Yoma, Chapter Eight – Lesson 6 (Partial)

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, for some reason I forgot to record. Fine. In any case, the claim is—well, this we already— the claim is that if you learn like Maimonides, that ordinary Yom Kippur is a broader cessation, then it’s much easier to understand how Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath swallows the Sabbath and becomes a kind of hybrid vehicle, basically an expanded Sabbath. Okay? Good. I really just want to go through, relatively quickly, a few differences between Yom Kippur and the Sabbath, and with that finish the discussion of labor in general. So I’ll summarize the differences I found. I made myself a kind of list, and I’ll summarize it. One difference is regarding the punishment, as we saw, right? On the Sabbath it’s stoning, and on Yom Kippur it’s karet. And if it was inadvertent, then in both cases it’s a sin-offering. But in terms of the definition of the laws themselves, it’s the same thing. The second difference is maybe a difference regarding whether there is a positive commandment concerning labor. According to Rashi at least, Ibn Ezra maintains that there is no positive commandment concerning labor on Yom Kippur. There is only a prohibition. And on the Sabbath there is both a positive commandment and a prohibition. And that’s a certain difference between Yom Kippur and the Sabbath, and maybe it also means that Yom Kippur isn’t really an expanded Sabbath. Maybe. Although you could say it’s an expanded Sabbath only on the side of the prohibition and not on the side of the positive commandment. Here you can play around with that point.

[Speaker B] So, if I understand correctly, there’s no positive commandment on Yom Kippur?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I wasn’t listening. According to Ibn Ezra in Rashi, there’s no positive commandment concerning labor on Yom Kippur. We talked about that in the fourth lecture. As for one who damages or injures on Yom Kippur, the Talmud in Megillah discusses it—what happens if someone caused damage on Yom Kippur? So the discussion there is whether “kim lei be-rabba minei” applies in the case of karet or not. Wait, yes, that is the implication—yes, that’s the implication of the punishment. The difference in punishment can have an implication, because it’s not clear that “kim lei be-rabba minei” applies to karet. It does apply in the case of stoning, as on the Sabbath, and also in cases of inadvertent liability to death penalties. But if the intentional punishment is karet, then “kim lei be-rabba minei” does not necessarily apply. That’s a dispute there in the Talmud, so the implication of the difference in punishment also comes up regarding the law of someone who causes damage on Yom Kippur. There’s also an implication regarding whether there is a positive commandment concerning labor. Then there is room to wonder what happens with a positive commandment overriding a prohibition. Regarding the Sabbath, there is both a positive commandment and a prohibition. Regarding Yom Kippur, if there is only a prohibition according to Rashi, then maybe a certain positive commandment could override the prohibition of Yom Kippur. Admittedly, this is a prohibition that carries karet, so it’s not so simple. Plainly, it isn’t overridden, at least not by an ordinary positive commandment. But there can be an implication for each of the two differences I mentioned: both the difference of whether there is a positive commandment concerning labor, and the difference in punishment—here it’s stoning and here it’s karet. There’s the difference of picking vegetables, which we discussed, and in the simple sense that’s rabbinic. It could be some kind of Torah-level abstention, and we saw there two possibilities to explain why this was permitted on Yom Kippur. Either it was permitted because they wanted to make things easier for us, or it was permitted because they wanted to be stricter with us. Since it causes greater affliction of the soul, therefore they permitted it. Food-preparation labor is another possible difference. Because the question is whether food-preparation labor was not permitted simply because one doesn’t eat, but that still belongs to the laws of a festival, or whether this comes from the laws of the Sabbath. The Netziv talks about this a bit, and maybe I’ll still comment on it later. The difference that raises a lot of discussion, and already begins in the Talmud itself, is the difference regarding travel limits and carrying. The labor of carrying and travel limits exists on the Sabbath and not on a festival, and the question is whether it exists on Yom Kippur. Apparently this is really the implication of our whole discussion—whether Yom Kippur is basically a festival for which food-preparation labors were not permitted because you don’t eat on it, while essentially it is a festival. According to that, apparently the prohibition of carrying and travel limits would not apply. Or you can say that Yom Kippur is Sabbath, and therefore food-preparation labor was not permitted not simply because technically one doesn’t eat on it, but because there is no permission for food-preparation labor at all—everything is forbidden, because it is like a Sabbath of complete rest. And if so, then of course carrying and travel limits would also be forbidden just like on the Sabbath.

[Speaker B] I didn’t understand. Carrying and travel limits are two different laws, right? Carrying is a category of labor, and travel limits is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Both—but both don’t apply on a festival, and the question is whether they do apply on Yom Kippur.

[Speaker B] But on Yom Kippur there’s obviously carrying, no? There’s no doubt about that, right? Why? Because labor is prohibited—“you shall do no labor.” Carrying is labor, isn’t it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so there are those who say carrying—

[Speaker B] —is not labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. No, carrying is—if Yom Kippur is a festival, then since it’s a festival, carrying would not be forbidden on it. The fact that food-preparation labor wasn’t permitted because one doesn’t eat on it—that’s about food-preparation labors, but not about the labor of carrying. Regarding the labor of carrying, it remains like a festival.

[Speaker B] But plainly—I haven’t learned all the later authorities—but plainly, apparently there is a full-fledged law of labor on Yom Kippur, because it says, “you shall do no labor.” It doesn’t say “work.” There’s no difference between the expression of labor on the Sabbath and the expression on Yom Kippur, and there is a difference on a festival. On a festival it always says “occupational labor.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s Nachmanides, but most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) don’t learn even that way. “Occupational labor” means labor. Really? Wow. Obviously. It’s only that they permitted food-preparation labors—that’s a special permission.

[Speaker C] Rabbi, this opinion that there’s no carrying on Yom Kippur—the Talmud says about it that it’s nonsense! Wait, wait. The Talmud rejects it completely. Meaning, there’s not even an initial assumption here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Just a second, just a second. There definitely is an initial assumption. In a moment we’ll see.

[Speaker B] Okay. As for travel limits, why should there be travel limits if it’s not written? I mean, where would that come from? Is there some exposition somewhere that derives Yom Kippur from the Sabbath?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second—you’re jumping ahead of me. That’s exactly my discussion. I’m bringing this in order to show whether Yom Kippur is a festival or whether it is Sabbath. If it’s like the Sabbath, then everything that applies on the Sabbath will apply. If it’s like a festival, then only what applies on a festival will apply.

[Speaker B] Maybe it would be like the Sabbath regarding categories of labor because it says, “you shall do no labor,” but not for things that aren’t written. Travel limits aren’t written. Travel limits are written: “let no man go out from his place on the Sabbath.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Travel limits are connected to carrying. Wherever there is carrying there are travel limits; wherever there is no carrying—

[Speaker B] Why, why? What? Is there a verse connecting it to carrying?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not connected to the labor of carrying; it’s an extension of the concept of carrying. That’s why on a festival it doesn’t apply.

[Speaker B] Why not say it doesn’t apply because it isn’t written?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, it doesn’t apply because it isn’t written?

[Speaker B] Like on a festival—because that law isn’t written for a festival, it’s not written in the Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s rabbinic. There’s a dispute whether it’s rabbinic or Torah-level. Does it have to be written? But even if it is written, they learn it from the Sabbath.

[Speaker B] On the side that it’s from the Torah, according to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rif, even if it isn’t written, they learn it from the Sabbath, because Yom Kippur is Sabbath.

[Speaker B] What, the sages expounded that Yom Kippur has the same law as the Sabbath? Is there some exposition like that? “A Sabbath of complete rest”—that Yom Kippur is like the Sabbath?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, there is a comparison between Yom Kippur and the Sabbath. We saw this in the Talmud. It’s a comparison, not a hekkesh, sorry. Look at the Talmud in Yoma. That’s exactly the question. Say, according to Rashi, “a Sabbath of complete rest” was said about affliction, and then it really comes out that Yom Kippur is not Sabbath—it’s a festival—and then it also fits according to Rashi’s view that there is no positive commandment concerning labor on Yom Kippur, because Yom Kippur is a festival and not Sabbath, so each thing stands on its own. But according to Maimonides it is “a Sabbath of complete rest,” and he takes the exposition of the Sifrei, the verbal analogy that the Talmud makes, and it seems he understands that Yom Kippur is Sabbath. Then I would expect everything to apply on Yom Kippur—carrying and travel limits and everything learned from the Sabbath—and also the positive commandment, by the way, is learned from the comparison to the Sabbath, the same comparison. Not a hekkesh—a verbal analogy, a verbal analogy.

[Speaker B] Where was that comparison? Where was it? In what place was that comparison?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Sifrei, and also on page 81 there—on 114, what we discussed there in the two passages we saw. 114. The Talmud in Yoma says this: “iti, even on the Sabbath,” yes? The appointed man who sends away the goat—even on the Sabbath. For what legal purpose, the Talmud asks? What are they teaching me by saying that the appointed man does it even on the Sabbath? Rav Sheshet said: to teach that if he was sick, one carries him on one’s shoulder. Meaning, if the man with the goat is sick, he carries him on his shoulder. According to whom? Not according to Rabbi Natan, because if it were Rabbi Natan, doesn’t he say that a living person carries himself, and then there is no carrying problem? You can even say it’s Rabbi Natan—someone sick is different. If he’s sick, then he doesn’t carry himself, and therefore there is a prohibition. Rafram said—from here Rafram learns this, that eiruv and carrying apply to the Sabbath, and eiruv and carrying do not apply to Yom Kippur. Okay? Rafram learns from here that the prohibitions of eiruv and carrying do not apply to Yom Kippur. How does he learn it? Because if eiruv and carrying did apply to Yom Kippur, look at Rashi. Meaning: since it was necessary to teach “iti, even on the Sabbath,” one can say that there is no prohibition of carrying on Yom Kippur, because if Yom Kippur were like the Sabbath with respect to carrying, why would I need a verse to permit his burden on the Sabbath? When it falls on a weekday too, it has the same law as the Sabbath. And if for Yom Kippur itself they permitted it for the appointed man, then Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath would also be permitted. What difference is there? It’s the same prohibition. Rather, we are forced to conclude that the prohibition exists only on Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath. On Yom Kippur itself there is no prohibition. And what the verse comes to teach me is that even on Yom Kippur that falls on the Sabbath they permitted the appointed man to carry him on his shoulder. And what comes out here? That there is no prohibition of carrying, and no prohibition of travel limits or eiruv, on Yom Kippur. Okay?

[Speaker D] Now again, I’m saying, in the parallel passage in Keritot—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I’m getting there—they say it’s nonsense. I don’t think anyone rules this way at all, any of the halakhic decisors.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Do people rule that way? Okay, one moment. In the Talmud in Keritot it says this: “There is one who eats one act of eating and is liable for it to four sin-offerings and one guilt-offering: an impure person who ate forbidden fat, and it was left over from sacred offerings, on Yom Kippur.” Rabbi Meir says: “If it was the Sabbath and he carried it out, he is liable.” They said to him: “That is not part of the case.” Okay? Meaning, among other things we are talking about Yom Kippur that fell on the Sabbath, and one is liable for carrying. Fine? “If it was the Sabbath and he carried it out, he is liable.” Now we are talking here about Yom Kippur. Look here. It says Yom Kippur, and Rabbi Meir says, “If it was the Sabbath and he carried it out, he is liable.” What do we see? That if it was ordinary Yom Kippur, not on the Sabbath, then there is no carrying liability. Right? Just as Rafram said above. And indeed here too it brings the same thing: Rav Rafram said, that is to say, eiruv and carrying apply to the Sabbath and not to Yom Kippur. From where, asks the Talmud? Perhaps there is eiruv and carrying on Yom Kippur, and this is what it means: if it was the Sabbath and he carried it out, he is liable also on account of the Sabbath and Yom Kippur. Fine? They are coming to add that if it was the Sabbath, then that adds another prohibition—not only the prohibition of Yom Kippur, but also the prohibition of the Sabbath. Fine? Now what is the conclusion from here? Meanwhile, notice: the Talmud does not disagree with Rafram. It is only claiming that you cannot prove your words from the Mishnah. Because in the Mishnah it could be that they came to teach that there is also a Sabbath prohibition, and there is also a prohibition on ordinary Yom Kippur. So there is no proof for your view, Rafram, from the Mishnah. But still, Rafram’s statement can certainly remain in force. Okay? Now there is room to wonder: what is the novelty here? What is the novelty in the Talmud’s saying that if it is Sabbath then he also violates Sabbath? Well, obviously. Meaning, apparently one might have said like the Or Sameach we saw above, that since it is both Sabbath and Yom Kippur maybe he would be liable only once, or like Rabbi Akiva, as we saw, and to say no: if it is both Sabbath and Yom Kippur, he is liable separately for each one. And that itself is the novelty. But I don’t think you need to go there, because here the whole context is how to produce a case in which one is liable for four sin-offerings and one guilt-offering. We are trying to show a scenario in which one is liable for many offerings all at once. So there is no novelty here in the fact that he is also liable for Sabbath; the novelty is that here, look, you have a scenario in which there are many sin-offerings. So that is why they added Sabbath too, not because there is some novelty that he is liable for Sabbath in addition to Yom Kippur. Therefore I’m not sure this is proof from here. Now the Talmud says: Rather, if Rafram’s statement was said, it was said on this that was stated: as it was taught in a baraita, “and he shall send it by the hand of an appointed man”—“man” comes to qualify even a non-priest; “appointed” means even in impurity and even on the Sabbath. “Appointed” means prepared in advance. It teaches: appointed, even on the Sabbath. Rav Rafram said: that is to say, eiruv and carrying apply to the Sabbath and not to Yom Kippur. What we saw in the Talmud there. So Rafram infers from here that there is no eiruv and carrying on Yom Kippur. At this stage that isn’t contradicted, because in the Mishnah above there is no inference, but there is also no need to say the opposite. His inference from the Mishnah above was rejected—it isn’t necessary—but the law that there is no carrying on Yom Kippur can still remain true. And from the appointed man, from the exposition regarding the appointed man, one really can infer that it is true. Now when we go back to the Talmud in Yoma above, it definitely could be that the Talmud speaks about the Sabbath because on Yom Kippur alone there is no prohibition of carrying. Alternatively—okay? But in the final analysis the Talmud rejects this. It says: from where do you know? The scapegoat is different, because its fitness on Yom Kippur is specifically in this way. What does that mean? On Yom Kippur they permitted the scapegoat. After all, what was Rafram’s proof? We saw it in Rashi above. If on Yom Kippur too there is a prohibition of carrying, and the appointed man is certainly allowed to go on ordinary Yom Kippur—that’s the Torah’s whole law—then we see that for the appointed man it is permitted to violate this prohibition. So obviously when Yom Kippur falls on the Sabbath it should also be permitted for him to violate this prohibition. What difference does it make? It always involves a carrying prohibition. Rather, we are forced—rather, the Talmud rejects that: not at all. It could be that even on ordinary Yom Kippur there is a carrying prohibition, but on Yom Kippur, because the appointed man is part of the service of the day, that overrides it. The service of the day—just like in the Temple where they offer sacrifices and that overrides Sabbath labors—so too the appointed man overrides the prohibitions of Yom Kippur because that is the service of the day. But when Yom Kippur falls on the Sabbath, maybe there he would not override the prohibitions of the Sabbath. Meaning, the service of the day would not override Sabbath prohibitions. Therefore the Talmud has to teach that even when Yom Kippur falls on the Sabbath, the appointed man can do it. And so one cannot infer from here that on ordinary Yom Kippur there is no carrying prohibition. There is a carrying prohibition, only for the appointed man it is permitted. Fine, and the verse comes to teach that this too is permitted for the appointed man when Yom Kippur falls on the Sabbath. Now again—what is the conclusion? So the Talmud says: rather, Rafram’s statement is nonsense. Nonsense, folly, something like that.

[Speaker B] There’s no proof.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Now the question is what is written here. Does it mean that Rafram is wrong in the law—that there is carrying on Yom Kippur, as Doron assumed a moment ago—or does it mean no: in any event there is no proof either from the Mishnah or from the derivation of the appointed man, but the law itself can still be correct. The proof fell, but the law could still be correct.

[Speaker B] And in the Talmud, the law itself isn’t learned from the baraitot. From the baraitot it becomes clear that this is the law?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. He knows it from some other source—tradition, who knows what. He cannot infer it from the Mishnah or the baraita, but that doesn’t mean the law isn’t correct. I’ll say more than that: throughout both passages, no opinion appears that disagrees with Rafram. No one disagrees with Rafram. The entire argument is about whether his inference is correct. No one is talking about whether he is right as a matter of Jewish law. Even when the Talmud says “Rafram’s statement is nonsense,” it could be that what is nonsense is Rafram’s inference, not Rafram’s law. Therefore, in principle, it could be that in the final analysis Rafram is legally correct; only his inference is wrong or not necessary. Tosafot on “Rafram said” in the passage in Yoma says: “In the chapter ‘They said to him’ we say that Rafram’s statement is nonsense, for they challenge him: perhaps the scapegoat is different, because its fitness on Yom Kippur is specifically in this way; rather, Rafram’s statement is nonsense.” That’s all. How do you understand this Tosafot?

[Speaker B] Again, he didn’t add anything.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s unclear, right? You can explain that what is nonsense is the inference. It’s not clear what he means. Although from the wording of Tosafot it seems a bit like the nonsense is the inference, because otherwise he would have said, “and we rule not like Rafram” in that passage there. What do you say in practice at the end? “In the chapter ‘They said to him’ we say”—you see the opposite, that Rafram’s statement is nonsense. Okay, so which passage is right? There’s a contradiction between passages. Which passage is right? Tosafot doesn’t add a word. Why not? Maybe because Tosafot says that all that was rejected is only the inference. The law remains, and therefore there is no contradiction between the passages. Maybe as far as interpretation is concerned there is a disagreement—whether you can learn it from the law of the appointed man. But as far as the law itself, maybe there is no disagreement; everyone agrees there is no carrying. In Tosafot in Keritot it’s somewhat similar: “Rafram’s statement is nonsense. And in the chapter on the two goats it teaches it here and does not reject it: perhaps the scapegoat is different, because there it overrides here; rather, it is common that the words of Torah are poor in one place and rich in another.” How do you understand this? Here, in my opinion, it sounds even more like what I said. Because what does “the words of Torah are poor in one place and rich in another” mean? On a simple reading, a contradiction is hard to see there. “The words of Torah are poor in one place and rich in another” means not all the information is found in one place; sometimes part of the information is found somewhere else. You can enrich your information if you look at parallel passages. But if the passages contradict each other, then that’s a contradiction, not enrichment.

[Speaker B] It’s something additional that isn’t written here; it doesn’t necessarily mean it’s contradictory even if we say that “nonsense”—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said it’s not necessary. I said that in Tosafot it seems more likely this way—more likely here than in Tosafot there—because Tosafot simply calls it “words of Torah”: here they are poor and there they are rich. As if there you see another aspect that doesn’t appear here. But that’s absurd—apparently really absurd—because here you’re basically telling me an incorrect law. You leave me at the end with an incorrect law and say nothing. And elsewhere the words of Torah are rich. So that’s not just enrichment—you’re confusing me. I don’t know, I’m not staking my life on this inference, but I think in the simple reading it seems to me that Tosafot is talking about the inference and not about the law.

[Speaker B] But in any case, the Talmud still doesn’t come out clear, even if we say that “nonsense” refers only to the proof. In one place it says the law as though it’s established, and in the other place it leaves me kind of open-ended. Exactly. Even if we say that “nonsense” only means there’s no proof, still in one place you presented it as if there is proof and it’s final, and in another place you leave it open.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do I care? As long as the law is correct, what do I care?

[Speaker B] That’s exactly the point. What—how do I know it’s correct if there’s no proof? I’m left in doubt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker D] In the law itself, in both places in the Talmud, the proof was rejected.

[Speaker B] The proof was rejected for the claim that that’s the law. But in the second place they said there’s no proof for the law. Right, so what is the law? If there’s no proof, I don’t know that that’s the law. There’s no proof.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The law was stated, as in the second passage: the words of Torah—

[Speaker B] —are poor in one place and rich in another. So that would be the conclusion, that this is the Jewish law?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what Tosafot says. Tosafot says: the words of Torah are rich in one place and poor in another.

[Speaker B] But he says it the other way, that it remains doubtful. Don’t think it was decided that way; rather, it remains in doubt because the proof was rejected.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not at all. “The words of Torah are poor in one place and rich in another” means exactly this: what is written here is correct; you just don’t have all the information. For all the information, look elsewhere. But they didn’t do anything here that is incorrect. The law is correct: there is no carrying prohibition.

[Speaker B] Where does Tosafot say that? I don’t understand that from Tosafot.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t say it explicitly. I read both Tosafot passages and said that from Tosafot’s wording it sounds like that’s what he means. If it’s a contradiction, then what does “the words of Torah are poor in one place and rich in another” mean? The words of Torah—here it says permitted and there it says forbidden. Is that called “the words of Torah are poor in one place and rich in another”? That’s called confusing the reader.

[Speaker B] But where are the positions? The positions are where it says “nonsense”—that one is correct? Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where are the positions? In “nonsense.” “Nonsense”—so there there is no proof, and there the law remains open. There appears the law of Rav Pappa. The law of Rav Pappa appears there, that there is no carrying. The inference there was rejected. That is exactly the full information. The law is correct and the inference was rejected.

[Speaker B] There’s no basis for the law according to what emerges from there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No basis for the law—there’s no proof for the law. The basis for the law comes from the Torah, not from the words of Torah and Mishnayot. He doesn’t say—

[Speaker B] If it came from the Torah and we knew it, then we wouldn’t be arguing with him. We wouldn’t be discussing proofs.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t say the source; he says the law. And his proofs were rejected, but the source remains. That’s what Tosafot says here. If he has a source, then—

[Speaker B] —he has proof. Why doesn’t the Talmud bring it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you ask that, ask it on Tosafot. But what Tosafot says is what I’m saying here. I didn’t understand him otherwise. Why did they leave it like this? But look: what Tosafot says is this.

[Speaker E] In the wording “nonsense”—like, “nonsense,” in the Talmud usually means rejection of proofs. “Nonsense” is a bit too strong a phrase if it only means “that is to say,” no? I’m not sure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If all Rav Pappa said was the proof, then the proof was rejected. Rav Pappa’s law itself never came up for discussion. Rav Pappa’s law appears here as a law with no dissent. Where is there anyone who disagrees with him? Rav Pappa just wanted to bring proof or a source from the Mishnah or from that man, and about that they say: that’s no proof. Fine. You could understand this as a rejection, but then it really is a contradiction between two passages. It’s much harder to say that it was rejected and then leave our passage anonymous, bringing Rav Pappa without any comment. On the contrary, I think it’s much more reasonable to say that the inference was rejected but the law is correct. Now Rif, Maimonides, and Rosh really do rule that there is a prohibition of carrying on Yom Kippur. They learned like Shlomo: the law was rejected. But then, according to them, there really is a contradiction between the passages, right? Because in our passage it appears as a correct law. Yes, but—

[Speaker B] There are lots of places—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —where passages disagree?

[Speaker B] There are lots of places. But Tosafot works harder to reconcile them, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That’s my next point in a moment. According to Tosafot, what I said above means there is no contradiction between the passages; there is only enrichment in one place that isn’t in another. A certain proof that you thought was correct turns out there not to be so, but the law is correct. If I’m right, then Tosafot is going according to its usual method. And by the way, exactly what Shlomo noted here—and this is no longer a matter for scholars; here the medieval authorities themselves already write it. The famous Maharshal writes that there is a difference between the approach of Tosafot and the approach of Rif and the Spanish sages: Tosafot made the Talmud into a ball—that’s his expression—meaning they basically try to harmonize all the passages. That’s what scholars call it. Scholars have quite a bit of work on this difference between the Ashkenazi approach of Tosafot and the Spanish approach: the Ashkenazim basically try to harmonize all the passages, while the Spanish sages have no principled problem with the fact that there are disagreeing passages. And that reflects a different conception of what the editing of the Talmud is doing. Is the editing trying to create coherence, harmonization among all the passages? Or is the editing just putting everything in one place and now you learn it, but there are disagreeing passages within that whole complex? Now, Tosafot’s approach here really fits, I think. Because if Tosafot wants to reconcile the two passages—to reconcile them you can only do it my way. But Rif and Maimonides, who are Spanish sages, are not bothered by the fact that the passages disagree, and they rule like one against the other. So this could definitely be a nice example of that issue. By the way, Rashi in Yevamot 34 and in Sotah rules like Rav Ram, that there is no carrying prohibition on Yom Kippur. Remember Rashi’s general position that we saw? Rashi generally says that Yom Kippur is not Sabbath. Right? He says there is no positive commandment on Yom Kippur. According to Avnei Nezer, he does not derive the labor prohibitions from “a Sabbath of complete rest,” only the affliction prohibitions, against Maimonides. But Rashi really does go with the view that Yom Kippur is not Sabbath. So if so, it fits very well with the fact that he rules like Rav Ram that there is no carrying prohibition on Yom Kippur. Not carrying, not travel limits, not eiruvin, of course, and not all kinds of things like that. Fine? Maimonides, who says that Yom Kippur is Sabbath, also follows his own line. Therefore he rules that there is a carrying prohibition on the Sabbath—on Yom Kippur. So this discussion about Rav Ram may perhaps serve as some sort of source for the fundamental question that has accompanied us throughout all the lectures: is Yom Kippur really Sabbath, or is it an upgraded festival? An upgraded Sabbath or an upgraded festival, really—let’s put it that way. Okay, good. Maybe I’ll just briefly note, because I don’t want to come back to this again in the next lecture: there is a discussion regarding kindling—look in my summary. At least according to the one who says that kindling was singled out as a prohibition, the question is whether it exists on Yom Kippur. On a festival and on Yom Kippur. In Sha’agat Aryeh, section 71, he argues that on Yom Kippur, according to everyone, kindling too was forbidden, and that is proof that Yom Kippur is Sabbath. In short, all these practical implications, for me, are indications of the question that keeps accompanying us: is Yom Kippur Sabbath or festival? So look in the summary. There’s also the resting of one’s animal, where you can discuss this issue too. I don’t think I found a source regarding Yom Kippur, but it’s a practical implication that ought to be discussed. And driving a donkey too—I didn’t find a source, but again that’s what I said there. Distinguishing categories of labor on Yom Kippur: there is some discussion about that too. There is distinction among categories of labor on the Sabbath, and there is no such distinction on a festival, so what happens regarding Yom Kippur? So the later authorities discussed it; there is a long Beit HaLevi and other later authorities who discussed it. Someone who apostatizes by desecrating Yom Kippur—there is a question whether he is like one who apostatizes by desecrating Sabbaths. Despite the severity of Yom Kippur, Yom Kippur is a festival, so it does not belong to the act of creation. “A remembrance of the act of creation” is not denial of the Creator. It could be that one who apostatizes by desecrating Yom Kippur is not like one who apostatizes against the whole Torah, not like one who apostatizes by desecrating Sabbaths. So in the Shulchan Arukh it appears in Even HaEzer 123 that if a scribe deliberately writes a bill of divorce on Yom Kippur, the bill is invalid because the scribe becomes an apostate. So you see that he understood Yom Kippur as like the Sabbath. Again, like Maimonides and Rif, of course, in the Spanish approach. Good. Also regarding the sacrifices of Yom Kippur, there is room to wonder whether that is by the law of Sabbath or festival, but I won’t get into that here. Good, I’ll stop here. Thank you very much.

[Speaker B] More power to you. Thank you very much, Rabbi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Goodbye. I see there wasn’t a recording here. I’ll leave this half hour, but it’s not—

[Speaker E] Shabbat shalom, Rabbi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, have a wonderful Sabbath.