Yoma Chapter 8 – Lesson 11

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so those are the two laws that Tosafot identifies in the law of education. There is still room here to discuss the question of how a minor can be obligated rabbinically in commandments. After all, the minor as such is not obligated in commandments, so he is also not obligated in “do not deviate.” If he is not obligated in “do not deviate,” then why should he obey a rabbinic obligation to keep commandments? How does this even get started? You turn to the child and tell him: we, the sages, decree that you must keep commandments on a rabbinic level. And I ask: with all due respect, who are you? What, anyone can come and start giving me all kinds of instructions here? Why should I listen to you? Oh, because of “do not deviate”? I’m not obligated in “do not deviate”; that’s Torah-level. And if you say that I’m obligated in “do not deviate” rabbinically, then why should I keep that obligation? Right, obviously, it doesn’t even begin.

Something like this is asked by Kovetz Shiurim regarding the obligation of a blind person. There are views that a blind person is obligated in commandments rabbinically, and so he asks: how does this business even get started? Rabbi Akiva Eiger asks this explicitly about a minor, and Kovetz Shiurim asks it about a blind person, I think. How does it begin? He is not obligated in “do not deviate” on a Torah level, so automatically he also need not obey.

If it had come from “to include Torah scholars,” Nachmanides would have had a problem. Because he asks against Maimonides: how can you tell me that rabbinic laws derive from “do not deviate”? According to that, every rabbinic law is basically a Torah prohibition, and in cases of doubt you should have ruled stringently. That is what Nachmanides asks against Maimonides. If according to his own view there is also a verse, just a different verse, what does that help? The very same difficulty still applies to him. After all, it is still Torah-based, and you should have been stringent. Therefore clearly—as Kovetz Shiurim says in Sofrim—according to Nachmanides there is no Torah source for this at all. Not just that by chance “do not deviate” is not the source according to his view, but rather according to his view there is no Torah source whatsoever for this matter.

I’ll add more than that: there isn’t even a logical argument for it, because if there were a logical argument, then why is it called logic? That too would have been Torah-level. So if there is neither logic nor a verse, then why must one obey them? Fine, this is an interesting riddle; I once wrote half a book about it.

In any event, the claim is that according to Nachmanides, whatever the source may be for the obligation to obey the sages, that source exists for children too, for minors too, so that is still somewhat understandable. But according to Maimonides, where you need “do not deviate,” how does the discussion of minors even begin? There is no law of “do not deviate” for minors. Maybe Maimonides would agree to Nachmanides’ reasoning, except that he says that in addition there is also “do not deviate.” And for minors there is only that reasoning, without “do not deviate.” Otherwise it is really difficult: how are minors rabbinically obligated in keeping commandments?

But of course there is no need to tie Maimonides to Tosafot. Tosafot, who says that minors are obligated in commandments rabbinically, does not necessarily have to learn like Maimonides, that the obligation concerning rabbinic commandments is founded on “do not deviate.” Maybe he holds like Nachmanides, and then there is no difficulty at all. So there is no need here to connect different positions of the medieval authorities (Rishonim).

In any event, this too is a point that needs discussion: how can one obligate rabbinically at all? Here, in this context, I want to add one more point. There are several later authorities (Acharonim) who wanted to argue that minors are obligated in commandments on a Torah level. For example, the Pri Megadim in Petichah Kolelet, and the Kehillot Yaakov, whom I mentioned earlier regarding Sukkah, also mentions this possibility—that minors are actually obligated in commandments on a Torah level. It is just that you cannot impose responsibility on them if they fail to fulfill them, because they lack understanding; therefore punishment does not apply to them, and they are regarded as coerced. But in principle the obligation itself applies to them too on a Torah level. So that is basically the claim. Meaning, the whole law of majority applies only to punishment, not to responsibility, not to the obligation itself.

[Speaker E] Why not say that they are obligated in some things and not in others? After all, all the examples we have of educating minors are examples like sukkah, assembly, and things like that, which seem to be time-bound positive commandments and things like that. Those aren’t the examples I’m talking about.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Pri Megadim and the Kehillot Yaakov aren’t talking about those examples; they’re talking about all commandments. Why not say that some commandments really…

[Speaker E] minors are exempt from for all kinds of reasons, and some commandments they are obligated in regardless? And what are all those “kinds of reasons”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the question.

[Speaker E] For example, time-bound positive commandments—let’s say they are exempt from those,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and all the laws of education were said only about time-bound positive commandments. Time-bound positive commandments?

[Speaker E] I can’t think of an example that isn’t like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We educate them regarding commandments in every area, not only time-bound positive commandments. There is a law of education even for time-bound positive commandments.

[Speaker E] And all the rest they are obligated in on a Torah level, no? What? You could say that all the examples, at least from what I remember—maybe there’s an example I forgot—but all the examples in the Talmud are examples of time-bound positive commandments. So why not say from the outset that the Torah-level exemption is only in that type of commandment, while there are other commandments that they are obligated in?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not sure you’re right; I really need to think about it. But beyond that, the law of education is certainly a general law. No one disputes that it applies to all commandments, not specifically time-bound ones. More than that: in the commandments where the law of education appears in the Talmud, it says explicitly that it is rabbinic. So you gain nothing here. About those cases it says that it is rabbinic, so to say that specifically there it is Torah-level and the others are rabbinic—that’s strange. Because there, like the passage we just saw in Sukkah, the two passages, it says this is a rabbinic obligation in sukkah. That does not seem plausible to me.

In any event, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) certainly did not learn that way. In any case, the point is that if I really understand that the obligation on the minors themselves is Torah-level, then perhaps one could slightly revise what the Kehillot Yaakov says in Tosafot and say that there is indeed a Torah-level obligation on the minor, and since he has no responsibility, the rabbis place the responsibility on his father. Then the rabbinic law of education is indeed a law of education imposed on the father, while the obligation on the minor himself is a Torah-level obligation. Torah-level, but without sanction, without the responsibility imposed on the minor to fulfill it.

Then the question does not arise: how can you obligate minors if they are not obligated because there is no “do not deviate”? It is not by force of “do not deviate”; it is a Torah-level obligation. Just as adults are obligated, so too minors are obligated, and what the Torah exempted minors from was not the obligations, but the punishments.

[Speaker F] How would that fit with passages where the Talmud in Berakhot, in two places, is uncertain whether a minor can discharge someone else’s obligation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a major question. According to this, one would have to say something like this: the obligation of minors on a Torah level is still weaker than the Torah-level obligation of adults, and therefore minors cannot discharge adults who are obligated on a Torah level. Adults who are obligated rabbinically they can discharge—not because they themselves are obligated rabbinically, but because they themselves are obligated on a Torah level with a weaker obligation. That is enough to discharge someone else who is rabbinically obligated; it is not enough to discharge someone else who is obligated on a Torah level.

[Speaker B] So then women can’t discharge minors? According to this…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question is how you understand women. Are women, in time-bound positive commandments, basically obligated but exempt from responsibility? You could say the same thing as for minors. And one of the implications, for example, is that if they do keep that commandment, they have performed a positive commandment. It seems that the commandment is indeed defined for women too; otherwise it would just be adding to the commandments. So it is defined for women too; they just are not obligated in the sense that no responsibility is imposed on them if they do not do it. In that sense, it really is like minors.

Okay, in any event, maybe that is one possibility for explaining it. I’m not sure. It is fairly clear that this is not Tosafot’s intention, and not the Kehillot Yaakov’s intention either.

Something similar exists—I think I also mentioned this—the dispute between the Minchat Chinukh and the Shaagat Aryeh, or the Gevurat Ari, at the beginning of Chagigah, regarding a minor who is obligated in the assembly commandment. The Gevurat Ari begins to analyze there the question of how a minor can be obligated in assembly when he has no land. The land belongs to his father; he has no property of his own. And if the father died and the minor inherited land, then he has land, but then the father is not bringing him. And yet the father needs to bring him to assembly. So either way, it would seem that a minor cannot be obligated in assembly.

So the Minchat Chinukh asks him: what do you want? The minor is obligated by the law of education; the father has to bring him there, not that the minor is obligated on his own. Therefore there is no requirement that the minor own land in order to be obligated.

Now, the fact that this is a law of education is a bit difficult, because apparently this law is written explicitly in the Torah: “Assemble the people, the men and the women and the children.” And the law of education is rabbinic. But apparently the Minchat Chinukh still wants to say that this is like the law of education, meaning an obligation imposed on the father, except that in this case it is a Torah-level obligation to educate his son concerning assembly. Maybe as part of “and you shall teach them diligently,” because it is Torah study—I don’t know.

But what does the Gevurat Ari answer? The Gevurat Ari apparently understands that there is an obligation on the minors themselves. Therefore the minor needs to own land in order to be obligated, exactly like an adult. And this is precisely the disagreement about assembly between the Minchat Chinukh and the Gevurat Ari.

But of course this is not necessarily the same dispute as that between Rashi and Tosafot regarding the general law of education. Because there it is specific to the commandment of assembly, since there the Torah itself says: assemble the children. So the Gevurat Ari argues that specifically there, apparently, there is also an obligation on the minors. That is his disagreement with the Minchat Chinukh. It does not mean he would say the same thing in all the general laws of education, because those are rabbinic laws. There he could certainly hold not like Tosafot but like Rashi.

Okay, we’ll see later that this dispute can have practical ramifications. Maybe I’ll briefly mention one already here. For example, an obvious practical ramification could be the question whether you have to fulfill the commandment in full accordance with the law. If you are speaking only about accustoming the minor and teaching him so that he will know what to do when he is an adult, as Rashi understands, then give him, for example, an invalid lulav. What difference does it make? The main thing is that he learns how to wave the lulav. When he becomes an adult, he will know to buy a valid lulav, and you will teach him the laws of lulav and everything else.

By contrast, if we are dealing with an actual rabbinic obligation in commandments, where the father has to make sure that the minor fulfills his obligation, then apparently he must do it properly. True, the Sha’ar HaTziyun brings the Ritva there in the laws of lulav. He brings the Ritva who says that in the law of education one must give the minor a valid lulav. That is one of the implications that apparently the minor is really performing a commandment; it is not merely that the adult is training him to keep commandments.

Now, that is not conclusive, because one could say that at least in commandments like lulav, where the defect is visibly apparent, one could say that this too is part of the law of education. You also have to teach him what a valid lulav is. What, will you give him an invalid lulav? After all, the invalidity of the lulav is visible, so he will see that such a lulav is valid—you educated him badly. I’m saying the opposite: someone who says that one may educate minors not in accordance with the law certainly does not understand that minors are themselves obligated in commandments. Someone who says that one must educate them in accordance with the law—that remains open. One can say it is because they themselves must fulfill the commandment, or that it is simply part of education.

We will later see a ramification: what happens when the commandment is fulfilled not in accordance with the law, where the defect is not noticeable. Then there will be a practical difference between those two possibilities.

Okay? So that is, for example, one ramification between these two conceptions. The same thing—if you remember, I mentioned the story about the Sochatchover, right? His father sent him to make kiddush on Yom Kippur when he was a child, and when he came back his father sent him to eat—sorry, when he came back, his father asked him: did you make kiddush? He said: of course not. Everything I am obligated in regarding kiddush is only by the law of education. The law of education is so that I will know what to do when I am older. But when I am older I won’t eat, so I won’t need to make kiddush on Yom Kippur. Therefore even as a child I don’t need to make kiddush on Yom Kippur. Someone like that, it seems to me, no longer needs education; even as a child he already knows.

[Speaker F] But if there were some situation where he would—well, that, what? Is there really such a case?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not if he’s ill, but his father—you’re not educating him according to the law, because he is not ill now. So you are educating him not according to the law. Let’s just try to get through a few more things. Anyway, that’s what he said. And again the question: if of course he is obligated in commandments as a child, then when they send him to eat, he should make kiddush regardless of getting used to it so that he’ll know what to do when he is older, because he is obligated to make kiddush; he is obligated in commandments. So that too is a ramification of the two conceptions I presented here.

The same thing appears in the Mishnah Berurah, in the laws of tzitzit. What happens when a minor spins his own tzitzit, or ties his own tzitzit? His intention for the sake of the commandment is ineffective, because he is a minor, and in the case of a minor there is no valid intention and no law of “for its own sake.” And if a minor makes tzitzit for himself and wears it, then he is in effect wearing tzitzit that was spun not for its own sake. So according to the view that one must teach him, educate him, to do the commandments in accordance with the law, it follows that you need to dress him in tzitzit spun by an adult. Tzitzit that he himself spun—you cannot use. You can educate him and teach him to spin tzitzit, but don’t then let him wear it, because that tzitzit is invalid; it is not for its own sake. Okay? Again, this is a practical ramification of this conception that one must educate toward proper performance of the commandments.

But there the Mishnah Berurah, it seems to me, concludes that you may let him wear the tzitzit that he spun. So several later authorities explain there that where the defect in the commandment stems from his very minority—not that I gave him an invalid lulav. With an invalid lulav, the defect is because the lulav is invalid, regardless of my minority. But here the invalidity in the commandment is only because of my minority. Meaning, if I myself were an adult and did the same thing—I spun the threads and tied the tzitzit and wore it—everything would be fine. In a place where the defect is only due to my minority, then that is okay. Even according to the Ritva’s view that in education the lulav must be valid, for tzitzit you may let the minor spin the tzitzit.

What is the idea behind this? Apparently, didn’t I say that the Ritva goes with the approach—apparently he could go with the approach—that the commandment of education means an obligation on the minor himself in the commandments, and therefore they must be fulfilled in accordance with the law? So what difference does it make whether the problem is because of his minority or whether the problem is essential? The answer is that apparently, if the problem is because of his minority, then the commandment itself is valid on the plane of the minor. Therefore even if he has to fulfill it in accordance with the law, this is called in accordance with the law—that he spun it for its own sake. On the plane of the minor, even a minor’s “for its own sake” is fine. On the plane of the adult, the minor’s “for its own sake” is not fine. In other words, even the object of the tzitzit is not invalid relative to the minor; it is invalid relative to the adult. Okay? Otherwise it is difficult to reconcile this Mishnah Berurah with the Sha’ar HaTziyun he brought there.

Again, unless we say that all of this is really education as habituation, and for lulav he wants a valid lulav only because that is part of the proper habit of fulfilling commandments. But if I tie it to Tosafot, namely that this is the obligation to fulfill the commandment rabbinically and therefore it must be done in accordance with the law, then the ruling about tzitzit spun by a minor becomes very unclear, and then one has to say what I just said.

Okay, now let us move to the Mishnah on page 82. The Mishnah, 82a, says as follows: “Children are not made to afflict themselves on Yom Kippur, but they are educated one year before and two years before, so that they become accustomed to commandments.” By the style, incidentally—“so that they become accustomed to commandments”—it sounds a bit as though here we are really talking about education in Rashi’s sense, to accustom them to keeping commandments, not because we need to make them fulfill some actual obligation incumbent on them, but in order to become accustomed. And that really is an unusual expression. Usually it says: we educate them in commandments. What does it mean: so that they become accustomed to commandments? Why not: in order to educate them in commandments? Why didn’t they use that expression? Maybe that itself—maybe that itself is the explanation for the shift in terminology. They say here not “educate them,” because here this really is not called education. Education is according to the law, and here it is “so that they become accustomed to commandments,” because in truth the education here is not according to the law. As you see in the Talmud, it is only fasting by hours and so on. So here we are really speaking about education not according to the law. Education not according to the law—its entire value is only in habituating the minor. Real education is when he fulfills the commandment according to the law, and that is education, like the Ritva, like the Sha’ar HaTziyun. Therefore according to the law would mean completing the whole fast. We’ll see in a moment.

In any event, what does “children are not made to afflict themselves on Yom Kippur” mean? Rashi says that “are not made to afflict themselves” means that we are not required to withhold food from them. “If a minor eats forbidden carcasses, the religious court is not commanded to separate him from it.” Okay? That is what “are not made to afflict themselves” means. It implies from Rashi, however, that actively feeding them is probably forbidden, because that is direct feeding by hand. We’ll see later whether that is really correct or not.

In Tosafot Yeshanim here, in the margin—look in the side margin—you have a very fundamental Tosafot Yeshanim on the laws of education. He says as follows: “An eight-year-old, a nine-year-old”—wait, this refers to the Talmud; that detail is not important for us right now. The Talmud gives more detail; the details of the Talmud are less important for our purpose.

Tosafot Yeshanim says this: It is difficult for me, because we say in tractate Nazir, in the chapter “One who said: behold I am a nazirite,” “a man may impose naziriteship on his son,” according to Reish Lakish, who says it is in order to educate him in commandments. His son, yes; his daughter, no, because with his daughter he is not obligated to educate her. But in our Talmud in Yoma, the law of education appears explicitly both for a boy and for a girl at different ages. So we see that there is a law of education for a girl. So Tosafot Yeshanim asks: how does this fit with the Talmud in Nazir, where according to Reish Lakish there is no law of education for his daughter?

The truth is, this is not so terrible. It could be that our Talmud follows Rabbi Yohanan and not Reish Lakish. There is a dispute between Amoraim here in our Talmud too. Fine, but Tosafot Yeshanim assumes that it should fit.

And he says: one can answer that there it speaks only specifically regarding naziriteship, but certainly regarding other commandments he is obligated to educate her. The whole discussion in tractate Nazir concerns only the obligation of education in naziriteship, where it applies to a son and not to a daughter. But the obligation of education in commandments generally—even Reish Lakish agrees that it also applies to daughters, and that is the law of education regarding Yom Kippur.

From here it seems that the commandment of education here on Yom Kippur is the ordinary commandment of education that we are speaking about. It is not something unique to Yom Kippur, but the general law. Tosafot Yeshanim asks: if so, since we say everywhere that “if a minor eats forbidden carcasses, the religious court is not commanded to separate him from it,” now that we educate him—shouldn’t separating him from prohibition be all the more so required? I introduced this earlier and said that if a minor eats forbidden carcasses, we are not obligated to separate him. If he is eating forbidden carcasses, you may leave him to eat; you are not obligated to separate him from the prohibition. But according to Tosafot, I am obligated to educate him—that is, to cause him to keep commandments. So in prohibitions, to prevent him from violating a prohibition, I am not obligated? Surely all the more so I should be.

What is the a fortiori argument here? On the simple level, why is this more of an a fortiori than that? Why is that more severe than this? If you say it is the same thing, I understand. But what is the idea that this is an a fortiori? If for positive commandments, then certainly for prohibitions—why? Pretty clearly because the prohibition is more severe than the positive commandment. What does that mean? On the face of it, this fits with Tosafot’s view, which says that if the minor is obligated in commandments, then it is pretty obvious that it is much more important to prevent him from violating prohibitions than to make sure he fulfills positive commandments. Or, generally speaking, to avoid prohibitions you have to spend all your money, while to avoid neglecting a positive commandment you only need spend up to a fifth. So even for an adult one has to make more effort to avoid a prohibition than to avoid neglecting a positive commandment; so too for a minor.

But if so, there is some assumption here that the severity determining the law of education is the severity of the commandment. In other words, it is very natural to identify this with the Tosafot we saw, Tosafot in Berakhot, that the law of education means an obligation on the minor himself in commandments. So I say: obviously I need to be more concerned that he not violate prohibitions than that he fulfill positive commandments.

Now look: of course, one could have rejected that. One could have said that since the prohibition is more severe, the duty to accustom him not to violate prohibitions is also more significant than the duty to accustom him to fulfill positive commandments. But just look at the actual answer of Tosafot Yeshanim, and that will sharpen the point further. He brings two answers.

First answer: “And Rabbi Eliezer of Metz says that education applies only to having him perform a commandment, but not to separating him from prohibition.” What does that mean? The law of education is to accustom him to perform positive commandments, not to separate him from prohibitions. There is no law of education in separating him from prohibitions.

And as for why here it is called education, by making them afflict themselves on Yom Kippur—why is that called education? He says: this is not separating him from prohibition, by separating him from eating; rather, it is education in that one educates him in the commandment of “and you shall afflict yourselves.” What is he saying? He is saying that basically the law of education exists only for positive commandments and not for prohibitions. And here, where we speak about educating toward the commandment, toward affliction, fasting by hours, he says that this is not separating him from the prohibition of eating, because there is no law of education in separating him from the prohibition of eating. The law of education applies only to positive commandments. Here it is only education toward the positive commandment of “and you shall afflict yourselves.”

According to this, then, the law of education on Yom Kippur was really said only about the positive commandment and not about the prohibition. According to Maimonides, there is a prohibition; according to Saadia Gaon and Halakhot Gedolot, there really is no prohibition, only a positive commandment. Tosafot Yeshanim assumes there is a prohibition, except that the law of education was not said about the prohibition but only about the positive commandment, like Maimonides. So Rabbi Eliezer of Metz’s claim is basically that the law of education applies only to positive commandments and not to prohibitions.

What is the idea behind this? In the question, Tosafot assumed that if there is a law of education for a positive commandment, then all the more so there should be one for a prohibition. So now why has he suddenly retracted—where did the a fortiori argument go? He ignores the a fortiori entirely, without explanation, without anything. It seems to me that if we understand—actually, even before “if we understand”—what could the reasoning be? Let’s try to complete what he did not say. What is the reasoning? Why would one really say that the law of education applies to positive commandments and not to prohibitions? The answer is that something from which one merely has to refrain is less important to habituate, teach, and educate. Fine, you have to tell him that it is forbidden to eat pork, or forbidden to eat on Yom Kippur. Positive commandments have details; you have to habituate the person and teach him. Therefore the law of education was stated regarding positive commandments.

Generally speaking, that may indeed be a correct distinction between positive commandments and prohibitions. And if so, if I am right, then Rabbi Eliezer of Metz is innovating that the role of the law of education is to accustom and teach the minor, and therefore it applies only to positive commandments and not to prohibitions. And that itself is the difference from what Tosafot Yeshanim assumed in his question.

Here I return to what I noted above: in their question, they assume the a fortiori argument—that if for a positive commandment there is an obligation to separate from prohibition, then for a prohibition, where there is a law of education, certainly there is an obligation to separate from prohibition. Why? Because they assume that the commandment of education is a commandment imposed on the minor himself. Then they say: if for a positive commandment he is obligated, then certainly he is obligated not to stumble in a prohibition. What is Rabbi Eliezer of Metz’s answer? The answer is: no, that is not the obligation. The obligation is not to obligate him in the commandments themselves; rather, the obligation is to accustom him to commandments. And that applies more to positive commandments than to prohibitions. So the a fortiori falls away on its own.

And if you remember, I was precise in the wording of our Mishnah, which said: “so that they become accustomed to commandments.” And I asked: why not say “to educate them in commandments,” as is said throughout the Talmud? Maybe according to this answer it is very clear. They do not say “to educate,” because education is like Tosafot—education means fulfilling the commandment itself, and then indeed it would seemingly apply to prohibitions as well. But here we are not talking about that. This is fasting by hours; it has to be done according to the law. And from that itself it is clear that this is not talking about that commandment of education, because after all the fasting is only by hours, so this is not fulfillment of the actual commandment itself. Right? So what is it? Accustoming them to commandments. Ah, accustoming them to commandments—Rabbi Eliezer of Metz says—that applies more to positive commandments than to prohibitions. Therefore it was said only about the positive commandment and not the prohibitions.

Still, the question arises: why then not apply the ordinary law of education on Yom Kippur as well? That is a good question. Fine, so there is a law of habituating to commandments. But what about the general law of education according to Tosafot? If we go like Tosafot, then what about the general law of education? Either we say that Rabbi Eliezer of Metz disagrees with Tosafot—there was an initial assumption like Tosafot, and his very answer is that this is incorrect, Tosafot is not right. Or we say that specifically on Yom Kippur there is no ordinary law of education, only habituation to commandments. And later we will see why. Maybe because it is difficult for minors, maybe it is a matter of danger to life or something like that, so one cannot teach them or bring them to perform the commandment according to the law—that is, to fast the entire day. That is called according to the law. You cannot; it is dangerous. Therefore the ordinary law of education does not exist here. What does exist? Accustoming them, teaching them, in commandments. And that is done by hours. But that applies only to the positive commandment and not to the prohibition. Okay?

So there are two ways to understand Rabbi Eliezer of Metz: either he claims that there is no general law of education of Tosafot at all, and he holds like Rashi—that itself is his answer. Or he says: no, there is the Tosafot law, and that seems more likely from the fact that he does not bother to note anything at all in relation to the question—he does not seem to dispute it. There is the ordinary law of education of Tosafot; it’s just that here it is not applicable, and only habituation to commandments applies. And that applies to positive commandments and not prohibitions. So that is Rabbi Eliezer of Metz’s answer.

Incidentally, it is quite likely that the aspect under discussion here is of course the obligation on the father, because the father’s obligation is to accustom and teach the son. The son’s own obligation is the obligation in commandments, and Rabbi Eliezer of Metz says that does not exist here. Therefore, according to Rabbi Eliezer of Metz’s answer, the aspect we are dealing with here is the father’s obligation and not the son’s own obligation.

Fine, so that is the first answer. Incidentally, in Terumat HaDeshen, section 94, he makes the distinction between passive omission and positive action: that the law of education applies to positive action and not to passive omission. Not between prohibition and positive commandment, and we already discussed that this is not the same distinction. According to Terumat HaDeshen, the explanation I gave earlier is even more compelling. Because what I said earlier—the distinction between prohibition and positive commandment—is not really essential. What is more correct is the difference between positive action and passive omission. In the law of education, I need to accustom the minor to things that require positive action in order to fulfill them, and teach him how to do them. But there is nothing to teach him about how not to do something. Not doing is simply not doing. Therefore the essential distinction is not between prohibition and positive commandment, but between positive action and passive omission. And if so, Terumat HaDeshen’s formulation leans even more strongly in the direction I explained here in Rabbi Eliezer of Metz.

The second answer brought in Tosafot Yeshanim: “And my teacher says…” First of all, the fact that he needed a second answer—what does that mean? It probably means that he is not willing to give up the a fortiori argument of the question. He does not hold like Rabbi Eliezer of Metz. In his view, if there is education for positive commandments, then all the more so there is education for prohibitions. And if I am right in my previous analysis, that means that the teacher of the author of Tosafot here is essentially saying that the commandment of education is indeed like Tosafot and not like Rashi—that it is an obligation on the minor himself. And if it is an obligation on the minor himself, then if one must ensure that he fulfills his positive commandments, all the more so one must ensure that he does not stumble in prohibitions. So the a fortiori remains in place, and he is unwilling to accept Rabbi Eliezer of Metz’s answer, who dropped it, one way or another. Therefore he needs a different answer. That’s all.

[Speaker F] Maybe, yes—sorry for interrupting—maybe the a fortiori can be explained a bit differently from what the Rabbi is saying. It could be that it really is a matter of habituation. Only once a minor gets used to eating plain meat and milk and enjoys it, it will be much harder for him to separate from it later. So there is more reason to habituate him not to do things than to teach him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, to habituate and not to teach. To teach is needed more for positive commandments; to habituate is more important for prohibitions. But the truth is, I think that may be true for prohibitions involving eating, but for other prohibitions I’m not sure you’re right. Beyond that, I myself already qualified it earlier. I said that the a fortiori could exist even according to the approach of habituation and teaching, because the claim is that it is more important to accustom and teach the minor in matters whose severity is greater. And still we are talking about habit, not about the minor himself fulfilling the commandment. Even so, in any case, the dependence I suggested is not necessary. I already said that earlier. Okay? Fine, maybe you’re right. I’m only saying that I had already qualified that dependence earlier in another way.

In any case, for our purposes, from the very fact that we need a different answer, it seems that we still remain with the conception that if there is education for positive commandments, then all the more so there is education for prohibitions. Fine, then what is the answer? How can that be? So the teacher of the author of Tosafot says: “Education applies only to the father, but for another person education does not apply to him; therefore too they are not careful to separate him.” Then he remembers Queen Helene—we’ll leave that aside here.

What is the claim? He says: you are right. When there is a law of education, there is also an obligation to separate. From the age of education, just as there is a law of education, so too there is an obligation to separate. The passage about “if a minor eats forbidden carcasses” speaks about a minor who has not yet reached the age of education. And a minor who has not reached the age of education—there is no law of education and no obligation to separate. Here the initial assumption was that even when he had not yet reached the age of commandments there would be an obligation to separate him, for example perhaps because transgressions dull the soul or something like that. So not for the sake of education would one separate him, but in order to keep him from the prohibition itself. The law comes to teach us that if a minor eats forbidden carcasses, we are not commanded to separate him. But once he is obligated—once he has reached the age of education and his father is obligated to educate him—then obviously just as he is obligated to educate him in positive commandments, all the more so in prohibitions.

And if I am right about what I said above, then indeed it could be that the teacher of the author of Tosafot remains, even in the conclusion, with the conception that prohibitions are more severe than positive commandments because this is an obligation on the minor himself—the view of Tosafot in Berakhot. Therefore this a fortiori does apply. But then it is a bit forced, because then it comes out—I don’t know whether “forced” is the right word—but the claim is that what emerges, and Tosafot itself in Berakhot seems to imply this, is that the obligation in commandments of a minor begins only from the age of education. Not that there is a Torah-level obligation in commandments even on a minor and he is merely coerced. Because if it were like that, it would also apply to a newborn minor. If we make it dependent on the age of education, then it seems that when the sages obligated the minor in commandments, it was only from the age of education—from the point at which he understands. From the point at which he understands, the sages obligated him in commandments. And from that point onward, the prohibitions also apply to him, not only the positive commandments. And consequently, if I have to ensure that he fulfills the positive commandments, then all the more so I have to separate him from prohibitions. There is a Tosafot in Shabbat 121.

[Speaker C] But Rabbi, Rabbi, that’s not—how does that fit the wording of the answer? The answer distinguishes between the father and another person. Right. The Rabbi didn’t say that. The Rabbi said something else: that where it says they are not commanded to separate him, that is talking about a minor who has not reached the age of education.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or a minor who has reached the age of education, but in relation to another person.

[Speaker C] In relation to another person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. In other words, what Tosafot Yeshanim is basically saying—what the teacher of Tosafot Yeshanim says—is that there is a connection between education and separating a child from prohibition. Okay. Meaning, wherever there is a law of education, there will also clearly be a prohibition—there is also an obligation to separate him from prohibition. Where does that connection show up? In two contexts. Tosafot Yeshanim says regarding another person who is not the father, that just as he has no law of education incumbent on him, so too he has no obligation to separate the child from prohibition. I’m saying there is another practical implication regarding a minor who has not yet reached the age of education. Just as the father has no obligation to educate him, so too he has no obligation to separate him from prohibition. Tosafot in Sabbath 121 says that if a minor eats carcasses, the religious court is not commanded to separate him from that—this is only if he has not yet reached the age of education. But if he has reached the age of education, then they really are commanded to separate him, like Tosafot Yeshanim here. The obligation regarding directly feeding him with one’s own hands—that is, Tosafot there says, the prohibition of directly feeding forbidden food to minors—that exists even for a child before the age of education. That’s obvious. Aside from Terumat HaDeshen, everybody agrees about that: that the prohibition of directly feeding him with one’s own hands applies even to a one-day-old infant. In any event, for our purposes, it could be that the two answers of Tosafot Yeshanim are divided between themselves on the question of Rashi and Tosafot in Berakhot. The first answer, that of Rabbi Eliezer of Metz, assumes that we are dealing here with getting the minor accustomed in preparation for his obligation when he becomes an adult. The second answer, of the teacher of Tosafot Yeshanim, maybe not necessarily, but perhaps speaks according to the view of Tosafot, who says that there is an obligation on the minor himself. Therefore, as long as he has an obligation, then certainly if that applies to a positive commandment, it will also apply to a prohibition. Still, of course, our Talmudic text speaks about the father being obligated to educate him. Why? Because as we saw in Tosafot there in Kehillot Yaakov, even according to Tosafot’s view that there is an obligation on the minor himself, it is still obvious that there is also an obligation on the father to see to it that he fulfills this obligation. All right? It’s obvious that according to Tosafot there are these two laws, and that comes up here too. Therefore the teacher of Tosafot Yeshanim also says that this applies only to the father and not to others. After all, that is what Kehillot Yaakov asked: if you are talking about the obligation on the minor himself, how does that relate to the father and to others? It is an obligation on the minor himself. So he says: on the minor himself there is an obligation both in positive commandments and in prohibitions. What is relevant to the father and to others? Rather, no—others are not obligated to see to it that the minor be separated from prohibition or be educated. And in any case, he brings in here also the obligation of the parents or of adults toward the minor beyond the obligation that rests on the minor himself, even if he is talking about the minor himself.

Okay. In any event, the Talmudic text in Yoma continues there regarding the obligation for a few hours: now, if we educate him at age two, do we need to ask about age one? And so on. It doesn’t matter, all the… I hope you already saw the Talmudic text, and if not, then it’s worth seeing, but those are details. Age twelve and this, three hours, two hours, all kinds of very specific definitions regarding education in fasting. Why is this important to me in general, beyond the details? Because it somewhat appears that here, unlike all the other Talmudic passages that deal with education, there is some special law of education in which the Sages step in and determine the details. We don’t find that anywhere else. Everywhere else they say: educate the minor while he is still a minor to fulfill the commandment. Here they go into details: from such-and-such an age do this, from such-and-such an age do that, for a boy, for a girl, this many hours, from what age, the Amoraim argue over exactly how to define it. What is this? Why do we find this here? Seemingly because… in other words, seemingly they should simply have told us: educate him to fast, and that’s it. The point is apparently that a full-day fast is not imposed on a minor under the law of education, again as we saw above. And then the Sages come in here and define: okay, so what do we do yes? The regular law of education does not exist here, because the regular law of education means doing it according to the proper halakhic standard. What does that mean? A full day. Right? And that does not happen here. It can’t, because of danger to life or something like that. So what yes? Then the Sages come and define what should nevertheless be done in order to accustom him to the commandments. In the other places we are talking about the law of education to fulfill the commandment itself, so why get into details? The commandment needs to be fulfilled according to its proper halakhic standard. Only on Yom Kippur, where the commandment cannot be fulfilled according to its proper halakhic standard, because that would mean fasting a full day—only there do the Sages step in and define what should nonetheless be done. And why? Because here we are talking about accustoming him to the commandments, not educating him in the commandments. Not that he begins to fulfill the commandment—education in the sense of beginning fulfillment—but accustoming him in the sense of teaching him and training him, which is a special law on Yom Kippur because here the regular law of education is impossible. So that is why they go into all the details.

By the way, there is room to connect this—I’m just saying this parenthetically. I assumed that if we need to educate the minor in commandments according to their proper halakhic standard, like the Ritva and Sha’ar HaTziyun, then seemingly he should have had to fast a full day on Yom Kippur. And if he does not fast a full day on Yom Kippur, that is not called education according to the proper halakhic standard. This could depend on the conceptual inquiry we made in the previous class. If the obligation applies at every single moment, then however many hours the minor fasts, he is fulfilling the commandment according to its proper halakhic standard. There are some moments in which he is not fulfilling the commandment, but in the moments when he is fulfilling it, he is fulfilling it according to the proper halakhic standard. So that would not contradict Sha’ar HaTziyun and the Ritva. By contrast, if the definition of the commandment applies to the whole day, then if he fasts only for some hours, that is not called fulfilling the commandment according to its proper halakhic standard. And then we get into the whole discussion I mentioned earlier. In other words, everything I said earlier—that from here it is self-evident that one need not educate the child in the commandment according to its proper halakhic standard, and I said that according to the Ritva and Sha’ar HaTziyun this is probably a special law on Yom Kippur because of danger, so we do not educate him to fast the whole day but rather partially—that is all only if I assume the commandment is to fast the whole day. But if I assume the commandment is to fast at every single moment, then this is indeed education according to its proper halakhic standard. In the moments when he fasts, he fasts according to its proper halakhic standard. We do not do it all day because of danger to life, but in those moments it is regular education—it is education in the commandment according to its proper halakhic standard.

Now look, there is an interesting note by the Mishnah Berurah. The Magen Avraham writes that even if the mother is not obligated in education, directly feeding him by hand is forbidden even to the mother—to feed the minor by hand—in section 616:9. Now in Sha’ar HaTziyun there. Sha’ar HaTziyun comments on the Magen Avraham as follows: “And Eliyah Rabbah and the other later authorities copied this, and see Chikrei Lev, section 108, who discussed this matter at length. In my humble opinion, however, the words of the Magen Avraham are not compelling, for one can say this only regarding a full-fledged prohibition, whether Torah-level or rabbinic, such as a child of eleven or twelve, who at least rabbinically must fast and complete it,” meaning fast a full day. “But not here, for here there is no prohibition at all for the minor, who fasts for some hours. On the contrary, indeed one is obligated to feed him after three hours at any rate. It is thus evident that his eating cannot be called a prohibition; rather, it is the father who is commanded to educate him in the commandments.” So there is no prohibition attached to the child’s eating. It is only that the father is commanded to educate him in the commandments. “And in a place where there is no commandment of education, such as with others”—what we saw in Tosafot Yeshanim, that others are not obligated in education—“it is possible that there is also no prohibition of directly feeding him by hand.” And he wants to broaden what Tosafot Yeshanim says even to directly feeding him by hand: that whoever is not obligated in education also has no prohibition against directly feeding him by hand. That is a very big novelty, totally implausible. For most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), the prohibition of directly feeding him by hand is a Torah-level prohibition that applies even to a newborn infant. It has nothing at all to do with the law of education. It is a Torah prohibition. The whole connection Tosafot Yeshanim makes is only regarding the prohibition of separating him from prohibition. Separating him from prohibition is perhaps a rabbinic law, but it exists together with the commandment of education. Directly feeding him by hand is irrelevant. Directly feeding him by hand is a Torah prohibition even for a newborn infant, and certainly it applies to the mother just as much as to the father. It has nothing to do with the law of education. Only the view of Terumat HaDeshen, let’s call it that—an isolated view—also links directly feeding him by hand to the law of education. But in the straightforward sense, these are puzzling statements.

But for our purposes, what do we nevertheless see from this Mishnah Berurah? We see that he makes a distinction between whether his eating bears the status of a prohibition—and when does that exist? When he is obligated to complete the fast and do all twenty-four hours—and when there is only a commandment on the father to educate him and accustom him to the commandments, which is in the case of partial-hour fasting. This is exactly the distinction I mentioned earlier. When he completes the fast, then he is fulfilling the commandment according to its proper halakhic standard. Here the minor himself is committing a prohibition. Therefore it is also forbidden to feed him by hand, because the minor himself is committing a prohibition. Because this is an obligation on the minor himself. This is the commandment according to its proper halakhic standard that the minor must fulfill. A partial-hour fast is not the commandment according to its proper halakhic standard. So why do it at all? To accustom him to the commandments; that is an obligation on the father. So there, says the Mishnah Berurah, there would not be an obligation regarding directly feeding him by hand—which is a strange thing to say—but there would not be an obligation to separate him, as Tosafot Yeshanim says. So here it is already stated explicitly, the distinction I spoke about earlier: that according to the two answers of Tosafot Yeshanim, there is really a distinction here between two laws—the law on the minor himself, who is obligated in commandments, and the law on the father to accustom him. The law on the minor himself has to be done according to its proper halakhic standard, and therefore that exists only in minors who complete the fast in the final year. But in younger minors, who only fast for some hours, that is not according to the proper halakhic standard, so this cannot be the fulfillment of the regular law of education of Tosafot, in which the minor himself performs the commandment; it is only a law on the father to accustom him to the commandments. And about that, the obligation to separate from prohibition and everything else we saw earlier was not said.

Now look at the nice point he brings in the next line. Sha’ar HaTziyun continues: “And I similarly found this reasoning in Rabbenu Manoach, who distinguishes between education through completion, which is the essence of the prohibition, and education through partial hours, which is merely a commandment on the father.” Exactly the explanation I gave earlier—happily, I merited to hit upon it by divine intuition. When we are talking about fulfilling the commandment according to its proper halakhic standard by completing the fast, that is the prohibition resting on the son himself. And of course the father only has to make sure the son fulfills it, but it must be fulfilled according to its proper halakhic standard. A partial-hour fast is a special law for Yom Kippur. These are two different things. There is a commandment on the father, and there is completion. Completion is the regular law of education of the whole Torah, where you need to fulfill the commandment according to its proper halakhic standard. All the details and precision in the Talmudic text in Yoma speak only about the partial-hour fast, because the partial-hour fast is a special law on Yom Kippur to accustom him to the commandments; it is not from the general law of education. It is a law of accustoming him to the commandments, and about that the Sages came in and established all these definitions.

Look at the end of the Talmudic text. Without getting into the context right now, just look at what the Talmudic text says: “The Rabbis said to you: what does ‘education’ also mean there? Completion.” Completion means fasting all twenty-four hours. That is what is called education according to one of the opinions among the Amoraim here. The Talmudic text asks: “And is completion called education? Is educating toward completion not called education? For was it not taught: what is education? If he was accustomed to eat at two hours, we feed him at three; at three, we feed him at four.” Rava bar Ulla said: “There were two kinds of education.” What does that mean, “there were two kinds of education”? According to what I am saying now, and what we also saw in the Mishnah Berurah and Sha’ar HaTziyun, exactly what is written in the Talmudic text is exactly what I said earlier. “There were two kinds of education” means there is the education of completion. The education of completion is the fulfillment of the commandment by the minor as one who is commanded and acts. He is obligated in the commandment and then he does it according to its proper halakhic standard for the whole day. The second type of education is to accustom him to the commandments—this is the education through partial hours. And that is what appears in the Talmudic text in Yoma, “to accustom them to the commandments,” which is a special law on Yom Kippur; it is not from the general law of education. The general law of education is to do the commandments according to their proper halakhic standard, and for that there is really no detailed breakdown at all—obviously he should fast. The only detail there is from what age, so that he should not be endangered: one year before adulthood he already completes the fast. That is the regular law of education. All the earlier addition is a special law on Yom Kippur; it is not from the law of education at all. It is to accustom him and teach him the commandments: if he was accustomed to two hours, he does three, and so on, in order to accustom him to the commandments.

In Maimonides, by the way, it is interesting that he writes: “A minor of nine years and of ten years is educated for partial hours. How so? If he was accustomed to eat at two hours into the day, we feed him at three. If he was accustomed at three, we feed him at four. According to the strength of the child, we add to his affliction by hours. A child of eleven years, whether male or female”—this is against our Talmudic text, and the Ra’avad already comments on that, but it is not important right now—“fasts and completes by rabbinic law in order to educate him in the commandments.” So on the one hand it seems he makes a distinction. From age eleven, “he fasts and completes by rabbinic law in order to educate him in the commandments”—educate him in the commandments in the sense of dedication of the altar, that he should begin fulfilling the commandments. Whereas “we educate him for partial hours” is not “to educate him in the commandments,” but rather “we educate him for partial hours” means we train him, accustom him, teach him—in the sense of education that we use in everyday language. So there are two things here. And therefore regarding the second one he says, “he completes by rabbinic law.” What does he mean by “completes”? Why here is it “by rabbinic law”? Was the first not rabbinic law? It is rabbinic law because here he himself is obligated in the commandments by rabbinic law in order to educate him in the commandments, meaning in order that he begin to… to train, accustom himself—rather, in order that he begin to fulfill the commandments. Like the dedication of the altar; it is not education in the sense of habit and learning. Okay?

Good. There is one more point I want to address, and I really have to finish, and that is the connection between the age of education and adulthood. From the time he reaches the age of education, from the time he can complete the fast, that is one year before adulthood—for a girl eleven, for a boy twelve, aside from Maimonides for present purposes, according to the Talmudic text. What is the connection? Why is there a connection between mental maturity, which is maturity regarding obligation in the commandments, and the obligation and completion of the fast? By the way, there are opinions in the Talmudic text that there is no obligation at all to complete the fast until he matures and becomes obligated in the commandments. And again the question becomes even stronger: why is there such a connection between physical resilience, the ability to withstand a fast, and maturity regarding general obligation in the commandments? So first of all, of course, that maturity depends on physical signs—we know this—two pubic hairs and so on. So it is not all that surprising. The Sages see that there is a correlation between emotional or mental maturity and physical maturity. Still, it is surprising that specifically the ability to withstand a fast is identified with physical maturity. Why are those connected? Maybe one could say that really the Sages only attached it there; it is not intrinsically embedded, but rather the Sages said: since we are entering the realm of danger to life here if we let minors complete the fast, we need to set a definition. So we set a sweeping definition. The simplest and easiest thing is to attach it to the age of adulthood or one year before it, depending on the different Amoraic opinions, and to establish some objective measure, so that not every father will have to assess whether his son can withstand it or not, because that leads us into various dangers and the Sages did not want to take those risks.

All right, regarding directly feeding him by hand, I’ll really just say it in two sentences. Regarding directly feeding him by hand, there is the passage on page 77b, which I’m not going into now, about feeding a minor and washing for the sake of feeding a minor, and so on. Somehow it appears that there is no prohibition of directly feeding him by hand on Yom Kippur. One may feed minors by hand. The whole Talmudic discussion, everything the Talmud discusses on page 77b, is only the question whether I may wash my hands in order to feed the minor. But feeding the minor itself does not raise any problem at all. The question is why. There are various explanations of this. Part of it is danger to life; a number of medieval and later authorities say it is because of danger to life. And that is a little difficult, because obviously there are minors who can withstand it, and certainly for some hours. If I say the fast is for the whole day, then partial hours are of course valueless, but if it is every moment, then at least make sure he fulfills the fast during those hours—that is not danger to life. So how is it permitted to feed him? Is it permitted to feed him only once he reaches the stage where it is already danger to life? That does not seem to be the case. There are those who want to argue that there is no prohibition at all of feeding by hand on Yom Kippur, or that it depends on time-boundness. Prohibitions that depend on time are prohibitions on the person, not on the object, and there is no prohibition of directly feeding by hand for person-based prohibitions. Or because this is talking about a positive commandment—this is what Divrei Yechezkel says in section 15—and because on Yom Kippur this is essentially a positive commandment. In prohibitions rooted in positive commandments there is no prohibition of directly feeding by hand; only in negative commandments is there a prohibition of directly feeding by hand. That is what the Magen Avraham claims. And Divrei Yechezkel says that because of this, on Yom Kippur too there is no prohibition of directly feeding by hand.

Ah—but according to Maimonides, at least, on Yom Kippur there is also a prohibition and not only a positive commandment? So here Divrei Yechezkel brings Nachmanides on the parapet commandment, which we saw, that where the prohibition comes to support the positive commandment, to make sure that I fulfill the positive commandment, then whoever is exempt from the positive commandment is exempt from the prohibition as well, as with women. So here he says that in a place where the prohibition comes to support the positive commandment—on Yom Kippur the prohibition comes to support the positive commandment—and the Torah explicitly writes only the positive commandment; the prohibition is only derived somehow. It comes to support the positive commandment; it has no independent standing. So if I can feed minors from the perspective of the positive commandment, there is no reason to refrain from feeding them because of the prohibition. The whole purpose of the prohibition is to make sure you fulfill the positive commandment. If the minor does not need to fulfill the positive commandment, then he also does not need to fulfill the prohibition.

Of course this raises a question: then why are women obligated in fasting on Yom Kippur? After all, this is a positive commandment dependent on time, and the prohibition comes to support the positive commandment, and as Nachmanides said regarding the parapet, a prohibition that comes to support a positive commandment—if it is time-dependent, women should be exempt from both the prohibition and the positive commandment. But I’ll remind you of what we saw in previous classes: women are indeed obligated because of an explicit derivation, either because of an inclusion from “the citizen,” or because Scripture equated woman to man for all punishments in the Torah. Really, because it is a time-bound positive commandment, women would be exempt; were it not for that, it would indeed have been a time-bound positive commandment from which women are exempt. Therefore we need the verse to include them as obligated.

All right, in the end I did this a bit quickly, but you’ll be able to see the completion in the summary. I also write there, I also bring Kehillot Yaakov, and I’ll upload it to the site as well, and then you can also read it inside. Okay, I’ll stop here, my apologies, because I simply have to run, all right? I’ll upload both files to the site this afternoon.

[Speaker D] Thank you very much, Rabbi.