Reasoning and Rationales of the Commandments, Lecture 11

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[0:02] Defining the status of reasoning as opposed to Jewish law
[1:21] The dilemma of minors’ obligation in commandments
[3:05] The connection between minors and the animal in the complaint
[6:13] The question of transgression without understanding in a minor
[10:29] The rule: one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition
[12:16] The case of a non-priest serving on the Sabbath
[20:17] The seven Noahide commandments and obligation
[29:13] Obligation without commandment – why punish?
[30:20] Exemption if it wasn’t explained – is that enough?
[32:59] Neglect of Torah study versus the commandment of Torah study
[34:20] The oath of a minor – what does Maimonides say?
[37:57] Is a clever minor obligated in an oath?
[45:14] A written oath – the view of Avnei Nezer
[47:18] The connection between the oath at Mount Sinai and the commandments
[54:52] Reasoning – when does it obligate?
[56:26] The authority of the Sanhedrin versus personal reasoning
[58:31] When the Sanhedrin permits and reasoning is stringent
[59:42] The role of logic in drawing conclusions

Summary

General Overview

The text argues that reasoning has binding status at a Torah-level sense, in that it can establish a prohibition or a moral-halakhic expectation for anyone who understands it, but it cannot create a full Torah-level obligation for purposes of punishment in a human religious court, and certainly not punishments governed by the Torah’s formal framework of commandment and warning. It presents a central implication through the discussion of minors: there are situations in which a minor is considered to have committed a transgression even though he is not punishable. This is explained by saying that things rooted in reasoning obligate anyone who understands them, regardless of age, sex, or status, whereas things dependent on commandment are limited to those whom the Torah actually commanded. The argument is based on passages in Sanhedrin and Yevamot, on Maimonides in the Laws of Kings and the Laws of Claims and Counterclaims, and on interpretations by later authorities and Avnei Nezer in the name of Ri Migash. It sharpens the point that reasoning obligates the individual himself when Jewish law has not ruled, whereas the Sanhedrin’s ruling obligates by force of “do not deviate” even without agreement with the reasoning.

The Status of Reasoning and Its Limits

The text assumes that reasoning has a status like Torah law, but it cannot create a full Torah-level obligation from which one may be punished in a human religious court. It states that the valid use of reasoning is mainly interpretive reasoning, which interprets an existing source in the Torah, rather than reasoning that generates new Jewish law. It emphasizes a distinction between the prohibition or obligation itself and the laws of punishment, which belong to a framework of command. It defines reasoning as a basic perception that something is true, and places it as the foundational assumptions on which logical inferences rest, while logic itself deals with the move from premises to conclusions and not with establishing the truth of the premises.

Obligation of Minors, Stumbling Block, and Shame in Sanhedrin

The text cites the Mishnah in Sanhedrin 54 about stoning an animal in a case of bestiality, and presents the two reasons: stumbling block and shame, including the reasoning that the animal should not pass through the marketplace and people say, “This is the one because of which so-and-so was stoned.” It quotes the discussion in Sanhedrin 55b regarding a girl of three years and one day who had relations in cases of forbidden incestuous relations, where those guilty with her are executed because of her while she herself is exempt. From the continuation it understands that an animal is also stoned when a minor boy or girl committed a transgression through it. It emphasizes that the Talmud concludes that when it was done intentionally there is a stumbling block even in the case of a minor, except that “the Merciful One had compassion on her,” and it cites Rashi’s explanation that stumbling block means “a stumbling block of sin.” From this it concludes that the passage clearly shows that when a minor commits a transgression, there is indeed a transgression even though there is no punishment. It adds that this law is ruled in practice, and asks how this fits with many places in the Talmud where a minor cannot discharge another person’s obligation because he himself is not obligated. It brings the Pri Megadim in the General Introduction, who wants to claim that the exemption of minors is only from punishment, while in principle they are obligated in the commandments, though he notes that most opinions do not take that approach.

The Contradiction from Yevamot and the Resolution through Noahides and Universal Obligation

The text brings the passage in Yevamot about the rule that one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition, and illustrates it with “a non-priest who served on the Sabbath,” where the Talmud establishes the case as one in which “he brought forth two pubic hairs on the Sabbath,” so that the prohibitions of non-priestly service and Sabbath desecration take effect simultaneously. It notes that later authorities such as Elchanan Wasserman, Rabbi Yitzchak Elchanan, Or Sameach, and Chelkat Yoav ask from there against the passage in Sanhedrin, because in Yevamot it implies that before the appearance of two hairs there is no transgression, and therefore the prohibitions take effect together only from the time of adulthood, whereas in Sanhedrin a minor is considered to create a stumbling block. It presents their resolution that the prohibition of bestiality is a prohibition that also applies to Noahides, and among Noahides there is no age measure like two hairs and thirteen years; rather, obligation depends on understanding. The Chatam Sofer adds that the age of majority is a Torah measure, and measures were not stated with regard to Noahides. It joins this with the principle that “there is no matter that is forbidden to a Noahide and permitted to a Jew,” and explains that every Jew includes a universal human layer, and on top of that a Jewish layer. Therefore, everything that obligates a Noahide also obligates a Jew, and from this follows that anything belonging to the seven Noahide commandments also obligates a Jewish minor when he understands.

Maimonides, Rabbi Nissim Gaon, and Reasoning as a Binding Source without Limitations

The text quotes Maimonides at the beginning of chapter 9 of the Laws of Kings about the six things Adam was commanded, and emphasizes his wording that “all of them are a tradition in our hands from Moses our teacher, and reason inclines toward them” and that “from the words of the Torah it appears that these were commanded.” It concludes that the Noahide commandments are characterized by the fact that reason inclines toward them. It cites Rabbi Nissim Gaon in his introduction to the Talmud, who says that anything dependent on reasoning and understanding of the heart has obligated man forever without any need for commandment. From this it develops a rule according to which something rooted in reasoning obligates anyone who understands it, with no limitations of age of commandment-obligation, Jewishness, sex, or status. It again stresses that punishment does not emerge from reasoning but from commandment, so even when the prohibition applies by force of reasoning, this does not necessarily imply punishment at human hands, though it does have significance in the judgment of Heaven.

Understanding, Measures, and the Boundary of Minority

The text answers the claim that a minor is exempt because of lack of understanding by saying that understanding develops continuously, and the Torah establishes a measure at which the line is drawn, such as two hairs or the age of thirteen as the presumption of Rava. It compares this to the laws of eating, where half a measure is prohibited by Torah law but punishment depends on an olive-bulk. It explains that a measure is the Torah’s way of defining a transition point within a continuous reality. It notes that the line is universal even though the rate of intellectual development varies from person to person, and therefore once the Torah fixed the line, personal sharpness no longer matters regarding ordinary command-based obligation.

Torah Study versus the Commandment of Torah Study, and Women’s Obligation by Reasoning

The text brings the distinction between the commandment of Torah study and Torah study itself, and presents that Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai holds that reciting the Shema in the morning and evening is enough to fulfill the commandment of Torah study. It defines the concept of neglect of Torah study as a separate obligation that is not part of the commandment of Torah study, but rather arises from reasoning about the value of Torah as the word of God that sustains the world, and therefore obligates a person to engage in it as much as possible. It concludes from this that when the obligation is rooted in reasoning, it is not limited by the exemption of women from positive time-bound commandments, and therefore argues that women are obligated in Torah study in every respect, even though they are exempt from reciting the Shema in the morning and evening.

The Oath of a Minor in Maimonides and Social Order

The text quotes Maimonides in the Laws of Claims and Counterclaims, chapter 5, in the name of “my teachers,” that one does not administer a Torah oath on the basis of a minor’s claim, but one does administer a rabbinic oath of inducement on his claim, so that “this one should not take his money when he is a minor and go off for free.” Maimonides concludes, “and to this my mind inclines, and it is for the repair of the world.” It adds that Maimonides rules that one does not administer an oath to the minor at all, and does not even accept a general ban from him, “because he does not know the punishment of an oath.” It asks how that reasoning fits reality in the case of a sharp minor who knows that no court punishment applies to him. It suggests that Maimonides means that the prohibition of a false oath applies even to a minor in the sense of obligation and sanction in the judgment of Heaven, and only when the minor does not understand the meaning of punishment does the oath lack deterrent force, so there is no point in administering it.

A Written Oath: Ri Migash, Avnei Nezer, and Mishneh LaMelekh

The text brings Avnei Nezer (responsum Avnei Nezer, section 306), who quotes a responsum of Ri Migash according to which someone who wrote an oath in his own handwriting and gave it to another is obligated to keep it even without uttering the oath verbally, and if he does not fulfill it, “his judgment is handed over to Heaven,” though he cannot be compelled by human beings because he did not utter the oath with his mouth. It cites the questions of Mishneh LaMelekh regarding oaths before the giving of the Torah and the idea of the “oath of Mount Sinai” as the basis for accepting the Torah, even though the obligation to fulfill an oath stems from the commandment “he shall not profane his word.” It brings Avnei Nezer’s explanation that one who swears to another is obligated by reasoning to fulfill it even without any warning, and the oath at Mount Sinai to the Holy One, blessed be He, stands on the side of reasoning. But an obligation rooted in reasoning is not accompanied by punishment at human hands, and therefore commandment is needed for the framework of punishment. It uses this to explain Ri Migash: writing does not diminish the obligation by force of reasoning, and therefore there is no difference between speech and writing with respect to the duty to fulfill it; the difference concerns only punishment and the application of “he shall not profane his word.”

Personal Reasoning, the Sanhedrin, and “Do Not Deviate”

The text states that reasoning obligates the person himself when it is his own reasoning and he understands it, but one person’s reasoning does not obligate another person who does not accept it. It notes that when the Sanhedrin enacts or determines a law based on reasoning, such as blessings over enjoyment on the basis of “whoever derives benefit from this world without a blessing is as if he committed sacrilege,” the obligation upon all Israel applies by force of the authority of the Sanhedrin and “do not deviate,” even for one who does not agree with the reasoning. It emphasizes that reasonings do not overturn an existing ruling, but where there is a lacuna and Jewish law has not decided, a person is obligated to act according to his reasoning and may be held accountable in the judgment of Heaven for not doing so. It explains that interpretive reasoning obligates the person with respect to his understanding of the source, to the point that if according to his understanding he violates the verse itself, that carries even greater weight than reasoning that creates a new law. It concludes by saying that the discussion of logic does not solve the problem of relativity, because logic decides only the transition from premises to conclusions, while the premises themselves rest on reasoning.

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Last time we talked about

[Speaker A] its status

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of reasoning, and my conclusion at least was that reasoning has a status like Torah law, but it cannot create an obligation with full Torah-level status. Meaning, for example, you can’t punish in a human religious court for violating an obligation whose basis is reasoning. All you can do is use reasoning to interpret a source that already exists in the Torah, meaning interpretive reasoning and not reasoning that creates a new law. We saw various uses of reasoning, we saw that you can’t derive the rationale of a verse, but I’m not going back over that here. What I want is to show an interesting implication of this issue of the status of reasoning, then move on to reasonings regarding rabbinic enactments and decrees, and finish the topic with another kind of reasoning, but that won’t be today. Maybe I’ll start with a dilemma raised by several later authorities regarding minors’ obligation in the commandments. We know that minors are not obligated in commandments until they bring forth two hairs or the presumption of Rava, yes, which is age.

[Speaker C] Just briefly, what exactly is reasoning? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You asked me to explain briefly

[Speaker C] what exactly reasoning is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Reasoning is what you understand to be correct.

[Speaker C] Okay, logic, accepted human common sense.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Logic is only forms of intellect,

[Speaker C] reasoning is the basis of logic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Reasoning is that you need a premise in order to make a logical inference, and where does the premise come from? Reasoning. Where does the premise come from?

[Speaker C] Logic is

[Speaker A] not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying it isn’t.

[Speaker C] as laws

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In logic you derive conclusions from premises, right? That’s what the laws of logic do. Where do you know the premises from?

[Speaker C] Wait, so reasoning is the premises of logic?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, yes. Reasoning is some perception that something is correct. The laws of logic don’t give me outputs that are true; the laws of logic tell me: if you have something that’s true, come, I’ll show you what results follow from it.

[Speaker C] In logic there are the premises of the laws of logic and there are the inferences

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of logic, logical arguments.

[Speaker C] The laws of logic deal only with the transition. So the logical premises are reasoning? Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All the logical premises are reasoning. Usually the premises come from reasoning. Of course, premises can come from something written in the Torah, and then that’s not reasoning. But in ordinary logical arguments, let’s say the kind we use in general, usually the premises come from reasoning. So regarding the obligations of minors, as I said, a minor is exempt from the commandments until he brings forth two hairs, signs of adulthood, or thirteen, which is the presumption. But we find a Talmudic passage in tractate Sanhedrin. In the Mishnah on page 54 it says like this: One who has relations with a male or with an animal, and a woman who brings an animal to herself, are liable to stoning. If a person sinned, what did the animal sin? Yet the animal too is stoned. Rather, because a person came to stumbling through it, therefore Scripture said it shall be stoned. Because a person came to stumbling through the animal, they kill the animal too. Another explanation: so that the animal should not pass through the marketplace and people say, this is the animal because of which so-and-so was stoned. In the Talmud they call this stumbling block and shame. The first reason is because of the stumbling caused by the animal, and the second reason is the shame. The animal passes through the marketplace and you see: this is the animal with which so-and-so did what he did. Now the Talmud discusses there regarding stumbling block and shame, whether the reason is stumbling block, whether stumbling block is enough, what, who is right—there are clarifications there in the Talmud. In the course of that discussion, on page 55b, the Talmud discusses what happens if it was an animal through which a minor boy or girl committed the transgression, not an adult.

[Speaker D] In which tractate? Sanhedrin.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rav Yosef said: come and hear. A girl of three years and one day—I’m skipping a bit—if one of any of the forbidden incestuous relations stated in the Torah had relations with her, they are executed because of her, while she is exempt. Right, a minor girl is exempt from the commandments, so if someone had relations with his sister, or a father with his daughter, things like that, and she is a minor, then the one who had relations with her is liable to death, because that doesn’t exempt him; it’s considered full intercourse once she has reached the age of intercourse, which is three, and she herself is exempt because she is not obligated in commandments. “One of any of the forbidden relations”—does that even include an animal? The Talmud says: does “one of any of the forbidden relations” mean that even an animal is included? Meaning that in such a case they also stone the animal? That would show that the reason they kill the animal is not because of stumbling block but because of shame. Because if it were because of stumbling block—what is stumbling block? A stumbling block in that a transgression was committed through it. But if it’s a minor girl or a minor boy, then no transgression was committed through this animal. So why should the animal be killed? So if they still kill the animal, that’s a sign that the correct reason is shame and not stumbling block. The Talmud answers: since they acted intentionally, there is also stumbling block; it is only that the Merciful One had compassion on her. On her He had compassion, but on the animal He did not have compassion. Meaning, the Talmud says: if she did it intentionally, that is called a stumbling block—but why is she not punished? She isn’t punished because the Torah had compassion on her.

[Speaker C] There’s intentionality and there’s stumbling block?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, as the Talmud says. The Torah had compassion on her, and therefore she isn’t punished, but such a thing is called a stumbling block. When Rashi talks about stumbling block, he says “a stumbling block of sin,” meaning it does indeed refer to a transgression. So you see from here that when a minor commits a transgression, it is a transgression. He just doesn’t receive punishment, but there is a transgression here. Meaning that the minor is in fact also commanded, not only the adult.

[Speaker A] If he has no understanding, what transgression is there here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the claim—the claim is that apparently he does have understanding, more or less that’s what comes out here. Beyond the conceptual question, how does this fit with the Jewish law we know? After all, a minor is exempt from commandments. Even before the conceptual arguments of whether he has understanding or not, we know that in Jewish law a minor is not obligated. So here the Talmud says that a minor is obligated. By the way, the Pri Megadim really does want to claim that the entire exemption of minors is only exemption from punishment, but in principle minors too are obligated in all the commandments.

[Speaker C] But if he has understanding, why exempt him from punishment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he has enough understanding to obligate him, but not enough to obligate him in punishment. It could be that this is some intermediate מצב or something like that. That’s what the Pri Megadim argues. Most opinions are not like that, but that is what the Pri Megadim wants to claim in his General Introduction.

[Speaker E] And there are various laws about when you have to separate a minor from prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Jewish law you don’t have to.

[Speaker E] Okay, but אצלנו what he does is a sin, so why—there are a lot of questions here, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No shortage. That’s one of the questions; there are many more. In the Talmud in many places it says that a minor cannot discharge another’s obligation because he himself is not obligated. If it’s only an exemption from punishment, then a minor is obligated in Grace after Meals, for example, by Torah law, not just rabbinically. Right? So why shouldn’t he be able to discharge someone else who is obligated by Torah law? Everywhere, the Talmud is full of this—that minors are exempt from commandments. How can it be that here the Talmud assumes they are obligated, only that punishment doesn’t apply because the Merciful One had compassion on her? Further on the Talmud says there: Rava said, come and hear: a boy of nine years and one day—now this is a boy, not a girl—disqualifies the animal from being offered on the altar, and it is stoned because of him. Yes, such an animal can’t be brought as a sacrifice, and it is also stoned because of him. And if he had relations with any of the forbidden incestuous relations stated in the Torah, they are executed because of her. And here too, there is shame but no stumbling block? Exactly the same as we saw with the girl, and they answer the same way. Since he acted intentionally, there is also stumbling block, and the Merciful One had compassion on him. On him the Merciful One had compassion, but on the animal the Merciful One did not have compassion. Yes, so once again the same idea. That’s how the Talmud assumes, and it leaves it there. And by the way, this is ruled as practical Jewish law. Meaning, they kill an animal with which a minor boy or girl acted.

[Speaker F] Meaning, maybe the simple reading isn’t that the animal didn’t involve a transgression—I mean, an animal has no understanding—but rather the issue there is that this is an abomination, something so utterly unacceptable that it has to be removed from the world. So maybe also with that child—but the Merciful One had compassion on him—not because he’s obligated and committed a transgression. There’s a transgression, but not in the sense that he is personally obligated, just not punished, like the animal…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he is not punishable. The Talmud says he is not punishable. The only question is whether he is obligated in the commandment itself.

[Speaker F] And it’s obvious that he isn’t punishable. Like an animal is not obligated in commandments, I mean.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course not, yes, obviously not, but still there is… So the Talmud is only saying why, even though there isn’t a transgression—yes, even though he isn’t obligated in the commandment—still there is something so disgraceful.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You mean morally. Because of the moral problem. Maybe that’s difficult, I don’t know, though it is a bit hard to assume that Jewish law is addressing a moral problem, because once it addresses it, then the problem becomes halakhic / of Jewish law and not moral, and then it’s more reasonable… I don’t know, maybe that’s possible, but then it would already be more reasonable to say that there really is a transgression here, only no punishment. Fine.

[Speaker C] Why do they punish the animal? What? Following up on his question. Either because of stumbling block or shame—that’s what the Talmud says. No, if it has no responsibility for its actions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s obvious that the animal has no responsibility, but the animal also has no rights. We punish it where we need to. A person we don’t punish just like that unless he is guilty. Let’s say a person committed a transgression unintentionally—we could have punished him in order to deter everyone else. But we don’t, unless he himself is guilty, meaning unless there is a justification from his own standpoint. With an animal you don’t need that, because it has no rights. The whole question is only what needs to be done for society, maybe, or for the public interest. So that’s one side. On the other hand, in tractate Yevamot the Talmud discusses the rule that one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition. Yes, we know the rule: if a person does an act that is already prohibited in one way, and now he does it in a way that would add another prohibition, then one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition. There is pork cooked in milk. Fine, pork in milk. If you’re going to do it, go all the way. So the Talmud says that he does not violate the prohibition of meat cooked in milk, because there is already a prohibition on the pork, and one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition. It’s not a simple question exactly how this works, whether it really belongs to the rule that one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition, if it’s just an example—not entirely clear that it is—and the question is why this applies in all sorts of such cases.

[Speaker A] Or because if it’s simultaneous?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not about whether it’s simultaneous. No, unless from a secondary angle, yes, at the same level, not more severe and not less severe. Once there is one transgression, the second transgression isn’t there. The question is whether this is about punishment or about the transgression itself. There’s a lot to discuss here; I’m not getting into all those details now.

[Speaker A] Because if it’s about punishment, then one is more severe than the other.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.

[Speaker E] If it’s the same thing, then maybe it counts as the first one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whichever was first. For example, pork is prohibited from the moment it comes into existence, from the time it is formed. When it gets mixed with milk, it also becomes prohibited as meat cooked in milk. So the pork prohibition was first, and therefore the prohibition of meat cooked in milk does not take effect on the prohibition of pork. Again, I’m assuming various things here that not everyone agrees with—I’m only bringing this as an example, okay? So the Talmud says there are several qualifications to this matter: where the second prohibition adds cases, or includes more things, then the second transgression also takes effect, and the person violates two prohibitions. In any event, within that discussion the Talmud says: what about a non-priest who served on the Sabbath? Again, yes, a non-priest who served means someone who is not a priest but performed the Temple service. Fine? So he committed a transgression, right? A non-priest who served—you need a priest to serve. Besides that, he did it on the Sabbath, and apart from the act itself, since this is not considered Temple service for him, there is also Sabbath desecration. So there are two things here. This too is connected to the question of one prohibition not taking effect on another prohibition, and again the Talmud discusses whether it does or doesn’t apply. In the end, the Talmud there makes an interpretive setup: for example, where he brought forth two hairs on the Sabbath, so that non-priestly status and Sabbath came together simultaneously. Yes, the question is: he was a non-priest before the Sabbath came, so essentially the Sabbath prohibition should not take effect on the already existing prohibition of non-priestly service, right? So why is he liable for both? The Talmud answers: for example, he brought forth two hairs on the Sabbath. We are speaking of a minor who became physically mature on the Sabbath, so the prohibition of being a non-priest who serves and the prohibition of Sabbath came upon him at the same moment, when he brought forth the two hairs, and therefore he is liable for both. This is called a prohibition that takes effect simultaneously. There are three exceptions to the rule that one prohibition does not take effect on another prohibition: where it includes more, where it adds more, and where it comes simultaneously. Okay? So here it was simultaneous, and therefore in this case both take effect on him; he is liable on both counts, both because of non-priestly service and because of Sabbath. So several later authorities ask—Elchanan Wasserman and Rabbi Yitzchak Elchanan and Or Sameach and Chelkat Yoav, various figures—they ask that this contradicts the passage about stumbling block and shame. Because in the passage about stumbling block and shame we saw earlier that even a minor’s transgression is a transgression. Here in the Talmud we see that until he brought forth two hairs it is not a transgression, and therefore the two prohibitions take effect simultaneously upon him. Right? I said you could challenge the Talmud from many places, but they ask specifically from here, and therefore there is a contradiction between the two passages. Now each in his own style, but they all give a fairly similar answer. Their claim is that the prohibition of bestiality is a prohibition that also applies to Noahides. And when is a Noahide obligated in this? A Noahide is obligated in prohibitions from the moment he understands; there is no age. The Chatam Sofer also says that the age of majority is a measure—it is one of the five measures of the Torah. There is the measure of two hairs or the age of thirteen—treat the thirteen as part of this. It is one of the Torah’s measures, and measures were not stated regarding Noahides. Yes? Measures, interpositions, and partitions are a law given to Moses at Sinai. Measures were not stated regarding Noahides, and therefore even Noahide minors are obligated—of course they need to understand. But again, it’s not because when they don’t understand they aren’t commanded. They are commanded; it’s just that when they don’t understand, there is a lack of understanding, like an insane person, fine, and then you can’t punish him. Meaning, with a minor, in short, there is no age from which onward you are obligated. By the way, that is what shows that in the case of Israel, when a minor is exempt, it is not just because he lacks understanding. Because if it were exemption because of lack of understanding, then it would be no different from a gentile. A gentile who lacks understanding is also exempt. Rather, in Israel there is a Torah law—one of the Torah’s measures, a law given to Moses at Sinai—that if he has not reached the right age or has not brought forth two hairs, then he is exempt. This is an exemption. He is not commanded. Okay? So they say that since there are commandments that also obligate Noahides, and among Noahides there is no age, no age-measure from when they become obligated, and the Talmud in Sanhedrin also says that there is no matter that is forbidden to a Noahide and permitted to a Jew. Meaning, there is nothing in the world that would be forbidden to a Noahide and permitted to a Jew. That’s what the Talmud says there. What is the idea behind that? It’s simple. Meaning, every Jew is also a little gentile. Yes, we’ve spoken about this already once, that a Jew is also a large gentile. But first of all there is some gentile within him, and on top of that gentile layer there is another layer, the Jewish one. Therefore, everything a gentile is obligated in, the Jew is also obligated in as a gentile. Beyond that, he is also obligated in obligations imposed on a Jew. Therefore, there cannot be a situation in which there is an obligation on a gentile, that a gentile is forbidden in something and a Jew is permitted in it. At most, a Jew will be forbidden in it on level one, in his universal level as a human being like every other human being, and not on level two. But certainly there cannot be something that a gentile is forbidden in and a Jew is permitted in. There can be a situation where a Jew is forbidden and a Noahide is permitted—that is the prohibitions belonging to level two. But there cannot be a situation where a gentile has something forbidden to him and a Jew is permitted in it. Because if a gentile is forbidden, that belongs to level one, and level one also exists in a Jew. And then their claim is: if you combine those two assumptions, then the claim is that if so, bestiality is a prohibition that also applies among Noahides, and among Noahides it also applies to minors, so it cannot be that a Jewish minor would not be obligated in it. And the Talmud says there is no matter forbidden to a Noahide and permitted to a Jew. So if so, the Jew too is obligated in it from a young age. And therefore, in the Talmud in Sanhedrin regarding stumbling block and shame, the Talmud says that indeed in the case of a minor there is a transgression, because it is dealing with a kind of transgression that also applies among Noahides, and these transgressions really do also obligate a minor. And in the Talmud in Yevamot we are talking about transgressions that are transgressions for a Jew, not for a gentile. Those apply only to an adult. Meaning, only from the time he brought forth two hairs or from the age of commandment-obligation is he obligated in those things, and therefore the Talmud says that only from the moment he brought forth two hairs is he obligated, and before that he was exempt. Basically the claim—the claim from here is, yes, without a question mark, right—anything that belongs to the seven Noahide commandments, every Jew is obligated in, including a minor. Meaning, if there is something that belongs to the seven Noahide commandments, there is no age of commandment-obligation for it; even a Jewish minor is obligated in it. Why? As a gentile. The question is what exactly the definitions would be—whether he would receive lashes or be stoned for transgressions of this type? Apparently not. Once you get into transgressions that carry punishments. But he would be obligated in them exactly as a Noahide is obligated in them. Meaning, the laws of punishment for Noahides are unique to Noahides, but the transgressions themselves are universal. Meaning, what a Noahide is obligated in, a Jew is also obligated in. In fact, Maimonides writes at the beginning of chapter 9 of the Laws of Kings that Adam was commanded concerning six things: idolatry, blessing the Name, bloodshed—“blessing the Name” is of course a euphemism—sexual immorality, theft, and laws. Even though all of them are a tradition in our hands from Moses our teacher, and reason inclines toward them, from the Torah’s words it appears that these were commanded. Meaning, he is basically saying that all these commandments, first, we received from Moses our teacher, second, at Sinai I mean, and second, reason inclines toward them, meaning there is reasoning, and nevertheless it appears that there was already a commandment about them for the children of Noah.

[Speaker A] A limb from a living animal…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes… a limb from a living animal… wait a second, Adam was commanded six things, and then the seventh thing is added afterward with all the later additions. The seventh thing is a limb from a living animal, and after that at Marah, and then at Sinai. In all this there is a question whether a limb from a living animal is something reason inclines toward or not, because what Maimonides writes applies to the first six. In any case, Maimonides writes that all the Noahide commandments are things reason inclines toward. That is what characterizes them. And that probably says—or sheds a more fundamental light on—the distinction I spoke about before. So basically the claim is not a formal claim that every Jew contains a little Noahide, and therefore everything a Noahide is obligated in, the Jew too is obligated in by virtue of the Noahide within him, what I earlier called level one. That is also true, but it’s not only that. Rather, the point is that all these things are based on reasoning. And something based on reasoning obligates everyone who understands it. Here there are no formal definitions. Something based on commandment—then the Torah says whom it commands and whom it does not command. It commands the adult; it does not command the minor. But if something is based on reasoning, then there is no formal question of from what age one is obligated. If you understand, you are obligated. If you do not understand, you are not obligated. It’s not that here there is a category of exemption and obligation and definitions of who is commanded and who is not, because the basis is not commandment. Meaning, if the basis of the obligation is commandment, then you have to check who was commanded and who was not commanded. But if the basis of the obligation is reasoning, then clearly the criterion is everyone who understands the reasoning—whoever the reasoning is relevant to, of course—and whoever understands it. If you understand it, you are obligated. And therefore I think—although the later authorities don’t express it this way—it seems to me that this is what stands behind what they say. Meaning, it’s not a formal matter that every Jew also has a little Noahide within him. Rather, the point is that if something comes out of reasoning, then it obligates.

[Speaker A] Even if it applies only to Israel? This commandment applies only to Israel and not to a Noahide? No, it’s not among the seven Noahide commandments. Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anything that is reasoning also obligates Noahides.

[Speaker A] There are many commandments.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so I brought this—I’m

[Speaker A] thinking about those seven

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Noahide commandments because they were commanded in those. As Maimonides says there—what does Maimonides say there? Even though they are a tradition in our hands from Moses our teacher, and reason inclines toward them, from the Torah’s words it appears that these were commanded. Meaning, Maimonides doesn’t say that only in these are they obligated. What question is he coming to answer? Even though reason inclines toward them, it appears that they were commanded concerning these. So one could have thought—what does that mean? Even though reason inclines toward them, still only in these are they obligated. Maimonides does not say that. Maimonides says: even though reason inclines toward them, and therefore the commandment is unnecessary, because anything reason inclines toward is something everyone is obligated in—for these, despite that, they were also commanded. Not only does reason incline toward them. But in principle, anything reason inclines toward, a gentile is also obligated in. I brought Rabbi Nissim Gaon in his introduction to the Talmud, what we put in the sources. He asks there: the Talmud brings about thirty commandments that apply to Noahides. So he asks: we know there are only seven. So he says that anything dependent on reasoning and on understanding of the heart, a person has been obligated in from the very beginning. You don’t need a commandment for that. Something that comes from reasoning—whoever understands the reasoning is obligated.

[Speaker A] But in order to obligate a minor, it has to be something they were actually commanded in, not just something that comes from reasoning. Why not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anything, yes, anything whose basis is reasoning—even if it is not one of the seven Noahide commandments—obligates minors. As long as they understand. If they do not understand, as with a gentile, then no claims will be made against them. But on the principled level they have no exemption. Exemption—there is exemption for one who does not understand because he is under compulsion, or because the Torah had compassion on him, as the Talmud says here. But it’s not that he is not commanded.

[Speaker A] We would have to go through all the commandments and sort out what is reasoning and what is not reasoning. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Something whose basis is reasoning—even a minor is obligated in that. Again I say, that does not mean he would be punished. Because punishment does not come out of reasoning. Punishment is a Torah law. And Torah laws are stated only regarding an adult, regarding one whom the Torah is speaking to. But the prohibition, or the expectation that a person behave properly, applies also to a minor. If that thing is based on reasoning, then it applies also to a minor.

[Speaker G] And if so, a Noahide has punishment according to whatever it may be?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. More than that—he has the death penalty for every transgression. But as I said, those are the laws of punishment for Noahides; that is not relevant to Israel. It is somewhat connected to the earlier question about the animal. With a Noahide the hand is lighter on the trigger when punishing, and for a Jewish minor that is also not true. Fine. I said that in order to bring this into Jewish law, so that it becomes Jewish law—even without that we are in fact expected to do it—but without legislation, without there being a commandment, then it is not part of Jewish law. Okay, the same is true for Noahides. And therefore they will probably have punishment only for their seven commandments. There is a question about laws—whether there is punishment or not. That is a dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides, because laws is their positive commandment, not a prohibition. Maimonides says about the people of Shechem that they incurred death because they did not fulfill the commandment of laws, and Nachmanides asks him: but that is neglect of a positive commandment—what punishment belongs there? It’s a positive commandment. Maimonides holds that even for neglect of a positive commandment there is capital punishment among Noahides.

[Speaker C] Can I ask something? One about a minor, the exemption of a minor. I understand simply that a minor’s exemption is because of understanding, not a law given to Moses at Sinai, not a scriptural decree.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I’m saying—not correct.

[Speaker C] No, it seems to me the Talmud says it. The exemption of a deaf-mute, an insane person, and a minor—they are exempt because they lack understanding.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, lacking… The Talmud says that the exemption is until the moment they brought forth two hairs. That is the law. Explanations can run from here until further notice. But that is the law. What happens if there is a genius of a child? Knows everything at age ten.

[Speaker C] So the explanation is detached from the law?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The explanation is not detached from the law. If you ask, I’ll already say it: clearly, understanding is something that develops continuously, right? No one wants to argue that at age thirteen a person is like a forty-year-old, and at age twelve and three quarters he is like a one-year-old child. There is some continuous process of development of understanding, right? Now the question is where you draw the line. Who said it’s the average? Wait, who said that?

[Speaker C] No, then you didn’t explain it well.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud says that these are measures.

[Speaker C] Measures, interpositions, and partitions are a law given to Moses at Sinai. It’s a measure. I understand, but there is also the other side, that the Talmud says that a minor’s exemption is because of lack of understanding.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m explaining. The measure determines what level of lack of understanding counts with regard to exemption from commandments. When you have a scale that is continuous, then you have to draw the line somewhere. Also with eating pork: half a measure is prohibited by Torah law, right? According to Rabbi Yochanan, half a measure is prohibited by Torah law. Meaning, you can eat a quarter of an olive-bulk, a third of an olive-bulk, three quarters of an olive-bulk—it is still a Torah prohibition, but there is no punishment. From an olive-bulk there is punishment. What does that mean? The claim is that the prohibition exists at every amount. From when is there punishment? There are measures, interpositions, and partitions—the measure is an olive-bulk, from which point it is eating significant enough that there is also punishment. But the prohibition exists even before that. This means that when there are things that come about continuously—not in a one-or-zero form, not yes or no, but continuously—then the condition is basically a measure of understanding? Yes, exactly. Meaning, a minor’s exemption is because he lacks understanding. But what does “lacks understanding” mean? And what about an adult who isn’t some great genius? He’s still obligated. From when is it called lacking understanding? Where does the line pass? So the Torah says: at age thirteen or with two hairs. Meaning, it is drawing a line on the axis of understanding, but the axis is the axis of understanding, and you still need a measure that draws the line. As I said earlier, it’s more than that. It’s not even a measure that is… it is obvious that with each person too, understanding develops at a different rate, right? There are people who reach a stage of development that someone else reaches at age fifteen, while someone else reaches it at age twelve, and nevertheless for both of them it is only from age thirteen. Why? That means that it is not even dependent on the actual development of understanding, but rather it is some measure that the Torah… right, in the background stands the idea that a minor lacks understanding, but once the Torah fixed it, it fixed a universal measure. Okay?

[Speaker C] Also regarding the fact that the seven Noahide commandments are based on reasoning—about the sexual prohibitions of a gentile. The prohibition of forbidden sexual relations among the seven Noahide commandments, which is sexual immorality—I think many understand that the prohibition of sexual immorality isn’t exactly reasoning.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so there is room to discuss that issue; they discuss it also around secondary prohibitions of sexual immorality. You’re right. But Maimonides assumes that it is. Fine? Maimonides says that reason inclines toward them, yes. At least regarding those six, apart from a limb from a living animal, he says that reason inclines toward them.

[Speaker A] What you’re saying is that, in practice, this system is barely a legal system at all—this framework, where things can also come from reasoning alone sometimes. Why? Because if the seven Noahide commandments—if Noahides are also forbidden to do things that are forbidden based on reasoning,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And they

[Speaker A] are not actually obligated, then on

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] what are they punished?

[Speaker A] Like

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As I said, what do you punish them for if there was no command?

[Speaker A] Exactly, there is still an obligation in any case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, you know, in a legal system—you’re a lawyer—in a legal system, obligations without punishment are not part of the law. They’re not part of the law. There’s the principle of legality: whatever is not forbidden is permitted. Government is the opposite, but for the citizen, whatever is not forbidden is permitted.

[Speaker D] There’s also the educational element. You’re speaking passively, as though this child is supposed to understand on his own what is forbidden, but someone has to explain it to him. In other words, there’s some kind of social problem if children are having relations with animals in that environment, right? Meaning…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, if they don’t understand, then they don’t understand. No problem—that’s something else. You have to explain it to him. We’re not dealing here with the laws of education. The law of education certainly exists.

[Speaker D] How were they supposed to understand?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First, it could be that they do understand even without that. But even if not—fine, they don’t understand. I said that someone who doesn’t understand is exempt.

[Speaker D] If they don’t understand because no one explained it to them?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem, then they’re exempt. I said: someone who doesn’t understand is exempt. It doesn’t matter right now why he doesn’t understand—because he’s stupid, because no one explained it to him, the reasons don’t matter. The law of compulsion exists: if he doesn’t understand, he’s under compulsion.

[Speaker D] So you expect some kind of statement from this that people need to…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There you go, now you’ve fulfilled your obligation.

[Speaker D] And how are they supposed to know?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I said—you’re absolutely right—but that’s not my topic. When you talk about the law of education, we’ll talk about it. Right now I’m talking about the halakhic definition. In halakhic definition, someone who understands is expected to do it; someone who doesn’t understand is not expected to, he’s under compulsion. How do you make sure people understand? That’s for another lecture. We’ll talk about that when we discuss the law of education—not next lecture, but another one.

[Speaker A] But you’re also assuming that every time you explain something to someone, he automatically understands, as if it’s a piece of reasoning that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, maybe yes, maybe no. Even if not—if he doesn’t understand, then he still isn’t…

[Speaker A] It doesn’t mean that everyone who gets it explained to him understands. It means

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that only after he understands do we expect him to do it. If he didn’t understand, even if they explained it to him, he’s still under compulsion. That’s obvious. But if someone thinks murder is fine, are we not going to convict him? Only after there’s a command of the Torah, then yes? A Torah command has to be observed; now it’s no longer dependent on reasoning, because without a Torah command, even if he understands, I said there’s no significant punishment.

[Speaker A] Without a Torah command, even a person who understands is expected not to do it, meaning

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a prohibition here, but there’s no punishment. For punishment you need a prior warning. Okay? So in fact what we see here is another facet of this whole issue of reasoning. Meaning: first, reasoning is sufficient to establish a prohibition or a commandment—apparently not to punish, but to establish a prohibition or commandment. And second, reasoning has no limitations. Meaning, there is no one who is not obligated by something that follows from reasoning. Something that follows from reasoning has no such limitations. Anyone for whom the reasoning is relevant, and who understands it, is obligated. He can be a gentile, a minor, a woman, an adult—whatever you want, it makes no difference. Anyone for whom the reasoning is relevant and who understands the reasoning, has to do it. He’s obligated by it—in the sense of obligated; I don’t mean technically obligated, rather obligated to do it, right? Which is a major novelty. I think we talked about this once regarding the commandment of Torah study. I spoke about the difference between Torah study and the commandment of Torah study. And I said that the commandment of Torah study—Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai says that if one read a chapter in the morning and a chapter in the evening, or even just recited Shema morning and evening, he has fulfilled his obligation. So what is the concept of neglecting Torah study? The concept of neglecting Torah study is not part of the commandment; it doesn’t address the commandment of Torah study but Torah study itself. It’s not the same thing. The commandment of Torah study is fulfilled by reciting Shema morning and evening—that’s enough, you’ve fulfilled the positive commandment. So why do you have to study all the time, and when you don’t study it’s called neglecting Torah study? That’s an obligation whose basis is reasoning. It’s an obligation rooted in reasoning that says: if we understand that Torah is the word of God, the basic thing that sustains us and the world, then obviously reason says that one should engage in it as much as one can. Again, as much as one can—you can do other things too—but the later authorities discussed this. But all of that is in the category not of the commandment of Torah study but of Torah study. And one of the consequences, as I said, is that women are obligated in this as well. So reciting Shema morning and evening—women are exempt. But in Torah study itself, in every respect, from blessings to the laws of menstruation and everything included, women are obligated. That’s my view. That’s one of the consequences, because something whose basis is reasoning has no limitation on who is obligated by it. Anyone for whom the reasoning is relevant and who understands it is obligated, and therefore everyone is obligated in it. Okay, maybe I’ll bring another example that illustrates this more clearly. Maimonides, in the Laws of Claims and Counterclaims, chapter 5, writes as follows: My teachers ruled that one does not take a Torah oath based on the claim of a minor. If a minor deposited an item with me and now he claims the item from me, and I claim it was stolen, do I need to swear to this minor the custodian’s oath? The answer is no. One does not swear on the basis of a minor’s claim, meaning if the minor is the claimant in religious court, he cannot impose an oath. However, one does take a rabbinic oath of inducement, the oath of the Talmud, yes? There are three types of oaths: the Torah oath for partial admission, the custodian’s oath, and the oath of one witness. There’s an oath at the beginning of chapter seven of tractate Shevuot, and the oath of inducement is what’s called the oath of the Talmud. And even if he was a minor who is not sharp regarding business dealings, one does administer the oath of inducement based on his claim, so that one should not take his money while he is a minor and walk away for free. Right? You have to protect minors, so people don’t just take their money, and when they make a claim against you no one can make you swear, so you can take their money and go home and no one can do anything to you. And this, toward which my opinion inclines, is for the sake of social order. Thus you learn that when a minor makes a claim against an adult, whether the adult partially admits, whether he denies everything, whether there was a witness there or not, he takes the oath of inducement, and he cannot reverse the oath onto the minor, because one does not impose an oath on a minor at all. The minor himself doesn’t swear, okay? Not even an oath of inducement. He does not even accept a general ban. A ban is basically one type of vow. Because he does not know the punishment for an oath. A minor—one does not impose an oath on him because he does not know the punishment for an oath. Now that’s a somewhat strange argument. What do you mean he doesn’t know the punishment for an oath? In other words, he doesn’t have enough understanding, like you said before. He lacks understanding, so we don’t impose an oath on him. But what if there is a sharp minor? A ten-year-old? But he understands everything, he knows, he’s a real demon, you know. I once told you—I don’t remember—I once met a Jew in Bnei Brak. I had written a booklet on miggo, and we once talked here about this topic. And some Jew came to me—he looked like a thirteen-year-old boy, I think a grandson of Rabbi Ades. He came to me there with comments on the booklet. My eyes went dark. I’d never seen anything like it. An insane genius. I mean, I had never encountered such a thing. He was casually fluent in all the medieval authorities and later authorities—hard to believe, I had never seen such a phenomenon. I mean, I talked with him there—extremely sharp, knowledgeable, unbelievable. The guy sits and studies by himself, he’s not in yeshiva, walks around Bnei Brak talking to people—amazing, in short. So let’s say someone like that. I assume that even at age twelve—he still hadn’t reached majority. I don’t remember how old he was. Two years earlier he also probably wasn’t just ordinary, I have no idea. A very interesting question. I don’t know. So, you know, when you hear all the stories about child prodigies—“even a youth makes himself known by his deeds.” At age two he finished the Talmud, at age three the Jerusalem Talmud, at age four his teacher had nothing left to teach him, and at age five, I don’t know, he went to study eurhythmics.

[Speaker F] At age five he went to composition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. So I always laugh when I hear these things, but I met this boy, and then I understood that sometimes it really can happen. Even though when they tell these stories, sometimes it can actually be true. In any case—so yes—what happens with a minor like that? He has understanding. Do we impose an oath on him? I’d be even more careful about imposing an oath on such a minor. Because if he’s that sharp, then he knows there’s no punishment for an oath on him. He knows there’s no punishment for an oath on him. The reason one doesn’t impose an oath on a minor is not because he doesn’t know the punishment for an oath, but because there is no punishment for him. On the contrary: if he’s a minor who is wise, then it’s even more dangerous to impose an oath on him, because he knows he’s taking no risk at all—there is no punishment on him. So what is Maimonides saying here? Maimonides says we don’t impose an oath on him because he doesn’t know the punishment for an oath. In other words, someone who does know the punishment for an oath—at least on the conceptual level—it sounds from Maimonides as if we would impose an oath on him. Why? After all, there is really no punishment on him. So it seems from here that apparently this prohibition of a false oath also applies to minors. Therefore, if the minor is sharp and he does know the punishment for an oath, then yes, impose an oath on him, because the whole point of an oath is fear of the punishment for an oath; that’s why a person is careful not to lie under oath. But if he lacks understanding and doesn’t grasp that an oath involves punishment, then he won’t be afraid to lie even under oath, so there’s no point in administering an oath to him—the oath won’t accomplish anything. But if he has understanding and he does grasp this point, then he too will receive punishment—when I say punishment, I don’t mean in court, I mean punishment by the hands of Heaven. And therefore, in principle, one really could impose an oath on him. And that is why what Maimonides says—that the reason one does not impose an oath on a minor is not because there is no punishment for an oath on him, because there is punishment for an oath, but because he does not know the punishment for an oath; that is why one does not impose it on him. Now this, of course, joins what I said earlier, because the basic idea is that if there is something whose basis is reasoning and not command, the assumption is “whatever comes out of his mouth he shall do,” yes? With regard to oaths, there is a dimension of reasoning beyond the Torah’s command—you have to speak truth, certainly when you say it in God’s name. So if there is a dimension of reasoning here, then anyone who understands the reasoning, even if he is a minor, is obligated by it. Perhaps you would say that also for the sake of social order I would impose an oath on the

[Speaker F] minor even though strictly speaking he isn’t obligated? Rather, we don’t impose it because he doesn’t know. But what social order? There’s no social order in that. He’ll swear falsely and that’s it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’ll seize his things now and then what?

[Speaker F] Exactly—so for the sake of social order I might say maybe we should impose it? On the contrary!

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because there’s no punishment on him, so he’ll swear. No, but

[Speaker F] if he understands the punishment, the obligation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t understand—there’s no punishment on him. If he understands, then he understands that there’s no punishment on him. On the contrary, have him swear till tomorrow—he’ll swear. He’ll swear falsely—what’s the problem? It won’t solve the problem. Social order doesn’t work in that direction.

[Speaker G] But there is a prohibition on him. A prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, therefore one has to say that there is indeed punishment on him. That’s what Maimonides is saying: there is punishment on him. Except that if he doesn’t know, that’s something else; then there’s no point in imposing an oath on him because he doesn’t know. But if there is a minor who does know, then he really will also be punished, and then one can impose an oath on him—there is a benefit to that oath. That is

[Speaker C] the reason. How—how does he not know? I didn’t understand, a minor who knows.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he knows and there is punishment on him, then he’ll be afraid to lie.

[Speaker C] That there is punishment for an oath. It’s forbidden to swear. And from where—from where would a minor know

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that there is punishment for an oath?

[Speaker C] Punishment for an oath, not obligation—the obligation is imposed by the court.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How does he know?

[Speaker C] That’s Maimonides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From wherever he knows all the other pieces of reasoning.

[Speaker C] What do you mean? There is no punishment for an oath—no, but there is no punishment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m claiming that there is. And you—no, a minor who has gone through all of Maimonides, okay?

[Speaker C] Again, again.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Will he swear or not swear?

[Speaker C] If this minor is

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] sharp enough, then in principle one can impose an oath on him. Why? Because there is punishment for an oath on him.

[Speaker C] But where in Maimonides does he say that a minor has liability for an oath? Where is that clause? Here, this very clause. What are you talking about? Here Maimonides says something simple: because he lacks understanding. So that’s what Maimonides is saying—that a minor does have the matter of oath. The minor who lacks understanding—don’t impose an oath on him. No, the minor can be in two states, as I understand this Maimonides. Either he’s an ordinary minor who lacks understanding, just a simple minor, and then there’s no point in imposing an oath on him because it won’t deter him. Or the minor is sharp. Suppose the minor is sharp and has gone through all of Maimonides, okay? But this minor also won’t be deterred—why? He says: I’ve gone through all of Maimonides and there is no clause that obligates me, that says a minor… So it’s not because he doesn’t know the punishment. Where is it written in Maimonides what you’re saying here? It’s not written anywhere. No—in Maimonides’ laws, is there anyone who says—what you’re saying now, is that written in Maimonides? Is what you’re saying written in Maimonides? It’s not written. No, in Maimonides one thing is written. What? Maimonides says you don’t impose an oath on a minor—that’s what’s written. No, an explanation is also written. Why? Because he does not know the punishment for an oath. But according to your view, the sharp minor does not swear

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] because there is no punishment for an oath, not because he doesn’t know.

[Speaker C] Maimonides says it’s only because he doesn’t know—there is punishment for an oath on him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If this minor is sharp and he studied Maimonides properly, then he knows that there is punishment for an oath on him. That’s what is written in Maimonides—that there is punishment for an oath on him; he just doesn’t know, so don’t impose an oath on him. But if he knows?

[Speaker C] The question is what “doesn’t know” means.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter—that’s what it means, doesn’t know. No, what does “doesn’t know” mean? Wait, that has to be examined.

[Speaker C] He doesn’t know the punishment for an oath, and—no, that’s it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And there is punishment for an oath?

[Speaker C] Obviously—otherwise what is there to know?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Otherwise what is there to know? If there is no punishment for an oath, then it’s not that he doesn’t know the punishment for an oath, but rather that there is no punishment for an oath.

[Speaker C] No, no, no. Fine, enough. No. This isn’t a private lesson.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s continue. So this matter—that regarding oaths, a minor is also obligated—you can see it in Maimonides many times. Laws that aren’t understood can often be found in Ri Migash. Ri Migash was the teacher of Maimonides’ father, as you may recall. Right—of Rabbi Maimon. And there are certain laws appearing in Maimonides that are responsa from Ri Migash; I think this is one of them. The Avnei Nezer writes as follows, in responsum Avnei Nezer, section 306. Now he basically brings a responsum of Ri Migash. Avnei Nezer in section 306 discusses the question: what is the law regarding a written oath? You know that with an oath you need explicit verbalization. So what is the law if someone swears in writing? Explicit verbalization means speaking with the mouth. What is the law if someone swears in writing? The later authorities disagreed about this. There is Rabbi Akiva Eiger—so the later authorities disagreed whether writing is like speech. Avnei Nezer claims there is a responsum of Ri Migash on this, and Ri Migash says explicitly that it is binding. And this is how he brings the responsum of Ri Migash: if one wrote an oath in his own handwriting and gave him his written document, he is obligated to fulfill what he swore, even though he never uttered the oath with his mouth. And if he did not fulfill it, his judgment is left to Heaven. But one cannot obligate him by human agency, since he did not utter the oath with his mouth. Meaning, the later authorities discuss whether writing is like speech or not. The discussion there is whether someone who writes an oath is considered to have made explicit verbalization, and then the person would also receive lashes if he violates the oath. Ri Migash says: leave that aside, that’s not what matters right now. According to everyone, even if writing is not like speech—still, if you swore in writing, you are obligated to fulfill it. True, if you violate it you won’t be punished—his judgment is left to Heaven; in court you won’t receive lashes—but it still binds you. That’s what Ri Migash says. So Avnei Nezer explains it there as follows. He says: it seems that the Mishneh LaMelekh had difficulty, in chapter 10 of the Laws of Kings, regarding the oaths before the giving of the Torah—Abraham and Isaac to Avimelech, Esau to Jacob, Eliezer to Abraham. There were all sorts of oaths we find before the giving of the Torah. But an oath is not among the seven commandments commanded to the Noahides, so what makes it binding? Why swear Abraham and Isaac, Avimelech and Eliezer and Abraham, if the Torah had not yet been given? There is no “he shall not profane his word,” an oath is not binding—so what is the point of swearing? What is the point of administering an oath? And it is even more difficult, says the Mishneh LaMelekh, regarding the oath at Sinai, which is the foundation of accepting the Torah. For as long as they had not accepted the Torah, they had not been commanded regarding oaths. I mentioned this once. What sense does it make to make the people of Israel swear to keep the Torah? As long as they had not accepted the Torah, they were not obligated to keep oaths. So how can you base the obligation to the Torah itself on the obligation to keep oaths? There is, of course, an assumption here that is not so simple. The Talmud says that an oath does not take effect on a prohibition because one is already sworn from Sinai, and an oath does not take effect on an oath. So all the prohibitions—we are already sworn to observe them, and an oath does not take effect on that because an oath does not take effect on an oath. Among the medieval authorities it’s not entirely clear that we’re really talking there about an oath in the literal sense, because we don’t find anywhere that the people of Israel swore at Mount Sinai. It appears nowhere. In the plains of Moab there is a curse and an oath, but at the revelation at Sinai it says nowhere that there was an oath. So some medieval authorities explain it in various ways, but the Mishneh LaMelekh here assumes—apparently as the Ran also assumes in tractate Nedarim 16—that they took this as a real oath. Their claim is that there actually was an oath there, even though the source is unclear. Maybe “we will do and we will hear”—that’s the claim. It could be, it could be that they interpreted it as an oath. And then the question the Mishneh LaMelekh asks here is: what is the point of basing our obligation to the commandments on an oath, when the obligation to keep an oath is itself one of the commandments? If I am not obligated in the commandments, then I also won’t need to keep the oath—what do you gain from it? So he says: and furthermore, even if they were commanded, still, the whole force of an oath is because of the commandment “he shall not profane his word,” and in what way is this warning greater than the other warnings in the Torah? What extra force does an oath add to the warnings of the Torah, since the oath too is only a warning? Don’t say that perhaps a person will be more careful to observe it even without a Torah warning because he understands it is forbidden—well, then he’ll also be careful to observe all the commands of the Torah. So why make him swear? How is this command different from all the others? After the Holy One, blessed be He, tells us the 613 commandments, there is also reason to say that we should observe the commandments. So what does an oath to keep the commandments add? That’s the claim.

[Speaker G] There’s a reasoning that when a person swears, he needs reinforcement—that makes it effective. Meaning, there’s a reasoning to fulfill…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that comes from “he shall not profane his word”—what do you mean?

[Speaker G] Reasoning—without that, would you say there’s reasoning? No, no, that’s the claim. That if he swore that he…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, right, he can swear till tomorrow.

[Speaker G] Yes, I know, but there’s no reasoning that whatever he swore he should fulfill. There is reasoning, but the question is whether reasoning obligates him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and that’s what we’re talking about.

[Speaker G] That’s what we said—that reasonings are included…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So now I’m getting to that—look, the fact that there is a reasoning doesn’t by itself mean anything. Therefore, it seems the explanation is as follows: certainly one who swears to another person—the reasoning decisively indicates that he is obligated to fulfill it, and no warning is needed for that. And that is the case of the oaths of Abraham and Isaac and Eliezer and so on, and likewise regarding the Holy One, blessed be He. But one who swears to himself that he will not do something, or that he will do something—in that case there is no reasoning, because to whom has he obligated himself? If you say to the Holy One, blessed be He—how do you know that the Holy One desires this obligation or prohibition? For that, the Torah had to command: “he shall not profane his word; whatever comes out of his mouth he shall do.” Therefore the oath at Sinai is also understandable: they swore to the Holy One, blessed be He, to keep His commandments, and that is by virtue of reasoning. However, for an obligation that comes from reasoning, we do not find in the Torah any punishment by human agency. Now the words of Ri Migash are also understandable. What is he saying? He says: why do we need “he shall not profane his word”? Because oaths that I swear to another person—reason says I must fulfill them. Who is writing this? Avnei Nezer. But oaths that I swear between me and myself—there there is no reasoning. Why would I have to fulfill that? And even with regard to the Holy One, blessed be He—who says He expects that from me? Therefore the Torah’s command is needed. But, Avnei Nezer adds, things that follow from reasoning—even if they are between man and fellow man, meaning the reasoning clearly does dictate them—we do not find punishment in that matter. For punishment, you need the Torah’s command of “he shall not profane his word.” So in my opinion, in the end, what he says at the end pulls the rug out from under his initial distinction. Because then you could say there is also reasoning in oaths between a person and himself, not only in oaths to another person. Why is the command needed? The command is needed so that one can punish—not in order to add another oath as such. But that’s in parentheses. In any case, that is his claim, and therefore there is sense in administering the oath at Sinai, because we are obligated to fulfill that oath by reasoning even if we had not yet accepted the Torah. So one can base the obligation to the Torah on an oath. And the same goes for all the oaths Eliezer swore to Abraham and all the others—there is reasoning that obligates them. And then he says: now the words of Ri Migash are understandable, because with the oaths before the giving of the Torah, the Torah never mentioned verbal utterance or “his word”; speech is not required. Therefore there is no distinction between orally and in writing. Therefore, one who swears to another by his own handwriting and gives him his written document is obligated to fulfill it—but one cannot punish him by human agency, since there is no negative commandment here and we do not find any punishment by human agency for this. His claim is that the whole dispute among the later authorities regarding a written oath could be relevant with regard to punishment. If we say that writing is like speech, then one who swore in writing is considered to have made explicit verbalization, and then he violated “he shall not profane his word” and would also receive lashes. But one who holds that writing is not like speech—that doesn’t mean that a person who swore in writing doesn’t need to fulfill it; it only means that this is not included in the prohibition of “he shall not profane his word,” so he won’t receive lashes. But the obligation to fulfill it exists even without that. Why? By force of reasoning. And in reasoning there is no difference whether you wrote it or spoke it. Whether you wrote it or spoke it matters in the Torah’s legal framework, because it says explicit verbalization, or it says that he shall speak; so in Torah law it applies to you only if the conditions really were met. But something that follows from reasoning has no limitations—wherever the reasoning applies, you are obligated to fulfill it. And he says this also regarding a written oath, even according to the view that writing is not like speech—meaning there is no explicit verbalization here, it does not meet the Torah’s conditions of “he shall not profane his word,” the negative commandment of “he shall not profane his word” does not apply to you—but you still have to fulfill it

[Speaker A] and there is punishment by Heaven.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And punishment by Heaven, exactly. And I think that is the source for Maimonides’ ruling regarding the oath of a minor. This is Ri Migash, as we said—that’s the source for Maimonides’ ruling regarding a minor’s oath: that the reason one doesn’t impose an oath on a minor is that he doesn’t know the punishment for an oath, but it implies, as I said, that there is punishment for an oath on him—he just doesn’t know. Why? That is exactly what Ri Migash says here: since the prohibition regarding an oath—the prohibition against violating an oath—is a prohibition whose basis is reasoning. And there too it’s an oath between one person and another; and even according to Avnei Nezer it is clear there is reasoning here, because we are dealing with the laws of claims and counterclaims, where you swear to another person. So in such a case, where there is reasoning, if the minor knew the punishment for an oath—and again, I’m talking about punishment by Heaven, not in religious court—then there would definitely be a point in imposing an oath on him. But don’t impose an oath on him, because usually he doesn’t know the punishment for an oath, that’s all. But on the conceptual level, if there were some minor here who did know, then indeed one could impose an oath on him—there is punishment for an oath on him. And this gives very nice expression to what we discussed earlier: that things whose basis is reasoning

[Speaker A] have punishment by

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Heaven, yes—that things whose basis is reasoning, first, are binding, and second, there is no limitation on whom they bind. Meaning, it can be anyone who understands, and anyone for whom the reasoning is relevant. All the Torah’s limitations—that you need explicit verbalization, that one must be an adult, male and not female in cases where the woman is exempt, and all sorts of things of that kind—are not relevant to things whose basis is reasoning. If there is a commandment whose basis is reasoning and it is time-bound, women would not be exempt from it.

[Speaker A] What happens with an adult who doesn’t understand the reasoning?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he doesn’t understand, then he is under compulsion—exactly like a minor who doesn’t understand the reasoning.

[Speaker A] The same thing? Yes. No, it could fall under the category of an incompetent person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—exempt. He doesn’t understand this reasoning. There is no essential definition of an incompetent person here.

[Speaker A] There’s no definition of what obligates

[Speaker C] fulfillment of a commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whatever the reasoning says. Each person for himself? About that—I may talk about it a little now. I raised it last time. I can’t really start the next topic, so I’ll say a bit about it. Look, regarding this matter of reasoning, this statement is very unsettling—that reasoning obligates. What is reasoning? This one says the reasoning is such-and-such, and that one says the reasoning is such-and-such. Whose reasoning is binding?

[Speaker A] The reasoning of the reasonable person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The reasoning of the reasonable person—who is the reasonable person? The people we meet out in the world. So I think the claim is the following. Obviously my reasoning cannot obligate someone else. If he agrees with that reasoning, then it will obligate him—not because I said the reasoning, but because he himself thinks it is correct reasoning. Then it obligates him, not in the name of my saying it. A reasoning that emerges from the Great Court—from the Sanhedrin, let’s say, decides that one recites a blessing before deriving benefit, yes? We discussed this in Pnei Yehoshua and Tzelach, where we saw that this is an obligation whose basis is reasoning: one who benefits from this world without a blessing is as though he committed sacrilege. A reasoning written in the Talmud, or reasoning that comes from the Great Court, obligates all Israel like any ruling of the Great Court. But that’s not… what?

[Speaker A] To transgress it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know—if a gentile… no, obviously. But someone who doesn’t agree—if I’m a Jew, then I’m obligated because the Sanhedrin said so, and there is “do not deviate.” But if I’m a gentile, is there

[Speaker A] “do not deviate” for a gentile from the Sanhedrin?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then he has no reasoning, right? He has no reasoning of his own. So what claim can you make against him? Therefore I say that in principle reasoning obligates each person who has that reasoning. And what makes people recoil—“well then everyone has his own Torah”—no, it’s not like that. Because my reasoning doesn’t obligate you. It’s not that if I have some reasoning, you are now considered a transgressor. You are not. You are judged according to your own reasoning, not according to mine. When I say judged, I mean by the laws of Heaven. When the Sanhedrin determines a reasoning, that’s something else: there is “do not deviate,” and that obligates me. It obligates me not because of the reasoning. It obligates me because of “do not deviate,” because the Sanhedrin determined it. Therefore it’s unrelated—I can even disagree with the reasoning, disagree with the Sanhedrin, it doesn’t matter.

[Speaker A] The source is reasoning, but the obligation…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. The Sanhedrin did it because of the reasoning, but now the reason I am obligated to obey is that there is “do not deviate,” that the Sanhedrin has authority. Therefore the threat that it sounds like everyone will just do whatever he wants—it’s not like that. First of all, whatever the Jewish law has already established—Sanhedrin, Talmud, whatever it may be—whatever Jewish law has established is established. Reasonings don’t help against what Jewish law has already established. In a place where there is a lacuna, meaning Jewish law has said nothing, if I think by reasoning that something should be done, or should not be done, I am obligated to do that. I am obligated. They will bring claims against me in the heavenly court if I don’t do it, even though it is only my own reasoning. Okay? If it is the reasoning of the Great Court, then everyone is obligated by it, even someone who does not agree with the reasoning. That is the claim. Just like in any law. By the way, the same is true in the context of interpretive reasoning. Until now I was speaking about reasoning that creates a new law, like the blessing over enjoyment. But interpretive reasoning is the same. Meaning, if in my opinion the interpretation of a verse, or of a law in the Talmud, or whatever, is a certain way, that obligates me; and if I don’t act accordingly, here in principle they might even punish me. Because I am violating the verse. This is not reasoning that created a new law. The law was created in the verse; only my reasoning tells me what the verse means, what the verse is saying. In such a case, it could be that they would even punish me.

[Speaker D] So if the Sanhedrin enforces the reasoning, meaning the Sanhedrin forces you…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If they have reasoning. But if they don’t have reasoning?

[Speaker D] But if you don’t agree with them that this is reasoning?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then I have to obey them—there is “do not deviate.” Coercion, yes.

[Speaker D] So then it’s not because of reasoning, because you don’t agree.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again: if it is the reasoning of the Sanhedrin, then as I said, I am not obligated by it because it is reasoning; I am obligated by it because the Sanhedrin said it—there is “do not deviate.” But if it is my own reasoning, and the Sanhedrin said nothing about it, then in principle I am obligated to do it. Theoretically, if it were possible to warn me, say, according to my own reasoning—know that according to your reasoning this thing is a Torah prohibition—then in principle they would even administer lashes for it, in my opinion. Even if the Sanhedrin would not have to agree with me on the matter. Because a person’s reasoning obligates him. Reasoning is a binding source.

[Speaker A] And if the Sanhedrin says… what? And if the Sanhedrin says it’s permitted, and you think the reasoning says it’s forbidden? Then I’m obligated by Heaven.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes—again, that’s reasoning to be stringent. Let’s say at the very least they certainly won’t punish me after the Sanhedrin determined it’s permitted. The question is whether there is still a claim against me to be stringent—there very well may be.

[Speaker F] What about “do not place a stumbling block”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What about it?

[Speaker F] If you—if you

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] dispute based on your reasoning that you’re obligated… We talked about the Ritva on tractate Sukkah 10, right? There, in the case of things suspended four handbreadths below the covering, someone who thinks it’s permitted could seemingly cause someone who thinks it’s forbidden to stumble. The Talmud says he can only cause him to stumble if he informs him. The Ritva—he can only cause him to stumble if he informs him. But we discussed what the significance of that is.

[Speaker C] Rabbi, why isn’t it better to explain—as you told us—that reasoning means logical inferences? Then we gain a uniform definition for everyone, instead of each person having his own reasoning.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Logical inferences are not uniform for everyone. Logical inferences have the same relativity as the reasoning I’m talking about. Because the conclusion of a logical inference is a result of its premises. And if we don’t agree on the premises, then no logical inference will help.

[Speaker C] But everyone agrees on the premises of logic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are no premises of logic. Logic has no premises. The premises are yours. Logic is the rules of inference—how we derive conclusions from premises. The premises are premises that you decide on.

[Speaker C] No, but logical inferences are necessary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The inferences are necessary—if, then. Right. But the premises themselves—where do you get the “if” from? That’s what you decide. No—logic does not determine which premises are true and which are false. That is not correct. The premises are yours. Logic is the rule of inference, how we derive conclusions from premises. The premises are premises that you decide on. No, but logical inferences are necessary. The inferences are necessary—the “if, then.” Right. But the premises themselves, the “if”—where do you get the “if” from? That’s what you decide. No—logic does not determine which premises are true and which are false. Okay. Fine.

Reasoning and Rationales of the Commandments, Lecture 11

Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

The Status of Reasoning and Its Limits

Obligation of Minors, Stumbling Block, and Shame in Sanhedrin

The Contradiction from Yevamot and the Resolution through Noahides and Universal Obligation

Maimonides, Rabbi Nissim Gaon, and Reasoning as a Binding Source without Limitations

Understanding, Measures, and the Boundary of Minority

Torah Study versus the Commandment of Torah Study, and Women’s Obligation by Reasoning

The Oath of a Minor in Maimonides and Social Order

A Written Oath: Ri Migash, Avnei Nezer, and Mishneh LaMelekh

Personal Reasoning, the Sanhedrin, and “Do Not Deviate”

Full Transcript

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Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

The Status of Reasoning and Its Limits

Obligation of Minors, Stumbling Block, and Shame in Sanhedrin

The Contradiction from Yevamot and the Resolution through Noahides and Universal Obligation

Maimonides, Rabbi Nissim Gaon, and Reasoning as a Binding Source without Limitations

Understanding, Measures, and the Boundary of Minority

Torah Study versus the Commandment of Torah Study, and Women’s Obligation by Reasoning

The Oath of a Minor in Maimonides and Social Order

A Written Oath: Ri Migash, Avnei Nezer, and Mishneh LaMelekh

Personal Reasoning, the Sanhedrin, and “Do Not Deviate”

Full Transcript

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