HaKones Chapter – Lesson 14

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, let’s start. Actually, before I begin the lecture, I want to hear from you a bit, as much as possible, some kind of summary of this semester. Points worth thinking about again, improving, suggestions, I don’t know, whatever comes to mind—I’d be happy to hear. By the way, not only about this lecture; if there are things about the framework in general, I don’t know, we’ll still discuss various issues in summarizing the semester, and I’d definitely be happy to hear on all aspects. Is there…

[Speaker B] I wanted to ask about next semester—does it continue with you as usual, and what…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You sound very faint, with background noise.

[Speaker B] I’m saying, next semester—can you hear me? Yes, yes. Next semester are we continuing with you as usual? How does it work in terms of the schedule in the beit midrash?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The system.

[Speaker B] Same schedule, does it stay?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, you can see on the website the schedule for the second semester too. In principle, the lectures stay at the same times and even more or less on the same topics. Here and there one person drops off and another is added, one of the teachers or one of the lectures, but that’s it. Basically it’s the same schedule. My lectures stay the same. Got it, thank you very

[Speaker B] much. But in terms of

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] what there was this semester, how was it? I took a few minutes’ break in the middle of the lecture—is that enough? Is that okay? Unnecessary? Tell me. Preparation—does something need to be different, maybe give something a bit different for preparation? I don’t know how much you managed to look at things before the lecture, if at all. Speak up, speak up, I’d be happy to hear. I want to hear a bit what you think.

[Speaker C] Yes, Rabbi, in general I think the break you do should be done in all the lectures, in my opinion, in the beit midrash. Yes, and that break, those few minutes, really helps.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, you mean tell the other teachers? No, no.

[Speaker C] I got it, what do you mean. Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tell the other teachers? What, what? You mean suggest it to the other teachers?

[Speaker C] Yes, I think it’s actually a good idea, because sometimes you need that break of a few minutes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.

[Speaker C] And the lectures are very interesting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Anyone else, anything else? How much did you manage to prepare beforehand? Do you look at the pages I sent with sources and preparation guidelines in the Dropbox? Do you get to them?

[Speaker D] Personally, I didn’t really get to prepare much, but at the beginning of the year it was easier for me, I had more time during the semester. As the semester went on, there was more pressure from studies, but I think that’s individual. And how much, say, is there here…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who among you has a study slot dedicated to this lecture?

[Speaker E] I have a study slot on Monday. I try to have it be for the lecture, but not always, meaning according to need, but yes, definitely. It’s important too—what can you do? Someone who didn’t do it, it really helps.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Shilo, do you have one?

[Speaker D] No, I don’t. I don’t have that, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ariel?

[Speaker F] I have a study slot on Monday, but usually I don’t end up getting to it. In the end I usually study other things. Sometimes I get to it, sometimes not.

[Speaker G] At the beginning, at first, I dealt more with the lecture materials, and afterward I saw there was no need. The lecture is just very clear, I think it stands on its own.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, so that’s one of my problems.

[Speaker G] Because…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] My assumption is that people haven’t looked, because I understand that at least some people haven’t, and so I build the lecture to address the lowest common denominator, because otherwise I lose some of the people. On the other hand, it really isn’t efficient. Meaning, if people have looked, fine, then you can start from an earlier stage already, or go through the sources more briefly. So that’s exactly part of the consideration.

[Speaker G] In my opinion, if it’s like it was now, and the background is like the background of the people here, then you can give up the whole preparatory study-slot idea. But maybe I’m wrong. For me it was unnecessary, and toward the end I really started doing other things.

[Speaker E] Maybe it’s only in the Zoom format, where you actually see the sources displayed, so you can kind of connect and prepare as you go. No, but he also does it relatively slowly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I do it as if we’re learning it now.

[Speaker E] Right, but I believe that if it’s a lecture, then you do need the preparation more, because you don’t see everything laid out in front of you on the slide.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in the lecture, when I gave frontal in-person lectures, I handed out pages with the sources. Meaning, people still saw it in front of their eyes. But that really is the dilemma—how much to assume you saw in advance, because if some didn’t, then basically I have to address that minimal common denominator, and then those who did prepare lose out a little because it goes too slowly, we go into the sources again, basically things you already had. I don’t really know what to do with that when not everyone has the possibility of looking beforehand. So that’s why somehow those who do dedicate study slots to it, as Binyamin remarked earlier, it comes out unnecessary in the current structure of the lecture. The question is whether I can do something else. Meaning, if other people don’t have study slots, or they have them but don’t use them for this, then I can build a different kind of lecture. Oren, what about you?

[Speaker C] I actually do have study slots, and what you did in the lectures actually did help, because sometimes I really didn’t manage to see all the sources.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I don’t

[Speaker C] know about the other guys here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But do you have a study slot around this lecture?

[Speaker C] I do, yes. Around the lecture—no.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, you have one study slot and you put several tasks into it? Yes. I understand.

[Speaker C] Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I…

[Speaker H] I don’t always manage to go through all the sources, so from my perspective it’s good that it stays the way it is now. And I wouldn’t call it the lowest common denominator, because that’s already a high bar—it’s not minimal at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in the lecture I read the sources, I go into different possibilities for understanding them. And if I assumed everyone had seen them, then maybe I’d still do it, but I’d do it quickly. Meaning, say, when I came to the institute in the first year, first two years, I didn’t read sources at all in the lecture. The lecture just started straight afterward. I mean, I’d start immediately talking—according to Rashba, what happens, and what the difference is between him and Ritva, and so on—and I wouldn’t go into the sources at all. Slowly I saw that some people didn’t manage to look at it before the lecture, and I really did need to start from the beginning. And then it’s always this kind of dilemma with regard to those who do work around the lecture. Again, I’m not blaming anyone—everyone according to the time he has and his skill and so on—but then it comes out that those who do work around the lecture sometimes lose a bit, because I’m really doing it too slowly for them. So, fine, I don’t know if…

[Speaker H] I know that other teachers too, who send source sheets—Rabbi Berkowitz, Rabbi Taylor, and so on—still start from the sources themselves. Meaning, I don’t know anyone who skips the sources and starts. Apparently, decline of the generations—what can you do.

[Speaker G] If I may, practically the only way is to do what you’re doing now, meaning to start from the source sheets, for a simple reason: there’s no way to guarantee that everyone will go through it, especially if there’s no exam. It’s not specifically connected to this institute—it’s true in all universities in the world. If there’s no exam, then not all students will read all the material, only those with high motivation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but on the other hand, if you build the lecture accordingly, then lecture after lecture people see that they’re not in the picture, and that itself could maybe cause them…

[Speaker G] They’ll just stop coming. I wouldn’t build on that. I don’t know. It seems very, very… I’d be glad if it were possible to guarantee that everyone would do some minimal preparation—that would help everyone. But I know there’s no way, no way to be sure it will really happen. Maybe if it weren’t Zoom and they were sitting in the beit midrash as a group studying together, then…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but that doesn’t happen because it’s not at the same times. The study session isn’t at the same times.

[Speaker G] In principle, you could arrange in the schedule that the lecture supposedly lasts another half hour, and that half hour is preparation before the lecture. Whoever registers has to be there. A study slot attached to the lecture. You could do such a thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but then it would be a short study session. Meaning, basically the reading of the sources that I do in the lecture—we’d do it maybe a bit more independently in half the time of the study slot or something like that.

[Speaker G] Yes, and then the lecture would be more effective, though even that I’m not one hundred percent sure about.

[Speaker H] It’s a good idea, but only after COVID is over.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, say if we had two hours—well, actually here it’s an hour and a half on your schedule, right? Because if it were two hours, then maybe it would really be possible to divide it: do an hour of study while I’m here the whole time, but we could do it in pairs or together or something like that, and then give an hour-long lecture. But that would mean the unit is two hours and not an hour and a half, and today a lecture unit is an hour and a half, while a study unit is two hours.

[Speaker G] Fine, so for whoever participates in it, it would count as an hour and a half of lecture and half an hour of study. That’s fine, no problem.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but people who are registered—some of them are really registered only for an hour and a half.

[Speaker G] Yes, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not to be here two hours.

[Speaker G] I understand. So whoever wants, from this point on, after this lecture, to register—after this change to register for the lecture—would know that he’s entering a commitment of two hours and not an hour and a half. You can do such a thing. But I still don’t see the… I’m trying to understand what the big dilemma is.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The dilemma is that I feel part of the lecture is really spent on reading the sources. True, I try to comment a bit on points, but part of the lecture goes to reading the sources, which is something that overall you can also do in a study session. That’s all, it’s not…

[Speaker H] Sure, like the Rabbi says, even while reading the sources the Rabbi is already adding things of his own. A lot of his own things, in my opinion. Fine, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anything else? Any other comment? Any insight? A suggestion for the future? Okay, if there’s anything like that in any case, I’d be very happy to get it by email or any way you want. Call, WhatsApp, email, whatever you want. I’d be very happy, because I want to hear a bit how this whole business works from your perspective. At least as of now it looks like we’re going to have another semester like this. The very optimistic think that maybe in the middle of the semester there’s some chance of change, but at the moment it doesn’t seem likely. It’ll probably continue like this until the end of the year.

[Speaker H] On the other hand, one of my lecturers said that the university is already preparing for the possibility that next year too they’ll start on Zoom. It doesn’t seem likely to me, but…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s…

[Speaker H] what he said, that there are discussions. Seems a bit much to me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You have to worry about the worst case. You have to prepare for all possibilities. But you know, I think with the vaccine and everything, and you’ve got until October—we’re talking about another nine months—I very much hope the vaccine will already have done something by then. Of course there can always be surprises and mutations and I don’t know what—you can’t rule anything out, and therefore they’re right to prepare. That’s not… But at least I can see the possibility that we will return to the regular format. Fine, okay. In short, anyone who has anything else—a comment, question, request, suggestion, whatever comes to mind—I’d be very happy to hear through any channel you want. Okay, let’s get back to our matter.

In the previous lecture we saw the dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish as to whether fire is because of his arrows or because of his property. And the conclusion of the passage, according to most medieval authorities (Rishonim), at least that’s the accepted way to read it, is that we distinguish between two kinds of damage by fire. There is a case where a person ignites a fire and his arrows have not ceased, meaning there is no barrier between the fire and the object, in which case this is really direct human damage, and he is liable even for concealed items, liable for the four forms of compensation—in other words, direct human damage in every respect, like someone who shoots an arrow. And when his arrows have ceased, meaning if you ignite a fire and there is a barrier separating you from the damaged object, and of course the barrier does not fall because of the fire but something else knocked it down, meaning that when you ignited the fire the damaged property was in fact protected—at some point that fell, and then your fire spread. Now here too you need one more addition: your fire spread, but you had time to fence it in, because if you had no time to fence it in then you’re under compulsion, so you are certainly exempt. But if you had time to fence it in and you didn’t, the Talmud says we do not go back to calling this his arrows. Meaning, it’s not really direct human damage; rather, even though you are liable, you are liable under the category of damage caused by one’s property and not under the category of direct human damage.

And I said that fire fits very well with the last few lectures, where we discussed all kinds of things that are somewhere between direct human action and damage caused by property. So in the case where his arrows have ceased, it is damage caused by one’s property, and there the exemption for concealed property applies. And there too, if you injured his hand, then you are not liable for the four forms of compensation, or for the five forms of compensation. Rashi says four; others say five. And that’s the difference between the two kinds of fire damage. Meaning, there is fire that is direct human damage when his arrows have not ceased, and there is fire that is damage caused by one’s property in every respect.

In Maimonides we saw that it apparently is not so. Maimonides apparently understands that the conclusion of the passage was not to distinguish between where his arrows have ceased and where they have not; on the contrary, the conclusion of the Talmud was that we drop the distinction between where his arrows have ceased and where they have not. And Maimonides basically claims that the conclusion of the Talmud is that the practical difference in saying that fire is because of his arrows—someone who also has the category of because of his property—the meaning is not… The Talmud says that Rabbi Yochanan, who holds that fire is because of his arrows, also has the category of fire as because of his property. So most medieval authorities (Rishonim) learn that this means two types of fire: where his arrows have ceased and where they have not. If his arrows have not ceased, it is because of his arrows; if his arrows have ceased, it is because of his property. Maimonides apparently read the Talmud as meaning that when it says he also has because of his property, the intention is that fire in general—whether his arrows have ceased or have not ceased—is something between his property and his arrows. With respect to the exemption for concealed property it is like his property, so he is exempt for concealed items. With respect to liability for the four forms of compensation it is like his arrows. And Maimonides seems not to distinguish between where his arrows have ceased and where they have not. Meaning, he reads the Talmud’s conclusion differently.

Then it comes out that according to Maimonides’ conclusion, fire is never fully direct human damage—even if his arrows have not ceased, in any case, fire is not completely direct human damage. Okay? It just has a dimension of direct human damage, but basically it belongs to the category of damage caused by one’s property. For example, something we’ll see later regarding someone who murders by means of fire: would he be considered a murderer? Because if it’s a person who murders, then he is liable to death as a murderer. But if this is not considered his own direct act, as with an arrow—for a person who shoots an arrow and kills is certainly liable to death, like someone who kills by his own force. But if a person kills by, say, his property—if a person’s property kills—in such a case the person is not liable to death. So what about fire? According to Rabbi Yochanan, who says fire is because of his arrows, then according to the interpretation of most medieval authorities (Rishonim), if it is a situation where his arrows have not ceased, then the person is liable to death. It’s like he killed by means of an arrow; fire and arrow are the same thing. According to Maimonides, whether his arrows have ceased or not, the killer is not liable to death. One who kills by fire is not liable to death, because this is not direct human damage. It is damage caused by one’s property, regarding which there is a novelty that he is liable for four forms of compensation—or for five forms of compensation, actually, according to Maimonides. Okay, so Maimonides says four, excluding humiliation, but that doesn’t matter, that’s only a side dispute.

Those are the two approaches we saw in understanding that passage there in chapter two. Let’s return to our passage. In our Talmudic passage we spoke about someone who bends his fellow’s standing grain in front of a fire. And the Talmud there says: if he did it in such a way that the fire reached there with a normal wind, he is liable in human court. The first answer is that he did it in such a way that with a normal wind the fire could not reach, but then an unusual wind came and burned the standing grain. In such a case he is exempt in human court but liable in the heavenly court. Rav Ashi does not accept this—apparently he doesn’t accept it—and Rav Ashi argues that we are talking about a case where he concealed the damaged grain, and therefore it is indirect causation, because he exempted the one who ignited the fire from paying, since he exempted the one who ignited the fire because he damaged concealed property. And therefore he is exempt from paying for it, and so the one who concealed the grain is basically indirect causation in damages, because he exempted the damager from paying and the injured party is left with uncompensated damage.

Now the question is, what happens in terms of whether his arrows have ceased or not—how does that fit with the conclusion of the passage in chapter two? On the face of it, we are dealing here with… If the man bent the grain in front of the fire, then when I look at the one who ignited the fire, the one who ignited it was in a situation where his arrows had ceased. Right? Because in practice, if nothing had happened—if the situation had remained as it was at the moment of ignition—the grain would not have burned. Meaning, the grain was protected. What happened? I bent the grain toward the place where the wind carries the fire—the normal wind, say, carries the fire—so I am liable in human court, because I simply took the grain to the fire. And there is no difference between sending the fire to the grain and throwing the grain into the fire or into the place where the fire is supposed to reach. Therefore the Talmud says this is liable in human court.

What happens when the fire arrives by means of an unusual wind? If the fire arrives by an unusual wind, then when I bent the grain, I brought it to a place where the fire reaches, and that is through an unusual wind. In such a case, the one who ignited the fire, in itself, is apparently exempt. Because what do you want from him? It’s an unusual wind—he’s not responsible for anything. As for me, who took it there, there is room to deliberate why I am liable. Why? Is it under the category of indirect causation? It’s not exactly indirect causation, because after all what I caused was also that there would be damage here by an unusual wind. But with an unusual wind, I too was not supposed to foresee it. And if the unusual wind was already blowing—we spoke about this at the beginning—then of course the one who bent it is liable in human court. Meaning, it’s not called an unusual wind if it is already there; then it’s common. So there is some liability in the heavenly court here; it’s not entirely clear whether this belongs to the laws of indirect causation or something else, I don’t know exactly what. In any case, that is the first opinion.

The big question is regarding Rav Ashi. Because Rav Ashi claims that we’re talking about a case where I concealed the grain, and in that way I basically exempted the one who ignited the fire. And now we have to ask ourselves what kind of case this is. If we are speaking of a case where his arrows have not ceased—apparently so, right? On the face of it, no one is talking here about some barrier that fell or something like that. So all in all, the fire advanced toward the grain, and we are dealing with a normal wind according to Rav Ashi; that itself is what he comes to dispute with the earlier statement. So we are dealing with a normal wind, and I wrapped the grain and turned it into concealed property. In such a case, in such a case, the one who ignited the fire is not exempt. Because after all this is not a case where his arrows have ceased, and where his arrows have not ceased, fire is direct human damage. Direct human damage is not exempt for concealed items, right? That is the conclusion—I’m speaking according to most medieval authorities (Rishonim) on the passage in chapter two. So the conclusion is that if this is not a case where his arrows have ceased, and that is apparently the case here, then the one who ignited the fire, even if I concealed the grain, is not exempt. So this cannot be what we’re talking about. Because otherwise, what difference does it make if I concealed it? In practical terms, the one who ignited the fire has to pay, and everything is fine. The fact that I concealed it or didn’t conceal it has no significance. I did not exempt the one who ignited it, the injured party did not lose out, and I of course don’t need to pay in any way—I didn’t do anything.

So this is difficult for the approaches of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who learned the passage in chapter two that way, because in our case, on the face of it, we are dealing with a case where his arrows have not ceased, and it is explicit in our Talmudic passage that in such a case there is an exemption for concealed property. So how can you say that over there the Talmud says that where his arrows have not ceased there is no exemption for concealed property because it is direct human damage? According to Maimonides it is excellent, right? Because according to Maimonides, even where his arrows have not ceased there is an exemption for concealed property. He is liable for the four forms of compensation in fire cases, but that is not the discussion in our passage. The exemption for concealed property exists; this is damage caused by one’s property.

Of course, if you remember, the Maggid Mishneh, when he explained Maimonides, said that perhaps Maimonides held that there is a conflict between passages. Yes, Maimonides, as it were, did not rule according to that passage there; maybe he thought there was a contradiction between passages. I said it’s possible that this can also fit into the passage there with a slight textual adjustment, though not really. But the Maggid Mishneh says that perhaps these are conflicting passages, and Maimonides interprets the mishnayot and the baraitot according to their plain meaning. And then there is no difference between where his arrows have ceased and where they have not—fire as because of his arrows is always true, and fire as because of his property is always true. And Maimonides does not accept the Talmud’s answers in chapter two; that’s what the Maggid Mishneh says.

A source for a passage that disagrees with the one there could be our passage. Because in our passage we see that when his arrows have not ceased, there is still an exemption for concealed property. So if so, that is really against the passage there. And since that is so, Maimonides may rule like our passage against the one there. Then according to the Maggid Mishneh, Maimonides too, when he read the passage in chapter two, read it like all the other medieval authorities (Rishonim). He read it that way, only he claims that it is not the practical law; he ruled according to another passage. I suggested earlier that Maimonides read the passage differently. The conclusion of the passage—that one who says fire is because of his arrows also holds because of his property—means that in the very same damaging force it is not entirely his arrows; it also has a dimension of his property. Not that there is another mode of damage that is because of his property, but rather that fire itself in all situations—true, it is because of his arrows regarding liability for the four forms of compensation, but basically it belongs to the category of his property, and therefore there is an exemption for concealed property. Then you can fit Maimonides into the flow of the Talmud itself in chapter two.

But according to the Maggid Mishneh, who says this is a contradiction between passages, it may very well be that our passage is the one that disagrees. According to how I read Maimonides in chapter two, it’s even better, because our passage does not contradict the one there—on the contrary, they fit perfectly. Both passages essentially say that every case of damage by fire, even if his arrows have not ceased, has an exemption for concealed property. What the Talmud said there about there being a distinction—that was rejected in the conclusion. That was the initial assumption, but it was dropped. Okay? So that’s according to Maimonides.

According to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), it is difficult, because according to them, if in our case we are dealing with where his arrows have not ceased, then it is not clear how there can be an exemption for concealed property here. This is direct human damage. How can there be an exemption for concealed property? So here, unless…

[Speaker H] Then let’s say our passage follows Reish Lakish and not Rabbi Yochanan.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s odd, but the practical Jewish law follows Rabbi Yochanan. Yes, it’s odd. It’s like saying the passages disagree, but it’s… Look, for example, in the Shulchan Arukh—which, by the way, generally follows Maimonides, as is known—look, when it rules in Choshen Mishpat 418: concealed property in fire is exempt, so that if one burned his fellow’s stack and there were concealed in it even threshing implements and so on, and cattle utensils that are normally concealed in a stack, he is exempt. And we estimate the place of the concealed utensils as though there had been barley or wheat there, according to what the stack was, and thus he pays him. In what case is this said? When one ignited the fire on his own property and it went and burned on his fellow’s property, and his arrows had ceased. Two requirements. For example, if the wall between them fell not because of the fire, and he could have fenced it in but did not. But if he ignited the fire on his fellow’s property, or even on his own property and his arrows had not ceased, for example if the wall fell because of the fire, he is liable for things that are normally concealed, and so on.

Meaning, he does in fact bring as practical Jewish law the distinction from the Talmud in chapter two, not like Maimonides. So how do we explain our Talmudic passage according to his view? Here it seems to me we need to go back to a remark I made in the previous lecture. After all, in our Talmudic passage it says, “someone who bends his fellow’s standing grain…” Meaning, let’s say first of all—there are those who wanted…

[Speaker H] Again, what is difficult from the Shulchan Arukh? About the Shulchan Arukh I don’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He believes that, as practical Jewish law, there is a difference between where his arrows have ceased and where they have not. That where his arrows have ceased, it is direct human damage, and where they have not, it is damage caused by property—not like Rashi. Okay, so if that’s so, then it’s not clear according to Rav Ashi why there is an exemption for concealed property in Rav Ashi’s case, since this is a picture of where his arrows have not ceased. Okay.

Now, some of the later authorities (Acharonim) wanted to establish a specific case, that in our passage we are speaking about a situation where his arrows had ceased. There was a barrier there and it fell. Because otherwise it really isn’t relevant. Why isn’t that mentioned? It may be that it doesn’t need to be mentioned, because in the laws of concealed property this is already known to work that way. The passage here does not go into all the details that need to be included. Once Rav Ashi introduced the issue of concealed property, we are supposed to understand on our own that the situation here is one where his arrows had ceased, because otherwise the exemption for concealed property is not relevant. We know this from the passage in chapter two, which is the main passage on fire. Therefore it doesn’t need to state in every place all the conditions—that is clear from the laws of concealed property. Then you can say there was some specific interpretive setup here, as several later authorities (Acharonim) say—I think Sefer HaChinukh says this, and others too—that one has to say that we are speaking here of a case where his arrows had ceased.

[Speaker F] By the way, could one say that the very fact that you need the action of the person who moves the stack already counts as his arrows having ceased?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker F] That the definition of his arrows having ceased is somehow broader, and also the fact that in order to burn this thing you need the stack to cover it—that too would count as his arrows having ceased, something like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? So you’re saying that always… then when is it a case of his arrows not having ceased regarding the exemption for concealed property? After all, with concealed property it’s always concealed, and still you’re telling me that where his arrows have not ceased there is no exemption for concealed property. According to your approach, there should be an exemption for concealed property there too, because by definition it is a case of his arrows having ceased. After all, it’s concealed inside the stack; in order to reach it you have to burn the outer stack. We saw something like that in the Chazon Ish. No, it doesn’t seem plausible to me. It also doesn’t seem that way conceptually, because “his arrows having ceased” means when the wall does not fall because of the fire. But if the stack itself is the wall, then clearly it falls because of the fire. The fire burns it, and that’s that. And all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) point out that we are speaking here of a wall that does not fall because of the fire, because if it fell because of the fire then it is not considered a wall. Meaning, it has to be protected at the moment of ignition. When I ignited the fire, the other person was protected. Something happened afterward that exposed him to the fire’s damage. But here he wasn’t protected; the fire burns the stack and then it burns what is inside it. Therefore there are later authorities (Acharonim) who want to set up the case here and say that we are speaking of a case where his arrows had ceased.

But note that this sharpens even more the remark I made in the previous lecture: why, essentially, does Rav Ashi make all these interpretive setups? After all, if we have the first opinion, if that first opinion is acceptable to him, then that is the simple explanation of this statement, “one who bends his fellow’s standing grain in front of a fire.” Why does Rav Ashi make this kind of setup—that he concealed it in ashes? That is apparently because he does not accept the first opinion. Even though Maimonides brings both opinions—we already discussed that—but on the face of it it seems that Rav Ashi does not accept it.

Now, this inference becomes stronger and stronger the more far-fetched Rav Ashi’s setup is. Because the more far-fetched Rav Ashi’s setup is, the harder it is to understand why he needed it—why wasn’t he satisfied with what Mar said initially? The more strained what you are proposing is in the wording of the statement itself, the harder it is to explain why you needed it. We are forced to say that he probably disagreed with Mar’s words. He does not accept Mar’s words, for all the reasons we talked about, and I also mentioned now. Here I remarked that Mar’s words themselves—it isn’t clear to what extent such a thing is even called indirect causation. Because the fire passes with an unusual wind, so when I bent the grain there, so what? Why should I have thought that fire would come here by an unusual wind? Just as the one who ignited the fire was not supposed to think so, neither was the one who bent the grain. What’s the difference? After all, the one who ignited the fire is exempt even in the heavenly court in the case of an unusual wind—completely exempt. So why should the one who bends it, when the fire moves through an unusual wind, be liable in the heavenly court? That’s a very non-trivial statement, and I can definitely understand why Rav Ashi does not accept it.

And I’m saying that if Rav Ashi does not accept it, he has no choice but to make an interpretive setup. And the more far-fetched the setup, the more it only sharpens or strengthens the conclusion that Rav Ashi could not have accepted Mar’s setup, and therefore he had to force the text. Because the farther his explanation is, the more it needs an explanation of why he needed it at all. Okay?

But still, even if I understand everything—why he doesn’t accept Mar and therefore needs a strained setup—it’s still difficult. The wording is “one who bends his fellow’s standing grain in front of a fire.” That is what it says. Rav Ashi says: not at all, no bending and nothing—he concealed this thing inside some blanket or something like that. How does that fit the words? Fine, make it a setup for me if you want—but even as a setup I don’t understand how you fit it in there. What is this—“the text is defective and this is what it teaches”? Not “one who bends his fellow’s standing grain in front of a fire,” but “one who conceals his fellow’s standing grain in front of a fire”? Are you changing the text? There’s something here that just doesn’t fit the words. It’s not a problem of a setup in a distant case. The problem is how it fits the words. The words say he bent it, not that he covered it.

So we touched on this a bit. I said maybe he bent it under the covering. Not “bent” in the sense that he tilted it to where the fire passes, but he bent it downward under the covering. Now I want to claim that perhaps there is an explanation here with which we gain two birds at once. He actually bent the grain toward the place of the fire. Notice, we are talking about a fire moving in a normal wind according to Rav Ashi. Mar says it is an unusual wind, but Rav Ashi returns to a normal wind. Then the claim is that Rav Ashi says: yes, he did bend it, as it says there—he bent his fellow’s grain in front of the fire. Only the Talmud asked: if so, then he is liable in human court; he takes the grain and puts it into the fire. So Rav Ashi says—he doesn’t want to back down from this being a normal wind; the first opinion said it’s an unusual wind, but no, no, it’s a normal wind—but he covered it. Meaning, he bent it and covered it. That is what Rav Ashi means. The covering does not come instead of the bending, but in addition. Meaning, he bent the grain into the path of the fire and covered it. He did both things.

So first of all, in the wording of the statement you can already make sense of Rav Ashi. It says he bends it. Rav Ashi adds that he also covered it. Fine, but at least you now fit, in some way, with what is written there, and you add one more setup. But according to what I described earlier, then it’s not a setup—you’re simply replacing what is written. That isn’t plausible.

Now what do I gain from this? First of all, the wording fits Rav Ashi better. “He bends it”—right, Rav Ashi says he bends it, only he bends it and then also covers it. But I say more than that: once he bends it—once he bends it, what does that mean? That without his bending it, the stack would not have burned, right? Because the fire passes along some path. I bent the grain toward the path of the fire. Had I not bent it, the fire would have passed here and the grain would have remained, it would not have burned. In other words, this is a case where his arrows had ceased. It is exactly a case where his arrows had ceased. Because when the person ignited the fire, essentially—and let’s speak of a normal wind—this did not endanger the grain. It did not endanger the grain. True, there was no barrier here, but what does that matter? Sorry. True, there was no barrier here, but the grain was protected. That is called his arrows having ceased.

Now what happens? I bend the grain. Once I bent the grain, I have now removed the shield, yes? Essentially the arrow was shot, and I removed the shield. So now the one who ignited the fire is liable because of damage caused by property, not direct human damage, because this is a case where his arrows had ceased. And now I covered it. Once he is liable under the law of damage caused by property, then he has the exemption for concealed property. And where his arrows had ceased there is an exemption—I’m speaking according to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), not Maimonides, yes? So where his arrows had ceased there is an exemption. Therefore, if I covered it, then I really did cause damage directly, because I exempted the one who ignited the fire from paying. Or in other words, there is no need to make a setup here that we are speaking of a case where his arrows had ceased. The Talmud itself is speaking about a case where his arrows had ceased, because otherwise there would be no need for him to bend the grain. If I need him to bend the grain, that means that if he had not bent it, the fire would not have burned it. Meaning, the grain was protected at the time the fire was ignited.

[Speaker H] Yes, but his arrows having ceased is only in a case where he could have fenced it in and didn’t, and this isn’t such a case—he can’t manage to raise the grain back up again in time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First, who said not? And second, second, that’s my next point.

[Speaker H] Because the picture the Rabbi drew is that when he ignited the fire, it couldn’t reach the grain, right? Meaning that after he ignited the fire, the other guy bent the grain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Once he bent the grain, you saw that the fire was advancing—

[Speaker H] he had enough time to restore the situation.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, that’s obvious if you’re talking about the exemption for concealed property. Without that, the exemption for concealed property doesn’t apply. It’s almost not even a setup. Meaning, fine, yes, we’re speaking of a case where he had time, because otherwise obviously there’s nothing to talk about.

I’ll say more than that now. Let’s go one step further, because actually there’s room to discuss this more conceptually. Let’s say the fire is advancing in a normal wind along a certain path, okay? And I’m here with my fellow’s grain and I bend the grain there, and let’s say I didn’t conceal it. Who would be liable—the one who ignited the fire or the one who bent it? I would say the one who bent it. Why? The one who ignited the fire—when he ignited the fire, the fire did not endanger this grain at all. The fire was going along its path, it did not endanger the grain. Now I come…

[Speaker H] He could have fenced it in and didn’t. He could have managed to fix it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying: in the case where he should have fenced it in and didn’t. I’m saying, now I come and bend the standing grain into the path along which the fire is advancing, right? In an ordinary wind. Meaning, de facto there is a fire there, and if not this very second then in another moment, but it’s an ordinary wind and I have to take that into account. So I’m basically bending something into a fire. Isn’t that direct damage? I’m the one igniting here—not the original fire-setter. What’s the difference between this and someone who takes another person’s object and throws it into an existing fire? There it’s obvious that the owner of the fire wouldn’t be liable; the one who threw it would be liable, right? That’s even worse than placing another person’s animal onto another person’s grain, where even there the one who places it is liable. Here, when you throw it into the fire, there’s no dispute, no doubt at all that you’d be liable. So why isn’t this really the same thing? I took the grain and bent it into the fire. The path the fire follows in an ordinary wind is the fire. So it turns out that when I bent the grain, I’m the one who’s liable, not the one who lit the fire. Now if that’s really true, then first of all, you don’t need to get to the point that he should have fenced it in and didn’t, like Doron asked earlier. We’re not talking about the one who lit the fire; we’re talking about the one who bent it. The one who bent it bent the items there. So here you certainly don’t need to say that he had some opportunity to protect it and didn’t. He’s the one who bent it—so don’t bend it. You don’t need the time interval in which he could fence in the fire. It’s not like the case of the one who lit the fire, where someone else bent something for you or breached your partition or bent grain into the path of your fire. There, in order to make the fire-setter liable, you really do need to say that he had some time to react; otherwise he’s under compulsion. But if you’re talking about the one who bent it, not the one who lit it, then whether he should have fenced it in and didn’t is irrelevant. You bent it into the fire—if there wasn’t time left, why did you bend it? Don’t bend it. You’re the one who’s liable. You basically threw something into a fire. Now true, you didn’t actually throw it straight into the fire, because the fire advances in an ordinary wind and you placed it on its path, because if you had actually thrown it into the fire this would be a person directly causing damage in every respect. If you throw it into the fire, that’s direct personal liability according to everyone, Rashi too would agree. So obviously we’re talking here about not having thrown it directly into the fire; I bent it into the path that the fire reaches in an ordinary wind. But still, since I’m taking it there, there is definitely room to see me as the one who kindled it. That’s your problem—why did you bend it? And then it comes out that if I bent it, I’m the one who has to pay, and then I concealed it and exempted myself from paying. Now the question is whether you can say such a thing. It’s not trivial, right? Meaning, on the face of it it seems not. What—would I get the exemption for concealed property in a case where I bend the item to a place the fire is about to reach at any moment, and I conceal it, and I save payment not from the one who lit the fire, but from myself? I’m the one who would have had to pay had it not been concealed, and now I concealed it and thereby exempted myself.

[Speaker H] Why did he exempt himself through concealed property? The one bending it is, seemingly, direct personal damage.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s why I said: he’s not bending it into the fire. He’s bending it to a place the fire is supposed to reach, because if he were bending it into the fire, that would be direct personal damage—there’d be nothing to discuss at all. And if it’s direct personal damage, then concealed property also wouldn’t exempt him. So obviously we’re not talking about such a situation. We’re talking about a situation where you bend the grain to the side, to a place the fire is about to reach in an ordinary wind. I’m only claiming that in such a situation, before we even get to concealed or not concealed, the one considered the fire-setter here is not the one who lit the fire, but the one who bent it.

[Speaker E] And if he’s the fire-setter, then it should be his arrows; if it’s enough for him to be called the fire-setter, then it should also count as his arrows.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and now really—that’s exactly what I’m asking. Meaning, if I really am the one who ignited it, then first, the question is whether this is his arrows or his property, because practically we rule like Rabbi Yohanan that one’s fire is due to his arrows, and second, even if it’s his property, does the exemption for concealed property apply to me? What I want to claim is that if I bent the grain toward that place and the fire is advancing in an ordinary wind, then maybe there’s room to view me not as a person directly causing damage but as “his fire due to his property.” For example, if I bent it there and still had some time to save it but didn’t, or something like that. After all, I could have bent it back. I didn’t bend it back. So yes—but here of course no time is really needed; you don’t need some forced interpretation saying the case is one where he had time to fence it in and didn’t, because he doesn’t need to fence anything in, he only needs to stop bending it, that’s all. Okay? So de facto this is a situation where I had the possibility to protect it. So we can see me as the one who set the fire, but the fire is due to his property, not due to his arrows. Because after all, at the moment I bent it, there still wasn’t any fire there; the fire advanced in an ordinary wind; I could have saved it, and from that point on I simply didn’t let go. That’s all. Or I left it bent; it could even be that after bending it I walked away and it remained bent there. Okay? So basically you can say this counts as his property. Now I also concealed it, and with “his fire due to his property” there is an exemption for concealed property according to most of the medieval authorities—not Maimonides, okay? So with “his fire due to his property” there’s an exemption for concealed property. Now the question is whether it makes sense to talk about the exemption for concealed property in a situation like this, where the person is both the one who set the fire and the one who concealed it. This takes us back a bit to the question about the exemption for concealed property that I mentioned in the first class. If the exemption for concealed property is an exemption based on compulsion, then you can’t say such a thing. But if the exemption for concealed property is some kind of scriptural decree—I don’t know, something the Torah exempted for one reason or another and I don’t know exactly what it is—then here maybe there is room to say that yes, it looks like some kind of legal maneuver, but we’ve already encountered situations like that. I’ll remind you of that person who threw a vessel from the top of a roof and then ran down quickly and received it with a sword—or broke it a moment earlier—where later authorities discuss this; it’s not clear what the law is in such a case, but later authorities discuss that maybe there too he would be exempt. Or the case of inciting, where it’s stated explicitly, that one who incites his own dog against another person’s animal is exempt just like one who incites another person’s dog—which is a crazy absurdity. Yes: if I merely fail to guard my dog and it goes out and causes damage, I’m liable; if I actively incited it, I’m exempt. So I suggested an explanation for that at the beginning of the semester. In any case, we do find things like this, where when an act is carried out through the involvement of two people, both are exempt, so even when the same person plays both roles, it could be that he’s still exempt. Again, of course, if the exemption is one of compulsion then I don’t think this works. But with the exemption for concealed property, I don’t know if it’s compulsion, and then maybe you really can say such a thing. And if so, then look: this actually resolves everything, because it means that the person—when it says that he bent another person’s grain before an animal or before a fire—Rava… Rav Ashi says yes indeed, it doesn’t matter, it’s talking about someone who bent another person’s grain, only he adds that in order for it to become indirect causation—because after all this is direct damage—so to make it indirect causation he gives a forced interpretation that he covered it. That’s all. And once he covered it, whom did he exempt? Not the one who lit the fire—he exempted himself. He exempted himself. But with the exemption for concealed property, if it’s not an exemption of compulsion, it may be that such a person can exempt himself. This counts as his property causing damage, because he bent it and could have protected it, and property causing damage has an exemption for concealed property even if I myself conceal the thing. The Talmud says there are various distinctions; the Talmud says that things that are ordinarily concealed in a stack don’t have such an exemption. Things that are ordinarily concealed. That smells a little like a consideration of compulsion, because if people ordinarily conceal such things in a stack, you can’t say you never imagined there were such things there. Again I’m saying, according to what I’m saying here, we need to say that the exemption is not an exemption of compulsion—and that really seems to be the straightforward sense of the passages, although I’m saying it’s not simple, but that’s what the straightforward sense of the passages seems to indicate—and then you have to say that regarding things that are not ordinarily found there, sorry, things that are ordinarily concealed there, they simply are not considered concealed. In terms of the definition of “concealed” in this scriptural decree that exempts one who damages by fire from concealed property, things that are ordinarily there are not called concealed. A concealed item, by definition, is only something found in a place that is not its natural place. Okay? But something that is normally found in that place we don’t regard as concealed—and not because of a consideration of compulsion, but because of the very definition of what counts as concealed, and so on. There are still a few more twists we’d have to make here, but for now we haven’t yet entered the question.

[Speaker E] Here the grain itself is concealed, no? What? Here they’re discussing that the grain itself is defined as if it were concealed. Okay. But that’s seemingly where it belongs, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? Concealed property is always there; the question is whether it is ordinarily found there. But here it’s grain.

[Speaker E] What? It’s grain. The field is there and that’s called concealed? Is he exempt for the grain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I see a sheet and I light a fire there, do I know there’s grain underneath it? I don’t know.

[Speaker E] Not a sheet, but he covered the grain; here it says he basically made it concealed by means of the grain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By means of a sheet? Not with grain. He covered the grain by means of something above it. So I’m saying: what I only wanted to say is that seemingly, if there’s an exemption regarding things that are not ordinarily found there, then here you can’t say these are things not ordinarily found there, because I knew it was there—I myself put it there. The claim is that “things not ordinarily found there” is not because I didn’t know or because he should not have imagined it, but because it is not defined as concealed. That’s what you have to say if I want to exempt the very person who concealed the items. It’s a big novelty, but I think in light of these difficulties in Rav Ashi, it saves the forced interpretation, it explains how this fits with the wording of the statement about one who bends another person’s grain, and maybe it can be said—I don’t know. All right, let’s stop for a three- or four-minute break and come back. Bring me—

[Speaker I] the red one. Bring me this red one.

[Speaker J] Come here. Whose mother? Tell me. Maybe I’ll take the five. Bring me the red one. It’s finished. Grandma. It’s finished. Grandma. Yes. One second. Yes. We brought it.

[Speaker I] Grandma, it’s finished. Grandma. Grandma. Pinchas. Yes.

[Speaker J] Who wants to come in here? Come, Chiki. Come, Chiki. Come. Come here. Who wants to come in? Come, Chiki. Come, Chiki. Come. Come here. Who wants to come in? Sabbath peace to everyone, the portion of Tazria-Metzora. This year the portions are combined. Tazria deals with matters of the woman who gave birth and the metzora, and Metzora continues the matters of the metzora and his purification. It’s well known what our Sages said: metzora—one who brings forth an evil name. The matter of tzara’at is a punishment for malicious speech. But let’s reflect for a moment on the process. The Torah says: “When a person has on the skin of his flesh a swelling, a scab, or a bright spot.” The priest sees, the priest declares impure, and the priest declares pure. Why specifically the priest? After all, the priest is a man of kindness. Aaron the priest loved peace and pursued peace. Why is he specifically the one who must rule “impure”? The answer is that specifically someone who is full of love and kindness can see the affliction in another not out of arrogance, but out of a desire to help him become purified.

[Speaker I] When the metzora goes outside the camp—“he shall dwell alone”—he receives time to reflect.

[Speaker J] He understands that his speech separated between people, and therefore now he is separated from society in order to repair that power. The great correction is to turn one who brings forth an evil name into speech of holiness, speech that builds worlds.

[Speaker I] May it be God’s will

[Speaker J] that we merit to guard our speech and use the power of speech only for good, for blessing, and for peace. Sabbath peace.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here in the Shulchan Arukh, where he brings the law of Rav Ashi: “One who saw a fire approaching another person’s grain and went and covered the grain, even though he caused him a loss because he made it concealed, he is exempt in human law and liable in the law of Heaven.” It’s pretty clear he’s not talking about bending and covering, right? There was a fire approaching and he only covered it. So here it looks like it’s only covering without bending. In such a case, you really do need to understand that obviously, according to the Shulchan Arukh—which rules the distinction between “his arrows are spent” and “his arrows are not spent”—you have to say the case is one of “his arrows are spent.” There was a fire approaching, his arrows are spent, the partition fell for some reason, he should have fenced it in and didn’t, and then the second person came and concealed it. None of that appears in the Shulchan Arukh, but it doesn’t appear because he already explained that concealed property applies only where his arrows are spent, so there’s no need to repeat it everywhere. Also in Maimonides, where he brings this matter—you remember Maimonides brings both forced interpretations, and he apparently seems to hold that there is no dispute between them, though I said it may be that Rav Ashi disagrees with Mar, but Mar does not disagree with Rav Ashi. In any case, he writes: “One who bends another person’s grain before a fire until it catches; if the fire reaches it only through an unusual wind, he is exempt in human law and liable in the law of Heaven.” That is Mar’s statement. “And one who conceals another person’s grain in earth or straw, and a fire passed and consumed it—the one who concealed it is exempt in human law and liable in the law of Heaven, because the one who lit the fire is exempt for concealed property.” Meaning, here it is clear that the liable party whom we saved was the fire-setter, not the one who bent it. In other words, we’re talking about a person who covered it without bending. Now in Maimonides himself there’s really no problem, because for Maimonides there is no need for “his arrows are spent” in order to have the exemption for concealed property. After all, here he’s talking about the exemption for concealed property, but according to Maimonides the exemption for concealed property exists whether his arrows are spent or not spent. So the person doesn’t need to bend the grain, because the whole reason he needed to bend the grain was that before the bending the grain wouldn’t have burned, and therefore this is called “his arrows are spent.” That’s the reason there is an exemption for concealed property here. But according to Maimonides you don’t need “his arrows are spent” in order to have the exemption for concealed property. So from Maimonides’ perspective, you don’t need to say he bent it. The big question still remains how Maimonides read the Talmud here—meaning, how Maimonides read Rav Ashi’s passage. So of course one could say that from Rav Ashi’s own perspective there’s no problem in the law, because Maimonides claims there is an exemption for concealed property even without “his arrows are spent”; no forced interpretations are needed, nothing. But the question still remains how this fits the wording of the statement, which says “one who bends another person’s grain before the fire.” How does Rav Ashi deal with that bending? That really isn’t clear, I don’t know. I don’t know how, because in Maimonides himself, precisely because Maimonides doesn’t need the bending substantively, there’s no reason to assume Rav Ashi also speaks about bending; but if he’s not speaking about bending too, then the wording is difficult. The wording of the statement says “one who bends.” And according to Rav Ashi, he didn’t bend it. So that’s really very difficult, and especially in Maimonides it’s even more difficult, because if Maimonides says Rav Ashi doesn’t disagree with Mar, and nevertheless he gives some implausible forced interpretation, then why? If you don’t disagree with Mar, why resort to an implausible forced interpretation? So I said that Rav Ashi may indeed disagree with Mar, but Mar accepts Rav Ashi. And then Maimonides rules like Mar, and therefore he brings these two laws, but he doesn’t bring Rav Ashi. Except that if that is really the case, then it could be that Rav Ashi himself actually holds that “one who bends” means he bent it. Maimonides doesn’t bring that because practically, in Jewish law, there is no need. But he does bring the fundamental law of Rav Ashi, with which Mar also agrees: that if a person bends something and saves the fire-setter from payment, then he is liable as indirect causation. And Maimonides brings the underlying law that emerges from Rav Ashi’s words; he doesn’t bring Rav Ashi himself because he doesn’t rule like him in practical Jewish law. So if you ask me how Rav Ashi explained it—he explained it as a person who bent it and concealed it. But Maimonides says Rav Ashi is not practical Jewish law, because there’s no need to bend it, okay? Even without “his arrows are spent,” concealed property will be exempt. And Rav Ashi thought like… the passage in the second chapter, that you need “spent arrows of fire” to exempt for concealed property. Maimonides rules that you don’t need that—or I don’t know if it’s a passage in the second chapter, depending on whether one learns it the way I presented it or not the way I presented it. But Rav Ashi learned like the other medieval authorities in the second chapter, that there must be “spent arrows of fire” in order to exempt for concealed property. Therefore Rav Ashi explained that he bent the grain before the fire. And in that sense Rav Ashi gives a reasonable forced interpretation to the statement, because there it says “one who bends your fellow’s grain before the fire.” And that’s right: he really is talking about someone who bent it—bent it and concealed it. That is what Rav Ashi said. Okay, so all of that is Rav Ashi. But when Maimonides brings the practical law, he brings Mar’s words, not Rav Ashi’s. And Mar agrees in principle to Rav Ashi’s law, that if you make something concealed, then you exempt the other person from payment, and therefore you are effectively causing damage through indirect causation for which one is liable in the law of Heaven—that law is correct, even according to Mar. It’s not the forced interpretation of the statement, but the law itself is true; that’s what Maimonides brings. And that law is learned from the Talmud. It doesn’t matter that Rav Ashi is talking about someone who also bent it; Maimonides doesn’t bring Rav Ashi because he doesn’t rule like him in practice. But from the Talmud itself the law does emerge that if one person lit a fire and another came and concealed the grain, then the second person is liable in the law of Heaven because he caused damage through indirect causation. That law emerges from the Talmud and it is indeed a correct law. Therefore Maimonides brings it. That doesn’t mean he interpreted Rav Ashi that way. Okay? Rav Ashi himself may well be speaking of a case where he also bent it. Okay, so that’s our passage in light of how the Talmud in the second chapter is understood. But basically, notice that all along we have two conceptions regarding damage by fire. The conception of Maimonides, who says that fire is always property causing damage, except that one is liable for the four additional categories; and the conception of most of the medieval authorities—by the way, some also read Maimonides that way, but Maimonides himself very much does not sound like that—and the conception of the other medieval authorities, who say that it is only in the case of “spent arrows of fire” that it is property causing damage, exempt for concealed property and also exempt for the four additional categories; and if it is not “spent arrows of fire,” then it is a person directly causing damage, liable for concealed property and liable for the four additional categories. It is direct personal damage in every respect. Now it seems that these two conceptions also find expression—we saw how these two conceptions learn our passage too, Rav Ashi and his dispute with Mar. And now we will see the expression of these conceptions with regard to a murderer by means of fire. I said earlier that this is really a practical implication. If you understand that it is literally like an arrow—the fire is literally like an arrow—then someone who shoots an arrow and kills another person is certainly liable; he is considered a murderer. So also one who murders another person by means of fire is considered a murderer, because it’s the same thing. According to Maimonides it is very, very likely that this is not the same thing. Because Maimonides says this is property causing damage: liable for the four additional categories, but there is an exemption for concealed property. So it’s likely that in the laws of murder we won’t view him quite as a direct murderer. Murder by indirect causation or something like that. So in the Talmud itself, on page 22, in the Talmud in the second chapter, in the course of the discussion the Talmud brings the following: “Come and hear: one who sets fire to a stack, and there was a bound kid in it and a slave near it, and he was burned with it—he is liable.” Yes, there was a kid there tied to the stack, unable to flee, and a slave not tied. The slave could flee. So if the slave and the kid were burned, I have to pay for the kid. Why? Because I burned the kid, so I damaged the kid, and I don’t have “he incurs the greater penalty” because I’m not liable to death for the slave, since the slave could have fled. If he didn’t flee, he burned himself, I didn’t burn him. So since I’m not liable for the slave, there is no “he incurs the greater penalty.” If the slave was bound and the kid was near it—what happens in the reverse case, where the slave was bound and the kid was near? Exempt for the kid. Why exempt for the kid? Because the slave was bound, so for the slave you are liable to death because you are a murderer, and therefore you have “he incurs the greater penalty” regarding the kid. The Talmud says: granted, according to the one who says “his fire is due to his arrows”—yes, this is brought in the framework of the inquiry between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish—so now the Talmud says: according to Rabbi Yohanan I can understand it. Rabbi Yohanan says “his fire is due to his arrows,” and that is why he is exempt. Why? Because if you say “his fire is due to his arrows,” then when you burned the slave you are liable to death because you are a direct murderer. So since that is so, you have “he incurs the greater penalty” for the kid. But according to the one who says “his fire is due to his property”—according to Reish Lakish, then even for the bound slave you are not liable to death, because after all fire is his property, not his arrows. So you are not a direct murderer; if so, you are not liable to death. It’s your property that killed the slave. It’s not that you killed him directly, and you are not a murderer. Would it really be so that he is not liable? Reish Lakish could say to you: what are we dealing with here? A case where he ignited the slave’s actual body. If a person takes the slave’s body and catches fire to it, even Reish Lakish agrees that that is direct damage. Remember? We talked about the case of bending the grain—one who bends it into the fire is directly causing damage. There is no discussion about that, neither according to Reish Lakish nor according to Rabbi Yohanan. So here too: one who catches the fire onto the body of the thing is obviously directly causing damage. We’re talking about someone who lit a fire, and the fire went in an ordinary wind and came to cause damage. So Reish Lakish gives a forced interpretation that it’s talking about a case where he ignited the slave’s body, in order to establish “he incurs the greater penalty,” because then he really is liable to death and there is “he incurs the greater penalty” for the kid. If so, what is the novelty? That’s obvious. It is necessary only in a case where the kid belonged to one person and the slave to another. You might have thought that if the kid belongs to one person and the slave to another, there would not be “he incurs the greater penalty,” because the property is for one and the death penalty is for another. It therefore teaches us that even when the property belongs to one and the death penalty relates to another, there is still “he incurs the greater penalty.” So the novelty is in the laws of “he incurs the greater penalty,” but that doesn’t concern us. What do we see here? Seemingly, we see here that the logic of “his fire is due to his arrows” is completely “due to his arrows.” Even regarding murder, you are considered a direct murderer, right? Otherwise what is the Talmud discussing here? The Talmud says: according to Rabbi Yohanan I understand. Why? Because Rabbi Yohanan holds “his fire is due to his arrows.” And then what? Then obviously you are liable to death for the slave and therefore “he incurs the greater penalty” for the kid. So we see that according to Rabbi Yohanan, when he says “his fire is due to his arrows,” that applies also regarding murder. “His fire is due to his arrows” completely—against Maimonides. Right? Maimonides says this is property causing damage, only he is liable for the four additional categories.

[Speaker H] Wait, but that Talmudic discussion is before the conclusion where they distinguish according to Rabbi Yohanan between spent and unspent arrows, so you can’t say this is against Maimonides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right, I completely agree. But I’m saying: the medieval authorities really do prove from this Talmudic discussion—Tosafot in several places, and other medieval authorities too—that “his fire is due to his arrows” is said even regarding murder. Okay? And therefore the claim is that “his fire is due to his arrows” means literally an arrow. It is direct personal damage. It is literally the person’s force. And since that is so, then regarding murder too he is liable to death, and then it’s pretty obvious that he would also be liable for the four additional categories and also liable for concealed property. Meaning, what difference is there? It is literally like his arrows. With an arrow too you’re not exempt for concealed property when you damage something with an arrow, right? So Doron says: right, but that doesn’t pose a difficulty for Maimonides. Why doesn’t it pose a difficulty for Maimonides? Because this is the earlier stage in the Talmud, when the Talmud still made a distinction between spent and unspent arrows. In the Talmud’s conclusion, it retreats from that whole story. And now the Talmud says: what do you mean? “His fire is due to his arrows” is not entirely his arrows; it’s partly his property and partly his arrows, the way Maimonides reads the Talmud. What I said earlier: that the meaning is “his fire is due to his property,” only he is liable for the four additional categories. But then we still need to understand: it’s still not clear. After all, here we basically have that statement about one who lights the stack. Maimonides has to explain that in any case. The Talmud’s answer—that he ignited the slave’s body—or the whole give-and-take of the Talmud, I can understand as applying only in the initial assumption. And that was dropped in the conclusion. But I’m not talking about the give-and-take; I’m talking about the statement itself, about the law itself. Why in the law itself is there “he incurs the greater penalty” for the kid if I kill the slave by fire? Isn’t that direct proof against Maimonides? The give-and-take of the Talmud—I accept what Doron said, because that is only at that stage, and later they retreat from it. In the conclusion they retreat from it. But the law itself remains standing. They bring a given law here. And that is against Maimonides. Indeed Tosafot in Sanhedrin—the Talmud there in Sanhedrin 76—there the Talmud distinguishes between constriction and indirect causation. Rava said: “If he bound him and he died of hunger, he is exempt.” Yes, someone bound another person and the person died of hunger. So the one who bound him is exempt. And Rava said: “If he bound him in the sun and he died, in the cold and he died, he is liable. If the sun was yet to come, if the cold was yet to come, he is exempt.” Meaning, if I bind him in a place that is hot or in a place that is cold, and because of the heat or cold the person dies, then I am liable. But if I bind him in a place where the sun is not yet there, it is merely supposed to arrive, or the cold is supposed to arrive there, then I am exempt; that is called constriction. Sorry, that is not called constriction; that is called indirect causation. If he bound him in the sun and he died, in the cold and he died—that is constriction. Okay? Or one who does not let a person get out to lift his head out of the water or something like that. That is called constriction and he is liable. But this is indirect causation and he is exempt. And if he bound him and he died of hunger, that too is indirect causation and he is exempt. And Rava said: “If he bound him before a lion, he is exempt; before mosquitoes, he is liable.” Rav Ashi said, even before—never mind, there are all sorts of things there that we won’t get into. By the way, as an aside—I can’t resist here—all these strange distinctions obviously have no moral basis. Right? On the moral level, you are a murderer in every respect. What difference does it make whether you did it like this or like that? You did an act that in a clear and deterministic way will bring about a person’s death intentionally, only you did it in such-and-such a way. So what? I think this is one of the indications—and this could be the subject of long lectures—but this is one of the indications, in my opinion, that even prohibitions in Jewish law that look like moral prohibitions are not really moral commands; they are halakhic commands. When I say “You shall not murder,” then “You shall not murder” is not there because it is immoral to murder. It was immoral to murder even before “You shall not murder” was stated. The Holy One, blessed be He, had complaints against Cain long before they heard the command “You shall not murder.” “You shall not murder” comes to say that there is also a religious problem in murder, not only a moral problem. A moral problem there certainly is—that is obvious from reason. Beyond that, “You shall not murder” says that there is also a religious problem here: you have also transgressed against Me. All the definitions brought here are distinctions within the religious problem. The religious problem exists in full when you constrict or murder directly. When you do it through indirect causation, the moral problem exists in full force. It’s the same thing. I see absolutely no moral difference between murder through indirect causation and murder through constriction. But the difference between them is a halakhic difference. And the halakhic difference contains some formal element. When you act directly, there is some deeper religious problem than if you merely cause the person to die. In the consequential sense, in the moral sense, you performed an act from which in the end the person dies, intentionally and clearly, so morally I see no difference at all.

[Speaker G] Yes, but it has to be emphasized that even if Jewish law is something else, it’s obvious that it is founded on the moral problem, right? Otherwise it’s not that Jewish law just happened to put some issue here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not by accident. This immoral act also contradicts religious principles, not only moral principles.

[Speaker G] No, but it contradicts religious principles because it contradicts moral principles. It’s not—it’s not accidental. Not because. Those two things—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] apparently come from some third thing.

[Speaker G] I have no problem if you want to say that, but then that’s no longer—that’s no longer Jewish law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. If one were because of the other, then I wouldn’t expect a difference between constriction and indirect causation.

[Speaker G] There is a difference; the difference is simply because Jewish law is a formal system. It has to be formulated in terms of rules, and then, inevitably—there’s nothing to do about it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then make a rule that indirect causation is also liable. What’s the problem?

[Speaker G] You can’t, but there will always be holes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. No, no holes at all. I don’t accept that.

[Speaker G] Many people said that with indirect causation you can’t always assign blame.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no problem at all. Everything defined as indirect causation—Jewish law spends a lot of time characterizing the concept of indirect causation. We ourselves are dealing with this very passage. So the Talmud has no problem characterizing the concept of indirect causation. And you could just as well have said that indirect causation in murder is liable. The concept of indirect causation is well defined. Jewish law says many things about indirect causation. If the concept were not defined, Jewish law should not have referred to it.

[Speaker G] I didn’t say the concept is not defined. I said that when you formulate a system of rules, you are also bound by formal principles. There’s nothing you can do.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You see the same

[Speaker G] thing in the laws of the Sabbath and in many other areas.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then set it that indirect causation should also be liable. Formal.

[Speaker G] But you can’t. I have a reason, I have other considerations. Because if indirect causation were liable, for example in the laws of the Sabbath that would create a problem for me. Of course you can’t necessarily distinguish between areas of law—what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What considerations?

[Speaker G] What? I didn’t understand, what? In the laws of the Sabbath, indirect causation should not be liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? What consideration?

[Speaker G] Because it is not intentional constructive labor. Well, actually regarding the laws of the Sabbath, that was just an example, never mind. My claim is that in every system—and by the way you can find such things in law too—in every legal system there is room for formal considerations.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true, not true. I said: you have to point me to a concrete consideration as to why not do it here, or that the system is simpler this way, or more efficient for some reason. None of that applies here. It’s not simpler, it’s not more efficient, there is absolutely no problem saying that indirect causation is liable. We are dealing with characterization; there are many passages devoted to clarifying the concept of indirect causation. So there’s no problem—you’ve already done that clarification, so the results of that clarification should also be relevant to the prohibition of murder. What’s the problem?

[Speaker G] It’s very strange to assume that quite by accident murder is exactly both a crime against morality and against religious principles—just by chance.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not assuming that. It really is strange, and I’m not assuming it. I said earlier that I’m not assuming it.

[Speaker G] Rather that there is a third factor that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, and it finds expression in the moral context one way and in the religious context another way. But the fact that there are differences in definitions between the religious context and the moral context means that there nevertheless is a difference—that the prohibition “You shall not murder” is not simply the expression of Torah morality. No, it is not the expression of Torah morality.

[Speaker G] In my view the difference is that there is no system of moral rules parallel to Jewish law. If there were “laws of morality,” for example ethics, there too you would find endless discussions about the question of what difference in severity there is between murdering by omission and by action. Exactly the kind of discussions that really resemble Jewish law. How did that happen? Suddenly everyone understands that there is no relevance conceptually.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, murder by omission is something completely different.

[Speaker G] It has no relevance conceptually.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s murder by action, not by omission.

[Speaker G] No, I’m saying: the difference between murder by action and by omission, on the face of it, seemingly has no relevance whatsoever. The thought that there is a difference—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. There is also a moral difference between action and omission. If a person is in a river and I don’t save him, that is different from if I drown him. What do you mean? Morally too it is different. Why shouldn’t it be different?

[Speaker G] Unless there are other circumstances there, like it would have been easier for you to refrain, or something like that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, not because it’s easier for me. It’s that I didn’t save him—those are two different things. But here I’m talking about two different things. Why?

[Speaker G] That’s a completely formal distinction. I’m surprised.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not at all. Not at all. A clear moral difference. A clear moral difference. What do you mean? Ask people who have nothing to do with Jewish law at all, and they too will tell you there is a difference.

[Speaker G] Right, that’s what I’m saying. So I’m asking why. Because when you try to formulate rules of action, rules of ethics, they say there is a difference.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not legal—moral. They say there is a difference.

[Speaker G] Because people confuse morality with ethics. They understand there is a difference in what is demanded of a person, but the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the moral relevance of it they can’t… No, but even people who don’t get confused—jurists—they too will tell you there is a moral difference between those two things.

[Speaker G] Then they’re wrong.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, okay. All right, I was only making an observation; this really isn’t our topic. But I think these cases sharpen this point a lot. In any case, Tosafot there writes as follows: “If the sun is yet to come”—the Merciful One made constriction liable only in a place where the damage has already begun. Yes, if the sun is already in that place and I tie the person in that same place—or bring him to the place tied and the sun is already there—it’s like putting him into the fire. But if I place him there and now the sun will come, that’s something else. So only in a place where the damage has already begun is it called constriction. But if the sun is not yet there and is about to come there, the damage has not yet begun, that is indirect causation, not constriction, and therefore here he is exempt. “However, if he bound him inside and brought him to a place where the sun is yet to come or the cold is yet to come, it appears that he is liable according to the one who says ‘his fire is due to his arrows,’ for regarding death too we hold one liable through ‘his fire is due to his arrows,’ as is proven in ‘How is damage by foot?’” Now here the comparison is one worth a lot of discussion. He claims that if I bind the person and bring him to a place where the sun is yet to come, then I am liable, because it is like “his fire is due to his arrows.” And everything in our case is when he was already there and I merely bound him and then the sun arrived. Do you understand the difference? Meaning: there is a case where the sun is already there. If I bind him while the sun is already there, I am liable; that is called constriction. Okay? If I bind him there—he is there, I bind him there, the sun—

[Speaker H] hasn’t arrived yet; the sun is about to rise.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that is called indirect causation, because the damage has not yet begun. That distinction appears in the Talmud itself. In the Mishnah, basically. Okay? Tosafot says there is a third case. What happens if I take a person, tie him up, bring him to another place where the sun is yet to come, and then the sun comes? Tosafot says: that is liable. Why?

[Speaker H] What’s the difference between that and the second case?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, what’s the difference between that and the second case? So he claims that in the second case I didn’t bring him there; he was there, and I merely didn’t let him flee. In a situation like that, where I merely did not let him flee and the sun is not yet there, only about to come, that is exempt. But if I brought him there while bound, then I placed him in a location where the sun is yet to come; that is called a direct act and I’m liable. It’s not just not letting him flee, because he himself was not there at all—I brought him there. I’m really liable not because I tied him, but because I brought him there; it’s just that if I hadn’t tied him, he would have fled. Once I tied him he cannot flee, and therefore bringing him there is effective. But bottom line, I’m liable because I brought him there.

[Speaker H] So tying is not a direct act? The tying itself is not a direct act, only bringing him there is?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This is not an act of murder, because it’s an act of failure to save. It’s an act that doesn’t allow him to be saved; it’s not the act that killed him. What killed him was the sun. He just claims there’s no difference between bringing the object to the fire and bringing the fire to the object. And when I take a person to a place where the sun is eventually going to come, that’s like putting him in the fire, even though the fire isn’t there yet when I place him there. But since I brought him to that place, then even if the sun is still not there, it’s considered that I put him into the fire, because on his own he never would have gone there at all, he never would have been there at all. So there, even if the sun is eventually going to come, I’m liable. It reminds us a bit, by the way, of our discussions about the one who bends it over, right? When he bent the standing grain toward the place where the fire was going to reach in a normal wind, right? My claim was that in such a case I actually can hold the one who bent it liable. I think from here you really see that nicely. Okay? Now this is the beginning of Tosafot. What did Tosafot learn here? One way or another, these are already distinctions that matter less for us. But what did Tosafot learn? Tosafot really understood that in our passage, his fire is considered like his arrows also with regard to murder. You’re liable to death if you murder someone by fire. He compares it to that case, and you can argue whether it’s similar or not similar. But as far as his assumption regarding murder by fire, it’s clear what he’s saying. He learns from our passage that someone who murders by means of fire is a murderer. From where in the passage? From the bound goat and the bound slave, what we just saw of course. He learns it from there, yes, that’s clear. At the end of Tosafot, that same Tosafot: “It can also be explained that in all these cases where the sun is eventually going to come, or the cold is eventually going to come, or the lion is eventually going to come, or he threw a clod upward and it fell downward, and even if he bound him and brought him there, he is exempt.” Now he says no—even if I bound him and brought him there to a place where the sun is eventually going to come, I’m exempt, because it is comparable to indirect indirect force. “And fire too, if it killed only through a normal wind, he is exempt from death.” When I send out a fire that goes along with a normal wind, I’m exempt from the death penalty, I’m not liable. Contrary to what he said at the beginning. Yes, these are two opinions in Tosafot. The first opinion says that someone who murders by means of fire is liable—fire that goes with a normal wind. Again, not someone who presses the fire directly onto the person himself, because then of course that’s a direct act with his own hands and he is certainly liable. Even Reish Lakish agrees to that. I’m talking about someone who lights a fire, the fire goes with a normal wind, and kills a person. According to the first opinion in Tosafot he is liable; that is murder in every respect. And of course Tosafot there apparently assumes that fire really is literally like an arrow, like the medieval authorities, just not Maimonides, and at least not where his arrows have ceased. Okay? The second opinion in Tosafot says no: if I murdered by means of a fire that went with a normal wind, I’m exempt, but with an arrow I’m certainly liable; Tosafot agrees to that too. What’s the difference? Because here it is comparable to indirect indirect force, “for with regard to monetary damages he is liable for full damages, and it is not comparable to half-damages for pebbles,” and so on, “even though it is indirect indirect force, because this fire of his is also liable on account of his property, as is proven in the chapter ‘How the Foot Causes Damage,’ that one who holds ‘because of his arrows’ also holds ‘because of his property.’” So what is Tosafot saying here? Tosafot is saying here that for the murder he is exempt. Ah—but in our passage we see that with regard to damages he is liable? Yes, he is liable because one who holds ‘because of his arrows’ also holds ‘because of his property.’ I don’t understand—if he also holds ‘because of his property,’ then that means it’s his damaging property, so you’re back to Reish Lakish? But he’s speaking within Rabbi Yohanan, and Jewish law follows Rabbi Yohanan. So according to Rabbi Yohanan there is also the category of his property, but here this isn’t his property, here it’s his arrows. Apparently we’re not talking about where his arrows have ceased, right? Here this is damage done by an arrow. So how does it help me that Rabbi Yohanan also has damage by his property in order to exempt him from death? You can’t read this Tosafot. What does he want? This is unequivocally the Maimonides that I quoted to you earlier. This Tosafot is exactly Maimonides’ position. He reads the Talmud’s conclusion—that one who holds ‘because of his arrows’ also holds ‘because of his property’—not as meaning that where his arrows have ceased, it’s his property, and where his arrows have not ceased, it’s his arrows. Rather, ‘his fire is considered like his arrows’ does not mean that this is not damaging property. It is damaging property that is liable for the four additional categories. That is what is meant by ‘he also holds because of his property.’ And therefore, Tosafot says, if that is so, with regard to murder he certainly would not be liable, because it is not a person who murdered; it is property that murdered. Here it says explicitly what I quoted from Maimonides earlier. Otherwise you can’t read this Tosafot. Okay, by the way, the Ran there in Sanhedrin also holds like Tosafot, like the second opinion in Tosafot. Usually people bring this as a dispute between Tosafot and the Ran, but it’s really two opinions in Tosafot itself. Okay, I think we’ll stop here. As for one more comment indeed: after all, I asked about Maimonides and the second opinion in Tosafot and the Ran—all those who learned the passage in chapter two in such a way that in the final analysis fire is not really a person who causes damage—so why, when he burns a bound slave, does that exempt him from paying for the goat under the principle of receiving the greater punishment? So the Rabbi of Brisk wants to argue that there is the school of Hezekiah, according to which even one who is liable to death unintentionally is also exempt from the monetary obligation. Say I killed someone unintentionally—I’m not liable to death for that. But still, if I have a parallel monetary obligation, I’m exempt from it. So the Rabbi of Brisk says: that exemption is not an exemption of receiving the greater punishment. Because the exemption of receiving the greater punishment is when you have two punishments, and you receive the more severe one. This is a different exemption. It basically says that someone who killed a person is not made to pay in such a situation. Not because of the punishment he is liable for, but because an act of killing a person does not generate, cannot generate, a payment obligation as well. Maybe you can even explain this in the sense that we don’t want to create a cheapening of human life. If you performed some act of killing a person, we are not willing to introduce any additional parameter into that picture. That is supposed to fill the whole screen. You killed a person, period. The description ends there. It’s like someone comes to me and I accuse him of murder, and besides that on the way he also stepped on an ant, so I wag my finger at him. Fine, that cheapens the murder. Once you murdered, I’m not willing to mention anything alongside it. And therefore you also won’t be obligated to pay, not because you are liable to the death penalty. It’s not a comparison between punishments where you have to take the more severe punishment, but an attempt to prevent any cheapening of an act of murder, of human life. Now if that’s so, says the Rabbi of Brisk, here after all he killed a slave, right? By means of fire. He killed a slave. And the fire is considered because of his property, and it’s not really an arrow, so you’re exempt from death. But there is still the principle of receiving the greater punishment with regard to the goat. That is the explanation according to Maimonides. And the whole discussion in the Talmud, where the Talmud said that this works out well according to Rabbi Yohanan and is difficult according to Reish Lakish—that is all in the initial assumption. In the conclusion you don’t need to get there. In the conclusion, Rabbi Yohanan too explains it not because it is receiving the greater punishment, but because of the second principle regarding those liable to death unintentionally. Okay? Good, we’ll stop here. That’s it. Thank you very much. Enjoy the break, good luck on the exams for whoever has them, and we’ll see each other next semester, whoever is registered—I don’t know who. In any case, if we don’t meet over the years, then please update me, don’t forget. Okay? Keep me updated on all developments, we want to know where things stand.

[Speaker G] What are we learning next semester?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Continuing—I’m continuing the chapter.

[Speaker G] Ah, okay.

[Speaker E] It could be that it won’t work with my schedule, so I’m moving to six o’clock, to Wednesday at six instead. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, thank you very much. Bye-bye.

[Speaker G] Thank you very much.