Reasons and Rationales of the Commandments, Lecture 10
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- General Overview
- The Three Blocks: Scriptural Decree, the Reason of the Verse, and the Status of Reasoning
- The View of Maimonides and the First Tanna: Why We Do Not Derive Law from the Reason of the Verse Even When the Reason Is Written
- The King Example: Abigail, Eighteen Wives, and a Mistaken Application of a Correct Reason
- The Rule of Doubt: The Torah Was Not Given to Ministering Angels, and One Must Have a Reason in Order to Doubt
- Majority, Evidence, and Postmodernism: Doubt Does Not Arise from the Mere Possibility of Error
- The Reason of the Verse in Practice: The Rarity of These Sugyot and the Distinction Between Using Reasoning and Contradicting the Text
- Reasoning as Torah-level Law and Mefaneach Tzefunot: “Why Do I Need a Verse? It Is Logical”
- Blessings over Enjoyment: Pnei Yehoshua, Tzelach, and the Distinction Between Gratitude and the Formula of the Blessing
- Tzelach’s Critique and the Distinction Between Interpretive Reasoning and Legislative Reasoning
- A Reason for Every Commandment and Rational Commandments: Accessibility of the Reason and Understanding “I Said I Would Become Wise, but It Was Far from Me”
- The Role of Command: From Maimonides in the Eighth Root to the Distinction Between What Is Proper and What Is Forbidden
- The Shakh’s Approach and Strain on the Language: Better to Tolerate Strain in Wording Than Strain in Reasoning
- We Do Not Punish Based on Logical Derivation: Refutation, Difference in Punishment, and the Scriptural Source
- Bava Batra: Be Fruitful and Multiply, Wicked Rule, and “Better That They Be Unwitting Than Deliberate Sinners”
- Hezekiah: “Why Involve Yourself in the Hidden Things of the Merciful One?” and Reasoning That Was Rejected
Summary
General Overview
The speaker presents a series built out of three blocks: in the first block, he argues that even commandments described as a scriptural decree have a reason, and that one can at least try to understand it, in line with Maimonides in the Guide for the Perplexed that the Holy One, blessed be He, does nothing without a reason. In the second block, he explains why we do not derive law from the reason of the verse—not because of a general fear of error in reasoning, but mainly when purposive interpretation leads to a conclusion that contradicts the wording of the text, in which case the contradiction itself indicates a mistaken application of the reason. In the third block, he examines the status of reasoning, argues that in order to cast doubt one needs a concrete reason, and develops the dispute over whether reasoning is Torah-level, including discussion of blessings over enjoyment, the role of command in turning logic into obligation, and the implications for laws such as “we do not punish based on logical derivation” and “better that they be unwitting than deliberate sinners.”
The Three Blocks: Scriptural Decree, the Reason of the Verse, and the Status of Reasoning
The speaker structures the series in three blocks. The first block deals with the concept of scriptural decree and argues that every scriptural decree has a reason; not only is there a reason, but it can also be known, and it is not necessarily a hidden reason. The claim also relies on Maimonides in the Guide for the Perplexed, that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not do things without a reason, and therefore behind every commandment there is a reason. The second block deals with the reason of the verse, and explains that the idea that we do not derive law from the reason of the verse because of fear of error is not logically plausible, because if there is a sensible reason then assuming it is not the reason increases the chance of error, so fear of error cannot explain the principle. The third block deals with the status of reasoning in general, and suggests that usually there is no reason to fear that we have erred in reasoning absent some indication, and from there arises the question whether reasoning is Torah-level and what that means.
The View of Maimonides and the First Tanna: Why We Do Not Derive Law from the Reason of the Verse Even When the Reason Is Written
The speaker argues that according to Maimonides we see that we do not derive law from the reason of the verse even where the reason is stated explicitly in the Torah, such as “he shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away.” He suggests that in the Mishnah there are really three positions, and that Maimonides rules like the first tanna, who does not derive law from the reason of the verse even when the reason is explicit, and therefore one cannot explain this refusal as fear that perhaps we are mistaken about the reason, because here there is no speculation at all—the reason is written. He proposes that the dilemma of the reason of the verse arises only where there is tension between purposive interpretation and the wording of the text, and in that situation the very contradiction teaches that the application of the reason is probably mistaken, because there is no reason to assume that the Holy One, blessed be He, formulated the verse imprecisely.
The King Example: Abigail, Eighteen Wives, and a Mistaken Application of a Correct Reason
The speaker explains that in the law of the king—“he shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away”—the reason is correct because it is written in the Torah, but it can still be applied incorrectly. He describes the derivation from the reason of the verse according to which, if the women are “righteous like Abigail,” one may multiply wives even up to eighteen and even thirty, because apparently they will not turn his heart away. He argues that the conclusion that one may add beyond the limit learned from the text contradicts the wording of the verse as interpreted by the Sages, and therefore the explanation is that the reason is correct but the inference from it is mistaken, because multiplying wives distracts the king’s heart from his role even if they are not wicked. He ties this to the principle that fear of error is not general, but is activated when reasoning leads to a result that contradicts the plain wording.
The Rule of Doubt: The Torah Was Not Given to Ministering Angels, and One Must Have a Reason in Order to Doubt
The speaker argues that there is no basis for fearing every line of reasoning merely because one might err, because the Torah was not given to ministering angels, and in the absence of a reason one should go with what seems right. He cites the Talmud in Shabbat 30 about someone who says to Rabbi or to Rabbi Chiya, “Your wife is my wife and your son is my son,” and the explanation of Rabbi Kook in Ein Ayah that one needs a reason in order to doubt. He cites the Talmud in Kiddushin that “they burn and stone on the basis of presumptive status,” and emphasizes that even for a presumption like “most acts of intercourse follow the husband,” severe laws are applied, because the presumption creates a situation in which there is no reason to cast doubt, and only an indication such as witnesses or an unceasing rumor begins to create doubt. He adds an example from Bnei Brak about whether a child who says he is bar mitzvah can be counted for a minyan, and argues that this is a ridiculous question when מדובר in someone with presumptive status and in a matter that can be clarified, because the laws of evidence are meant for situations where there is an actual doubt.
Majority, Evidence, and Postmodernism: Doubt Does Not Arise from the Mere Possibility of Error
The speaker tells the story about Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz and a priest who argued from “follow the majority,” and explains that one follows the majority only when there is doubt, but when there is no doubt there is no reason to activate majority rules. He illustrates this with a piece of meat carrying a high-level kosher seal in a city where most shops sell non-kosher meat, and argues that the majority is irrelevant when there is point-specific certainty. He attacks a postmodern outlook that places every position under a permanent “not certain,” and argues that the mere possibility of error does not create doubt without some indication, just as in the desert there is a reason to doubt seeing an oasis because of a mirage, but there is no reason to doubt seeing his own tefillin in an ordinary situation. He also presents Bertrand Russell’s example of the celestial teapot in order to argue that even a supposed “fifty-fifty” state needs justification, and not every lack of knowledge creates equal probability.
The Reason of the Verse in Practice: The Rarity of These Sugyot and the Distinction Between Using Reasoning and Contradicting the Text
The speaker argues that sugyot about the reason of the verse are extremely rare in the Talmud, and that if there were a principled prohibition on using reasoning, one would expect “Wait, we do not derive law from the reason of the verse” to appear everywhere, but that simply does not happen. He explains that the problem of the reason of the verse exists only when reasoning leads to a result that contradicts the wording of the verse, whereas when the reasoning fits the wording there is no obstacle to interpreting it that way and drawing halakhic conclusions. He connects this to the example about the prohibition on killing another person in order to save oneself and to the discussion of thirty against one, and emphasizes that when halakhic decisors establish a law without a verse they do so by force of reasoning, not by rejecting reasoning, and so the debate is over what the reasoning says, not whether one follows reasoning. He adds Maimonides at the beginning of the laws of rebels, that any religious court can change something that came from interpretation of a verse or from reasoning, and that specifically with rabbinic enactments there is a requirement for a court greater in wisdom and number.
Reasoning as Torah-level Law and Mefaneach Tzefunot: “Why Do I Need a Verse? It Is Logical”
The speaker mentions Rabbi Kasher, the story of the Rogatchover’s writings, the founding of the Torah Shelemah Institute, and the publication of Mefaneach Tzefunot, and presents the book as an attempt to build an encyclopedia of lines of reasoning and modes of thought rather than of topics. He describes the difficulty of indexing an encyclopedia of reasoning alphabetically, and the claim that whoever succeeds in this will dramatically advance Torah study. He quotes that Rabbi Kasher, in the pamphlet “Reasoning Is Torah-level,” brings sources such as Or Zarua and Alfa Beita, and emphasizes the Talmudic prooftext “Why do I need a verse? It is logical,” as showing that reasoning and verse are treated as having equal standing, because otherwise one could have said that the verse is needed in order to elevate a law from rabbinic to Torah-level.
Blessings over Enjoyment: Pnei Yehoshua, Tzelach, and the Distinction Between Gratitude and the Formula of the Blessing
The speaker presents Pnei Yehoshua’s difficulty with the Talmud in Berakhot, which grounds the source of blessings over enjoyment in reasoning—“it is forbidden to enjoy this world without a blessing”—and concludes that if reasoning is Torah-level, then blessings over enjoyment should also be Torah-level and doubtful cases of blessings should require stringency. He brings Tzelach and also his own position, that the Torah-level obligation is to thank the Holy One, blessed be He, in order to avoid the category of misuse of sacred property, while the text of the blessing with the Divine Name and kingship is a rabbinic enactment and therefore rabbinic. He compares this to Maimonides on prayer: the basic obligation is Torah-level, but the form, times, and wording are rabbinic, and therefore in a doubtful case one can fulfill the Torah-level duty in one’s own language while keeping the rule that in a doubt about rabbinic law one is lenient regarding the formula. He notes that he was told something like this exists in Rabbi Igra in the name of Hafla’ah, and asks for a reference.
Tzelach’s Critique and the Distinction Between Interpretive Reasoning and Legislative Reasoning
The speaker presents Tzelach’s argument that if reasoning creates Torah-level commandments, then rational commandments were written for nothing, and explains that Tzelach distinguishes between interpretive reasoning, which interprets an existing Torah law, and legislative reasoning, which innovates a new law. He explains that according to Tzelach, reasoning can determine a Torah-level result only in an interpretive context, because then one keeps the law because it is the meaning of the verse, but reasoning does not legislate a new commandment such as a blessing over enjoyment before eating. He discusses the fact that even drawing the line between innovation and interpretation is itself done through reasoning, and brings examples of interpretive reasoning such as “What makes you think your blood is redder?” as an interpretation of “You shall not murder,” and also “What did you see to include and what did you see to exclude?” as an interpretation of the prohibition of carrying on the Sabbath. He mentions two examples of “Why do I need a verse? It is logical,” such as “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted” and “the burden of proof is on the claimant,” and tries to understand them as interpretations of “judge your fellow justly,” while at the same time discussing whether blessings over enjoyment can be connected to misuse of sacred property, and brings the students of Rabbenu Yonah who say that one who eats without a blessing must bring a guilt offering, with the note that a guilt offering can also come for matters that do not contain an outright prohibition.
A Reason for Every Commandment and Rational Commandments: Accessibility of the Reason and Understanding “I Said I Would Become Wise, but It Was Far from Me”
The speaker is asked how one can say that every commandment has a reason and still distinguish between rational and non-rational commandments, and he answers that all of them have a reason, but the difference is how accessible the reason is to us. He interprets “I said I would become wise, but it was far from me” about the red heifer as a case where there is a reason, but even King Solomon did not find it. He explains that according to Tzelach, non-rational commandments need to be written because without that we would not know them, whereas with rational commandments one can ask why they needed to be said when we already understand them through reasoning.
The Role of Command: From Maimonides in the Eighth Root to the Distinction Between What Is Proper and What Is Forbidden
The speaker argues that even if reasoning is correct and powerful, command is not superfluous, because its role is not only to convey information but to obligate and create a warning from which punishment and judicial enforcement flow. He illustrates this with an analogy to traffic laws: even if logic says not to cross on a red light, without legislation one cannot judge and punish. He connects this to Maimonides in the eighth root and to the discussion of formulations of command that create a prohibition, and cites Rashba, who asks regarding the sciatic nerve how the description “therefore the children of Israel do not eat” becomes a prohibition without language of command, and emphasizes that command is what turns proper/improper into forbidden/permitted or into a halakhic obligation. He argues that from here emerges a concept of “weak Torah-level”: reasoning can obligate in the sense of caution and doubt, but without command there is no formal “warning” for purposes of punishment, and therefore the gap between Pnei Yehoshua and Tzelach may not be absolute, but may concern the status of command.
The Shakh’s Approach and Strain on the Language: Better to Tolerate Strain in Wording Than Strain in Reasoning
The speaker describes the approach of the Shakh in Choshen Mishpat, who marshals many medieval authorities (Rishonim) in order to show that they all really say what he says, even at the price of forcing the language, מתוך confidence that the correct reasoning requires that the Rishonim could not have said otherwise. He quotes the principle attributed to the Beit Yosef that it is better to tolerate strain in the language than strain in the reasoning, and suggests that both Pnei Yehoshua and Tzelach can be seen as fitting a combined approach in which reasoning has Torah-level weight but command is needed to turn it into a full prohibition.
We Do Not Punish Based on Logical Derivation: Refutation, Difference in Punishment, and the Scriptural Source
The speaker returns to the rule that we do not punish based on logical derivation and cites Rabbi Yosef Engel in Atvan DeOraita, who counts three “explanations,” and argues that there are really two explanations plus a scriptural source, not three independent explanations. He rejects the explanation that we do not punish based on logical derivation because of fear of refutation, because there is no place to fear error in reasoning without some indication, and brings proof from the fact that one punishes on the basis of presumptive statuses such as “most acts of intercourse follow the husband.” He notes that an a fortiori argument is a relatively weak form of reasoning and therefore refutations are common there, but still argues that fear of refutation should not be accepted as a principled reason to deny punishment, and he prefers the other explanation that distinguishes between types of punishment or requires an explicit warning.
Bava Batra: Be Fruitful and Multiply, Wicked Rule, and “Better That They Be Unwitting Than Deliberate Sinners”
The speaker cites a Talmudic passage in Bava Batra at the end of the chapter Chazkat HaBatim in the name of Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha: after the destruction of the Temple, law would dictate decreeing not to eat meat and not to drink wine, but one does not impose a decree on the community unless most of the community can endure it. He quotes the continuation about “wicked rule” that abolishes Torah and commandments and does not allow people “to enter the week of the son, and some say the salvation of the son,” and there “law would dictate that we decree upon ourselves not to marry a woman and not to have children,” but “leave Israel alone; better that they be unwitting than deliberate sinners.” He asks: seemingly, without a decree the public is fulfilling the commandment of being fruitful and multiplying and is not unwitting at all. He therefore concludes that the Talmud assumes that by reasoning it would have been proper to refrain from procreation even without a rabbinic enactment, and the hesitation was whether to reveal such a law-of-reasoning to the public, with the ruling that it should not be revealed so as not to turn the unwitting into deliberate sinners. He emphasizes that the example shows interpretive reasoning that qualifies the Torah commandment of being fruitful and multiplying without an explicit enactment, and notes that this has implications for questions of family planning.
Hezekiah: “Why Involve Yourself in the Hidden Things of the Merciful One?” and Reasoning That Was Rejected
The speaker mentions Hezekiah, who used reasoning to avoid having children because he saw that a wicked person would come from him, and was answered, “Why involve yourself in the hidden things of the Merciful One?” He distinguishes between reasoning based on a private future prophecy, where possibilities of repentance and change may exist, and an existing public situation of decrees that prevent Torah and commandments, and argues that the discussion in Bava Batra concerns a different kind of reasoning that relates to present reality. He raises the possibility that Hezekiah erred either in the reasoning itself or in the way he used the reasoning, and concludes with this as a continuation of the foundational point of the series about the need for a reason in order to cast doubt and about the limits of deciding by force of reasoning.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This series, really, I built in something like three blocks. The first block dealt with the concept of scriptural decree, and I tried to show and argue that even a scriptural decree has some kind of reason. Not only is there a reason, but we can even know it. It’s not necessarily even a hidden reason. Beyond what Maimonides writes in the Guide for the Perplexed, that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not do things without a reason, and therefore clearly behind every commandment there has to be some reason, my claim was that beyond that, not only must there be some reason, but we can at least try to understand it, even in those things about which it is said that they are a scriptural decree. Meaning, basically, this is a view that says there has to be reasoning behind everything. That was the first block. The second block dealt with the reason of the verse, and there apparently you see the opposite—that one has to be very careful with such logical considerations. Who knows, maybe you’re mistaken, and therefore we do not derive law from the reason of the verse, because perhaps you’re mistaken in the explanation you’re offering for the commandment. There too I continued consistently in the same direction and tried to show that this is not the explanation, or at least it’s not a plausible explanation, for all kinds of reasons. If there’s a concern about error, then of course there’s also concern about error if we do not derive law from the reason of the verse, and the question is why that concern is preferable to this concern. If we have a sensible reason for a commandment, but there’s a concern that maybe we’re wrong—on the other hand, this is the reason that seems logical to us, so to assume that it is not the reason is an even greater chance of error. Right? If we assume this is the reason, maybe we’re wrong—but if we assume it’s not the reason, it’s even more likely that we’re wrong, because this is what sounds logical to us. That’s what it means for the reason to be logical: it is more reasonable than the alternatives. So it seems to me that at least on the logical level, this explanation—that we do not derive law from the reason of the verse because of fear of error—is not plausible. So then why? I explained—at least in Maimonides’ view, you see this I think quite clearly—because Maimonides says we do not derive law from the reason of the verse even in a place where the reason is written explicitly in the Torah. For example, “he shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away.” So the Torah itself gives the reason. And if the Torah itself gives the reason, then why in that case do we not derive law from the reason of the verse? And we saw there in Maimonides—that is, there is a Mishnah there, where a dispute is brought between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda, and Maimonides rules like neither of them. I showed that there is actually a first tanna in that Mishnah, even though it looks as if there are only two positions; in fact there are three, and Maimonides rules like the first tanna, who does not derive law from the reason of the verse even in a place where the reason is written in the Torah. Now, that apparently means that the issue of not deriving law from the reason of the verse is not because of concern that maybe we are mistaken. Because where the Torah itself writes the reason, there is no reason to be concerned that we are mistaken. It wrote it itself; this is not our speculation. And therefore I proposed another explanation for why we do not derive law from the reason of the verse: because the place where one would need to derive law from the reason of the verse is where purposive considerations, teleological interpretation, lead to a different conclusion than linguistic considerations do. That is where the dilemma arises—whether to derive law from the reason of the verse or not, right? Where the purpose basically leads me to a halakhic conclusion different from what is written in the plain sense of the verse. Then I ask myself whether to follow the purposive interpretation or not. Only in such a case does the dilemma arise. But in such a case, says Maimonides, it may indeed be that you erred in deriving law from the reason of the verse. In a place where the reason leads you to a different conclusion from what is written in the verse, there you probably erred about the reason. Why? Because there is no reason to assume that the verse was phrased carelessly or imprecisely; the Holy One, blessed be He, formulated it. So why would He formulate it incorrectly? After all, if the considerations of wording lead to one conclusion and the considerations of reason lead to another, and if the reason is correct, then that means the considerations of wording are not correct. What, the Holy One, blessed be He, phrased it incorrectly? Therefore, says Maimonides—or the first tanna according to Maimonides—we do not derive law from the reason of the verse simply because, in the place where the dilemma of whether to derive law from it exists, that itself is an indication that you probably erred in analyzing the reason. But this is not a general concern—only where it contradicts the plain sense of the text. And I showed that this is true even where the reason is written explicitly in the Torah. Even there, you can still err about the reason. Meaning, this is not a general fear of error; it is fear of an incorrect interpretation of the correct reason. You may arrive at the correct reason, but it is not at all certain that you will draw the correct conclusions from it. For example, in the context of the king: “he shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away.” So one who does derive law from the reason of the verse there is basically saying that women who do not turn his heart away—righteous women like Abigail—he can multiply as much as he wants, even eighteen. So he says: if they’re like Abigail. Then he says: if they’re like Abigail, then even thirty, because they won’t turn his heart away. That is deriving law from the reason of the verse. And the final conclusion is that we do not derive law from the reason of the verse even though it is written in the Torah. Why? What I argued is that we do not derive law from it because, although that is indeed the correct reason—after all, it is written in the Torah, so clearly it is the correct reason, the Torah itself says it—still, even though it is the correct reason, you applied it incorrectly. Because you think that thirty wives like Abigail will not turn the king’s heart away—but that’s not true. Thirty wives, even if they are like Abigail, will turn his heart away. Because he will be constantly occupied with all his wives’ matters instead of dealing with the things he ought to be dealing with. Not because the women are wicked specifically, but simply because having many wives is not good and turns the king’s heart away from his task. So the reason is indeed a correct reason—that his heart should not turn away. The reason why he should not multiply wives is so that his heart should not turn away. But if I reached the conclusion that the application of that reason leads to a conclusion different from what is written in the verse—in the verse it says up to eighteen, but the application of the reason led me to say no, if they are like Abigail then even thirty—but the Torah says up to eighteen, after the Sages’ interpretation, let’s say, up to eighteen—that’s what it says. So how can that be? Apparently I applied the reason incorrectly. And the reason is indeed correct—the concern that his heart may turn away is the correct reason—but apparently I applied it incorrectly, because the fact is that it contradicts what emerges from the wording of the verse. So that was the second block. Right? Once I say that behind every commandment there is a reason, the question arises: so why don’t we derive law from the reason of the verse? We don’t derive law from the reason of the verse not because of fear of error—and here I’m really continuing the same direction—but because in a place where there is a contradiction with the wording of the text, there there is apparently a concern about error. But not that, generally speaking, whenever I draw some conclusion, I therefore need to be concerned that maybe I made a mistake. I use reasoning in very many places in Jewish law, and nowhere do we find concern that maybe I made a mistake in the reasoning. Not that there is no such concern—of course one can always make a mistake—but what can you do? The Torah was not given to ministering angels. This is the best I know, so this is what I have to work with. Meaning, there is no reason to begin being suspicious of everything I think—maybe it isn’t correct—because then we won’t get anywhere. And that leads me to the third block, which I began last time, and that is the status of reasoning in general. So if indeed behind everything there is reasoning, and if indeed one need not fear making a mistake in reasoning—again, except where maybe I’ll just add one more sentence, one more remark. I said that basically behind everything there is reasoning—that was the first block. The second block: one need not fear that one made a mistake in reasoning. Again, of course one can always make a mistake in reasoning, we’re human beings—but in the absence of a reason, I do not need to fear that I made a mistake in reasoning. If that is my reasoning, I go with it; the Torah was not given to ministering angels. That reminds me of the story in the Talmud in Shabbat 30. The Talmud there brings two stories, one about Rabbi and one about Rabbi Chiya, where someone comes to him and says, “Your wife is my wife and your son is my son.” And to the other one he says, “Your mother is my wife and you are my son.” Like, some mamzer kind of thing. Meaning, basically, I slept with your mother, and he’s not her husband, and you’re her son—you’re not at all the son of the man you think is your father. So he says to him, “Would you like to drink a cup of wine?” He drank and burst. Meaning, he gave him a cup of wine, gave him a cup of wine and waved him off to hell, could be the guy died, there’s an interpretation there of what exactly “drank and burst” means, doesn’t matter—but basically he brushed him off. He did not respond to the claim. And Rabbi Kook there in Ein Ayah explains that the lesson or the message of those stories—I think we once spoke about this—the message of those stories is that in order to be concerned or to doubt, you need a reason. We do not doubt without a reason. And therefore, someone comes—there is something that has presumptive status. The Talmud in Kiddushin says: “They burn and stone on the basis of presumptive statuses.” Right? “One who strikes his father or mother shall surely be put to death.” Who says that is his father? It’s only a presumption that most acts of intercourse follow the husband. Who says that’s his father? You’re killing a person—“shall surely be put to death.” You kill a person because he struck his father, and maybe that’s not his father? There is a presumption that most acts of intercourse follow the husband. You kill someone based on a presumption? “By the testimony of two witnesses.” You can’t do less than two witnesses. Right? Circumstantial evidence won’t help. You don’t execute a person based on circumstantial evidence, at least according to Maimonides, even if it’s absolutely 100 percent. Only two witnesses. So in this case too you’re using a presumption to kill him? The answer is yes, because the presumption only tells me: look, this is what is established. This is my father, everybody knows this is my father, I know this is my father, there is no reason in the world to cast doubt on the fact that this is my father. Since that is so, it’s like two witnesses. You don’t need two witnesses—it’s obvious. If everybody holds this way, it’s obvious. That doesn’t mean it couldn’t be otherwise. It could be otherwise, but in order to awaken a doubt that maybe it is otherwise, you need a reason. So if a witness comes, or two witnesses, or an unceasing rumor, or things like that, and says there’s some problem here, then we begin to doubt. Without that, we do not doubt. In order to doubt, you need a reason.
[Speaker B] And the man who comes and testifies about himself—isn’t he a reason? What man? The one who says, “You are my son.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, apparently that is not a sufficient reason.
[Speaker B] Sufficient.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A person does not render himself wicked. There are many explanations there, but apparently that is not a sufficient reason. Yes, exactly. So Rabbi Kook says, also regarding that Talmudic passage in Shabbat that I cited earlier, it’s the same thing. Meaning, if something is presumed to be a certain way—a presumption. I once told that I was in Bnei Brak, and in the synagogue there where I prayed—it was a sort of kollel fellows’ minyan—so in our synagogue, the son of one of the kollel men became bar mitzvah, and he gave a short lesson that Sabbath. And he gave a lesson on whether one may count for a minyan a child who says he is bar mitzvah. Like, people always ask: do we have ten? How old are you? Like, there’s some kid here—how old are you? Are you already bar mitzvah? Fine, and “He is compassionate.” Who says he is believed, this child? So he says, admission by the litigant. So what if he says so? He might even be a gentile, who knows what, do you know who he is? It’s a ridiculous lesson. Why is it ridiculous? Because if he says he is thirteen and that’s how he is regarded in his surroundings, this is something that can be clarified, people know him and he’s from the area—then he’s bar mitzvah. Why are you now getting into the laws of evidence? You get into the laws of evidence in a place where you have room to doubt; concern that maybe he is a liar, or I don’t know what, there is some particular indication that maybe this isn’t so. Fine, then we start investigating, and the laws of evidence—everything’s fine. The laws of evidence are meant for situations where we have some actual doubt. Yes, it’s like my favorite story about Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz—another of the thousands of stories told about him—where the priest comes to him and says, why don’t you follow us? We are the majority, and it says in the Torah, “follow the majority.” So he says, when I’m in doubt, I follow the majority. If I’m not in doubt, I do not follow the majority. That’s not a joke—it’s completely true. Completely true. There is no reason in the world to follow the majority when I am not in doubt. If there is a piece of meat I found in the street, fine, most stores in the city sell non-kosher meat, in principle I’m supposed to go after the majority of stores—but this piece of meat has a seal of premium kashrut on it. Okay? So am I supposed to worry that maybe this meat is non-kosher? If I’m not in doubt about this piece because it has a recognized seal, then this piece is kosher. What do I care that most stores in the city are non-kosher? I don’t follow the majority in a place where I’m not in doubt. I don’t use rules and laws of evidence where I have no doubt. Therefore, the claim—and this is a simple claim—the basic claim is that in order to be in doubt about something that sounds reasonable, that seems correct, that is established as it is, you need a reason. The fact that I’m not certain is not a basis for doubt. By the way, this is one of the great mistakes, I think, of postmodern thinking, which constantly repeats and says: look, but it isn’t certain, you can make mistakes, there are narratives, there’s this and that, everyone and we are all human beings—which is all true. So what? True, one can err. So what? In order to doubt, you need a reason. The fact that one can err—true, one can err. Okay, if you bring some indication that there’s an error in what I’m saying, certainly one needs to worry that maybe I’m mistaken. But if there is no indication, then what, I’m not supposed to rely on anything I think? So if once someone erred in sight, saw a mirage in the desert, from that point on he will no longer believe his eyes? No—there is an indication. If you are in the desert, and we know there are such things as mirages, then pay attention: if you suddenly see an oasis in the middle of the desert, you may not be seeing correctly. We already know there is a reason to cast doubt, so I say okay, it may not be correct. But if I’m just here and I see, I don’t know, my tefillin, then my tefillin are here. What does it matter that I heard about mirages? Meaning, it’s not because I’m certain, but because in order to doubt, you need a reason. And that reminds me—they reminded me of a story of Bertrand Russell. He was one of the great pianists of the twentieth century—let’s go back a second—more importantly, a very important mathematician and philosopher. So Bertrand Russell has his famous parable of the celestial teapot. He tells it about why he has no concern at all that religious faith is correct. Suppose someone comes and tells me there is a small teapot orbiting the planet Jupiter. So he says: look, I have no idea whether there is or isn’t a teapot there, but I’m not going to be in a fifty-fifty state…
[Speaker C] About that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, why should I assume there is even room to doubt such a thing? Just as I know nothing about teapots there, he knows nothing either. Let’s say we ask him, how do you know? I don’t see the teapot there. Of course you don’t see it, because it’s small—how can you see a small teapot from that distance? Fine, if that’s so—fifty-fifty. Fifty-fifty: either there’s a teapot or there isn’t. It doesn’t work like that. For him the idea of God—the Deity, right?—is basically the same thing as a celestial teapot, and he’s making a logical claim. But the parable is a correct parable. Meaning, you also need a reason to be at fifty-fifty; it is not true that every time you know nothing, it’s fifty-fifty. Not true. If something is reasonable, then it is probably the correct thing until there is a reason to think otherwise. Okay? So here too—just a second, I’m only finishing the introduction—here too it’s the same thing. And the claim is that it is true that our reasoning is prone to error; we can make mistakes, obviously. No one can be certain that his reasoning is absolutely right. But that is not an argument against using reasoning. If that is my reasoning, then as far as I’m concerned it is probably correct. It could be that if someone brings an indication and shows me—listen, there are some refutations of this line of reasoning, it’s not so simple—fine, okay, then I need to reexamine it, then I’m in doubt. But as long as no one has shown me that, the mere fact that I am a human being and can make mistakes changes nothing. It changes nothing. Even though it’s true—not because it isn’t true, it is true—but it changes nothing. Because if this is what seems right to me logically, then for me that is the assumption. And if I think that the reason for this law is a certain reason, then I have no reason in the world to assume there is some other hidden reason that I don’t know, instead of the very reasonable reason by which I understand the law. Why assume that this isn’t correct? Therefore I say that you need a reason in order to cast doubt on what I think. And regarding the reason of the verse, that is exactly the point. Meaning, generally speaking, what we mean by not deriving law from the reason of the verse—in general, when we see a verse, there is a logical rationale, and we can also understand that rationale. That was the first block I mentioned. In the second block I say yes, but this is where there is a difference between the interpretation according to the reasoning and what emerges from the wording of the verse, and then the question of the reason of the verse arises—whether to follow the reason or the wording of the verse. Only in such situations. In such a case there is reason to cast doubt on my reasoning, because the interpretation that follows from the reasoning leads to a different conclusion than the interpretation that comes out of the wording of the verse. Ah—then indeed you need to be concerned that perhaps the reasoning is incorrect. But only because there is reason to be concerned. Meaning, in general, if I understand a verse in a certain way, there is no problem whatsoever. And therefore I said that in most Talmudic sugyot, cases of the reason of the verse are extremely rare. The Talmud uses reasoning all the time, and nowhere do we find the Talmud saying, wait, what are you doing deriving law from the reason of the verse? Nowhere. There is a dispute in maybe three places in the entire Talmud between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda—“you shall not take a widow’s garment as collateral,” and in the case of the king it works in the reverse as we saw—and that’s more or less it, maybe one other place. Now, this comes up here and there among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but it’s very rare. I would have expected—what do you mean? There is reasoning everywhere. Everywhere I would expect: wait, wait, we do not derive law from the reason of the verse, what are you doing using reasoning? What nonsense. In a place where the reasoning contradicts the wording of the verse, then we do not derive law from the reason of the verse. In a place where the reasoning fits the wording of the verse, then what is the problem? Obviously I will interpret the verse according to the reasoning, and I will also draw halakhic conclusions from that reasoning. This is not only interpretation of the Torah, but also part of the halakhic consideration. If the reasoning interprets the verse and there is no tension between the result of purposive interpretation and the result of linguistic interpretation, then there certainly we follow the reason—why not? You need a reason to cast doubt, as I said earlier, and here there is no reason to cast doubt. If that is my interpretation, then that is what I go with.
[Speaker D] And what we discussed in the past—that Rava says that you are forbidden to save yourself, that you may not kill someone else in order to save yourself. “Who says,” and so on. But when there is a case—thirty against one—where the reasoning seems to say, well, thirty people are more important than one, we still do not allow killing one in order to save…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So really, why not? Really, why not?
[Speaker D] Because usually they say that you may not kill one to save…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Oh really?
[Speaker D] …one.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The fact that people usually say it—people usually say things; people usually also speak slander. The question is what what they say is based on. On reasoning. You yourself said it—not based on reasoning? You yourself say: “Who says your blood is redder?” The Talmud itself brings a logical argument for that. So there you have proof that the reasoning says not to kill the thirty to save the one. Otherwise where did they get it from? You can say: I don’t like the reasoning of those halakhic decisors, fine. But when the decisors say it, they say it on the basis of reasoning; they don’t have a verse for it. So right there you see that the ruling is based on reasoning—it is not against reasoning.
[Speaker D] I understand, but when the reasoning doesn’t apply…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the opposite, the opposite. They say that the reasoning there too says not to kill the thirty. Because if it didn’t say that, then why would they say it? There is no scriptural source for it; the whole law is reasoning. So really—rather, you can say I don’t agree with the reasoning of these decisors, that’s perfectly fine. Then one can argue. But when the decisors say such a thing, they say it because the reasoning says it, not because one does not follow reasoning. What else should we follow? There’s no verse there. If there is a verse against reasoning, I say okay, we don’t follow the reasoning, there’s a verse. Here there is no verse; the entire law is based on reasoning.
[Speaker E] So clearly everything we do is just reasoning. To argue about what the reasoning says—that’s what we were talking about there. If there is logic in lines of reasoning, then why is there a hierarchy of earlier authorities? Who said there is? The Torah changes in every generation. Absolutely. Completely. That’s obvious.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides writes at the beginning of the laws of rebels against rabbinic authority—Maimonides writes about this. Any religious court in any generation can change what a previous religious court established. A matter established by a formal count can be released only by another formal count, but with a count—certainly even if it is not greater in wisdom and number—a matter whose basis is in interpretation of a verse or in reasoning, any religious court can change the words of an earlier religious court. With rabbinic enactments there is a special rule that it has to be a religious court greater in wisdom and number. Fine, so because the Sages may have wanted to reinforce their words, or I explained it in another way too, and so on. Okay, so those were the first two blocks. Now I’m at the third block. The third block says: okay, so what do we do with reasoning? If reasoning is so strong and there’s no reason to cast doubt on it unless there is a concrete reason—but if not, then I don’t need to worry that my reasoning is wrong. Fine. So if that’s the case, then it really seems natural to reach the conclusion that reasoning is Torah-level. And that’s the third block: reasoning is Torah-level. What does that mean? I mentioned a simple assumption in several places. There is a booklet by Rabbi Kasher, and he has a book on the Rogatchover, Mefane’ach Tzefunot. Do you know this story? Rabbi Kasher, I think, still managed to study a bit with the Rogatchover in Europe, I think, and afterward he lived in the United States for a long time. And one fine day, I think in the 1960s, a woman comes to him and says, listen, Rabbi, at some dinner or something, listen, I have a sack full of Torah manuscripts. I have no idea what this means or what to do with it—maybe you’ll know what to do with it. So he looks through it and sees that these are manuscripts of the Rogatchover, which are worth millions—you have to understand, an entire sack came to him. Then he founded the Torah Shelemah Institute, what today also has a branch in Israel and in the United States, which published Mefane’ach Tzefunot, and he brought out the writings of the Rogatchover. And it turns out that the Rogatchover’s daughter was married to the rabbi of Petah Tikva, Rabbi Katz. And a little before the Holocaust she wanted to go bring her father’s writings from Europe. They told her not to travel because the Nazis were already there, and I think it was already really 1939 or something like that. She went anyway and was killed there. Meaning, they caught her and murdered her, but apparently she managed to send many of the writings, if not all of them. He apparently had enormous quantities. She managed to send many of the writings to the United States, and that was basically the sack that Rabbi Kasher received there. In any case, his main book, Rabbi Kasher’s presentation of the Rogatchover’s method, is Mefane’ach Tzefunot, by analogy to Tzafnat Pane’ach, which are the Rogatchover’s own works. And there it’s a kind of encyclopedia of the Rogatchover, with all the forms of thinking. I once talked about this, about associations. I once talked about the fact that the hardest task, even on the mathematical level I think, or the logical one, is to try to index the Torah not by topics. Say, the Shulchan Arukh or Maimonides organize Torah by topics: the laws of holidays, the laws of vows, the laws of civil law, damages, things of that kind. But if I want, say, to help teach a talmudic scholar, then what I really need is an encyclopedia of lines of reasoning, or forms of thought, or distinctions. Because these things cut across topics—you can have the same type of distinction in many different kinds of passages. Now, it would be very useful if someone made such a thing, because when you get stuck on some difficulty, here—you have a toolbox, you can see which tool to use. Let them make an encyclopedia! What’s the problem with making such an encyclopedia? The problem is there’s no way to index it. You need to give a person a book where he has the ability to flip through and get to the place he needs. He can’t read the whole book every time he gets stuck on one problem, otherwise we haven’t accomplished anything, right? Meaning, you need to give it, say, according to the alphabet or something like that, but there’s no logical alphabetical order here. How will the reader know which page to go to in order to find the tool he needs? There’s no way to index that. And that’s the million-dollar question. Whoever succeeds in finding an index of that type, I think he will have advanced Torah study by ten generations. You could organize a structured index of all forms of thought and distinctions, the differentiations, make a Talmudic encyclopedia of reasoning—not of topics, not alphabetically, which is easy to index, but of reasoning. And then you don’t have to reinvent the wheel. You’re stuck on a difficulty, you flip through, get to the right page, you have three options, you choose which one makes sense here and move on. You can develop Torah further; you don’t have to reinvent it every time. Never mind. In any event, Mefane’ach Tzefunot basically tries to do something like this throughout. It’s an encyclopedia of reasoning. Say, time—the nature of time—that’s one chapter. Is it made of parts or not made of parts? A list of references in the Rogatchover for either side. Is time, I don’t know, existent or non-existent? That’s a subsection in the same chapter; again, a list of passages where the Rogatchover discusses whether yes or no. That’s the closest thing I know to an index for an encyclopedia of reasoning. But there, of course, you can only go by the content. There’s no natural index, so it’s simply indexed by content. Here he talks about time, here he talks about that—you can find it. That’s relatively easy to do. In any case, there—I’m going back, clear associations. At the beginning there is a booklet called Reasoning Is Torah-Level. And there he brings the Or Zarua, from Alfa Beita, and all kinds of writers among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), whose simple conclusion is that reasoning is Torah-level. Exactly what I said before: because behind everything there is reasoning, and if there is no reason to assume it is mistaken unless there is some indication of that, then ordinarily I don’t worry that I made a mistake in reasoning—so what’s the problem? If I have a line of reasoning, it is probably correct. And therefore indeed the Talmud in several places asks: why do I need a verse? It’s simple reasoning.
[Speaker C] This is a new kind of Torah-level, not a strong Torah-level. We’ll see in a minute.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For now, no. So why do I need a verse? It’s simple reasoning. Meaning, if the Talmud asks why I need a verse when I already have reasoning, that implies the Talmud understands that reasoning and a verse have equal status. Right? Because if reasoning yielded only a rabbinic law and the verse yielded a Torah-level law, then there’s no question of why I need a verse if it’s simple reasoning. Why do I need the verse? To tell me it’s Torah-level and not rabbinic. What do you mean, why do I need the verse? True, I would know it even without the verse, but without the verse I would think it’s rabbinic, and the verse comes to tell me it’s Torah-level. Rather, if the Talmud asks why do I need a verse—it’s simple reasoning—the Talmud is apparently assuming that something derived from reasoning is not only correct and valid, but has a status like Torah-level law. But that’s really the third block—not certain. Meaning, it has status. Something derived from reasoning—first of all, everything is reasoning. Second, the second block: there is no need to worry that the reasoning is mistaken unless there is some reason, some indication, that it is mistaken. Third stage: not only do we not need to worry that the reasoning is mistaken, but reasoning has a status like a verse. Meaning, we are so confident it is correct, we are so allowed to rely on it, that from our standpoint it’s like a verse. On this there is a dispute. And that’s what we’re discussing, so—
[Speaker C] But with your own reasoning you could still be mistaken.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, that’s exactly what we’re discussing. So now should I worry that I was mistaken? If I need to worry that I was mistaken, then we’re already stuck in the second block. Assuming there is no concern that I was mistaken, then this reasoning has a status like Torah-level law. So this conception that reasoning is Torah-level—that’s what I brought at the end of the previous class. I spoke about the Pnei Yehoshua and the Tzelach. That’s what leads the Pnei Yehoshua to challenge the Talmud in Berakhot. The Talmud in Berakhot looks for a source for blessings over enjoyment—how do we know one blesses over food before eating it? And there are various attempts there to derive it. In the end the conclusion is that it is forbidden to benefit from this world without a blessing—that’s reasoning. It is forbidden to benefit from this world without a blessing, and whoever benefits from this world without a blessing is as if he misappropriated sacred property, like misuse of consecrated property. And therefore the reasoning is that you must bless before you eat. That’s the Talmud. So on that the Pnei Yehoshua asks: if so, then reasoning should make it Torah-level. Because the blessing should be Torah-level, because if the blessing is derived from reasoning, and the Talmud says everywhere, why do I need a verse? It’s simple reasoning—that means reasoning has equal status to a verse. So in fact the law of blessings over enjoyment should have been a Torah-level law. Doubts about blessings should have required stringency, not leniency. But we know that blessings over enjoyment are rabbinic law, not Torah-level law. So how do we understand such a thing? So the Tzelach—and I argued—that what is really true is that blessings over enjoyment are in fact Torah-level. The Pnei Yehoshua is right. It really is Torah-level, and nevertheless the laws that in cases of doubt regarding blessings we are lenient are still correct. Why? Because the Torah-level law of blessing is the law to thank the Holy One, blessed be He, in order to remove it from the category of misuse of sacred property. Say thank you to the Holy One, blessed be He, for the apple you gave me before I eat it. But to bless with God’s name and kingship, with the specific liturgical formula of the blessing—that is rabbinic law. For the Torah-level requirement, in order for me to avoid misuse of sacred property, it is enough for me to say thank you to the Holy One, blessed be He, in my own language, and then I have fulfilled the Torah-level obligation. The Sages instituted a formal text for the blessing, but the obligation to bless in that format is only rabbinic law. So if I am in doubt—that’s the conclusion—if I am in doubt, then the Torah-level part I must fulfill, because with a Torah-level doubt we are stringent, and therefore I need to thank the Holy One, blessed be He.
[Speaker D] But the blessing formula, especially since there is—
[Speaker C] Here there’s the issue of an unnecessary blessing, so—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The blessing formula is only a law—
[Speaker C] Rabbinic, and therefore in a doubtful case—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In my opinion that’s the halakhic conclusion.
[Speaker C] And what I think is, I think he mentions in the later authorities (Acharonim) something like this, and he says Rabbi Igra in the name of the Hafla’ah. Oh yes?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, no, I didn’t know that. Interesting. If you have a reference I’d be happy to see it. In any case, it’s a bit like Maimonides on prayer. Yes, Maimonides on prayer—Maimonides says that the law of prayer is Torah-level. Nachmanides disagrees with him. But it’s clear that Maimonides agrees that the prayer formula and the prayer times and the wording and all those things, all the laws of prayer, are rabbinic laws; the Men of the Great Assembly established them, the Amidah. Right? Why? So what’s the relationship? There is some Torah-level obligation to pray, but you can do it in any form you want and whenever you want. The particular form the Sages established is rabbinic law. Therefore, in terms of the laws of doubt, if you are in doubt whether you prayed at all, then according to Maimonides, a Torah-level doubt requires stringency—you need to pray, but in your own language. Because as far as rabbinic law is concerned, a rabbinic doubt is treated leniently. Okay? I think the same idea exists regarding blessings too. Now, the Tzelach comments on the Pnei Yehoshua—and we managed to see this already at the end of last time. The Tzelach comments on the Pnei Yehoshua: where do we ever find such a thing? According to that, we don’t need verses at all. Anything that has reasoning behind it wouldn’t need verses? What do you mean, reasoning is Torah-level? There can’t be such a thing. So why does the Torah write laws that have reasoning behind them? It makes no sense. Therefore, says the Tzelach, there is no such thing. Clearly, something derived from reasoning is not Torah-level, and therefore all blessings too are rabbinic except for Grace after Meals, which is written explicitly: “And you shall eat and be satisfied and bless.” Yes? That’s what he says: to say that something based on reasoning is considered a Torah-level commandment—we have never heard such a thing. And if that were so, then all the commandments that are rational would have been written for nothing. So how does he explain this? I think the conception behind it—you can read his wording carefully—but I think I understand what he meant. You have to distinguish between two situations. One situation is reasoning that is interpretive reasoning. Meaning, where I have some law written in the Torah, and I have reasoning that says this law is like this and not like that—in other words, I am interpreting the law and using reasoning to interpret the law. There, reasoning is Torah-level. And there it does not need to be written; the Torah does not need to write that the law is such-and-such. If I understand it through reasoning, then the law is such-and-such. But in a place where the reasoning creates an entirely new law—not interpretive reasoning, but legislative reasoning, reasoning that creates a new law and does not interpret an existing Torah-level law—in such a place the law is not Torah-level. That is the Tzelach’s claim. Now, in our case, blessings over enjoyment, the reasoning creates a new law. The reasoning wants to establish that one must bless before food. That is not interpretation of an existing Torah-level law; it is creating a new law. About that he says: we have not found such a thing, because if reasoning could create new laws, then the rational laws would not have needed to be written. The Torah would not have needed to write rational laws. Only where you use reasoning to interpret a verse—that is obvious, that’s what we do all the time. You use reasoning to interpret a verse. Once you used reasoning, that is what the verse means. Now when you fulfill the Jewish law that you interpreted, you fulfill it because that is what the verse says, not because that is what your reasoning said. So fine, that can be done. Reasoning is a legitimate interpretive tool. And in that sense, of course, there is no problem; reasoning absolutely can replace a verse. But it cannot be that reasoning replaces a verse in order to create an entirely new law. That really is—
[Speaker F] Just a second, only regarding the examples—only regarding whether you’re creating something new or not. What? You need reasoning to tell you whether this is a novelty or whether it’s part of an existing law. Like “and you shall eat and be satisfied and bless”—you could say the law is that you need to bless, and now the reasoning comes to tell me when I need to bless. Not a new law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so that’s interpretive. That’s interpretive, because you are interpreting the Torah’s law—when one needs to bless. What the Torah did not write.
[Speaker F] No, what I’m saying is: a new law, to bless before—that’s a new law. Right. The blessing itself. The blessing itself. I’m saying you could say it’s not the blessing itself; that too is interpretive—to say that the Torah’s general rule was that you need to bless. Where is it written? “And you shall eat and be satisfied and bless.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that is the Torah-level law of Grace after Meals. No one is claiming that this reasoning is what lies behind—“it is forbidden to benefit from this world without a blessing” is not an explanation of Grace after Meals. If it were an explanation of Grace after Meals, then there would be no need for a blessing beforehand. Grace after Meals already removes it from the category of misuse of sacred property.
[Speaker F] What I’m asking is: how do you always know? You also need reasoning to tell you when this is a novelty and when it is not a novelty.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. That’s part of the reasoning. Part of the reasoning also tells me whether this is included in an existing law or whether it creates a new law. Of course. Yes. I’ll continue.
[Speaker D] I’m going back to that same Talmudic passage with Rava, that you may not save yourself by killing someone else in order to save yourself. Is that a novelty? Or is that Torah-level?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, a novelty? It is a definition within the parameters of “you shall not murder.” It is not a novelty. He says that even in such a case of killing, that’s an interpretation of “you shall not murder.” In order to permit killing someone, you need a very good explanation. He says here there is no good reason: “Is your blood redder than your fellow’s blood?” Therefore the prohibition of murder applies here too. For example, a practical difference, like what we discussed back then: suppose I went and murdered someone to save myself. Did I violate the prohibition of murder, or did I violate the prohibition of “Why do you think your blood is redder?” There is no prohibition called “Why do you think.” “Why do you think” is reasoning that says that even in such a situation the prohibition of “you shall not murder” still applies. You cannot remove this situation from the prohibition of “you shall not murder”; therefore the prohibition of “you shall not murder” remains in force here. That is clearly interpretation of the prohibition of murder. All the lines of reasoning we know—taking something out and bringing something in—when the Talmud in tractate Sabbath on page 96, if I remember correctly, says: what difference is there between taking out and bringing in? Just as carrying out is forbidden on the Sabbath, bringing in is forbidden on the Sabbath too. Again, that is an interpretation of the prohibition of carrying out. The claim is that the prohibition of carrying out exists not only in that form but also in bringing in. But this case of benefiting from this world without a blessing is a relatively exceptional case; it uses reasoning to create a new law, not to interpret an existing law. About that the Tzelach says: this is not Torah-level; it is something entirely different. The cases where the Talmud says, why do I need a verse? It’s simple reasoning—there are two cases, which actually need a little discussion. One is “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted.” How do we know “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted”? The Talmud says: why are you bringing me a verse? It’s simple reasoning. And the second is: the burden of proof is on the one who seeks to extract money from another. The Talmud says: why do I need a verse? “The one who has the pain goes to the doctor”—the one who suffers the claim has to go prove it. In both of those cases, on the face of it, we’re dealing with a new law, not interpretation of an existing one. But I don’t think that’s correct. It is interpretation of the law of “with righteousness shall you judge your fellow.” The Torah tells me, “with righteousness shall you judge your fellow”—one needs to judge according to an orderly legal process, to judge fairly. What is legal procedure? For example: the burden of proof is on the one seeking to extract money from another. And that is what is called judging fairly. Why? Here, put in the blessing before it.
[Speaker C] And that too is fairness—that he blesses beforehand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And redeeming a firstborn donkey. “With righteousness shall you judge your fellow”—you can put that into every—
[Speaker C] At that level of association you can put it anywhere, but there’s no connection at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s interpretation of the prohibition of misuse of sacred property. Fine, that’s already closer, but it still seems to me far enough away. There are no consecrated items here, nothing connected to misuse of sacred property. It’s hard to see it. Although in fact you brought the students of Rabbenu Yonah who say that someone who eats without a blessing has to bring a guilt-offering. That’s serious. That’s his proof that I’m right, because I said it is a Torah prohibition to eat without a blessing. And what he’s right about is that it is a Torah prohibition. And the fact that you blessed not in the formula of the Sages but because you said thank you. And the proof is from the students of Rabbenu Yonah; there they say one must bring a guilt-offering. Then maybe one really could understand it that way—that it is interpretation of the prohibition of misuse of sacred property. It’s still far-fetched. I already said that regarding a guilt-offering—and we once discussed this at length—that a guilt-offering is brought even for things that involve no prohibition. You do not need a prohibition in order to incur a guilt-offering. Therefore even according to the students of Rabbenu Yonah, I do not think you need to say that it is interpretation of the prohibition of misuse of sacred property.
[Speaker B] Where exactly is the line between Maimonides’ claim that every commandment has a reason and the distinction between rational commandments and non-rational commandments? After all, if every commandment has a reason, then apparently all of them are rational.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is how accessible the reason is to us.
[Speaker B] But no, you’re saying each one has one. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So here too. The question is how much I understand, right? The question is how much I understand. The test of rationality is what I understand, not whether it has a reason; everything has a reason. The question is what I understand. “I said, I will become wise, but it was far from me”—what King Solomon did not know was the red heifer. What does it mean he didn’t know? There was nothing to know? No. When he says he didn’t know, it means there is a reason, but even Solomon, the wisest of all men, did not find it. So that means there are reasons for everything. It’s just that there are things we do not know. Fine, okay.
[Speaker B] So that’s what the Tzelach means when he says—even otherwise, in a place—when he says “rational ones,” why did the Torah say them? So doesn’t he also ask about non-rational ones, why did the Torah say them?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Since there we would not have known without it, therefore the Torah said it in order to tell us. But there is a reason there too. Yes. So I think that’s the essence of the Tzelach’s approach. But—and here you have to pay close attention—in the end, the claim that I think is true is actually with the Pnei Yehoshua and not with the Tzelach, it seems to me. Or I don’t even know whether they are really all that different from one another. I claim that something derived from reasoning really is Torah-level. What the Pnei Yehoshua says—and therefore in a case of doubt we should be stringent, even regarding the blessing beforehand—but only regarding the obligation to bless, not regarding the formula established by the Sages. Then it turns out that even a new law generated by reasoning—there too we say that reasoning has a status of Torah-level law, not as the Tzelach says. But pay close attention: the Tzelach is also right in a certain sense; it’s not full Torah-level law. So what he said earlier—is it rabbinic? Yes. It’s not full Torah-level law. Why not? Because in the way I discussed the eighth principle of Maimonides, from which I brought the meaning of command according to Maimonides—what is a command? I discussed there that when the Torah—yes, people ask why the Torah writes rational commandments, which is what the Tzelach asks. The answer is very simple: because if the Torah had not written them, reason would still tell me to fulfill them, but there would be no command. And in order to punish, for example, you need a command. As I said before: if the Knesset had not legislated that it is forbidden to run a red light, logic would still tell me not to run a red light—it’s dangerous. But if I ran a red light and took the risk, nobody could come to me with claims. I took a risk; you can’t put me on trial. You can put me on trial only where the legislator said that this act is forbidden. Meaning, a command has a status not only as the way in which the legislator informs me what is right and what is wrong. I don’t need him to inform me what is right and what is wrong; I don’t think he is smarter than I am. The meaning of a command is not to pass information to me; the meaning of a command is to command me. And as long as I was not commanded, then the thing is logical and fitting to act that way, but there is no halakhic obligation. So the claim is that, say, if I blessed—let’s say I ate without a blessing, without even thanking, not only without the blessing formula. According to the reasoning I should have blessed. As long as it was not established as law but was only reasoning, then in fact one can come to me with claims that I did not act properly, but one cannot tell me I committed a prohibition. One cannot tell me I committed a prohibition. Yes, in human courts you cannot punish me for that, for example. Just as the Holy One, blessed be He, punishes people also for immoral things, not only for violations of Jewish law, so He can say to me, listen, here you were not okay, you’ll receive punishment. But in human law one cannot punish that; it is not a halakhic obligation, it was not legislated. Therefore the command has—this question of the Tzelach, who asks why we need a command for rational commandments, basically assumes that a command has no role other than to bring to my attention that this thing is forbidden to do. But that is not true. The role of a command is not to inform me of something. Even one who knows—it still has significance to command him. When I command him, I turn what he knows into an obligation. Until now he merely knew that this is the proper way to act; from now on it is already an obligation. And I think I mentioned the eighth principle—that Maimonides speaks there about the negation of obligation. Maimonides says that in a place where there is no instruction from the Torah, even though you understand that this is what the Torah means, that thing is not a prohibition. Only if the verse uses terms like “beware,” “lest,” and “do not”—the Sages say those are expressions of prohibition. Why? But if I know from “therefore the children of Israel do not eat the sciatic nerve to this very day.” Fine—say the Sages tell us that this is a prohibition, but Rashba already asks: how is this suddenly a prohibition? There is no command here at all. It describes some custom: the people of Israel did not eat the sciatic nerve because of what happened to Jacob with the angel. How did that become a prohibition? So Rashba asks that, and he says: it is a tradition from the Sages that nevertheless it is a prohibition. And let’s say there were no such tradition, okay? Then I know it is not proper to eat the sciatic nerve; the children of Israel did not eat the sciatic nerve in memory of Jacob’s struggle with the angel. So why is that not a prohibition? I know it is not proper to do it. What more is needed to make it a prohibition? What is needed is a command. Meaning, it has to say: it is forbidden to eat the sciatic nerve. As long as there is no command, I understand that it is not proper to do it, but there is no obligation. So therefore, even if I say there is reasoning behind—let me maybe give another example—there are all kinds of questions about moral commandments or rational commandments in general; moral commandments are especially striking. Why was “you shall not murder” written? Or “you shall not steal”? Don’t we understand on our own that murder is forbidden? With Cain, the Holy One, blessed be He, comes to him and says, “The voice of your brother’s blood cries out to Me from the ground,” before He ever dreamed of commanding about bloodshed. “Whoever sheds human blood, by man shall his blood be shed,” or “you shall not murder”—that comes later. So how was Cain supposed to know that murder is forbidden? Why did they come to him with claims? First of all, it’s reasoning, right? It’s reasoning that murder is forbidden, and therefore the Holy One, blessed be He, comes to him with claims. Fine, so if it’s so obvious, why do we need the command? After all, the Holy One, blessed be He, already came to him with claims before the command. So why do we need the command afterward? So that the Holy One, blessed be He, can come with claims against a person who does not behave morally. But you need the command in order to turn it into law, into binding law. Now even an earthly court can punish. So “we have heard the punishment, but from where do we know the warning?”—that’s what the Talmud asks in many places. “Warning” means the prohibition in the Torah. And this very terminology of the Sages reveals exactly what I said here: that the meaning of the command is to warn the person, not to explain to him that it is forbidden. I also know that it is forbidden. But as long as I merely know that it is forbidden, it is not a prohibition. Or, as long as I know it is improper—it still is not a prohibition.
[Speaker B] So what remains Torah-level in this?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? So what remains Torah-level in this? So I’m saying: the status of such a thing is like Torah-level. In cases of doubt one may have to be stringent, because after all there is a real problem here. If I am in doubt, I need to be concerned that there may be a problem, and I need to be stringent. As for punishment, there is no warning here. And to punish, you need a warning. So therefore I say this is weak Torah-level. So maybe the Tzelach calls that itself rabbinic, I don’t know. And therefore I say that I’m not at all sure there is a disagreement between the Tzelach and the Pnei Yehoshua. And what I am more sure of is that the truth is like this. Where exactly they stand, I don’t know. I think both of them can agree with what I am saying here. But yes, like what the Shakh always does all the time. We talked about this. The Shakh has those Shakh discussions in civil law the size of soccer fields, enormous, miles long, where he recruits all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and explains that they all say what he says. Meaning, in the end he starts with a view that goes against the accepted understanding in the passage, and then he shows us, one after another, that all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) really say the same thing. He forces some of them—it doesn’t matter—he does what he needs to do in order to line them all up. And what is the idea behind it? He is so convinced that it is true, so the medieval authorities (Rishonim) did not speak nonsense. This is obviously the correct thing. Therefore it is better to force the wording than to force the reasoning. So clearly it is better to endure strained language than strained reasoning, as the Beit Yosef writes. So on his assumption, all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) really say what he says. Here too, I think that both the Pnei Yehoshua and the Tzelach, what they are really saying is this very thing. Okay, so in effect the meaning of all this, the conclusion I am reaching for now in this third block, is that reasoning has some sort of Torah-level status; you can call it Torah-level. We do not doubt the correctness of the reasoning, but it is still not true that a command is therefore unnecessary. You need a command in order to turn something into a full prohibition. Why? Again, according to the same course of the previous blocks. Not because maybe I am mistaken in my reasoning. The command is not meant to say, well, if you had relied on reasoning maybe you’d be wrong, maybe it’s not correct, you can’t rely on your reasoning. No, I can rely on my reasoning. I am continuing the same principle. So why is a command needed? It is needed not in order to reveal to me that this is clearly true. It is needed in order to turn it into a prohibition. To turn it from the proper and improper into the forbidden and permitted, or into an obligation. For that you need a command. So again I say, this all follows the same line: if I have reasoning, there is no reason to cast doubt on it. There is no—fine, I do not think it is correct to say that we cast doubt on it. Therefore, for example, I once also spoke about the rule that we do not administer punishment based on inference, and there too the commentators disagreed why we do not punish—yes, if something is learned by an a fortiori argument, then from the a fortiori argument we do not learn the punishment, only the prohibition. If B is learned from A because B is more severe than A, and A carries some punishment, for B we do not punish. Why? After all, it is more severe. So if on the lighter case we punish, then on the more severe one certainly. But we do not punish based on inference. There are a few explanations for this; I brought it up in another context—ah, in the context of a different passage I discussed it. It’s a very amusing topic. Rabbi Yosef Engel in Atvan De’oraita, and afterward they copy this into the Talmudic Encyclopedia, says there are three explanations. One explanation is: perhaps there is a refutation of the a fortiori argument. You cannot know, therefore you do not punish. A second explanation is that perhaps the punishment for the more severe matter—the punishment of the lighter matter is not enough for the more severe matter. And therefore do not punish. Leave it to the Holy One, blessed be He.
[Speaker B] Maybe it’s just not correct.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How do you take—how do you dare take from the side—there is a difference between punishments that is a difference in kind, not just in intensity. And there are several proofs of that. A third thing is that they learn it from a verse: we do not punish based on inference. “The daughter of his father or the daughter of his mother.” Why does it need to say “the daughter of his mother”? If she is also the daughter of his father, then why say it? To teach you that we do not punish based on inference. It’s a verse. This always amuses me. It’s nonsense, of course, because these are not three explanations. It’s two explanations and a source. There are two explanations for understanding “we do not punish based on inference,” and the source is from the verse that says “the daughter of his father or the daughter of his mother.” Okay? It is not that there are three explanations. When people look at it as three explanations, they assume that anything written in a verse probably has no reasoning behind it. So it’s either reasoning A or reasoning B or there’s no reasoning and it’s just from a verse. But that is not true. What is written in a verse also has reasoning behind it. Exactly what I said here. Therefore these are not three explanations; they are two. There are two explanations, and a source from that verse. And by the way, of the two I would drop one, because of the concern about refutation. In my opinion that cannot be correct, precisely because of what I said here. The concern about refutation is not—why should I be concerned about refutation if I have no indication of it? If I have reasoning, I do not worry that this reasoning is mistaken unless there is some reason to worry. Therefore there too, regarding not punishing based on inference, I do not think it makes sense to say that because of concern for refutation, therefore we do not punish based on inference. Nowhere do I worry about refutation. There are many things I fully believe in that are based on reasoning—not a fortiori arguments, other kinds of reasoning. Many things. So now I can’t punish for anything at all? What about the presumption that most sexual relations are with the husband? Isn’t that reasoning? So how do we punish someone who struck his father or mother? “One who strikes his father or mother shall surely be put to death.” After all, that is based on reasoning, as I said before; it is based on the reasoning that most sexual relations are with the husband. Reasoning? Maybe you are mistaken in that reasoning. How can you punish someone, kill someone, on the basis of reasoning? Yes, you can. So why in the case of an a fortiori argument? An a fortiori argument is the weakest reasoning you know. An a fortiori argument is usually not a good line of reasoning at all. True, there are sometimes refutations; I said, reasoning is not something airtight. But if I have no indication that there is an error here, why assume there is an error? Yes, I do not accept this explanation that we do not punish based on inference because of concern for refutation. Fine. I want to bring an example—also an interesting example on this topic—from the Talmud in Bava Batra at the end of the chapter Chezkat HaBatim. The Talmud says there as follows: It was taught: Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha said, from the day the Temple was destroyed, it would have been proper that we decree upon ourselves not to eat meat and not to drink wine, but we do not decree a decree upon the community unless most of the community can abide by it. Fine, so therefore we do not decree it. And from the day the wicked kingdom spread, which decrees against us evil and harsh decrees and prevents us from Torah and commandments, and does not allow us to enter the week of the son—and some say the redemption of the son, maybe there are two interpretations there, I don’t remember—it would have been proper that we decree upon ourselves not to marry and not to have children, and thus the seed of Abraham our father would come to an end on its own. But leave Israel alone; better that they be inadvertent than deliberate. Again, notice: the first thing was that it would have been proper to decree upon ourselves not to eat meat and not to drink wine when the Temple was destroyed, but we do not decree a decree upon the community unless it can abide by it. That’s one law. The second case: it would have been proper not to engage in procreation because the wicked kingdom does not allow us to fulfill commandments, so there is no need to bring children into the world in a situation where they cannot be educated in Torah and commandments. Okay? But what can you do? Leave Israel alone; better that they be inadvertent than deliberate.
[Speaker C] Again, what does that have to do with—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does it have to do with “better that they be inadvertent than deliberate”? “Better that they be inadvertent than deliberate” means: you are doing a prohibition, and I do not tell you that it is a prohibition, because I know you will not listen to me and will continue doing it, and then you will be deliberate. Better to leave you committing the prohibition inadvertently. But here the Jewish people were engaging in procreation. The Sages are discussing the question whether to tell them not to procreate, whether to decree against procreation because of the wicked kingdom, right? They decide not to decree it. So if they did not decree it, then what is the law? There is the commandment of procreation, right? One must do it. So what does it mean here, “better that they be inadvertent than deliberate”? They are not inadvertent and not deliberate—they are performing a commandment. If the Sages had decreed against procreation, then it would have been forbidden to procreate, and anyone engaging in it would be inadvertent or deliberate. But here the discussion is whether to decree. Now, if they decided not to decree, then someone doing it is neither inadvertent nor deliberate—he is engaging in the Torah’s positive commandment of procreation. Why is he inadvertent? I would have expected that what should appear here is exactly what appeared in the previous case: we do not decree a decree upon the community unless most of the community can abide by it. That is what should have been brought here. And more than that—they brought that principle two lines earlier. So something here cries out for explanation. Two lines earlier they brought that principle, and that is the right principle here too. But here, no—they said “better that they be inadvertent than deliberate.” What is this? It means that in fact someone who is engaging in procreation now is inadvertent. Not that he is fulfilling a positive commandment. In fact it would have been proper not to procreate even without the Sages decreeing it. In such a situation, by reasoning alone one should not procreate. Someone who does not know—the broad public does not know—the Sages debated whether to establish this as an ordinance, to inform the public not to procreate. They said it is not worthwhile; let them remain inadvertent. But still, even when we did not establish it, in essence they should have refrained from procreation, those who understood. It’s just that with someone who does not know, it is better to leave him inadvertent, because better that they be inadvertent than deliberate. What does that mean? That by reasoning alone it emerges that the commandment of procreation does not apply in a place where they do not allow us to fulfill commandments. By reasoning alone, without the Sages establishing anything and without anything else. More than that—even an individual who reaches that reasoning, and the Sages explicitly did not establish it, should have stopped procreating on his own decision, not that of the Sanhedrin.
[Speaker B] Who are we in this whole story?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who were our parents, to be more precise? We are all the children of the ignoramuses of that generation, right? The ones who didn’t know, or who didn’t—
[Speaker D] That’s what I said. We are all descendants of the ignoramuses of that generation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We have—
[Speaker D] Hillel the Elder, Rabban Gamliel. Who said Hillel the Elder was in that generation?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who said we’re talking about the generation of—
[Speaker B] Of—
[Speaker D] Rabban Gamliel?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is brought in the Talmud. Rabbi Yishmael had children; it is explicit that he did. Who said? You see the lineage. The lineage of whom? I don’t know—who is talking to whom here? Rabbi Shimon and Rabban Gamliel?
[Speaker B] Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha, Rabbi Yishmael—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ben Elisha, I don’t know whether he had a child—
[Speaker B] But all the others.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who are the others? I don’t know. Whoever shares this view, the Talmud says he understood on his own not to bring children into the world. He was not inadvertent—that’s what the Talmud says.
[Speaker B] Rabbi Akiva didn’t understand?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, I have no idea. By the way, did Rabbi Akiva have children? Yes, Yehoshua he had. Fine. Every person—the claim is that we are inadvertent. According to this, we are descendants of the ignoramuses of that generation. But for our purposes—so don’t go looking for pedigree in matchmaking; we all have the same pedigree, in the trash. So that’s not—anyway, the claim for our purposes, what we see from here is that the status of reasoning is so strong—and here I’m talking about interpretive reasoning, because this is reasoning that interprets or qualifies the law of procreation, which is a Torah-level law. And this reasoning basically says that in a place where I reach the conclusion through reasoning that it is not worth bringing children into the world, or that it is forbidden to bring children into the world, then in principle I should not bring children into the world. And if I don’t act that way, then I am in the category of inadvertent. Meaning, I did something problematic, but inadvertently; I am not guilty if I didn’t know. If I knew, then I am deliberate. But if I didn’t know. Meaning—and all that came from reasoning, without the Sages even establishing it. Meaning, we should have understood this on our own even without the Sages establishing it. And that’s a very interesting novelty. By the way, this has implications for the laws of procreation in general—how much so-called family planning is really possible. Because there is enormous hysteria around this after the Holocaust, and I think they greatly exaggerate these things. There is definitely room for various considerations here.
[Speaker G] What about Hezekiah?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “What concern is that of yours with the hidden matters of the Merciful One?” Okay.
[Speaker G] There? He said it based on reasoning.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he said this reasoning, “an egg that has not yet been laid.” Meaning, you know that in the future he’ll turn out wicked—why should you concern yourself with the hidden matters of the Merciful One? That’s not correct reasoning. But when you’re living in a generation where there are already decrees in place, and the public is not being allowed to engage in Torah and commandments—that already exists. It’s not some prophecy about what will happen with my son. Prophecies about what will happen with your son—maybe he’ll repent, maybe he’ll in a sense come back to life, so why should you concern yourself with the hidden matters of the Merciful One?
[Speaker B] That actually strengthens it—he used that reasoning.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but they told him no.
[Speaker B] So it’s always a question whether
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whether he was mistaken in the reasoning, or whether what he was actually mistaken about was the very use of that reasoning—that was his mistake. Okay.