Yoma, Chapter 8 – Lesson 7

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because at the beginning the Talmud is talking about the wording, according to the first version. That’s how it understood it. Afterward, in the baraita, two versions are brought. What’s the difference between the two versions? Exactly this is the difference. Now, after the later version is brought regarding the baraita, now I’m saying there’s no reason not to apply that to the Mishnah as well. So it comes out that the whole first part of the Talmud went only with the first version. And you could say that the entire first version starts from the beginning of the Talmud until the end of the first version here. And the later version, which now explains the baraita, according to its approach you could also explain the Mishnah the same way. And then what you’ll actually see, what this actually means, is that there’s some dispute here whether the term “forbidden” doesn’t apply at all to prohibitions that carry karet, or whether it does apply but it’s not exhaustive. If it applies but isn’t exhaustive, then you can say fine, they said it even though it wasn’t exhaustive because they wanted to gain the last four items on the list. But if it’s simply not correct at all to say it regarding eating and drinking, then even if there are additional items, you can’t say “forbidden” when it doesn’t apply at all. Except that this is difficult, because why indeed doesn’t it apply at all? What’s the problem? Why can’t you say “forbidden” even regarding such prohibitions that carry karet? Karet is the punishment, but it’s forbidden because of the warning prohibition. It could be, it could be that the point is this. Wait. It could be that the point is this. The first version and the first part of the Talmud, their problem isn’t that the term “forbidden” doesn’t apply at all to prohibitions of karet. Of course it applies. Rather, the claim is basically: why are you mixing things that are forbidden on pain of karet with things whose prohibition is just an ordinary prohibition? That’s the point. In prohibitions of karet you should have said that one is liable to karet, and after that brought the other prohibitions and said they are forbidden. True, the term “forbidden” applies to everything, but why are you mixing them together? And to that the Talmud answers—in effect it answers like this: On Yom Kippur it is forbidden to eat and drink and do all these things, and really the prohibition written there is a prohibition on less than the minimum measure. I’m not mixing things together. I brought—the whole list brings only the things that are forbidden without karet. And after that the Mishnah continues—and here I go back to the remark I made to Shlomo above, that the Mishnah does in fact speak about the karet. Later in the Mishnah it says there—wait, one second. Later in the Mishnah it says like this, you see the Mishnah: Yom Kippur is forbidden with respect to eating and drinking and washing and anointing and wearing sandals and marital relations. A king and a bride may wash their faces, and a woman after childbirth may wear sandals; these are the words of Rabbi Eliezer, and the Sages forbid it. One who eats an amount the size of a large date, including its pit, and one who drinks a cheekful, is liable. All foods combine to the size of a date, and all liquids combine to a cheekful. Eating and drinking do not combine. What does “liable” mean? Liable means liable to karet.

[Speaker C] Yes, but that’s already a different law, a separate law in the simple sense. In the first law karet isn’t mentioned, only prohibition is mentioned.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the first sentence.

[Speaker C] But in the baraita both prohibition and karet are mentioned, and therefore—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is—Shlomo, I understood, wait, one second. The first part of the Mishnah doesn’t mention the karet. The second part mentions the karet. And what you need to read is like this, according to the first version and the beginning of the Talmud. I’m now fitting this onto the introduction I gave in the second lecture. Yom Kippur demands from us a complete cessation. From labor, from eating, from drinking, from afflictions, from everything. Complete cessation means down to the smallest crumb. You’re forbidden to eat anything at all, even a partial measure. After that the Mishnah adds and says: if you eat the size of a large date or drink a cheekful, then you also incur karet. That’s a different passage. But the whole initial list comes to tell me basically the obligation of cessation, the prohibition, and therefore specifically the less-than-the-minimum-measure is not a forced reading. Less than the minimum measure comes to tell you how far the obligation of cessation extends. You’re forbidden to engage at all in any of these things, including in the tiniest measures. True, regarding punishment, that applies only at the size of a large date or a cheekful. That’s what the Mishnah says later, that if you eat a large date-sized amount or drink a cheekful, then there is a punishment of karet. And if that’s so, then maybe it’s easier to understand this forced reading of less than the minimum measure. Basically the claim is that the whole first part is talking about prohibition, a prohibition that does not involve karet, including eating and drinking. It does not involve karet. And that’s what the Talmud really says, in the way it explains the baraita. Look at how the Talmud formulates it, in the first “this is what it means”: this is what it means—when they said “forbidden,” they said it only regarding less than the minimum measure. What does that mean? Everything they said in the first part—regarding eating and drinking, that means less than the minimum measure, and regarding the other afflictions, those are the other afflictions, exactly as the Talmud said at the beginning. But at the minimum measure—now they continue explaining the continuation of the Mishnah—but at the minimum measure one is punished with karet. Even though one is punished with karet, one is punished with karet only for eating and drinking and doing labor. Only here was the distinction introduced between eating and drinking and the other afflictions with respect to karet. Regarding prohibition, the obligation of cessation is a complete obligation of cessation for everything. For everything. And therefore here they really were talking about less than the minimum measure. It is an obligation of cessation, a complete obligation of cessation. Regarding the punishment of karet, what is newly taught is that it applies only from the minimum measure and up. That is completely correct; it’s a different matter. Except what? Here one still has to understand—there’s still a certain strain here. Why? Because according to what I’m suggesting here, it comes out that this law of less than the minimum measure stated here in the Mishnah is a special law of Yom Kippur; it’s not the regular law of less than the minimum measure. On Yom Kippur there is an obligation of cessation, a complete obligation of cessation, even for a crumb, independent of the regular law of less than the minimum measure stated for all Torah prohibitions. Right? If I understand that the Mishnah here is talking about the parameters of the obligation of cessation on Yom Kippur, then apparently it’s saying here a special law of Yom Kippur because of the complete obligation of cessation; therefore I’m forbidden even to eat a grain or drink a little, not because of the general law of less than the minimum measure that exists in all Torah prohibitions of eating, but because of the obligation of cessation on Yom Kippur. So why does the Talmud connect this here to the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish whether less than the minimum measure is forbidden by Torah law or only rabbinically? And afterward the Talmud starts discussing, in itself, that there is a prohibition of less than the minimum measure throughout the Torah. Apparently it seems from here that what is being discussed is not less than the minimum measure because of the obligation of cessation on Yom Kippur, but rather the ordinary law of less than the minimum measure, like all Torah prohibitions—there’s also a law here of less than the minimum measure. So that’s a bit of a comment on what I said earlier. I don’t know. Unless we say that really there are two laws here. One law is less than the minimum measure on Yom Kippur—that’s the less-than-the-minimum-measure law of the obligation of cessation. And since we have a complete obligation of cessation on Yom Kippur, that’s different from all prohibitions of eating, different from all prohibitions of eating in the Torah; here there is, fundamentally, a Torah obligation of cessation even for any amount whatsoever. It’s no less severe than washing, anointing, wearing sandals, and marital relations. Complete rest, cessation, “and you shall afflict yourselves,” or from wherever they derive all the other prohibitions—we’ll see in a moment—all the other obligations of affliction. So eating and drinking in less than the minimum measure also enter into this general obligation of affliction. Karet—this exists only for eating the minimum measure and drinking the minimum measure. The law of less than the minimum measure in the rest of the Torah is an additional law. Obviously, beyond the specific law of Yom Kippur there is also the prohibition of less than the minimum measure that exists in all Torah prohibitions. Look at the Talmud—and several later authorities already noted this—on page 73b the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish is brought, right? Whether less than the minimum measure is forbidden by Torah law or permitted by Torah law. And then the Talmud says on 74a—you see 74a in the last part of the page—“Returning to the main discussion: less than the minimum measure—Rabbi Yohanan said it is forbidden by Torah law, Reish Lakish said it is permitted by Torah law. Rabbi Yohanan said it is forbidden by Torah law since it is fit to combine, he is eating prohibition. Reish Lakish said it is permitted by Torah law; the Merciful One said ‘eating,’ and here there is no eating.” Fine, so apparently that’s a reasoning: since it is fit to combine. The Talmud asks: Rabbi Yohanan objected to Reish Lakish—“I only know that whoever is subject to punishment is subject to warning; with regard to a koy and less than the minimum measure”—or “kebi,” I don’t know how that’s pronounced—“and less than the minimum measure, since it is not subject to punishment, one might think it is not subject to warning. Therefore the verse says: ‘any fat.’” What does “any fat” mean? Any fat—even the tiniest amount of fat. Yes, they include from the verse “any fat,” even the tiniest amount of fat. So there is a scriptural source that forbids less than the minimum measure, not merely the reasoning that it is fit to combine; it’s from a verse. So maybe there is here—

[Speaker C] A source from a verse—that’s with fat? The source from a verse is with fat.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, so all of it—it’s not in the whole Torah. On the contrary, so maybe “fit to combine” was said about Yom Kippur. That’s the reasoning of Yom Kippur: in the end he is eating prohibition, and it isn’t called ceasing if you eat less than the minimum measure. Regarding less than the minimum measure in the whole Torah, maybe that really isn’t from the reasoning of “fit to combine” but from the verse “any fat,” even the tiniest amount of fat.

[Speaker C] Maybe the verse is speaking only about fat?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s a general model for the whole Torah.

[Speaker C] It’s a general model?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, otherwise if it’s speaking about any fat, then what is the objection to Reish Lakish? The objection to Reish Lakish, who says less than the minimum measure is permitted, would be answered by saying “any fat” is unique to fat—what do you want? Obviously it’s speaking about the whole Torah.

[Speaker C] No, I understood that it’s forbidden to eat. You’re saying that even for “any fat” it’s called eating because of the reasoning that it is fit to combine.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, so you’re suggesting another explanation. We’ll get to it when we talk about less than the minimum measure—why we need both things. Right now I’m suggesting a different direction to reconcile our Talmud passage. What I want to claim is maybe that the reasoning of “fit to combine” really speaks only about Yom Kippur, because on Yom Kippur it simply expands the prohibition even to less than the minimum measure regardless, even according to Reish Lakish. Maybe—even according to the reasoning of Reish Lakish, not “also according to Reish Lakish.”

[Speaker C] But why is that needed as indispensable? On Yom Kippur we say it’s complete cessation, that’s it. You don’t need to reach the reasoning of “fit to combine.” It’s another reasoning.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And also what is not called—

[Speaker C] What is it, because of “fit to combine” that it isn’t called—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —ceasing, to eat less than the minimum measure?

[Speaker C] It’s another reasoning, as I understand it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You understand yes, and I’m suggesting no.

[Speaker C] Fine, okay. And also the Talmud—their dispute looks like it’s in general; they weren’t talking about Yom Kippur at all. It’s a novelty to say that what they were talking about—the Talmud brought it here in context, but not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I agree with what you’re saying here, and I also agreed earlier. And still I’m saying that if I want to reconcile the Talmud the way I said before, there is a way to read the Talmud differently: that “fit to combine” is an expansion of the concept of cessation, and “any fat” is the source for the prohibition of less than the minimum measure in the whole Torah. The difficulty here is more than just that it doesn’t sound right; the difficulty is that the Talmud explains the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish this way, with “fit to combine.” So it seems that it’s not so—unless we say that they have two disputes. Meaning, Reish Lakish disputes also on Yom Kippur, saying that less than the minimum measure is not forbidden, or is forbidden only rabbinically, and also regarding the rest of the Torah Reish Lakish disputes because of “any fat.” Then these are two independent disputes—that’s already harder. Although it could be that Reish Lakish, because he doesn’t accept the reasoning of “fit to combine,” therefore he doesn’t accept it both on Yom Kippur and in the rest of the Torah. Rabbi Yohanan says to him: the reasoning of “fit to combine” speaks about the cessation of Yom Kippur; regarding the rest of the Torah you’re right, but there I really have “any fat,” even the tiniest amount of fat. Okay? Then maybe it’s easier to say this. Again, I’m saying all this in a tentative way, because the truth is that the Talmud really is difficult, as I said earlier. What bothers the Talmud about the term “forbidden” being applicable also to eating and drinking when it comes in a list with all the other afflictions? What is difficult about that? The only way I can understand it is according to the first version I’m speaking about; the later version really says this itself, but then it comes out that the later version disagrees with the beginning of the Talmud, and that isn’t mentioned there—the beginning of the Talmud follows the first version. And still an explanation is needed according to the first version and the beginning of the Talmud: what bothers them about the term “forbidden” applying to the whole list because of the last four items? So I suggested this proposal here; whoever accepts it will accept it, and whoever doesn’t, won’t. Just one second, let’s use the opportunity for how I do this, one second.

[Speaker B] Okay,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I was just taking attendance. Okay, so I’ll continue. I now want to continue regarding the status of the other afflictions. We saw in the later version that the later version derives the other afflictions from “complete rest,” cessation, and that means there is no karet for them. Now, the fact that there is no karet for them is clear; probably the first version agrees too, because after all both versions come to explain the baraita. And in the baraita it says explicitly that the punishment of karet is only for one who eats and drinks, not for the other afflictions. The difference between the two versions is only the question of what the word “forbidden” refers to—whether to the four afflictions or to less than the minimum measure—but clearly there is no karet. So now—why is there no karet in the other four afflictions? Or alternatively, what is there in them? Where are they learned from? What prohibition is there in them? In the second version it says explicitly: they are learned from “complete rest,” cessation. What does the first version say? It could be that the first version holds that the four afflictions are only a rabbinic prohibition. And therefore it is unwilling to interpret the term “forbidden” as referring to a rabbinic prohibition, and therefore it says they said it regarding less than the minimum measure—but of course that is only according to Rabbi Yohanan, who says that it is a Torah prohibition. According to Reish Lakish, less than the minimum measure is also forbidden only rabbinically, so you gained nothing by that, okay? But the Jewish law follows Rabbi Yohanan, so perhaps it goes according to the normative Jewish law, according to Rabbi Yohanan, that less than the minimum measure is forbidden by Torah law, and therefore the first version said that “forbidden” can refer only to a Torah prohibition, namely the prohibition of less than the minimum measure according to Rabbi Yohanan. The four afflictions are a rabbinic prohibition. If I’m right, then the dispute between the two versions is about the status of the four afflictions. According to the first version it is a rabbinic prohibition; according to the later version it is a Torah prohibition of “complete rest,” cessation. But notice: “complete rest,” cessation, in the simple sense, is a positive commandment, right? It’s not a prohibition. “Complete rest,” cessation, is a positive commandment. So here we have either a rabbinic prohibition or a positive commandment. Look at Rashi on the words beginning with “complete rest”; look in front of you on the later version on 74d. Rashi says: “Complete rest”—it is written regarding affliction. What does that mean? “Complete rest” speaks about affliction. We already saw that this is Rashi’s view, right? As opposed to Nachmanides, who derives from “a Sabbath of complete rest” the positive commandment regarding labor, Rashi says that “a Sabbath of complete rest” speaks about affliction. And here too that’s what the Talmud seems to imply, that from “a Sabbath of complete rest” they derive the four afflictions, implying that it speaks about the afflictions, not the labor. Rashi continues and says: “And just as regarding ‘complete rest’ said concerning the Sabbath, the rabbis relied upon it for the other labors that were not in the Tabernacle and are not full labor, so too this ‘complete rest’ regarding affliction, as it is written ‘it shall be a complete rest for you and you shall afflict yourselves,’ comes to add to the affliction of eating and drinking.” Meaning, just as on the Sabbath the word “complete rest” comes to add rabbinic prohibitions, prohibitions of cessation that are not full labor and are not forbidden by Torah law, so too regarding affliction here on Yom Kippur, the word “complete rest” comes to add afflictions that are not from Torah law but rabbinic, and they are not full affliction included in the affliction that carries karet, and that is what is learned—the four afflictions that are not full afflictions. This is how most later authorities understand Rashi: that according to Rashi the four afflictions are forbidden rabbinically, like rabbinic Sabbath restrictions. But we know that the Ritva and Nachmanides—I already mentioned this—and perhaps Maimonides too, there is some dispute in understanding Maimonides, understand that “complete rest,” cessation on the Sabbath is a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic one. It is a Torah prohibition that is not stoning; it is not one of the labor prohibitions; it is an obligation to cease as a prohibition—meaning, a positive commandment, okay? It is a Torah obligation to cease from things that are not labors, the character of the Sabbath or something like that. According to that, it could be that even in Rashi one can say that “complete rest,” cessation written regarding the afflictions—the four afflictions on Yom Kippur—is also a Torah prohibition not included in karet, just as “complete rest” is not included in the prohibition of stoning for labor on the Sabbath. The question is what Rashi’s view is. And if so, then it could be that here too what Rashi means is that the four afflictions are not prohibitions of karet, but they are still Torah prohibitions learned from “complete rest.”

[Speaker G] From where in Rashi is that implied?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait. The phrase “the rabbis relied on it” could suggest that this is only rabbinic law and merely a support-text. But that isn’t necessary, because “the rabbis relied on it” can mean something like “Scripture handed it over to the rabbis.” The verse there too—even the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who speak about Torah-level cessation on the Sabbath—also agree that the rabbis are the ones who determine what is included in Torah-level cessation. Scripture handed it over to the rabbis, just as was said regarding the Sabbath; it was also said regarding the afflictions of Yom Kippur, and then it could be that it is Torah law.

[Speaker G] From where did the Rabbi say that it’s implied from Rashi that cessation is Torah law?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It seems to me it’s in tractate Shabbat on 114, in the Talmud there. Shabbat 114? Yes, what we saw, the passage we saw there regarding preparing vegetables. Okay. Fine, look there. It doesn’t have to be, but that’s how it seems. So as I said, this will depend on the understanding of how one understands the “complete rest” of the Sabbath. Whoever understood that the “complete rest” of the Sabbath is Torah law, though not labor, will likely understand here too that the four afflictions are Torah law though not karet. Whoever understands that there “complete rest” is merely a support-text and a rabbinic prohibition, here too will say that the four afflictions are a rabbinic prohibition. The Talmud in tractate Nedarim 2b—the Talmud there discusses whether washing is called self-affliction. If someone vowed to afflict himself or swore to afflict himself, is he allowed to wash? Okay? The Talmud says yes, and the rabbis said that washing contains self-affliction when one does not wash. It tells me that if she did not wash, that is called self-affliction. But they raise a contradiction: no, even though one is forbidden in all of them, one is punished with karet only for eating and drinking and doing labor. Yes, that is the baraita brought here. And if you say that when one does not wash there is affliction on Yom Kippur, then if one washes one should incur karet. You’re telling me that washing too is affliction, so why is there no karet for washing? From here we see that washing is not affliction. Rava said: it depends on the context of the verse. Regarding Yom Kippur, where it is written “you shall afflict yourselves,” it means something whose affliction is felt now; washing, its affliction is not felt now. Sorry—its affliction is felt now; washing, its affliction is not felt now. Regarding vows, where it is written “every vow and every binding oath to afflict the soul,” it means something that comes to affliction. And if she does not wash, it comes to affliction. What is he saying? If I don’t wash now, it doesn’t afflict me right now. I will come to affliction if I haven’t washed. In vows, it is enough that I will come to affliction. On Yom Kippur I am not afflicted right now from the fact that I am not washing. Therefore washing is not affliction. Therefore don’t challenge me from Yom Kippur to the laws of vows and oaths. So Tosafot—so washing is—

[Speaker E] A form of cessation, according to that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Exactly. According to that, washing is a form of cessation. Apparently that’s what comes out. Look in the Talmud. Tosafot there in Nedarim: “But they raise a contradiction: even though one is forbidden in all of them—marital relations, wearing sandals, washing, anointing, etc.—one is punished with karet only for eating, because that is affliction, and is included in ‘every soul that is not afflicted shall be cut off.’ And if you say that refraining from washing is affliction, then washing too should incur liability on Yom Kippur.” Up to here he explains the Talmud. And Tosafot asks: this is difficult, because in the last chapter of Yoma 74b it asks, “And if you would say it means affliction through marital relations, behold it says ‘you shall afflict yourselves’—what affliction involves loss of life? This is eating and drinking.” If so, washing too—even if it is called affliction—one is not liable for it. On 74b the Talmud says that washing too is affliction; it’s just not an affliction involving loss of life, and therefore one is not liable for karet for it. So regarding Yom Kippur, what are you proving to me from the fact that there is no karet? Fine, but there is still a prohibition, because it is called affliction. So regarding oaths and vows, washing should indeed be called affliction. So this contradicts the Talmud in Nedarim. There is a contradiction between the Talmud in Nedarim and the Talmud on 74b here. The Talmud in Nedarim assumes that if there is no karet for washing on Yom Kippur, then apparently it isn’t called affliction at all. But the Talmud here on 74b says the opposite: it is called affliction, just there is no karet for it. Karet applies only because it is not an affliction that destroys life. Only eating and drinking—if you don’t eat and drink, you die. But washing is not an affliction that destroys life, though it is called affliction. And then according to this, regarding vows and oaths, washing should have been included in self-affliction. So why does the Talmud there say no? That’s Tosafot’s question. Tosafot says: one can say that certainly it is not affliction by Torah law, and the verse of affliction is merely a support-text, yet it is called affliction, and so is the conclusion here. Tosafot says: there is no choice—if we want to reconcile the passages, we have to say that the verse is only a support-text and washing is really not included in affliction at all. It is merely a support-text. And therefore, regarding oaths and vows too, washing is not included among the afflictions. So Tosafot says: here, the reason one is not liable to karet for washing is because it is rabbinic law, merely a support-text, not a Torah prohibition without karet. There is no Torah prohibition either; it is only a rabbinic prohibition. Merely a support-text.

[Speaker C] There’s no prohibition of affliction, but maybe there’s a prohibition of cessation, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, in a moment we’ll see. In a moment we’ll see. So really—maybe you already said it—so let’s say it here. “Merely a support-text”—Tosafot doesn’t bring our Talmudic passage, where they derive the afflictions from “complete rest,” cessation. Why doesn’t he bring from here, from where they derive it from “complete rest,” cessation? Because he wants to show that it is affliction, not to show that it is forbidden. From “complete rest,” cessation, you can’t learn that it is affliction. Therefore he brings the Talmud on 74b, from where we see that it is called affliction, and about that he says it is merely a support-text. But regarding the level of prohibition, there could be a Torah prohibition learned from “complete rest,” cessation. It just isn’t called affliction. But then something very interesting comes out, namely that both are positive commandments. After all, affliction itself is a positive commandment, “you shall afflict yourselves,” and that does not include washing. Also, the positive commandment of washing is not the same positive commandment as eating and drinking. Do you understand what comes out from this? That is, karet was stated only for eating and drinking, not for washing, right? But karet was stated regarding the prohibition of eating and drinking. What about the positive commandment? I would have said the positive commandment in eating and drinking is like that of washing, according to the one who says it is a Torah prohibition. But no—even the positive commandment of eating and drinking is learned from affliction. Right? Karet is given for the prohibition. The positive commandment is “you shall afflict yourselves.” And that positive commandment was said regarding eating and drinking. Does it also include washing? The answer is no. Washing has a Torah-level positive prohibition on Yom Kippur, but it is not learned from “you shall afflict yourselves” but from “complete rest,” cessation. This is all if I accept what Shlomo said, and also that in Tosafot there is a Torah prohibition on washing on Yom Kippur. But in the simple sense—and this is how most later authorities understand it—Tosafot means there is no Torah prohibition at all. Everything is just a support-text. Also “complete rest,” cessation is a support-text, and also affliction is a support-text, and therefore it is only a rabbinic prohibition. Look for example at the parallel Tosafot here on 77a: “And Rabbeinu Tam explained”—this is Tosafot’s view here too—“that all the afflictions of Yom Kippur are only rabbinic, and the verses are merely support-texts, except for eating and drinking.” Here it is already clear: there is no Torah prohibition except eating and drinking. And the other afflictions are a rabbinic prohibition. What about “complete rest,” cessation? That too is a support-text. Not only affliction is a support-text, but also “complete rest,” cessation is a support-text. They are all support-texts. Okay? Now, Tosafot in Nedarim—I’m saying—it’s not stated there explicitly. One could have combined it with what I said earlier and say that everything he says is only a support-text concerns only the connection to affliction. But from the perspective of “complete rest,” cessation, there might still be a Torah prohibition even in washing. But if Tosafot here says this, then in the simple sense it seems that Tosafot there means this too. Although at the beginning of Tosafot on 77a another view is brought; I don’t want to get into it because that would require getting into the passage. But Rabbeinu Tam’s explanation is the second answer in Tosafot. There is a first answer from which it appears that it is not just a support-text, but a Torah prohibition. And then one has to say that there really is a Torah prohibition but without karet. Then it comes out that there is a dispute between the passages, because the Talmud in Nedarim implies that this is not included in affliction, while here it says it is a Torah prohibition. You’ll say to me, no, there is no contradiction between the passages, because what is written here—that it is a Torah prohibition—is because of “complete rest,” cessation, not because it is affliction. But that’s not correct, because the Talmud here is speaking about all the afflictions of Yom Kippur, and this concerns the meaning of the word “affliction.” We’ll see this later. Look here at the Talmud on 76a-b: “Forbidden in eating—these five afflictions correspond to what?” And they talk about all five as afflictions. So apparently it’s not talking here about “complete rest,” cessation; it is talking about the afflictions. And so it seems indeed to work this way. Rabbeinu Tam says it is all merely support-texts, a rabbinic prohibition. Rashi seems to imply—could imply—that it is learned from “complete rest,” cessation here in our passage, whether rabbinic or Torah. The same with Tosafot in Nedarim: he says that from the side of affliction it is only a support-text, but from the side of “complete rest,” cessation there might be a Torah positive commandment. I don’t know—unless I combine him with Rabbeinu Tam here. The beginning of Tosafot on 77 seems to imply that even regarding affliction itself it is not merely a support-text, but there is a Torah positive commandment without karet for the other afflictions. And then it really seems that this is a dispute between the passages over against Nedarim, because it is speaking here of affliction too as a Torah affliction,

[Speaker B] not only “complete rest,” cessation, okay? Now there are parallel passages. Look at 74b: “The rabbis taught: ‘you shall afflict yourselves.’” See?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “The rabbis taught: ‘you shall afflict yourselves.’” One might think he should sit in the sun or in the cold so that he suffers? Therefore the verse says, “and you shall do no labor.” Just as labor is by passive omission, so too affliction of the soul is by passive omission. On the face of it the Talmud is trying to add more afflictions, right? “You shall afflict yourselves.” And then it rejects it, saying yes, but one need not sit in the sun or the cold. And in the simple sense it implies that the other afflictions—what are they? They are indeed Torah-level, and they are included in “you shall afflict yourselves,” right? It’s only that beyond these five afflictions, don’t add more. But these four afflictions, the Talmud understands, are Torah-level afflictions. Otherwise what is the discussion of sitting in the sun and the cold? After all, even washing, anointing, and wearing sandals wouldn’t really be required by Torah law—they would all be rabbinic. Rather, the Talmud here assumes that all the afflictions are Torah-level. There is a distinction regarding karet, but Torah-level there certainly is. And on that the Talmud asks: if it is only these six, perhaps sitting in the sun and the cold should add still more afflictions? To that the Talmud says no. But the other afflictions—in the simple sense it seems they are Torah-level. Further, the Talmud says later—

[Speaker C] But in the simple sense it also seems there would be no difference between them, and there should be karet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand. I didn’t understand.

[Speaker C] In the simple sense it also seems there would be no difference between them and one would be liable to karet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But it says earlier in the Talmud that there is a difference. So I’m saying, fine, maybe—

[Speaker C] It doesn’t fit this baraita.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe it’s a dispute. No, who says? Regarding the derivation—

[Speaker C] Why should there be a difference if everything is learned from “you shall afflict,” and “you shall afflict” is passive omission?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s it. Because there is a derivation that excludes the other afflictions from karet. Which derivation?

[Speaker C] According to this baraita there isn’t; that’s another baraita. It’s not this baraita, it’s a different kind of exposition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? But you’re deciding there is a dispute between the passages, and I’m trying to reconcile them. I can reconcile them. There is an exclusion that excludes the others from karet.

[Speaker C] I didn’t understand. The exclusion that excludes from karet also excludes them from the very idea of affliction. According to that exclusion they aren’t included at all in the verse about affliction.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe in “complete rest,” cessation; maybe in affliction but without karet, no?

[Speaker C] But here it learns it from affliction, not from “complete rest.” Here it doesn’t learn the prohibition of the five things from “complete rest”; it learns it from affliction, and therefore—but only by passive omission—so there’s no difference. There should have to be karet for all of them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not sure that the exclusion there from karet doesn’t exclude them here as well. Why shouldn’t it exclude them here too?

[Speaker C] Because according to the exclusion there, this isn’t called affliction at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For purposes of karet they aren’t called affliction.

[Speaker C] What? That’s already not—no. How do you expound it, how do you expound it that it applies only for this and not for that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’ll explain. “You shall afflict yourselves” is the positive commandment. In the positive commandment, afflictions include everything. But karet is given for the prohibition: “every soul that is not afflicted shall be cut off.” Regarding the “not afflicted” that appears there—wait, wait—regarding the “not afflicted” that appears there, the matter of karet, it does not include the other afflictions, only eating and drinking.

[Speaker C] There it’s a prohibition? But there in the simple sense it’s a positive commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Where is a prohibition written there?

[Speaker C] “Not afflicted”—one who does not fulfill the affliction, that’s the plain meaning.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. What you said in the lecture before last, that the prohibition is learned from the fact that there is karet. And the affliction to which the karet refers is the affliction of the prohibition. Where does the warning come from? So Maimonides says there are various expositions, but the karet refers to the prohibition, not the positive commandment. So if that’s so, then the affliction that appears in the context of the prohibition—there only eating and drinking are included, not the other afflictions. But “you shall afflict yourselves,” which is the positive commandment, may include the other afflictions too. At least if we are not making a dispute between the passages. Fine, let’s continue. In a moment there will be disputes among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). “And if you should wish to say: where someone is sitting in the sun and it is hot for him, shall we not say to him, ‘Get up and sit in the shade’? If he sits in the shade and it is cold for him, shall we not say, ‘Get up and sit in the sun’? It must be similar to labor. Just as with labor you did not distinguish, so too with affliction do not distinguish.” All the time they insist on comparing the other afflictions to eating and drinking. Only afflictions that are not these four afflictions are excluded here. And the Talmud says explicitly that we are speaking only about afflictions similar to eating and drinking, where we do not tell them, get up and sit here, get up and sit there. That implies that all four afflictions are like eating and drinking, so they are Torah-level. There is no karet because that is only on the positive commandment of the Torah law, like eating and drinking. That was excluded from the prohibition of karet. Now the Talmud asks: “And if you wish, say instead: behold it says, ‘and I will destroy that soul’—an affliction that involves destruction of life; and what is that? Eating and drinking.” Yes, so the Talmud says, no matter—“the school of Rabbi Yishmael”—wait—“behold it says, ‘and I will destroy that soul’—an affliction that involves destruction of life; and what is that? This is eating and drinking.” Fine, so the affliction that involves destruction of life—that is “and I will destroy that soul,” that is karet. Okay, only an affliction involving destruction of life has karet. So on the contrary, it actually implies that this is not the meaning of the word “affliction”—I’m answering Shlomo—it implies that this is not the meaning of the word “affliction.” Rather, it was excluded from karet because karet speaks only about a certain type of affliction, namely afflictions that involve destruction of life. But that does not mean that the word “affliction” does not include the other four afflictions. It does include them. For example, regarding the positive commandment it includes them. Yes.

[Speaker C] Now, yes, but according to this Tosafot will come out—Tosafot, if we say that this is only the affliction of karet—I didn’t understand. Because what Tosafot says about destruction of life—so they say that only about the affliction of karet, but maybe it is still affliction regarding the prohibition? So what is their question? As if they didn’t really answer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s what I asked. I said that according to Tosafot in Nedarim, there is probably a dispute between the passages. There’s nothing to be done. So in any case there is a dispute between passages.

[Speaker C] According to them, would there be karet for washing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, of course not. There is a dispute between the passages. In the passage in Nedarim it says that washing is not included in affliction at all, not even for karet. Affliction—the word “affliction” does not include washing. Also not regarding the prohibition.

[Speaker C] What? Also not regarding the prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, also not regarding the prohibition. It’s literal altogether. The word “affliction” does not include washing. According to whom? It’s astonishing. Fine, in any event that contradicts the passage here. So now, if so, we have three views. The Tosafot view, that all this is just support-text. Rabbeinu Tam’s view: it’s all support-texts, the four afflictions are rabbinic. Another view: affliction includes washing too. And now this splits into two: either there is here the positive commandment—there is the positive commandment but not the prohibition, and therefore there is no karet, but there is a Torah positive commandment regarding the four afflictions; or there is both the positive commandment and the prohibition, because after all the word “affliction” includes washing too, only “and I will destroy that soul,” the karet, excludes the other afflictions and leaves only eating and drinking. And these three views appear among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and also among the later authorities (Acharonim). Tosafot’s view, that everything is rabbinic. The Ran’s view, that there is both a Torah prohibition and a positive commandment even in the other afflictions, only no karet. And Maimonides’ view seems in the simple sense to be that it is only a positive commandment and not a prohibition. We’ll see in a moment. Old Tosafot at the beginning of the chapter—look in front of you, it’s printed there at the beginning of the chapter on the side of the page. “Yom Kippur is forbidden with respect to eating and drinking and washing and anointing, etc.” Apparently this implies that all these afflictions except eating and drinking are rabbinic, since there is no karet for them; only for eating and drinking, as we say in the Talmud. And also because we permit a king and a bride to wash, and one who has sores on his head to anoint as usual without concern, and one whose hands are dirty with mud or excrement to wash. All these, by the way, are the proofs of Rabbeinu Tam, whom I didn’t read inside. Rabbeinu Tam argues that all this is rabbinic, for otherwise we would not find all these specific leniencies in the other afflictions. In washing and anointing there are various leniencies in situations of a king or a bride or dirty hands, etc. Rabbeinu Tam says that if it were Torah law, the rabbis could not have permitted it.

[Speaker C] But if we learn according to the way of the Ritva and Nachmanides, that “complete rest” is Torah law but it’s through the rabbis, then you wouldn’t have a proof.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right, and that’s exactly why they say this—we’ll see in a moment. So in any event, that’s also what Old Tosafot says: that apparently all this is rabbinic, okay? “However,” says Old Tosafot, “all these can be pushed aside, because there is karet only for eating and drinking, which involve loss of life, as we say in the Talmud, even though all of them are from the Torah.” What does “they are from the Torah” mean? Both the prohibition and the positive commandment, only they were excluded from karet. “And also only washing the whole body is forbidden by Torah law.” So what about all these leniencies if it is forbidden by Torah law? Since in those leniencies it is not merely suspended, it is permitted outright; not because of need, but because it was not prohibited in those contexts. Fine? “However”—I’m skipping a bit—“from the fact that it used this language.” What does he say—“complete rest,” cessation, all this is support-text, etc. “From the fact that it used this language, ‘five afflictions correspond to what,’ and did not say ‘from where do we derive it’ or ‘how do we know it,’ it implies that those verses are merely support-texts.” His conclusion is that he rejects the possibility that this is Torah law, and he says it is merely support-text. Fine? “And know this, because it derives the five afflictions from the same source as eating and drinking. So perforce they are not derived from that verse. And furthermore, from what is said here, ‘and the woman after childbirth may wear the sandal,’ according to Rabbi Eliezer, while the Sages forbid—here this is certainly only suspension and not permission. Only because the woman after childbirth may wear the sandal. If it were a Torah prohibition, how could they permit her? And there is no danger, since the rabbis forbade it where there is no danger.” In short, his conclusion is that this is rabbinic law. In the She’iltot—I’ll share it with you from the She’iltot: “The Holy One, blessed be He, warned Israel to sit in fasting on the tenth of Tishrei, even if it is on the Sabbath, and it is forbidden in eating and drinking and wearing sandals, washing, anointing, and marital relations by Torah law. Everything is forbidden by Torah law. From where do we know this?”

[Speaker H] Five afflictions are written. “And you shall afflict,” “you shall afflict”—one for eating and drinking, for washing, anointing, wearing sandals, and marital relations.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This is the Talmud on page 77 that says: corresponding to what are the five afflictions? Corresponding to the five times it says “you shall afflict,” corresponding to the five afflictions. Tosafot Yeshanim brings this and says that it is just an asmachta, a scriptural support. The She’iltot derives from this that everything is included under the category of affliction. Simply from his language it seems both the prohibition and the positive commandment are included. It is forbidden both by a prohibition and by a positive commandment. It was only excluded from karet, that’s all. And here later on he explains — I’m not going to read all of this because we don’t have much time. Later he explains all the permissions. The proof of Rabbeinu Tam — after all, Rabbeinu Tam brought proof for why this is rabbinic, like Tosafot Yeshanim: the fact is that there are all kinds of permissions to wash, to anoint, and so on. If this were a Torah-level prohibition, they wouldn’t allow it in exceptional cases. So he brings here — he explains that all these things actually are permitted, either because this is not merely overridden but entirely permitted, or because — as I’ll explain later — Scripture handed it over to the Sages; I’ll show that later. The view of the Ran is that this really is forbidden by Torah law. Let’s see the Ran; I’m sharing it with you here.

“It is explained in the Talmud that all of these are called affliction, and regarding Yom Kippur five afflictions are written, and these five are — with drinking included under eating. And it is explained in the Talmud that when it teaches ‘forbidden,’ which implies that even regarding eating there is a prohibition, but there is no karet — it refers to a half-measure, meaning eating less than a large date, etc. But one who eats a date-sized amount or drinks a cheekful is also liable to karet. But all the others — namely washing, anointing, wearing shoes, and marital relations — there is a prohibition, but there is no karet.”

“There is a prohibition” here means, simply speaking, both a positive commandment and a prohibition in full — according to the one who holds that there is both a positive commandment and a prohibition, of course. “And some say further that these are prohibited only rabbinically, and even though the Talmud derives them from verses, they are only asmachtot” — that’s Rabbeinu Tam — “and that is why we are lenient,” etc. “So Tosafot concluded.”

And the Ran says: this is difficult for me, because it was taught in the Talmud: “Although they said it is forbidden, they said that the punishment of karet applies only to one who eats, drinks, or does labor.” And if it is true that these other afflictions are only rabbinic, how is it relevant to say about them, “they did not say the punishment is karet,” when there is not even a Torah prohibition there at all? He infers from the language of the baraita that we saw at the beginning of the lecture: what do you mean, “they did not say the punishment is karet except for one who eats and drinks”? It should have said: they did not say there is a Torah prohibition except for eating and drinking. Not only was karet stated only regarding eating and drinking — the Torah prohibition itself was stated only regarding eating and drinking. But you can see that this is not so; it was excluded only from karet, not from the Torah prohibition.

“Therefore it seems to me that all of them are from the Torah, but since they are not included among the afflictions explicitly written in the verse, but rather come from the extension of ‘a Sabbath of solemn rest,’ as stated in the Talmud, they are lighter, and Scripture handed them over to the Sages. And behold, they were lenient with them as they saw fit and permitted anything not done for pleasure.” Here we already see another hint to how he understands it — not like Tosafot Yeshanim. He apparently holds that here there is only a positive commandment learned from “Sabbath-rest, rest from labor.” There is no prohibition here, because this is not really affliction in the full sense. But there is this “Sabbath-rest, rest from labor,” so there is a positive commandment here.

And now all of Rabbeinu Tam’s inferences are resolved, right? How did Rabbeinu Tam allow it? How did the Talmud permit, in various situations, the five afflictions if they are Torah-level? What does “Sabbath-rest, rest from labor” mean, and “Scripture handed it over to the Sages”? Exactly like Nachmanides says about “rest” on the Sabbath: the Sages are the ones who determine what is permitted and what is forbidden. So the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. The Sages determined that this is forbidden, so they can also permit it in various situations. Therefore it is permitted, but in essence it is still Torah-level.

But in the final analysis the Ran hesitates on this matter. Everyone cites the Ran’s view as saying that it is Torah-level, but it’s not so simple, because in the end the Ran hesitates here. And the Ran says — okay, I’m not going to read it now, I’ll just say it: the Ran asks, I’m allowed to feed minors, I’m allowed to wash minors, and these are things done only for pleasure. How can it be permitted if there is a Torah prohibition — “you shall not make them eat,” “you shall not feed them”? Anything forbidden to an adult is also forbidden to be actively given to a minor. And if this is a Torah prohibition, then how could they permit feeding it to minors? Therefore, says the Ran, maybe after all it could be only rabbinic; it requires further analysis.

To feed? What does “feeding” mean? No, no — “feeding” means putting juice into their mouths by hand, or “feeding” in a metaphorical sense: actively giving them a prohibition. So what about eating and drinking, you’ll ask? That’s really what you meant to ask, Shlomo. So eating and drinking — after all, we are allowed to feed them, right? And eating and drinking clearly involve a Torah prohibition; there’s even karet. So how is it permitted to feed them those things? The Minchat Chinukh asks this, and he says it’s because of danger to life. These are things that involve loss of life. So he says, then feeding is difficult, because that would mean I’m only allowed to feed them up to the point of preserving their life; once they’ve eaten the minimum necessary, beyond that I would be forbidden to feed minors. We don’t find such a thing, we don’t find such a thing. So I think that eating and drinking need different explanations in any case. And if eating and drinking require different explanations regarding feeding minors, then it also won’t be so difficult why regarding the other four afflictions I’m allowed, for example, to wash them. I’ll give the explanations when we get to minors, but once there are explanations for eating and drinking, then washing is not such a strong difficulty either.

I’ll finish maybe just with Maimonides’ view; I still want to get to that. We’ll do it quickly because I don’t want the lecture to go on too long. Look at Maimonides in chapter 1, halakhah 5; I’m sharing it. I stop the screen share each time because every so often I want to see you, so that’s why I’m jumping around a bit with the sharing.

“And we likewise learned by tradition that it is forbidden to wash on it, or to anoint, or to wear shoes, or to have intercourse. And it is a commandment to refrain from all these, just as one refrains from eating and drinking, as it says, ‘a Sabbath of solemn rest.’ ‘Sabbath’ regarding eating, and ‘solemn rest’ regarding these matters.” That’s it. What does “by tradition” mean? It’s somewhat vague language. But it seems that he learns “a Sabbath of solemn rest” as an actual derivation. He does not say that they merely attached it to the verse. And you should know that for Maimonides, “by tradition” means something not written explicitly in the verse, but derived through interpretation. That is called “by tradition.” But in essence he learns “a Sabbath of solemn rest” as a full-fledged derivation.

But look further: “And one is liable to karet or a sacrifice only for eating and drinking alone. But if one washed, anointed, wore shoes, or had intercourse, they give him disciplinary lashes.” Here there is one word that is very important: “or a sacrifice.” “One is not liable to karet” still doesn’t prove anything — it could be that there is a prohibition here, but no karet. But why is there no sacrifice? Seemingly that implies there is no prohibition. Therefore there is no sacrifice; there is only a positive commandment, as he says, because it is learned from “rest from labor.” But it’s not so clear. Why? Because there is no karet here, right? When is one liable to bring a sacrifice? Not for every prohibition. For which prohibitions is one liable to bring a sacrifice? Only for prohibitions for which deliberate violation incurs karet. But here, regarding washing and these things, even if there is a prohibition, there certainly is no karet. So automatically there would also be no sacrifice for unintentional violation. Therefore it could be that Maimonides holds that there is also a prohibition here.

I’ll say it again: from his language it seems that he learns it from “solemn rest,” and “solemn rest” is a positive commandment. But the fact that there is no sacrifice is not proof. Why do I say that? Because the Ran himself wrote about his own view: “And so too wrote Maimonides.” And the Ran himself — now the question is what exactly he means — simply speaking, the Ran says there is a Torah-level positive commandment here but not a prohibition. Therefore it seems the Ran understands Maimonides as holding that there is a positive commandment here and not a prohibition. In Maimonides himself there is room to hesitate. There is room to hesitate, because the fact that there is no sacrifice does not necessarily mean that there is no prohibition. But it is true that he says it is learned from “Sabbath-rest, rest from labor,” which indeed looks like a positive commandment.

So in Maimonides’ view it somewhat appears that this is only a positive commandment and not a prohibition, and therefore the absence of a sacrifice is not only because there is no karet but also because there is no prohibition. Then Maimonides really joins the Ran, just as the Ran says: “And so too wrote Maimonides.” Tosafot Yeshanim raises the possibility that it is both a prohibition and a positive commandment and rejects it, concluding that it is rabbinic like Rabbeinu Tam. But the She’iltot seems to say that it is Torah-level, like the initial assumption of Tosafot Yeshanim. So in the end we really have three positions.

Rabbeinu Tam’s position is that it is rabbinic, and that is also the conclusion of Tosafot Yeshanim. The initial assumption of Tosafot Yeshanim — and that is also what seems to emerge from the She’iltot — is that it is both a Torah-level prohibition and a positive commandment; there is just no karet. The Ran’s position — unless his hesitation at the end changes things, but this is how his view appears — is that it is a Torah-level positive commandment, and this is also how he understands Maimonides, and that indeed also seems to be the plain sense of Maimonides: that it is only a positive commandment, but still Torah-level. And “they give disciplinary lashes” is fine; even for a Torah-level positive commandment they can give disciplinary lashes. Whenever there are no formal lashes, no forty lashes, they give disciplinary lashes.

Look in the Commentary on the Mishnah at what Maimonides says, and with this we’ll finish. By the way, maybe before that — in Sefer HaMitzvot, Maimonides lists the afflictions, the other afflictions, only under the positive commandment and not under the prohibition. Positive commandment 164. So that is also somewhat evidence that for him they exist only under a positive commandment.

In the Commentary on the Mishnah he writes as follows: “The Torah did not explicitly state the prohibition of these things on the fast of Yom Kippur; rather, it used language of affliction five times. It said ‘a Sabbath of solemn rest,’ etc., and it said ‘a Sabbath of solemn rest,’ etc., and ‘on the tenth,’ etc., and ‘but on the tenth,’ etc., and ‘and this shall be for you,’ etc. And it came by tradition” — that’s what he called “by tradition” above — “that this comes to forbid five bodily pleasures: nourishment, washing with water, anointing with oil, wearing shoes, and sexual relations. And regarding each of these the language of affliction is stated in the verses, but they are hints and asmachtot, while the essence of their prohibition is tradition. And anyone who does one of these is liable to disciplinary lashes.”

Okay? So here again Maimonides’ language is not entirely clear. What is this tradition? “By tradition”? Simply speaking, it is a Torah-level positive commandment, but one that emerges by interpretation. And according to Maimonides, what emerges from interpretations is not exactly Torah law in the plainest sense. So here I remain with a certain ambiguity. Okay?

Fine, maybe just look here at the end of the Commentary on the Mishnah, one more sentence. “And it is desirable that the king appear handsome, as it says, ‘Your eyes shall behold the king in his beauty,’ and likewise a bride, so that she should not become repulsive to her husband; therefore we permitted them to wash their faces. And Scripture handed it over to the Sages.” Even if this is a Torah-level positive commandment, there is still room to permit it. It is not as Rabbeinu Tam tries to prove, that it must therefore be rabbinic. Even if it is Torah-level, Scripture handed it over to the Sages, and so they permitted it to them so that she should not become repulsive to her husband.

Okay, I’ll stop here. You’ll be able to see the details already in the summary, but I’ll stop here. Does anyone want to ask anything?

[Speaker E] A comment? Thank you very much, Rabbi.

[Speaker B] Thank you very much, Rabbi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thank you.