Topics in Talmudic Logic, Lecture 16

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A plain-sense interpretation. Wait, one second. I’m sharing now, I’m sharing now the second principle, which we already read once, just so we can see one passage. “And all of them are undoubtedly rabbinic, yet they counted them among the commandments, even though the plain sense of the verse does not indicate any of those matters.” What is he actually saying here? What the plain meaning of Scripture indicates—how can you count that as Torah-level Jewish law among the commandments? It’s rabbinic. You see, that’s the criterion: what the plain meaning of Scripture indicates. If not, it’s rabbinic. Now let’s see his conception. He states explicitly the conception that leads him to this. “And perhaps you might think that I refrain from counting them because they are not true, and that the law derived through that hermeneutic principle is either true or not true.” Meaning, maybe you think I don’t count the Jewish laws that emerge from exegetical derivations because they aren’t true. That I don’t believe in these derivations, that I don’t trust the tools of derash. Maimonides says: that is not the reason. That’s not why I don’t count them. “Rather, the reason is that whatever a person derives are branches from the roots that were told to Moses at Sinai in explanation, and they are the 613 commandments. And even if Moses himself had derived them, it would not be proper to count them.” What is he saying? He says that what a person derives from the verses by means of the tools of derash are branches from the roots that were told to Moses at Sinai in explanation. What is this metaphor of branches from roots? The 613 commandments are the roots. What are the branches? The branches, as he defines them here, are the things we derive from the verses using the tools of derash. Why are these branches? Branches that come out of roots—actually, the opposite, we uncovered more roots here. “Branches that come out of the roots” means expansions, right? The trunk spreads out and grows branches. Okay? This metaphor basically tells us that Maimonides sees the commandments, the 613 counted commandments, the Torah-level laws, as roots, and what emerges from derivation as branches that expand the root. That is exactly the metaphor underlying Maimonides’ entire approach. Maimonides basically claims that the tools of derash are tools that expand what is written in the Torah and do not expose what is inside it; they are tools of expansion, not tools of disclosure. And Maimonides really does write—look here in the passage I read earlier, I’m marking the passage again now, look. “And they reached, in these matters”—this is the Halakhot Gedolot—“errors even harsher than this, namely, that when they found a derivation in a verse from which they concluded that one must perform some act or avoid some matter, and all of them are undoubtedly rabbinic, they counted them among the commandments.” The Halakhot Gedolot counts things even though it is clear that they are rabbinic; he includes them in the count of commandments. “Even though the plain sense of the verse,” what I read earlier, “does not indicate any of those matters.” Even though the plain meaning of Scripture does not indicate this—how can you count it as Torah-level law? Since when do we identify the plain meaning of Scripture with Torah-level law? What does that have to do with anything? Maimonides identifies them. The plain meaning of Scripture is Torah-level law; the exegetical meaning of Scripture is not Torah-level law. Why? Because the plain meaning of Scripture, which is Torah-level, is the roots; and its derash is the branches, those are the expansions. What is written in the Torah is Torah-level law; what I expand beyond what is written in the Torah is rabbinic. Now look how he continues. “With the principle that, peace be upon them, they taught us, namely their saying of blessed memory: ‘A verse never departs from its plain meaning,’ and the Talmud asks everywhere, ‘What is the verse itself speaking about?’ When they found a verse, they would learn many things from it by way of explanation and proof.” What does that mean? Maimonides says: I have proof against the Halakhot Gedolot, because it says, “A verse never departs from its plain meaning.” So you see that Scripture is only its plain meaning—why are you bringing in derash as well? “A verse never departs from its plain meaning.” Do you know how people usually understand “a verse never departs from its plain meaning”? Nachmanides attacks Maimonides here on exactly this point. The expression “a verse never departs from its plain meaning,” in its simple sense, means the opposite of what Maimonides says. It means that when you make a derash on a verse, don’t think we ignore the plain sense entirely and remain only with the derash. The plain sense is also correct. “A verse never departs from its plain meaning” means: don’t remove it entirely from its plain meaning; its plain meaning also remains a legitimate interpretation of the verse, not only its derash. Maimonides learns it differently. “A verse never departs from its plain meaning” means that only the plain meaning of Scripture is an interpretation of the verse. In other words, according to Maimonides every verse has only one interpretation: the plain sense. Everything else—derash, hint, whatever you want—all other interpretations are not interpretations of the verse; they are expansions. Interpretation is something that reveals or decodes what is inside the verse. Derash does not do that; derash expands. Therefore there is only one interpretation of a verse, only the plain sense. Derash expands beyond what is in the verse. And that is what he concludes here at the end of the passage I marked: “When they found a verse, they would learn many things from it by way of explanation and proof.” That is what he calls expansion. When we derive things from a verse beyond its plain sense, the plain sense is the interpretation of the verse, it is what is written in the verse. The derash is an expansion by way of explanation and proof, an expansion of the spirit of the verse; it is not an interpretation of the verse. This is Maimonides’ main passage, together with the earlier passage we saw, from which you can see his conception. Meaning that Maimonides is basically saying the following—let’s summarize for a moment what we’ve seen so far; I’m leaving Maimonides aside now. In practice, what Maimonides says is this. First of all, he identifies the Written Torah with Torah-level law, and the Oral Torah with rabbinic law. What is written in the Torah is Torah-level law—and by now we know that “what is written in the Torah” means either what is explicitly written or what can be decoded by plain-sense interpretive tools. And what is not written in the Torah, which is the Oral Torah, is rabbinic. What does that include? Either ordinary rabbinic laws—fences, decrees, enactments—or laws given orally to Moses at Sinai. Why? Because they are not written in the Torah, so they are not Torah-level in the literal sense. Yes, Torah-level in the literal meaning—what does “Torah-level” literally mean? From the Torah, right? Torah-level means from the Torah. So what is written in the Torah is Torah-level. That is what Maimonides says, just in the literal sense. A law given orally to Moses at Sinai is not written in the Torah; it is transmitted orally, therefore it is not Torah-level. Laws that emerge from derivations—here there was room to hesitate. It depends on how you understand the mechanism of derash. Nachmanides, and the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) who understand the mechanism of derash as a mechanism of disclosure—if I make a derivation and that derivation produces some law, then I have exposed that law from the verse, carved it out of the verse, so that is a Torah-level law even according to Maimonides’ own definition, because it is in the verse. The fact that I needed the tools of derash to get it out doesn’t matter; it was still lying there. I just needed the tools of derash to open that safe, to extract what was inside. But Maimonides claims otherwise. Maimonides claims that laws that emerge from derivations are expansions, not decoding. It is not a decoding of what is inside the verse. What is inside the verse is only the plain meaning of Scripture, or things learned by plain interpretation. But midrashic derivations are expanding tools; they do not expose what is in the verse, and therefore a law that emerges from a derivation is a rabbinic law. Why? Because it is not in the verse according to Maimonides’ criterion. It turns out that according to Maimonides, in order to understand his full picture, you need two assumptions. One assumption is the interpretive assumption. Maimonides’ interpretive assumption says that derash is an expanding tool and not a disclosing tool. The second assumption needed to understand Maimonides is the definition that identifies Torah-level law with the Written Torah, and rabbinic law with the Oral Torah. What appears in the Torah is Torah-level; what does not appear in the Torah is rabbinic. The combination of these two assumptions together says that derivations, since they expand rather than disclose, produce laws that are not decoded or drawn from the verse but are rather expansions of the verse. Consequently, if it is not written in the Torah, then according to the second assumption it is rabbinic, it belongs to the Oral Torah. It is not Torah-level. What is interesting now is to check whether these two assumptions are independent of one another. I claim they are. These two assumptions are independent. What does that mean? You can define the difference between Torah-level and rabbinic law as Maimonides does: what is written in the Torah is Torah-level, what is not written in the Torah is rabbinic. But if you regard midrashic laws, the tools of derash, as disclosing tools, the way Nachmanides sees them, then laws learned through derash would still be Torah-level, right? Without the interpretive assumption, even if you adopt the halakhic assumption, but without the interpretive assumption, the laws learned from derivations would be Torah-level. Why? Because if our interpretive assumption is that derivations disclose laws rather than create or expand them—if they disclose—then in effect these laws were inside the verse. So even according to Maimonides’ definition, what is inside the verse is Torah-level, and therefore it could have been Torah-level. If I accepted Maimonides’ interpretive assumption that derivations are expanding rather than decoding, but did not accept his definition of what counts as Torah-level, I could still say that laws learned from derivations are Torah-level. True, they are expansions of the verse—but who said only what is inside the verse is Torah-level? Maybe what expands beyond the verse is also Torah-level. Only enactments, only legislation, that is rabbinic. Therefore, in order to say what Maimonides says, you need both assumptions, and they are independent. More than that: you can disagree with Maimonides on either one of the two assumptions. I’ll give you an example. The Talmud in Nedarim says that someone who swears, “I will review this chapter,” meaning he swears to learn some chapter, some topic / passage, then “he has made a great vow to the God of Israel,” meaning the oath takes effect. So they ask there: but he is already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai—how can that be? One cannot swear to fulfill a commandment. We are already sworn to keep the commandments. An oath cannot take effect on top of another oath that already exists. So the Talmud asks there—and the Talmud says: no, we are not sworn concerning Torah study. Reciting the Shema morning and evening is what we are obligated in by Torah law. Additional Torah study—if you want to learn another chapter, another topic / passage—that is optional. Therefore one can swear concerning that, because one is not obligated in it. All the medieval authorities (Rishonim) ask there: what do you mean? What about “And you shall teach them diligently,” that the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth, so that if someone asks you, you won’t stammer and answer him? In other words, one must master all of Torah. There is a concept of neglect of Torah study. What is neglect of Torah study according to this? You only need to recite Shema morning and evening, so there is no neglect of Torah study? Neglect of Torah study means that when you can study and don’t, you’re failing. But if there is no obligation to study, then what is neglect of Torah study? So the Ran there says—there are disputes among the medieval authorities there—but the Ran says that this is true; however, the concept of “And you shall teach them diligently,” from which we learn the obligation to study Torah all the time and the concept of neglect of Torah study, is a derivation. And since it is a derivation, an oath can take effect upon it. But it is quite clear that the Ran agrees with Maimonides in his interpretive assumption. What is the interpretive assumption? That if something emerges from a derivation, then it is not written in the Torah. It is an expansion of what is written in the Torah; it is not a decoding of what is written in the Torah. On this the Ran agrees. And therefore, says the Ran, one cannot say that I am already sworn and standing concerning this from Sinai. I am already sworn and standing from Sinai concerning what is written in the Torah that we received at Sinai. But a law that is not written in the Torah, and also does not emerge from within the Torah, but is rather an expansion beyond what is written in the Torah—for that, we are not sworn and standing from Sinai. Therefore one can swear to study a chapter, because the obligation to study that chapter emerges from a derivation; it is not explicitly written in the Torah, it is not included in “you shall meditate on it day and night.” Therefore one can swear concerning it. Does that mean that the Ran holds that laws learned from derivation are rabbinic laws? What do you say? Obviously not. First of all, you can see this from the Ran himself in several places. But there is no necessity for that at all. Why? The Ran accepts Maimonides’ interpretive position, that derivations are an expanding tool and not a disclosing tool. But that is not enough to arrive at the conclusion that midrashic laws are rabbinic. What else is needed? One must also assume that only laws written in the Torah are Torah-level, and laws that are expansions of Torah verses are not Torah-level laws. That is Maimonides’ second, halakhic assumption. The Ran does not accept that. Therefore the Ran can agree with Maimonides on the interpretive assumption that derash is an expanding tool and not a disclosing tool, and still not say what Maimonides says, namely that laws derived from derash are laws of the Sages. Such laws are Torah-level laws. In the Ran עצמו there you can explicitly see that he views this as Torah-level law, not as rabbinic law. The “And you shall teach them diligently,” that you must study all the time, is a Torah-level law, but it is a Torah-level law that emerges from derivation, and therefore an oath takes effect upon it. Now I’ll bring you the opposite example—not opposite, but the other side of the same coin. Can there be a halakhic implication for someone who, say, adopts Maimonides’ interpretive position but does not adopt Maimonides’ halakhic position? Suppose someone thinks the tools of derash are expanding tools, but he does not define Torah-level as only what appears in the Torah. So in his view, laws derived from derash are also Torah-level laws. Could that have a halakhic implication? This is an interpretive dispute; on the halakhic plane he disagrees with Maimonides—sorry, on the halakhic plane he disagrees with Maimonides, and on the interpretive plane he agrees with Maimonides. The question is whether his agreement with Maimonides on the interpretive plane can have a halakhic implication. So first of all, we already saw the Ran—that is one example, right? The Ran says: I agree with Maimonides interpretively that laws emerging from derivation are expansion and not disclosure. And that sounds like just a meta-halakhic question, not a direct halakhic question. But the Ran says yes, it has a halakhic implication: if someone swears concerning a commandment learned from derivation, the oath takes effect. So there you have a halakhic implication of the interpretive claim. Okay? But there is another interesting halakhic implication, and you see it in Maimonides. I won’t read it inside in full, I won’t show it to you, I’ll just read it from the book. In the section of Pekudei it says, these verses, look: “And they made the tunics of fine linen, woven work, for Aaron and for his sons. And the turban of fine linen, and the ornamental caps of fine linen, and the linen breeches of twisted fine linen. And the sash of twisted fine linen, blue, purple, and crimson yarn, the work of an embroiderer, as the Lord had commanded Moses.” You see that the word “fine linen” appears here six times. That is linen. So this word appears somehow six times—the number six. The Talmud learns from this as follows. The Talmud in Yoma says: “The rabbis taught: things with regard to which ‘fine linen’ is stated—their thread must be sixfold.” The word “fine linen,” although it means linen, is expounded numerically as six. Okay? That the thread must be twisted from six strands. If something is described as “twisted,” then it is eight strands. The robe is twelve strands, the curtain twenty-four strands, the breastplate and ephod twenty-eight strands. Now the Talmud asks: from where do we know that in things about which ‘fine linen’ is written, the thread must be twisted from six strands? “Whence do we know that their thread is sixfold? For the verse says: ‘And they made the tunics of fine linen, and the turban of fine linen, and the ornamental caps of fine linen, and the linen breeches of twisted fine linen.’ Five verses are written. One is needed for itself—that it is linen. One is needed that their thread be sixfold.” Yes, that itself is already a derivation, of course, because the word means linen, not the number six, but we derive from it that the thread must be sixfold—that is a derivation. “And one teaches that they must be twisted.” Meaning, not just put six strands there, but twist them into one another and make a thick thread. “And one teaches the same for the other garments in which ‘fine linen’ is not stated.” Meaning, another occurrence of the word “fine linen” teaches that in other garments, where “fine linen” is not written, all these laws still apply. “And one teaches that this is indispensable.” And one more time the word “fine linen” is written to teach that all these laws are indispensable. You know that in sacrificial law the rule is: “Scripture must repeat it in order to make it indispensable.” In other words, if a law is written in the Torah in the context of sacred matters, that still does not mean it is indispensable; only if the Torah repeats it or says something like “an eternal statute,” then we know the law is indispensable, otherwise it is not. Here the word “fine linen” is repeated to say the laws are indispensable, because this is priestly vestments, it is part of sacred matters, so it has to be written again to make it indispensable. Okay, now pay attention to something nice here, pay close attention. So we learned from here that the threads must be sixfold, and this must also apply to garments for which “fine linen” is not written, but only “linen,” for example. And one occurrence teaches that this is indispensable. Now Maimonides writes as follows. In the laws of Temple vessels Maimonides writes: “Every place in the Torah where it says ‘fine linen’ or ‘twisted fine linen,’ the thread must be sixfold; and wherever it says ‘linen,’ if the thread was only a single strand, it is valid, though it is preferable as an ideal commandment that it be sixfold.” Okay? Meaning, those garments that the Torah describes with the word “fine linen,” they must be made sixfold and twisted, and this is indispensable. But for garments where it says “linen” and not “fine linen,” one should twist them and they should be sixfold, but this is not indispensable. Now that does not fit with the Talmud; already the commentaries on Maimonides wonder what he is writing here, because the Talmud said there are five occurrences. One occurrence of “fine linen” is to say it is linen, one to say it must be sixfold, one to say it must be twisted, one to tell you that all these laws also apply to a garment where “linen” is written and not “fine linen,” to include other garments, and one to say that this is indispensable. Well then, all these laws that apply to a garment in which “fine linen” is written should also exist in a garment in which “linen” is written—including that they are indispensable. So how can Maimonides say no? The laws are there, true, even in a garment where “linen” is written, but as indispensable they are not indispensable. How does he divide it? The answer is very simple. Because, as I said earlier, the first time “fine linen” appears, that is for the plain sense of Scripture—that it should be linen. All the remaining occurrences of “fine linen” are learned by derivation; all the other four laws are learned by derivation. Again: one law that it should be sixfold, one law that it should be twisted, a third law that all these laws also apply to garments where “linen” is written and not only where “fine linen” is written, and a fourth law that this is indispensable. All of those are derivations. Why is that important? Because, as I said, according to Maimonides derash is an expanding tool, not a disclosing tool. Right? If I ask myself what is written in these verses with all these appearances of “fine linen,” is it written there that it has to be twisted and sixfold and so on? Is that written in the verses? No. Because these are derivations. I expand beyond what is written in the verses and learn all these laws. These laws are an expansion of what is written in the verses. Okay? Now the last “fine linen” teaches me that everything written in this verse is indispensable. Okay? What is written in the verse? Nothing—apart from “fine linen” in its plain meaning, nothing. Right? As for the garment in which “linen” is written—how do I know that its thread must be sixfold? From the derivation of “fine linen,” right? “If it is unnecessary for garments where ‘fine linen’ is written, apply it instead to garments where ‘linen’ is written.” That is a derivation. So it is not explicitly written in the verse. Therefore when we say that what is written in the verse is indispensable, that means what is written in the verse—not things we expanded beyond the verse. And therefore all these laws for garments where “linen” is written do exist; it has to be sixfold, it has to be twisted, but they are not indispensable. They exist because the derivation is a true derivation, as Maimonides says: do not think I believe derivations are not true, but rather that they are branches growing out of roots. They are true, but they are expansion and not disclosure. Therefore, when it says here that all this is indispensable, the meaning is: everything written in the verse is indispensable. But in the verse regarding garments where “linen” is written, those laws—that it must be sixfold and twisted—are not written. That is derivation. So about that, the rule that it is indispensable was not said; therefore it is not indispensable. On the one hand, the law exists for those garments; on the other hand, it is not indispensable. And notice: this is a halakhic implication—that it is not indispensable—of Maimonides’ interpretive principle, not of his halakhic principle. Because this halakhic implication, in my view, would also be accepted by the Ran, even though on the halakhic plane he disagrees with Maimonides and only on the interpretive plane agrees with him. This law is a product of Maimonides’ interpretive determination, not his halakhic determination—of the fact that Maimonides sees derivations as an expanding tool and not a disclosing tool. Okay? Even if I define Torah-level law not like Maimonides, so that not only what is written in the Torah is Torah-level, it still makes no difference. This thing can be Torah-level, but it still will not be indispensable, because it is Torah-level law that is not written in the verse. And what is indispensable is only the laws written in the verse. So this is a halakhic implication of the interpretive principle, not the halakhic principle. Okay? That is a very nice illustration of the independence of these two assumptions of Maimonides, the interpretive assumption and the halakhic assumption. But for our purposes, if I summarize, the foundation from which the whole story in Maimonides begins is twofold. First assumption: derivations are an expanding tool and not a disclosing tool. That is an interpretive assumption. Just, how do I see derivations? Supposedly this should not have any halakhic implication. Other medieval authorities can agree with Maimonides and still see all the laws that emerge from derivation as Torah-level laws. This is a determination—call it how I understand these interpretive tools; it is a question in interpreting the Torah and should not necessarily have halakhic significance. Maimonides’ second assumption is a halakhic assumption: only what is written in the Torah is Torah-level law; what is outside the Torah is of the Sages. That is a halakhic assumption. My claim is that Maimonides’ interpretive assumption sometimes does have halakhic implications. One implication we saw: an oath takes effect on such laws because they are not written in the Torah. A second implication is that derivations that speak about the Torah will not speak about such laws that are not written in the Torah, but only expand them—like the twisted fine linen, which is not indispensable. Why? Because it really is a correct law, but it is a correct law not written in the Torah, and what is indispensable is what is written in these verses—that is what is indispensable, not what expands beyond these verses. So those are halakhic implications of Maimonides’ interpretive assumption. Let’s get back to our topic. What does this mean, after understanding these two assumptions? It means, essentially, that every law not written in the Torah, no matter its source, is of the Sages. What is the idea behind this? I want to explain how from this we derive all the differences between Torah-level law and rabbinic law. One second, I’m muting this thing. From here we derive all the differences between Torah-level law and rabbinic law. And we need to check how to apply this to laws given orally to Moses at Sinai and to laws that emerge from derivations. First of all, regarding lashes—Maimonides wrote this explicitly, we saw it. Maimonides calls laws that emerge from derivations “a warning derived by reasoning.” For Maimonides, “a warning derived by reasoning” is not only an a fortiori inference, but any law derived from any derivation whatsoever, not only a fortiori, and Nachmanides attacks him on this. Meaning that from Maimonides’ perspective, if there is a law that we learn from a derivation, there are no lashes for violating it. It is a law of the Sages. Why? Why are there no lashes for it? The answer is very simple: if it is not written in the Torah, this is not necessarily a question of halakhic force; rather, if it is not written in the Torah, then we were not warned. How do we know this is forbidden? It is not written in the Torah that it is forbidden. The Sages interpret it this way or that way. Maimonides claims: the Sages’ interpretation is not a warning. Maybe I don’t agree with the Sages. What is written in the Torah cannot be argued with. If it is written, I am warned. But if something emerges from a derivation of the Sages, you cannot say that if I did it I had been warned. Maybe I didn’t know that the Sages derived it; maybe I didn’t agree with their derivation. Again, I’m not allowed to disagree—but you still can’t say that I had been warned, that I am fully intentional, and punishments are administered only where there has been prior warning. Therefore, says Maimonides, we do not punish. On the other hand, says Maimonides, what happens if the punishment is written in the Torah but I have no warning—we saw this in Maimonides—and the warning emerges from derivation? Then lashes are given. Why? Because if the punishment is written in the Torah, then clearly the Torah says there is punishment. This warning that we learned through derivation merely revealed to me that the Torah itself prohibits it and therefore punishes it, and I have an indication of this because the punishment is written in the Torah. In that case we treat the derivation as a disclosing derivation and not an expanding one. Because if the Torah punishes, then clearly the Torah prohibits; I am only looking for where it says it prohibits. I didn’t find it; I found only a derivation. That probably means this derivation revealed to me that the Torah prohibits it—it is not an expansion, because otherwise how is there punishment? Therefore, when I have a derivation and the punishment is written in the Torah, we do punish even though the law emerges from derivation, because I was warned. After all, it says, “One who strikes his father or his mother shall surely be put to death.” There is no warning; nowhere does it explicitly say that it is forbidden to strike one’s father or mother. It says that one who strikes his father or mother shall surely be put to death. And if the Torah says “shall surely be put to death,” then clearly from the Torah’s perspective this is forbidden. True, I need to search for some source; I found a derivation. And that doesn’t matter—in the end it is clear that I have a warning. If I struck my father and mother, I saw that I am going to be punished; I have a warning, so we can punish me even though the warning emerges from derivation. Okay? But if I have no punishment in the Torah—if I have a warning derived by reasoning, I learn the prohibition from some derivation—now the question is whether we administer lashes or not. The answer is that we do not, because something derived from derivation is not considered a warning. I can always say: I didn’t know, I didn’t think of it, I didn’t agree, I didn’t know this derivation. The Torah I know; the Torah is written and I can read it. What is written there—I cannot say I didn’t know. There I am warned. But derivations of the Sages are not considered a warning, so we do not punish for them. Notice: this is not because it is less severe. According to this conception, we do not punish for derivations of the Sages not because it is a lighter law, but because it is a law that is not written. Therefore Maimonides, for example, explains why we do not punish for laws that emerge from derivations: because punishments are not derived merely by reasoning. Not because it is lighter, but because it is learned from reasoning, from derivation, and is not explicitly written in the Torah. What about a law given orally to Moses at Sinai? The same thing. Why do we not punish for violating a law given orally to Moses at Sinai? Because such a law is transmitted orally. How do you know whether I heard it or didn’t hear it? It is not written in the Torah. Therefore this too is not considered a warning. Maybe I didn’t hear it, maybe I don’t agree, maybe a different tradition reached me. That is not solid enough to count as a warning, such that I can complain to the one who violated it and punish him on that basis. Still, punishments are administered only where there has been prior warning. Therefore a law given orally to Moses at Sinai does not count as a warning, and we do not punish one who violated it. Of course, if the law given orally to Moses at Sinai merely interprets a law written in the Torah—like the measures that we saw in Maimonides’ commentary on the Mishnah—then yes, we do punish. Why? Because what is written in the Torah is written in the Torah. Now you ask yourself: how much pork does one have to eat in order to violate the prohibition of pork? It is not written in the Torah. So go search if it is not in the Torah. You know there is a prohibition of pork; it is written in the Torah. You just don’t know how much one must eat to violate it. Go find out. If you ask the Sages, they will tell you there is a law given orally to Moses at Sinai that the measure is an olive-bulk. So true, we learned that from a law given orally to Moses at Sinai, but here the law given orally to Moses at Sinai interpreted a verse. There is a prohibition in the verse against eating pork. You can’t say you weren’t warned. Or say, I didn’t know it was an olive-bulk. I’ll ask you: and what did you think? After all, it is written that there is a prohibition against eating pork. What did you think? You should have gone and clarified what amount creates the prohibition. And if you had clarified, you would have found that there is a law given orally to Moses at Sinai that it is an olive-bulk. Therefore, for a law given orally to Moses at Sinai concerning measures, we do punish, because it is a law given orally to Moses at Sinai that simply reveals what the Torah is saying. These two assumptions I mentioned in Maimonides explain all the implications that distinguish Torah-level from rabbinic law. There is another difficulty that Nachmanides asked: there is a kind of paradox in Maimonides’ approach. Maimonides says, on the one hand, that a law transmitted by tradition, a law given orally to Moses at Sinai, is not Torah-level. We do not punish for it; it is not Torah-level. On the other hand, Maimonides says, a law that emerges from derivation is also not Torah-level, we do not punish for it. But if there is a law given orally to Moses at Sinai that is anchored by a derivation, then it is Torah-level. It is counted in the enumeration of the commandments, we punish for it, it is fully Torah-level. Nachmanides asks: how does zero plus zero equal one? I mentioned this at the end of the first lecture. How can each of these things separately be rabbinic? Oral tradition from Sinai is of the Sages. A law that emerges from derivation is also of the Sages. So why, if I have an oral tradition from Sinai and I also have a derivation for it, does it suddenly become Torah-level? How does zero plus zero become one? I think what is going on here is this. Maybe I’ll give a short introduction that will explain this too, and afterwards it will also explain the laws of doubt. In Derekh Hashem by the Ramchal there is a passage where he explains that every transgression and every commandment has two aspects. In a transgression there is, first of all—say they forbade us to eat pork. I ate pork. What is the problem with eating pork? Two problems. One problem: I was commanded not to eat pork and I violated the command. Second problem: why was I forbidden to eat pork? Presumably because eating pork causes some kind of spiritual damage, I don’t know what. There is some problematic quality in eating pork. So something happened by virtue of the fact that I ate pork. That is the second problem. In fact there are two problems in every transgression. One is the result of the transgression, because of which it is defined as a transgression in the first place—apparently there is some problem it creates. The second is that I did not obey the command. It is the same in a commandment. Here I have a commandment to put on tefillin, I put on tefillin. There are two positive things I did here. First, I obeyed the command; I have a command to put on tefillin, and I obeyed. Second, why is there a command to put on tefillin? Presumably it brings some spiritual benefit. So if I put on tefillin I also attained that spiritual benefit. These are two sides of every transgression and two sides of every commandment: the essential side and the formal side, the side of obedience or rebellion against the command, and the spiritual benefit or damage because of which this is defined as a transgression or commandment. Okay? For example, Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman—maybe even before him some earlier authorities write this—the Talmud says that one who is commanded and does is greater than one who is not commanded and does. Why is one who is commanded and does greater? Tosafot HaRosh and the Ritva write that one who is commanded and does is greater because if I am commanded, then when I do the commandment I gain the two gains I mentioned before: I both obey the command and also gain the benefit that the commandment gives. In contrast, if someone is not commanded and nevertheless does it, then he gains the spiritual benefit but there is no obedience to a command here. Therefore greater is one who is commanded and does. It is simple mathematics. He is greater because he has two spiritual gains and not just one. And therefore it is also more severe if someone violates a transgression that he is commanded about than if he violates one he is not commanded about, okay? For the same reason. Let’s look at some implications of this distinction before returning to our issue. Suppose someone intended to eat pork but ended up eating lamb, as in the Talmud in Nazir. A person sees a piece of meat in front of him, thinks it is pork, knows it is forbidden, and feels like eating pork—he wants to commit a transgression. He eats the piece, and then a witness comes and says that piece was actually kosher meat. Meaning, you are not only wicked, you’re also foolish, or a loser, a schlemiel. Okay? You can’t even manage to commit sins successfully even when you want to. What is the law for such a person? The Talmud says he needs atonement, in Nazir. But what does that mean in terms of the conceptual framework I’m developing here? This person thought to violate God’s command, right? He knows that God forbids eating pork and he decided nevertheless to eat it. So regarding the command, he did violate it. But the result, the spiritual corruption, of course he will not experience, right? Because in the end what he ate was not pork; the spiritual damage caused by the transgression will not be there, because he did not actually do the transgression. So here, for example, is a situation where it is possible to violate the command—there is the transgression of going against the command—but there is no spiritual damage created by that transgression. There is only one aspect of the transgression. So that is not a full transgression. A full transgression exists only when both aspects are present. Okay? What is the opposite case? What about someone who sins unintentionally? One who sinned unintentionally does not know there is a prohibition here, right? Because he does not know it is pork. He thinks it is lamb. Okay? And therefore he eats it thinking he is eating kosher meat; he does not want to transgress. He eats it and in the end it turns out he ate pork by mistake. There is no violation of the command here, because he did not know there was a command at all; there is no rebellion against the command. But there is spiritual damage as a result of the transgression, because he did commit the transgression; he ate forbidden meat. Right? This is exactly the dual case to the previous one I described. In the previous case there was rebellion against the command but no spiritual damage; here there is spiritual damage but no rebellion against the command. Okay? These are basically the differences between these two aspects in every commandment and every transgression. My claim is the following: a Torah-level commandment is only a commandment for which both aspects are present—both command and benefit or spiritual damage, whether it is a positive commandment or a prohibition, benefit or spiritual damage. If both are present, that is Torah-level; if only one is present, it is of the Sages. Let’s see. What about a law given orally to Moses at Sinai? What about laws emerging from derivations? So look: first let’s start with the simplest laws, laws explicitly written in the Torah, laws that the Sadducees also admit to, yes? Explicitly written—“You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together.” Someone plowed with an ox and donkey together, okay? Then clearly he violated a command—there is an explicit command here, there is a warning here—and of course there is also spiritual damage, there is a transgression, he committed a transgression. So both are present; that is Torah-level. Okay? Now what happens if someone violates a law given orally to Moses at Sinai? If someone violates a law given orally to Moses at Sinai, then there is a command there, right? There is a command there. Why? Because the command is oral, but there is a command. So why is it not written in the Torah? What is the issue? How is this different from any other commandment that God wrote? Why didn’t He also write the laws given orally to Moses at Sinai in the Torah? There aren’t that many. Why? Why didn’t He write them? The answer is: because laws given orally to Moses at Sinai are laws of command without content. Without substantive content. They contain only the aspect of command. There is no substantive content. Therefore it is not Torah-level; it is of the Sages. That is why they remained outside the Torah, because what appears in the Torah is only something that has content and also has the matter of command, and is commanded. A thing that has command without content is of the Sages, because you need both things. What about laws that emerge from derivations? Laws that emerge from derivations—we said these are expansions of what is written in the Torah. In what sense are they expansions? Suppose: “The Lord your God shall you fear”—to include Torah scholars. What does this expansion really mean? It means that the same idea that exists in fear of God also exists in reverence for Torah scholars. Meaning, the substantive content that exists in the prohibition also exists in the obligation to revere Torah scholars, not only in fear of God. But there is no command, because according to Maimonides’ interpretive assumption, something that emerges from derivation is an expansion of what is written in the Torah, not itself written in the Torah. If it is not written in the Torah, then there is no command concerning it. This expansion only tells me that just as there is spiritual damage if I do not fear God, so too I will have that spiritual damage if I do not revere Torah scholars. That is what expansion means. But there is no command here, because I am not putting this inside the Torah. So who commanded me? If I were to say it is inside the Torah, like Nachmanides, then there would also be a command for it. But Maimonides says it is an expansion, so there is no command for it. So what does this expansion say? It says there is here the same idea that exists in fear of God. Reverence for Torah scholars is a kind of fear of God. Just as that is something positive, so this is something positive. Meaning, it contains the substantive content of fear of God, but there is no command. So this is exactly the dual case to a law given orally to Moses at Sinai. A law given orally to Moses at Sinai is a law with command but without essence, and a law that emerges from derivation is a law with essence but without command. And Torah-level laws are only laws that have both essence and command. And therefore both of these are laws of the Sages.

[Speaker B] Now let’s go back—wait, sorry, I got a bit confused. I don’t really understand, then why do you need to do something without a command?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You don’t.

[Speaker B] No.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You need to—just know that it will cause you spiritual harm. You really won’t receive punishment for it. It’s like someone who goes through a red light even though there was no law enacted by the Knesset. There’s no Knesset law. Okay? But still, in reality people stop at red and go on green, okay? But there’s no Knesset law, no one will sue me. Can I go through a red light? Formally, the answer is yes. There’s no law, no one can prosecute me for disobeying the law. But the damage, or the danger in this case, still exists, because in reality someone who goes through a red light is taking the risk of being run over. That’s exactly the situation here. The situation here is that for a transgression that comes out of an interpretive derivation, you can’t punish someone for it. There’s no legislation, no command about it. But there is a prohibition here in the sense that it brings spiritual harm, exactly like a transgression that the Torah explicitly established. And therefore you have to be careful about it, because it will bring me spiritual harm for the same reason that one has to be careful about a written transgression. Okay? All right. Now, so this basically means the following: something is Torah-level if it fulfills both conditions. If one of the conditions is missing, then it is words of the Sages. Now Nachmanides asked against Maimonides: what about a case where something that is transmitted to us by tradition, a law given to Moses at Sinai, is called words of the Sages? Something that comes from an interpretive derivation is also words of the Sages. But if there is both a law given to Moses at Sinai and an interpretive derivation together, then it’s Torah-level? How does this miracle happen? Now of course this is very simple, right? Something that comes from a law given to Moses at Sinai—what does that mean? That we have a command concerning it. Right? But if it comes from an interpretive derivation, if it also has a derivation attached to it, what does that mean? That it also has substantive content. So if it has both a command and substantive content, then it is Torah-level. That’s why it is Torah-level. Okay. Now I’ll maybe bring one more example so you can see the relation between these two aspects. In Maimonides’ ninth root, Maimonides first establishes that… that if the Torah repeats the same command many times, we count it only once. For example, it says twelve times in the Torah that one must observe the Sabbath. How many positive commandments are there to observe the Sabbath? One. Why not twelve? Because overall the commands overlap with the same prohibition. We count the prohibitions. In the second part of the ninth root, Maimonides talks about a general prohibition. What is a general prohibition? It’s one verse from which many different prohibitions are learned. For example, “Do not eat over the blood.” “Do not eat over the blood” is one verse, but from it they derive a warning for a stubborn and rebellious son, a warning not to eat before prayer, a warning to a religious court not to eat at the time on the day when they issue a death sentence, and all kinds of other warnings learned from that same verse. The Talmud says this is a general prohibition. Maimonides says: a general prohibition is counted only once. For example, “Do not eat over the blood” he counts only in relation to the stubborn and rebellious son. Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perla asks, in his introduction to Rav Saadia Gaon’s Book of Commandments, where he goes through Maimonides’ roots—on the ninth root he asks and says that in Maimonides there is apparently a contradiction between the two parts of this root. In the first part Maimonides tells us that what determines things is the content, not the number of commands, right? Therefore if the Torah repeats the command many times, it makes no difference; if the content is one, we count one commandment. In the second part Maimonides says that what determines things is the number of commands, not the content, because if I have one command with many contents that it prohibits, we count one commandment. Why? So in practice, does the content determine things, or do the commands determine things? If the commands determine things, then you should have counted twelve commandments to observe the Sabbath and not one. If the content determines things, then in a general prohibition you should have counted five prohibitions, not one, even though there is only one verse—there are five different contents here. So it’s a contradiction from the first part of the root to the second part of the root. How can it be that in the very same root Maimonides contradicts himself internally? What do you say? We’ve gone back a little to logic. How do you resolve the difficulty? Very simple, very simple. You need both. What determines it is the combination of a command and separate content. Now everything is fine, right? In order for a commandment to be counted, there has to be a specific command specifically about it, and it has to have content that is separate from other commandments. Now this resolves both parts. In the first part, Maimonides is talking about twelve times that we are commanded to observe the Sabbath. So we have twelve commands but one content. How many commandments do we count? One. Because we do not have twelve commandments each of which has both separate content and a command, right? We have twelve commands, but only one content. And in order to count, you need both separate content and a separate command, therefore we count one. What happens in the second part of the root? There we have a general prohibition. It says, “Do not eat over the blood,” and from this they derive five prohibitions, five negative commandments. Again Maimonides counts one prohibition. Why? Again, because if I count only something that has both a command and content, then it is impossible to count more than one. Because although I have five different contents, I do not have a command for each of them; I have only one command. Again, I cannot count more than one. Therefore there is no contradiction at all. What is needed is the combination of content plus command in order for something to be counted. Does this remind you of what I said earlier? I think it’s exactly the same thing. Basically what is written here behind this, in the ninth root, is that in order for something to be Torah-level, so that it will be counted in the enumeration of the commandments, it must have a command and it must have separate substantive content, right? That is exactly what Maimonides says in the ninth root: there has to be a command and there has to be an essence. Laws that emerge from interpretive derivations have essence but no command. A law given to Moses at Sinai has a command but no essence. Therefore it is not counted in the enumeration of the commandments. Exactly just as a general prohibition is not counted in the enumeration of the commandments, and exactly just as “observe the Sabbath” written twelve times is not counted in the enumeration of the commandments. In all these cases, what is missing is either the content or the essence. In order to count a Torah-level commandment, it has to have both content and essence. And when that does not exist, we do not count it. That is basically what Maimonides is claiming. Now I think I’ll stop here, because I’m now starting a somewhat long section. I won’t manage to get through it. I’ll just say: we have one more lesson, and with that I’ll finish the topic, and in that lesson we’ll deal first with an explanation of the laws of doubt, what follows from what I’ve said up to now concerning the laws of doubt from the picture I’ve just described. I’d maybe suggest that you listen to the recording a bit beforehand, because I feel these gaps make it a little hard to continue what we were discussing. And afterward I’ll talk about the logical significance of the matter, because after all that’s our goal. I want to say a bit about the logical significance of the picture I’ve described here. Okay, any questions or comments? If so, now’s the time.

[Speaker C] What does “words of the Sages” mean? Again? What? I didn’t understand. What do the words “words of the Sages” mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re cutting out, I can’t hear you well.

[Speaker C] What do the words “words of the Sages” mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Words of the Sages” means rabbinic, yes.

[Speaker C] And how is that rabbinic if it’s Torah from Sinai, a law given to Moses at Sinai?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that’s what Maimonides says: a law given to Moses at Sinai is called words of the Sages because the ones who transmitted it to us were the Sages. But its halakhic status is also rabbinic—that’s the big novelty. It’s not just a question of source, it’s also a question of authority. Okay. We’ll see, for example, regarding the laws of doubt—we’ll see this in detail next time—how this affects the laws of doubt in all these cases. All right?

[Speaker B] Can you just sharpen once more why the Sabbath, which you said is mentioned 12 times as a command, is counted once?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because each of the commands has the same content. In order to count 12 commandments, I need each of them to have separate content, not just a separate command. If it has only a command without content, or only content without a command, we don’t count it.

[Speaker B] Okay. And is there some case like that, where there are two identical commands whose content is different?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not two identical commands whose content is different. Two different commands whose content is different. If they’re identical, how is the content different?

[Speaker B] Because say they tell us twice to observe the Sabbath, once with this kind of content and once with that kind of content, and then would you count that as two commandments?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what Nachmanides argues against Maimonides. Maimonides doesn’t accept that. Nachmanides, in his glosses to the sixth root—or to the ninth root—argues against Maimonides that repeated statements of commandments several times simply come to teach additional laws; they’re not just repetitions. And according to Maimonides it comes out that they are just repetitions. Yes. Another question? There’s also a simple question… Okay, so next time, as I said, we’ll talk about the laws of doubt, and afterward we’ll talk about the logical dimension of this whole picture. Goodbye. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.

[Speaker E] Thank you very much. To you as well.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thank you very much. Oy vey.