Receiver Chapter – Lesson 15
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- [1:04:51] The question of hiring false witnesses when a debt exists
- [1:06:38] Is one obligated to pay in the heavenly sense when “the mouth that prohibited” is involved
- [1:09:23] Hiring false witnesses for the benefit of a friend – halakhic implications
- [1:15:30] Nimukei Yosef – the source of the Jewish law on the subject
- [1:20:01] The Rema on hiring false witnesses for oneself
- [1:23:11] The witnesses’ obligation when they deny the falsehood
- [1:26:00] Conclusion – exempt in human court but forbidden because of “distance yourself from falsehood”
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, at the end of the previous semester we were dealing with cases of indirect causation. The baraita that brings four cases of indirect causation, and now we’re at the case of someone who hires false witnesses to testify. In the meantime the group here is a bit small. I don’t know whether the group is small or people just haven’t gotten organized yet. I hope those who join later will feel they missed a little bit. I’m a bit unsure what’s going on here. In any case, I’d appreciate it if whoever can would turn on a camera so I can see you, see who I’m talking to. From the university’s standpoint this is even actually official guidance. Whoever isn’t a student, I’m just asking. But I’d be grateful to anyone who can open it, because I want to see who’s here.
[Speaker B] Rabbi, this is David Zilberstein. I basically only joined this semester,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But
[Speaker B] my computer broke yesterday, and it’s just not really convenient to open the camera through the phone.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, what, is that supposed to change later on?
[Speaker B] Definitely, I don’t intend to be without a computer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If there’s some local issue then fine, but in principle I’d be happy to see the people in front of me like this.
[Speaker B] Yes, definitely, Rabbi, definitely, one hundred percent.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good, so hello Shlomo. I see someone else came in too. Also, if you can turn on a camera I’d appreciate it. Okay, let’s start. We’re basically in the topic of cases of indirect causation, where in all of them one is exempt in human court but liable in the heavenly sense. And the case we reached last time is someone who hires false witnesses to testify, which we still haven’t dealt with. The Talmud on page 56a—I’ll just put it up here so we can sync up. Okay, so at the end of 55b you see, here it goes. It was taught: Rabbi Yehoshua said, there are four things such that one who does them is exempt in human court but liable in the heavenly sense, and these are they: one who breaches a fence before another person’s animal, one who bends another person’s standing grain before a fire. Those are the two things we already saw. And one who hires false witnesses to testify, and one who knows testimony on behalf of another but does not testify for him. We’re now talking about one who hires false witnesses to testify, and in all these cases, one who does them is exempt in human court but liable in the heavenly sense. Rashi already says here, and we also saw this in the previous cases, that what we have here is basically an exemption because this is indirect causation. When you cause damage indirectly, your obligation to pay is only in the heavenly sense and not in human court. I’ll remind those who simply weren’t with us last semester: the Meiri cites Ba’al HaHashlama, who says that when it says here “liable in the heavenly sense,” it means liable to pay only in the heavenly sense. It doesn’t mean merely that it’s forbidden, or not only that it’s forbidden, that there is an element of prohibition; rather we’re talking here about an actual monetary obligation. We saw that there are places where that doesn’t sound right, there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) where it doesn’t sound like they understood it that way, Pnei Yehoshua—we saw this in several places—and others. But that’s how the Meiri learns it, and that will accompany us later too, so that’s why I’m mentioning it. Now the Talmud starts discussing each case separately. So here: “The master said”—yes, here begins the first case. “One who breaches a fence before another person’s animal”—that was the first discussion. After that: “The master said, one who bends another person’s standing grain before a fire”—that was the second discussion we dealt with last semester, whether because of his arrow-force and concealed objects and so on. The third case is our case, and we’re beginning it now here. “The master said: one who hires false witnesses.” What are the circumstances? If a person hired false witnesses to testify that so-and-so owes money. If you say it was for himself—if we’re talking about him hiring false witnesses so that they testify that the defendant owes money to him himself—then he needs to pay back the money, and he would also be liable in human court. Rather, it must be for his fellow. Meaning, the Talmud says it can’t be talking about a case where he hired the false witnesses for his own benefit, because if so then he would in fact have to pay in human court, he would have to return the money he took, he took money that doesn’t belong to him. And since that is so, it’s obvious that the baraita is not talking about that, right? The baraita can’t be talking about such a thing when it says “exempt in human court but liable in the heavenly sense,” because here he is liable in human court. There’s no choice except to establish it by saying that he hired the false witnesses so that they would testify that money is owed to his fellow, not to himself. Okay? So that’s basically the Talmud’s move.
[Speaker C] In a bit we’ll look at that again for a moment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Later, when the Talmud does the “why each case was needed,” it says there are other kinds of cases too. We actually saw this in the classes that opened the topic. Here: “And also one who hires false witnesses.” Why did it need to state “one who hires false witnesses”? You might have said: let us say, “the words of the Rabbi and the words of the student—which does one obey?” and then he shouldn’t even be liable in the heavenly sense. Therefore it teaches us otherwise. Meaning, what’s the novelty in this case, that someone who hires false witnesses to testify has to pay? The novelty could have been that I might have thought he wouldn’t have to pay even in the heavenly sense, not just in human court. Why? Because “the words of the Rabbi and the words of the student—which does one obey?” I hired two witnesses and gave them money so they would give false testimony. They decided to lie. They’re adults with legal and halakhic / of Jewish law responsibility, and if they chose to lie, then why should I have to pay? That’s their transgression, because there is no agency for a transgression, entirely based on that same reasoning of “the words of the Rabbi and the words of the student.” So basically this is considered their transgression, and they should pay whatever needs to be paid. Why obligate me? It teaches us that in the heavenly sense I am liable. Okay? True, not in human court, but yes in the heavenly sense. That’s the Talmud’s move. Let’s now look a little at the details. Basically we’re talking about a person—in the beginning the Talmud says we’re talking about a person who hired the false witnesses to testify for himself, yes, that money is owed to him. Now on that the Talmud says: that can’t be, why? Because for that he is liable even in human court, not only in the heavenly sense. Now here we have to pay close attention. On the face of it, what he is liable for here in human court is not really damages liability, compensation, punishment, or whatever, but rather “your money is in your possession.” Meaning, if I took two false witnesses, hired false witnesses, they testified, so-and-so paid me the money, and then it became clear that these witnesses were liars, that I hired them to lie, then the Talmud says I have to return the money in human court, not in the heavenly sense. Therefore it is obvious that this isn’t the case being discussed. What is the meaning of this obligation that I have to return the money? What I have to return here is not under the law of a damager, and not under punishment or compensation or anything like that. It’s simply: your money is in my possession. I have money belonging to someone else; it isn’t mine; I have to return it. Okay? So the question here is deeper than just: after all, here he’s liable in human court and not in the heavenly sense. His obligation here is not only that it’s an obligation in human court; it’s not really an obligation at all. It’s simply: return his money—it’s his money, not yours. Not that you have to pay. You don’t have to pay anything; just take his money, because his money is with you. That’s much deeper than the discussion whether this is in human court or in the heavenly sense. It’s not an obligation to pay at all, not in human court and not in the heavenly sense; it’s simply “your money is in my possession.” Even in tort law, when we speak about an obligation to pay under damages law, then I have to pay you for damage I caused you. That duty to pay for damage I caused you is a duty to compensate you. You can’t say that I have money of yours in my possession; it’s not a claim of “your money is in my possession.” Notice, though, this isn’t a fine; it’s financial compensation, meaning I legally owe you money, it’s not a punitive payment like a fine. But even in a payment obligation under the law, the definition is still that I owe you payment. And that is my money, only I owe it to you—I borrowed from you, I damaged you, all sorts of things like that. In our case, it’s simply that your money is with me; I have to return it to you, not pay you. It was never mine. I don’t need to pay you that money, because it isn’t mine at all—it’s yours. Okay? Now the Talmud’s question here is not only: wait, how can you say “exempt in human court but liable in the heavenly sense,” if he’s also liable in human court? The question is deeper. It’s not “liable in human court as well,” but simply “your money is in my possession”—give him back his money, that’s all. And that’s stronger. I’m emphasizing this because later we’ll come back to this point. So the question is—and this too is a question we’ll come back to later—how do the witnesses stand in relation to this? In other words, how was it even discovered that these witnesses are liars, that he hired them? And what do the witnesses themselves say? Do the witnesses still insist that they testified truthfully? And what—he admits that he hired them to give false testimony? What exactly is the case here? Meaning, what exactly is the situation? Because perhaps one might have said that he himself admits that he hired them for false testimony, but they themselves say, what are you talking about, the testimony is true testimony. Now here, on the face of it, his words are set against two witnesses. A person cannot be believed to disqualify two witnesses. Therefore, in principle, there might have been room to say that in such a case, if the witnesses stand by their position and still claim that they gave true testimony, then even if he himself claims that this is false testimony, that he hired them to testify falsely, he cannot disqualify the witnesses. So one cannot say that the ruling the court issued, that the defendant should pay the money, is a ruling that becomes void. It does not become void; there are two witnesses here, and those witnesses still have the presumption of being valid, and the money was extracted on the basis of the testimony of two valid witnesses. Then one might perhaps have said that there would be no liability upon him in human court under the law, but perhaps only in the heavenly sense. But that of course cannot be correct. I’m introducing all this because it will come back to us later. It cannot be correct—why? Because once there is an admission by the litigant himself, by the plaintiff himself, then even if the witnesses themselves say that they testified truthfully, they insist and stand by their position that the testimony is true testimony, and what he says—that he hired them to lie—is false, then clearly we do not disqualify the witnesses. That’s obvious; a person cannot disqualify two witnesses with his own mouth. But since he himself admits that the money is not owed to him, then this is an admission by a litigant, and an admission by a litigant, on the legal plane—not in the heavenly sense, but in human court—an admission by a litigant is like a hundred witnesses. And since that is so, he himself admits that they do not owe him the money, so certainly he must return the money in human court, not in the heavenly sense. Therefore this too cannot solve for me what the case is here, what this obligation is. Because in every scenario there has to be liability here in human court; this can’t be the case the baraita is speaking about. This is human-court liability. And an admission by a litigant—it’s true that there is room to wonder exactly how we relate to that admission, because after all, as I said earlier, he cannot nullify two witnesses. There are two witnesses; two witnesses are the strongest evidence; a person cannot disqualify two witnesses. So if you ask the court what the truth is—I don’t know, maybe one could have said that the truth is that there is a debt here, because the witnesses testify and no one disqualified them; you can’t disqualify the witnesses, maybe only through formal refutation, but perhaps you can’t disqualify the witnesses. So what then? You have some admission by a litigant—fine, you want to obligate yourself, obligate yourself. But one cannot say that reality was actually clarified for the court and that there really is no debt here. That would have been the claim, as it were. But then this could seemingly also be tied to the question of how we understand an admission by a litigant. Because you have to understand that precisely about a case like this this saying was stated: “An admission by a litigant is like a hundred witnesses.” What does “like a hundred witnesses” mean? After all, in Jewish law, two are like a hundred, right? A hundred witnesses have no advantage over two. So what is the meaning of this expression that an admission by a litigant is like a hundred witnesses? The meaning of the expression is that an admission by a litigant specifically is in fact stronger than two witnesses. The metaphorical expression is that it is like a hundred witnesses, even though a hundred witnesses themselves are not stronger than two. But we use the expression “an admission by a litigant is like a hundred witnesses” to say that an admission by a litigant is the only thing that can overcome the testimony of two witnesses. When—what’s the case here? Exactly a case like this. Two witnesses come and say that so-and-so owes me money, and I, as it were, go against myself and admit that he does not owe me money. So there is my admission by a litigant, and it goes against two witnesses testifying in my favor. In a case where I admit—yes, I testify to my own detriment, I admit—in such a case I overcome even two witnesses. That is the meaning of “an admission by a litigant is like a hundred witnesses.” That is the meaning of “an admission by a litigant is like a hundred witnesses.” Therefore in our case the admission by a litigant overrides the two witnesses, and therefore legally we rule that there is no debt here, even though we did not disqualify the witnesses; their testimony remains intact in principle, they are truthful witnesses, we have no ability to disqualify them. But if he admits that he hired them to lie, then there is an admission by a litigant that he is not owed the money, and that is legally admissible. It’s very important to understand: there is a famous dispute between Mahari ben Lev and Ketzot HaChoshen in section 34, paragraph 4, in Choshen Mishpat. And there Ketzot HaChoshen brings that Mahari ben Lev claims that an admission by a litigant cannot be a matter of credibility. And the reasoning is really that there is no such thing as something overriding two witnesses. Beyond that, he is also an interested party, so how can it be that he is believed even though he is testifying to his own detriment? But an interested party—the assumption at least of Mahari ben Lev—is that an interested party is disqualified whether for his own detriment or for his own benefit. An interested party is not a witness. Not because we necessarily think he’s lying, but because he is not an admissible witness, like relatives for example. Relatives are disqualified from testifying even to a relative’s detriment, not only to a relative’s benefit, because they are not admissible witnesses. It’s not a problem of reliability; it’s a problem of admissibility. So too an interested party has a problem of admissibility. So Mahari ben Lev asks: then how can an admission by a litigant be believed like a hundred witnesses? He should not be believed even like one witness. It has no significance; he is speaking about himself. So Mahari ben Lev says something like: it’s like a vow. Or not exactly like a vow—more like a gift; a vow is more in the realm of self-imposed prohibition. But it’s like a gift: he is basically giving a gift. And therefore he says that this is not really credibility. It’s not that we believe you that no debt is owed to you, but if you want to give gifts, give gifts. A person can give gifts to whomever he wants. The fact that there are two witnesses who say that I am owed the money, and I want to give him a gift of one hundred shekels—can someone stop me? So therefore it is not really that I am more believed than two witnesses. It’s not that we accept my words and write in the ruling that I am believed and that in truth no debt is owed to me; rather, if I want to give gifts, no one will stop me. I’m presenting this right now in the most simplistic way possible. So that is what Mahari ben Lev says. Ketzot HaChoshen argues that this cannot be, and of course he is right, it cannot be; this is complete nonsense, one cannot say such a thing, and it is quite clear to me that Mahari ben Lev also did not mean that. Ketzot HaChoshen argues that this is credibility in every respect. When someone makes an admission by a litigant, this is credibility, and he has more credibility than two witnesses. If you ask the court what happened factually, what was the reality—there was no debt here. What can you do? There are two witnesses who say there was. An admission by a litigant overrides two witnesses. That is Ketzot HaChoshen’s claim, and that is also the simple explanation in the Talmudic passages; you see it in many places. You see, for example, let’s say someone sues me and says: you owe me one hundred shekels. Wait—someone says you owe me one hundred shekels, and I tell him: absolutely not, nothing of the sort ever happened, I never borrowed. Now two witnesses come and say that I borrowed and repaid. Now the Talmud says: anyone who says “I did not borrow” is as though he said “I did not repay.” Meaning, if I say there was no loan, then it follows from my words that I also did not repay, right? If there was no loan, then I also did not repay. So what comes out? Like this: regarding the loan, I claim there was no loan, but there are two witnesses against me saying there was a loan, so the court rules that there was a loan. Regarding repayment, I claim I did not repay; that is an admission by a litigant because I am testifying to my own detriment, I say I did not repay. Two witnesses testify that I did repay—they testify in my favor—but since I testify to my own detriment that I did not repay, I override the two witnesses, because an admission by a litigant is like a hundred witnesses. And then we get something absurd: there are witnesses testifying that I repaid, and I will have to repay again because I admitted. Now think—can this be explained here as a gift? It’s totally irrelevant, right? The person says: I never borrowed at all. Can you say he intended to give a gift? If he intended to give a gift he would have taken one hundred shekels out of his pocket and given it as a gift. The person intended to get rid of the claim; he didn’t take into account that in another moment witnesses would come and testify that there was a loan, so he tried to brush him off and said: leave me alone, I never borrowed at all, leave me in peace. Obviously he didn’t mean to give him a gift, right? And nevertheless we treat it as an admission by a litigant. What does that mean? That one cannot explain the credibility of an admission by a litigant as though it were really giving a gift and not credibility. There are more proofs of this—they’re just crushing, meaning you can’t say otherwise, it’s obvious. There are all kinds of conceptual inquiries—people like to give all kinds of lectures about this in yeshivot—but it has no basis. Meaning, you can’t say such a thing; Mahari ben Lev did not mean that either. What Mahari ben Lev meant to say, it seems to me, is that my credibility to admit that I did not repay is based on my ability to give a gift. It is in his power; since it is in my power also to give a gift, and after all no one can stop me, then once I say “I did not repay,” no one can contend with that claim. But in the final analysis it is credibility. It is credibility that stems from the ability to give a gift—what the Talmud calls “it is in his power.” Since it is in his power to bring about that result with his own hands, without depending on anyone else, then he is also believed to say that this is how it is. Because after all, what will stop me from giving gifts? Now, not because I really want to give a gift—I don’t intend to give a gift—but I am now saying in court, “I did not repay.” If I say I did not repay, I have full credibility even against two witnesses. Why? Because when I testify to my own detriment, I testify that, as it were, I need to give someone a gift; I can always give it to him as a gift. So since that is so, no one can undermine my credibility. I have the ability to produce that result without anyone being able to interfere. And since that is so, that also grants—this is a novelty, by the way, because after all I didn’t mean to give gifts here—so no one can stop me? I didn’t mean to give gifts. But Mahari ben Lev innovates that the ability to give a gift grants credibility even to a claim that doesn’t really mean to give you gifts, but to a claim that follows from what he said. What follows from his words is that there was no repayment, so as far as we are concerned it is as if you stood in court and said: there was no repayment. And with respect to the claim “there was no repayment,” you have absolute credibility. All right? That is Mahari ben Lev’s claim. So I return to our issue: I don’t think there is room to hang this on the dispute between Ketzot and Mahari ben Lev, because one might have said that according to Mahari ben Lev this is not credibility. Therefore one could perhaps have said that he is obligated to pay in some sense only in the heavenly sense, because really, from the standpoint of human law, from the standpoint of reality, he isn’t liable. But since he admitted and wants to give a gift, then they obligate him to pay in the heavenly sense in some way? But that is not correct; it cannot be correct, because Mahari ben Lev too is speaking about credibility. And once you make an admission by a litigant in court, you have credibility like a hundred witnesses. And the court rules that no debt was owed to you. And if you took the money, the court in human law will extract the money from you—not in the heavenly sense and nothing of the sort. Even according to Mahari ben Lev, not only according to Ketzot. Okay?
[Speaker D] It’s a bit hard to speak here about credibility; it’s more formal credibility. Because it’s obvious to everyone that he didn’t really mean to make that claim, it just slipped out. So it’s a bit strange. If we believe him, it’s not because we think he is speaking
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the truth, because after all he
[Speaker D] said what he said.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that doesn’t matter. No, I’m not entering right now into the question whether this is really the factual truth; this is the legal truth.
[Speaker D] No, no, that question is relevant—whether this is factual truth or not. Because according to the way you’re explaining it now, then it seems that the credibility of “it is in his power,” yes, the way you want to explain Mahari ben Lev, seems to apply only to the matter of factual
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] truth, because why would he
[Speaker D] lie if he could have just done it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, that already turns it into a migo. But “it is in his power” is not a migo, as the Rosh writes; “it is in his power” is something else. And that’s why that was the point of the remark I made earlier, that even according to my explanation of Mahari ben Lev this is still a novelty. Because I really would have said that “it is in his power” does not grant credibility to someone who in fact doesn’t really want to give a gift, but all that follows from his words is that there was no repayment, that’s all—that there was no repayment. But he didn’t really mean to give gifts. So it could be that the mechanism of “it is in his power” also would not give him credibility here for such a thing. Mahari ben Lev innovates that yes, it does, and that is definitely a novelty, I agree. It’s not something obvious, but it is at least a novelty one could say. The conception that this is giving a gift cannot be said at all—that has no basis.
[Speaker D] It’s already very similar, because we’re speaking about formal credibility. If it isn’t factual at all, if we don’t really think that those were the facts,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] but it is credibility.
[Speaker D] it’s a kind of gift—you call it credibility, that’s a very nice word, credibility. It’s not that we believe him; it’s that we just do…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We believe him legally. What does “believe him” mean?
[Speaker D] But “believe him legally”… I don’t like that, because what does “believe him legally” mean? Is there legal truth and factual truth?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’ll give you an example. Let’s say a person says: look, I borrowed money from someone. You know, I mentioned I think the story in Vayikra Rabbah about Alexander the Great, who came to Africa, I think, and there two people came before the wise king there, whom Alexander came to see judging the people—so it’s not Africa, it’s something else I think. So, the thing with the money. Yes. So one person comes and says: I bought a field from so-and-so and found a treasure there, I want to return it. And so-and-so says: what are you talking about, I sold him the field and everything in it. Right, each one is a bigger saint than the other. So there they came up with some makeshift solution. Do you have a son, do you have a daughter—they should marry and take the treasure. I’m asking: what is the truth? What should be ruled? So he has no son and no daughter. What do you rule?
[Speaker D] There there’s no legal dispute between them at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, but that’s exactly the point. So he found some makeshift solution. I’m asking: regarding the truth, what do you rule?
[Speaker D] Yes, I’m not making a claim against you, you don’t have to give it to him. So what do you do?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In other words, what you’re basically saying is: as far as I’m concerned, that is the legal truth. The factual truth doesn’t interest me, because if you don’t make a claim, then even if it belongs to you, I don’t address that question. Without a claim, I don’t address it.
[Speaker D] But I’m saying that once you’ve said that—if you formulate the explanation this way—then you’re already getting closer to the matter of a gift. Because something that is legally credible
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and not factually, you’re saying that’s
[Speaker D] close. But it still isn’t a gift; it’s credibility. “It is in his power” is credibility.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s close, but it still isn’t a gift; it’s credibility. The practical difference is in “anyone who says ‘I did not borrow’ is as though he said ‘I did not repay.’”
[Speaker D] No, but
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The practical difference is in “anyone who says ‘I did not borrow’ is as though he said ‘I did not repay.’” In such a case you cannot say this is a gift. If you explained it literally as a gift, that explanation collapses. That Talmudic passage doesn’t fit that explanation.
[Speaker D] It’s not a gift given under coercion, right—it’s a gift given under coercion, but the idea is that he has the power to create the obligation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not a gift; it’s credibility. “It is in his power” is credibility. Fine, this is semantics, not important. What I mean to say is: this is not a gift. How close it is to a gift—it may be that it’s closer to a gift than ordinary factual credibility. I agree.
[Speaker D] Fine, but it isn’t a gift; rather, it belongs to the area of credibility. Let’s sum it up with that formulation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are such forms of credibility—migo as the strength of a claim. What is migo as the strength of a claim?
[Speaker D] Migo as the strength
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of a claim is again credibility not based on evidence. Meaning, it’s not that these are really the facts. But on the legal level there is strong logic to give you credibility. Yes, fine, but you brought an example from migo. There are indeed those who argue, for exactly those same reasons, about the story of migo as the strength of a claim. Yes, but I think those arguments are difficult, because there is very good evidence for migo as the strength of a claim. I agree. Fine, in any case, let’s return to our issue. So basically the argument is that if the person hired the false witnesses to testify that the money is owed to him himself, then when the Talmud says “exempt in human court and liable in the heavenly sense,” it doesn’t only mean that it’s not merely in the heavenly sense but also in human court; rather, there is no obligation here at all, it is simply a claim of “your money is in my possession.” And what I wanted now only to add in this whole last move is that even if he admits through an admission by a litigant, it really doesn’t matter; this is still a case of “your money is in my possession.” And it is “your money is in my possession” because in the end, according to your own position, there is an admission by a litigant that this money belongs to someone else, so give it to him—that is a claim of “your money is in my possession.” All right? Even according to Mahari ben Lev as well, where perhaps factually it may not be his money, but if I admitted that it is his money, then on the legal level there is testimony or credibility that the money is his, and the claim becomes a claim of “your money is in my possession.” Okay, so that is why the Talmud in the end says—let me just read Rashi. Rashi writes: “Money fit to be paid”—that very money that he extracted, he is obligated to return. Yes, the very money that the false witnesses helped him extract—that money he is obligated to return. Rashi comes precisely to say this: that what is written here is not liability in human court as opposed to liability in the heavenly sense, but rather a liability of “your money is in my possession.” Meaning: give me back the money; that same money that you extracted, return it. It’s not an obligation of payment. The money that you received—return it; it isn’t yours. Okay, that’s basically what he means to say. And then indeed, on that basis, the Talmud says: rather, for his fellow. That is, we’re talking about his having hired false witnesses for the benefit of his fellow, not for his own benefit. Okay? Now here it already becomes an interesting question, and that is what the case is about—this is the conclusion of the Talmud. Meaning, we are talking here about a situation where Reuven hired false witnesses for Shimon’s benefit in a claim against Levi. Meaning, he hired false witnesses who would lie and say that Levi owes money to Shimon, and Reuven is the one who hired the witnesses. Okay? Now in that situation, after all, Reuven does not have the money; Levi paid it to Shimon. So Reuven does not have the money. In that case we cannot return the money under the rule of “your money is in my possession.” This is what the Talmud is speaking about when it says “exempt in human court but liable in the heavenly sense,” and here the payment is already payment as compensation or punishment or something like that, and not a matter of “your money is in my possession.” Because I do not have Levi’s money. This of course raises the question: why are they coming to him? Let them go to Shimon, who received the money because of this falsehood, and let him return the money he received. What do they want from me? Let them go to Shimon, who received money that was not owed to him. Let them take the money from him under the rule of “your money is in my possession,” and then now what do you want from me? The money returned to its owner, no damage was caused, so what am I supposed to pay for?
[Speaker E] So maybe it’s from the angle of atonement for the sin he committed? Maybe the “liable in the heavenly sense” here is from the angle of atonement for the sin?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “from the angle of atonement” mean?
[Speaker E] Meaning, he has to be at peace with himself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he has to pay again? So he has to pay again? But after all, he hasn’t lost money; he got the money back. Fine. So now what am I supposed to do? I’m the one who hired the witnesses.
[Speaker E] Yes, since he is the one who actually committed the sin, who hired the witnesses, then apparently he should return it to Levi.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And Shimon should remain with the money?
[Speaker E] No, no, right, that can’t be. Right, that can’t be.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So look, one possibility is to say that “liable in the heavenly sense” here is not like the Meiri, which I mentioned earlier. “Liable in the heavenly sense” means that he is not okay, he transgressed a prohibition. And indeed the fact that he is not liable to pay in human court means not that he isn’t liable in general, but that there is simply nothing to pay. Okay? If the false witnesses testified for his own benefit, then he has to return the money. So you can’t say he’s liable in the heavenly sense, even though again, he certainly did commit a prohibition. It’s just that you can’t say “liable in the heavenly sense,” because that implies that he is exempt in human court, and that isn’t true. After all, he has to pay in human court. Therefore the Talmud says we’re talking about his hiring false witnesses for Shimon’s benefit. What happens in such a situation? The money is taken from Shimon. That is a separate issue. But the person himself—after all, it is obvious that he transgressed a prohibition; he hired false witnesses for Shimon’s benefit. So “liable in the heavenly sense” means he is liable to punishment, he transgressed a prohibition. The money, of course, is taken from Shimon; that has nothing to do with him, it’s not his money. And that is of course not like the Meiri, who explained that what is written here, “liable in the heavenly sense,” means liable in payment. Here it would only mean prohibition. That fits better with Pnei Yehoshua. Or with the approaches we inferred from, for example, Pnei Yehoshua, that when it says here “exempt in human court and liable in the heavenly sense,” it means exempt from payment but liable to punishment for the prohibition—for the prohibition he committed. Which is perfectly understandable. There’s no problem with that. Right? Now, one could ask—or one could explain—that perhaps we are talking here about a situation where Shimon died, or ran off with the money, or has no money, or spent all his assets, and there is no one from whom the money can be extracted. Then it turns out that Levi, the defendant, basically lost money and has no one from whom to collect it; the money that went to Shimon has been spent. Okay? It’s gone. Or Shimon ran off, or whatever. Maybe in such a situation they come to Reuven and say to him: you pay in the heavenly sense—as an actual payment obligation. This is no longer just prohibition. Pay. After all, you caused damage to Levi. Why in that case should he not be liable in human court? After all, he caused damage to Levi. Is that a possible explanation?
[Speaker E] Because it’s indirect causation?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because this is indirect causation, right? After all, at the end of the day there’s no claim here of “my money is in your possession.” I don’t have his money. But I caused him to lose out. Right? Since I caused him to lose out, then all I’m obligated to pay is under the laws of Heaven. What happens if I hired the false witnesses for my own benefit? Here too there wouldn’t be liability in a human court in the sense that what I caused him to lose was only through indirect causation. The obligation that would require me to pay in a human court is because of “my money is in your possession.” That’s what we said earlier. So what’s the difference between hiring false witnesses for my own benefit and hiring false witnesses for someone else’s benefit? There’s no fundamental difference. In both cases the damage was caused only indirectly. It’s just that in the case where the witnesses I hired testified for my own benefit, I simply have to return the money because of “my money is in your possession.” So in that case there also wasn’t really any loss caused here, and therefore even under the laws of Heaven there’s no wrongdoing and no claim against him. There isn’t even a loss by indirect causation; there’s no loss at all. But suppose, just hypothetically, that I took the money for myself and spent it. I spent it, it’s gone, there’s no money left, I can’t return it to him. What happens in that situation? Maybe one could have said, fine, then here I’m obligated to pay under the laws of Heaven. But even that can’t be. Because if I have no money, then under the laws of Heaven too I won’t be able to pay. And after all, the obligation to pay is also an obligation in a human court. I have money that belongs to someone else; the fact that I spent it does not exempt me from returning it. Therefore, when I hired the witnesses for my own benefit, there’s no option here—it has to be an obligation in a human court; you can’t explain it otherwise. But the option that comes up when I’m talking about a case where I hired the witnesses for someone else’s benefit sheds light on something that also exists in the case where I hired them for my own benefit. Since on the conceptual level, even when I hired them for my own benefit, in principle I caused damage here indirectly. And in principle there is an obligation to pay under the laws of Heaven, but in practice, because in parallel there is also the obligation of “my money is in your possession,” that somehow neutralizes the issue. Because what can you do—there’s an obligation of “my money is in your possession,” so there’s no point talking about an obligation under the laws of Heaven. Only when I hired the false witnesses for someone else’s benefit, and there there is no issue of “my money is in your possession,” and that other person ran away, then there is no issue of “my money is in your possession.” Then claims can be made against me on the basis of indirect causation in torts, that I caused you damage and therefore I’m obligated to pay under the laws of Heaven. Therefore this limiting interpretation they give, this limiting interpretation they give—that he hired these witnesses for someone else’s benefit—is not some forced interpretation; it’s obvious, it can’t be otherwise. It’s clear that that’s what’s being discussed. If he hired them for his own benefit, then there’s no discussion at all. The whole discussion of liability for compensation, the whole discussion that sees him as a kind of damager, can arise only if he hired the witnesses for someone else’s benefit. So here this is not some far-fetched limiting interpretation; it’s obvious that this is what’s being discussed. “One who hires false witnesses” means one who hires false witnesses for someone else, because if he hires false witnesses for himself, just return the money—that’s “my money is in your possession”; that’s not what we’re talking about. But the idea of an obligation of compensation under the laws of Heaven exists even if I hired the witnesses for my own benefit; it just can’t be implemented in practice because there is also an obligation of “my money is in your possession,” that’s all. This limiting interpretation here too—and this is what always happens with limiting interpretations—the limiting interpretation here simply finds a situation in which one can discern something that also exists in the ordinary situation. It’s just that in the ordinary situation you can’t discern it, because something else prevents it from appearing: the obligation of “my money is in your possession.” And therefore they say, fine, fine, it’s talking about someone who hired witnesses for someone else. The point is that the law is also true if you hired the witnesses for your own benefit; it just has no practical application, no practical consequence, because as long as there is a claim of “my money is in your possession,” in the end there also won’t be any damage here and therefore you also won’t be obligated to pay under the laws of Heaven. But on the conceptual level, even when you hired the witnesses for your own benefit, you did in fact cause damage under the laws of Heaven. Or in other words, when you hired the witnesses for your own benefit, you weren’t only a thief, you were also a damager under the laws of Heaven. But the moment you return the theft as a thief, the damage is automatically resolved as well. So there’s no point discussing your paying as indirect causation under the laws of Heaven, understood? Meaning, there’s a practical implication to this whole move I’m laying out here: “my money is in your possession” or liability for compensation. Because the point is that when I hire witnesses for my own benefit, both things exist. The only thing that happens is that when I solve the theft problem, the damage problem disappears too, so there’s no possible case in which I could be obligated under the laws of Heaven. Even if I ate the money and have no way to return it, that doesn’t matter, because I’m still obligated by “my money is in your possession,” so there’s nothing to discuss in terms of my becoming obligated under the laws of Heaven as a damager. Only when I hired this for someone else’s benefit can this discussion even begin, because then the discussion splits. He is obligated because of “my money is in your possession,” and I am obligated as one who caused damage indirectly. So if he returns the money, then fine, I really don’t have to pay. But if he ran away, spent the money, can’t return it, then I have to pay—but only under the laws of Heaven, as damage by indirect causation. Here that can arise. But if he does return the money, for example, then I won’t have to pay even under the laws of Heaven, because at the end of the day once the money came back, I didn’t cause you damage, not even indirectly. Okay? Now why really is the damage I caused you considered indirect causation—let’s say that person ran away with the money—why is that called indirect causation? Not that I caused him to disappear, of course; he disappeared by his own decision. Rather, I took the money out of your possession by means of witnesses, through another factor. Therefore it happened indirectly. Meaning, the indirect causation is about taking out the money, not about the fact that he disappeared. The fact that he disappeared is needed only so that the problem can’t be solved by returning the money to Levi. But in terms of the damage, the damage occurred when I took out the money, not when he disappeared. And when I took it out by means of the two witnesses whom I hired, that is called causing damage indirectly. Okay, that’s the Talmud’s line of reasoning. Now the question arises: how is it actually established that these witnesses are false witnesses? How can it be established that the witnesses are false witnesses? What are we going to say? That two other witnesses will come? Then it’s just two against two. Okay? So on what basis am I going to say that this is false testimony? I can’t disqualify two witnesses, although we already talked about that. Right? So what exactly is the case here? So Meiri—or maybe more than that—if this is talking about a case where I hired them for my friend’s benefit, then I’m not even a litigating party, because I’m not admitting that I myself am liable; I’m admitting that my friend is liable. I can’t admit that my friend is liable. And then what comes out? I’m only testifying that these two witnesses are false witnesses. Very nice—but one person can’t disqualify two witnesses.
[Speaker E] Maybe the witnesses themselves, after they testified, regretted it and said they testified falsely?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A person cannot declare himself wicked. There’s no way out. Meaning, if I hired them for my own benefit, then I can admit, as I said at the beginning of the class, that my own admission as a litigant overrides two witnesses. I can’t disqualify them, of course, but since I admit that I am not entitled to the money, then even though they testify that I am entitled to it, my admission overrides the testimony of the two witnesses. Okay, so there there’s no problem. But according to the Talmud’s conclusion, we’re talking about a case where I hired them for my friend’s benefit and not for my own benefit. In that situation, if I myself admit that I hired false witnesses, that’s not an admission of a litigant. I’m not admitting that I’m liable; I’m admitting that Shimon is liable. I can’t admit that Shimon is liable. To say that Shimon is liable—I’m one witness, but there are two witnesses against me saying that he is not liable. They override me. So here too an admission of a litigant won’t help. And if I say it even as a witness, I can’t really say it because a person cannot declare himself wicked—by saying that I hired them to testify falsely. Okay, so this whole story, once the Talmud reaches the conclusion that we’re talking about a case where I hired witnesses for someone else’s benefit, the question becomes much sharper: how did it become clear to the religious court that these were false witnesses? How did that happen?
[Speaker E] Disproof by alibi? Alibi is a possible solution.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s take a look for a moment. I brought Meiri here; I’ll share the file with you. But this—
[Speaker E] It won’t work according to Meiri, though. We’ll soon see.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because—
[Speaker E] In a case of alibi, the witnesses themselves have to pay the money.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, we’ll soon see. Right. “One who hires false witnesses to testify”—if it was for his own need, once he collected based on their testimony, he must return it even in a human court. Okay? “Once he collected based on their testimony” means after he already collected and the money is in his hands, then he has to return the money. If he didn’t collect it, then they simply don’t take the money. That’s all. Meiri says as follows: and specifically when he admitted it, because if it is based on those witnesses, they are not believed, for a person cannot declare himself wicked—rather, it’s by admission. Again. So Meiri says this: this is talking—notice which case he’s talking about—about a person who hired them for his own benefit, the opening stage of the Talmud, right? That’s what he’s talking about. And then I ask: how was it established that these witnesses were liars? So he says: when he admitted it. Because when he admitted it, then there is an admission of a litigant and it overrides the testimony of the two witnesses. He does not disqualify them, but regarding the debt it overrides the testimony of the two witnesses. And therefore, when he admitted it, that is the case under discussion where he is obligated in a human court to pay the money. And specifically when he hired them for himself, yes? “And if based on those witnesses”—what are you going to tell me? Maybe there is another possibility? That the witnesses themselves admit that they lied. They are not believed, because a person cannot declare himself wicked, except through his own admission. Therefore one must say that we’re talking about the claimant, the one who hired them, admitting it. “And witnesses by alibi,” Meiri continues—maybe one could say they were found false through alibi testimony. Meiri says no. If they did not yet extract the money, they take it from them; if they did extract it, they do not take it. Because with conspiring witnesses, once the money already left on the basis of their testimony—when they conspired but did not succeed, and not when they already did it. So if the money already left on the basis of their false testimony and now they were disproven by alibi testimony, in that case they are not obligated to pay the money, right? “When they conspired, but not when they did it.” Okay? So in that situation one can also say that the person himself is really obligated to pay in a human court because—the witnesses, after all, are not obligated to pay as conspiring witnesses, so he himself, not under the laws of Heaven but in a human court, has to return the money because the money is in his possession unlawfully. It was taken out based on false witnesses. “And if they extracted”—if they did not extract the money based on them, then there’s nothing to talk about at all, because then why should he pay? The money didn’t leave based on them. They themselves, by the way, would have to pay. Levi would only profit. Levi would receive money from the conspiring witnesses, even though the original money was not taken from him. So Levi would actually profit, not merely avoid a loss. This could be a scheme between Reuven and Levi together in order to bring Levi a profit. Okay, because Levi would in fact receive money from the two witnesses. Therefore that is certainly not what’s being discussed. But if the money has already been taken out, then indeed he is obligated in a human court. But if the money was already taken out, then they don’t extract it from the witnesses; rather, they extract it from the claimant, right, from the one who hired them. “And the great codifiers wrote that even if he paid, they still extract it from them.” Yes, that’s Maimonides; it’s basically a dispute among the medieval authorities. “And similarly, if they were flogged, they are flogged.” It appears that they do not hold of “when they conspired, but not when they did it,” except in a case where they caused him to be executed, because his brother is no longer alive. And some disagree regarding flogging, as we explained in the first chapter of tractate Makkot. Yes, Rashi at the beginning of tractate Makkot writes—he brings this exposition of “when they conspired, but not when they did it”—but no, that exposition does not appear in the Sages. There is no such exposition. The exposition that does exist is: if they caused him to be executed, they are not executed; if they did not cause him to be executed, they are executed. And there is a difference between the formulations. Because “when they conspired, but not when they did it” sounds like a general rule for conspiring witnesses in all contexts: if the punishment was already carried out, then they are not punished; only if the punishment was about to be carried out but was not carried out. But if I explain it as “if they caused him to be executed, they are not executed,” then it speaks only about death. But flogging or money—even if they carried out the punishment—the witnesses still have to pay. They are done to as they conspired to do. Only in a case of execution was a special rule introduced. So Meiri claims that this is Maimonides’ view, since they hold that they do not accept “when they conspired, but not when they did it”—there is no such exposition at all—but rather they hold by the exposition “if they caused him to be executed, they are not executed.” “And some disagree regarding flogging, as we explained in the first chapter of tractate Makkot”—that isn’t important for our purposes. In any event, there are opinions that in monetary cases the witnesses must pay even when the money already left. And then of course I am not obligated to pay the money, not as compensation. I may perhaps have to return the money. It’s an interesting question what Meiri means here. Does Meiri mean to say that I can now keep the money with me? Because after all, the conspiring witnesses pay by the rule of “as they conspired,” so you, the defendant, didn’t lose anything—so why are you suing me? That’s not reasonable, although Meiri’s wording somewhat sounds like that, but it’s not reasonable. Why? Because, as I said at the beginning of the class, my obligation to pay this money is because of “my money is in your possession.” It is not payment for damage. It’s not a case of direct actionable damage where one is obligated to pay under the laws of Heaven. I am obligated to you because of “my money is in your possession.” So if the money came to me on the basis of false testimony, it’s obvious that I have to return it to you; that is “my money is in your possession.” The fact that the witnesses have to pay by the rule of “as they conspired” is something additional, a punishment imposed on the witnesses. Therefore I think that this whole remark of Meiri is only a side point: to let you know that the whole story here only begins if the money already left. If the money did not leave, then there’s nothing to talk about. But if the money did leave, there are opinions that the conspiring witnesses do not pay, okay? Then one might have thought perhaps that I somehow compensated you—but that is not so, because there is still the issue of “my money is in your possession.” I must return your money simply because it is in my possession. Fine. In any event, when I hire false witnesses for myself, if you ask how we know they are false witnesses, the answer is simple: either I myself admit it, in which case it’s an admission of a litigant, or the witnesses were disproven by alibi testimony. Fine? Then I have to pay—of course, if the money already left, I have to pay it. If the money didn’t leave, then the money remains where it is and the witnesses are subjected to the law of “as they conspired.” But if the money did leave, then I have to pay it—not by the rule of “as they conspired,” but by the rule of “my money is in your possession.” The big question is what happens according to the Talmud’s conclusion, where we’re talking about a case in which I hired them for my friend’s benefit. There, if we’re talking about an admission of a litigant, it doesn’t apply, as we said before, because he is not the litigant. He is admitting here that Shimon is liable, not that he himself is liable. So that cannot obligate Shimon to pay. Shimon says, what are you talking about? The witnesses are valid, the witnesses say they are valid, and you claim they’re not—you’ve got a problem. Okay? Therefore in such a situation, in such a situation, you cannot determine that the witnesses are lying witnesses, false witnesses. So how is it established that the witnesses lied? How is it established that he hired false witnesses to testify? We are left only with the option of alibi disproof, right? Only the option of alibi disproof. What then? If the witnesses were disproven by alibi testimony, then here too we have to pay close attention: if the witnesses were disproven by alibi testimony, so what? If the money already left—yes, sorry, if the money, if the money did not leave, then the witnesses themselves must pay by the rule of “as they conspired,” right? So here certainly they can’t obligate me, because not only did the lender not lose, he profited—he now has more money than he had at the outset, because the conspiring witnesses paid him as well. If the money did leave, and the one who got the money ran away, and it’s impossible to recover the money from him, and as for the witnesses we follow the position of those medieval authorities who say that even in monetary cases, if the money left, the conspiring witnesses are not obligated—that is the only possible case, right, according to Meiri? There’s no other possibility. An admission of a litigant does not apply here, because the admission of a litigant doesn’t work: I’m not the litigant, I hired this for my friend’s benefit. As for alibi disproof—if the money didn’t leave, then why should I have to pay? I caused no damage. If the money did leave, then the witnesses are not obligated, and if that fellow ran away with the money, then claims can be made against me to pay as one who caused damage indirectly. But according to the view of the medieval authorities that the witnesses themselves must pay, then even in a case of alibi disproof they can’t make claims against me. Unless we say that the conspiring witnesses have to pay because that is a penal payment, not compensation for the loss they caused, while I have to pay because I caused damage indirectly. The fact that he gets money from the conspiring witnesses doesn’t mean I didn’t damage him, because the money he gets from the conspiring witnesses is a penal payment imposed on the conspiring witnesses. From a property standpoint he is still entitled to his money that was taken from him unlawfully. And perhaps one could say that in such a situation, even though the conspiring witnesses pay, I can still be sued as one who caused damage indirectly and I would have to pay under the laws of Heaven. Okay? Good, let’s stop here for a few minutes. I usually take a break in classes so it won’t get too long on Zoom. We’re a bit past the halfway point of the class, so we’ll come back in another three or four minutes, okay? Go wash your face, refresh yourselves a bit, so we can come back. Okay, let’s get back. The question Meiri asks is basically how they managed at all to discover that the witnesses here had been hired to give false testimony. The question is: why do we need to get into that question in the first place? Meiri assumes that the discussion in the passage is a discussion of what the religious court rules. Does the religious court obligate you to pay under the laws of Heaven? Sometimes it obligates you, in the sense that it rules that you have to pay under the laws of Heaven. It does not enforce it because it is under the laws of Heaven, though perhaps there’s a discussion whether courts compel fulfillment of commandments. There’s room to discuss that. But one could have said that this law is talking about what the person himself is obligated to do. And then the question doesn’t arise of how the court knows that the witnesses are false witnesses. The court really doesn’t know. I hired false witnesses for my own benefit or for someone else’s benefit, no matter. The money left. Now I know that I hired them to give false testimony. They were not disproven by alibi, and I did not make any admission of a litigant and nothing like that. But I know the truth. It could be that what is written here is that I am considered one who caused damage indirectly and I need to pay under the laws of Heaven. He is obligated under the laws of Heaven—whatever that means, prohibition or obligation to pay or something else. Then there is no need to get into whether there was alibi disproof, whether I admitted it—I don’t need to admit it before a religious court, there’s no need to disprove the witnesses by alibi, the witnesses remain and their testimony remains and everything is fine. But I still have an obligation to pay under the laws of Heaven, because I caused damage indirectly. We are not discussing here the question of how the religious court would rule or how the religious court would rule. We are discussing the law imposed on the person. That’s all. And then all these questions don’t arise. Meaning, the whole discussion of how the witnesses were determined to be liars assumes that the entire discussion in this passage is about what the religious court rules, and not about what Jewish law imposes on me. Because if the discussion were about what Jewish law imposes on me, then we wouldn’t care how the witnesses are found to be liars; I know they are liars. The question is what I am obligated to do. In other words, Meiri’s assumption is that the discussion here is about the religious court, and therefore he says: how can it become clear to the religious court that these witnesses are false witnesses? But on the other hand, notice that Meiri speaks about a case where I testified for my own benefit, not for someone else’s benefit. Right? When I testified for my own benefit, one might have said: fine, here it is obvious that the discussion is about the court and not about me, because I’m a fraud. After all, I hired witnesses to give false testimony for my own benefit. So what are they going to tell me? Yes, you have to pay to discharge your duty before Heaven because you caused damage indirectly. Thank you very much—I’m a liar and a fraud, everything I did was to make money. So there’s no point here in Jewish law explaining to me what I’m obligated to do; that’s not the issue. I’m not going to do what I’m obligated to do. Therefore in that case it really is clear to Meiri that the Talmud’s discussion is about the religious court, not about me. Under what circumstances will the religious court obligate me to pay under the laws of Heaven—rule that I am obligated to pay under the laws of Heaven? For that, the religious court has to become convinced that the witnesses were false. But what happens according to the Talmud’s conclusion, when I took witnesses and hired them to testify for Shimon’s benefit, not for my own? In that case there is no need to get into the question of how it was established that the witnesses were false. It wasn’t established. But I still have to pay because I caused damage indirectly. I did something for Shimon’s benefit. I might have thought, look, if Shimon wants to repent and not use money that isn’t his, let him return the money—what does that have to do with me? The novelty is that because I did this thing, I am obligated to pay under the laws of Heaven, because I am called one who caused damage indirectly. Even though, basically, Shimon is supposed to return the money and then there would have been no damage at all. So there is a novelty here, and one could say that novelty even about that fraud who hired the witnesses. But all that is only when we are talking about someone who hired the witnesses for someone else’s benefit. And when he hired the witnesses for his own benefit, here it is clear that the discussion is about the religious court and not about the person and not about him. It’s only about when the religious court will tell him that he has to pay under the laws of Heaven, not when he is obligated to pay. He doesn’t care what he’s obligated to pay—he’s a fraud. Therefore, it may be that this whole discussion of Meiri, when he speaks about how the court knows the witnesses are false, not for nothing does he speak only about the first case, where I hired the witnesses to testify about me for my own benefit. He doesn’t get into this at the second stage of the Talmud, where I hired witnesses for someone else’s benefit, because there it really may be that the witnesses were not disproven by alibi, and I didn’t admit anything, and nothing of the sort. But I myself am told: know that you are considered one who caused damage indirectly and you must pay under the laws of Heaven. Either to pay, or there is a prohibition—yes, according to Meiri it means he has to pay. Yes, according to the one who says that there is a prohibition here, then obviously there is a prohibition, that’s clear. But even according to Meiri, who says that “obligated under the laws of Heaven” means obligated to pay, one can definitely understand that he is obligated to pay and they tell him he is obligated to pay independent of the witnesses. The religious court knows nothing of the whole story. The religious court thinks the witnesses gave true testimony. Then the whole question simply never arises. So it may be that everything Meiri says about hiring false witnesses for my own benefit is not incidental, but rather because only there does this whole question arise. Now another question comes up. What if someone really was owed the money? By Levi or by Shimon, to me or to Shimon—it doesn’t matter, in both cases. Am I allowed to hire false witnesses in order to extract from Levi money that is rightfully mine? I have no witnesses for that loan, or for the damage he caused, or whatever it may be. But I know the truth: he owes me. That’s the truth. Now I hired false witnesses to testify against Levi and extract from him money that legally belongs to me. But the witnesses are false witnesses; I hired them. What is the law in such a situation? Here too there is room to discuss how the court would know any of this. Were they disproven by alibi? The whole Meiri story, yes? Were they disproven by alibi, or did I myself admit it, or whatever. Because think about a case where I myself admitted it—that’s the first case Meiri mentions. If I myself admitted it, then what did I say there? Listen, I hired false witnesses, but in truth he owes me money. I hired the false witnesses to extract money that rightfully belongs to me. That’s what I say. What is the law in that situation? One could have said that in such a case I am not obligated even under the laws of Heaven to pay, because after all, the money rightfully belongs to me. So I myself certainly am not obligated to pay; the money belongs to me. It may be that I did something wrong by hiring false witnesses—we’ll still talk about that, whether it is permitted—
[Speaker E] to do such a thing? A person may take the law into his own hands, but the question is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] whether something like this is allowed or forbidden, we’ll still discuss that. But right now I’m talking about the question of whether I have to pay, not whether I behaved properly or not. Since after all the money is my money. So what are you going to say? Yes, but the religious court doesn’t know any of this. And if the witnesses were shown to be false, and I said I hired them, then from the court’s standpoint how does it know that this money is really owed to me? The court knows there is an admission that I am owed the money. Now here it’s not so simple, because here we have “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted.” After all, I could have admitted nothing. Right? I could have left the witnesses standing as they were, and the court would extract the money and I would take the money and go home. Now I come to court and of my own initiative say to them: listen, I hired these witnesses to lie. But know that this money is money that rightfully belongs to me. So seemingly I clearly have “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted.” And in such a case the religious court too should believe me that I was entitled to the money. It will believe that I hired them and thereby disqualify the witnesses, but from my standpoint it will accept my words as an admission of a litigant that I hired the witnesses to lie, but on the other hand, the document comes with its cancellation attached. After all, I also say that the money belongs to me. That too the court will accept, because “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted.” And then what happens in such a situation is that when I hired the false witnesses for my own benefit, and there really was a debt owed to me, then seemingly I have “the mouth that forbade” and I do not have to pay. In such a case there would apparently be no obligation even under the laws of Heaven. The question is whether there is a prohibition here; I’m talking about the obligation to pay. The question whether there is a prohibition in doing such a thing—that is a question we’ll deal with later. Is there a prohibition in doing such a thing? But in terms of the obligation to pay, even under the laws of Heaven there would seemingly be none here. What happens if I hired the witnesses for my friend’s benefit? What happens if the witnesses were disproven by alibi and it wasn’t that I admitted they had been hired to lie? If they were disproven by alibi, then there is no “mouth that forbade.” Then they won’t believe me that the money belongs to me, and of course I will have to pay. Yes, that’s clear. But what if I hired the witnesses for my friend’s benefit, as in the Talmud’s conclusion? And in truth my friend really was entitled to the money. Levi really did owe Shimon the money. But Shimon had no witnesses, so I, Reuven, came and hired witnesses for him who would lie and extract the money from Levi. In that case this is not an admission of a litigant. A person cannot declare himself wicked. If I say that I hired witnesses to lie, I’m not believed. And I’m not admitting that I owe the money. I’m admitting that Shimon is owed the money. To say that Shimon is owed the money is not an admission of a litigant; it is testimony. I am not believed—I’m one witness. Therefore in such a case, if indeed the money really was owed to Shimon, then when I come and say I hired the false witnesses for Shimon’s benefit, clearly they won’t take the money away from Shimon. But from me they might, possibly, yes. Why? Because from a legal standpoint I caused damage—after all, Levi does not owe Shimon, legally speaking. So I caused damage to Levi, because now the money cannot be recovered from Shimon, and according to my own account I did something here that damaged Levi. Even though according to my own account Levi also owes Shimon the money, but on that point the religious court does not believe me. Right? So this is a very complicated case. Because notice: I hired witnesses to testify that Levi owes Shimon money. The witnesses testified, and Levi paid the money to Shimon. Now I come to the religious court and tell them the following story: know that I hired these witnesses and they lied, but the truth is that Levi owed money to Shimon. Very complicated. Ask the religious court: was there a debt of Levi to Shimon? What will the religious court say? Obviously yes. Why? Not because of my admission; because of the witnesses’ testimony. There are two witnesses here who testified, and I am not believed to disqualify two witnesses. I can make an admission of a litigant regarding myself, but I cannot disqualify the witnesses. The religious court has before it testimony of two witnesses that Levi owes money to Shimon. So from the standpoint of Levi’s liability to Shimon, there are two witnesses here, and from the court’s standpoint Levi owes money to Shimon. As far as the court is concerned, the two witnesses are valid witnesses. Now I come and say: I hired them to lie, but Levi really does owe Shimon. If we accepted only his admission that he hired them to lie, I could say: then pay money, because you have admitted as a litigant that you caused damage—not an admission of a litigant that he doesn’t owe the money, but rather that according to your own account you damaged Levi because you say that you arranged false witnesses. So pay Levi under the laws of Heaven because you caused damage, albeit indirectly. Wait a second—but I also say that Levi really did owe Shimon money. I’m not only saying that I hired witnesses to give false testimony. I’m also saying that Shimon is entitled to the money from Levi. So if you accept everything I say, then according to my own account I also did not cause Levi any damage. I caused him to fulfill his obligation, one he was trying to evade. So even according to my own account you can’t obligate me. But it’s not so simple. Because if I come and admit and say these witnesses are false witnesses, that is testimony against my own interest. Right? So that’s an admission of a litigant; I obligated myself. Now I come and say, yes, but Levi really did owe Shimon money. Who says I am believed about that? That is testimony that comes to exempt me. Am I believed to exempt myself? I’m an interested party; I’m one witness. So one might have said that they accept my claim that the witnesses were false witnesses—not in order to disqualify them, but in order to obligate me to pay as one who damaged Levi. I damaged Levi. And they would not accept my claim that Levi really owes money to Shimon, because that is a claim that comes to exempt me. On the other hand, once again I can come and say: “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted.” If you accept from me the statement that these witnesses are invalid—again, you don’t really accept it generally, you accept it only with respect to me myself in order to obligate me—then also accept my claim that Levi really did owe Reuven money. And therefore, simply speaking, in that case I wouldn’t have to pay. Fine? Even if I did this for my friend’s benefit, even then it seems to me, simply speaking, that I would not have to pay. Not even under the laws of Heaven?
[Speaker E] Not even under the laws of Heaven?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not even under the laws of Heaven. After all, under the laws of Heaven I know the truth. I’m claiming that Levi owed Shimon money, and I know it. I saw that he borrowed from him. But I’m one witness; I couldn’t extract the money. So I hired two false witnesses to testify. So how can you ask me to pay under the laws of Heaven if I know that I was in the right and caused Levi no damage at all? Is Heaven going to make claims against me if I don’t pay an amount that I know I don’t owe? If the religious court thought that way, then it would force me, but if this is an obligation under the laws of Heaven, that’s my account with the Holy One, blessed be He; if I know that this is the truth, I won’t pay. Now this discussion comes up here among the medieval authorities, in Nimukei Yosef. Here, I brought the relevant passage from Nimukei Yosef. By the way, for those who don’t know from last semester, I send—I upload summaries to Dropbox, and you can see there the summaries of the classes. This page that I’m sharing here. By the way, there are several people here with cameras off. Please turn on your cameras. Shlomo, are you with us? Shlomo Buti, or Vati, something like that.
[Speaker F] Rabbi, is the Dropbox the link from the institute’s website?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Thanks. Shlomo? We need a smile here.
[Speaker F] Are you—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] with us?
[Speaker C] Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s going on, you don’t have a camera?
[Speaker C] No.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And will that change next time?
[Speaker C] I’m considering buying one. Okay, because—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] as a matter of principle, people need to sit with cameras on. Okay?
[Speaker C] I was generally saving one for exams.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. A camera isn’t very expensive; you can buy one. Who is S.M.? I don’t know who that is. S.M., who is that? Not with us? What? There’s someone here calling himself S.M. Aryeh, who is Aryeh?
[Speaker D] A regular participant. Okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You don’t have a camera?
[Speaker D] No, I’m the one who spoke—I said he’s a regular participant. Apparently he doesn’t have a camera right now, but he’s here all year.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Please, anyone who has some issue with a camera, contact me. As a matter of principle, people need to sit with cameras on. Okay? So either by email or after class, not now, but contact me. Good, let’s continue. Right, yes—so Nimukei Yosef says as follows: “He must pay back the money.” Notice, according to the quote, which part of the Talmud is this discussing? The first stage, right? The stage where the person hires false witnesses for his own benefit. “He must pay back the money”—that money that he extracted he is obligated to return, as we saw in Rashi. “And the Ra’ah wrote: from here it appears that they obligate only one who hired witnesses concerning money that was not owed to him. But if it was owed to him, except that there were no witnesses to the matter, he is not liable—except that he violates ‘Keep far from a false matter.’” First of all, he’s talking about a situation where a person hired false witnesses for himself. Okay? When a person hired false witnesses for himself, they say that if the money really was owed to him and the witnesses came only to extract money that was in fact owed to him, then the Ra’ah says there that he does not have to pay. But he does violate “Keep far from a false matter.” Yes, in the Talmud it says “he must pay back the money.” “He must pay back the money” applies when there was no debt, but if there was a debt then he does not have to pay back the money, though he violates “Keep far from a false matter.” What happens in a case where he hired false witnesses for someone else’s benefit? I don’t know; Nimukei Yosef doesn’t write it. But from the reasoning we developed earlier it seemed that there too there would be no obligation to pay, right? He plainly reasons this way even for one who hired witnesses for his own benefit, even from the standpoint of causing damage. Because you say that I am a damager because I hired false witnesses, but the same account also says that Levi really did owe the money to Shimon. So you can’t obligate me as a damager. Therefore it seems that this rule applies also to one who hires false witnesses for someone else’s benefit. Even though the discussion here is only about one who hires false witnesses for his own benefit. But he still violates the prohibition of “Keep far from a false matter.” The Rema in section 32 rules as follows: “One who hires false witnesses to extract a maneh from Reuven for Shimon is exempt in a human court and liable under the laws of Heaven.” Gloss of the Rema: “And this is specifically where he did not really owe him, but if he did owe him, only that these witnesses are liars, he is exempt under the laws of Heaven but violates ‘Keep far from a false matter.’” Nimukei Yosef, chapter HaKones, in the name of the glosses of Ra’ah—not the Rosh. “And similarly, if he did not hire them but merely persuaded them with words to testify for him,” etc. “And all this is when one hires false testimony for his fellow and he himself does not admit it.” “He” meaning the fellow, yes? “But if he hired false testimony for himself and extracted money unlawfully, or if the litigant admits it, he must return it and remove the stolen property from his possession. And if he said that it was lawful and the witnesses admit that they testified falsely, the witnesses must pay.” Please note: he begins the law with one who hired false witnesses for someone else, right? Because this is the law of the Shulchan Arukh, and the Rema is discussing the law of the Shulchan Arukh, and on that he brings the rule of the Ra’ah: that if the other person really was owed the money, then I am exempt, right? Even though the Ra’ah said this rule about a case where he hired them for himself, not where he hired them for others. But as we said earlier, simply speaking it appears to be the same, because in both cases there is “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted.” Now in the second part of the law, the Rema moves on to discuss one who hires false testimony for himself. What happens in such a situation? So he says, “And if he said that it was lawful,” right? The line before the end—that is, that Levi really owed me the money and the witnesses admit that they testified falsely—then the witnesses have to pay. And what if the witnesses do not admit it? “If he said that it was lawful”—why do the witnesses have to pay? If I say that this was done lawfully—I hired the witnesses for my own benefit, I’m Reuven, yes? Now I say it was done lawfully. I admit that I hired false witnesses, but I say there really was a debt; Levi owed me money. So the Rema says: if the witnesses admit that they testified falsely, then the witnesses must pay. And he does not say what the law is when the witnesses do not admit it. It seems obvious that when the witnesses do not admit it, I am exempt from paying; I have “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted.” That is, after all, the rule explicitly stated by the Ra’ah. The first part of the Rema is an expansion that the Rema makes to the words of the Ra’ah. The Ra’ah himself spoke of a case where I hired the witnesses for myself. But beyond that, even from the Rema himself it follows that I am exempt from paying. Why? Because what happens when the witnesses admit that they testified falsely? Then they must pay. Why? They are not conspiring witnesses; this is not “as they conspired.”
[Speaker E] Ra’ah—didn’t we say that a person cannot declare himself wicked?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So why, indeed, if they admit that they lied, do they have to pay? Because the claimant is exempt. That is the proof that the Rema agrees with the Ra’ah here too, of course: that even when I hired the witnesses for my own benefit, if I claim that I hired false witnesses but there really was a debt, I am exempt from paying. So if the witnesses admit that they lied—if the witnesses do not admit that they lied, what do you want from them? They say it was true testimony. The fact that the other fellow admitted it—fine, he admitted it. But if they themselves admit that they lied, then we say to them: wait a second, so you are admitting as litigants that you robbed Levi. The fact that Reuven says there really was a debt is irrelevant; Levi claims there was no debt. Levi sues the witnesses to pay him because, in his view, they lied; in his view they lied and caused him a loss, and therefore they must pay. And Reuven does not need to return the money to him, because Reuven has “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted”—he says there really was a debt. Then it turns out that the witnesses really did cause damage to Levi. And here, by the way, this is not damage by indirect causation; this is direct damage. Because one who hires false witnesses causes damage through them, so his damage is indirect, but the false witnesses themselves are direct damagers, not indirect ones. Therefore they have to pay in a human court, not merely under the laws of Heaven.
[Speaker E] Why shouldn’t we say here that a person cannot declare himself wicked?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We do say that, and therefore they are not believed to disqualify themselves. But as an admission regarding the money, that exists here.
[Speaker E] And what about “once a witness has testified, he cannot go back and testify differently”? After all, they already testified in court, so they’re changing their testimony.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a good question. No—so that’s exactly the point. You don’t need “he cannot go back and testify differently.” Because after all, we are not accepting what they say as testimony. From the standpoint of the testimony, there was a debt here. But you yourselves are saying that you lied, so there is an admission by a litigant on your part that you caused damage. We are not accepting this as testimony. Therefore, it has nothing to do with “he cannot go back and testify differently.” Okay. Fine, so regarding the witnesses’ liability, they would have to pay—not because of “he cannot go back and testify differently.” This is not testimony. Okay? But now notice one more final comment, and with this I’ll finish: when he speaks about someone who hires witnesses for the benefit of another person, he says that he is exempt by the laws of Heaven, but violates “keep far from a false matter.” So what does it mean to call that liable by the laws of Heaven? Apparently, like the Meiri. Right,
[Speaker E] Apparently he understood it like the Meiri, that he has to pay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because after all, he also says there is a prohibition here. So why would you call such a thing exempt by the laws of Heaven? Because he apparently understands that liability by the laws of Heaven means an obligation to pay. And that does not exist here. There is a prohibition here. That’s an indication that he learned it like the Meiri—that “liable by the laws of Heaven” means liable to pay. With some strain, one could say that he is exempt by the laws of Heaven from paying under the laws of indirect causation, regarding the prohibition of causing damage indirectly. That’s what “exempt by the laws of Heaven” would mean, but he still violates “keep far from a false matter.” Fine, maybe one could say that, but straightforwardly that’s not so. Straightforwardly, it seems like the Meiri. Okay?