This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Feedback on the structure of the lecture and breaks
- Combining topic-based study with continuous study of the pages
- References for the next lecture and summaries on the website
- Planning the lectures and the goals of the learning
- The distinction between day and night on Yom Kippur and the Talmudic passage on page 81a
- The “etzem etzem” move, five verses about labor, and creating availability for a verbal analogy
- A sensitive reading of the structure of the sugya: the day-night split as a secondary argument
- An objection to the verbal analogy and the status of a verse as “available”
- Multiple views in the sugya and a proposal for why they do not accept “etzem etzem”
- Repetitions in the Torah, the ninth root in Maimonides, and the question of textual surplus
- Maimonides in the laws of resting on the tenth and presenting day-night in relation to affliction
- The old Tosafot versus Maimonides and understanding the initial assumption
- The explanation of Gevurat Ari: connection to the atonement of the day
- Moving to the addition to Yom Kippur and the exposition of “and you shall afflict yourselves on the ninth”
- “The tanna of etzem etzem” versus the exposition for the addition, and suggested practical differences
- An intentional break and participants’ questions
- Administrative questions about the first semester
Summary
General Overview
The text presents feedback about the difficulty of maintaining concentration in a long frontal lecture and proposes a simple solution of short breaks instead of “artificial didactics” like tasks and breakout rooms. He asks the learners to combine topic-based study that progresses according to the conceptual structure with continuous movement through the pages of the chapter in order to get a complete picture, and explains the limitations on sending source sheets because there is no organized mailing list during Elul. He then lays out the planned order of the lectures and details the goal of the track: to build a broad view of Yom Kippur while also drawing wider insights about general halakhic concepts.
Feedback on the structure of the lecture and breaks
He says that some people find it hard to stay focused through an hour and a half of frontal teaching. He proposes incorporating methodological breaks of two or three minutes in the middle of the lecture, with the option to ask questions and talk, instead of assignments, breakout rooms, and working on sources, which seem to him like “unnecessary nonsense.” He also gives an example of “refreshing” the audience with a joke in the style of Rabbi Akiva about Esther and Sarah.
Combining topic-based study with continuous study of the pages
He asks whether the participants are also “running through the chapter” alongside the lecture, and reminds them of his request to combine topic-based study with continuous study in page order, so that the two tracks together will provide a good picture of the chapter. He says that each person should decide for himself, but recommends running through the pages because the lecture itself does not follow page order, but rather content and structure, and continuous study gives prior familiarity with the sugyot.
References for the next lecture and summaries on the website
He says that he uploads a summary of each lecture to the website, but that is not a convenient format for references and source sheets. He explains that usually he builds an email group and a mailing list in order to send summaries and guidance, but in Elul he avoids that in order to save everyone the “unnecessary hassle,” and therefore it is hard for him to send messages simply. He mentions the possibility of placing files in a folder on the site, although that is less convenient, and presents the expected order of topics so that anyone who wants can move ahead.
Planning the lectures and the goals of the learning
He plans to deal first with questions about the nature of Yom Kippur time, including the addition to the day, eating on the ninth, the difference between day and night, and the role of time in the prohibitions of Yom Kippur. After that he plans to move to the obligation of women and minors, with reference to the Mishnah and Talmud in Sukkah 28 and to the Mishnah on page 82 in their tractate, and then move on to the prohibitions of eating in general and the comparison between eating prohibitions on Yom Kippur and ordinary eating prohibitions. He says his goal is twofold: to present an overall structure of Yom Kippur within which the details function, and at the same time to extract from Yom Kippur an understanding of general concepts such as women’s obligation in commandments, minors’ obligation in commandments, the difference between a prohibition and a positive commandment, and the nature of “times” in Jewish law.
The distinction between day and night on Yom Kippur and the Talmudic passage on page 81a
He opens with the distinction between day and night on Yom Kippur, and emphasizes that the Talmudic passage on page 81a brings a derivation with separate warnings and punishments for day and for night, something we do not find in other festivals. He asks why there would even be an initial assumption to distinguish between day and night, and what the relation is between that initial assumption and the conclusion once it is established that both are forbidden.
The “etzem etzem” move, five verses about labor, and creating availability for a verbal analogy
He presents the words of Ravina, “This tanna derives it from ‘etzem etzem,’” and the idea of the verbal analogy “etzem etzem” as based on an available verse, and brings the Talmud’s explanation that “five verses are written concerning labor,” divided into a warning for daytime, a warning for nighttime, a punishment for daytime, a punishment for nighttime, and one more “to make it available,” in order to teach affliction from labor, both by day and by night. He cites Rashi, who explains that this means “four prohibitions and one karet,” and explains how two punishments are produced by means of “if it is not needed for one matter” and the creation of textual availability.
A sensitive reading of the structure of the sugya: the day-night split as a secondary argument
He argues that the distinction between day and night regarding labor arises only in the context of the need for a source for the warning about affliction, and not in an independent discussion about labor. He concludes that the initial assumption to distinguish between day and night is “weak,” because it is pulled in only to explain an excess of verses in order to create availability for the verbal analogy, and not because there was a strong primary assumption to distinguish that way. He notes that if there had only been four verses about labor, or if there had been a warning about affliction from another source, there would have been no need to interpret the verses as dividing labor between day and night.
An objection to the verbal analogy and the status of a verse as “available”
He explains that the fact that the Talmud says “there is room to object” shows that the derivation is being treated like a verbal analogy that is not based on an available verse, in which case objections are possible, whereas a verbal analogy based on an available verse is not open to objection. He interprets Ravina as coming to explain that the derivation is a real verbal analogy precisely because it is available, and not an analogy in the style of a general paradigm, so there is no room for objection in the ordinary sense. He describes the possibility that in borrowed language even an analogy is called a “verbal analogy,” and when it is not available it in practice functions like a general paradigm and therefore can be challenged.
Multiple views in the sugya and a proposal for why they do not accept “etzem etzem”
He notes that the Talmud presents additional opinions for the source of the warning about affliction, such as the school of Rabbi Yishmael, Rav Acha bar Yaakov, and Rav Pappa, and comments that the Talmud does not discuss why they do not accept the “etzem etzem” move. He suggests that the other views are not willing to accept the whole construction of dividing labor into day and night in order to serve the creation of textual availability, and therefore they reject the move and establish a different derivation. He adds that from the standpoint of the tradition of verbal analogy as well, the problem of disputes about verbal analogies is discussed among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), and he cites the understanding of Nachmanides and the sages of Spain that a verbal analogy requires traditional support, but is not necessarily a “complete tradition” from Sinai.
Repetitions in the Torah, the ninth root in Maimonides, and the question of textual surplus
He uses Maimonides’ ninth root about repetitions in Scripture in order to distinguish between an approach that sees repetitions as strengthening an idea without any halakhic practical difference, and an approach that requires every repetition to teach an additional detail or to create availability for exposition. He suggests that if there are too many “extra” verses, perhaps they are meant for reinforcement and not to create availability, but when one remains surplus after the functions have been divided, there is room to see it as available for a verbal analogy. He compares this to the rule of “the tanna taught and omitted,” and to the question “what did he omit that he omitted this?” as a quantitative argument about the meaning of omission.
Maimonides in the laws of resting on the tenth and presenting day-night in relation to affliction
He cites Maimonides in the Laws of Resting on the Tenth, chapter 1, law 6: “Just as labor is forbidden on it both by day and by night, so too affliction is forbidden both by day and by night,” and emphasizes that the structure of the laws presents the day-night point as something especially needed in order to teach affliction, whereas in labor itself Maimonides presents the prohibition as an obvious given. He sees this as strengthening the reading that the day-night division is not an independent basic premise in labor, but rather a tool within the discussion of affliction.
The old Tosafot versus Maimonides and understanding the initial assumption
He quotes the old Tosafot, who wonder: “I do not know—do we require everywhere a punishment for daytime and nighttime regarding labor, such as Sabbaths, Jewish holidays, and Chol HaMoed?” He emphasizes that the old Tosafot understand the sugya as a general initial assumption about the need for separate warnings and punishments for day and night also on Sabbaths and Jewish holidays. He presents this as a different reading from Maimonides, for whom the discussion arises specifically because of the special nature of Yom Kippur and the link between labor and affliction. He suggests that the old Tosafot may see Yom Kippur as a kind of neighborhood combination of two separate aspects—labor like Sabbath and holiday, and affliction as a unique law—whereas Maimonides sees it as one broad rest.
The explanation of Gevurat Ari: connection to the atonement of the day
He cites Gevurat Ari, who suggests that the initial assumption to distinguish between day and night stems from the verse’s linking affliction and labor to “for on this day He will atone for you,” and since “the night of Yom Kippur does not atone, only the day does,” one might have said that the night is not included at all in affliction or in the prohibition of labor. He uses this to show that the initial assumption may be unique to Yom Kippur because of its connection to atonement, and not because of ordinary laws of labor.
Moving to the addition to Yom Kippur and the exposition of “and you shall afflict yourselves on the ninth”
He moves to the sugya of adding onto Yom Kippur on page 81b and presents the exposition of “and you shall afflict yourselves on the ninth day of the month,” together with “in the evening” and “on the ninth,” which leads to the conclusion, “one begins and afflicts oneself while it is still day,” and from there to the rule that “one adds from the weekday onto holiness.” He presents the continuation of the exposition for the end of the day—“from evening to evening”—and the expansion to Sabbaths and holidays through “you shall rest” and “your rest,” and the rule that “every place where rest is stated, one adds from the weekday onto holiness.” He notes that Maimonides brings the law of addition only regarding Yom Kippur, whereas other medieval authorities (Rishonim) understand a Torah-level addition also for Sabbaths and Jewish holidays.
“The tanna of etzem etzem” versus the exposition for the addition, and suggested practical differences
He presents the Talmud’s question, “And the tanna of etzem etzem—what does he do with this ‘on the ninth day of the month’?” and explains that the question assumes that the tanna of etzem etzem already has a derivation for the addition from limiting expressions that exclude the addition from karet and from the prohibition, so that the verse “on the ninth” is extra for him. He describes the possibility of understanding a dispute about the nature of the addition: is the addition an extension of Yom Kippur itself, or a new separate positive commandment? He suggests practical differences, such as whether women are obligated in the addition if it is a newly created positive commandment without a prohibition, as opposed to a continuation of the day’s positive commandment, in which women would in any case be obligated; and he raises possible practical differences on Sabbath in connection with kiddush and whether the addition is “the beginning of the Sabbath” or an additional framework.
An intentional break and participants’ questions
He stops for a short break to get some air. A participant asks about the source of the positive commandment to rest on Sabbath and its connection to “remember” and “observe,” and he replies that in Maimonides there are sources like “and on the seventh day you shall rest,” and says this needs to be checked in the relevant sugyot, while distinguishing between sanctifying the day and the positive commandment of refraining from labor.
Administrative questions about the first semester
A participant asks about “topics in the thought of Jewish law,” and he answers that this refers to a meta-halakhic look at the system of Jewish law, including the nature of dispute, the relation between Jewish law and truth, pluralism and tolerance in Jewish law, the meaning of rejected opinions, and autonomy in halakhic rulings versus precedents. Another question comes up about the scheduling problem ahead of the next semester.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One more point from the feedback I got from some people: apparently it’s a little hard to maintain concentration through an hour and a half of frontal teaching. A few people told me that. So maybe I’ll try—I was thinking of doing some methodological breaks in the middle, talk a bit, ask questions, whoever wants can get up and take a two- or three-minute break, and then we’ll come back to the lecture. Okay? I mean, you can give assignments, divide people into rooms, look at sources, and all kinds of things like that—I don’t know, it seems to me like unnecessary nonsense. Meaning, if you want to refresh the audience, you don’t need artificial didactics. You just take a few minutes’ break and come back, and that seems more sensible to me. Like Rabbi Akiva’s jokes, right? Why did Esther merit to rule over 127 provinces? Because she was the daughter of Sarah, who lived 127 years. Fine, so that’s the first point. The second point—I wanted to ask whether all of you are also running through the chapter a bit, looking at the pages. What I asked at the beginning was that alongside our learning, which is being done more or less according to thematic order, there should also be some continuous learning through the pages, because overall it seems to me that these two tracks together will give a good picture of the chapter. So I’m just reminding you again to really try to run through the pages alongside the lecture. One more comment—just one more second—another comment: people asked me about references for the next lecture, meaning sources to look at before the next lecture. Here, to be honest, I had thought of doing that, and I even did it in the first two times—I added it at the end of the summary I uploaded to the site. I don’t know how much you looked at the summary, but I upload a summary of each lecture to the site. But really, that’s not a convenient format. Usually I build an email group and a mailing list, and then I send messages, summaries, and guidance before the next meeting. Now here, since it’s Elul, just four or five weeks, I thought I’d spare everyone all that unnecessary hassle of an email group, so I didn’t build one. Now I understand that the price is that I can’t send you messages or source references in a simple way.
[Speaker B] And there’s a folder—there’s a folder on the site. You can put it there, there’s your folder on the site.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But then I—
[Speaker B] I know, it’s an option.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, right, it’s an option, just a less convenient one. I assume some people don’t go into that folder, and even if they do, I upload a file in which it says, “Look at these two sources”—it’s not really a proper file. So maybe somehow I really will do that. In any case, I’ll tell you more or less the expected order, so that whoever wants can see what comes next. Today I want to deal with questions connected to the nature of Yom Kippur time: the addition, eating on the ninth, the difference between day and night on Yom Kippur—questions connected to time, yes, how time plays a role in the prohibitions of Yom Kippur. The coming lectures—I probably won’t finish this today—but the next lectures, after I finish this, I’ll deal with the obligation of women and minors. I hope I’ll do that in one session. The obligation of women and minors—Sukkah 28, there it’s women and minors, and the Mishnah on page 82 in our tractate and the Talmud there. After that I’ll move to eating prohibitions. Eating prohibitions in general, and eating prohibitions on Yom Kippur compared to regular eating prohibitions. And more or less that will finish the thematic discussion of Yom Kippur. I assume that’ll use up our time. If it doesn’t use up our time, then maybe we’ll still do something for half a lecture and deal with more specific things that come up in that context. Right now I specifically want to look at the overall picture, although in every aspect of the overall picture I am trying to show broader dimensions too—yes, what is a prohibition, what is a positive commandment—not just to talk about the prohibition and the positive commandment of Yom Kippur, but to see a little what that means in more general halakhic terms. So it’s a double goal, so to speak. On the one hand, I’m trying to present a big-picture view of Yom Kippur, some kind of structure within which all the details are supposed to function. But also, within that picture, I’m trying not to be specific only to Yom Kippur, but from Yom Kippur to try to see what it says about more general concepts: women’s obligation in commandments, minors’ obligation in commandments, what the difference is between a prohibition and a positive commandment, what “times” are in general, how time plays a role on Yom Kippur but also in Jewish law generally, and things like that. Okay, so that’s… Fine, that’s it for the clarifications. Let me get into the matter. Okay. Fine, so we’re basically…
[Speaker C] Can I ask something for a moment? We said once that if we’re learning in order—since the first lectures, I’ve been learning a lot of these topics from the first lectures and the sources for the positive and negative commandments, so I’ve been more focused now on those sugyot and less learning in order. Is that okay?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s up to your judgment. I’m only recommending. As long as you’re learning, do whatever you want—you’re grown-ups.
[Speaker C] I’m just recommending that in order to get—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —some kind of overall picture, precisely because I’m not going in page order but each time entering some sugya that’s relevant, and my order is not the pages but the content or the structure, then precisely in order to complete the picture it is worthwhile to run through the pages, because that way you get a fuller picture, in my opinion. And I also think that it gives you some familiarity with the sugyot when we get to them, because you’ve already seen them in your regular learning, or at least some of them. But that’s only a recommendation—decide what you think. Okay, so regarding the commandments of the day, as I said, I want to deal with four aspects. The time-commandments as the essence of the time. One is the distinction between day and night on Yom Kippur, which we already saw on page 81. The second is the addition to Yom Kippur. The third is a discussion about the nature of time on Yom Kippur itself—is it one unit, is it made up of parts, of moments?—and the commandment of eating on the ninth, before Yom Kippur. Those are basically the sugyot that touch on times connected to the time-frame of Yom Kippur. So I’ll start for a moment with the distinction between day and night. The Talmudic passage on page 81a brings a derivation with separate warnings—warnings and punishment separately—for day and for night. And that requires explanation. We haven’t found this on other festivals, that we need two separate warnings, one for day and one for night, or two separate punishments, and here somehow the Talmud does bring that. And the question is why, and what it means, and what the conclusion is after they’ve already said that both day and night are forbidden. Does that completely negate the initial assumption, or how exactly are we to understand the relation between the initial assumption and the conclusion? So let’s begin with the Talmud on page 81a. The Talmud there, I remind you, we actually saw it. The Talmud there deals with the warning regarding affliction, and Reish Lakish says there is no explicit place where it is written—how do we know the warning concerning affliction on Yom Kippur? So within that discussion Ravina says as follows: “This tanna derives it from ‘etzem etzem.’” He makes a verbal analogy, “etzem etzem.” Available. The word “etzem” is available, because otherwise you don’t make a verbal analogy—at least available from one side. And that’s a question the commentators already raise here, because it’s only available from one side and not from both sides, and the question is whether that’s enough for a verbal analogy. Seemingly that’s a dispute, but here the Talmud assumes that being available from one side is enough. “And if it were not available, one could object, as we objected.” Okay? If it isn’t available, then it can be challenged. The Talmud says: In what way is it available? It says like this: “Five verses are written concerning labor.” One for the daytime warning, and one for the nighttime warning. Warning—all this is about labor. So at this point it’s a warning for day and a warning for night. “And one for the daytime punishment, and one for the nighttime punishment.” Meaning one is a punishment for the day, one is a punishment for the night. So far we have four.
[Speaker C] Rabbi, can you share the screen? The Talmud?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That would be easier, at least for me.
[Speaker C] No problem, I’m sharing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here it is. This is basically the summary that afterward I’ll upload to the site. So yes—basically we have “etzem etzem,” and it has to be available. How is it available? The Talmud says there are five verses, and all of them are about labor. Five verses were said about labor. The Talmud says: one for the warning of the day, one for the warning of the night, one for the punishment of the day, one for the punishment of the night—that’s four. One remains for us. “And one to make it available,” meaning one is free, “to learn affliction from labor, both by day and by night.” The Talmud says that once that one is free, then our derivation is that we learn from labor, where both by day and by night there is punishment and warning, and the verbal analogy teaches us that the same is true regarding affliction, both by day and by night, for punishment and for warning. Okay? So everything basically applies both to affliction and to labor. Rashi there on the spot—I’ll share that too—look here further on: “Five verses are written concerning labor: four prohibitions and one karet.” In Acharei Mot, in the section “but on the tenth…” —in Masoret HaShas there’s some correction here—“one for the nighttime punishment, for if it is not needed for a warning, assign it to punishment.” Yes, Rashi tells us that the four written verses are four prohibitions and one punishment. Now notice: from this we derive two warnings and two punishments. Right? Labor by day and by night: warning; punishment by day and by night. So there are two warnings and two punishments for labor here. Affliction comes from the fifth, but the first four are all about labor. Now in terms of the verses, it’s four prohibitions and one karet. So how do we get two punishments here? Rashi says two are for the warnings: two from within the four prohibitions are warnings. The karet is apparently for the punishment—punishment for labor. We are left with two more warning verses. One warning is for the nighttime punishment, because the punishment is a punishment for the day. The nighttime punishment—that comes by “if it is not needed for one matter,” because for warning we no longer need it; we already have a warning both for day and for night. So by “if it is not needed,” it teaches me punishment even though it’s a verse of warning, and the remaining warning verse is the one that is available, and it creates the verbal analogy for us to teach that the same is true regarding affliction. Okay? That is why Rashi writes here, “and one for the nighttime punishment”—the second Rashi—“for if it is not needed for a warning, assign it to punishment,” assign it to the matter of punishment. Okay? So that’s the point. Now here, of course, the question arises: how are we making a distinction between day and night here? Why specifically here does that initial assumption arise, to distinguish between day and night? What is special about Yom Kippur that doesn’t arise on Sabbaths, on Jewish holidays? Usually we speak about a twenty-four-hour day—it’s a full day. It’s not like the other fasts of Tisha B’Av and Yom Kippur—well, those actually begin by day. So here and there we do find laws that are only on half a day, only by day. But in Torah-level law, at least, when we talk about some special day, it is always a full day. It isn’t— even the Passover sacrifice, for example, includes the following night, right? It’s the 14th, the day of the 14th and the night after it. That itself is the festival—what the Torah calls the Festival of Passover. In the Torah, the Festival of Passover is the 14th, not the 15th. So it’s always a full day. The question of whether the day follows the night or comes before the night—that’s sacrificial matters and non-sacrificial matters, yes, the well-known things. In any case, the question is why an initial assumption arises here. Now here I want you to pay attention and be a little sensitive to the way this appears in the Talmud. When the Talmud speaks about a warning for labor, there is no hint that there are separate warnings for day and night. It isn’t brought in that context. The Talmudic discussion here deals with affliction, and in the context of the discussion about affliction they go back to labor and suddenly find that we have a separate warning for day and for night, and now they return to affliction: there is a verbal analogy, and that teaches that affliction too applies both by day and by night, the punishment and the warning. But this whole distinction between day and night in labor arises in the context where we are looking for a source for affliction. And about labor itself, nobody says that there is a warning for day separately and a warning for night separately. Only in the context of the source for the verbal analogy that teaches me about affliction do they suddenly start making distinctions between day and night in labor, and that itself requires explanation.
[Speaker C] There isn’t any source at all for the laws of labor, right? I didn’t understand. I’m not saying it’s against it, but there isn’t really any source for the labor laws, right? Anyway, it comes up in this context and not as an independent context.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. And if it had been said about labor by itself, I would have expected there to be a discussion about labor too, and that they would bring four verses there and also explain why the Torah needs to say four verses in order to state warning and punishment by day and by night. By night. And afterward you’d tell me that the fifth is the verbal analogy from labor to affliction. But this whole thing is not there. In the context of the derivation about affliction, they suddenly remember that there are separate warnings about labor by day and by night. Now that itself cries out for interpretation. It seems a little from here that if indeed—let’s say there were—suppose there had only been four sources and not five, or alternatively suppose we had a warning for affliction from somewhere else, I don’t know from where, then not—or not alternatively, even in addition—that I have a warning for affliction, I found it, the Torah wrote it explicitly, let’s say, okay? Besides that, I have four verses about labor. Would we say that those four verses refer to warning and punishment for day and night? It seems to me not.
[Speaker C] There’s another question too, right? Why regarding affliction don’t they derive four verses—for the prohibition of day and night and a warning for day and night?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That isn’t a problem, because the verbal analogy tells you that whatever exists in labor exists in affliction. So it’s enough that in labor they taught both day and night; the same then applies to affliction.
[Speaker C] And “etzem etzem,” which verbal analogy? Yes yes, “etzem etzem.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what’s called the tanna of “etzem etzem.” Okay, so now the question is—but the point is basically that from this structure that I noted in the Talmud, it seems that the initial assumption to distinguish between day and night would not really have arisen. Only because we are looking for a warning for affliction and we find that there are five verses about labor, we ask ourselves: wait a second, what is going on here? One surely explains the other. There are five verses about labor and I don’t have a warning for affliction. Apparently one of the labor verses comes to warn about affliction. So I ask myself: wait a second, then what about the other four? Those are for day and night, warning and punishment. So the whole business starts the other way around: precisely because I need a warning for affliction and I have the datum that there are five verses, now suddenly I, as it were, pull out of my sleeve this idea that I need a warning for day and a warning for night, and a punishment for day and a punishment for night. If there had only been four verses, and I had a separate warning for affliction unrelated to them, I wouldn’t say that those four verses are warning for day and night and punishment for day and night. It arises only in this context in order to explain the availability for the verbal analogy of affliction. Meaning, this somewhat softens the sharpness of the point. It means there isn’t really an initial assumption here to distinguish between day and night. There is—but it’s a weak initial assumption. I wouldn’t have thought of it at all were it not that I already found four verses, where the fifth I understand to be the one made available for the verbal analogy, but regarding the first four I want to know why they were brought. Fine, I have no choice, so I look for why—maybe there was an initial assumption here to distinguish between day and night. The initial assumption arises because there are verses, not that there are verses because there is an initial assumption. In other words, I think that’s the tune at least that I hear from the way this distinction comes up in the Talmud. It doesn’t come up in the Talmud as a warning for labor—they bring four verses, there is a warning for labor by day and by night, warning and punishment, so I would understand that there really is some initial assumption to distinguish between day and night in labor. But here it comes up only after I come to show that the fifth verse is available. I’m stuck with four verses—how am I going to explain them? Maybe the Torah wants to tell me not to distinguish between day and night. So there is such an initial assumption; that still requires explanation, why I would entertain that at all, but it is much weaker. Meaning, some minimal reasoning is enough for me to say this, okay? Because all it means is that otherwise I wouldn’t think it was made available for the matter of affliction—not that I would really think it isn’t forbidden by day and by night. Okay? So that makes it weaker, and that’s what I want to say.
[Speaker C] And also the baraita itself—it proposes the reasoning very simply; the baraita was perfectly straightforward. Again? Ravina here too—what is Ravina doing? He sees that the baraita isn’t understood, and he says an explanation that isn’t written in the baraita at all. The baraita learns by “if it is not needed,” no? That’s also just—I’m saying, not that it’s connected to these questions—but we also have to understand what—if you have difficulties with the baraita, then you invent something out of thin air too, “etzem etzem.” Where is this whole verbal analogy written in the baraita? What do you mean where is it written? The baraita brings it—what does it mean where is it—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —written?
[Speaker C] The baraita doesn’t make the verbal analogy of “etzem etzem.” The baraita says there is punishment regarding labor, but it isn’t needed, so necessarily if it isn’t needed for punishment regarding labor, assign it instead to warning for affliction. Right. And he said no, there is an objection to the derivation from labor, and therefore he said no, it’s from “etzem etzem.” Okay. So basically he’s coming to explain the baraita, but he says something entirely different. He didn’t explain the baraita. He said: the baraita isn’t understandable, I’ll tell you something new.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but he is explaining the baraita. He says, “This tanna”—Ravina’s wording is “This tanna derives it from ‘etzem etzem.’” Derives it.
[Speaker C] Yes, I know that he’s sort of—he says the baraita isn’t understandable and then says something totally different. How can you put that in?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? We have a difficulty on the baraita, so we have an answer: he apparently derived it from “etzem etzem.” This appears often. What’s the problem? It’s an interpretation of the baraita.
[Speaker C] It’s just—where does this interpretation even come into the baraita? I can read the baraita a million times and I’ll never get to that interpretation. The baraita says X, and he says Y.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Why was it stated? It is available, to compare and derive from it a verbal analogy. Punishment is stated regarding affliction; punishment is stated regarding labor. Just as labor has punishment and warning, so too affliction has punishment and warning.” That’s it. That’s the point. And then they ask, “There is room to object.” “There is room to object”—what do you mean, there is room to object? A verbal analogy doesn’t have objections. What does “there is room to object” mean? Rather, when you have a verbal analogy that is not available, then there can be objections. So Ravina says to that: no, no, here it is available, so objections are not relevant. That’s what he says: “For if it were not available, one could object, as we objected.” He is explicitly explaining the baraita. Do you understand what I’m saying? The rule is this—look, generally when you see in the Talmud, there is no such thing as an objection to a verbal analogy. There is no such thing. Objections exist regarding an a fortiori argument and a general paradigm. Not regarding a verbal analogy, not regarding general and particular. There are no objections. Why not? Because an objection speaks about a logical inference. When you have an a fortiori argument, that’s a logical inference. If I have an objection, I’m showing you that the relationship is not just one of leniency and stringency. And with a general paradigm, I make an analogy. If I have an objection, I’m saying the analogy isn’t secure because there may be differences here. But a verbal analogy is not a logical comparison. There’s one word here and one word there, and the Torah compares them to one another. What does objection have to do with that? Why should I care about an objection? The Torah—I’m not saying this on my own reasoning. The Torah says that here and here it’s the same law. That’s all. So what relevance is there to an objection? To that Ravina comes and says: no, no, no, you didn’t understand. You think this is a verbal analogy that is not available. A verbal analogy that is not available can indeed be challenged. Because who says there is a verbal analogy here at all? A verbal analogy that is not available is not really a verbal analogy; it’s an analogy. Because if the Torah wrote “etzem” and needed to write it, then how can you derive some law from it? Maybe it was written simply because it needed to be written. What do you want? How do you derive the law learned from the verbal analogy? Rather what are you doing? You are basically making an analogy between labor and affliction. That’s not a verbal analogy; it’s a general paradigm. And that can be challenged. Ravina says: you didn’t understand. “This tanna derived it from ‘etzem etzem.’” It’s a verbal analogy. Not only is it a verbal analogy, it’s a verbal analogy from an available verse. And if it’s a verbal analogy from an available verse, it cannot be challenged. That’s why Ravina adds that if it had not been available, it would have been possible to challenge it, as we challenge. You thought it wasn’t available, and so you say: but surely one can challenge it. Not true. One cannot challenge it, because it is available. Once it is available, it isn’t a general paradigm, it’s a verbal analogy. And if it’s a verbal analogy, there are no objections to a verbal analogy.
[Speaker C] So now—so after it’s available, there’s a verbal analogy even if there is an objection, right? Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And how does the verbal analogy work? Ravina says it explicitly. He says: since if it weren’t available, one could challenge it—
[Speaker C] Now I have another question. If it’s a verbal analogy, then why do you need there to be a fifth verse? Seemingly if four verses are enough, then the verbal analogy should be enough too, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the fifth verse has to be the available one from which you make the verbal analogy.
[Speaker C] Is it the word “etzem” that’s available, or the verse?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The verse. The fifth verse is extra, and from it they make the verbal analogy of “etzem etzem.”
[Speaker C] I understand, interesting. So it’s not the word that’s available, it’s the verse that’s available.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. A lot of times in a verbal analogy they do make it that a word is available. In this case we’re talking about a verse that’s available.
[Speaker D] So—
[Speaker C] Then he didn’t really need to add this whole thing of “he derives it from etzem etzem,” because that’s not his main answer. The main thing is that it’s available.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but he wants—
[Speaker C] —to tell you “he derives it from etzem etzem” because—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —he wants to tell you that it’s a verbal analogy and not a general paradigm.
[Speaker C] But it says in the baraita that it’s a verbal analogy.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the baraita it says that one learns one from the other.
[Speaker C] No, it says verbal analogy.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Why was it stated…? Available to compare and derive from it a verbal analogy.” But after we raise an objection, we see that it’s not available.
[Speaker C] Yes, but why did he need to say that there’s “etzem etzem” here, as if… I already know that there is a verbal analogy here. The whole thing is that I’m just coming to add a verse that’s available, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So then he emphasizes that once the verse is available, this is a verbal analogy and not a general paradigm. The difficulty was that it’s not a verbal analogy but a general paradigm. So Ravina comes back and says: no, no, no, it’s a verbal analogy because it’s available.
[Speaker C] Ah—so even a general paradigm can in borrowed language be called a verbal analogy?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What I’m saying is: a verbal analogy that isn’t available—how, in principle, do you learn from one to the other if it isn’t available? It’s written because it needs to be written. How can you make a verbal analogy out of that? What do you want the Torah to write if it wanted—
[Speaker C] —to teach me only the law—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that’s written in the verse, without teaching me the verbal analogy?
[Speaker C] I understand. So “verbal analogy” there would be a borrowed expression—I could understand it as a borrowed expression, meaning learning something from the similarity.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly. Because otherwise, if it isn’t available for derivation, what are you learning one from the other? By the way, this appears in a number of places—it appears in a number of places where they use the term verbal analogy, but what they really mean is an analogy, that is, a general derivation, as if it’s the same thing. Even in modern Hebrew, by the way, when people say, “I’m making a verbal analogy from this to that,” they mean they’re comparing them because they’re similar. In contemporary Hebrew, and also in the Talmud there are several places like this, and the commentators really struggle with it—what does a verbal analogy have to do with it? It’s not a verbal analogy there at all. I think the intention is really a general derivation. Now, we latch onto the same word that appears in both contexts, maybe, and sometimes maybe not, so it looks like a verbal analogy. But once it isn’t available for derivation, then essentially it’s a general derivation, not a verbal analogy. That’s what they asked, and Ravina answers that: no, no, no—it is a verbal analogy. Okay? Not because here there is a punishment regarding affliction, since it also doesn’t say “selfsame” “selfsame.” It says: a punishment is stated regarding labor, a punishment is stated regarding affliction, right? And then they make a verbal analogy. So what is the verbal analogy? You would think it’s a verbal analogy of “karet, karet”—punishment in labor and punishment in affliction. He says no, it’s a verbal analogy of “selfsame, selfsame.” It’s not a verbal analogy of “karet, karet”; it’s a verbal analogy of “selfsame, selfsame,” because one of the verses is superfluous—it is available for derivation. Okay? Now then, later in the Talmud, additional opinions are brought. Wait, maybe I’ll also share for a moment: additional opinions are brought here. The school of Rabbi Ishmael taught: “Affliction” is stated here, and “affliction” is stated there; just as there He did not punish unless He first warned, so too here He did not punish unless He first warned. Rav Acha bar Yaakov said: he learns “a Sabbath of solemn rest” from the Sabbath of creation. The details don’t matter to me right now; the point is that there are additional opinions here that do not accept the verbal analogy of “selfsame, selfsame,” and instead have a different source: just as there He did not punish unless He first warned, so too here He did not punish unless He first warned. And Rav Pappa said: it itself is called “Sabbath,” as it is written, “you shall cease from labor, your Sabbath.” Then the Talmud explains why Rav Pappa and Rav Acha bar Yaakov each did not say like the other—or rather, it explains the need for both, yes, why the dispute is framed this way, why each one did not say like the other. And that itself is interesting, because why—I’m asking beyond that—why do all the tannaic or amoraic opinions, all these views, because some here are tannaim and some are amoraim—why do all these opinions not accept the verbal analogy of “selfsame, selfsame”? There is no refutation against it. It doesn’t say there’s any problem with it. They simply suddenly bring other opinions. What was wrong with the first opinion? It could definitely be that they just don’t
[Speaker C] accept the distinction between day and night, and then they say the whole thing is only to add understanding.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly. It could be that they were not prepared to accept this whole move that distinguishes between day and night. I’m just sharpening even more what I said above: this initial assumption to distinguish between day and night is a weak initial assumption. Most of the opinions don’t accept it at all. And even the one who does accept it only raises it in the context of the discussion of affliction de facto, after the fact. He’s not really saying that you need two sources to prohibit labor by day and by night and to punish by day and by night. More than that: even the discussion of why both views are needed is made only between Rav Pappa and Rav Acha bar Yaakov later in the Talmud. Why don’t they ask about all three of these opinions why they did not accept the tanna of “selfsame, selfsame”? Why do they ask only about Rav Acha bar Yaakov and Rav Pappa?
[Speaker E] Maybe he didn’t complete the verbal analogy. Say that again? Maybe he didn’t learn the verbal analogy from his teacher.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That would be much worse. Usually the conception is that a verbal analogy cannot be a matter of dispute. Nachmanides already comments on this in a number of places.
[Speaker E] Unless he received it from his teacher.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he didn’t receive it from his teacher, he can’t derive from it.
[Speaker E] Right, so sometimes the Talmud…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So if he received it from his teacher and I didn’t receive it from my teacher, then I have to accept what he said. The tradition didn’t reach me, but it did reach him. There’s no room here to argue. Nachmanides already comments on this in the topic of “the best quality” in tractate Bava Kamma 7, where the Talmud brings Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael as having a dispute over a verbal analogy: “field, his field”—whether this means the field of the damager or the field of the injured party regarding the best-quality payment. So already there Nachmanides asks: a person only expounds a verbal analogy if he received it from his teacher, so how can there be a dispute over verbal analogies? How do we find disputes over verbal analogies at all? So too the students of Nachmanides, the sages of Spain, the early Spanish authorities, all comment on this—the Ritva, Nachmanides, the Ra’ah, Ran, all of them comment on it. And therefore they indeed say that when we say a person only expounds a verbal analogy if he received it from his teacher, the intention is not really that every… Rather, you need some hint that comes to you through tradition. For example, you need the hint that tells you: between these two words in the Torah there is a verbal analogy—but they don’t tell you what. And you try to understand what is learned from that verbal analogy. Or the reverse: they tell you, “this law was learned from a verbal analogy,” but they don’t tell you from where. And you look for a pair of words from which that law could be learned. Meaning, you don’t make a verbal analogy on your own without having some support that there really is a verbal analogy here. Precisely because, as some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) explain, a verbal analogy is something so strange and far-reaching that you can use it to get anywhere you want—just take any two words and do whatever you like with them. Therefore in that case you need some assistance to fortify the derivation of the verbal analogy. But the intention is not that this is literally a tradition from Sinai, end of story—that everything reaches me complete from Moses our teacher. That’s what Nachmanides and all the others point out, and it goes against what people usually think, that all verbal analogies were handed down to Moses at Sinai, so that basically everything is just straightforward tradition. That isn’t true. Rather, there is a certain support. But for our purposes I’m saying: specifically because a verbal analogy does come, in principle, through tradition, here it should be even harder to explain to me why the next three opinions don’t accept it. After all, there is a verbal analogy here. Nobody asks that. Why not? Apparently because of the difficulty that appeared above, before the tanna of “selfsame, selfsame.” What was it? That they held this verbal analogy was not available for derivation, and therefore it is open to refutation and cannot be learned from. And what about the five verses, one of which is available for derivation, showing us that there is indeed such availability? The answer is: they do not accept this whole distinction between day and night and all these gimmicks. Where do we ever find a distinction between day and night?
[Speaker C] So they disagree with the baraita, because they understand that the baraita is a general derivation, and there is a refutation against it, so they reject it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. And therefore the Talmud doesn’t even ask why these opinions don’t accept the baraita, because that’s obvious: the whole story of this baraita is strange. Explain to me what the baraita is saying; I don’t need explanations for why someone doesn’t accept the baraita. Okay? I’m trying to show you that this initial assumption is a weak initial assumption. Meaning, people don’t accept it, and it’s obvious that they don’t accept it. And even when it comes up for the one who does raise it, it comes up only after the fact, once I already have four verses and I need to prove availability for derivation in the context of affliction. Nobody initially entertains such an assumption that you need one source for day and one source for night separately from the outset.
[Speaker E] But that’s only an answer. Day and night are just an answer to make it available for derivation—as if the availability already exists. If you don’t accept day and night, then there are, as it were, several verses that really are apparently available for derivation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then the whole story is unnecessary; availability for derivation isn’t relevant at all. We’d have to discuss separately why they wrote five verses here. In a moment I’ll comment on that. But if you tell me that each one has a role and one is left without a role, then something here… so that one is available for derivation, and from that you make a verbal analogy. How—why am I saying this? I may as well say it now. Maimonides, in the ninth root—this is now the broader angle—Maimonides in the ninth root talks about, I think I mentioned this, repetitions in Scripture. And one example he brings is that the Torah commands observance of the Sabbath twelve times. Do we count twelve positive commandments? The answer is no. We count one positive commandment. Why? Maimonides says, because we count the content of the commands—I talked about this—the content of the commands, not the number of commands. If they have the same content, it is one commandment. So Nachmanides asks: then why did the Torah repeat it—why did the Torah repeat the same thing twelve times? That’s superfluous. Available for derivation, in the language here, yes; it’s extra. Why did the Torah repeat it? Therefore Nachmanides says: there are no repetitions in the Torah for no reason. Every repetition in the Torah comes to teach some further detail. Or in our case, for example, maybe one is available for derivation in order to make a verbal analogy from it. But there has to be some reason why the Torah repeats something needlessly. Maimonides, by contrast, says explicitly that he does not accept this. Maimonides claims that the Torah can sometimes repeat things without teaching anything further and without adding understanding—simply to reinforce the point. To say the matter is severe.
[Speaker C] But that is a teaching—to reinforce the point. So what bothers Maimonides there?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not reinforce in the sense of teaching a legal consequence—just to say it’s severe. There’s no halakhic practical implication in it. Okay, so what?
[Speaker C] If I want to say something is severe, I’ll say it several times. What people hear from me several times…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then say it’s severe, say that it carries a severe punishment—why repeat the same thing five hundred times? It’s strange. Twelve times the same thing? You expound every tiny stroke of every letter—you derive from an extra yod and a missing heh and I don’t know what—and then you have eleven complete verses about Sabbath that basically say nothing? What’s the problem? Write that Sabbath is severe, and save twelve verses in the Torah. What Maimonides writes there is strange; it’s not simple. At least within the assumptions of the Sages, who don’t say things pointlessly just for rhetorical flourish. There are some who tie this to Rabbi Ishmael, yes, that “the Torah speaks in human language,” and then some things are said merely for rhetorical flourish. The Torah speaks the way a storyteller speaks; you don’t have to analyze every letter and every extra word and start deriving from it. And that’s what Maimonides says. Now here, it seems to me that that’s what lies at the root of the issue. If I have five verses and I have no explanation for any of them, I’m not going to make five verbal analogies out of that and say they are all available for derivation. It doesn’t work that way. Rather, what? I’ll say like Maimonides: it was probably said in order to strengthen the point. Yom Kippur is very severe—that’s what they wanted to say. Okay? But if I have four that are occupied, and one fifth that I don’t know what to do with, then I say: good, so that one is available for derivation for a verbal analogy. That I can understand. All right? When I ask what the amoraim and tannaim who disagree with the tanna of “selfsame, selfsame” and don’t learn this whole move would say—apparently according to them there are five verses available for derivation, or four if you like. Warning and punishment in any case require two; those are needed for themselves. But three are superfluous. Warning and punishment for labor are needed in any case, okay? And there are three left over. What do you do with them? No—if there are three left over, then that’s for reinforcement. If there is one left over, I can say it is available for derivation. Like “the tanna taught some and omitted some.” Whenever the Talmud says that, and there is a list of four or five things, the Talmud asks: but there is also a sixth thing. And the Talmud answers: the tanna taught some and omitted some. Immediately it asks: what else did he omit, that he omitted this one? Meaning: if he omitted something, he must have omitted at least two. You don’t leave out just one thing from a list. There is actually a lot of logic in this. If you want to save space, you don’t save space by leaving out one thing. If you give me part of a list, then leave at least two things out. Save significant space. You bring me five things and leave one out? Then just bring six already. Sometimes there are these quantitative considerations that tell you where logic says the omission is meaningful and you have to learn something from it, and where it says no, that would already be too much; you can’t derive from every little thing like that. So it was probably intended only for reinforcement, as Maimonides says. Okay? That’s one possibility. I don’t know—maybe. In any case, I hope all this is enough to convince you that there really is some kind of weak initial assumption here. Okay? Look at Maimonides’ wording in the Laws of the Rest of the Tenth Day, chapter 1, law 6: “Just as one must cease from labor on it both by day and by night, so too one must cease regarding affliction both by day and by night. And one must add from the profane to the holy at its entrance and at its departure, and ‘you shall afflict your souls,’ etc.”
[Speaker D] Now notice that this is law 6. Wait, let’s see for a second—I’ll show you the structure so you can get a sense of the structure of the laws in Maimonides. Can you see?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Law 1: It is a positive commandment to cease from labor on the tenth day of the seventh month. No hint of day and night, right? A positive commandment to cease for the entire twenty-four-hour period. Law 2: Any labor for which one is liable to stoning for intentional violation on the Sabbath, one is liable to karet for intentional violation on the tenth day. All of this is about forms of labor. Law 3: It is permitted to trim vegetables, etc. All these are laws relating to labor. Law 4: Another positive commandment on Yom Kippur is to cease from eating and drinking on it. All right? We learned that this is affliction and that it is a positive commandment, and anyone who eats or drinks has nullified a positive commandment and transgressed a prohibition, etc. Law 5: And likewise, we learned by tradition the other afflictions. Okay? Law 6: Just as one must cease from labor on it both by day and by night, so too one must cease regarding affliction both by day and by night. And one must add from the profane to the holy, etc. That means that when he discussed all the prohibitions—when he discussed the warning regarding labor, he didn’t bother writing that there is a warning for both day and night. No one would ever have thought to distinguish. Suddenly here Maimonides notes: know that you might think cessation regarding affliction applies only by day. No—it’s both by day and by night. How do I know? Because for labor too it applies both by day and by night. You see that the structure of the laws in Maimonides screams exactly what I said about the Talmud: that the whole discussion to rule out the distinction between day and night in the context of affliction arises only with respect to learning about affliction. It is not talking about labor at all. If there had only been a prohibition of labor and no prohibition of affliction, nobody would ever have thought to distinguish between day and night. Once we are learning about affliction, then suddenly an initial assumption arises: fine, but maybe that’s only by day and not by night. The text teaches us that it is not so—and they also did not distinguish in labor.
[Speaker C] It’s simply talking not about the warning, but about the positive commandment of affliction, as it were.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a second I’ll talk about that. Both about the positive commandment and the prohibition. In a second I’ll talk about it. The point is that in our Talmud this clearly applies to the warning. Because we are learning a verbal analogy from labor to affliction. And if we have a verbal analogy from labor to affliction, then there is no difference: just as labor has a warning and a positive commandment, so too affliction has a warning and a positive commandment. So this verbal analogy basically says everything—everything there is in affliction—applies both by day and by night. More than that, as I’ll say in a moment, I think the point is that cessation on Yom Kippur is one overall cessation, both from labor and from pleasures, so there is really no room to distinguish between labor and affliction, because they are all details of one big cessation. And that is what Maimonides wants to say, and therefore there is no distinction between day and night. In a moment I’ll explain that a bit more. Now, what I really want to show here from Maimonides is that the structure of the laws in Maimonides puts right on the table what you need a somewhat sensitive ear to hear when reading it in the Talmud. When the Talmud raises the difference between day and night, true, it raises it with respect to labor, but that is only as the possibility from which one learns about affliction. When discussing labor itself, there is no initial assumption to distinguish between day and night. And Maimonides builds his laws exactly this way. And from Maimonides’ perspective there is no initial assumption to distinguish between day and night in labor. The entire initial assumption to distinguish between day and night arises only when I take labor and learn from it to affliction. Then the question arises: wait, wait, but perhaps this whole thing is really only by day? He says no: just as in labor there is no difference between day and night, so too in affliction there is no difference between day and night. So that’s on one side. On the other side, one could have asked why—let me formulate it a bit differently—why doesn’t the Torah write three verses? Why five? With three verses I would learn one for the warning and one for the punishment of labor, and the third would be available to learn affliction from labor. The distinction between day and night in labor arises only in the context of the verbal analogy between labor and affliction. That’s what I want to say. Okay? Therefore this… it starts from five. There’s no question why not make it three. If there were three, I wouldn’t say all this. If there were three, I wouldn’t say this, because the whole idea is that perhaps regarding labor you have a warning for labor and a warning and punishment—but regarding affliction I might have had some initial assumption to distinguish between day and night. Therefore you need a source that they do not distinguish between day and night, even though that source is written regarding labor. But the whole reason you need it is in order to rule out the distinction between day and night in affliction.
[Speaker C] If so, then it shouldn’t have had to be available for derivation. According to this, it shouldn’t have had to be available for derivation, because if I say there is no point in labor to say day and night, then apply it to affliction. Why does it need to be available for derivation according to this? Why do you need a fifth verse?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying when… that’s what I said at the beginning. Obviously, after I make it available for derivation and learn from it to affliction, then a faint, weak initial assumption does arise: maybe after all these verses, one is for day and one is for night. Understand? The initial assumption to distinguish between day and night comes up even with respect to labor, not only with respect to affliction.
[Speaker C] It comes up with respect to labor. What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It does arise. Yes. But it arises with respect to labor only when I relate to labor as the source for the prohibition of affliction. When I discussed labor itself, it did not arise. And I claim—why is that? Because the moment I see labor as the source for affliction, I suddenly understand that labor and affliction are two sections of the same matter. This is Maimonides’ conception of the Rest of the Tenth Day, which we’ve discussed more than once: that this whole thing is one big cessation. And if the whole thing is one big cessation, one could say that this cessation applies only by day and not by night. Unlike all other Sabbaths and holidays, even the prohibition of labor would apply only by day and not by night. Why? Because the prohibition of labor on Yom Kippur is not the regular labor prohibition of a holiday or Sabbath; rather, it is part of the obligation of cessation that is attached also to affliction from pleasures. And in that context, let’s say it applies only by day and not by night.
[Speaker C] He learns from here that it’s all one big obligation of cessation? Because ostensibly, if he learned it from somewhere else, then he wouldn’t need all these derivations here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, on the contrary, he would need them. Since you learn that this is one big cessation…
[Speaker C] So then if in labor it’s…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, then there would have been an initial assumption to say that regarding affliction, yes, cessation… there was room there to distinguish between day and night; in a moment I’ll explain. There was room to distinguish between day and night. Now, once I understand that this is cessation, then I would say: fine, maybe I’ll also divide labor between day and night on Yom Kippur, because labor and affliction are one unit on Yom Kippur. Then I would say that the prohibition of labor on Yom Kippur is not like on Sabbath and holidays, but is part of the cessation together with affliction, and then perhaps it applies only by day and not by night. That’s why all the verses are needed. Only in the context where I connect labor to affliction and turn it into one large cessation does an initial assumption suddenly arise to distinguish between day and night. Because if I understood this as just a holiday or Sabbath or something like that, then as with every holiday and Sabbath I would never have imagined distinguishing between day and night.
[Speaker C] So only in this derivation does it come up that it’s all one big cessation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, on the contrary. It comes up that it is one big cessation from the fact that “solemn rest” is stated, as we learned in the first and second classes.
[Speaker C] And still there was room to distinguish among the sections of the cessation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. After I understand that it is one big cessation, after I understand that affliction and labor are one unit, then I understand that labor on Yom Kippur is not like the labor prohibition on a holiday and on Sabbath. It’s something else. It’s part of entering holiness; it’s part of atonement. So it is a total cessation involving labor and affliction. But if that’s so, one could say that it applies only by day, for example because only by day is there atonement. And if it is a condition for atonement, then both labor and affliction would apply only by day. Therefore you need verses to say that it applies both by day and by night. And nowhere is it the other way around. Hm?
[Speaker E] Nowhere is it the other way around. So after they bring the warning about affliction, then you see that everything is the same, that there is both a positive commandment and a prohibition, and then you can say Maimonides’ theory that it’s one cessation, so then you need to learn day and night in labor. It’s somewhat reversed in the Talmud. The Talmud does the prohibition at the end.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Regarding the positive commandment of affliction, that’s not relevant; from “solemn rest” we know it, and cessation is written as a positive commandment, not a prohibition. So seeing labor and affliction as one unit already comes out for me from the positive commandment. So now, when I learn the prohibition warning from labor to affliction, I would say: fine, there is a warning from labor to affliction, so I learn that there is also a warning, so I understand that altogether this is one unit also regarding the prohibition. But if it is one unit, then maybe it is only by day? Therefore it all comes together like this. The whole move of availability for derivation is built on four plus one, not two plus one. The very fact that one is available for derivation is what causes you to need four and not settle for two.
[Speaker E] And where does Maimonides actually get the warning for affliction from?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides writes: from “solemn rest.”
[Speaker E] We discussed that that’s difficult; ostensibly that’s a positive commandment. Right? So apparently he didn’t really learn the Talmud exactly, because the whole source in the Talmud is about a warning.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are places where “solemn rest” is written; there are places where Maimonides writes that it is karet. And since there is a derivation that creates a warning if the punishment is written in the Torah, then the warning can also be derived exegetically. And in our case that is exactly the situation. In the Book of Commandments, I think that’s what he writes. And in our Talmud, this “if it is not needed for this matter,” this availability for derivation—that is an exegetical derivation. So if there is an explicit punishment and I have a warning from a derivation, that is the warning. Okay? So that is exactly the initial assumption according to Maimonides. Now compare this to Tosafot Yeshanim. Tosafot Yeshanim on our page writes as follows: one for the punishment by day and one for the punishment by night. “I do not know whether everywhere we require a punishment for day and night regarding labor, such as Sabbaths and holidays and the intermediate days of a festival.”
[Speaker E] In the Talmud it doesn’t say the intermediate days of a festival.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but he adds to Sabbaths and holidays. What’s going on here? He understands that there is a real initial assumption to distinguish between day and night in labor, including on Sabbaths and holidays. Meaning, he did not read the Talmud the way Maimonides read it. Maimonides reads the Talmud: there is no initial assumption at all regarding Sabbaths and holidays. The only reason this comes up is in the context of Yom Kippur because of this general concept of cessation that we discussed, and then an initial assumption arises to distinguish between day and night, and the text teaches us there is no distinction—it applies both by day and by night. Tosafot Yeshanim reads the Talmud just as it is written. There is an initial assumption here that the labor prohibition applies only by day and not by night. You need two different warnings and two different punishments for day and night. That’s what he writes. So he says this needs examination: why in ordinary Sabbaths and holidays do we not bring two different sources? By the way, he also formulates it as “I do not know whether we require.” He doesn’t say “we don’t find.” That phrasing is interesting. Meaning, it could be that we do find it, they just didn’t get into it. I would say simply: we do not find such a thing—I don’t know—one for the day and one for the night. They just didn’t get into that issue, but in principle even on Sabbaths and holidays there is a separate warning for day and for night. But for our purposes, Tosafot Yeshanim understands it as a real and general initial assumption—not only for Sabbaths and holidays, not only for Yom Kippur. Not the way Maimonides understands it. Not because of the special concept of cessation unique to Yom Kippur, but even on Sabbaths and holidays there was in principle a need for a separate warning for day and for night. He only says: we haven’t found it; I don’t know if it is needed; it isn’t clear to me. But from the way he read the Talmud, it is quite clear that he did not read it like Maimonides. Okay? I’m saying these are nuances, but it’s worth noticing that these are two different things. And it could be that each follows his own approach. Maimonides, who conceives of the laws of Yom Kippur as the Rest of the Tenth Day—some broad cessation, as we have already seen more than once—so according to his view he indeed reads the Talmud as we saw above, and it seems to me that this really is the plain meaning of the Talmud, not what Tosafot Yeshanim says. Although I think that when people read the Talmud in a straightforward way, everyone will learn like Tosafot Yeshanim. I think that’s wrong. Because since it comes up only in the context of the warning for affliction, everything I said at the beginning—that sensitivity in reading—then it is clear that in the plain meaning of the Talmud Maimonides is right. Tosafot Yeshanim didn’t notice that, I don’t know, he doesn’t get worked up about it. He reads the Talmud as it stands. There is an initial assumption here that you need a separate warning—not only an initial assumption, but you need a separate warning for day and for night. And if so, that would mean that on Sabbaths and holidays too you would need it. He doesn’t connect it to the unique character of Yom Kippur. It could be that he follows a view that disagrees with Maimonides and does not see labor and afflictions as one complete unit. Therefore, what difference is there between Yom Kippur and other Sabbaths and holidays? Yom Kippur simply has two aspects. It has an aspect of labor, and an aspect of affliction—just like on Passover there is leaven and matzah in the laws of the holiday. So too on Yom Kippur there are the holiday laws—that is, cessation from labor—and there is affliction, which is the leaven-and-matzah of Yom Kippur, the special laws of Yom Kippur. The whole move I made in Maimonides until now—it seems to me that this is exactly what Tosafot Yeshanim does not accept. He says this is a layer-by-layer composite of two aspects. One aspect is the labor prohibition like every Sabbath and holiday, and the second aspect is affliction, which is the special law that Yom Kippur has—like leaven and matzah on Passover or sukkah and lulav on Sukkot. Maimonides says it is not divided into two; the same body of laws contains both, because it is one big, broad cessation. Okay? So there is apparently some fundamental dispute here about how
[Speaker E] to understand the nature of the prohibitions of affliction and labor on Yom Kippur. Is there reason to say that because it says “on this very day,” that’s why there’s an initial assumption that we’re talking only about the day—because the word “very” is written?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a little strange, although the Talmud does say things like that from time to time, because then it comes out that the Torah itself excludes and the Torah itself includes. Don’t exclude and include at the same time.
[Speaker F] On the other hand, it also says “from evening to evening you shall observe your Sabbath,” which means it does include the evening.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe the positive commandment only—“you shall observe your Sabbath”—that is only the cessation, only the positive commandment. I don’t know; there is room to discuss it. Also, “from evening” is already the addition to Yom Kippur—that’s beyond. The same thing, by the way, regarding “on this very day”: the tanna of “selfsame, selfsame” uses that to exclude the prohibition and the karet of the additional period. Okay, so “on this very day” is not coming to exclude the night; it is coming to exclude what precedes the twenty-four-hour period, not what precedes the daytime. So that is probably not what is meant here in the Talmud, at least. So it turns out that there is some dispute here, and we return to the same dispute that keeps accompanying us all the time: how to understand the nature of the prohibitions of affliction and labor on Yom Kippur. All right, maybe let’s stop for three minutes, as I said. I’ve already taken an hour, but let’s pause for about three minutes. Whoever wants can go wash their face a bit; whoever wants to talk or ask a question, or discuss something—now’s the time.
[Speaker D] Let’s get a bit of air so it won’t be too long all at once. In another three minutes we’ll come back.
[Speaker C] Rabbi, can we ask in the meantime? Yes, yes. Regarding the warning of cessation on the Sabbath—where do we learn cessation from? I saw in the summaries that the rabbi writes that it is from “Remember” and “Observe,” that from there they learn the warning about cessation on the Sabbath, the positive commandment of cessation on the Sabbath. But I didn’t find it. I looked and didn’t find that this is the source of the obligation of cessation on the Sabbath.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Regarding “Remember” and “Observe,” regarding women, where it says “Remember” and “Observe” were said in one utterance—they compare remembering to observing, and whoever is included in… Yes, but what is the positive commandment?
[Speaker C] Maybe from there the…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Isn’t that about kiddush and havdalah? We’re talking about the prohibition and the positive commandment of labor, and on that women are obligated.
[Speaker C] But there it isn’t the source of the positive commandment. From there the rabbi sees that there is a positive commandment, right—but what is the positive commandment? Ostensibly the positive commandment is not “Remember,” right? Why not? Meaning, does Maimonides understand that the positive commandment is “Remember”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or there is “you shall cease”—I don’t remember at the moment. We can look at Maimonides and see from which verse he brings it.
[Speaker C] Right, and he brings “and on the seventh day you shall cease.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so there are other verses from which you can derive a positive commandment. But I think that from “Remember” and “Observe” as well, from that comparison regarding women, it is fairly clear that the Talmud understood that “Remember” there means remember in the positive commandment regarding labor. Otherwise it should have said that women are obligated in kiddush, not in the positive commandment of labor.
[Speaker C] Meaning, “Remember” obligates labor—is that what he’s saying?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, because otherwise what does “Remember and Observe were said in one utterance” mean? “Observe” is certainly about labor, right?
[Speaker C] Where is that Talmudic passage?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, “Remember and Observe were said in one utterance”? I don’t remember at the moment; we can look. Let’s see. Shevuot 20,
[Speaker E] no? Wait.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, Berakhot 20b, also in Rosh Hashanah 27, Shevuot 20. Yes. No, Shevuot 20 isn’t this; Shevuot 20 is later in Shevuot 20. Yes, because in Shevuot 20 they also derive something else from it—“something the mouth cannot speak,” etc., yes. You know what? Now I’m looking at Berakhot, and there it really is talking about women in the kiddush of the day, not about the positive commandment of labor. Wait, that really is an interesting question. At least in the medieval authorities (Rishonim) it’s clear that they learn it from here. Wait. Which?
[Speaker C] What do you mean by the medieval authorities (Rishonim)? On the Torah? On the Talmud?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, on the Torah I’m not familiar with it.
[Speaker E] Wait. Nachmanides—there’s Nachmanides on the Torah that says it’s a positive commandment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Remember” is a positive commandment, right—that “Observe” is fear and “Remember” is love.
[Speaker C] Yes, but Nachmanides doesn’t say labor there. Does he say labor?
[Speaker E] It’s a positive commandment; that’s simply the expression of the fact that you don’t do it.
[Speaker C] So—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be that it is a positive commandment of kiddush of the day. Wait one second—there is Tosafot, for example in Kiddushin, where it is clearly stated. In a moment, if you want, I’ll find it for you. Tosafot in Kiddushin, when discussing positive time-bound commandments, talks about “Remember and Observe were said in one utterance,” that women are obligated also in the positive commandment. Because the question is: why doesn’t a positive commandment override a prohibition in the case of women? Since regarding Sabbath, women are not obligated in the positive commandment, only in the prohibition—or on a holiday. Okay? So if there is a positive commandment, it could override that prohibition. So Tosafot says no: since women are obligated both in the positive commandment and in the prohibition, a positive commandment does not override a positive commandment plus a prohibition. On Kiddushin 34a? Yes. Look there: “Rabbi Yosef of Eretz Israel raised a difficulty”—do you see?
[Speaker C] Wait a second, I’m opening it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I see we already need to return to the class. Look there from “his difficulty from Rabbi Yosef of Eretz Israel.” He talks about a holiday, that women on a holiday are obligated only in the prohibition and not in the positive commandment, and then basically there you have a positive commandment overriding a prohibition. About Sabbath he doesn’t.
[Speaker C] In… what…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Returning a lost object and sending away the mother bird. I really need to look at this; I thought it appeared explicitly in the Talmud, but I need to check. How do we know that women are obligated in the positive commandment of Sabbath? That is really the question. It is written also in Maimonides, and in Sefer HaChinukh, Maimonides, etc. Okay, let’s get back to our topic.
[Speaker C] I just checked Maimonides on the question of the source. I had the impression that just as on Yom Kippur it isn’t clear, so too on Sabbath there is no clear source in the Talmud. That was my impression; I didn’t have time to check. We asked, the rabbi asked about Yom Kippur and there was a whole discussion, and it was as if Sabbath was obvious—but from what I tried to find regarding Sabbath…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But regarding Sabbath—on Sabbath you don’t need any discussion; it’s obvious. It says “you shall cease”—a positive commandment, a positive commandment regarding labor on Sabbath certainly exists in several places; it’s repeated 12 times.
[Speaker C] Yes, the question is what the expression “solemn rest” means—maybe it means something else?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—a positive commandment regarding labor, explicitly. In Maimonides it’s clear.
[Speaker C] In Maimonides yes, Maimonides says it. The question is where he saw it in the words of the Sages. Just as regarding Yom Kippur the rabbi asked where we see it in the words of the Sages, I started checking regarding Sabbath.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, we’ll see. In any case, the point—I’m returning to us—is that we saw a dispute between Tosafot Yeshanim and Maimonides over how to understand this initial assumption that distinguishes between day and night regarding Yom Kippur. In fact, the Gevurat Ari brings that initial assumption and explains the initial assumption for distinguishing between them. I’ll share again. So he says: “I do not know whether everywhere we require a punishment for day and night, such as Sabbaths, holidays, and the conclusion of the Sabbatical year.” I don’t know why he brought in the conclusion of the Sabbatical year here. In any case, that’s about the addition. In any case, he says: “And it seems to me that although on other holidays and Sabbaths one does not need a separate warning and punishment for the night, because the night is included in the day, nevertheless because the Merciful One linked the affliction and labor prohibition of Yom Kippur to the atonement of the day, as it is written: ‘you shall afflict your souls and you shall do no labor, for on this day He shall atone for you.’” We see that labor and affliction are because of the atonement. “And there was an initial assumption that since the night of Yom Kippur does not atone, only the day does,” as is stated at the end of the first chapter of tractate Shevuot, etc., “therefore here too there was an initial assumption… Thus the night does not atone, only the essence of the day. And since that is so, there was an initial assumption that since the night does not atone, only the day, the night is not included in affliction and labor prohibition.” You see? The initial assumption applies both to affliction and to labor prohibition. But why? Because I understood that affliction and the prohibition of labor are conditions for atonement. And atonement takes place only by day. So this is exactly the move I was discussing here, only without, of course, the whole framework of broad cessation. But the idea, the logic, is exactly the same logic. In other words, the initial assumption is that the labor prohibition on Yom Kippur is not like on Sabbaths and holidays, but is connected to affliction and constitutes a condition for atonement. And once that is the case, maybe it applies only by day. Therefore an initial assumption arises on Yom Kippur that it wouldn’t apply at night. Okay? Yes, by the way, Tosafot HaRosh here really writes that the initial assumption is because the Torah says “on this very day,” what the rabbi wanted to say earlier. Also regarding the addition to Yom Kippur—which I’m not sure is right—but that is the claim in Maimonides. And the question is: what is new in the conclusion? So in the conclusion, the prohibition applies both by day and by night. What does that mean? One could say: by day it remains as part of the conditions for atonement, and in addition there is also the law of a holiday, and therefore it also exists at night. But then it comes out that there are two laws on Yom Kippur, two reasons to cease from labor. One is the cessation that constitutes a condition for atonement, but that is only by day; in addition there is also the law of a holiday, and according to holiday law it is no different from any other holiday, which also applies at night. Or one could say no: what is new is that in fact cessation from labor is like every holiday and is not a condition for atonement—which perhaps is really what Tosafot Yeshanim says. A third possibility is to say no: what is new is that everything is indeed a condition for atonement, but even as a condition for atonement one must afflict oneself at night too, not only by day. In order to be atoned for during the day, you need to arrive already afflicted from the beginning of the twenty-four-hour period. And the fact that atonement is done only by day does not mean that the affliction is performed only by day. Especially in light of what I said, that the concept of afflicting oneself always refers to a duration of time. So when they tell you to arrive afflicted, it doesn’t mean that right now you should merely be in a state of not eating; rather, you should already be in the midst of a fast. What does it mean to be in the midst of a fast? That you are already after some period of not having eaten. You are already within a fast. So therefore, says the Talmud—then it would be from the beginning of the twenty-four-hour period, meaning all night. And now it is all a condition for atonement, but the condition for atonement is that you be afflicted from the beginning of the twenty-four-hour period, even though the atonement is only by day. And the initial assumption was that since the atonement is by day, the affliction too would only be by day. And we said that according to Maimonides this is a faint initial assumption, but in any case that whole initial assumption is rejected by the text.
[Speaker C] And what about labor? Regarding labor too, do I have this idea that I should already be in a state of cessation?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Regarding labor, we said that maybe cessation from labor is also not merely not doing labor, but being in a state of cessation.
[Speaker C] Yes, but does that require that I started earlier? Or regarding cessation can you also say that even if I didn’t start earlier, if when morning begins I am already ceasing, that’s enough?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You could say that, and you could also say not. I don’t have proofs here, so I’m saying there are three possible ways to understand the conclusion. All three are possible. I don’t know what to say as to the final conclusion. According to Maimonides, apparently the third possibility is the correct one, because Maimonides says in the conclusion that both affliction and labor are one big cessation that is apparently part of the conditions for atonement.
[Speaker C] But from Maimonides it seems as if regarding labor it’s obvious that it includes the night, because he says “just as…” He presents it as a given.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but what I’m saying is that after the extension to affliction has been established, the initial assumption now comes back to labor as well—that maybe it applies only during the day.
[Speaker C] But Maimonides doesn’t present it that way. At least in his laws he doesn’t present it as though there was some initial assumption regarding labor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? On the contrary, he does present it that way.
[Speaker C] He’s kind of the opposite—where?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In law 2. Why does he say that it applies both by day and by night? Only on the Sabbath…
[Speaker C] Not affliction. But mainly he says it in order to teach about affliction. It’s like he’s saying that just as with labor there’s no distinction—as if with labor that’s self-evident, that’s a given.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But why does he say that? Because when you extend labor to affliction, then I say, wait, wait, wait—so what does that actually mean? It means that labor and affliction are all one single cessation, and then an initial assumption arises to distinguish in both labor and affliction between day and night. But then he says, wait, with labor we have two verses: one speaks about the day and one speaks about the night, and we need them after this connection. After we have the two verses, we learn that with labor there’s no difference between day and night, and from that we’ll also learn that for affliction there’s no difference between day and night. But the whole initial assumption arises only after I connect it to affliction, what I said above. Fine, these are comments; everyone will take from it what they take. I’m saying this.
[Speaker E] Is the Ninth of Av also somewhat like this? Following the earlier classes—that it’s cessation, and therefore the night too?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Most halakhic decisors seem to hold that the prohibition of labor is only by day. But that, you know, is in the halakhic rulings. Fasting?
[Speaker E] Ah, so it depends on that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The prohibition of labor. We were talking about the prohibition of labor on the Ninth of Av. But you know, in the halakhic rulings, all of that is inventions of the decisors. Meaning, where does it come from, where did it come from? I can understand an opinion that says no, the prohibition of labor applies over the entire twenty-four-hour period.
[Speaker E] Maybe at night it’s less common for people to do labor?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be. We’re talking there about the thirty-nine categories of labor and their derivatives. Remember, I pointed this out in the class too—that on the Ninth of Av as well, it doesn’t mean only distraction from the fast, as is usually understood. Rather, there are several of the early Ashkenazic medieval authorities (Rishonim)—the Mordechai and the Ravyah and others—from whom it seems that these are literally Sabbath labors, and I inferred that from Tosafot too. Tosafot says that there is no difference between labor on the Sabbath and labor on the Ninth of Av or on Yom Kippur except for the addition. Tosafot asks: but what about a place where the custom is to do labor? And then I ask Tosafot: but what about a place where the custom is not to do labor? It’s still not the same thing. So according to Tosafot, no—it is the same thing. A place where the custom is not to do labor means all the labors of a Jewish holiday. Okay. Now later in the passage, I’m moving on now—this was the first section, about the distinction between day and night. I’m now moving to the discussion of adding onto Yom Kippur. The Talmud on 81b brings there—I said there were several opinions that derive a warning for affliction, and then it makes a need-for-both argument between Rav Acha bar Yaakov and Rav Pappa. The Talmud says as follows: “But why did Rav Acha bar Yaakov not say like Rav Pappa? Because he needs ‘a Sabbath of solemn rest’ for that which was taught in a baraita: ‘And you shall afflict yourselves on the ninth of the month’—might one think that he should begin fasting on the ninth? Scripture says: ‘in the evening.’ If in the evening, might one think after dark? Scripture says: ‘on the ninth.’ How so? He begins and afflicts himself while it is still day. From here we learn that one adds from the weekday onto the holy.” Meaning, he learns from this verse that one adds from the weekday onto the holy, and therefore he doesn’t agree with Rav Pappa. Okay. Now the Talmud asks: I have this only for its entrance; from where do we know for its exit? Scripture says: ‘from evening to evening.’ Both the first evening and the second evening require an addition. Okay. And I have this only for Yom Kippur; from where do we know Sabbaths? Scripture says: ‘you shall rest.’ I have this only for Sabbaths; from where do we know Jewish holidays? Scripture says: ‘your Sabbath.’ How so? Every place where cessation is stated, one adds from the weekday onto the holy. Seemingly, there is a Torah-level law of addition on Yom Kippur, on Sabbaths, and on Jewish holidays. In practice, Maimonides brings the law of addition only regarding Yom Kippur. Not only is it only on Yom Kippur, but it is only for affliction on Yom Kippur, not for labor. That is Maimonides. The position of other medieval authorities (Rishonim) is that the law of addition is a Torah-level law for Jewish holidays as well and for Sabbaths as well. In Maimonides this is a whole story. In this respect it seems he does not bring it. So it could be that this is just an asmachta, or it could be that he follows another tanna, because there are other tannaim who learned the law of addition from other places. There are parallel Talmudic passages. Some learned it from the Sabbatical year or from various other places. In any case, the Talmud learns from here the law of addition, that one adds from the weekday onto the holy. The Talmud later asks: “And the tanna who derives from ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame,’ what does he do with ‘on the ninth of the month’?” What’s the question? So Rashi explains: the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame’ excludes the addition from punishment, on 81a. Right? He says that from “on this very day” we learn that karet applies only to the day, only to the twenty-four-hour period, and not to the addition. So what does that mean? Apparently there is a prohibition there, otherwise why would you need to exclude it from karet? Right? But if there is a prohibition there, then why do we need this verse about the addition? You’ve now brought me a verse that teaches addition, but according to the tanna of ‘very selfsame,’ from the fact that there is a verse excluding the addition from karet, it’s clear that the prohibition exists there—only karet was excluded. That’s how the Talmud asks. And then it answers that it’s needed for the obligation to eat on the ninth; let’s leave that aside for the moment. The question itself is a strange question. Or maybe before that: what about our tanna, who disagrees with ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame’? So according to his position, apparently there is no exclusion of the addition from karet, right? Because if there were such an exclusion, that exclusion would prove that the prohibition is there, only that it was excluded from karet. So he wouldn’t need the verse. If he needs the verse, that implies he has no exclusion from karet regarding the addition. So what comes out according to his view?
[Speaker C] There would be karet for the addition?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Seemingly, according to his view there would be karet for the addition too. Everything that is written that there is no karet for the addition applies only according to the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame.’ And in fact I found in Rabbenu Elyakim, one of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), that he writes this—that according to our tanna, against the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame,’ there is karet for the addition too. A tannaitic dispute. Where the difference would be—and in a moment I’ll explain further—it may be that the difference lies in the question of how I understand the law of addition. Is the addition an extension of the prohibitions and commandments that apply on Yom Kippur itself, meaning that it extends Yom Kippur a bit earlier and a bit later, or not? Yom Kippur is on Yom Kippur itself. The addition is a new law. It’s a new law, and then there’s no reason to assume that it would carry karet. Okay? Meaning, it could be that our tanna learns the law of addition from here, right? And he does not exclude the addition from karet. Why not? So I say: why doesn’t he exclude the addition from karet? Because the law learned from here concerning the addition is an innovative law. It’s not an extension of the laws of Yom Kippur itself into the additional time. It is a separate positive commandment. We learn it regarding the addition: ‘from evening to evening shall you rest, your Sabbath,’ yes, on the ninth. On the ninth, from evening to evening—from here we learn that one adds from the weekday onto the holy. What does that mean? This addition is a separate positive commandment; there is a separate positive commandment concerning the addition. It doesn’t mean that you start Yom Kippur earlier. It’s a separate positive commandment. If so, there is no need to exclude it from karet. Karet was not said about it. Karet was said only about Yom Kippur. There’s no need to exclude it from karet. Only if you say that the prohibition in the addition is an extension of the prohibitions of the day itself would there have been an initial assumption to say that karet too would apply to the addition. Indeed, then you need an exclusion that karet was not said about the addition. Okay? But the tanna who disagrees with ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame’ says that there is no exclusion of the addition from karet, so Rabbenu Elyakim says that apparently according to him there is karet. I say no, not necessarily. It could be that he says there is no need to exclude the addition from karet because from the outset the whole prohibition there is an innovative prohibition. So there is no initial assumption that there would be karet there, and therefore there is no need to exclude it from karet. And then it comes out that the difference is not whether there is karet—for everyone there is no karet. The difference is only in the question of what the nature of the addition is. According to the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame,’ the addition is simply an earlier start of Yom Kippur, with all that implies, except for karet, since karet was excluded. According to the tanna who disagrees with the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame,’ he claims that Yom Kippur starts at the beginning of the day. The addition is a new law, a new positive commandment. One practical difference, for example, could be women’s obligation. If this is a new positive commandment with no prohibition attached to it, then women would be exempt. If it is a continuation of Yom Kippur, then it could be that even if there is only a positive commandment there and no prohibition. I remind you that the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame’ excludes not only karet but also the prohibition. Remember the Talmud? Let me show you the Talmud here.
[Speaker C] Yes, granted if there’s some prohibition here, but it objects again and again…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, we’ll get to that, we’ll get to that—it really is difficult, what I’m saying. So here in the Talmud on page a it says: “And the tanna, what is the reason from here, ‘on the ninth of the month,’ and ‘you shall do no labor’—might one think that one is punishable for additional labor? Scripture says…” and so on. “Might one think that he is not punishable by karet for additional labor?” Scripture says… “Might one think that he is not punishable by karet for additional labor, but is punishable by karet for additional affliction?” Scripture says no. “Might one think that there is no punishment at all, but he is nevertheless warned regarding additional labor?” You see? Here. “Might one think that there is no punishment at all, but he is nevertheless warned regarding additional labor?” Scripture says: “You shall do no labor on this very day.” “Might one think that he is not warned regarding additional labor, but is warned regarding additional affliction?” Also no. So what do we see? It excludes it also from the prohibition. So what remains there? Not only was karet excluded, the prohibition too was excluded. Only the positive commandment remains. Right? Now if only the positive commandment remains, would women be obligated? That would be a time-bound positive commandment. On Yom Kippur there is both a positive commandment and a prohibition, but with the addition there is only a positive commandment. So I say this: if this positive commandment is simply continuing the positive commandment of Yom Kippur and they’re only telling you to start it earlier, then whoever is obligated in the positive commandment of Yom Kippur—and women are obligated in the positive commandment of Yom Kippur—would also be obligated in the positive commandment of the addition, because it is just the same positive commandment, only starting earlier. But if I view it as a newly innovated positive commandment, then women could be exempt, because it is only a positive commandment and there is no prohibition.
[Speaker C] Why are women obligated in the positive commandment of Yom Kippur?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because in a matter that contains both a positive commandment and a prohibition, women are obligated. That’s at least the accepted approach. That same Tosafot in Kiddushin 34a—if you look there, you’ll see it. He doesn’t say it explicitly, but it’s implied. Think for a second about what follows from his words and you’ll see that according to one view he takes “observe” and “remember” as applying only to the Sabbath. There is no general principle that wherever there is both a prohibition and a positive commandment, women are obligated in the positive commandment too. But there is another opinion in Tosafot that says no—wherever there is both a prohibition and a positive commandment, women are obligated in both the prohibition and the positive commandment.
[Speaker C] He’s speaking according to the other view.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Okay, and all of this here is a tannaitic dispute. That could be exactly the dispute between the tannaim. And then it actually comes out—notice—that according to this, the Talmud’s question is a somewhat strange question. Because the Talmud asks regarding the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame’: this tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame,’ what does he do with “on the ninth of the month”? And Rashi explains: what do you mean? If he has an exclusion from karet, then apparently the prohibition itself exists. So if the prohibition exists, then why does he need the verse “on the ninth of the month in the evening”? What kind of question is that? “On the ninth of the month in the evening” introduces a new prohibition. Obviously the Talmud understood that according to the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame,’ the prohibition of the addition is a continuation of Yom Kippur, so there is no room to introduce some newly innovated prohibition; there is already the innovative prohibition, namely the prohibition of Yom Kippur itself. But we saw that the tanna excludes from there both karet and the prohibition. Necessarily, what remains is presumably the regular positive commandment of Yom Kippur. And therefore the verse “on the ninth of the month in the evening” is superfluous. Meaning, true, it is only a positive commandment even according to the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame,’ but it is the positive commandment of Yom Kippur; it is not a new positive commandment. And the tanna who disagrees with the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame’ also says that there is only a positive commandment there, but it is not the positive commandment of Yom Kippur—it is a newly innovated positive commandment. That is the difference between them. Because if there had been a prohibition on Yom Kippur in the additional period, I could have said—there would have been room to say—that there is a prohibition on Yom Kippur in the addition, and therefore it would have been necessary to exclude it from karet, and that verse “on the ninth of the month in the evening” would come to include that there is also the positive commandment for the addition. So what’s the problem? What is the Talmud asking? You see that it doesn’t work that way; rather, it is an extension of the whole of Yom Kippur, both the positive commandment and the prohibition. Only afterward is it excluded from karet, and also excluded from the prohibition. What remains is only the positive commandment, but it is the positive commandment of Yom Kippur; it is not a new positive commandment. And therefore the Talmud says: so why do you need a new positive commandment for the addition? There is already the positive commandment of Yom Kippur that begins with the addition. In contrast, the tanna who disagrees with the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame’ does indeed need this verse according to his approach. Why? Because according to him, the addition does not continue Yom Kippur at all. No. Yom Kippur starts at the beginning of the day. The addition is a newly innovated law, learned from “on the ninth of the month in the evening,” and it apparently contains only a positive commandment—“you shall rest, your Sabbath”—and not a prohibition, at least simply speaking. A practical difference is that women, for example, would be exempt. Okay? Now where are the practical differences? So as I said earlier, apparently there is only a positive commandment in the addition according to both tannaim. The practical difference is the question—which is the actual dispute—what kind of positive commandment it is: is it a new positive commandment or the positive commandment of Yom Kippur? One practical difference I mentioned is women’s obligation.
[Speaker C] So how can there be karet if it’s only a positive commandment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what was excluded. Again.
[Speaker C] I didn’t understand. According to Rabbi Elyakim, according to Rabbi Elyakim it’s…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, according to the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame,’ wait. According to the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame’—
[Speaker C] There definitely is no karet.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The addition, the addition is Yom Kippur complete.
[Speaker C] Yes, but it says there that it’s not karet.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait—but there is a special exclusion from karet and a special exclusion from the prohibition, and then only the positive commandment remains.
[Speaker C] And according to the second baraita?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to the second baraita, there is nothing of Yom Kippur at all in the addition; it is a completely newly innovated law.
[Speaker C] Yes, but all this is not like Rabbi Elyakim, what you just told us.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rabbi Elyakim, there is karet. Obviously. I brought that against Rabbenu Elyakim. I said that Rabbenu Elyakim is not necessarily correct. Even the tanna who is not the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame’ does not necessarily hold that there is karet for the addition. Rabbenu Elyakim claims that the tanna who is not the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame’ holds that there is karet for the addition, because he does not accept the exclusions of the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame.’ I am saying that he also does not accept them because he doesn’t need them.
[Speaker C] I understand what the Rabbi is saying, but what is the Rabbi bringing as proof from this Rabbi Elyakim that it’s a commandment in its own right and there is karet?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it’s an extension, an extension of Yom Kippur into the added time. That’s not difficult; that’s the straightforward simple reading.
[Speaker C] What, is there a positive commandment with karet besides Passover and circumcision?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is there another one? Not besides—no, it’s the same law. It’s the same law as Yom Kippur. Yom Kippur just begins before the day begins, in the added period, and therefore everything is there: karet, positive commandment, prohibition—everything is there.
[Speaker C] So there wouldn’t be a dispute about that between the baraitot? I understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in the baraita there is a dispute.
[Speaker C] No, but there wouldn’t be a dispute in this definition of whether the addition is a commandment in its own—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —right, in its own right or an extension of Yom Kippur. Correct. The dispute would be whether there is an exclusion from karet and the prohibition. According to the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame,’ there is an exclusion from karet and the prohibition, and according to the second tanna there is no exclusion. But bottom line, what remains—each one according to what he thinks remains—is regular Yom Kippur.
[Speaker C] Even according to Rabbi Elyakim?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even according to Rabbi Elyakim, exactly. But according to the accepted approach—I haven’t found anyone who agrees with Rabbi Elyakim—meaning, it is generally accepted that there is unanimously no karet for the addition. So that is what I am claiming: that Rabbi Elyakim’s words are not necessary, because even the tanna who disagrees with the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame’ does not need an exclusion from karet and from the prohibition, because from the outset this is only a new prohibition, a new positive commandment to add from the weekday onto the holy. A practical difference, for example, as I said, is regarding women. Another practical difference: what happens, say, on the Sabbath? If I understand adding onto the Sabbath as the beginning of the Sabbath itself, then we can discuss whether I need to recite kiddush if I eat during the added period. Because if the Sabbath has begun, I’m not allowed to eat without kiddush. More than that: if I recited kiddush during the added period, have I fulfilled my obligation? Or did I sanctify the addition, which is a different law from sanctifying the day? On Yom Kippur this isn’t a practical difference because you don’t eat.
[Speaker C] But sanctifying the day also doesn’t require that it be within the day; it can also be close before it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, simply speaking, you have to do it on the day itself. You can’t sanctify it in advance. Kiddush—what we call kiddush—is done on the day itself. But its entrance…
[Speaker C] According to Maimonides, where the commandment of kiddush and havdalah is one and the same commandment, we recite kiddush during the Sabbath and havdalah after the Sabbath.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but kiddush is within the Sabbath.
[Speaker C] Yes, but if it’s the same commandment, we should also do havdalah while the Sabbath is about to end…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, havdalah—havdalah is not to sanctify the Sabbath; it is to desacralize the weekday. As a result, the Sabbath is sanctified. No, it’s to part from the Sabbath. That is the simple understanding. What does it mean to sanctify the Sabbath at its departure? It means to show that it is not the same as the weekday. That is called sanctifying it. So that you do within the weekday, because the sanctification of the Sabbath there is done through the desacralization of the weekday. Therefore every act regarding a day has to be done within the day in question—both havdalah and kiddush. So now there can be a practical difference regarding the concept of the addition on the Sabbath. If the addition is the beginning of the Sabbath rest, then one can recite kiddush for the Sabbath in advance—not only can one, one must; you can’t eat without kiddush. And if you recited kiddush, you fulfilled your obligation; you don’t recite kiddush again on the Sabbath. If the addition is a new law, then perhaps one could say either that kiddush is not required, or that if you did recite kiddush it does not help for the Sabbath itself, only for the addition, and on the Sabbath you would need to recite kiddush for the Sabbath.
[Speaker C] Is there such a possibility, to recite kiddush twice, basically?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe. I don’t know. I’m saying I haven’t found such a thing explicitly, but in order to sharpen the difference between the views, I’m giving a practical illustration here. It brings an explicit derivation exempting women. And that apparently means that without this derivation, women would have been obligated on Yom Kippur—on the addition to Yom Kippur. Sorry, on Yom Kippur itself, not on the addition, I think. On Yom Kippur itself. And regarding the addition I don’t remember; we’d have to check for a moment. We’d need to check the passage.
[Speaker C] From the Talmud that says, “Better that they remain unwitting rather than become deliberate sinners,” which implies that the day itself obligates women. About—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll get to that in a moment. Not in a moment, because I’m already finishing, but from the Talmud of “better that they remain unwitting” you really do see that women too are subject to the addition. And that apparently means that this is not a new positive commandment but a continuation of the positive commandment of Yom Kippur. Then we have to discuss whether that Talmud of “better that they remain unwitting” depends on the tannaitic dispute here. According to Rabbenu Elyakim, really not, and that strengthens his position. But according to the suggestion I proposed, that only goes according to the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame,’ not according to the second tanna.
[Speaker C] But Maimonides rules like—not like ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame’—and still rules “better that they remain unwitting” regarding women.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame’ is really a matter of exegetical interpretation, so I don’t know how much one can infer from Maimonides as to which tanna he rules like.
[Speaker C] No, he doesn’t rule regarding the addition on the Sabbath, basically.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That doesn’t prove anything. It could be that it’s an asmachta or something like that, but still, the exposition regarding the addition of Yom Kippur—he could agree there with the tanna of ‘very selfsame’ and ‘very selfsame.’ Why he leaves out Sabbaths and Jewish holidays—that is a separate issue; we’ll talk about it later. Okay, I think I’ll stop here. If anyone wants to add something or ask, then of course.
[Speaker E] A question not related to the class—so after everyone finishes asking, if anyone wants. Regarding registration for semester A, today is the last day it’s possible. What is the class “Topics in the Thought of Jewish Law”? What is that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What will the topics be?
[Speaker E] Yes. I want to understand it; it sounds a bit general.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think there’s supposed to be some syllabus there; I wrote something. In principle, I intend to talk about looking at Jewish law on the meta-halakhic level. What is a dispute, Jewish law and truth, pluralism and tolerance in Jewish law, the significance of opinions rejected by Jewish law, autonomy in halakhic ruling versus recourse to precedents. Meaning, a kind of top-down look at the philosophy of Jewish law, how the system of Jewish law works.
[Speaker E] I understand, thank you.
[Speaker C] Rabbi, I still don’t have my schedule yet in order to know when, at what times I can come to the institute next semester. What do you do with that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.
