishments.”

Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perla on Maimonides: doubt whether there is a prohibition fulfilled in affliction, and proofs from lashes

The text quotes Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perla, who argues that Maimonides counts a prohibition regarding the affliction of Yom Kippur alongside the positive commandment and proves it from the Mishnah in Keritot, but in his words this is “certainly puzzling,” and the Mishnah does not prove that there is a prohibition. The text adds that in any case there is a stronger proof from a Mishnah that counts “one who eats on Yom Kippur” among those liable for lashes, because lashes apply only to a prohibition, and it notes that Saadia Gaon, consistently with his approach, does not count this as a separate prohibition.

Women’s obligation in the other afflictions, and how it depends on the various approaches to prohibition/positive commandment in the other afflictions

The text says that the Talmud assumes women are obligated in the other afflictions as well, but explains that this becomes complicated according to views that hold that the other afflictions involve only a positive commandment, without a prohibition and without punishment, because the comparison “for all punishments” would not apply there. The text notes that according to the She’iltot and the Ran there is also a prohibition in the other afflictions even though there is no karet, while according to the Ran there is also a rabbinic side, and according to Maimonides there is only a positive commandment. It describes how the implications for women’s obligation depend both on whether there is a general rule of extending from prohibition to positive commandment and on whether women are obligated in rabbinic time-bound commandments, bringing the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot and the Tosafot discussion of “they too were included in that miracle.”

Tosafot in Kiddushin and the Ritva: the dispute whether women are obligated in a positive commandment when it comes together with a prohibition

The text brings Tosafot in Kiddushin 34, which asks why parapet, returning a lost object, and sending away the mother bird are counted as positive commandments that are not time-bound, when they also contain a prohibition. It gives a first answer that one can find aspects of the positive commandment without the prohibition, and another answer that suggests a practical difference regarding whether a positive commandment can override a prohibition. The text quotes interpreters who assume that women are obligated in the prohibition but may still be exempt from the positive commandment when it is time-bound, in which case another positive commandment could override the prohibition because this is not a case of “a prohibition plus a positive commandment.” It brings the difficulty raised by Rabbeinu Yosef of Eretz Yisrael from the sugya “one may not light with burning oil on a Jewish holiday,” and Tosafot’s answer, which introduces another idea, that a “prohibition with a positive commandment at its side” is stronger even if women are exempt from the positive commandment. The text says that the Ritva even states that when there is both a prohibition and a positive commandment, women are not obligated in the positive commandment, and concludes that according to these approaches it is possible that on Yom Kippur women are obligated only in the prohibition and not in the positive commandment. That creates a difficulty for Maimonides’ approach if, in the other afflictions, there is only a positive commandment.

The reason for women’s exemption and Avudraham’s suggestion versus the approach of Tosafot

The text brings Avudraham, who explains women’s exemption from time-bound positive commandments as a way of leaving them free time, and suggests a line of reasoning according to which if women are already obligated in the prohibition anyway, they do not really “gain time,” and therefore maybe it would not make sense to exempt them from the positive commandment. The text says that Tosafot does not go in that direction, because it leaves open the possibility of exemption from the positive commandment even where the prohibition exists, and discusses only the strength of the prohibition for purposes of being overridden.

Moving to minors: three fundamental laws

The text defines three laws regarding minors: the law of education, which is rabbinic and begins when the child “has reached the age of education”; the prohibition against directly causing a minor to violate a prohibition, which according to most views is Torah-level and applies to every minor even before the age of education; and the law that “if a minor eats forbidden foods, the religious court is not commanded to separate him” when the minor is acting on his own, and there is no general obligation to stop him, aside from the father’s obligation under the law of education once the child reaches the age of education. The text sums up that for practical Yom Kippur issues, what mainly remains are the law of education and the law against directly causing the violation.

A minor in the sukkah: “a minor who does not need his mother” as the measure for education, and the asmachta of “all” to include minors

The text returns to the Mishnah in Sukkah and brings the Talmud’s question how “all” can include minors if minors are exempt from sukkah, and answers that the obligation applies only to a minor who has reached the age of education. The text emphasizes that the Talmud explicitly says that the obligation of a minor who has reached the age of education is rabbinic, and the verse is only asmachta. It brings criteria from the school of Rabbi Yannai such as “he relieves himself and his mother does not wipe him” or “he wakes from sleep and does not cry out, ‘Mom, Mom,’” and argues that there is not necessarily one universal age; rather, “each commandment depends on what it is.”

Queen Hileni: proof of the force of rabbinic education and the need to obey the Sages

The text brings the sugya in Sukkah 3 about Queen Hileni, who sat in a sukkah more than twenty cubits high and the elders did not object, and the rejection of the proof on the grounds that a woman is exempt from sukkah. The text shows that the Talmud restores the proof from the fact that she had seven sons, and it is impossible that not one of them was a child who no longer needed his mother and was therefore rabbinically obligated. And if the issue is only rabbinic, one might still have thought that she simply was not careful about it, so the Talmud adds: “And furthermore, she did nothing except in accordance with the Sages,” to strengthen the point that she was careful even about rabbinic education.

The dispute in understanding education: an obligation on the father or on the child, and two complementary laws

The text brings, in the name of Kehillot Yaakov, Sukkah section 2, that there is a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot whether education is an obligation on the father to educate or a rabbinic obligation on the child himself. It raises a difficulty from the Talmud in Nazir, which speaks about father and mother and about a young girl, from which it seems that education refers to the parents’ obligation. The text suggests a resolution according to which there are two laws of education: a rabbinic obligation on the child in the commandments, and a responsibility on the parents to ensure fulfillment because the child does not have full responsibility. It suggests that these are “two sides of the same coin” rather than two unrelated laws.

“Education” as the language of beginning versus preparation for the future, and the example of a child making kiddush on Yom Kippur

The text explains that the word “education” also has the meaning of beginning, as in “the dedication of the altar,” and therefore education is not only preparation for the future but the opening of a person’s actual observance of the commandments already in childhood. The text brings a story about a child who was sent to eat on Yom Kippur and argued that there was no need for kiddush, because kiddush in childhood is only “so I’ll know what to do when I’m older,” and when he is older he will not be eating. It notes that this fits one conception, but according to Tosafot’s conception, education obligates actual performance, and therefore he should have made kiddush.

An analogy to public commandments: Hakhel and Torah reading as obligations on the community and responsibility on individuals

The text brings the commandment of Hakhel as an example of a public commandment in which women are obligated despite its being time-bound, because the obligation rests on the community. It explains how Sefer HaChinukh can say that the commandment was fulfilled by the majority of the community, and yet someone who did not come “has neglected a positive commandment,” because the fulfillment is communal but the responsibility is personal. The text applies the same principle to Torah reading in the Mishnah Berurah and concludes that this is similar to education: the child may be the one who is obligated, but responsibility is placed on the adults because a child does not bear responsibility.

Education on Yom Kippur: “education by hours” versus “completion,” and the question whether the commandment is actually being fulfilled

The text says that in Maimonides, and in explanations such as Rabbeinu Manoach, there is a division on Yom Kippur between education by hours and completing the fast at older ages, and it suggests that these are two different obligations. The text suggests that completion is a rabbinic obligation on the child himself to fast an entire day, while education by hours is not actually fulfillment of the commandment but habituation and training. This is similar to the question whether one educates with an invalid lulav, where the Ritva and Sha’ar HaTziyun are strict because one side of education is the actual fulfillment of the commandment itself. The text closes by saying that in Maimonides’ wording one can clearly detect “two systems” of education corresponding to these two aspects.

Okay. What’s the name of that battalion commander’s office? What battalion commander? Because he poured out his wrath on wood and stones. Fine. So today I want to talk about the obligation of women and of minors; since we have only men here, we can lump the two together. To magnify, just a second, to glorify the Torah and exalt it. Okay? So I’ll start with the obligation of women, and after that I’ll move on to the obligation of minors. So here’s the thing: the fasting on Yom Kippur—we remember that there is a positive commandment. There is no explicit prohibition, even though it’s fairly clear that there is a prohibition; the question is where it comes from. The warning is apparently derived from a verbal analogy, “etzem etzem” or something like that. With labor, the prohibition is what appears explicitly, and the positive commandment—you have to discuss what exactly its nature is. So right now I’m talking about the fasting of Yom Kippur, and it is, as said, a positive commandment. Simply speaking, it is a positive commandment dependent on time—right, it’s only Yom Kippur—and therefore women ought to be exempt from Yom Kippur, right? What? Wait, at this stage we’re talking about the positive commandment.

Now, in the Talmud we find in a number of places quite clearly that women are in fact obligated on Yom Kippur. For example, we find special leniencies for a pregnant woman and for a bride, right, a bride and a king and so on. We see that the Talmud’s assumption, as something obvious, is that women are obligated just like men, and simply speaking this is said about all five afflictions. So if this is a positive commandment dependent on time, what’s the reasoning? That’s where we begin the discussion. I’m stating the question; in a moment we’ll get to the answer too. This happens in many places—at the end of the day, time won’t be enough. In any case, it seems this is said about all the afflictions, not only eating and drinking. The leniency for a bride, for example, concerns washing, so it’s pretty clear that the prohibition for women is on all the afflictions, not only eating and drinking.

Now, the explicit source we find for this law—beyond the leniencies, which indirectly show that women are obligated—there is an explicit source. The Mishnah in tractate Sukkah speaks about the exemption of women, slaves, and minors from the sukkah: a minor who no longer needs his mother is obligated in the sukkah—yes, he has already reached the age of education. There was an incident in which the daughter-in-law of Shammai the Elder gave birth, and he broke through the plaster ceiling and put roofing over the bed for the sake of the minor. “From where are these matters derived?” the Talmud asks. As the rabbis taught: “Citizen”—this means citizen. “The citizen”—to exclude women. “All”—to include minors. Okay? So for now this is all regarding sukkah. “All the citizens in Israel shall dwell in sukkot”—so this comes to exclude women and include minors. The Master said: “The citizen”—to exclude women. Does that imply that “citizen” means both women and men? I ask that things not leave this room. “The citizen” means both women and men, and therefore “the citizen” comes to exclude women. If there weren’t the definite article, if it were just “citizen,” then it would mean both women and men. But wasn’t it taught in a baraita: “The citizen”—to include female citizens, who are obligated in affliction? So apparently “citizen” means men. Meaning: what is actually the meaning of the word “citizen,” and therefore what does the added definite article—“the citizen”—come to add?

So from the interpretation regarding sukkah we learn that “citizen” includes both women and men, and “the citizen” comes to say only men, excluding women—the choicest among the citizens, as Rashi says, the more important among the citizens or something like that, meaning the man. So “the citizen” comes to exclude women, but “citizen” by itself means both. On Yom Kippur—and this is what the Talmud here brings—it also says “the citizen,” but there “the citizen” comes to include the female citizens who are obligated in affliction. So there we see that “citizen” without the definite article means only men; you need the definite article in order to include. There are actually two questions here, and the Ritva and Rashi each emphasize a different one. One question is: what is the meaning of the word “citizen”? Does “citizen” include both men and women? The second question is: when you add the definite article, does it exclude or include? Okay. Two questions, and apparently there is a contradiction between these two sources with respect to both questions, also with respect to what the word itself does.

Now the Ritva claims no—the Ritva claims that if the definite article is added to a word that includes, then the definite article excludes. If the definite article is added to a word that excludes, then the definite article includes. So there is no contradiction regarding the function of the definite article. The function of the definite article depends on what the meaning of the word is without the definite article. The contradiction is about the meaning of the word “citizen” itself. Fine, just a side note.

So the Talmud answers: Rava said, these are established laws, and the rabbis merely attached them to verses. Basically this is a law, probably a law given to Moses at Sinai or something like that, and the interpretation is only a scriptural support. Okay? Here, when we say “scriptural support,” I think I mentioned in one of the previous lectures that the term appears in two meanings, at least two meanings. One meaning is: this is a rabbinic law, a rabbinic law that they support with a verse. That is not the situation here. Here we are dealing with a Torah law—that women are obligated on Yom Kippur and exempt from sukkah by Torah law, not rabbinically. So what does it mean, “they attached it”? Since it doesn’t derive from the verse but from a tradition, from a law given to Moses at Sinai, then even here sometimes they attach it to a verse. So when you find the word “scriptural support” in the Talmud or among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), it doesn’t always mean that the Jewish law is rabbinic. It only means that the Jewish law does not derive from this verse. What it is derived from—you have to discuss separately. It doesn’t derive from this verse, but is only attached to it. Okay?

In any case, it’s a law and the interpretation is only a scriptural support. That doesn’t entirely solve the problem, okay? Even when you make it a scriptural support—very nice—but still: does the definite article come to include or to exclude? After all, even when you make some kind of scriptural support, you still have to do it in line with the logic of interpretation. Right? How does this business work?

So the Talmud asks: which is the verse and which is the established law? Sorry—which of these two interpretations is the verse and which is the established law? Sorry: law and scriptural support. One of them is a real interpretation—the one that fits, say, the correct understanding of the word “citizen” and the definite article—and where it doesn’t fit this plain meaning, that’s probably only a scriptural support. That’s what “law and scriptural support” means. Okay? Even though Rava spoke in the plural—“they are established laws”—as though both are law. True, but the Talmud assumes: why assume both? Why make both into law when there is a contradiction? One of them works; only the second one doesn’t. We’ll see later that there is in fact a reason why the Talmud speaks about both. But right now the Talmud ignores the fact that it was phrased in the plural and asks: so which of them is the scriptural support and which is the real interpretation?

And another question: why do I need a verse, and why do I need an established law? If one of them is a verse and one is an established law—why do I need either of them? I need neither the verse nor the established law. Why? Because sukkah is a positive commandment dependent on time, and every positive commandment dependent on time women are exempt from. So regarding women’s exemption from sukkah, that follows from the fact that it is a positive commandment dependent on time. Why do I need for that a support, a law, an interpretation? What’s that relevant for? I know it even without that. Why on Yom Kippur? Here comes the next phrase: Yom Kippur is derived from Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav. So I also don’t understand Yom Kippur. Therefore when the Talmud asks, it asks: why do I need a verse and why do I need an established law—and why do I need a verse? It asks it about both. The question on sukkah is because it is a positive commandment dependent on time. The question on Yom Kippur is because it follows from Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav.

For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, and similarly it was taught in the school of Rabbi Ishmael: the verse says, “a man or a woman”—Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah. For all punishments in the Torah. How does this serve as a source for obligating women on Yom Kippur? Apparently because there is a prohibition and a punishment for eating. Ah—so first of all, when it says “punishments,” on Yom Kippur there is no court-imposed punishment; it is karet. Karet, right? The Talmud apparently assumes that when it says “punishments,” that includes karet. Right? Therefore a woman is obligated on Yom Kippur because there is karet. One could have taken another step and said: since there is karet here, apparently there is also a prohibition, because this isn’t Passover and circumcision where the karet is on a positive commandment—that we saw in Maimonides and others. Here it is karet on a prohibition, so apparently there is also a prohibition here, and women are obligated in prohibitions. Not only because of the punishment—the punishment is an indication, a sign, not the reason. Rather, once there is a punishment, apparently there is a prohibition, and women are obligated in prohibitions. The differences between women and men are only regarding positive commandments, not prohibitions. And since there is a prohibition here, women are obligated.

In principle one could have said that indeed women are obligated in the prohibition and also in karet, but who says they are also obligated in the positive commandment? In an ordinary positive commandment, not the positive commandment of Yom Kippur. Ah. After all, on Yom Kippur there is both a positive commandment and a prohibition, right? You tell me regarding the prohibition that since there is karet, women are obligated because Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah. What about the positive commandment? The positive commandment is already part of the same matter, right? What do you mean the same matter? It’s said about the same thing—and therefore what? There is still a positive commandment and a prohibition. So maybe women would not be obligated in the positive commandment. So this interpretation comes and says that they are obligated in the positive commandment too. In the prohibition they are obligated because Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah. You asked why we need an established law or a verse, or why we need a source. The rabbi is asking about the—no, he isn’t asking, I’m saying. Seemingly one could have said that what we needed here a law or verse for was the positive commandment. The fact that you brought me the prohibition—what does that have to do with it? Fine. And the Torah doesn’t say it. And it doesn’t say it, yes. The question is why not.

At first glance I would say that this positive commandment is basically a prohibition. I don’t know whether this positive commandment is a prohibition, but where there is an overlapping positive commandment and prohibition, like on the Sabbath, right—where there is an overlapping positive commandment and prohibition, “remember” and “observe” were said in one utterance, for example—then anyone obligated in the prohibition is obligated in the positive commandment as well. Therefore the Talmud doesn’t even bother to address the positive commandment, because once on Yom Kippur there is a prohibition, it is obvious to the Talmud that women are obligated in the prohibition, and therefore they will also be obligated in the positive commandment, because when the positive commandment and prohibition overlap, women are obligated.

Fine—but that’s not necessarily so. Why not? On a Jewish holiday, women are exempt from positive commandments of the holiday. Right. Sukkah, for example. Why not say that because of the prohibitions of the holiday—well, the prohibitions of the holiday have nothing to do with the positive commandment to sit in the sukkah. The positive commandment concerning labor on a Jewish holiday—women are indeed obligated. The positive commandment of refraining from labor on a Jewish holiday, resting on a Jewish holiday. The commandment of sukkah is a different section. We want there to be overlap between the prohibition and the positive commandment. We’ll see this in a moment.

In any case, at first glance it seems from the Talmud that the Talmud does not distinguish between positive commandment and prohibition. If concerning a certain matter there is both a positive commandment and a prohibition, then it is obvious to the Talmud that just as women are obligated in the prohibition, they are obligated in the positive commandment too. Alternatively, at least theoretically, one could have said there is no positive commandment here, only a prohibition. But that isn’t likely, at least regarding affliction, because with affliction, on the contrary, what is written in the Torah is the positive commandment. The prohibition—you still have to discuss whether and from where we derive it, but the positive commandment is explicit. So it is hard to say there is only a prohibition here.

I’ll just remind you that Saadia Gaon, according to Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perla—I mentioned this—claims that it doesn’t matter at all how the Torah writes: whether in active language or passive language. The question is what the content of the commandment is. According to him, it is entirely possible that the affliction on Yom Kippur is only a prohibition. By forbidding me to eat, that is basically a prohibition. He doesn’t care that it is written in positive language, “and you shall afflict yourselves.” For him, it isn’t the form of the wording that determines things, but the content of the commandment—and we discussed the relation between content and formulation. Okay?

So now the Talmud brings two answers. Abaye said: actually, sukkah is the established law. So in sukkah, “the citizen” is only the scriptural support. And it was necessary, because you might have thought: “you shall dwell” means as you live—just as a dwelling includes a man and his wife, so too a sukkah includes a man and his wife. Therefore it comes to teach us otherwise. There would have been a thought to obligate women in sukkah, so that’s why you need a source that exempts them. In this context the question always comes up: after the source exempted them, are women exempt because this is a positive commandment dependent on time, or is this a special exemption? Meaning, does this interpretation come to say that the rule of positive commandments dependent on time applies here too, despite the fact that you might have thought otherwise—or not? Maybe that rule does not apply here, because “just as a dwelling includes a man and his wife, so too a sukkah includes a man and his wife”; here the exemption is different, not because this is a positive commandment dependent on time, but because of the established law. Fine. So there is room to hesitate about that. Maybe there are practical consequences—whether women need to recite a blessing over it, can recite a blessing over it, can women fulfill it at all? Maybe not? Maybe what is said about positive commandments dependent on time would not be said here? So there may even be practical consequences.

What about the scriptural support of sukkah? After all, there is also a scriptural support, right? The scriptural support is just that—a scriptural support. It doesn’t interest us. Once you say “established law,” the meaning is that the definite article is only a scriptural support. Fine. That the definite article is only a scriptural support. “The citizen.” The definite article that comes to exclude women is only a scriptural support, because there is already an established law that excludes them. So in sukkah it’s scriptural support, and on Yom Kippur it’s “man and woman.” Right. So in practice it comes out that in sukkah this is the scriptural support, and on Yom Kippur women’s obligation is really what is learned from “the citizen.” Sukkah is the established law—law and scriptural support. Therefore the verse, yes. And on Yom Kippur “the citizen” equates woman to man. Ah—but about that we still have to ask: wait, but don’t we already have “Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah”?

Rava said: it was necessary, because you might have thought to derive “fifteenth” “fifteenth” from the Festival of Matzot: just as there women are obligated, so too here women are obligated; therefore it comes to teach us. Okay? The difference between him and Abaye is only what the initial thought was for obligating women, but it doesn’t change the structure. It’s still scriptural support and established law.

Why are women obligated on the Festival of Matzot? They are obligated in eating matzah. They are obligated in the prohibition of eating leaven. Rashi writes: Rava said it was necessary—just as there women are obligated in eating matzah, even though matzah is a positive commandment dependent on time, because this is derived as Rabbi Elazar said: “You shall not eat leaven with it; for seven days you shall eat unleavened bread with it.” Whoever is included in “you shall not eat leaven” is included in the positive obligation “eat matzah.” And women are included in prohibitions, namely the eating of leaven.

Now here you have to notice carefully: the connection between leaven and matzah is not trivial. Because the commandment not to eat leaven is not a commandment to eat matzah, and the commandment to eat matzah is not a commandment not to eat leaven. In the ordinary understanding, on the rest of the holiday apart from the first night one can refrain from eating matzah entirely as long as one does not eat leaven. This is not a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment whereby anyone who eats leaven has thereby violated the positive commandment of eating matzah. So that means the commandment of eating matzah and the prohibition of eating leaven are not commandments overlapping in content; they are two distinct commandments. Now if these are two distinct commandments, why connect women’s obligation in the prohibition to the positive commandment? Fine, on the Sabbath—“remember” and “observe” were said in one utterance—there the positive commandment and the prohibition overlap in content; both are about not doing labor. One is phrased positively and the other negatively. So they tell me: whoever is included in “observe” is included in “remember.” But here these are two totally different commandments. It’s like what someone suggested earlier about resting on a Jewish holiday. Resting on a Jewish holiday has nothing to do with leaven. What? It’s written in the verse—leaven and eating matzah. Okay, so what this means is precisely why you need that juxtaposition in the verse linking leaven to matzah. Meaning, if there weren’t this juxtaposition, I would think women were exempt from the commandment of eating matzah because it is time-dependent. Ah, they are obligated in the prohibition of leaven, true—but so what? There is no overlap in content between the positive commandment of matzah and the prohibition of eating leaven. Therefore you need a source for it.

And if so, then once again you can derive nothing from here about the question I raised earlier: is there a general rule that when a prohibition and a positive commandment overlap in content, no special source is needed—that women are automatically obligated? Why? One might say: here you see there is no such rule, because in fact a special source is needed to obligate women in matzah. You remember I said that every time there is a source, it proves the opposite of what it says. If you need a source, that is a sign that ordinarily this is not the case. Okay—but here you cannot make that claim, because here the source is needed in any event, even if there were such a sweeping rule, since leaven and matzah do not overlap in content. So even if there were such a rule from “remember” and “observe” being spoken in one utterance, I would still exempt women from matzah were it not for this juxtaposition. Okay?

Now the Talmud asks—there may be one exception, I’ll just note, maybe if I get to it later. There is one exception in this context, and that is Nachmanides—whom I mentioned, though I no longer remember where—Nachmanides in Kiddushin 34 regarding the commandment of a parapet. Nachmanides claims that in the commandment of a parapet there is “you shall make a parapet for your roof” and “you shall not place blood in your house”—a positive commandment and a prohibition. He claims that the whole point of the prohibition there is to reinforce the positive commandment. That is basically his argument. Therefore the practical consequence is that if the positive commandment were time-dependent and women were exempt from the positive commandment, then they would also be exempt from the prohibition. So that is an example of a case where there is a prohibition and positive commandment overlapping in content, and yet women are exempt from both. Not only are they exempt from the positive commandment; they are exempt even from the prohibition.

There can be three situations. There can be a case where there is a prohibition and a positive commandment that overlap. If they do not overlap in content, then there is nothing to discuss unless there is a special source, as on Passover. But if they do overlap in content, there can be three situations. One possibility is that women are obligated in both, because since there is a prohibition they are obligated in, they also become obligated in the positive commandment. Another possibility is that they are obligated in the prohibition but exempt from the positive commandment because it is time-dependent, and there is no rule necessarily linking the prohibition to the positive commandment. And a third possibility is that they are exempt from both, because just as they are exempt from the positive commandment, they are exempt from the prohibition. The third case is Nachmanides’ novelty, and it is said only where the whole point of the prohibition is to reinforce the positive commandment. Then it is obvious that if I am not obligated in the positive commandment, there is no point in imposing a prohibition to make sure I fulfill the positive commandment—I don’t need to fulfill the positive commandment. So obviously I will be exempt from the prohibition as well.

If the situation is one where the prohibition and positive commandment are independent—not that one comes to reinforce the other—then we are left with the two possibilities that accompany us throughout: either there is a rule saying that once they overlap, women, just as they are obligated in the prohibition, are obligated in the positive commandment; or not, each is judged on its own. In the prohibition they are obligated, but in the positive commandment, if it is time-dependent, women are exempt. Will he not say this in every case of a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment? What? Won’t he say this—this novelty of Nachmanides—in every case of a prohibition overlapping a positive commandment? Every case where prohibition and positive commandment overlap, not a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment. An overlapping prohibition and positive commandment. “A prohibition inferred from a positive commandment” has nothing to do with here. Why? Because you’re saying— No. A prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is simply a regular positive commandment. There is no overlap between prohibition and positive commandment. The point is when there is an overlapping positive commandment and prohibition. And he doesn’t say it in every case where they overlap. For example, “observe” and “remember” in one utterance—we see that women are obligated. So there are situations in which clearly Nachmanides would not say this.

Has the Talmud up to now answered the question of the contradiction between “citizen” and “the citizen,” where one is inclusion and the other exclusion? It didn’t address that question, right? How is it resolved? Ah—for scriptural support. Now the question is which is the scriptural support and which is not. At first we thought that in sukkot that was the scriptural support and on Yom Kippur not. We still have a question to solve: but on Yom Kippur, why is this needed, since we already have “Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah”? Maybe one is inclusion and one is scriptural support. That’s what the Talmud says. It could be scriptural support and a derivation—the method of derivation, as it were. That’s a remark I made earlier, and I don’t know what to say about it.

So I’m saying that if the prohibition comes to support the positive commandment, like with parapet, then women might be exempt from both the prohibition and the positive commandment. This is an interesting point because—and I’m jumping ahead a bit, since I’m not sure I’ll get to it—what kind of prohibition and positive commandment would there be? There is no time-dependent commandment that is inevitable. I don’t know—who says? Why? I don’t know, you could say this about a Jewish holiday, you could say it about many things. I don’t know; you’d have to ask Nachmanides how he reads each such pair of commandments.

For example, look at Yom Kippur. Regarding Yom Kippur I already mentioned the question how it is permitted to feed minors. After all, there is a prohibition of directly causing a minor to consume forbidden food—we are supposed to get to that later in the lecture. There is a prohibition of directly feeding forbidden food to a minor. So how is it permitted to feed minors on Yom Kippur? Some say it is because of saving life. I said that’s rather dubious. I don’t need to feed him for saving life, certainly not beyond what he needs. What he needs, okay, saving life—but beyond that, why is it permitted for me to feed him? And the custom is that we do let them eat. Right, so therefore the issue of saving life is a rather dubious answer.

There is the Divrei Yechezkel—whom I mentioned—the Divrei Yechezkel wants to say, following this Nachmanides in Kiddushin, that on Yom Kippur too the prohibition supports the positive commandment. And altogether this sounds reasonable, since the positive commandment that is written in the Torah—what is actually written in the Torah regarding affliction—is only the positive commandment. The prohibition we somehow derive. So it is certainly possible that the Torah specifically wrote only the positive commandment, and did not write the prohibition explicitly, because the prohibition is not really essential; it only comes to support the positive commandment. Okay? Then accordingly he says that if so, since according to the Magen Avraham one may feed a minor where the violation is only of a positive commandment—he cites some Magen Avraham who says that with positive-commandment prohibitions, the prohibition of directly causing a minor to sin does not apply—if it is a positive-commandment violation, then on Yom Kippur, where in principle this is a positive-commandment prohibition and the prohibition only comes to support the positive commandment, therefore it is permitted to feed a minor directly.

But notice: according to this, it follows that women ought to be exempt from fasting on Yom Kippur. Since then this is a positive commandment dependent on time, which exempts them, and the prohibition, all it does is support the positive commandment—so in fact women ought to be exempt. Right? But that isn’t difficult. Because according to his approach, this is very logical, since in our case there is the inclusion from “the citizen” to include women. So actually, fine. The problem is that according to the Talmud it doesn’t work, because the Talmud itself raises this objection. The Talmud says: but Scripture already equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah. Why doesn’t it answer: that punishment comes to support the positive commandment, and if it comes to support the positive commandment then certainly it does not apply to women? It doesn’t answer that. Meaning, the conclusion is not difficult for him, but the course of the Talmudic argument is problematic according to his view. Fine, we’ll get to him.

Then the Talmud objects concerning Yom Kippur: Yom Kippur is derived from Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav. Right, that is the question left to us above. It is necessary only for the additional affliction. You might have thought: since the Merciful One excluded additional affliction from punishment and from warning, women were not obligated in it at all; therefore it comes to teach us otherwise. In short, this is about the addition—the additional period. I didn’t get into that; I only made a remark about it. The addition—which interpretation? Yom Kippur. No—but “the citizen,” which comes to include women, comes to include women regarding the additional affliction. Meaning, on Yom Kippur itself, on Yom Kippur itself, one really learns from Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, that Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah. So why do I need “the citizen,” which is not scriptural support but a real derivation on Yom Kippur? It is the scriptural support in sukkah, but on Yom Kippur it is a real derivation—I need it for the additional affliction. Okay? That is what the Talmud says.

Then it really comes out that on Yom Kippur women are obligated because of Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav. And that brings us back to the question: are they also obligated in the positive commandment, or only in the prohibition? And that will depend on the question whether there is a sweeping rule that whenever there is a prohibition and a positive commandment overlapping in content, women are automatically obligated in the positive commandment too—or not. On the Sabbath it says “remember” and “observe” in one utterance—that is a special derivation—but maybe there is no sweeping rule like that. Regarding affliction this is also an interesting question. The Talmud says that this is needed for the additional affliction. Right? Meaning, without “the citizen” I would think women are exempt from the additional affliction. Why? Because there is no punishment or prohibition there. Because there is no punishment or prohibition there. All of women’s obligation comes from Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, right? Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav says that Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah—but with the additional period, it was excluded from punishment and apparently also from the prohibition, and therefore there you cannot learn that women are obligated. Hence you need the inclusion from “the citizen.”

Now here is a very subtle point. Why? Because is the positive commandment of the additional period a separate positive commandment, or is it the same positive commandment of ordinary Yom Kippur? No, that’s exactly the idea—an extension, as it were, of Yom Kippur. Right, but if so, then that’s not correct—that’s what I thought. Seemingly this is difficult. Is the positive commandment in the additional period merely an extension of the positive commandment of Yom Kippur itself? Meaning, does it apply also to the additional period, not only to the actual day itself? So once women are obligated in that positive commandment because they were equated regarding all punishments in the Torah on the day itself, why should they not be obligated in it during the additional period as well? After all, it is the very same positive commandment.

It seems from here, simply speaking, that the additional period is a novel, independent positive commandment. What was excluded in the additional period is not the prohibition and the punishment; what was excluded in the additional period is all the Yom Kippur prohibitions. And there is a new novelty that there is a positive commandment regarding the addition, another positive commandment, and with respect to that positive commandment women are exempt because it is a positive commandment dependent on time. Right? That is how one would have to say it.

One could say, somewhat forcedly, though I don’t think too terribly, that even though this is a continuation of the positive commandment of the actual day, still the fact that we are obligated also in the additional period is not part of the parameters of the positive commandment; it is part of the parameters of the day. Meaning, there is an obligation on the person to add additional time onto Yom Kippur, and consequently the positive commandment applies there too. Maybe this obligation does not apply to women. Now, they are obligated in the positive commandment, but they are under no obligation to extend the positive commandment into the additional period, because that is not part of the definition of the positive commandment. The positive commandment speaks about Yom Kippur; only there is also a definition that men are obligated to add to Yom Kippur additional time, and consequently there will be there also a positive commandment, also a prohibition, also a punishment. The prohibition and punishment were excluded; only the positive commandment remains. Even if it is the positive commandment of the actual day itself—the same positive commandment, not another one. But for women, who were not obligated to add the additional period, there perhaps would not be the positive commandment there even though it is the same positive commandment. Because their Yom Kippur is different from men’s Yom Kippur—not the positive commandment. The positive commandment is the same positive commandment: when you have Yom Kippur, there is a positive commandment to afflict oneself. The question is when you have Yom Kippur. Men have Yom Kippur including the additional period; the initial thought would be that women do not—that they need not add. The Talmud says that they do.

Anyway, for our purposes, what comes out in the bottom line is that on Yom—now what does this imply regarding the rules where there is an overlapping positive commandment and prohibition? So they count both of them; Maimonides counts them. No, counting both is obvious, but I’m asking whether women are also obligated in the positive commandment. So we said that is not clear. We said it depends. “Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah”—here there is no juxtaposition between the prohibition and the positive commandment. No—who says? If there is a sweeping rule. On the Sabbath there is “observe” and “remember” in one utterance; perhaps that is a special source. Yes, it was said in one utterance, therefore they are obligated. But who says that whenever there is a prohibition and positive commandment with overlapping content, women are obligated in the positive commandment too? We said: only punishments—what about the positive commandment? Exactly, that is the question.

There are two possibilities. One possibility is to say indeed that women are not obligated in the positive commandment. In the positive commandment of Yom Kippur they are not obligated. They have the prohibition and karet, all true, but not the positive commandment. Fine? The second possibility is to say: no, there is such a rule, and here you must invoke the rule, that where they are obligated in the prohibition, they are also obligated in the positive commandment. But then you have to assume there is such a rule. It was not said specifically about the Sabbath or particular places, but as a general rule.

Regarding leaven and matzah on Passover, we already saw that this does not touch the issue at all, because there there is no overlap in content between the prohibition and the positive commandment. If women are obligated only in the prohibition and not the positive commandment, then what is the whole initial thought that they would be obligated in the positive commandment of the additional period? No additional derivation would be needed for the addition. Because if in the main positive commandment they are not obligated, then in its extension they would be obligated? So the Talmud’s assumption must be that they are obligated in the positive commandment. And what is the Talmud’s conclusion? No—what is the Talmud’s conclusion? Bringing a proof from the initial thought is always dangerous. What is the Talmud’s conclusion? The Talmud’s conclusion is that women are exempt. Women—sorry—that women are obligated. Obligated, and from the additional period they are exempt? No, they are obligated in the additional period. Sorry—that they are obligated in the additional period. There was an initial thought to exempt women from the positive commandment of the additional period. Right? And it was newly taught that they are obligated.

No, I didn’t make a mistake—it’s just trickier. No, I’m saying there are still the two possibilities, I think. Meaning, the initial thought was that women would be exempt from the additional period. Why indeed? Perhaps because they are exempt from the positive commandment of the day itself, and therefore they would also be exempt from the positive commandment of the additional period. Right? So seemingly, at least from the initial thought, it appears that women are in fact exempt—there is no positive commandment for them on Yom Kippur. In the initial thought, yes. Then it teaches us that they are obligated. What does that mean, that they are obligated? One of two things: either this is a new positive commandment, as we said earlier, or indeed “it teaches us” this very point, that women are obligated in the positive commandment too. The Talmud does not explain the initial thought; it does not say that it is because they are exempt from the positive commandment of the actual day. It says because there is no punishment or warning there. So what if there is no punishment or warning there? Why should they be exempt? What does that have to do with punishment and warning? What—women are never obligated in positive commandments? Women are not obligated in positive commandments? The Talmud says that because there is no punishment and no warning, therefore this is a positive commandment, and since it is a positive commandment, women are exempt because it is a positive commandment dependent on time. And the positive commandment of Yom Kippur itself, apparently women are exempt from that too, and therefore here too they would be exempt. It teaches us either that this is a new positive commandment in which women are obligated, although in the positive commandment of Yom Kippur itself they are still exempt—which is a bit strange. Although if it is a separate positive commandment, in principle yes, though I agree that is somewhat forced. The second possibility is that “it teaches us” this very thing, that they are obligated also in the positive commandment of Yom Kippur itself. No, in the additional period there is only a positive commandment. That they are obligated also in the positive commandment of Yom Kippur itself, and consequently the initial thought to exempt them from the additional period falls away. Fine, there it is only a positive commandment, okay, but they are obligated even in a positive commandment. Then you say that it is the same positive commandment, in both the additional period and Yom Kippur itself.

The first possibility seems to me very forced—to say that they are obligated only in the additional period but not in the positive commandment of the actual day itself. In the positive commandment of the additional period but not that of the actual day? I don’t know. Yes, I agree that’s forced. Not for nothing is it called an addition. If they are exempt from the positive commandment, then it is an addition to the day, not to the commandment. I said that earlier too. Okay, fine. So in short, we go with the second possibility. Then one can prove the rule: when the positive commandment and prohibition overlap, women are obligated. Right. Right. And on the assumption that if they are indeed obligated in the additional period, then assuming that the positive commandment of the additional period is not a newly created commandment—because that is indeed a bit forced—then it is a continuation of the positive commandment of Yom Kippur. And if they are obligated in it, then clearly on Yom Kippur itself they are also obligated. How do I know they are obligated? After all, Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav says: Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah. Here then there is a rule that says positive commandment and prohibition always go together. If there is a positive commandment and a prohibition, women are obligated in the positive commandment too, not only in the prohibition. Okay?

Now Rabbi Yerucham Perla, on positive commandments 54–55, says the following: behold, Maimonides of blessed memory and all who follow him counted with regard to the affliction of Yom Kippur day also a prohibition in the count of prohibitions, besides the positive commandment that they counted among the positive commandments. Maimonides in the Book of Commandments brought proof that the affliction of Yom Kippur contains a prohibition from the Mishnah at the beginning of tractate Karetot. We brought this, right? For there it counts all those liable to karet, and among them also one who eats on Yom Kippur. And at the end it says: but Passover and circumcision are positive commandments. From this it follows that all the others listed there contain a negative commandment. See there, right? We saw this. And Rashi also explained it this way there. But truly from that Mishnah there is no proof. The proof Maimonides brought is no proof. Why? Because one could say that when it says “Passover and circumcision are positive commandments,” it means only that they are fulfilled by positive action, not that they are positive commandments in the formal halakhic sense. Everything that is fulfilled by positive action has no karet on it except Passover and circumcision. And if so, then he says it may be that on Yom Kippur the karet is on the positive commandment, not on the prohibition.

And why didn’t the Talmud include Yom Kippur together with Passover and circumcision? Because on Yom Kippur you fulfill it by passive abstention, not by positive action. Therefore in that sense Yom Kippur is not exceptional. All prohibitions are fulfilled by passive abstention. So Yom Kippur is not exceptional. Passover and circumcision are exceptional because they are things fulfilled by positive action and violated by passive non-performance, and yet they still incur karet. Yom Kippur doesn’t enter that distinguished list. Therefore it was not brought there. But it could still be that on Yom Kippur the karet really comes on the positive commandment, not on the prohibition. And it could be that there is no prohibition at all? There is only the positive commandment of “and you shall afflict yourselves” on Yom Kippur, and on that karet was said. No prohibition at all? After all, in Karetot they are not necessarily counting prohibitions there, right? No. According to this, it comes out that in Karetot the Mishnah brings all the commandments, and not only prohibitions. He himself says this. Later he says it himself. The language of the Mishnah does imply negative commandments, and what he means to say is that “negative commandment” there means it is fulfilled by passive abstention, not that it is a formal prohibition in the halakhic sense.

Yes. But these words of Maimonides of blessed memory are certainly puzzling, and in any case there is no proof from that Mishnah there to say that eating on Yom Kippur contains a prohibition. You cannot bring proof that there is a prohibition in it, when the Torah itself contains no explicit prohibition. Although a bit of proof may be brought from the Talmudic passage in Makkot there, for according to what was initially assumed there, that the reason Passover and circumcision do not bring an offering is because they lack a prohibition-warning. This is the Talmud he brought earlier. If so, one who eats on Yom Kippur, whom the Mishnah there lists among those who do bring an offering, you must say that there is a prohibition in it. Otherwise, if those don’t have a prohibition, it implies that all the rest do have one. But besides the fact that this can be rejected, in any case from the Mishnah itself there is certainly no proof at all.

And I am even more puzzled why he needed that, for there is an explicit Mishnah that counts one who eats on Yom Kippur among those liable to lashes, and lashes certainly apply only to a prohibition. But our master the Gaon did not count this prohibition later in the list of prohibitions. And indeed he is not alone in this. Meaning, why is he making this whole move? Because according to Saadia Gaon, in his view there is no prohibition concerning fasting on Yom Kippur; there is only a positive commandment. And after all Maimonides brought what seemed to be a decisive proof that Yom Kippur is not listed among the positive commandments for which there is karet. According to Saadia Gaon this is a positive commandment that has karet attached to it. And to that he says: no, this is a positive commandment fulfilled by passive abstention, and that resembles a prohibition. Therefore it was not brought there. But in truth this is only a positive commandment. So it is not just a counting issue; it is really a matter of there being no prohibition in it according to Saadia Gaon, supposedly? Yes, yes. There is no prohibition. No actual prohibition. It’s not a matter of restraining; no, no—he says something like this is not a prohibition because all it tells me to do is something positive. The Talmud itself already said there is a refutation of Maimonides from those liable to lashes, because one who eats on Yom Kippur is counted among those liable to lashes. That is a conclusive proof for Maimonides. Right, right. He said that earlier. Fine. But still, what he brought—he said the proof is no proof.

Rather, according to what Nachmanides wrote in the name of the Bahag—that his opinion too is like Maimonides’, that one should not count punishments separately—and here he is discussing whether punishments are counted separately from warnings. I won’t get into all that now. Why is that relevant here? Why is that relevant here? A feeling of satiety is not eating, and yet that feeling of satiety does negate the affliction. The simple conception is that if you understand that the eating prohibition on Yom Kippur—and this is the topic we discussed last time—the eating prohibition on Yom Kippur differs from ordinary eating prohibitions, and the whole point of it is to ensure that you are afflicted, then even if you reach a state in which you are not afflicted—you feel satiated because of a pill—simply speaking, it seems that you violate it. As opposed to regular eating prohibitions, where you can consume any pills you like and it changes nothing. Fine. I’m sure not everyone will agree with that conclusion, but certainly there is room for it, based on what I said before.

One could say here that there is indeed a prohibition, only it is not counted. What practical difference does it make? No, that is more sensible. No, there is no relevance to the fact that there is a prohibition here. It’s like the Torah says twelve times to rest on the Sabbath. So is that twelve positive commandments that just are not counted, or is it one positive commandment? Fine. I’m asking. No, he would get lashed once—well, that’s clearer. What do you mean, once? Regarding counting? But someone who violated it—did he violate twelve positive commandments? Is this only a question of counting the commandments? What depends on what mode—what is this? Twelve times the Torah says to rest on the Sabbath. Would he get lashed only once? We’re not talking about lashes—he doesn’t get lashed at all; it’s stoning—but I’m asking whether he violated twelve positive commandments. Twelve times the Torah says there is a positive commandment to rest on the Sabbath. Is this only a matter of counting? Simply speaking, no. He didn’t violate twelve positive commandments. If that were so, for example concerning whether a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, you would have to enter all that into the calculations. It would be a much more complicated story. Simply speaking, this is a positive commandment and a prohibition. No, and Saadia Gaon says: I don’t care if it is formulated as positive commandment or prohibition; the content determines it. And if formulation isn’t dominant—if content determines it, not wording—then it isn’t a positive commandment and a prohibition; it is twice a prohibition. Sorry—twice a prohibition. Fine? Don’t eat. Fine. So then it is twice a prohibition, and therefore counted only once, just like the twelve times. Fine.

And if so, here where he counted it and we cannot say the practical difference is the prohibition—what practical difference does it make that there is a prohibition? Regarding women. Because due to the positive commandment alone they would not be obligated, since it is a positive commandment dependent on time. That is not so. For Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah, and here there is karet. What does he mean to say? Is he assuming that this is a prohibition? No, no, no. He says that according to Saadia Gaon there is karet on the positive commandment. The fact that it was not counted with circumcision and Passover has its explanations, but there is karet on the positive commandment. But Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, who says “Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah,” does not mean prohibitions; it really means, simply, all punishments in the Torah. Even if punishments come for a positive commandment, still that means women will be obligated. Then it turns out that we have here only a positive commandment without any prohibition, and women are obligated.

What will happen with the additional period, which was excluded from punishment? In the additional period, after all, it was excluded from punishment—there is no karet for the addition. Right? What happens there? Seemingly they would be exempt? So if that positive commandment is a continuation of the positive commandment of the actual day, simply speaking women would be obligated, just as on the actual day, because on the actual day there is also punishment. But if it is a novel positive commandment, then simply speaking they would be exempt. Fine. So that will depend on what we discussed earlier.

If he says there is only the positive commandment of affliction and whoever does not afflict himself gets karet, how does that fit with the Talmud about Passover and circumcision? He explained that earlier. Passover and circumcision, not Sabbath. Passover and circumcision are violated by passive non-performance; those are the only cases of karet like that. On Yom Kippur, although it too is a positive commandment, how do you violate that positive commandment? By an action. You get up and eat. So this is karet that comes for violating by positive action. Formally it is defined as a positive commandment, or nullifying a positive commandment, but the manner of violation is by positive action, and in that sense it is not exceptional. It is based on the manner of violation and not on the formal definition of whether this is a positive commandment or a prohibition—that is what he said earlier. Fine. And according to Saadia Gaon the whole claim is that beyond the manner of violation there is no such thing; that is what defines prohibition and positive commandment, not the wording. The Torah’s formulation is not what matters. I mentioned this too when I discussed the relation between prohibition and positive commandment. Okay.

Women are also obligated in the other afflictions. Regarding the Sabbath, what did he count—did he count a positive commandment or not? A big question regarding the Sabbath. With the Sabbath, simply speaking, this is difficult against Rabbi Yerucham Perla, because Saadia Gaon does count there a positive commandment. A positive commandment of resting without a prohibition. Right, and that does not exist in the other afflictions. So regarding the other afflictions we saw several views. According to the She’iltot and the Ran there is a prohibition there, even though there is no karet. According to Maimonides there is only a positive commandment, no prohibition. And according to the Ran it is entirely rabbinic. Okay?

What will happen regarding women? If it is rabbinic, then it will depend on the question what the law is for rabbinic commandments dependent on time. Are women obligated or exempt? Simply speaking this is a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot. Regarding the four cups and other things, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says that women are obligated because they too were part of that miracle. So Tosafot asks: why do we need to arrive at “they too were part of that miracle”? They should already be obligated because it is rabbinic, even without that. We see that women are exempt even from rabbinic commandments unless there is some rationale like “they too were part of that miracle.” And this is against Rashi. Tosafot raises an objection to Rashi. It seems they disagree on the question of what happens with rabbinic commandments dependent on time.

Some explain that according to Tosafot this is because ultimately the force of a rabbinic law comes from “you shall not deviate,” so in the end it is a prohibition. It is always a prohibition. Even if it is a rabbinic positive commandment, its halakhic force is really the force of a prohibition, and therefore women are obligated in all rabbinic commandments, whether positive or negative. And perhaps Rashi follows Nachmanides, who does not base rabbinic authority on “you shall not deviate.” Some later authorities want to say this or that. In any case, if it is rabbinic, then it will depend on the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot.

From here it is clear in the Talmud that women are obligated in all the afflictions as well. So seemingly it follows from here that women are obligated also in rabbinic positive commandments dependent on time, right? Unless we say that once again this is dragged after the Torah-level obligation; since at the Torah level they are obligated, it could be that this follows after the Torah law. According to Maimonides they are only in the positive commandment—again the question arises: after all “Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah.” Now if this has only a positive commandment, then in that positive commandment there is no karet, no punishment and no prohibition, so women should be exempt from the other afflictions. But in the Talmud we saw the bride and so on, and the pregnant woman, that women are obligated also in the other afflictions. So one has to say that because they are obligated in the prohibition, they are therefore also obligated in the positive commandment on Yom Kippur itself. And since they are obligated in the prohibition, they are obligated in the positive commandment, and that same positive commandment—and only that positive commandment—also applies to the other afflictions. Therefore women will be obligated in the other afflictions as well, because they were already obligated in that positive commandment by force of the prohibition. Even though with those afflictions themselves there is only a positive commandment without a prohibition.

According to the She’iltot and the Ran, who hold that there is also a prohibition, then it is altogether simple. Even though there is no punishment. But still, if “Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah,” there is no punishment here. There is a prohibition—so what? But according to Rabbi Yerucham Perla, what determines things is only the punishment. No, according to Rabbi Yerucham Perla what determines things is only the punishment. Therefore each matter stands on its own, but the principle in Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav speaks only about punishments, not prohibitions, according to Saadia Gaon—that is, according to Rabbi Yerucham Perla’s reading of Saadia Gaon. Okay? If so, there is room to hesitate there too. Okay, so that is regarding women in the other afflictions.

Now I just want to finish this section—it took me a bit of time. So in the end what is the conclusion? Is there indeed such a rule saying that if a positive commandment and a prohibition overlap, women who are obligated in the prohibition are also obligated in the positive commandment? Such a sweeping rule? The accepted approach among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) is yes. But it is not completely agreed. There is Tosafot on page 34 in Kiddushin. The Talmud there brings a list of commandments that are not time-dependent: parapet, returning a lost object, and sending away the mother bird. Fine? The medieval authorities there wonder: why are these examples brought? In all those examples, besides the positive commandment there is also a prohibition. So even if they were time-dependent, women would not be exempt—and about this there is the Nachmanides I cited earlier.

So Tosafot says: Rabbi is puzzled, for in all of these there is a prohibition written. Regarding parapet it says “you shall not place blood in your house,” and even though we established that this applies to raising a dangerous dog or maintaining an unsafe ladder and so forth, in any event it also applies to a parapet. And regarding lost property as well it says “you may not ignore it,” and regarding sending away the mother bird, “you shall not take the mother with the young.” If so, how would women be exempt even if these were time-dependent? After all, Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah. So why are these examples brought there in the Talmud as examples of positive commandments not dependent on time? Even if they had been time-dependent, women would be obligated.

And he says: because in all of them one can find cases where there is the positive commandment without the prohibition. There is no overlap in content. There are situations in which there would be only the positive commandment and not the prohibition. I’ll pause here—what does that mean? It means that if there is no overlap in content, there is no connection between them. But if there is—like we saw in leaven and matzah—but if there is overlap in content, what does Tosafot assume? That there is a sweeping rule, obviously: anyone obligated in the prohibition is also obligated in the positive commandment. So here in Tosafot we already see clearly for our purposes: “man or woman,” “for all punishments in the Torah,” is said about the prohibition. I asked: what happens with the positive commandment of Yom Kippur? From this Tosafot it follows: it applies to the positive commandment too. Anywhere there is also a prohibition, this also applies to the positive commandment.

Then he brings practical differences—where there is only a positive commandment without a prohibition. And some explain that there is still a practical difference if a woman comes to fulfill a positive commandment, because one might have thought that women are exempt from a positive commandment dependent on time, and therefore would likewise be exempt from the prohibitions as well, since one might say that the positive commandment would override the prohibition. But when they are obligated in a positive commandment not dependent on time, then another positive commandment would not come and override it, because a positive commandment does not override both a prohibition and a positive commandment together.

What is he saying? When there is an overlapping positive commandment and prohibition, okay—he says, what practical difference does it make whether it is time-dependent or not? If it is time-dependent, women may be exempt from the positive commandment, but they are still obligated in the prohibition, so what difference does it make? There is a practical difference. What happens if another positive commandment wants to override these positive and negative commandments? Now women are obligated only in the prohibition, not in the positive commandment. So another positive commandment would override it, because a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. A positive commandment does not override a prohibition and positive commandment together. But if women are obligated only in the prohibition, and there is a positive commandment that wants to override it, then the positive commandment overrides it.

What does he assume in this answer? That they are not linked, right? Meaning that if there is an overlapping prohibition and positive commandment, women are obligated in the prohibition but not in the positive commandment. Therefore, if it is time-dependent—if the positive commandment is time-dependent—women would be obligated in the prohibition but still exempt from the positive commandment, and the practical difference is that another positive commandment would override it. So here we have a position among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) that does not see this as a sweeping rule, that whenever there is an overlapping positive commandment and prohibition, women are automatically obligated in the positive commandment too.

Rabbeinu Yosef of the Land of Israel objects to this explanation. For if so, regarding “one may not light with burning oil on a Jewish holiday”—that is, impure priestly oil that must be burned, and there is a positive commandment to burn it—but on a Jewish holiday there is a positive commandment and a prohibition of resting. So a positive commandment does not override a prohibition and a positive commandment. There is no stoning there; on the Sabbath you don’t need a positive commandment and prohibition because there is stoning, but on a Jewish holiday it is a regular prohibition. Yet there is a positive commandment and a prohibition. So a positive commandment does not override both. What happens with women? But the positive commandment there is time-dependent—don’t we see that? What? Rather, a woman is not obligated in the positive commandment of the holiday because it is time-dependent—so could she then light with burning oil on a Jewish holiday? Meaning there is a commandment to burn this impure priestly oil, and opposing it there is only the prohibition, because the positive commandment of the holiday is time-dependent. So seemingly she ought to burn the oil on the holiday. And if you say indeed so—why then did no tanna happen to tell us this? Rather, what you must say is that a positive commandment that has a prohibition along with it—even though the positive commandment is stronger and therefore not overridden—here too the prohibition is stronger. Therefore he says apparently what these interpreters say is not reasonable, and he rejects it.

But notice how he rejects it. He does not say that the positive commandment remains in force. He says that a prohibition which has a positive commandment alongside it—the prohibition itself is stronger, and another positive commandment would not override it even though there is no positive commandment there for the woman. Meaning, even in his rejection he remains with the idea that where there is an overlapping positive commandment and prohibition, women are exempt from the positive commandment. There is no sweeping rule, as those “some explain” had proposed. In that sense, Tosafot too accepts this. He only says that because there is a positive commandment alongside it, the prohibition itself becomes stronger, and because it is stronger another positive commandment does not override it. As a matter of the laws of overriding, he says. Right? So here we have a position among the medieval authorities—or positions—those “some explain,” and then Tosafot himself, that there is no such rule connecting an overlapping positive commandment and prohibition.

And the Ritva likewise really says that where there is a prohibition and a positive commandment, the positive commandment drops out—meaning women are not obligated in that positive commandment. Then according to this, it could indeed be that with the positive commandment of Yom Kippur, women are exempt. If the source is not from the added positive commandment, then on Yom Kippur itself women would be exempt from the positive commandment, because there we do not have “observe” and “remember” in one utterance. “Observe” and “remember” in one utterance is a special derivation that on the Sabbath, since “observe” and “remember” were said in one utterance, women are obligated in the positive commandment too. But there is no sweeping rule like that. For example, on a Jewish holiday, where it was not said, then no—they are exempt from the positive commandment. Also on Yom Kippur, simply speaking, they would be exempt from the positive commandment. Then they are obligated only in the prohibition and not in the positive commandment. And there is karet on them, but that is severe, so therefore it would not be overridden by another positive commandment; in any case it contains karet, so another positive commandment would not override it.

Would women not be obligated? That raises an interesting question: what happens with the other afflictions? After all, seemingly with the other afflictions, according to the views that there is no prohibition—if there are views that there is a prohibition then there is no problem—but according to the views that there is no prohibition, only a positive commandment, this is really a Torah-level problem. So those views that appear here in Tosafot presumably will not fit with the view of Maimonides that regarding the other afflictions there is only a positive commandment. Fine? Because otherwise it is indeed difficult. Thank you.

So that is regarding this rule: when there is an overlapping positive commandment and prohibition, are women obligated in the positive commandment too? Just one note. What does it mean that when the prohibition exists, the positive commandment also makes the prohibition stronger and less able to be overridden? What is the sense of that? In other words, why does the positive commandment strengthen the prohibition? Look, one could say the following. Why are women exempt from positive commandments dependent on time? The reason of the verse, in the simple sense—we are not supposed to use the reasons of Scripture in order to interpret the laws—but the Abudraham nevertheless writes that women are exempt so as to free up time for them or something like that. The principle is that there is no essential exemption here.

Now, if in fact women are obligated in the prohibition, then there is no reason to exempt them also from the positive commandment. Because the positive commandment in any event will not free up time for them, since on the side of the prohibition they will have to be occupied with it anyway. Consequently, in such a case they should not be exempt from the positive commandment either. But that is not what Tosafot says. Tosafot says they are exempt from the positive commandment; only the prohibition is stronger. According to what I suggested here, the claim would be that once there is a prohibition and positive commandment, even if the positive commandment is time-dependent, the positive commandment itself does not lapse, because there is no reason to exempt the women—they are in any case… right. It is like I mentioned the Rogatchover, remember, about cooking on a Jewish holiday that falls on the Sabbath, in responsum 2. What happens if someone cooked on a Jewish holiday that falls on the Sabbath? He claims it could be that he also violated cooking on the holiday. He also violated cooking on the holiday, not only cooking on the Sabbath. Why? Because the whole permission to cook on a Jewish holiday is because of food preparation. But on the Sabbath, in any event, you can’t cook because of the laws of the Sabbath. So there is also no reason to permit the holiday prohibition for that. Why permit something that won’t help you anyway? Of course, the assumption is that this is suspension, not full permission. They suspend it for you for food preparation. If it won’t help you anyway, why suspend it? If it is fully permitted, as Nachmanides says—“occupational labor,” but not labor for food preparation—then fine, it’s not relevant.

So is the exemption of women really just a kind of suspension? What? So I’m saying, if indeed according to the Abudraham, it is only that I suspend it because they need the time or something like that—but this is a suspension. In principle they too should have had to fulfill it. Once there is a prohibition, and regarding the prohibition they are obligated anyway, then they won’t have that free time in any case. So why suspend the positive commandment? Okay? One could explain it that way. But it does not seem that way in Tosafot. Tosafot says the positive commandment truly does not apply, only the prohibition is stronger. And the positive commandment does not apply.

Fine. Now I want to move on to minors. We’ll see how much we manage to cover. Regarding minors there are basically three relevant laws, and it is worth paying attention to them. Not everyone is aware of this. What? Minors? Age thirteen—when? Yes, and two pubic hairs, whatever. The parameters of minority. Even though we learned there in the Mishnah in Sukkah that a minor who no longer depends on his mother is obligated in sukkah? No? Yes, in the Mishnah in Sukkah. We’ll get there in a moment. That is by the law of education. And that’s very unusual, no? And that is by the law of education. The Talmud there says that. We’ll see in a moment. The Talmud itself raises the question.

But in Maimonides there are three states, I think, on Yom Kippur. In Maimonides there is, as it were, a minor who has not yet reached the stage for education by hours and this and that. That’s in the Talmud, not Maimonides. Yes, but Maimonides distinguishes there that there is a difference in the type of obligation. There are minors for whom the father is obligated—that is an obligation on the father to do this. There is an intermediate stage where the person is obligated… I’m going to get to that in a moment.

The laws of minors in Jewish law generally divide into three. There is the law of education. From the moment the minor reaches the age of education, one must educate him in the commandments. That is a rabbinic law. The law of education is explicit in the Talmud as only rabbinic, not a Torah obligation. The second law is the law of directly causing a minor to consume forbidden things. That is the passage in Yevamot 113–114. When I directly feed or give a minor a forbidden thing, I violate a Torah prohibition. According to most views it is Torah-level. There is Terumat HaDeshen who apparently says it is rabbinic, but according to most views it is Torah-level. And this applies to every minor, whether he has reached the age of education or not. Every minor. They derive it from creeping creatures and blood and so forth.

The third law is: if a minor eats carcasses, the religious court is not commanded to separate him. But here the practical Jewish law follows that the religious court is not commanded to separate him. Meaning, if a minor commits a transgression on his own initiative, I am not obligated to stop him. Fine? And the medieval authorities say: okay, if I am his father and he has reached the age of education, then by the law of education I will have to stop him. But there is a dispute in the Talmud whether there is an obligation on everyone, at any age, to stop a minor from transgressing. That would be an extension of the prohibition of directly causing him to sin—not only is it forbidden to feed it to him directly, I would also have to separate him. That extension is ruled in practical Jewish law not to exist. Fine? So for our purposes we are left with basically two laws: the law of education and the law of directly causing a minor to consume a prohibition. Okay?

Now let’s start with the Mishnah. The Mishnah in Sukkah that we saw: women, slaves, and minors are exempt from sukkah; a minor who no longer needs his mother is obligated in sukkah. The Talmud asks: the Master said “all” includes minors—but didn’t we learn that women, slaves, and minors are exempt from sukkah? So how can you tell me that a minor who no longer needs his mother is obligated in sukkah? It is not difficult: here it refers to a minor who has reached the age of education; there it refers to a minor who has not reached the age of education. The Talmud asks: a minor who has reached the age of education—isn’t that only rabbinic? Here the Talmud says explicitly that the law of education is rabbinic. This appears also on page 3 in Sukkah; we’ll see it in a moment. It is rabbinic, and the verse is only a mere scriptural support. Here that is scriptural support in the other sense: it is a rabbinic law that they attached to the verse, but really “all” to include minors is only a scriptural support. It is not truly the source; it is a rabbinic law.

So here we see, first, that minors are not obligated in commandments; second, that minors become obligated by the law of education once they reach the age of education; and this obligation is a rabbinic obligation. And according to this, the obligation is on the father—or on the minor—it isn’t clear. Right. Okay, so far we haven’t said anything about that.

Now the Talmud asks: what is meant by “a minor who no longer needs his mother”? The school of Rabbi Yannai said: any child who relieves himself and his mother does not need to wipe him. Or there are various criteria: any child who wakes from sleep and does not call “Mommy, Mommy.” Adults also call out! Rather, any child who wakes and does not call “Mommy, Mommy.” Twice “Mommy, Mommy,” or is once enough? Twice apparently. That’s what it says; it says it twice. In short, there is some age. Some want to claim this is a universal age; that sounds very strange to me. Simply speaking, it appears from the Talmud—and so some of the medieval authorities say—that every child at some point reaches that stage, and each commandment is judged according to its nature. Meaning, for every commandment you have to check whether the child’s understanding is already sufficient or not, and therefore there is no universal age of education for all commandments and all children. Each thing on its own; that is the simple explanation. There are views that disagree.

What about a boy versus a girl? Simply speaking, like this—though I’ll make a remark about that in a moment. The Talmud in Nazir says that for a girl there is no law of education. Sukkah page 3b, end of 2b into 3a. Rav Yehuda said: there was an incident with Queen Helena in Lod, whose sukkah was higher than twenty cubits, and the elders would enter and leave there and said nothing to her. The discussion there is the height of a valid sukkah. So we see that her sukkah was more than twenty cubits high and they said nothing to her—apparently a sukkah above twenty cubits is valid. They said to him: is that a proof? She was a woman and exempt from sukkah. She can sit even without a sukkah; she is exempt from sukkah, so they said nothing to her. He said to them: but she had seven sons, and moreover she did nothing except in accordance with the sages.

Why did it need to say additionally “and moreover she did nothing except in accordance with the sages”? This is what he was saying to them: if you will say that they were minor sons, and minors are exempt from sukkah—since there were seven, it is impossible that not even one of them had reached the stage of not needing his mother. Seven sons—so the oldest among them must already have reached that stage, which is the age of education. And if you say that a minor who no longer needs his mother is only rabbinically obligated—again, the law of education is rabbinic; again the Talmud says it. And if she would not heed rabbinic laws? Come and hear: “and moreover she did nothing except in accordance with the sages.” Okay, so this indeed is the law of education.

Now in Kehillot Yaakov—I won’t get into this here; I’ll upload it to WhatsApp if you want—siman 2 in Sukkah on this Talmudic passage. He brings the Tosafot Yeshanim, which maybe we’ll still get to later. He wants to claim there is a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot over how to understand the law of education. Is the law of education a law on the father to educate his son—or on the parents, or on the father, we’ll discuss that later—to educate his son so that he will know what to do when he is grown? Or is the law of education a rabbinic obligation on the minor himself in the commandments?

How does he understand it? Where does he understand it from? Who is “he”? The minor—how does he understand that he needs to be educated? You teach him. You tell him: you are rabbinically obligated in commandments. How do I understand that I need to perform commandments on the Torah level? Someone told me. So the same with the minor—they will tell him. Minors still do what they are told; adults don’t do what they are told.

Kehillot Yaakov basically claims this on one side. On the other hand he says Tosafot holds that the obligation is on the minor himself. He asks against Tosafot: there is a Talmud in Nazir. The Talmud there discusses whether the obligation is on the father or also on the mother. It says it is only on the father, and with a child it is only for a boy and not for a girl. Now, if the obligation is on the child himself, what is the relevance of discussing whether the obligation is on the father or the mother? It is on neither father nor mother. In halakhic terms, it’s not with father and not with mother; I went with the group of friends, as the old comedy troupe says, right? So why discuss the father and the mother? Clearly there is an obligation on the parents. So how can Tosafot say that the law of education is an obligation on the minor himself?

So he wants to claim that according to Tosafot there are obviously two laws of education. One law of education is on the minor himself; a second law of education is on the parents to educate him in the commandments. I wanted to suggest in several places that the two laws can be combined—that these are not just two separate laws. Where did these two laws suddenly come from? There are two sides of the same coin here. What does that mean? The minor is rabbinically obligated in commandments. But why is a minor exempt from Torah-level commandments? Because he lacks understanding. What does it mean he lacks understanding? Is he stupid? No—there are very smart children. He lacks responsibility, right? We do not impose responsibility on minors. Also in ordinary life we do not impose responsibility—that is the point of a minor. A minor is not someone stupid; a minor is someone not yet mature, someone without responsibility. So what does this mean? That even if he is obligated in commandments, you cannot impose responsibility on him to fulfill them because, fine, even if he is obligated, who says he will keep them? Earlier I said minors do what they are told—apparently not always. Okay? They do not bear responsibility; they also do not understand the significance of the matter.

Maimonides writes that one does not administer an oath to a minor because he does not know the punishment for an oath. It follows that the punishment for an oath does pertain to him. Meaning, he belongs in the sphere of prohibition; he just doesn’t understand. So there is no point in making him swear, because the whole point of an oath is that it is something intimidating—he will fear to lie under oath—and if he does not understand, then it won’t intimidate him. The oath has no moral force. Okay? So the claim is basically that minors are exempt because they do not have responsibility. For exactly that reason, responsibility is imposed on the adults. That is not two laws; it is the same principle. The obligation is on the minor; the responsibility to ensure that he fulfills that obligation is on the adults. Fine?

This will probably depend on the question of what the term “education” means. What is “education”? In Hebrew, you know, “education” has two meanings. Maybe connected, but still two meanings. In the more common sense, education means to accustom someone or teach someone for the future. But what is the “dedication of the altar,” for example? A beginning. The beginning of the altar’s service—that is the dedication of the altar, the first service. To dedicate something means to use it for the first time. That is called dedicating it. The law of education in this sense does not point to the future at all. The minor begins his commandment-observance while still a minor; that is the law of education. Meaning, the beginning of his commandment-observance is while he is still a child, not when he becomes an adult. Fine? Rabbinically—but the rabbis imposed a law of education, not “education” in our modern sense, meaning to train him and teach him so that he knows what to do when grown, but to impose on him himself a rabbinic obligation to perform the commandments now. Meaning, the dedication of the person takes place while he is still a child. The beginning of his commandment-observance is while he is still a child. It is not for the needs of his future adulthood.

I told the story in one of the previous lectures about the Ktav Sofer, right? His father sent him to eat on Yom Kippur and asked him whether he had recited kiddush. He said: I didn’t recite kiddush, because all my need to recite kiddush is only by the law of education so that I know what I’ll do when I’m an adult. But when I’m an adult I won’t be eating, so why should I recite kiddush? Now that is according to Rashi’s conception. But according to Tosafot that is incorrect, because according to Tosafot he himself has an obligation to perform commandments, and simply speaking that is not dependent on what will happen when he grows up, and according to Tosafot he should have recited kiddush. Okay? So that is basically the claim.

I brought several examples for this. Maybe one example is the commandment of Hakhel. The Sefer HaChinukh writes that anyone who did not come to Jerusalem for the commandment of Hakhel has nullified that positive commandment. But if most of the public came to Jerusalem, then the commandment of Hakhel is fulfilled, and whoever did not come nullified the positive commandment. Now simply speaking, that positive commandment is a commandment on the public. And not only is it on the public, but because it is imposed on the public, women are also obligated in it. Even though it is time-dependent, the Talmud in Kiddushin says that although it is time-dependent, women are obligated in Hakhel. Why? I think the intent is—and you see this very clearly in the language of the Sefer HaChinukh—because the obligation is not imposed on an individual. The exemption of women applies to an obligation imposed on an individual person. Each individual has to ask whether he or she is obligated or exempt. In positive commandments dependent on time, women are exempt when standing on their own. Men are obligated, women exempt. But if the obligation is on the public, then everyone included in the public is obligated in it. Since the commandment of Hakhel is a public commandment, although it is time-dependent, women are obligated because they are part of the public. Okay?

Now if that is indeed the case, then perhaps one can understand this strange phenomenon that appears there in the Sefer HaChinukh: he says that once most of Israel arrived in Jerusalem, the commandment was fulfilled, but whoever did not come nullified the positive commandment. How can it be that the commandment is fulfilled and at the same time someone nullifies it? Make up your mind. If the one commanded in this commandment is the public, and the majority of the public arriving in Jerusalem counts as the public being there and fulfilling the commandment, then the public fulfilled it—so what’s the problem? And if the commandment is on each individual separately, then what difference does it make whether it is the majority of the public or not? Let each person who came perform it, and whoever did not come nullified the positive commandment. How are you dancing at two weddings at once?

The answer I suggested is that the obligation is imposed on the public. But you can’t—there’s no responsibility on a public. “A pot owned by partners is neither hot nor cold.” Right, impose an obligation on the public and that is the guaranteed way to make sure nothing happens. Everyone will say: let the public do it—what’s that got to do with me? It’s not convenient for me now. What does that mean? You have to impose personal responsibility. Every one of the individuals in the public has to do what he can so that the public fulfills its obligation. That means the fulfillment of the commandment is by the public. But the responsibility that the commandment be fulfilled lies on the individuals. And the novelty with public commandments is that when someone does not fulfill his responsibility, even though the commandment was fulfilled by the public, he has nullified a positive commandment. There can be a nullification of a positive commandment by an individual even though the one commanded in that positive commandment is the public.

I brought this as a way of resolving contradictions in the Mishnah Berurah regarding Torah reading. There they discuss whether Torah reading is an obligation on the public or an obligation on individuals. Right? Now what practical difference do they bring? If it is an obligation on the public, then if there are ten men in the synagogue, I can leave. Let the public read the Torah—what’s that got to do with me? The Mishnah Berurah says it is an obligation on the public; therefore in a prison one need not bring a Torah scroll in—never mind the details. But still, it is forbidden to leave. And why is it forbidden to leave? If it is an obligation on the public, let there be ten and let them read—what’s that got to do with me? The point is: no, it is true that the obligation is on the public, but if everyone leaves, then the public won’t read either. Jewish law imposes responsibility on each individual within the public to do what he needs to do so that the public can fulfill its obligation. And with Torah-level commandments, this goes so far that if that individual does not do what he should, he has nullified a positive commandment.

Fine? That means that also regarding the law of education, the two sides of Kehillot Yaakov are two sides of the same coin. The minor is rabbinically obligated in commandments, but he has no responsibility. So the responsibility is placed on the parents. Exactly like the obligation of the public, where responsibility is placed on the individuals. Meaning, it is not always the case that the one commanded in the commandment and the one who fulfills it are… what? Of the blessing? Like praise. Yes—although in Jewish law, minors have damaging hands, so to speak. One does not have to pay for the damages caused by children. But the claim is that sometimes Jewish law separates between who is commanded in a commandment and fulfills it, and who is responsible for making sure it gets done. When? In places where the one commanded cannot bear responsibility—publics, or minors, or something like that.

People always say that in reserve duty, when everyone gathers together, they all behave like children, right? We revert to being children. A public is children. Whenever we gather, we behave like children—that’s just how it is. A public has no responsibility. It’s the same phenomenon; it’s not a joke. A public has no responsibility. We become children again when we are in a public. That’s how it is. In any case, that is the point for our purposes.

Now, in the context of Yom Kippur—I’m already skipping ahead, and I’ll upload this to WhatsApp—read it there. In the context of Yom Kippur it turns out that apparently there are these two aspects you mentioned earlier in the name of Maimonides. There is education for hours, and there is completing the full fast. From certain ages there is education for hours, and from age eleven or twelve one already starts fasting a full day. In Maimonides’ language, and in other places too—Rabbeinu Manoach there and others—you can see these are different obligations. The obligation to complete the fast is basically a rabbinic obligation on the minor himself to fast. The obligation to fast by hours—the commandment itself is not fulfilled by that, and the commandment under the law of education, this is in the Ritva cited in Sha’ar HaTziyun regarding lulav: is one allowed to educate a minor with an invalid lulav? Invalid. Fine, let’s say you can’t tell that it’s invalid, because if you can tell, then you’re not educating him correctly—you have to teach him how to do it properly. In the end it’s complicated, but yes, exactly. If you take something whose invalidity is not visible, is that allowed? Seemingly if this is only to accustom the minor and teach him, there should be no problem at all. The Ritva says no, and Sha’ar HaTziyun brings this as practical Jewish law. Why? I think the simple conception is because there is an aspect of the commandment of education in which you have to fulfill the commandment itself on the rabbinic level—you have to fulfill the commandment itself, so it has to be a valid lulav.

There is another aspect: the father has to make sure that you fulfill the commandment, and perhaps also educate you from the age of education. If he doesn’t know, the father has fulfilled the commandment. So the father fulfilled the commandment, but he didn’t fulfill the law of education. A practical difference would be, for example, if there is no valid lulav, then give him an invalid lulav. Even though it says not to bring an invalid lulav, if there is no alternative, at least you gain the learning even if you do not gain the actual rabbinic fulfillment of the commandment.

Now also on Yom Kippur my claim is that there are two kinds of obligations. When he completes the fast—at age eleven or twelve, when he completes the day—then he fasts rabbinically. He is rabbinically obligated to fast. This is not mere training for when he becomes an adult. Therefore this also has to be done properly—a full day, as required. When you fast him only by hours, the commandment itself has not been fulfilled, because fasting by hours is not enough—it is like an invalid lulav. So what is the point of training a child to fast by hours? The claim is yes—the point is that there is in this the dimension of accustoming him, teaching him, for the stage when he becomes an adult. And that law also exists. Therefore the law of education before age eleven and after age eleven are really just two different laws of education, the same two laws we also find in Tosafot.

And the other—look in Maimonides, because in Maimonides’ wording, certainly, here and there, there is—there are—two systems.