Agency Matters – Lesson 4 – Rabbi Michael Abraham

This transcription was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I’m not worthy. In any case, what he said here is that from Maharam Padua it emerges that the second agent is the agent of the first. In any event. Even according to Mar bar Rav Ashi. Because in practice we rule like Mar bar Rav Ashi. So if in practice we rule like Mar bar Rav Ashi, then when Maharam Padua says that the second agent is valid, that he is the agent of the first, he is apparently saying that even within the view of Mar bar Rav Ashi. So why, if the first one dies, can the agent continue to act according to Mar bar Rav Ashi? Because this is a power of attorney. And with a power of attorney you can act even if the one who empowered you dies. That’s the Ketzot, the Ketzot that I mentioned in the previous lesson. “And the reason they may not deliver it after death is only because there is no longer anyone to divorce, since the husband’s marital bond to her has already ceased.” So why may they not deliver it after death? Because once she is a widow, there is no one to divorce. But in terms of the agent’s ability to act, he is still an agent. It’s just that practically he has nothing to do with that power to be an agent, because the woman is already a widow. But here, when the first agent dies—if he is the agent of the first agent, and now the first agent has died—then he still has the power to act, even though he is the agent of the first agent, because agency is a power of attorney, not an extended hand. Okay? So he still has the power to act. And the husband is still alive, so the woman is still married; there is someone to divorce. That is the practical difference. Therefore Mar bar Rav Ashi says that if the husband dies and you can no longer act, that is a sign that he is the husband’s agent and not the first agent’s. Because if he were the first agent’s agent, he would be able to act even if the first agent died. Those are the essential words of the Ketzot HaChoshen. “And in my humble opinion this is not necessary at all. In my humble opinion this is not necessary at all, for one can certainly say regarding this that according to Mar bar Rav Ashi the second is not nullified by the death of the first, because the second is the husband’s agent; that is the basic rule of ‘an agent appoints an agent,’ that he makes him the husband’s agent, not his own, as is implied by the language of the Talmud: ‘they all come by the husband’s authority.’ What Maharam Padua wrote, that the first can cancel the second, is understandable even if the second becomes the husband’s agent, because nevertheless, since he became the husband’s agent by the force of the first one’s mouth and speech, one can say that the first can cancel him, for in any case his speech can cancel, since speech comes and cancels speech, and after all the speech is his.” What is he saying? He says: after all, in the Talmud itself Mar bar Rav Ashi says that they are all agents of the husband, right? Why? So he says like this: the fact that according to Maharam Padua the first can cancel the second does not mean that the second is really the first’s agent. The second is the husband’s agent. But who appointed him to be the husband’s agent? The first agent. He appointed the second to be the husband’s agent. Now after the appointment he is the husband’s agent. But since his appointment came through the force of the first agent’s speech, the first agent can, through another speech act, cancel his first speech act, because speech comes and cancels speech. And therefore he can cancel his agency even though he is the husband’s agent, not the first agent’s agent. Okay.

[Speaker B] Think of it like email.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If information comes out from me, then—

[Speaker B] It’s my email, and the email comes from me. Okay, yes. Exactly, really exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good, so where is there a hint to email in the Torah? Where is there a hint to email in the Torah? Yes. “Have you eaten from the tree from which I commanded you not to eat?”

[Speaker B] By contrast, when you bring video, the video is connected one to another, and the one who wrote it is the interrupting point. It’s considered as… okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, in any case, what he is basically saying is that contrary to what you proved, the Ketzot proved from Maharam Padua that the second agent is the first agent’s agent, and nevertheless Mar bar Rav Ashi says that if the first dies, the second is not canceled, right? That is proof that this is a power of attorney. The Kehillot Yaakov says no, not true. It can be explained even according to the “extended hand” model, not according to power of attorney. The second agent can act in the owner’s name even if the agent dies, because he is the owner’s agent, not the first agent’s agent. So why can the first cancel him? Because speech comes and cancels speech. I appointed him through speech, so speech comes and cancels speech. It’s… think of it like email. Just as with email you can delete it, let’s say the email was sent through another server. The server owner can delete the email from the server. It won’t reach you. But if the email reaches you, it reaches you from the sender, not from the server. Not you—the server owner. The server owner is the agent of the agent. Not connected, the server owner. The server owner is the second agent. Yes, the server owner. Now he can delete what is on the server, right? Then the email won’t reach you. But if he doesn’t delete it, then the email reaches you from me, the sender, not from the server owner. So the first agent is transparent. Even though he can cancel the email, delete it.

[Speaker C] No, but as to the actual point, he is an agent. The first one? The first one is not transparent.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? He can delete the second agent and then he won’t be an agent, right? And if he doesn’t delete him, the second agent is the owners’ agent, the husband’s, not the first’s.

[Speaker C] The first agent can delete the agency.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Just as the server owner can delete the server.

[Speaker C] Let me explain something else to you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The server owner can delete the email with his server, he can burn his server. So he can break the playing tools. He can delete what is written on his server. Fine. He can delete what is written on his server, right? Don’t go too deeply into this analogy. He can do that, but if he doesn’t do it, when the email reaches you it comes from me, not from him.

[Speaker B] Forward.

[Speaker C] More correct would be to do it as a forward. If you compare it to emails, I sent an email to one person. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the same thing, fine, it’s the same thing. Fine. Fine, never mind. Fine, practical difference, fine. So it’s the same thing, it’s not—okay. In any case, I’ll just bring an example here for this matter. It’s a Talmudic passage in Nazir. The Talmud in Nazir says as follows: someone who vows naziriteship without wine—he does not want to be forbidden from wine, right? So he is a nazirite, and the condition is void because it is a condition against what is written in the Torah, okay? Nazir 11. Tosafot asks there: when he says, “I am hereby a nazirite,” naziriteship takes effect upon him in every respect, and when he says “on condition,” he imposes a condition against what is written in the Torah, and the condition is void. “And if you say: you could derive this from the fact that naziriteship cannot be carried out through an agent”—we saw in the previous lesson that something that cannot be done through an agent cannot be done conditionally, right? So he says: naziriteship cannot be carried out by an agent, and therefore a condition should also not work, because we require a condition analogous to that of the descendants of Gad and Reuven. Tosafot says: “It can be said that since others can bring his offerings in his place, it is considered as though the entire act can be done through an agent.” Fine. In the Shitah Mekubetzet there he answers differently—that is Rabbeinu Azriel. “And Rabbi Azriel of blessed memory wrote: here there is no need to require a condition that can be carried out through an agent, like the condition of the descendants of Gad and Reuven. That requirement applies specifically to an act done by hand, such as acquisition, halitzah, a bill of divorce, kiddushin, and the like. There, certainly, if it cannot be done by another but only by himself, the act is stronger, and even if the condition is not fulfilled, the act is not nullified. But with a vow and naziriteship, where no physical act is needed but only that he should abstain and guard himself, it is not so strong that it should stand if the condition is not fulfilled.” What is he saying? He says that a vow and naziriteship are things not done by an act, right, but by speech. I impose the vow and the naziriteship through speech. Since that is so, the condition can nullify it. Why? Because speech comes and cancels speech. But in an act, such as halitzah, divorce, and bills of divorce, there there is a special novelty in the Torah that the condition nullifies it even though it is an act and not speech. There is a special Torah novelty that the condition nullifies it, but that is only if the act is entirely in your control, meaning if you can do it through an agent. If you cannot do it through an agent, then the Torah did not introduce that novelty, and therefore you cannot do it. Here, conditions can operate even without the model of the condition of the descendants of Gad and Reuven. You do not need the condition of the descendants of Gad and Reuven, because speech comes and cancels speech, and therefore there is also no limitation that if it is not in your control you cannot make a condition. Okay? Therefore I do not care if you cannot do it by an agent. That is the claim. For our purposes, what matters is that he sees the vow and naziriteship as speech, and therefore speech can come and cancel them. So the Kovetz Shiurim notes here something strange. True, I imposed the naziriteship and the vows by speech, but now a legal status has taken effect on the object; in other words, there is now an act here. How can speech change reality? And what does it mean that speech comes and cancels speech? “Speech comes and cancels speech” means that if there is something that is speech and not reality, then another speech can cancel it. But if a reality has been created here, speech cannot cancel reality. Now here a reality has been created. True, it was created by speech, but a reality was created—a legal status of naziriteship or of a vow was created. How can speech cancel that? We see in the Talmud here—or at least in the Shitah Mekubetzet—that if there is a practical result created by speech, still speech can cancel it, because that practical result apparently constantly rests on the speech that created it. And if the speech cancels the initial speech, then the result will dissolve; that is, it will no longer exist. Meaning: it is not that the speech made the result and then went home, and now there is a practical result here and speech can’t do anything to it. No. The speech is constantly sitting here and producing the practical result, and if the second speech cancels the first speech, then the practical result will also disappear from the field. Okay, so what do we see here? That when there is a practical result brought about by speech, it has the significance of speech, not of an act, and therefore speech can cancel it, right? That is basically what he is saying here. The first agent created the second agent. Now the second agent is already the owners’ agent; the act has been done, there is now a reality—the second agent is the owners’ agent. But how did he become the owners’ agent? By the force of the first agent’s speech that appointed him. Now if the first agent cancels his speech, even though he is not the principal of the second agent—the principal is the owner—but his speech cancels the speech of the appointment of the second agent, then the result, that the second agent is the owners’ agent, will not exist. Okay? It’s the same idea. I return to the Kehillot Yaakov. What if someone sent a bill of divorce?

[Speaker C] If someone sent a bill of divorce?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.

[Speaker C] He gave it to the first agent, the first agent appointed the second, the first one suddenly changed his mind and says to him: no, I don’t want you to pass on the bill of divorce.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: if he can cancel the agency of the second, as Maharam Padua says, even though the husband is the principal.

[Speaker C] Because if—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the husband appoints him again, then he is the husband’s agent. But that agency that he received from the first agent will no longer exist. That is what Maharam Padua writes, that the first agent can cancel the second agent. The Or Sameach, chapter 2 of the laws of divorce, proved the opposite. Yes, so the Ketzot proved from Mar bar Rav Ashi that agency is a power of attorney, because the fact is that even if your principal dies, you still have the power to act. The Or Sameach, chapter 2 of the laws of divorce, proved the opposite. I mentioned this Or Sameach—it is the Or Sameach that says there is a dispute between the Ketzot and Maimonides whether this is a power of attorney or an extended hand. He proved the opposite: “For Mar bar Rav Ashi said only that when the first dies the second is not nullified because they all come by the husband’s authority”—meaning, the second is the husband’s agent. But had he been the first one’s agent, he would be nullified by the death of the first, even though there is still a marital bond to dissolve by divorce. This shows that the agent does not himself become the actor, but is only considered the hand of his principal. And likewise if the principal becomes insane: since the principal cannot act, the act of his agent is ineffective. See there in the Or Sameach. The Or Sameach proves from Mar bar Rav Ashi the opposite of the Ketzot. The Ketzot proved that this is a power of attorney; the Or Sameach proves that this is an extended hand, from the very same case. Why? So he says like this: what does Mar bar Rav Ashi say? If the first dies, the second agent is not canceled. Why? Because he is the husband’s agent, right? But if he were the first one’s agent, the first agent’s agent, then he would indeed be canceled. Why? Because this is an extended hand. Right?

[Speaker C] Because—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You cannot act in the name of someone who died, who no longer exists. So it is specifically proof that this is an extended hand, not proof that it is a power of attorney. That is his claim. He says: “Indeed, according to the path of the Jerusalem Talmud mentioned above, there is no proof from death to insanity, because one can say that even though the agent is only the hand of the principal, nevertheless his acts are effective even though the principal is insane, because an insane person too can act where there is no deficiency of intention. And only when his principal dies can the agent certainly not act, because the dead person himself certainly has no legal capacity for acquisitions and transfers. But in any case, regarding the definition of agency—whether he becomes the actor or is like the hand of the principal—the proof of the Or Sameach is correct.” What is he saying? He says there is a difference between an insane person and a dead person. With a power of attorney—I spoke about this last time—if the principal becomes insane, then the agent can act, because the power is in his hands. But if the principal dies, then even according to the conception of power of attorney, the agent cannot act. Because you also cannot be the holder of a power of attorney for someone who is dead. The Ketzot understands that you have really become the principal himself. A power of attorney does not mean that you became the principal himself. It is only a mechanism for how agency works. It works as a mechanism of power of attorney. But you are still an agent, and if your principal dies, then whose agent are you? If the principal becomes insane, you are still his agent, just what? He has no mental competence. Fine, your intention will count as the intention of the act. But a principal who died—the problem is not that he has no intention. There is no principal. If there is no principal, how can there be an agent? A principal who became insane—there is a principal, he just has no competence. The agent received the power of attorney, so the agent’s intention is what will perform the act. Okay? Therefore one should not compare insanity to death. I spoke about this.

[Speaker C] What? Became insane because he died?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, there is no principal. It has nothing to do with speech canceling speech. Agency has no meaning if there is no principal. Whose agent are you? “Indeed, in my humble opinion one can say that even if we say that the agent becomes the actor, and therefore can perform his agency even when the principal has become insane, nevertheless when the principal dies the power of ownership leaves the agent, because the agent becomes the actor only by virtue of bearing the status of one who stands in the place of his principal and fills his role and is authorized to act in his place, and his hand is like the principal’s hand. Therefore where the principal became insane, since the agent still bears the status of one who fills his place and is the authorized representative of the husband of the woman, the agent himself indeed has the power to divorce as the owner. But when his principal dies, then necessarily the agent loses the status of one who fills his place and is the authorized representative of his principal, since that principal is as one who is no longer at all in this world; consequently the agent’s power of ownership also lapses, because necessarily he had the owner’s power only by virtue of his status as representative and stand-in of the principal, as stated above.” After that he notes—and this is just an interesting note—“And according to this, one can settle what Mar bar Rav Ashi proves, that truly the first did not nullify the second, from the fact that if the husband died, all of them would immediately be nullified. By whose power do they come? By the husband’s power. If the husband has it, all of them have it,” and so on. “For it is puzzling: what proof is there from the fact that if the husband dies all the agents have no substance, that the second is not the first’s agent but the husband’s agent? In simple terms, even if the second were only the first’s agent, when the husband dies they would all be nullified because there is no longer anything to divorce, as the marital bond has already ended.” The Or Sameach already wondered about this and remained with it unresolved—yes, that’s what we discussed earlier. “And according to what I wrote it is understandable. One can say that it is obvious to the Talmud that whether we say the agent is like the hand of the principal or whether we say the agent becomes the owner for purposes of divorce, in any case all his power exists only by virtue of the status of one who fills the place of and acts as the representative of the husband of the woman. And when the husband dies, the power of agency automatically lapses, apart from the reason that there is no longer anything to divorce. From this Mar bar Rav Ashi proves that necessarily all the power of the second exists only because through the first one’s appointment he becomes the representative of the husband. For as the representative of the first one, he cannot divorce the wife of the husband.” Right? That is what we said before. If the husband dies, then even if he is the first agent’s agent, he can no longer be an agent, because the first agent is no longer an agent, so you also cannot be the first agent’s agent. After that he says, “Afterward I found in Beit Meir”—another interesting note—“siman 121, that he addressed this point: what Mar bar Rav Ashi proved from the fact that when the husband dies they all become nullified, that the second is the husband’s agent and not the first’s. But even if the second were the first’s agent, if the husband dies, necessarily they would all be nullified because there is nothing to divorce, since the agency has ceased.” And he answers—now he rejects the rejection—that the entire practical difference in whether he can divorce after death is for the purpose of exempting her from levirate marriage. So what difference does it make whether he can divorce her after the husband dies? If the husband died, she is already a widow, so suppose he could divorce her—so what? Why is that a practical difference? The practical difference is levirate marriage, right? Because if he divorces her, then she is a divorcée and not a widow, so she is not bound by levirate marriage. Okay? “And he answered that the whole practical difference, whether he can divorce after death, is to exempt her from levirate marriage. And wherever she is bound to levirate marriage, the opinion of Beit Meir is that there still remains upon her the marital bond of the first husband. Consequently there is still something to divorce, namely to remove the husband’s power that remains with his wife, and thereby the bond will be removed.” Yes, this is the well-known sugya of bond in Yevamot. What is the point there? When she is bound to levirate marriage, what does that mean? That she still has a bond to the dead husband. And until you do the levirate marriage or the halitzah, her bond to the dead husband still remains. That means there is someone to divorce, even though he has already died—she is essentially still his wife. So from the perspective of the question, whom can you divorce—after all she is already a widow? Not true. She is not a widow; she is bound. The moment she is bound, there is in effect a bond to the first husband. So for this purpose there is someone to divorce. If there is someone to divorce, then the power of the agent to divorce her has meaning. It is not true that since the husband died, what relevance is there to discuss the power of the agent, since there is no one to divorce anymore. No—there is someone to divorce. And the whole discussion about the power of the agent is a relevant discussion. And therefore Mar bar Rav Ashi correctly proves that if the agent cannot act, that is a sign that he is the husband’s agent. Right? What was asked against him was: that is not a sign that he is the husband’s agent; there is simply no one to divorce because the husband died. No—there is someone to divorce. And if he cannot act, that means he is the husband’s agent and not the first agent’s agent. Fine, so that is regarding what? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker C] How is it considered? If a person gives someone an object as an agent and tells him to pass it to so-and-so to whom I owe money, and while he is passing it on the person dies—does the debt remain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A debt belongs to the estate; the heirs will have to pay it.

[Speaker C] No, but the agent lost the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the question. If it is a power of attorney, then the agent did not lose it, because the agent received the power, and it does not matter that the principal died. And there is still a debt here to repay, because the debt remains even if the owner dies.

[Speaker C] A debt is not a gift.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he now gave a gift, that is another question; we will see that later regarding a gift. Because with a gift there is no debt here. The debt remains even if the creditor dies; the debt rests on the property. But with a gift, he wanted to give a gift, but there is nothing in the property itself, so here indeed the whole discussion of Maimonides and the Tur may arise—what happens with an agent when the principal dies, whether the agent can still give the gift. Maybe, I don’t know, there is room to discuss that.

[Speaker B] A power of attorney to sell, to sell something, and meanwhile I die.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Same thing, same thing, that is the question. I do not know what the civil law says. From the standpoint of Jewish law, that is the question here: is this a power of attorney or an extended hand? Especially if it is a power of attorney and the power of attorney remains in force even if the principal dies according to the Ketzot—according to the Ketzot, you could still give it. According to the later authorities who reject the Ketzot, and they say: what difference does it make? Even if you hold a power of attorney, if the principal dies, whose attorney are you? There is no one for you to be the attorney of, so it is impossible. Okay? But in the case of a debt, the argument that there is no debt at all if the principal dies does not exist. The entire question is only whether the agent now has the power to act or does not have the power to act. But the fact that there is a debt—there is certainly a debt.

[Speaker B] The heirs, from the standpoint of the debt, have to pay everything and not only what remains with us.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, leave aside the oath. If it is clear that he must pay, then he must pay. It is a lien on the property. They always have to pay. But what does it mean that orphans are not subject to the commandment, and debt repayment is a commandment? So there is a tannaitic dispute there, that orphans are not subject to the commandment. But in principle the debt exists. If they are minors, maybe they are not subject to the commandment. Fine. So now I want—this was regarding an agent appointing an agent. We see that there are possibilities here: that he is the first one’s agent or the second one’s agent, and that connects to everything we discussed above in the question of why we need a source at all for the rule that an agent appoints an agent. Okay? So there are two possibilities: if he is the first one’s agent, maybe I would not know that such agency exists; or if he is the owners’ agent, maybe I would not know that such agency exists. So there are possibilities here, what Rav Shmuel said one way or the other. Now I want to talk about the rule of “mere words” in the context of an agent appointing an agent. The matter of an agent appointing an agent in our sugya—this was the novelty: an agent appoints an agent. To what was that novelty applied? To an agent for delivery? To an agent for receipt? To both? To neither? To what exactly was this novelty applied? But the question is to whom it was applied. More than that: it is stated here with regard to an agent in divorce. What about an agent in kiddushin? So regarding an agent for delivery of a bill of divorce, everyone agrees that an agent appoints an agent, because that is the baraita. An agent for delivery of a bill of divorce—clearly an agent appoints an agent. Now the question is what happens with an agent for receipt of a bill of divorce, which also appears in the baraita, but it is not clear whether the novelty that an agent appoints an agent was introduced there too or only for an agent of delivery. And similarly the question arises regarding agents of delivery and receipt in kiddushin: does an agent appoint an agent there? In short, we have four types of agents: an agent of delivery and receipt for a bill of divorce, and an agent of delivery and receipt for kiddushin. An agent of delivery for a bill of divorce—an agent appoints an agent; that is the baraita. In all three of the other types, the medieval authorities dispute whether an agent appoints an agent. And that brings us to the sugya of mere words. There in Gittin 66. What? What is “mere words”?

[Speaker B] It says “mere words and they transmitted”—we’ll soon see, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There in Gittin 66: Rabbi Yirmiyah bar Abba said, “They sent from the study hall to Shmuel: Let our master teach us. If one said to two people, ‘Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife’”—yes, he takes two people and says to them, “Write a bill of divorce and give it to my wife”—“and they said to a scribe, and he wrote, and they signed.” They were the witnesses, but they did not write the bill of divorce themselves; they told a scribe to write it. What is the law? He sent back to them: “She must leave, and the matter requires further study.” “She must leave” means the bill of divorce is valid; in other words she is divorced, but I am uncertain about it. What is meant by “the matter requires further study”? What was his doubt? Why was it not obvious to him? “Shall we say it is because these are mere words, and he was uncertain whether mere words can be transmitted to an agent or cannot be transmitted to an agent? But Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi: the law follows Rabbi Yosei, who said that mere words are not transmitted to an agent.” What does this mean? The Talmud says there is such a thing called “mere words,” agency concerning words, and mere words are not transmitted to an agent. So maybe Shmuel’s doubt was whether this counts as mere words. The agency to write the bill of divorce is mere words, and mere words are not transmitted to an agent. Therefore they cannot appoint the scribe as an agent to write the bill of divorce. So the Talmud says this cannot be what his doubt was. Why? Because in practice we rule like Rabbi Yosei that mere words are not transmitted to an agent, so it should have been obvious to him that the bill of divorce was invalid. They signed, but the writing—they told a scribe to write the bill of divorce. Right. And now the question is whether they can appoint the scribe as an agent to write the bill of divorce. Okay, that is the doubt. The Talmud says this cannot be what Shmuel’s doubt was, because regarding the law of mere words, the practical law is clear. The law follows Rabbi Yosei that mere words are not transmitted to an agent. Yes, that is what the Talmud says later. “The body of the matter: Shmuel said in the name of Rav Yehudah in the name of Rabbi: the law follows Rabbi Yosei, who said that mere words are not transmitted to an agent.” If you appoint an agent for words, not for actions—for writing the bill of divorce; we’ll soon see what “mere words” means. Let’s say an agency to say something to someone, exactly. An agency not to do an act, but an agency to say words. And if we maintain—and I move to the second part of the Talmud here, there is what? Yes. I’m skipping a bit of the continuation—“And if we maintain that ‘write’ means in our handwriting, then the writing of the bill of divorce is valid.” Yes, he said to them, “Write.” The question is what he meant. Does “write a bill of divorce” mean “sign what you write,” or does “write the bill of divorce” mean “write the actual text of the bill of divorce”? Because they gave it to a scribe to write and they themselves signed. So if he meant—if it is clear, in other words if our doubt is about what the principal meant when he said “write.” Did “write” mean “sign”?

[Speaker B] He said to them, “Write”—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And you sign, what you write, write in your own handwriting. But the actual bill of divorce you may also entrust to a scribe. Yes, so it says: “But didn’t Shmuel say in the name of Rabbi that the law follows Rabbi Yosei, who said that mere words are not transmitted to an agent?” They said: “If we maintain that ‘write’ means our handwriting, then the writing of the bill of divorce is treated as if he said, ‘Tell them.’ And Rabbi Yosei agrees in a case of ‘tell them.’” What does that mean? If you say that what he meant was that they should sign, right, then why is the writing of the bill of divorce valid? After all, the law is that Rabbi Yosei says that mere words are not transmitted to an agent. So true, their signing is fine, but the writing of the bill of divorce should have been invalid, because they passed it on to a scribe, and mere words are not transmitted to an agent. So why is the writing of the bill of divorce valid? Forget their signing—why is the writing valid? So the Talmud says no, that is fine, because it is considered as if he had said, “Tell them.” Rabbi Yosei agrees in a case of “tell them.” If he says to them, “Tell the scribe to write,” that is acceptable even according to Rabbi Yosei. Because when Rabbi Yosei says that mere words are not transmitted to an agent, that is when he told them to write and then they go and tell the scribe to write—that is not valid. But if the husband says to them from the outset, “Tell the scribe to write,” “tell the scribe to write,” that is valid even according to Rabbi Yosei. Everything Rabbi Yosei invalidates is where he tells them to write and they pass it on to the scribe—that is called mere words. But in a case of “tell them,” meaning if he tells them from the outset, “Tell the scribe to write,” that is valid. Okay, now the only question is what he meant. Shmuel’s doubt was what the husband meant. Did he mean “tell them,” or did he tell them to write the bill of divorce and therefore it would be invalid? Because in a case of “tell them” it would be valid, but if he told them to write the bill of divorce and they passed it on, it is invalid. And that was Shmuel’s doubt. So “mere words are not transmitted to an agent” is completely agreed upon; there is no dispute about that. Nor is there any dispute that in a case of “tell them” it is valid. The only question is what the principal meant: did he say “tell them,” or did he tell them to write? Okay? Let’s say that they themselves are scribes, or he doesn’t know, it doesn’t matter. But a bill of divorce really is a somewhat more problematic matter to write. What do you mean?

[Speaker C] If I compare it to a debt or payment of documents, that’s one thing, as opposed to—not a debt—a gift, for example. Because here there is an issue that you are taking something out from the principal that can go out even not according to his will. I didn’t understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Suppose a person—

[Speaker C] Doesn’t want to divorce his wife. For example, he told someone, “Write me the bill of divorce,” and afterward he changed his mind. He can change his mind and not give the bill of divorce.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that is true in every matter of agency. So what?

[Speaker C] There is now the stage where he starts thinking that he wants to divorce his wife. Okay. And then he begins to carry it out. So he says to him: write the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The bill of divorce, do this for him, take the—no, maybe if he said “write and give.” He has already finished; that’s it, he appointed them.

[Speaker C] He can’t stop it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but he didn’t stop it, so what? No, fine—

[Speaker C] This is a classic case, but the agency here is more complicated.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More complicated than what? Than simple agency where I say to someone: take a hundred shekels and pass it to this person.

[Speaker C] There are now more safeguards, I think—the Talmud itself talks about this—that there could be much greater damage if the bill of divorce reaches the woman.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know about damages. That may all be rabbinic. Not relevant—we are talking about the core law. At the level of the core law, once you appointed an agent you can cancel him. Even if he appointed—

[Speaker B] Forty times?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter. You can be stricter rabbinically, but in principle, if you made someone an agent you can cancel him. I don’t see here any such distinction. There is, however, Nachmanides—the Ketzot brings that Nachmanides says that in a case of “tell them” there is a dispute among the Amoraim about “tell them.” The baraita says that Rabbi Yosei concedes in a case of “tell them,” but there is another Amora who says that Rabbi Yosei invalidates even in a case of “tell them.” Okay? Nachmanides says: the one who invalidates in a case of “tell them” does so only for a bill of divorce. For with a bill of divorce there is a rule that it must be written for her sake. And if it must be written for her sake, then when the scribe writes, what does “for her sake” mean? It must be by the husband’s command, that the husband tells him to write. Therefore in a case of “tell them” it is invalid, because if the agents told him to write, that is not considered that the husband told him to write. Because the requirement in a bill of divorce is that there be speech from the husband, and we spoke about the fact that “a person’s agent is like himself” does not turn you literally into the husband. It is not the husband who said it; it is the husband’s agent who said it. So Nachmanides says that for such a matter the law of agency was not said. That is what Rabbi Yosei means when he says that in a case of “tell them” it is invalid. But in a case of “tell them” in other contexts, where you do not need the writing to be for her sake, then “tell them” may be valid according to everyone. That is what he says: “And there are those who validate in a case of ‘tell them,’ that is, even though mere words are not transmitted to an agent, that means that when one is made an agent for a matter he cannot appoint another agent in his place where it is mere words. But in a case of ‘tell them’ it is valid.” And see the Tur, who wrote so in the name of Nachmanides, that he distinguishes between a bill of divorce and a gift. Meaning, with regard to a bill of divorce it is invalid even in a case of “tell them,” because it requires being written for her sake. But with regard to a gift, “tell them” is effective. Okay? Because a bill of divorce is unique; it needs to be for her sake. But in principle, in a case of “tell them” it is valid, and there is no problem of mere words there. Okay, so that is regarding the problem of mere words in general. Now he starts moving through all the types of agents and examining whether there is a problem of mere words—whether an agent appoints an agent or does not appoint an agent. So I begin with an agent for receipt in divorce. The Tosafot Rid in Kiddushin writes as follows: “That an agent appoints an agent means that the husband’s agent appoints an agent.” Yes, an agent for delivery on behalf of the husband can appoint an agent, as we learned in the second chapter of Gittin: “He forms a court and sends it,” and so on. “But the woman’s agent cannot appoint an agent, because these are mere words. And mere words are not transmitted to an agent. For the woman gave him only mere words: ‘Receive my bill of divorce for me,’ and we rule like Rabbi Yosei in the chapter ‘One who says receive,’ who said that mere words are not transmitted to an agent. And it is unlike the husband’s agent, for to him he gave an actual object, and therefore he can appoint an agent, as I explained in the collection of responsa.” What does that mean?

[Speaker C] So he says like this: with an agent for delivery—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The husband’s agent can appoint a second agent. Why? Because it is not mere words. Why is it not mere words? Because the bill of divorce is physically in the agent’s hands. This is not words; it is a tangible object. He passes this object to the second agent, so he is not passing on only words, he is passing on an object. In such a case the first agent can appoint the second agent. Therefore an agent for delivery can appoint an agent. But an agent for receipt on behalf of the woman has no object at all in hand. She says words to him: “Receive the bill of divorce on my behalf.” Words. Mere words are not transmitted to an agent. Therefore the agent for receipt cannot appoint a second agent. Okay? Now notice, and I am already drawing your attention to something we will discuss later: if mere words are not transmitted to an agent, then how is there any agent for receipt in the first place? You are telling me that the agent for receipt cannot appoint a second agent in his name. But how can the woman appoint an agent for receipt? After all, that is mere words. Mere words are not transmitted to an agent. You see that the problem of mere words arises only when the first agent passes the words on to the second agent. But the first agent himself, even if this is mere words, can still be the owner’s agent. Right? So that is a note of Rabbi Akiva Eiger—we will discuss it—but for now I am just placing it as a question mark on the side. Okay? So what Tosafot Rid is telling us, in essence, is that an agent for delivery can appoint a second agent; an agent for receipt cannot, and the problem is the problem of mere words. An agent for receipt is mere words, therefore he cannot appoint a second agent. An agent for delivery is not mere words because he is holding a bill of divorce in his hand. So not-mere-words means an object. What do we see? That the concept of mere words comes to exclude a situation where you hand the agent some object. Suppose you send an agent to buy something, okay? Then you hand the agent an object and tell him to buy this for so-and-so. That is fine; it is not mere words. What if you send an agent to buy something? You did not hand him anything at all. He will buy, and once he buys he will have something in hand, right? Seemingly that is mere words—it would be impossible. But of course, as I said here, “impossible” means that you can appoint such an agent, but that agent will not be able to appoint a second agent to buy something. But if you send an agent to buy something, that is probably possible, because even in the case of an agent for receipt, the woman appoints an agent for receipt; only the agent for receipt does not appoint a second agent to receive in his stead. Okay? That is what Tosafot Rid says. But the Rashba, for example, and likewise the Ritva, disagree with him. He says: “This teaches that an agent appoints an agent. And if you say: granted, his agent appoints an agent of the husband, but how can her agent, the woman’s agent, appoint an agent? Are these not mere words, and mere words are not transmitted to an agent?” Again, notice: he is not asking how there can be an agent for receipt in the first place—that is obvious. The question is how an agent for receipt can appoint a second agent. Now why does the fact that this is mere words not bother him with the agent for receipt himself? Only the question whether the agent for receipt can appoint a second agent to work in his name. That, he says, cannot be. “And Rabbi Barceloni of blessed memory answered that here we are dealing with a case where the woman made him an agent through a formal acquisition, which is strong enough to empower him to appoint an agent. And it seems reasonable when she gave him permission to appoint an agent, for we say that mere words are not transmitted to an agent only when the agent appoints him on his own initiative. But when it is by the principal’s intention, he appoints an agent.”

[Speaker B] Yes, if she gave him permission to appoint an agent—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then he really can appoint an agent. Which seems reasonable—if he can appoint—“tell them.” Ah, now the question is what counts as her giving permission?

[Speaker B] What are we talking about?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Appoint an agent. That is basically “tell them.” In short, this is the distinction we saw in the Talmud on page 66, that in a case of “tell them,” Rabbi Yosei agrees that it is possible. The whole problem of mere words exists only when it is not “tell them.” If it is “tell them,” then no. But it is not exactly the same as giving permission. In a case of “tell them,” that is an agency where I, the woman, tell him: you are not my agent for receipt; you are my agent to appoint an agent for receipt. Right? Giving permission is not that. You are my agent for receipt, only you also have permission to appoint a second agent. Do you understand? That is not the same as “tell them.” In “tell them,” you are not an agent for receipt at all. Your entire agency is only to appoint another agent for receipt, who will be my agent for receipt. You are not my agent for receipt; you were not appointed at all to receive the bill of divorce on my behalf. You were appointed only to appoint an agent for receipt. That is called “tell them.” In the Rashba it is not written that way. In the Rashba it says that if the woman gives him permission to appoint, he is an agent for receipt, only he does not appoint on his own initiative; rather, he received permission from the woman to appoint a second agent. That too is fine. That is an option, right? But he is indeed an agent for receipt; he just also has permission to appoint a second agent. The Rashba says: “And it seems reasonable when she gave him permission to appoint an agent, for we do not say that mere words are not transmitted to an agent except when the agent appoints him on his own initiative. But by the principal’s intention he appoints an agent. And as is proven there, for in a case of ‘tell them,’ an agent appoints an agent.” What is the proof? In “tell them,” once again, the first agent is not an agent for receipt at all. He is an agent whose role is to appoint the second to be the agent for receipt. That works. The Rashba says that from there there is proof that if the woman appointed you as an agent for receipt but gave you permission to appoint someone else, that too is fine. That is the proof—from the law of “tell them.” I do not think it is necessary. The Rashba understood that “tell them” can mean that the first one is also an agent for receipt, he just has permission to appoint a second one who will be an agent for receipt. Right? I would understand “tell them” to mean that the first one is not an agent for receipt at all. His whole agency is only to appoint someone else to be the agent for receipt. But an agent for receipt who was appointed himself cannot pass that on to the second one because that is mere words. If you were appointed to appoint an agent for receipt, then that is not mere words. Why is it not mere words? Because you are not the agent for receipt; you are not passing on your own power. You are carrying out your own agency. What is your agency? To appoint someone else as an agent for receipt. That is what I did—I appointed him. Therefore “tell them” is valid. But if you yourself are an agent for receipt, you cannot pass that power to the second one, because a power that is mere words cannot be transferred. The Rashba did not understand it that way. We will see later in Rabbi Akiva Eiger that he discusses exactly this point. The Rashba understood that even if you are an agent for receipt, if the woman does not mind your appointing someone else, that too is fine. You can pass on your power even though it is mere words. And on the face of it, that is not what is written in the law of “tell them,” and the Rashba brings proof for this from the law of “tell them.” That is his proof. It may be that what the Rashba means is this: you were appointed to be an agent for receipt, but the woman gave you permission to appoint another agent.

[Speaker B] If she gave you permission.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that means that basically you were appointed for two possible missions: either you are an agent for receipt, or you appoint someone else to be the agent for receipt, and then you are not the agent for receipt. There are two possibilities—choose between them. It’s not that you were appointed as an agent for receipt, and now, as the agent for receipt, you transfer that power to the second agent. That’s not possible; that’s mere words. Okay? But if the woman gave you permission to appoint, then what does permission to appoint mean? She appointed you to “tell them to tell.” One option: you yourself can be the agent for receipt. Second option: you can appoint someone else to be the agent for receipt. Either this or that—I appointed you for two possible missions, and you choose which route to take. If that’s the case, then it’s fine. So it really comes out that according to the Rashba, if that’s so, then according to the Rashba, if you were appointed to be an agent for receipt, you cannot appoint someone else as an agent for receipt. Even if the woman agrees—that’s not the point—you can’t, because it’s mere words. If the woman said to you, “Listen, if you want, appoint someone else,” then you can. Why? Because here this is really “tell them to tell.” Because from the outset you were appointed either to be an agent for receipt or to appoint someone else as agent for receipt. It’s like “tell them to tell”; you were simply appointed either for “tell them to tell” or as an agent for receipt. You choose which of the two. So if “tell them to tell” works, then everything is fine. And the fact that you are an agent for receipt does not in itself let you appoint a second agent, because that is mere words. Mere words you cannot pass on to a second agent.

[Speaker B] And what if he said to him—he said to him—that what he said to him was: appoint another as an agent for receipt; after all, he told me in summary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says there are two possibilities: either you are the agent for receipt, or you are an agent to appoint an agent for receipt—for “tell them to tell.” So the “tell them to tell” here is one of two options: either I appointed you as an agent for receipt, or I appointed you to say “tell them to tell.” And since “tell them to tell” is valid, then he chose the second option. Fine, he’s allowed to.

[Speaker C] Or, “either you write, or you tell the scribe to write.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. And then it’s fine. So in practice, the Rashba claims that an agent for receipt can appoint an agent, against Tosafot Rid. Right? Tosafot Rid said that an agent for receipt cannot appoint an agent because it’s mere words. The Rashba says an agent for receipt can appoint an agent, but that’s not completely precise. Exactly—because if he received permission, then really this is “tell them to tell,” and in “tell them to tell” the Rashba also agrees that this is not mere words, and Tosafot Rid also agrees that this is not mere words and that he appoints an agent. The Mordechai in Gittin also says similar things: Rabbeinu Barukh, author of Sefer HaChokhmah, raised an objection, in chapter 2 of tractate Kiddushin—yes, Sefer HaChokhmah: but don’t we say, “and he shall send, and she shall be sent,” teaching that an agent can appoint an agent? But this is nothing but mere words, so how can he appoint an agent? How can he appoint an agent—it’s mere words! And some explain that receipt of divorce—the receipt of the bill of divorce—or betrothal constitutes a full-fledged act. That already does disagree with Tosafot Rid. The Rashba does not necessarily disagree with Tosafot Rid, because the Rashba compares this to “tell them to tell,” right? But here he says that an agent for receipt can appoint an agent and that this is not mere words. Not because she gave him permission or anything—not that. It’s not mere words. Why? Because an agent for receipt—to receive a divorce or to receive betrothal—is a full-fledged act. It’s not mere words, not speech. It’s an act. And regarding an act, we do not say “mere words.” So what is mere words? We saw in the Talmud / Talmudic text: agency to write the bill of divorce. Agency to write the bill of divorce is mere words, but agency to receive a bill of divorce is not mere words. Why, what’s the difference? Because writing the bill of divorce is an action. There’s no object here. Receiving the bill of divorce is agency regarding an action involving an object. You receive the bill of divorce. True, you receive rather than give, but it is agency to perform an act. Writing the bill of divorce is not producing an object; it’s an action, it’s something abstract. About something like that, we say it is mere words. That’s Rabbeinu Barukh, author of Sefer HaChokhmah. And from Mori HaKohen I received: whenever the matter is not completed through the agent, it is considered mere words and is not transferable to an agent. But receipt of the bill of divorce—that is the completion of the matter. A different distinction. Not the distinction of Sefer HaChokhmah. The point is: when you complete the action, it’s not mere words. When it is not completion, it is mere words. When you write the bill of divorce, you haven’t completed anything; afterward you still have to give it in order to complete the divorce. That is mere words. But receiving the bill of divorce completes the matter, completes the divorce, so that is not mere words. That is a real act. It’s not the same as Sefer HaChokhmah. Sefer HaChokhmah said that since in receiving the bill of divorce you perform an act, then it’s not words—it’s an act. Writing the bill of divorce is just, well, here he says that receiving the bill of divorce completes the matter—not because an object is involved, but because you complete it, the significance of the matter. The significance of the matter is when you complete the thing, and the moment you complete it, that gives it importance, so it is not mere words. A bit like, say, writing on the Sabbath—you know that you need two letters. One letter is not writing, but if that letter completes a book, then it is writing. When you complete the thing, that gives importance to the act; it’s as if you wrote two letters. Okay? Okay, so that’s regarding an agent for receipt. And an agent for delivery in betrothal. An agent for delivery in divorce is explicit in the baraita. What happens with an agent for delivery in betrothal? So what do you say about an agent for delivery in betrothal? Here there is—

[Speaker B] an object, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He receives something, right?

[Speaker B] The moment he—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] receives something from the sender—that, we saw in the Mordechai, is not mere words, right? More than that, it’s also an act that completes the matter. When you perform betrothal, that completes it. According to both opinions in the Mordechai, an agent for delivery in betrothal is not mere words, like an agent for delivery in divorce, right? But Tosafot Rid says: we find it in divorce—how do we know it in betrothal? Meaning, we derive in betrothal that the man can betroth through an agent, but not that the agent can appoint an agent, because these are mere words. And an agent for delivery in betrothal is mere words, where he tells him, “Go and betroth a woman for me.” And even if he handed him some object, it is not comparable to a bill of divorce, because the bill of divorce is the thing that effects the divorce; if the bill of divorce is lost, the agent has no power to divorce her. But the betrothal object that he handed him—if it is lost, he can betroth her on his behalf with his own. So it turns out that the essence of the agency is mere words, therefore it is not transferred to an agent. Agency of delivery in betrothal is different from agency of delivery in divorce. Why? Because in divorce you receive a bill of divorce, and the bill of divorce is the thing that effects the divorce. If the bill of divorce is lost, then that’s it—you cannot divorce her. In betrothal, let’s say you received a perutah from the husband, fine? If the perutah is lost, you can take a perutah of your own and betroth her. So really you are not an agent to transfer that specific perutah to the woman; that perutah is just a practical means. You are an agent to betroth, but to betroth is words. The object here is not an essential object. If you lose this object, there will be another object that you can use. The essence of your agency is not to transfer this object to the woman; it is to betroth her. True, I don’t want you to lose a perutah, so I give you my perutah, but the perutah is not specifically the thing that effects the betrothal. You can also betroth with something else. Therefore this is not considered that you received an object. It is not agency regarding an object; it is agency regarding an act. Agency regarding an act is mere words. In divorce, this is agency to transfer the very bill of divorce itself to the woman. The object is an essential object; it is not incidental. You cannot replace it with something else. No, there is the law of the Canaanite slave—there is a Talmudic text in Kiddushin 7. The one who betroths can betroth her with his own property—the agent, sorry, can betroth her with his own property on behalf of the sender.

[Speaker B] In any case he—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] has to say it; that has nothing to do with the law of the Canaanite slave. Even if you betroth with the sender’s money, you still have to say, “Behold, you are betrothed to him,” and even if you betroth with your own, you still have to say, “Behold, you are betrothed to him,” yes, that’s obvious. Also in the rulings of Rid he writes: we find it in divorce—how do we know it in betrothal? And if you say, let us derive it from divorce, one can refute that: what is unique to divorce? That it can take place against her will. The verse says, “And she leaves and becomes,” equating becoming married with leaving. Rabbeinu Yitzhak wrote: just as in divorce an agent can appoint an agent, so too in betrothal. However, you only find such an agent where he is prevented by circumstances, parallel to an agent in divorce. But he can appoint an agent also in betrothal. And this does not seem right to me, says the Rid, because when we derive betrothal from divorce, that applies specifically to the first agent, but not that the agent can appoint an agent, because these are mere words, where he says to him, “Go and betroth a woman for me.” And even if he handed him some object, it is not comparable to a bill of divorce, because the bill of divorce is the thing that effects the divorce, so if it is lost the agent has no power to divorce her. If, for example, he writes another bill of divorce—let’s say the bill of divorce was lost—will he write another bill of divorce? It won’t help. You need to appoint him again as agent for the new bill of divorce, because the agent is agent for that particular bill of divorce. But with money, if the money is lost he can take different money or take money belonging to the agent; he does not need a new appointment of agency, the agency still stands. We see that the agency is not tied to the object. But the object of betrothal that he handed him—if it is lost, he can betroth her with his own. So it turns out that the essence of the agency is mere words. But if he betrothed with a document, then it is similar to a bill of divorce. In betrothal by document, the agent can appoint an agent, because a betrothal document is like a divorce document. If he appoints him to betroth the woman with a betrothal document, then it is specifically with that document. He cannot betroth her with something else, and if the document is lost, the agency is void. Therefore it is not mere words. The holy one of Radush ruled in the Mordechai that one who appoints an agent to betroth a woman and gave him the ring with which to betroth—even if circumstances prevented him on the way, he cannot appoint another agent, because these are mere words, and mere words are not transferred to an agent. And even though regarding a bill of divorce we hold that an agent can appoint an agent and it is not mere words because of the delivery of the bill of divorce—here too there is delivery of the ring, so this is also an act involving an object. It is not comparable. For regarding a bill of divorce, a woman is divorced even against her will, and immediately when the bill of divorce reaches the hand of the agent, it is as though she were already divorced. Therefore it is not mere words, because the agent can divorce her against her will, for the hand of the agent is like the hand of the husband. But an agent for betrothal—if the woman does not consent, she is not betrothed. Therefore this is mere words. His reasoning is different from the Rid’s. He says there is a difference between a bill of divorce and betrothal. Betrothal is mere words, and the halakhic / of Jewish law agent cannot appoint a second agent. With a bill of divorce, yes; with betrothal, no. But the explanation is not like what we said before—that if the money is lost, he can take other money. Rather, betrothal cannot be done against the woman’s will. If the woman does not agree, then she cannot become betrothed. That means you did not receive the full power of agency; not everything is in your hands. You depend on the woman’s consent. Only where everything is in your hands can you appoint another agent, because someone who has everything in his hands can also delegate authority to another agent. So with a bill of divorce, once you received the appointment to divorce, you go to the woman, and it won’t help her at all—you can divorce her against her will. So you can also appoint another agent to do it, because your control is complete. But in betrothal your control is not complete; the woman can refuse and she will not be betrothed. So in that situation you can be an agent, but you cannot appoint another agent because it is mere words. That is a different explanation from what we saw earlier. Why?

[Speaker C] In betrothal you can appoint whomever you want; in the end, if the woman doesn’t agree, then it dies. Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can appoint? No—you don’t have control. Why should you be able to appoint?

[Speaker C] Appointing doesn’t matter; he’s just coming with the message—give her the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That “doesn’t matter” part is mere words. So you yourself can be an agent, and you cannot appoint another agent, because you don’t have enough control to do that. Like we saw: if you cannot make a condition, you cannot appoint an agent. If you do not have full control over the matter, then you cannot appoint an agent. And in betrothal, do you have full control over the matter? In divorce—yes. In betrothal—no. They’ll ask again: so then why can I appoint the first agent in betrothal at all? After all, I don’t have control—maybe the woman will refuse? I’m the husband now. Even the husband cannot betroth a woman against her will. If she didn’t agree, she didn’t agree. So how can he appoint the first agent, but not the second? That remains a question. So we’ll talk about that next time. Rabbi Akiva Eiger, if you saw—are you looking a bit at the preparation sheet I send? Rabbi Akiva Eiger talks about this. Look there, those who haven’t seen it.