Probability and Statistics – Lecture 3

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Does that mean it’s unintentional? I’m heading there; we’ll get to it. That’s exactly the point for which I brought this passage. So the claim is that in a case of an inevitable result, Rabbi Shimon agrees that it’s prohibited. Now pay attention. If I drag the bench over ground where it’s not certain that a furrow will be made, okay? Then if I intended to drag the bench but a furrow was made, I’m exempt; that’s unintentional. Because we’re talking about ground where it’s not certain a furrow will be made, so it’s not an inevitable result, okay? But if I intended to drag the bench in order to make a furrow, then even if it wasn’t certain that a furrow would be made, if in the end a furrow was made and that’s why I dragged the bench, then I’m liable. Meaning, the fact that it wasn’t certain doesn’t matter. It matters only where I didn’t intend it. The distinction between something certain to happen and something not certain to happen matters only where I had no intention. Okay? If there’s ground where a furrow will definitely be made, then if I didn’t intend it I’m liable, and if I did intend it I’m liable. If there’s ground where it’s not certain a furrow will be made, then with intention I’m liable, and without intention I’m exempt or it’s permitted. Okay? So the question of an inevitable result—that is, whether we’re dealing with ground such that a furrow will definitely be made—plays a role only when the dragging is done unintentionally. If I intend it, I’m liable in any case, whether it’s an inevitable result or not. All right? That’s an important point. What does that actually mean? It basically means: what exactly does an inevitable result do? At first glance it seems that an inevitable result does not solve a problem of culpability, right? It doesn’t turn me into someone who intended it. An inevitable result doesn’t turn me into someone who intended it, because intention means: what was my motivation when I dragged the bench, right? That’s how I defined intention earlier. Now even if a furrow will definitely be made here, still my motivation is moving the bench, not making the furrow, so I’m still acting unintentionally. Even if it’s an inevitable result, I’m still acting unintentionally. So why am I liable? The accepted explanation here—Rabbi Elchanan talks about this, and others too—is that really, when something is unintentional, why am I exempt? After all, there’s no lack here—it’s not a problem of lack of culpability; culpability exists. If I intended it, then I’m certainly liable. So if I didn’t intend it but I knew it was going to happen, why am I not culpable? I should have been careful, because I knew it would happen. It’s not a problem of lack of culpability. So what is it? The result isn’t connected to me. A result that was not the intended goal of my action is not a result connected to me, and therefore I’m exempt for it—for the furrow that was made. But if it’s an inevitable result, if a furrow necessarily comes about in such ground when I drag the bench, then the result is connected to me. Not because that turns me into someone who intended it, but because you don’t need intention in order to incur liability. What you need is only that the result for which one is liable be connected to me. If I intend it, then intention connects the result to me. If I don’t intend it, then in principle it isn’t connected to me—unless it’s an inevitable result, and then the inevitability basically connects the thing to me in place of intention. Not that it turns me into someone with intention, but it connects the result to me, and therefore I’m liable. There’s another possible way to say it: that really the exemption for unintentional action is someone who doesn’t know. But then the question is: what’s the difference between that and mere inadvertence? And then basically the inevitable result makes me into someone who knows. Right, so that’s fairly clear. Rabbi Chaim, for example, and several later authorities want to distinguish between unintentionality in all of Torah and unintentionality on the Sabbath, where one is about knowledge and the other is about desire or what the goal of the action is, but I’m not going into the details there; take it in the simplest possible way as much as I need for our discussion. Now let’s look at the question: what happens if I drag the bench over ground where it’s not certain that a furrow will be made? It’s doubtful whether a furrow will be made or not. What is the law in such a case?

[Speaker E] Rabbi, but aren’t all cases cases of inevitable result? Again, the laws of nature are known; it’s only in the awareness of the doer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, we’ll get there, we’ll get there, I’m heading there, we’ll get there. So when on this ground it’s not certain that a furrow will be made, the law is—that’s the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda—the law is that it’s permitted. Right? That’s called not an inevitable result, right? Because it’s not certain that a furrow will be made. Meaning that where I have doubt, that’s the antithesis of an inevitable result. An inevitable result is when it will definitely happen; doubt is when it’s not certain that it will happen. Okay? Now let’s look at what really happens in such a case, and we’ll see that it’s not so simple. In the Shulchan Arukh…

[Speaker C] Wait, Rabbi, I’m just asking as an aside. By the way, I’m asking: why doesn’t this person try it for ten centimeters, see whether it makes a furrow or not, and rule accordingly?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why should he try? No, he doesn’t—

[Speaker C] know whether it makes a furrow or not, so let him try, see, and then do it. Why should he try? If he doesn’t know, it’s permitted, so why does he need to try? No, but after ten centimeters he’ll know. If he knows, then he’ll stop.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the problem? I’m talking about a situation where he doesn’t know. If he doesn’t know, it’s permitted. Even if he can avoid getting into this tangle, he doesn’t have to; it’s permitted. No, he isn’t doing any transgression. There’s no issue; he doesn’t need to check.

[Speaker C] So what cases are we talking about? Because right now he doesn’t know, but he’ll drag it ten centimeters or so and then he’ll know.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly. And the ground can also vary from place to place. Not every part of the ground is exactly the same. So yes, it doesn’t matter; right now we’re talking about a situation where he doesn’t know. Whether that was the first ten centimeters, what difference does it make? It’s a principled claim. Okay? Okay. Now let’s take a look: the Shulchan Arukh brings this law. “Anything whose species is normally trapped, one is liable for it. If its species is not normally trapped, one is exempt but it is prohibited. Therefore flies, even though their species is not normally trapped, it is prohibited to trap them.” What does that mean? There are animals that it is normal to trap. There are animals that people don’t trap. Nobody needs them and they aren’t trapped. That’s called “its species is not normally trapped.” The Torah prohibition of trapping applies only to animals whose species is normally trapped, meaning those that people are accustomed to trap. Someone who traps an animal that people generally do not trap has violated only a rabbinic prohibition—exempt but prohibited. Okay? So, for example, flies are “a species not normally trapped,” and therefore it is prohibited to trap them, but one is exempt though it is prohibited; it is not a Torah prohibition. Okay? Now the Rema adds to this: “Therefore one should be careful not to close a small box or seal containers that have flies in them on the Sabbath, because that constitutes an inevitable result that they will be trapped there.” Right? Meaning, if I now want to close a box and there are flies inside it—now I’m closing the box not in order to trap them, but in order to close it. But I am also trapping them, so this is unintentional. But it’s unintentional with an inevitable result, because if I close it, then I’ve certainly trapped them inside. Now true, this is only a rabbinic prohibition because they are flies, a species not normally trapped. But it’s an inevitable result, and therefore it is prohibited. There are views that say that an inevitable result involving a rabbinic prohibition is permitted, but the simple understanding is that it is prohibited. “And there are those who are lenient where, if he opens the vessel to take them from there, they will fly away.” If I close the box, and when I later open it to take the flies, the flies will fly away, then when I closed the box that is not called that the flies were trapped. Because flies that are considered trapped are flies available for my use, that I can take. But if these flies are trapped inside the vessel, yet they are not available for my use, because the moment I open the vessel to take them they’ll fly away, that is not called that I trapped them. So there is an argument in the Rema here: some say such a thing is not called trapping, if they will fly away when I open the box. Okay? Now the Tur there brings, essentially, the view of the Baal HaTerumot, who is really the source of the Shulchan Arukh, and he disagrees with him. “Anything whose species is normally trapped—one is liable; if its species is not normally trapped—one is exempt, exempt but prohibited. Therefore flies, even though their species is not normally trapped, it is prohibited to trap them. Therefore the Baal HaTerumot wrote that it is prohibited to lock on the Sabbath a box that has flies in it; rather, one should place a knife or some object between the lid and the box in such a way that they can leave.” Right? Meaning, when you close the box, leave a gap so the flies can get out. Be careful not to trap the flies. I’m picturing British noblemen on horseback going out fly hunting. And truthfully what they do is no less ridiculous, but that’s another matter. “And it seems to me that one need not be so exacting about this.” That is already the Tur’s own words; up to this point it was the Baal HaTerumot. “And it seems to me that one need not be so exacting about this, for the flies are not trapped in the box, because if one comes to open the box and take them, they will fly away.” That’s the reasoning the Rema brings there. “And this is not similar to bees in a hive, regarding which it is taught: one may spread a mat over the hive, provided that he does not intend to trap.” Right? There is a hive with bees inside, and I spread a mat over it. I’m permitted to spread it if I don’t intend to trap. Now why—after all, there too it is an inevitable result that I trapped the bees? Because the hive is small and the bees are trapped in it, whereas here we are talking about a large box. “And furthermore, regarding the hive itself it teaches, ‘provided that he does not intend to trap,’ from which it follows that when he does not intend, it is permitted.” Fine, that doesn’t matter to us right now; in any case we’re talking about where it’s not certain that they are trapped, and I don’t think that matters for our issue. Now then, there is a dispute. So the Tur basically disagrees with the Baal HaTerumot. He claims that since when you closed the box with the flies inside, they are not really available for your use—because if you want to open the box and take them, they will fly away—this is not called trapping. Therefore he says there is no problem with it. The Taz on the Shulchan Arukh there explains the words of the Tur differently, and in my opinion incorrectly as well, but that’s how he explains it. “The Baal HaTerumot wrote to prohibit, and regarding this he wrote, ‘and it seems to me that one need not be so exacting about this,’ etc. And it seems to me that the words of the Tur are correct,” says the Taz, “and first let us analyze his language carefully.” For he wrote, “And it seems to me that one need not be so exacting about this,” and he did not write, “And it seems to me that it is permitted.” If he thinks it’s permitted, let him write that. Says the Taz: rather, he too holds that it is prohibited when one definitely sees flies in the box. Rather, what he means is that one need not be exacting afterward to inspect whether there are flies there. What the Tur means to say is not that it is permitted to trap the flies, but rather that I am not required to be exacting—meaning I don’t have to inspect the box to see whether there really are flies in it. Even if I don’t know, I’m allowed to close the box. That’s what he claims. And his linguistic proof from the wording of the Tur is that the Tur writes that “one need not be so exacting about this.” He doesn’t write that it is permitted. What does “to be exacting” mean? He need not be exacting and check whether there are flies inside the box. That’s what it means. But if he knows there are flies, then it’s prohibited even according to the Tur’s view. That’s what he claims. The truth is, it’s clear to me that he is wrong, for several reasons. I can’t understand at all how he read the Tur. First of all, the Tur himself gives the reason. He says, “because if one comes to open the box and take them, they will fly away.” Right? So clearly his reasoning is that they are not considered trapped after I close the box. That’s a totally different line of reasoning; it has nothing to do with… He certainly does disagree with the Baal HaTerumot. I don’t understand what the Taz wants at all. It seems he never saw the Tur inside. Beyond that, though: what does the Tur mean when he says, “one need not be so exacting about this”? That is—I’m saying this parenthetically, because the Taz matters to me, but his inference from the Tur isn’t right. The Taz himself is still a view; there are other halakhic authorities who think this way too. It’s certainly true that his inference from the Tur is not correct. What does the Tur mean when he writes, “one need not be so exacting about this”?

[Speaker C] So the Taz understands it to mean: to place a knife or some object between the lid and the box?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. “One need not be so exacting about this” does not mean that one need not inspect and see whether there are flies in the box. We’re talking about a box that has flies in it; I know there are flies in it. “One need not be so exacting” means one need not place a gap—a knife or something like that—to create a space between the lid and the box, as the Baal HaTerumot says, creating a gap between the lid and the box. You can close it completely, because they are not trapped in a usable way. Therefore—I don’t know, in my opinion the Taz did not see the Tur. Otherwise I don’t understand how he could say this. In any case, for our purposes what matters is the Taz; leave the Tur aside. The Tur doesn’t say that. But for our purposes what matters is the Taz. “And regarding the Tur’s second question it seems that this is what he means: first, that even if there are definitely flies there, this is not called trapping, unlike bees. And second, even if you say that when they are definitely there it is an inevitable result and prohibited, in any case where it is doubtful whether there are flies there, it should be permitted, for there it is not an inevitable result, because this is a doubtful inevitable result, and therefore it is an unintentional act and permitted.” What is he saying? He says: I don’t know whether there are flies in the box or not. So the Tur says you need not be exacting and check whether there are flies. So the question on the Tur is: what do you mean, why doesn’t he need to be exacting? After all, this is an inevitable result! If there are flies and you close it, then it’s unintentional, yes, but it’s unintentional with an inevitable result, so it’s prohibited. Why doesn’t he need to be exacting and see whether there are or are not flies there? So the Taz says: he need not be exacting because if you don’t know whether there are or are not flies there, then it’s basically a case of doubt whether you are trapping or not trapping. It’s a doubtful inevitable result. And what is the law in such a case? It’s permitted. Because doubt is not an inevitable result—that’s the whole idea. If there is doubt, then it’s not… What is an inevitable result? An inevitable result is when I know for certain that the outcome will occur. But here, that’s exactly the point: if there are no flies in the box, then I do not know with certainty that closing the box will trap them. And since that’s so, this is not a case of inevitable result but ordinary unintentional action, and therefore it is permitted.

[Speaker C] But in this case, it’s you who is choosing to ignore that point.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like the question you asked earlier about the ten centimeters. I’ll give you the same answer. Once the act is permitted, then I’m allowed to ignore it; there’s no problem at all. The act is permitted. If this were an exemption based on lack of culpability, then you could say to me, check—you are culpable; why didn’t you check? But if I claim that no transgression was committed here at all, then why do I need to check? What’s the problem? The act is not problematic. Okay.

[Speaker C] But still, it’s you who doesn’t know; it’s not that in reality it’s uncertain whether it’s one way or the other.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s already a different claim, and I’m coming to it in just a moment. Now in fact I’m now getting to Rabbi Akiva Eiger. In the end, the Taz concludes as practical Jewish law that one need not be exacting, and one may close the box without checking whether there are flies there. “And so it seems to me to be the practical Jewish law: if he sees flies there, let him first chase away whatever he can chase away. But he need not search for this.” Meaning, he doesn’t need to check; if he knows there are flies, let him chase them away. If he doesn’t know, he doesn’t need to check. That is his practical ruling. Now Rabbi Akiva Eiger disagrees with him. Rabbi Akiva Eiger appears in Yoreh De’ah on an entirely different law. The Rema writes there as follows, siman 87: “There are those who say that it is prohibited to stir the fire under a gentile’s pot, because they cook in them sometimes milk and sometimes meat, and one who stirs the fire under their pot may thereby come to cook meat with milk.” Meaning: if there is a non-Jew’s pot, I am not allowed to kindle a fire under it. Why? Because if I light a fire under the pot, then inside the pot there is absorbed milk and also meat, because the gentiles cook both things in it, and once I put fire under the pot, the fire cooks the meat with the milk, and I have violated the prohibition of cooking; as you may recall, meat and milk are prohibited not only to eat but also to cook. So therefore it is prohibited to do this, says the Rema. Rabbi Akiva Eiger comments there: “This is difficult for me, because he does not intend to cook; he only intends to stir the fire.” He doesn’t intend to cook the meat and milk absorbed inside the pot. “And this is not an inevitable result, because perhaps the gentile did not cook both meat and milk in the pot.” True, many times gentiles do both, but that’s not certain. Maybe he cooked, maybe he didn’t. So in fact this is not an inevitable result; it’s doubtful. And he certainly does not intend to cook. If he intended to cook the meat and milk, then even if it were not an inevitable result—

[Speaker C] result, he’d still be liable; we discussed that. But if he doesn’t intend that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He intends to put fire under the pot. So there, only if

[Speaker C] it’s—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] an inevitable result is he liable. But here it’s not an inevitable result, because perhaps there is no absorbed meat and milk in the pot. So he finds the Rema’s ruling difficult.

[Speaker C] And then he explains it this way:

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And one must say that specifically in a doubt concerning the future—perhaps this thing will not occur through his act—such as dragging a chair or bench, where the doubt is that perhaps by his dragging no furrow will be made. But in a doubt concerning the past,” yes, about what already was, “as here—if there is absorbed meat and milk in the pot, then by stirring the fire it will certainly be cooked; the doubt is only whether there is no absorbed meat and milk in it—this is called an inevitable result.” What is he saying? That there is a difference between whether the doubt concerns what will happen in the future—and you can already see the similarity to our previous discussions—and whether the doubt concerns something that already exists now or existed in the past. For example, the flies of the Taz—what is that? A doubt about the past or about the future?

[Speaker C] A doubt about the past. About the past, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is whether there are already flies in the box or not. Regarding dragging a bench, it’s a doubt about the future, right? The doubt is whether a furrow will be made or not when I drag it. So that’s a doubt about the future. And with the pot it’s once again like the flies: a doubt about the past. The question is whether meat and milk are absorbed in the pot. If yes, then when I light the fire under the pot I certainly cook them. And Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: a doubt about the past is called an inevitable result. All the doubts that remove something from the category of inevitable result are only doubts about the future. Now about this one can argue quite a bit. I’ll explain briefly—maybe one more sentence. “Indeed, according to the Taz,” and then he brings this Taz from Orach Chayim, “who wrote there, according to the Tur, that if one closes a box and it is doubtful whether there are flies there, one may close it, because it is an unintentional act, and even though it is an inevitable result, nevertheless perhaps there are no flies there and thus it is not an inevitable result.” That is a doubt. “If so, then apparently in our case there is complete permission, because this person does not intend to cook in the gentile’s vessel, and it is possible that there is no absorbed meat and milk inside it at all, and thus it is not an inevitable result.” So according to the Taz, here too it should really be permitted. Rabbi Akiva Eiger himself claims that it is prohibited. By the way, the Rema himself writes that it is prohibited, right? Here the Rema writes, “one who stirs the pot may thereby come to cook meat and milk.” So it is prohibited, he says. So this is proof against the Taz—this Rema here. It’s not merely a dispute between Rabbi Akiva Eiger and the Taz; there is a Rema here that is conclusive proof against the Taz. We see here that a doubt about what already was does not remove the matter from the category of inevitable result; only a doubt about the future, like dragging a bench and making a furrow—only there does it remove the matter from the category of inevitable result. Okay, now what exactly is the… why is there a difference between doubt about the past and doubt about the future? On this there is a very long Biur Halakhah, and there are many discussions among the later authorities, some of which imply that the difference really is on the axis of whether it concerns the past or the future. But simply speaking, that is not the point. It is not a question of past or future, but a question of whether this is really a doubtful inevitable result or not an inevitable result. What does that mean? Ontic doubt or epistemic doubt—that is the question. Meaning: when I talk about the flies in the box, here we arrive at the point, because this is another example of the difference between ontic doubt and epistemic doubt. When I look at the flies in the box, now I’m about to close the box and I don’t know whether there are flies in it or not. But in reality itself, either there are flies or there aren’t; reality itself is not vague, right? This is a state of doubt, not vagueness. Okay? Therefore here he basically says: on the side that there are flies inside the box, and I closed it, this is a full-fledged inevitable result. So what if I don’t know? Then I am in doubt about a prohibition, and in cases of doubt about a prohibition we rule stringently. There is a doubt here whether there is a prohibition of unintentional action with an inevitable result—a Torah-level doubt, and therefore stringently. Therefore Rabbi Akiva Eiger says that in an epistemic doubt, of course that does not permit it. Epistemic doubt is an inevitable result. Of course the prohibition is only doubtful and not certain, because you don’t know whether there are flies or not, so you can’t say this is definitely prohibited—but it is still a doubtful prohibition. But with ontic doubt—if in reality itself, as with the ground for example, where I don’t know if in such ground—or rather, in such ground it’s not certain that a furrow will be made, not that I don’t know; in such ground it’s not certain that a furrow will be made. This is ground of some medium hardness, say, and I’m not sure whether a furrow will be made or not. There, indeed, if it’s not certain, then it’s not an inevitable result. But there this really is ontic doubt: a doubt in the ground itself whether the ground is such that a furrow will be made or not. With ontic doubt, then it is not an inevitable result; with epistemic doubt, it is a doubtful inevitable result.

[Speaker C] No, Rabbi, the ground itself knows itself—it knows whether it will make a furrow or not, if you know the ground in all its dimensions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, that’s it, we’ll get to that in just a moment. All right? Not in just a moment, but soon I’ll get to it. Fine, I agree—soon, we’ll see. So in any case, the distinction in principle—and that’s how people generally explain it, and I think it’s the simplest explanation—is that the difference Rabbi Akiva Eiger makes, which the Taz is unwilling to make, but the difference Rabbi Akiva Eiger makes, and for which there is proof from the Rema there in Yoreh De’ah, is that there is a difference between ontic doubt and epistemic doubt. In ontic doubt there is no prohibition at all; you committed no transgression, because this is not an inevitable result—it is unintentional action not involving an inevitable result. That is dragging a bench and making a furrow. In epistemic doubt, as with the box or with the pot on the fire, there what is happening is only that you don’t know. But in reality itself, if there is meat and milk, or if there are flies in the box, and you close it or put fire under it, then in a case of inevitable result you have violated the prohibition. The fact that you don’t know—fine, that means it is a doubtful prohibition. And a doubtful prohibition is also prohibited; a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently. But we have not left the category of inevitable result. All right? So this is what is called the category of “doubtful inevitable result.” Because apparently “doubtful inevitable result” is an oxymoronic term. If it is doubtful, then it is not an inevitable result. The whole idea of inevitable result is that it is certain. So what is “doubtful inevitable result”? That is indeed how the Taz understands it. The Taz says there is no such thing as doubtful inevitable result; if that’s what you mean, then it is not an inevitable result. But Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: that’s not right. There is such a concept as doubtful inevitable result. If when you violate the prohibition through unintentional action with an inevitable result, it is a Torah prohibition, then even if you are in doubt whether there is a prohibition here or not, you must be stringent, because a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently. That is all when your doubt is epistemic. You do not know whether there are flies there; you do not know whether there is meat and milk in the pot.

[Speaker D] But when there is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] ontic doubt, then there is no inevitable result here at all, because the whole idea of inevitable result is that there is no doubt—it will definitely happen.

[Speaker D] According to the Taz, then, is there a concept of a Torah-level doubt requiring stringency, so that we would be stringent, or will it always be called unintentional and we exempt?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a case of doubt—a Torah-level doubt in an ordinary prohibition, unrelated to unintentional action—

[Speaker D] But in unintentional action there is an exemption in the whole Torah. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here we are speaking only about doubt in unintentional action. In doubt regarding an ordinary prohibition, of course there is such a thing; why wouldn’t there be? I have a piece of meat and I don’t know whether it is pork or beef—that is ordinary doubt, a Torah-level doubt requiring stringency. I understand, okay. It is only in unintentional action that this whole discussion arises.

[Speaker D] Let’s say I have one prohibited piece and one permitted piece, and I do not intentionally want specifically the prohibited piece; I don’t care if it’s also the permitted one—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then what does “unintentional” mean? No, that’s not unintentional; it’s unrelated. Not unintentional? Okay. No, unintentional is when you intend one action, and incidentally a second action comes out of it. When you eat one of the pieces, you intend the prohibition and get the permitted one, or vice versa—you just got whichever one you got. That’s not two things. In unintentional action there are two actions: one I intend, and the second I do not. Here you can simply say: I acted in error.

[Speaker D] Mere inadvertence, if—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] if you like, but it’s not unintentional action.

[Speaker C] So what? Is that itself Rabbi Shimon’s claim—that even where there is a Torah-level doubt, when you don’t intend it, it is permitted? No. No.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the contrary: Rabbi Shimon claims that if there is vagueness here—ontic doubt—then it is not an inevitable result, and it is permitted. But if there is epistemic doubt here, then Rabbi Shimon would also obligate. This is called doubtful inevitable result, a doubtful Torah prohibition requiring stringency. All right? And that is Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s claim.

[Speaker C] What? Even when there is vagueness, didn’t we say last week that even with vagueness we go stringently?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, and that’s exactly the point. Again, first of all, I said last week that it isn’t “going stringently.” Going stringently means that in doubt you take the stringent side. In vagueness, the stringency is definite, because both sides are there—the one side and the other side. That’s one thing. But beyond that, here we are not talking about the laws of doubt. Ontic doubt permits not because of the laws of doubt, but because there is no prohibition. Once the prohibited action is done unintentionally and it is not certain to happen, then you simply did not commit a prohibition. This is not a problem of the laws of doubt. It is not because in doubt one may be lenient; rather, this is a special kind of doubt, a doubt in which there simply is no prohibition at all. Now I remind you again of what I said: that the permission of unintentional action is not a permission based on lack of culpability, but a permission based on lack of transgression. Why is that important? Because now you understand that what I know or do not know is not relevant. The distinction between whether I know or don’t know is relevant when we are discussing my culpability. So if I say, I am not culpable, I didn’t know—whereas if you did know, then you are culpable. So here there is room to discuss: do you know or not know? That is on the plane of culpability. But if the discussion is about the question whether you committed a transgression, then why should I care what you know or don’t know? The whole question is whether the action you did is connected to you. And then it depends on the factual question: when you close the box and there are flies inside it, clearly the trapping of the flies is connected to you. Yes, you committed a transgression. To say, I was in doubt, I wasn’t sure—so what? You committed a transgression. The transgression is still on you. That’s not the point. You could claim, I didn’t know, if the claim “I didn’t know” were a claim of exemption. But in a doubt that is meant to remove the case from inevitable result, it is not a claim of exemption; it is a claim that there is no prohibition. Once reality is such that the prohibition does not necessarily emerge from my action, then this simply is not a prohibited action. That’s all. But that’s only if in reality itself, reality itself is such that the action I’m doing is not certain to produce a prohibition. But if in reality itself the action I’m doing certainly produces a prohibition, and I just don’t know whether there are flies or whether there is meat and milk, then this is a doubtful prohibition. It’s not connected to the plane of inevitable result; it is just an ordinary doubtful prohibition. Are you with me? It’s a somewhat fine distinction, but I think it’s very clear. All right, or not? This silence is a little suspicious.

[Speaker D] Could you say it again, again?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again. Regarding—after all, I explained that the difference between inevitable result and not inevitable result is kind of “doubt,” right? Something that is not an inevitable result is doubtful, meaning I don’t know whether it will happen or not. What I want to claim now is: it is not doubt, it is vagueness. If it is doubt, then it is still an inevitable result; only in vagueness is it not an inevitable result. Why? Because I explained that the exemption for unintentional action is not an exemption based on my not being culpable. I did a prohibited act, but I’m not culpable because I didn’t know. No. I am culpable, I knew everything. It is not an exemption based on lack of culpability; it is an exemption based on lack of prohibition—I didn’t commit a prohibited act at all. All right? So what does inevitable result do? It does not turn me into someone culpable; it connects the act to me, and therefore now a prohibition has occurred, a prohibition connected to me. The culpability was always there; the whole question is whether there will be a prohibition. So inevitable result turns the situation into a prohibition. Now I committed a prohibited act. Now let’s discuss what happens with inevitable result when I have ontic doubt. Say, with the ground: I drag the bench over the ground, and this is a kind of ground where it is not certain that a furrow will be made. So that is ontic doubt. In the ground itself, a furrow may be made and may not be made. Okay? In such a case you can’t say that this is an inevitable result—that’s the whole point. When dragging a bench over this ground, it is not certain that a furrow will be made, so it is not an inevitable result. That is exactly the case that is not an inevitable result, about which Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagreed. But with flies in the box, that is not this case. Because with flies in the box, on the side that there are flies in the box—I don’t know. But if there really are flies in the box, then when I close the box, that closing necessarily leads to trapping. Right? That follows necessarily from my action. I just don’t know whether that is the case or not. But that has nothing to do with the necessity of the connection between my action and the result; it only has to do with what I know about the situation. But what I know about the situation belongs to exemptions based on lack of culpability, to the laws of doubt. It does not remove the case from inevitable result. The doubt that removes something from inevitable result is doubt on the ontic plane. It has nothing to do with whether I am culpable or not; it is a question whether in reality itself the prohibition necessarily emerges from my action. That is determined by ontology. And then it really lies on the axis of yes-inevitable-result or no-inevitable-result. But with epistemic doubt, that has nothing to do with whether it is an inevitable result or not. To determine inevitable result, look at reality—ask the Holy One, blessed be He. He knows whether there are flies there or whether there is meat and milk in the pot or not. Therefore it is certainly an inevitable result. True, if I don’t know whether there are flies, then it is a doubt, and because of doubt one must be stringent, of course, because a Torah-level doubt is treated stringently. With flies it is a rabbinic doubt, but still, if you can check, it may be that one should check even in a rabbinic doubt.

[Speaker C] Okay? Is it clearer now? Yes, yes, clearer. But with the ground and the furrow, if you say that’s vagueness, then that means it is both an inevitable result and not an inevitable result.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand.

[Speaker C] Last week we said regarding those two people that in vagueness it is both A and B. Right? Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So—

[Speaker C] so with this ground too it is both an inevitable result and not an inevitable result.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, with this ground not exactly—but only formally. With this ground, when I speak about vagueness, I mean like with the child in the mother’s womb before forty days, the way the Sages understood it. Before forty days it can be a boy and it can be a girl. In the end only one comes out. It’s two potentials. And here too with the ground there are two potentials: there may be a furrow and there may not be a furrow. Right now it is not that I both made a furrow and did not make a furrow. In the end, either I made one or I didn’t. But at the level of potential it is open; it could go either way. Okay, now the question that really arises is the one some of you asked, and quite rightly. But first, before the question: up to this point, you see that this is another illustration of the distinction between doubt and vagueness, or between epistemic doubt and ontic doubt, right? Because ontic doubt operates on the axis of whether this is an inevitable result or not an inevitable result; epistemic doubt operates through the laws of doubt, but has nothing to do with whether it is an inevitable result or not. All right? That is the first distinction. So first of all, this is another example of the distinction between epistemic doubt and ontic doubt. Now I’m moving to the next stage. I said I would come to a third type of doubt. The big question here, of course—the one several of you asked—is: there is no such thing as ontic doubt, as I said earlier; there is no real vagueness in the world. There is no real vagueness in the world at all, as our master said. All right? If I know the ground, if I know the ground completely, then obviously, with ground of this sort either a furrow will be made or a furrow will not be made. Every type of ground, in a deterministic way, it’s clear whether a furrow will be made or not. It’s just that I don’t know, because I’m not an expert on soils, and there may be knowledge that perhaps no expert knows, but in principle the Holy One, blessed be He, certainly knows—not like the two sisters, where even the Holy One, blessed be He, does not know which one is married to me. Here this is information certainly possessed by the Holy One, blessed be He. If I asked Him, He would tell me whether a furrow will be made here or not, right? Therefore in truth, even in the case of the ground and the furrow when dragging a bench, there too this is epistemic doubt, not ontic doubt. Or in other words: there is no doubt in the world that is ontic; all doubts are epistemic. And if that is so, the Taz is right. Because then what counts as the kind of doubt that is not an inevitable result? We said only ontic doubt. But there is no ontic doubt; all doubts are epistemic. If epistemic doubts do not remove something from the category of inevitable result, then what does remove it from inevitable result? Nothing. And that is a serious difficulty for Rabbi Akiva Eiger. All right? Every doubt is really epistemic doubt—it’s just that I don’t know. In reality itself, either it will happen—someone who understands well, someone who knows well the nature of the ground and is an expert on soils, will tell me either a furrow will be made here or a furrow will not be made here. I don’t know because I’m a layman in that field. But again, if so, that’s epistemic doubt, and all the doubts you want, all the cases that come up in the Talmud, all the unintentional acts with inevitable results and all those things, are all epistemic doubts. And when we talk about a doubt that removes the matter from the category of inevitable result, it would have to be ontic doubt—but there is no ontic doubt in the world.

[Speaker E] Rabbi, but could one suggest some sort of ontic doubt? When there is some involvement of a human factor—for example, when you drag it, the thing being dragged, over the ground, it depends on how forcefully you drag it; you can apply various degrees of force. Once there is human involvement here, which is still subject to your choice, if you believe in free will—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand, but even there, the human factor depends on whether he performs this action as a choice that has value-laden dimensions. Then I’m willing to accept it.

[Speaker E] But why on earth? Who said that choice—what is this? Everything is choice. Everything is subject to your choice. “Value-laden” or “not value-laden” is a whole new story. What does “value-laden” mean? I know what value-laden and not value-laden means—everything in life is value-laden—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Quite easily—

[Speaker E] I really think so, I truly believe that. Everything is value-laden; it depends what you intend to do with it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is what the person dragging the bench thinks. Is this person now making a value decision from his perspective? If yes, then there is room for what you said—that he is making a free choice and the outcome is genuinely open. But that is not the case here. A person does an action in which, in the end, true, the person is involved, but his biology is involved too, and biology too is part of the laws of nature.

[Speaker E] But there’s always a value factor involved. You drag it—why are you dragging it? I’m dragging it because I want to bring the table. Why are you bringing the table?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why are you dragging it—

[Speaker E] how are you dragging it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in everything there are value considerations; you do something because of your desire. That’s not true; there is never a value consideration involved. You could have chosen not to do it, you could have chosen not to drag the table over the ground because you could have rested; you decided to do it. Why are you doing it? Why are you acting in the world at all? I said, and I repeat—wait, listen—I said, and I repeat again: the decision at issue here is how to drag it. Whether to drag it in a way that creates a furrow or in a way that does not create a furrow. Not the decision whether to drag it. The decision whether to drag it is not relevant.

[Speaker E] And I think everything a person does—his intensity, not only what he does but how he does it, the style in which he does it—very often the style, the style is often more important than what he does, the way he does it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what difference does it make what’s more important? I’m asking a question.

[Speaker E] No, it’s kind of connected to choice, I mean.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it has nothing to do with choice. When a person drags a bench, he drags it however it comes out. He never chooses how to drag it. Maybe he makes a choice only in the sense of what is more convenient for me. But what is more convenient for me is not choice; it is a calculative decision about what is more convenient.

[Speaker E] When we say “style is the person,” that’s not just a throwaway line. The Rabbi knows that’s a very deep statement, and it means that what matters isn’t what—it matters more than what you do, it’s the style in which you do it, in what—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Style is of no interest in this context in any way. Why should style matter? I’m asking whether it is predetermined. The answer is yes. That’s it, unequivocally. There is no room for argument. The person is making no value judgment here. The person decides how to drag. That decision is a calculation; it is not a choice. This is what is called picking, not choosing. And in picking, not choosing, there are experiments in neuroscience that show this: with picking there is no choice, with choosing there is choice. This is what the Sages said: “Everything is in the hands of Heaven except the fear of Heaven,” and today that is corroborated experimentally. At the end of the day my biology is involved—so what? It is still completely deterministic.

[Speaker E] Simplistic science says there is no free choice at all in anything.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Simplistic science says nothing in this context; it simply does not deal with it.

[Speaker E] What, does plain simplistic science accept human free choice?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know what “simplistic science” and “non-simplistic science” are.

[Speaker E] Any science whatever. Does science accept choice—science does not deal with the question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Oy, he hasn’t read the

[Speaker E] book The Science of Freedom.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Science does not deal with the question whether we do or do not have choice. Science describes the deterministic aspects of the world, that’s all. Fine, but we’re really drifting. In principle, what comes out of this is that there is no situation that is not an inevitable result. If it happened, then it was clear in advance that it would happen. If it didn’t happen, then it was clear in advance that it would not happen. There is no situation that is genuinely open. You see the analogy to what happened with prayer about the past? There is no situation in which both possibilities are legitimate within the framework of nature. There is always one possibility that is fixed deterministically. So what is a case that is not an inevitable result according to Rabbi Akiva Eiger? A very difficult question for Rabbi Akiva Eiger.

[Speaker G] So maybe that’s what he means—maybe Rabbi Akiva Eiger means a case where it’s easy to see it, versus a case where it’s hard to see it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so we’ll see in a moment. I think that is connected. Let me say it in one sentence and we’ll continue next time. I think there are situations where, if you ask an ordinary person whether this is an ontic doubt or an epistemic doubt, he’ll tell you it’s ontic—even though in truth it’s epistemic. If you ask a non-expert, an ordinary person, and say: when I drag a bench over this kind of ground, will a groove be made or not? He’ll say: look, this is ground of medium hardness; maybe it will, maybe it won’t, it’s not certain, it depends. Now if you press him and ask: is this an epistemic doubt—you just don’t know—or is the nature of the ground itself some kind of intermediate nature? I think a lot of people would answer that it’s the nature of the ground itself. Certainly people in the time of the Sages, but I think even today. There are things that we see this way. Say, for example, as I discussed in previous classes, you ask someone: when I throw a die or flip a coin, is that a random process? Any normal person, including scientists, will tell you yes, it’s a random process. Of course that’s complete nonsense; there’s nothing random here. Rather, the common-sense layman’s perspective, let’s call it that—if you’re not a philosopher—the common-sense perspective when you look at these things is that for you it’s an ontic doubt. I don’t know whether it will land on one, two, three, four, five, or six on the die. It depends on the die, it depends on all kinds of things. It could land on one, it could land on two, all the way to six. So the ordinary person—and I say again, including scientists, and I’ll bring examples—relates to these things as an ontic doubt. Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: if so, that perspective determines that this is not a psik reisha. What people perceive as an ontic doubt is in truth an epistemic doubt. But if you ask people casually, they’ll tell you it’s an ontic doubt. By contrast, with flies inside a box, any person you ask will tell you… will tell you that it’s an epistemic doubt. After all, either there are flies in the box or there aren’t, I just don’t know. Everyone understands that. And the same with meat and milk in a pot. So there it’s an epistemic doubt. According to Rabbi Akiva Eiger, there’s no choice, and according to him it’s clear that he’s making a distinction not between ontic doubt and epistemic doubt, but between what I’ll now call pseudo-ontic doubt and epistemic doubt. Pseudo-ontic means a doubt that is as if ontic—it isn’t really ontic, it’s epistemic. But people perceive it as an ontic doubt. So from Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s perspective, something like that—if it’s a pseudo-ontic doubt—then it’s no longer a psik reisha. There’s really no such thing as a truly ontic doubt at all. Either pseudo-ontic doubt or epistemic doubt. These are two kinds of epistemic doubts. And if that’s so, then first of all we saw the distinction between ontic doubt and epistemic doubt in this topic, and then we also discovered that there is actually a third case, or a third kind of doubt: pseudo-ontic doubt. It’s really an epistemic doubt, but when you ask non-philosophical people, they’ll say, no, no, reality itself is not unambiguous. They see this as vagueness in reality itself. So that’s called pseudo-ontic doubt. Okay? Good, I’ll stop here, and we’ll continue a bit more next time. Questions?

[Speaker D] Comments? But when a person does what the Rabbi is now defining as pseudo-ontic doubt, which is only as if—then why does the Torah exempt him specifically in such a case? Why doesn’t it mean exemption specifically in that case? After all, if there’s really no difference, in the end when he acted the reality was already fixed. So the act was attributed to him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the reality relevant to us is reality as perceived by the ordinary person. Similar to the reasoning people use regarding worms, for example, that can’t be seen with the ordinary naked eye. There are halakhic decisors who say: those aren’t the worms that were prohibited, or the insects that were prohibited—only what can be seen with the eye without the help of instruments, right? Because Jewish law works according to the perspective of the ordinary person, not according to the scientific perspective. So—

[Speaker H] So here we go by simplistic thinking and not more careful thought?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’d call it layman’s thinking, yes. Okay.

[Speaker C] And do you agree with that or not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does it mean, do I agree with it? The question is whether Jewish law works that way. For the Sages, apparently it did. Is it right to do that? Good question, I don’t know. It would be nice if we were all philosophers, but the Torah was not given to ministering angels, and rule by philosophers is a Platonic dream. And what could testify to that better than these very days? A little current-events comment I added.

[Speaker G] Rabbi, I wanted to ask a few things, if that’s okay? Yes, yes. About the Rabbi’s approach—which is a logical approach that many people think—that the Holy One, blessed be He, hardly intervenes in the world, and the laws of nature are His faithful messengers, and that’s what governs day-to-day reality. For example, an earthquake in Turkey happened because the plates under the earth’s surface, together with the lava, shifted, and not because He decided it or didn’t decide it. Okay. I find this very difficult, because when I learn the Five Books of Moses and the Prophets, the Five Books and the Prophets are full of this intervention—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All the time, on quite a large scale. I’ve answered that in many places on my website, so it’s worth reading there. I answered it at great length in several places on the site. My claim is that reality apparently changed.

[Speaker G] When?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It changes gradually, not all at once. Just as prophecy departed.

[Speaker G] Three thousand years ago there were no laws of nature?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there were laws of nature, but the involvement was more intensive, and there were also prophets who could diagnose when this was intervention by the Holy One, blessed be He, and when it was a natural matter. Today there is less involvement, and there are no prophets to give such a diagnosis either—except perhaps Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu, who gave a very clear diagnosis about—

[Speaker G] Yes, yes, I saw what he wrote. He knows, right. Yes, that really angered me, the thing he imagined really angered me—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That whole thing.

[Speaker G] Okay, but in any case, isn’t this such a major event that we should have gotten some notice about it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker G] Did communication stop? Intervention stopped?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can just see it. Don’t you see that we no longer have prophets? That there are no open miracles—don’t you see that?

[Speaker G] Everyone agrees with that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I claim there are no hidden miracles either. I claim that together with the open miracles, the hidden miracles also disappeared. No one argues that the open miracles disappeared and that prophecy ended, right? Meaning, there was a change, some sort of withdrawal of the Holy One, blessed be He, from the world—everyone agrees on that. The whole question is how far that goes. I claim that it also happens on the plane of hidden miracles, not only on the plane of open miracles and prophecy and those things.

[Speaker G] Okay. Now, I asked a question on the website. I don’t know what happened to the site these last few days—the order of the questions there got messed up, or maybe it’s just on my computer, I don’t know—and the question didn’t go through. What? Which one?

[Speaker C] Yes, yes, there’s some hacker playing with the site.

[Speaker G] There are questions mixed in from a few years ago, from a few months ago, and new questions also aren’t being accepted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, what’s the question?

[Speaker G] My question is—I don’t really know how much this is a question the Rabbi will like—but how do you cope psychologically with such an approach? Meaning, we really are… what is this?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I answered that question.

[Speaker G] It doesn’t appear on the site.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I answered it.

[Speaker G] I went onto the site, I don’t see it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I’ll check it. It could be that it escaped somewhere. I did answer it. Okay, there are some hackers here playing around; I’ll check it and upload it, I hope, if I can find it. If not, try asking again. Okay, but as you say, I don’t have much to add about that. Fine.

[Speaker G] No, because basically we’re alone in the world, without illusions. And that’s psychological.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand. Fine, there’s—

[Speaker G] I have one more point, if I may? I have one more point I want to clarify, may I? Yes. In Column 247 the Rabbi wrote about the concept of peer review—that basically when someone has skill and philosophical knowledge at my level, then if we’re both truth-meters, we’re in trouble. So my question is: I didn’t understand the claim there in the column. When I find a reason why he is wrong and he finds a reason in me why I’m wrong, why then is that okay? The very fact that I give my own approach preference over his?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t understand.

[Speaker G] If we’re both truth-

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] meters, then fine, that has to be taken into account. What… I didn’t understand.

[Speaker G] No, the Rabbi wrote: how can I really decide this doubt? After all, why is my opinion preferable to his? So the Rabbi wrote: when I can find a reason why he is wrong. Correct. But the question the Rabbi asked afterward is that he too can find a reason in me why I’m wrong.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe. If he found one, I’d be happy to hear, but I check and I don’t see it.

[Speaker G] Well then we’re back to… then again we’re in a symmetric situation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, we’re not back there again. Only if he shows me that I’m wrong are we back there again.

[Speaker G] The fact that I found a reason why he is wrong doesn’t automatically mean that he also found a reason in me why I’m wrong. What, if I speak to someone and he’s wrong then I’m always wrong too? Where does that rule come from? No, but then let’s take a big question, like whether there is a God or there isn’t a God. I think, for example, that an atheist is wrong because he’s afraid of the implications of there being a God, and an atheist thinks that I’m afraid to think there is no God because I want the security and protection of there being a God. So each side has a good reason to think why the other is wrong.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Very good argument, correct.

[Speaker G] So why, if I reached the conclusion… so why, if I reach the conclusion that there is a God, can I be more confident in that than the atheist?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think I wrote there that if you are aware of the claims or biases that may exist in you, then you can now examine yourself again and ask to what extent that bias affects you. Now of course that examination too is not free of errors; it could be that you’ll miss it there as well. But you’ve advanced a bit further. And now if, after your attention has been drawn to a possible bias in you, you checked yourself again and reached the conclusion that nevertheless this is your position and it doesn’t seem to you that you’re mistaken, then fine.

[Speaker G] What do you mean, fine? I accept my opinion because I have no other choice where to go?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. It means that it’s probably correct. Not certainly correct, but probably.

[Speaker G] But the person on the other side also examined himself very well.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he examined himself, then fine. But not always when you examine yourself—

[Speaker G] And if I know that too, then I also know that statistically there are—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m saying again, there may be situations—you’re confusing two things here. There are situations in which you really will reach the conclusion that if two people say two different things, then you’re in doubt. I don’t deny that there can be such situations. What I want to claim is that not all situations are like that. Meaning, the fact that someone says something different from me doesn’t mean I necessarily have to be in doubt. For example, if I’m aware of his biases, then I have an advantage. If both of us are aware of our biases, and I also examined my own bias, again I have an advantage. If he examined himself and I examined myself, then it may be that we’ll conclude that I have no advantage—so be it.

[Speaker G] Ah, so what I want to claim here is that on a question like God, for example, statistically there are enough honest, trustworthy atheists who examined their biases and reached a different conclusion from mine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If that’s what you think, then be in doubt. I don’t think so.

[Speaker G] Really? So we divide the world into honest people and less honest people?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean honest? I don’t mean they’re lying. I mean people who miss things because of biases.

[Speaker G] But doesn’t the Rabbi say that religious people miss less because of biases? I—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I say that I miss less because of biases, not religious people. What religious people do doesn’t interest me. I examine myself. I don’t rely on others. I try to cleanse myself as much as I can from biases. There is never any guarantee that you certainly succeeded; all of that is true. I try to cleanse it, and I do my best. And in my estimation I reached a conclusion that is more reasonable than its opposite. That’s it. And whoever says otherwise, in my opinion, probably didn’t fully cleanse himself.

[Speaker G] And how much can a person really rely on himself? After all, at the end of the day, if we’re honest with ourselves, most of Israeli society—if it had grown up in the Palestinian Authority—would today support Hamas or Abu Mazen, I don’t know which.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore, try to examine yourself whether you’re in a situation where you’re fed by the environment in which you grew up, and whether, had you grown up among Palestinians, you would have turned out like them. If so, then so be it; I really would not attribute much importance to my positions in such a situation.

[Speaker G] Okay, meaning I can relate to my positions only when I’m sure that if I had been born Christian I would think—think on a reasonable level—not sure, not sure, but I can relate to my understandings insofar as I think I would have been able to reach them even if I had been somewhere else. It’s interesting how many people can answer that that’s how they would behave. Demographic reality shows that 99 percent of the world does not behave that way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Demographic reality is made up of 99.9 percent idiots—so what? What does that prove? It proves nothing.

[Speaker G] Okay, fine, so why is that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] interesting?

[Speaker G] Okay, very good. Thank you very much.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Really, with these thoughts, every time you bring me back to the last few days. My feelings are very difficult about what’s going on here—

[Speaker G] In the Supreme Court, with the reform.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, in general, about the public argument, about the amount of stupidity on both sides. It just drives me crazy. And it shows how much democracy is a collection of idiots making decisions in which really one is more foolish than the next, from every direction, on both sides. The level is so low on both sides that it’s simply awful.

[Speaker F] The fact that the rabbis are fairly silent on the matter, and you don’t hear all the Torah people or the leaders of the generation, or I don’t know, the sages of the generation, whatever you want to call it—they avoid entering this issue because why get involved, why get into controversy, why leave the comfort zone of consensus? Why? Better to walk between the raindrops, to say noncommittal things and say something that will suit everyone. But when they’re needed, that voice is not heard. And these are fateful days in every sense, at least in the opinion of many, really fateful days. And the Torah people, this way or that, you don’t hear their voices, when in fact someone says things and sees what is really at stake.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I wish their voices were not heard. Unfortunately, their voices are heard far too much.

[Speaker I] Rabbi, what’s the point—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why absolutely not—

[Speaker F] agree with—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the more liberal side?

[Speaker F] You don’t hear it.

[Speaker I] Since we’ve already gotten onto the topic, what is the main point the Rabbi sees among those protesting against the plan that makes them idiots?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Many points. First of all, first of all, the crazy hysteria. Wait a second—does it follow from that that the Rabbi has not taken a position regarding—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Oh, I have a position. I’m against the judicial reform. Okay. But I’m against—I’m against its extreme formulations.

[Speaker I] But what—regarding the threats of civil war?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what—

[Speaker I] the Rabbi means?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. No, about the threats of—no, not in that sense. I’m in favor of civil war. I think people should take up weapons. If there is a real concern for democracy here, then people should take up weapons, no question about it.

[Speaker I] Okay, so where is the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I don’t think there is a real concern. But yes. I think there is a real concern about stupidity. And that worries me much more than concern for democracy. Democracy is the worst system when the public is stupid, because when you let the majority make decisions—that’s democracy—you get stupid decisions.

[Speaker I] I agree, but that’s why I’m asking: what stupidity does the Rabbi see in the opposing opinion, in those who are protesting—where is their stupidity?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Please, I see there bizarre arguments. What do you mean? I’m trying to drag, by force, out of various ideological opponents of mine from the protesting hard-left side: what exactly are you afraid Bibi will do with this reform in his trial? Regarding his trial? I can barely get out of them some argument about what could happen there. In my opinion nothing will happen there regarding his trial, but maybe yes. But I can’t get them to explain. Give me some explanation of what is supposed to happen.

[Speaker G] And that’s another thing regarding the explanation about the override clause.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Everyone there is shouting “override clause, override clause.” The override clause is not relevant. Every law that is enacted can have a limitation clause inserted into it. Today. You don’t need new legislation for that. And that handcuffs the High Court in exactly the same way as a general override clause, except that this is general and that would be on each law separately. So how can they kill all the redheads, like in the example?

[Speaker I] How can one impose a limitation on each law separately? Meaning, if the High Court intervenes?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I make a limitation clause.

[Speaker I] What do you mean a limitation clause? What do I do there with the ruling that came out?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That this law will not be nullified even if it conflicts with a Basic Law.

[Speaker I] Even if a court ruled that it should be nullified? Yes. I don’t see how that can be done today.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? What’s the problem? Say the High Court will nullify it, fine. The High Court can also nullify the judicial reform. Obviously.

[Speaker I] But I want to say, I want to say just one point. Because first of all, I’m glad the Rabbi is against it, but I want to say one point that in my opinion very much makes the difference between the protesters and those in favor of the method. And the point is simply that we are dealing with—we cannot attribute sincerity and honesty to Mr. Levin, who presented the plan, because if he really wanted—wait, wait, let me just finish—if he sincerely wanted to change the system, the proper way is not, the day after he was chosen as Justice Minister, to drop an atom bomb with five little cluster bombs, not talk to anyone—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Oh, specifically on this point I completely disagree with you. Completely disagree with you.

[Speaker I] Someone who wants to change things could have from the outset created a situation where for three or six months people sit down, work through it, do everything necessary—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, that’s talk that’s emerging only now; it’s not sincere talk. I’ll tell you why. Very sincere. No, again, I’m not accusing you personally.

[Speaker I] I’m saying the claim is not sincere.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll tell you why. Because when dialogue of this kind was proposed in the past, the Supreme Court and the whole system around it were unwilling to talk about anything. They tried to talk about the Judicial Selection Committee, they tried to talk about seniority, they tried to talk about everything—the legal advisers, the status of legal advisers, they tried to talk about it all—

[Speaker I] They were not willing to talk about it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore Levin, out of sheer frustration, got fed up and said: okay, if you don’t want to talk, now we’re the majority, we’ll do it. And by the way, in my opinion Levin really does—he truly and sincerely believes in this, I’m convinced of it. Unlike Bibi the manipulator, I think Levin really and sincerely believes in this. And by the way, when you examine Levin’s program clause by clause, in my opinion every clause has justification. The problem is the total package.

[Speaker I] Obviously. But again, Levin’s sincerity may not be what is at issue. What is at issue is the form in which one carries out such a significant revolution.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and that’s exactly the point. When they are in power and now going to make the move, suddenly everyone remembers that they want six months of dialogue. But when they tried to initiate such a dialogue while they were in the opposition, or when they were not determined enough, or when they had someone like Kahlon with them who didn’t let them pounce on the Supreme Court and so on—in all the situations where they didn’t have the power to do what they are doing today, no one was willing to talk to them. Including the Supreme Court and its justices, who are the first ones unwilling to accept criticism about anything and unwilling to discuss anything.

[Speaker I] I don’t agree historically with that, and there’s also a lot of data here on the court’s interventions, which are few. No, no, I didn’t say the court intervenes a lot. But you see—let’s leave aside for a moment who is to blame and who isn’t. Can this plan as it is, in the way it is being proposed, in the trampling and aggressiveness with which it is being advanced, with every hour they say something new and won’t hear anything—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Can—

[Speaker I] this continue like this?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let me tell you something, Ezra: that’s not correct. First of all, it’s not true that every hour something new comes out. The plan from the first evening when Yariv gave his press conference until today is the same plan. It hasn’t changed.

[Speaker I] Why? I can give you all sorts of other things all the time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What changed is only moderation. Some moderation has already been introduced along the way. What does keep coming up all the time are the crazy things of Deri and Smotrich and Ben Gvir and those laws—that’s not connected to the judicial reform. Laws about the Kotel and laws about I don’t know what and all their nonsense—that’s madness.

[Speaker I] But it creates this big atom bomb, because you can no longer separate things, because you can see with your own eyes—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ezra, pay attention: that’s not true. No sections were added here since Levin’s press conference. That’s not true. In the plan itself no sections were added. So what happened? They understood that until now they hadn’t managed to do anything. They hadn’t managed to do anything, and they say: what you don’t do in the first hundred days, as the well-known saying goes, won’t happen. And since the other side was never willing to talk, they say okay, now the power is with us and now we’ll do it. I completely understand the motivation. More than that: the other side, when it does things, doesn’t do them through dialogue either. It’s just that it usually doesn’t have the power to do things; it’s usually in the opposition. But when it has the power, it uses force no less. So don’t tell me stories that they’re ready to talk and we need dialogue and discussion—nobody talks. On both sides, nobody is willing to talk.

[Speaker I] Now you can’t talk.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The problem with the reform is not the speed at which it’s being done and not the lack of dialogue. That is a problem, but it’s a problem throughout our politics, not only in the reform. The problem with the reform is its content. The reform is problematic in content. But the whole issue of hurrying and not talking and so on—so what? Everyone does things the same way. That’s our politics, unfortunately.

[Speaker F] Rabbi, Rabbi, I’ll send the Rabbi later a video of Netanyahu—other interviews of Netanyahu—where he says unequivocally: I will absolutely prevent any legislation against the court. He says that when he was prime minister ten years ago and less. I’ll send the Rabbi a video.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Are you coming to prove to me that Netanyahu is a liar? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker F] No, I’m saying I’ll send the Rabbi right now, in another minute, two videos of Netanyahu saying it explicitly. We know, we know. But the Rabbi blames the other side. The Rabbi blames the other side—Netanyahu wasn’t on the other side. He said: I’m preventing all such legislation. So why is the Rabbi criticizing the defenders of the court? But I have another question for the Rabbi. I think the real argument is not only that the style is trampling and murderous and that the other side is supposedly like that—that doesn’t solve it. We’re not little children. Right now, the one who has power is the one who needs to show restraint, not the other side. So the other side wasn’t like that—so what? Are we little children? You started so now I’ll—? Something like this, which is supposed to change for half the nation the feeling of what kind of country they live in, aren’t you supposed to do that with some understanding that it’s important to preserve statesmanship and do things properly? I agree one hundred percent. I agree with the understanding that every—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] action one takes should be done through dialogue. The problem is that it doesn’t happen.

[Speaker F] But now you’re the one with the money, now you can do it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] why don’t you do it? No. You know, the left-wing approach says that we demand nothing from the Palestinians; we are the ones with power, therefore we must yield.

[Speaker F] That’s exactly not what I said. I didn’t say yield, I said talk.

[Speaker I] No.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, you’re trying to convince me that dialogue is an important thing and lacking. Obviously! I’m only claiming that it is lacking on all sides. And everyone who had power used it brutally. So now suffer?

[Speaker I] But Rabbi, is the Rabbi now willing, because of history—which I don’t agree with, but let’s assume for the sake of argument that history was as the honorable Rabbi says—is the Rabbi willing to enter into a democratic disaster just in order to settle accounts with the way the left behaved? What does that have to do with anything now? Right now we are in a situation where someone is trampling democracy. By the way, it will happen tomorrow, it will happen the day after tomorrow.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll tell you two things. First, it’s not a question of what I’m willing to do. I don’t want this. I’m only saying: it’s neither clever nor sincere to come with complaints now when you yourself do the same thing in the opposite direction. So whether I’m willing or unwilling is a different discussion. Second, in my opinion, in my opinion, this is not a disaster, not a democratic disaster. That is an exaggerated statement. I do find problems here, certainly problematic things. But not that democracy is ending and being destroyed, and I also don’t think it can’t be fixed after a year or two or three when people see that it’s problematic.

[Speaker I] If the public feels it, it will fix it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s none of this hysteria that everything here is destruction and a Holocaust is about to happen—that is part of the stupidity of the—

[Speaker I] Rabbi, Rabbi, it’s a psik reisha. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s wait and see.

[Speaker G] Yes, right, right, Rabbi, it’s a psik—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] reisha, it’s a psik—

[Speaker G] reisha of people who haven’t grasped that the people elected them. A psik reisha of people who are unwilling to come to terms with the fact that their last stronghold that protected them—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Different argument. That I do not accept. That’s a different argument. They have a right to protest, and it’s not true that they haven’t grasped that the people elected them. They’re saying they want their rights, they want to fight for their opinion, and that is their full right. But, but I do think the apocalyptic description here is completely exaggerated.

[Speaker I] But you can’t allow yourself to put that to the test, because when I take to the surgeon what—by the way, all the insane things the Rabbi sees as insane that they’re doing with Deri and Smotrich and so on—they are the proof that when you get to that point, they really will do whatever they want, they’ll suddenly bring out—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How are these things proposed and then dropped a day later?

[Speaker I] Because of the pressure, because of the protests.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem, protests are excellent, I’m in favor of protests. Absolutely fine. Completely in favor of protests. Meaning, I think it’s excellent. I think that precisely because there is no dialogue in our democracy from any direction—don’t make a mistake about this—the left is no more open than the right, absolutely not, and no less trampling than the right; it simply has less power. But when it has power, it tramples exactly like the right. But I think—and instead of that I recently heard from Yuval Elbashan a statement that seemed very correct to me—that where there is no dialogue and no intellectual clarification of directions and no clarification of the issues—and there isn’t, unfortunately there isn’t—the clash is the democratic substitute for that, and this clash will bring us somewhere to some kind of middle. By the way, I think hysteria—I’m not at all sure that hysteria helps, because hysteria in a certain sense also hardens the other side and maybe somewhat prevents possibilities of compromise, maybe. But that’s really a question…

[Speaker I] It will affect Bibi. Power will affect Bibi. Power will affect Bibi. He’ll retreat—Bibi, not Levin.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Levin—these demonstrations are of no interest to him whatsoever. What will affect him is the economic data and the—

[Speaker I] Exactly, right, of course. But I’ll ask one last question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And I’m completely in favor. And even if people take their money out of the country for political reasons—and it’s clear to me that these are political reasons—that is completely legitimate. It’s a tool in the struggle, absolutely fine.

[Speaker I] Right. One last question because we won’t finish the argument. Rabbi, why is that okay?

[Speaker G] That’s not patriotic; it harms the state.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, they want to harm the state in order to change it. That’s their right. Correct.

[Speaker I] Rabbi, the people of—

[Speaker G] the right didn’t say things like that, not even during the disengagement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because they’re idiots.

[Speaker G] Absolutely not, absolutely not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because they’re—

[Speaker G] idiots because they understand that the idea is bigger.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the idea is not bigger.

[Speaker G] The Rabbi is now in a… understand what will happen if there is no State of Israel.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who said there won’t be? There will be a State of Israel, because people will understand that they can’t afford those losses and they’ll mend their ways. Excellent. That’s the way of—

[Speaker G] That’s one possibility, or the economy… I didn’t understand, I didn’t understand. This is destroying the state, harming the economy; a person who does such a thing is anti-Zionist.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, hysteria. When people take out their money—first they threaten and then they take it out—that’s a threat. A person who doesn’t want the state destroyed—if this is very costly for him—the right, which supposedly never does such things, should draw the conclusion and understand that these will be the prices and move on.

[Speaker I] It—

[Speaker G] That the right has to think that through is obvious, but it’s obvious that what the left is doing is illegitimate. That all the commentators and all the reporters—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s legitimate, not only legitimate, in my view it’s heartening.

[Speaker G] To withdraw money and investments?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Withdrawing them is the way to have influence; without that they’ll influence nothing.

[Speaker C] That’s true.

[Speaker G] Maybe we should also give money to the Palestinian Authority, maybe also to Hamas and Hezbollah—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe we should also drop an atom bomb on Bibi.

[Speaker G] Come on, no—so I don’t understand the difference. I don’t understand the difference.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You want to harm the State of Israel. Think for another two minutes; after you calm down, you’ll immediately understand the difference.

[Speaker I] I just want to ask one final question from my perspective. The Rabbi now imagines himself in a situation where the power is in his hands, he leads the entire right, and he is in the position he’s in. Would he continue insisting, or would he go with the proposal that says clearly that if—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If everything were in my hands, of course I would not only compromise—I myself am in favor of compromise. So it’s not that I need to compromise because others think differently. I myself am in the middle. Yes.

[Speaker I] But the compromise comes on the background of this: pause, take the plan off the table, there is no plan, and now sit together from scratch without preconditions and start discussing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand what “without conditions” means. Rabbi, in the end there is a government. If I were consulting with people, I would consult with them in order to clarify what is really most correct, not in order to please them. There’s a difference between making a compromise so that everyone is satisfied—that’s one discussion, again, not illegitimate—and another discussion, which is: I really want to hear from people what will happen as a result of these changes so I can take that into account and do it in the best way. But in the end, if I’m the government, I decide. That’s how it works.

[Speaker E] The Rabbi said there was never any dialogue. But in the previous government there was a collection of dwarfs; no one there thought he could determine anything because he knew there were barely sixty-one, and if he didn’t persuade the other side it wouldn’t happen. So there was dialogue between right and left, religious and secular, and even between Jews and Arabs, and overall it was conducted with fairly good understanding. But they brought it down violently, with the attack on Silman.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That was dialogue within the coalition. What does that have to do with anything? There was a coalition made up of all sorts of shades, fine, obviously. We’re talking about dialogue between the blocs, not between right and left. Right and left today isn’t even the issue. The issue is Bibi and anti-Bibi, or Bibi-Haredim and anti-Bibi-Haredim.

[Speaker I] Fine, the question is whether we’ll see more kippah-wearers at the demonstrations. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t hear.

[Speaker I] The question is: when will we see more kippah-wearers at the demonstrations?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m very uncomfortable with some of the things that accompany the demonstrations, but I’ll probably join them in the end, because I also think it’s important to be there. More power to you.

[Speaker I] So on that optimistic note, we’ll finish. Thank you very much.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Goodbye, Sabbath peace.

[Speaker I] Thank you very much.