Yoma, Chapter 8 – Lesson 12

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Commandment 187 is the warning against eating meat cooked in milk, as it says as well, “Do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk,” the second time. It appears three times. Here it means the prohibition of eating. And in tractate Chullin in the Talmud they said: for meat cooked in milk one is flogged for cooking it and flogged for eating it. And in tractate Makkot they said: one who cooks the sciatic nerve in milk on a Jewish holiday and eats it—yes, like that old comedy sketch about the guy who drove the wrong way without a license and crashed into a kiosk on the sidewalk—so here too, someone trying to rack up prohibitions, he cooks the sciatic nerve in milk on a Jewish holiday and eats it. Okay? So he gets five sets of lashes. He is lashed for eating the sciatic nerve, lashed for cooking the sciatic nerve, lashed for cooking meat in milk, lashed for eating meat in milk, and lashed for kindling a fire. And there they said, “Take out the kindling and bring in the issue of consecrated food, and its warning is derived from here”—doesn’t matter. And in tractate Chullin they said: “That is why the Merciful One expressed eating in the language of cooking, so that just as one is lashed for cooking, so too one is lashed for eating.” That teaches you that you get lashes both for eating and for cooking. And in the second chapter of Pesachim they said regarding meat in milk: “That is why the Merciful One did not write eating explicitly in its case, to say that one is liable for it even not in the normal manner of benefit.” Yes, with meat in milk you are liable even if you eat it not in the normal beneficial way, unlike ordinary food prohibitions. We’ll come back to that in a moment. “And remember this,” says Maimonides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now to the second passage. “And here it is appropriate for me to hint at a great principle that no one before me mentioned.” Yes, before me no one came up with this idea. “Namely, that His statement, may He be exalted, ‘Do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk,’ is repeated in the Torah three times. And the masters of interpretation said”—that is, the Sages—“that each prohibition is for its own matter.” Meaning each one comes to introduce something else. They said: one is for the prohibition of eating, one for the prohibition of benefit, and one for the prohibition of cooking. “And if the questioner should ask and say: why did you count the prohibition of eating it and the prohibition of cooking it as two commandments, but not count the prohibition of deriving benefit from it as a third commandment?” Maimonides counts here two commandments, not three: the prohibition of cooking meat in milk and the prohibition of eating meat in milk. Deriving benefit from meat in milk is not counted by Maimonides as a separate prohibition. So he asks: if the questioner asks me why I did not count benefit as a third commandment, let the questioner know that the prohibition of benefit should not be counted as a commandment in its own right, because it and the prohibition of eating are one matter, for eating is one species of benefit. That is the key sentence. “And His statement, may He be exalted, about something that ‘shall not be eaten,’ is merely one example among the forms of benefit, and the intent is that one should not derive benefit from it, neither by eating nor otherwise.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that mean? He is saying this: when the Torah forbids something as food, it really meant to give an example. It is really a prohibition of benefit; eating is just the common example of how people benefit from such things, from forbidden meat or something like that. When they want to tell you not to benefit, they say: don’t eat it. Like when it says, “If a man’s ox gores his fellow’s ox.” So you are liable for goring: if my ox gored someone else’s ox, I have to pay. What if my dog bites someone else’s ox? I also have to pay. But it says, “If a man’s ox gores his fellow’s ox.” The idea is that goring is only an example. It is an example of damage, but other kinds of damage also obligate. Maimonides says that when the Torah says not to eat, that is only an example. What it really means is not to derive benefit. Eating is simply the most popular or most common form of benefit, so it is used as the example—but really the point is not to benefit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And this is what Rabbi Abbahu says in Pesachim: “Every place where it says: ‘you shall not eat,’ ‘you shall not eat of it,’ ‘it shall not be eaten’—both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit are implied, unless Scripture specifies otherwise, as it did regarding a carcass.” That is how he explains Rabbi Abbahu: that Scripture explicitly clarified that benefit from it is permitted. As it says, “To the stranger within your gates you may give it, and he may eat it.” Fine. So what have we gained here? Maimonides is basically explaining to us the relation to Rabbi Abbahu’s words, who links a prohibition of eating to a prohibition of benefit. Why is it really that everywhere the Torah prohibits eating, the thing also becomes forbidden in benefit? So Maimonides says: simple—because the Torah did not really forbid eating. The Torah forbade benefit, not eating. Eating is only one of the examples of benefit, that’s all. Therefore Rabbi Abbahu says that every place where eating is written, it includes both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit. By contrast, Hezekiah argues no: a prohibition of eating is a prohibition of eating, and a prohibition of benefit needs a separate source, because for him eating is not an example of benefit; it is a specific prohibition on the act of eating itself, not on benefit in general. In a moment I’ll spell that out a bit more.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Just notice that this slightly contradicts what he said in that wonderful point above. Because in that wonderful point above he basically says that if I cook forbidden fat in milk and then eat it, the prohibition of meat in milk will not take effect on the prohibition of forbidden fat. Why? Since meat in milk includes both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit, he says that the prohibition of benefit branches out from the prohibition of eating. It is not an independent prohibition. If it takes effect, it takes effect and then expands to include benefit as well. But if it does not take effect—and in that case one eating-prohibition cannot take effect on another because there is nothing added—then there is no eating-prohibition here, and then it also does not expand to benefit. Now notice: according to what Maimonides says here, it doesn’t seem that way. Because according to what he says here, when it says a prohibition of eating, it really means not to derive benefit. It is not an expansion. The prohibition was broad from the outset. It is a prohibition on all forms of benefit, unlike forbidden fat, where only eating is prohibited. So I would actually expect the prohibition of meat in milk to take effect on the prohibition of forbidden fat. And there in Maimonides it sounds—as Tosafot in Pesachim also seems to understand—that the prohibition of benefit branches out from the prohibition of eating; meaning once the eating-prohibition takes effect, the benefit-prohibition extends from it. But if the eating-prohibition never took effect, then the prohibition of benefit also never arose. According to what Maimonides says here, it seems to me that his wonderful point in Keritot doesn’t work. Okay, but for our purposes what matters is what Maimonides says here, because he really is offering an explanation that I think he follows very consistently in Rabbi Abbahu’s view. He is basically claiming that when the Torah states a prohibition of eating, what it really says is: don’t derive benefit. That is what it really says. Eating is just the example, that’s all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now of course things get complicated regarding meat in milk. So he says—maybe we’ll do this quickly, since it’s not our main issue, but just to complete the picture: “According to this principle, it is not proper to count the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of benefit as two commandments.” Why? Because they are not two commandments, they are one commandment: a prohibition of benefit. Eating is only an example, okay? “And if we were to count them as two commandments with regard to meat in milk, then we should likewise count, with regard to leaven, produce of a tree during its first three years, and mixed seeds in a vineyard, in each of these four, the prohibition of benefit as a separate commandment in its own right. And since with those he counted only the prohibition that came in the form of forbidding their eating alone, and included within it the prohibition of benefit as we have explained, so too it should be with meat in milk.” Meaning: just as with leaven and all the other places we count only the prohibition of eating, with meat in milk too we count only the prohibition of eating, and the prohibition of benefit follows from it. Except that here there is a snag. Why? “And one question remains here alone, namely: someone may say—since the prohibition of benefit comes from the prohibition of eating, as explained by the Sages, why did Scripture need a third prohibition regarding meat in milk in order to forbid benefit from it, as we have explained?”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, with meat in milk there are three instances of “Do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk”: one for cooking, one for eating, and one for benefit. So why, according to Maimonides, do we need the third one? Every prohibition of eating is only an example, but really it also prohibits benefit. So why do we need the third source? Maimonides says: “Here is the answer: it was needed because regarding meat in milk Scripture did not say, ‘you shall not eat of it,’ from which eating and benefit would both have been forbidden, and therefore another prohibition was needed to forbid benefit.” What does he mean? It says only—

[Speaker C] “Do not cook.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It says “Do not cook,” and it does not say “you shall not eat.” Where it says “you shall not eat,” then we explain that the prohibition is really one of benefit, and eating is just one example among the forms of benefit. But with meat in milk, even the prohibition of eating is not written in the language of “you shall not eat”; it is written in the language of “Do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk.” So because of that, were it not for—

[Speaker B] —there would have been—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —the third verse, I would have understood that there is only a prohibition of eating here and not a prohibition of benefit. Therefore the third verse comes and says: no, there is also a prohibition of benefit here. All right? But then right there I come back and say: fine, so why don’t you count all three?

[Speaker C] Because it’s the same content. Maimonides counts by content, not by how many verses there are.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not the same content. There is a prohibition of cooking, a prohibition of eating, and a prohibition of benefit.

[Speaker C] No, in the end it is the same content, because I’m saying that everywhere eating is written, the content is eating and benefit, and eating is just an example. Here eating is not written, so I need those two parts—which in practice are the same content. According to this whole line of thought, it’s exactly the same content, because eating is just an example of benefit. I just couldn’t derive it, so Maimonides counts according to the number of contents.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Either way, if it’s the same thing—if it’s the same content—then it would have been enough to write two verses, and from the second verse we would derive eating, and since eating is the same content as benefit, we would also derive benefit.

[Speaker C] No, if there had been two verses I would have thought—

[Speaker D] —that it’s not the content of benefit. That it’s only, like, a limitation in punishment? Liable or exempt—but prohibited is prohibited. So maybe that’s not a reason to count it. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. What do you mean?

[Speaker D] Well, that the reason they don’t count the prohibition when it’s not in the normal manner—that that’s really the surplus.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, not in the normal manner? Benefit! They don’t count a prohibition of benefit.

[Speaker D] And that’s like eating. It’s like eating, together with the eating.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And here you need a verse.

[Speaker D] And the practical difference is that it’s only in punishment, for something not done in the normal manner, but not a reason for the prohibition itself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? It does have a practical difference because there is a difference. What is that? Where does the practical difference come from? The practical difference comes from the fact that there is a difference. In punishment, but not in the prohibition? Also! What would I really have learned? Look—what emerges from this quite simply is as follows: the first “Do not cook a kid in its mother’s milk” teaches cooking. The second verse, since it is not written in the language of eating, teaches eating without benefit, right? Otherwise the third would not be needed. What would I have thought from the second verse? What is “eating without benefit”? After all, eating is only an example of benefit. I would understand that in this case it is a prohibition of eating on the act of eating, not on benefit of which eating is merely an example. A prohibition on the act of eating. Then it applies only to the act of eating; acts of benefit are other acts. Understand?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let me put it differently. When Maimonides says that a prohibition of eating is just an example of one species of benefit, what is he really saying? That when there is a prohibition of eating, the prohibition is not “to eat”; the prohibition is “to derive benefit.” Even when I eat, when have I violated the prohibition? The prohibition is not on the act of eating that I performed; the prohibition is on the fact that I derived benefit. The act of eating is just one of the ways to derive benefit, that’s all, right? Now, if there were a prohibition that spoke only about the act of eating, then I would not derive from it a prohibition of benefit, right? When the prohibition speaks about the benefit of eating, then that benefit is just an example of benefit in general, and all benefit is prohibited. But if there is a verse that forbids only eating, then I say the verse forbids the act of eating, not the benefit of eating. And then it has nothing to do with a prohibition of benefit at all. The act of eating is forbidden; it has no connection to a prohibition of benefit. Therefore I need an additional source for a prohibition of benefit. But if so, notice that we then really have a prohibition of cooking—that is the first “Do not cook.” We have the prohibition on the act of eating—that is the second “Do not cook.” And we have the third prohibition, the prohibition of benefit, which includes within it even the benefit of eating, not only the act of eating. Okay? So that is a different prohibition; it is not the same content. These are three different prohibitions, none of which is identical to the others. And let’s look at the continuation for a moment.

[Speaker C] Why not say that really the third source is what explains the second? Then they are not two different prohibitions; it’s just a different way of writing what the second one means.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why should we say that? There are three different sources here. Why say that the third goes back and collapses them into fewer prohibitions? Three sources, each teaching what it teaches.

[Speaker C] Because then you still need to explain why Maimonides did not count all three. Because then you still need to explain why Maimonides did not count all three. Fine. The practical difference is for eating without—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —benefit. Your thought may be right; I’m just asking what his logic was.

[Speaker C] I’m not asking how to explain Maimonides, I’m—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —asking how he himself explained his own position. I don’t understand, I don’t understand what happened here. Explain to me what proves how Maimonides learned it. What Maimonides learned—I can agree with you about that. I’m only asking why he learned it that way. After all, he has three sources in front of him. One teaches a prohibition of cooking, the second teaches a prohibition on the act of eating, not on the benefit of eating, because otherwise the third would not be needed. The third comes and teaches the benefit of eating. Now you are claiming that once the third came, the second is erased and swallowed up by the third. Why say that? You have three prohibitions, each one teaches something, and that is what it teaches. That’s it. I see no reason to say such a thing. More than that—look at what follows. Maimonides says explicitly what I’m saying. Because he says: “And we have already mentioned the reason why the Merciful One did not write eating regarding meat in milk: because everywhere eating is mentioned one is liable only if he derives benefit from his eating. But if he opens his mouth and swallows one of the forbidden things, or eats it while it is hot enough to burn his throat and hurt him when swallowing, and the like, he is exempt—except for meat in milk, for which he is liable upon eating even if he does not derive benefit, as they mentioned. And so too with mixed seeds in a vineyard, as will be explained later.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what is he saying? Why was it written this way? To teach you that with meat in milk you are liable even if you eat without deriving benefit. Why? According to your approach, that is not true. Because according to your approach, once the third prohibition was written, the second prohibition that forbids the act of eating no longer exists. So if what remains is a prohibition of deriving benefit from eating, then where there is no benefit there is no prohibition. Maimonides holds that the second prohibition remains: a prohibition on the act of eating.

[Speaker C] So why didn’t he count it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right—if the second remains, why didn’t he count it? Therefore, if you ate something not in the normal beneficial way, you violated the second prohibition, not the third. You violated the second because you performed an act of eating. You didn’t benefit, but you did perform an act of eating. So I come back and ask about Maimonides—and I don’t have a good answer to this—why doesn’t Maimonides count three commandments here? Maimonides is dancing at two weddings. On the one hand he tells me there is no reason to count benefit, since the prohibition of eating is only an example and really it is a prohibition of benefit. On the other hand, here specifically he says that eating is not merely an example of benefit, because in fact one is liable even when eating without benefit. So he says that here specifically the prohibition of eating is a prohibition on the act of eating, not a prohibition on deriving benefit from eating. Fine—then there are two different prohibitions here. Why don’t you count them? Maybe he does not count it because in practice it forbids me the same thing. When I eat something, it is forbidden—both because of the second prohibition and because of the third prohibition. When I eat not in the normal beneficial way, then it is forbidden only because of the second prohibition. So maybe there is a practical difference, but in principle it forbids me the same things. So maybe for that reason he does not count it, I don’t know. It really is strange. But that is what he writes here. I do not have a good answer as to why he really does not count it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But for our purposes, since we are not actually learning the laws of meat in milk, what matters is what follows from the principle Maimonides establishes. Maimonides is basically explaining Rabbi Abbahu’s view here. Rabbi Abbahu says that every prohibition of eating includes within it a prohibition of benefit. Meaning: because the prohibition on eating is a prohibition on the benefit of eating. And the benefit of eating is only an example; really it is a prohibition of benefit in general. The benefit of eating is just the example the Torah chose. What does Hezekiah dispute? Hezekiah apparently disputes exactly this point. According to him, the prohibition of eating is probably a prohibition on the act of eating, not on deriving benefit from eating. Then, if there is also a prohibition of benefit, that is a new addition: there is now also a prohibition of benefit. And now if you eat, you violate both the prohibition of benefit and the prohibition of eating, because according to Hezekiah you performed an act of eating and also derived benefit. Okay? But if you have a prohibition of eating without any additional inclusion of benefit, then what remains is a prohibition on the act of eating, not on benefit. That, apparently, is what emerges from Maimonides’ explanation of the dispute between Hezekiah and Rabbi Abbahu.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But as Jewish law we rule like Rabbi Abbahu. I already read earlier the ruling in Maimonides in chapter 8 of Forbidden Foods: Maimonides rules like Rabbi Abbahu. Meaning that as Jewish law Maimonides holds that food prohibitions in general are prohibitions of deriving benefit from eating, not prohibitions on the act of eating. They are prohibitions on the benefit of eating, and that is only the example. More than that: even in places where we have a special source that excludes benefit and leaves only a prohibition of eating, there is no reason to assume that the definition changes. The prohibition remains one on deriving benefit from eating. Usually we understand that this is only an example and really it is a general prohibition of benefit, but if an exclusion comes and says that benefit is not included and only a prohibition of eating remains, it may be that the prohibition of eating still remains a prohibition on deriving benefit from eating. But then it is only benefit from eating and not other forms of benefit. Here the benefit of eating is not an example meant to teach that all benefits are prohibited; rather only that one is prohibited. But it is still eating that involves benefit, not every act of eating. Because otherwise it would follow that all food prohibitions in which no prohibition of benefit is stated—eating them not in the normal beneficial way would also be forbidden. And that is not true. In ordinary food prohibitions that do not include a prohibition of benefit, if one consumes them not in the normal beneficial manner, one is also exempt. Meaning, it seems that even when the prohibition of benefit is excluded and only a prohibition of eating remains, the definition of a prohibition of eating is still a prohibition on deriving benefit from the eating. What was excluded are the other forms of benefit. In other words, here it is not an example; it is this itself that remains. But it is still benefit from the eating and not the act of eating itself. That is unlike meat in milk. Why? Because with meat in milk, after the second “Do not cook” taught a prohibition of eating, the third “Do not cook” came and taught a prohibition of benefit. Now the third already includes the second, so that is not plausible. Apparently the second does not teach eating that involves benefit; rather it teaches eating—the act of eating. And the third adds the prohibition of benefit. Therefore someone who eats it not in the normal beneficial way did indeed not violate the third, but he did violate the second. That is not the same as ordinary food prohibitions from which benefit was excluded and only a prohibition of eating remained; there, if one consumes them not in the normal beneficial manner, he is exempt, sorry—not like meat in milk. Maimonides says this explicitly. Only with meat in milk is it different.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore this definition of the prohibition of eating remains, both when it is accompanied by a prohibition of benefit and also when the prohibition of benefit has been excluded. Because when the prohibition of benefit has been excluded, the prohibition of eating means benefit from eating and not other benefits—but it is still benefit from eating, not the act of eating. That is unlike meat in milk. In meat in milk it is a prohibition on the act of eating.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now I’ll say briefly—I have a long article on this topic; you can see the link in the class summary—that there are certain prohibitions, and one can see very consistently in Maimonides, that these really are prohibitions on the act of eating and not on deriving benefit from eating. For example, let’s share for a moment. Maimonides writes at the beginning of the laws of leaven and matzah as follows: “Leaven on Passover is forbidden for benefit, as it is said: ‘Leaven shall not be eaten’—there shall be no permission of eating in it.” That is exactly Hezekiah’s language. Right? Rabbi Abbahu says you do not need the passive “shall not be eaten” in order to teach the prohibition of benefit. Anywhere it says “you shall not eat,” “you shall not eat,” in any form of eating-language, it includes a prohibition of benefit as well. And Maimonides rules like Rabbi Abbahu, as we saw in the laws of Forbidden Foods. Yet here Maimonides writes in Hezekiah’s language. He brings “shall not be eaten,” meaning there shall be no permission of eating in it. More than that: here, unlike elsewhere, in halakhah 1 Maimonides writes about the prohibition of eating leaven, and in halakhah 2 he writes the prohibition of benefit from leaven. He does not write “it is forbidden to eat and derive benefit” together, as he usually does. Here with leaven he writes them separately. It seems from him that he really goes like Hezekiah: the prohibition of eating is one prohibition, and the prohibition of benefit is another, learned from the passive language. Eating here is not an example, not one species among the forms of benefit. Leaven is exceptional in this respect.

[Speaker B] By the way, there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who ruled like Hezekiah. I’m not going into that here; right now I’m talking within Maimonides’ view.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Can you see the article I just shared with you? The title in front of you is: “What do the sciatic nerve and leaven on Passover have to do with one another—what is their historical source?”

[Speaker C] No, no—we just see the regular source sheet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, one second then. I clicked from within that sheet to the link, and I didn’t know whether it shares the link or not. Okay, look here—I’ll just bring it here, because all the sources are quoted here. Look at Maimonides, halakhah 1: “Anyone who eats an olive-sized amount of leaven on Passover, from the beginning of the night of the fifteenth until the end of the twenty-first day of Nisan, deliberately, is liable to karet, as it says: ‘Whoever eats leaven shall be cut off.’ If he did so inadvertently, he is liable to a fixed sin-offering, whether he ate it or dissolved it and drank it.” Halakhah 2: “Leaven on Passover is forbidden for benefit, as it says: ‘Leaven shall not be eaten’—there shall be no permission of eating in it. And one who leaves leaven in his possession on Passover, even though he did not eat it, violates ‘it shall not be seen’ and ‘it shall not be found.’”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He divides it first of all into two separate halakhot—that is one thing. Second, he brings Hezekiah’s language, even though he ruled like Rabbi Abbahu. The later authorities already ask this; the Kesef Mishneh discusses it at length, and others as well raise this issue.

[Speaker B] Beyond that, it’s also not clear why the prohibition of sourdough—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —and the prohibition of leaven. Maimonides writes here in the second halakhah: “And it says: ‘No sourdough shall be found in your houses,’ and the prohibition of leaven and the prohibition of the sourdough with which one leavens are one and the same.” Hidden behind that line in Maimonides is a difficulty raised by quite a few later authorities. Se’or, as the Tosefta says, is something very, very sour that is used to leaven doughs. Take dough and leave it to ferment for a very long time and it becomes sourdough. Okay? If you put it into some dough, it ferments the dough. So the Torah’s prohibition when it says—now this is apparently difficult, because the sourdough is so sour that it is unfit for human consumption and even for a dog. That is what the Tosefta says. And if so, it is not clear how there can be a prohibition of eating regarding sourdough. That is what Maimonides says: “the prohibition of leaven and the prohibition of the sourdough with which one leavens are one and the same.” Why are they one and the same? Sourdough is not fit for eating. As a reminder, with meat in milk, one who eats not in the normal manner is exempt if there is no benefit. Here he says that sourdough, which is not fit for eating, is still forbidden. So Maimonides apparently senses this, and he offers an explanation. What is the explanation? That sourdough is the father of all leavened things. After all, it is the thing with which leaven is made. So how can you say that sourdough is not leaven? It is a strange explanation. Who said sourdough is not leaven? Of course it is leaven. It’s just that eating it is not really eating, because you don’t benefit from it—it is not fit for eating. Who said it is not leaven? What does that have to do with it? The question was not why you define sourdough as leaven. The question is why you forbid it under food prohibitions, when ordinarily in food prohibitions something not fit for eating is not forbidden. If it is not fit even for a dog, then it is not forbidden even rabbinically. If it is not fit for a person but fit for a dog, then it is forbidden rabbinically. But here it is not fit at all. So how does Maimonides’ explanation help me—that sourdough, too, is leaven? What are you saying? I know it is leaven, but it is not fit for eating.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You see in Maimonides that when the thing is called leaven, then it falls under the prohibition of eating whether it is fit for eating or not. Why? What is the idea here? I think the idea is that according to Maimonides, the prohibition of eating leaven is a prohibition on performing an act of eating on something that is leaven. It is not a prohibition on deriving benefit from that eating. Therefore the fact that sourdough is unfit for eating and one does not enjoy it does not bother me. All that bothered Maimonides was only the question whether sourdough counts as leaven or not. Once he showed that it counts as leaven, then for him the problem is solved. Because you are eating leaven. So what if I’m eating leaven? I also eat pork; if it is unfit for eating then I am exempt. So no—with leaven, if you eat leaven you are liable. Why? Because if you eat pork that is unfit for eating, then you did not derive benefit, and the prohibition of eating pork is a prohibition on deriving benefit from eating pork—the view of Rabbi Abbahu, that a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit are both implied. But in the prohibition of eating leaven, the prohibition is on the act of eating, not on the benefit from eating. The only question is: what may not be eaten? Leaven. The question is whether sourdough is leaven. Once Maimonides showed that sourdough is leaven, he is not bothered by the fact that it is unfit for eating. The issue he is dealing with is why it is called leaven, not why it is fit for eating. If it is called leaven, I don’t care that it is unfit for eating. If you ate leaven, you violated the prohibition, whether it is fit for eating or not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What about leaven that is totally unfit for eating—not sourdough, but leaven that has spoiled? There is no prohibition. Why? Because that is no longer leaven. It is no longer food; it is no longer bread, say. But sourdough is obviously leaven, because it is used to leaven doughs. Therefore the status of leaven does not fall away from it. The fact that it is unfit for eating only interferes with benefit, but its status as leaven does not fall away. With spoiled pork, or even spoiled leaven—say spoiled bread—there the status of leaven falls away. Therefore I am exempt not because there is no enjoyment, but because what I ate is not leaven at all. What is no longer bread, no longer food, is not called leaven. But with sourdough, according to Maimonides, even though in itself it is not food, it is a kind of seasoning, a kind of thing used to prepare bread, to raise the dough, so you cannot say it is not leaven. Clearly its status as leaven does not fall away. After all, it is the very thing that creates the fermentation in other doughs. So how can you say it is not leaven? Therefore Maimonides says that with sourdough one does violate the prohibition—unlike spoiled leaven, and certainly unlike spoiled pork. Okay, this is an important point. Now where did Maimonides get this idea from?

[Speaker B] So look, the Kesef Mishneh there also asks: “And our teacher, even though he holds like Rabbi Yohanan—”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —“wrote in Passover law in the language of Hezekiah, even though he holds like Rabbi Abbahu, as is explicit in chapter 8 of the laws of Forbidden Foods, and also in chapter 2 of Shechitah it appears he holds that way,” and so on, doesn’t matter. So why does he write here in Hezekiah’s language? Up to that point he proves that Maimonides holds like Rabbi Abbahu. Nevertheless, regarding the prohibition of benefit on Passover, since there is an especially explicit verse there on which everyone agrees, he used that source. And the Ran writes this as well on the Rif. There is a rule with Maimonides that he often brings the simpler source. Even if it was rejected in the Talmud, Maimonides is not bound by the Talmud’s final conclusion regarding which source to quote; he is bound by the final halakhic conclusion. But as for the source, he chooses what fits the wording better, what seems more intuitive, what works better rhetorically. Therefore the Kesef Mishneh says that here Maimonides chose Hezekiah’s source merely for rhetorical elegance, but in truth he basically holds like Rabbi Abbahu. I claim that this is not correct; there is a substantive explanation here. Regarding leaven, Maimonides really does hold like Hezekiah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait—there is a Talmudic passage, here. In tractate Beitzah it says, in the Mishnah: “The House of Shammai say: sourdough in an olive-sized amount, and leaven in the size of a date. And the House of Hillel say: both this and that in an olive-sized amount.” The first Mishnah in Beitzah. The Talmud asks on Beitzah 7b: what is the reasoning of the House of Shammai? Why do they say sourdough in an olive-sized amount and leaven in the size of a date? If so, says the Talmud, “The Merciful One should have written ‘leaven’ and there would be no need for ‘sourdough,’ for I would have said: if leaven, whose fermentation is not severe, is prohibited in an olive-sized amount, then sourdough, whose fermentation is severe, all the more so. Why then did the Merciful One write ‘sourdough’? To tell you that the measure of this is not like the measure of that.” In other words, the Talmud says: according to the House of Shammai, where did they get that sourdough is in an olive-sized amount while leaven is in the size of a date? Because the Torah forbade both leaven and sourdough. They ask themselves: why was it necessary to write sourdough? If there is a prohibition on leaven, we would have learned by an a fortiori argument that sourdough too is forbidden. So “sourdough” is extra. Why write it? To teach you that there is a difference in the quantities. Why did they decide that sourdough has the smaller quantity and leaven the larger quantity? Because an olive-sized amount is smaller than the size of a date—the date size is the measure for Yom Kippur in the Talmud. Since sourdough is more concentrated. It is more leaven. Eating sourdough is more severe than eating leaven. Okay?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now this is extremely strange. Sourdough is not fit for eating. What kind of a fortiori argument is that? If the Torah had forbidden leaven, I would know by an a fortiori argument that sourdough is also forbidden to eat? How? Sourdough is not fit for eating. What kind of absurd a fortiori argument is that? And the Talmud here says it without blinking: ah, it is extra, because if “leaven” had been written, I would have learned “sourdough” by an a fortiori argument. This reminds you of Maimonides that I mentioned earlier. You see it explicitly here in the Talmud. The Talmud says that if sourdough is more “leaven” than ordinary leaven, more than bread, then it is more prohibited, and I do not care that it is not fit for eating or that one gets no pleasure from it. That is exactly Maimonides. Maimonides says that if I showed you that sourdough, too, is called leaven, then of course it is forbidden; I do not care that it is unfit for eating and gives no enjoyment. That is explicit here in the Talmud. True, it is according to the House of Shammai, not the House of Hillel. What do the House of Hillel say? “Both are necessary.” Why? “For if the Merciful One had written ‘sourdough,’ I would have said it is because its fermentation is severe, but leaven, whose fermentation is not severe, I would say no—therefore it is necessary. And if the Merciful One had written ‘leaven,’ it is because it is fit for eating, but sourdough, which is unfit for eating, I would say no—therefore it is necessary.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For the House of Hillel it is more complex. They make a two-way necessity argument. On the one hand they raise against the House of Shammai exactly what I said before: what kind of a fortiori argument would we have made? If “leaven” had been written, I would not have learned sourdough by an a fortiori argument, because sourdough is not fit for eating. So if sourdough is not fit for eating, how can you derive it by an a fortiori argument from leaven? But on the other hand, if Scripture had written—notice—if it had written “sourdough,” I would not have known that ordinary leaven is forbidden. Why? Because perhaps they forbade sourdough because its fermentation is severe. I don’t understand—what does “its fermentation is severe” mean? Therefore it is less forbidden? No, more forbidden. And so you do accept the House of Shammai’s logic, that if something is more fermented, it is more prohibited. You just understand that there is also an opposite consideration. Both sides are valid. Also the House of Shammai’s side—therefore the necessity goes in both directions. If something is more sour, there is reason to forbid it; and likewise if something is more sour, there is also reason to be lenient because it is unfit for eating. In other words, they do not completely reject the House of Shammai’s reasoning; they just say there is another side as well.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More than that: once the Torah wrote both sourdough and leaven, the House of Hillel too agree that both sourdough and leaven are prohibited. So even if they would not have derived it logically as the House of Shammai did, once there are verses they too agree that the Torah said both sourdough and leaven are prohibited. And I ask: why? How did the Torah say that? So what if there is a verse? Sourdough is not fit for eating. Meaning, the House of Hillel too agree in principle with the House of Shammai’s reasoning; they just think you need a verse for it. That’s all. But once there is a verse, they too understand that the prohibition of leaven is different from the Torah’s other prohibitions. Even something not fit for eating is forbidden, so long as the status of leaven still rests on it. And that, in my opinion, is Maimonides’ source.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And what is the idea behind it? The idea behind it is exactly what I said earlier. I claim that according to Maimonides’ understanding of Rabbi Abbahu, food prohibitions are prohibitions on deriving benefit from eating—basically ordinary prohibitions of benefit. What happens if the Torah prohibits the act of eating, not the benefit of eating? Then we saw in the analysis of meat in milk that in such a case a person would be prohibited even when acting not in the normal beneficial way, and so on, right? I claim that this is the case with leaven. In the prohibition of leaven, all the Hasidic teachers explained to us that this is the evil inclination and that you have to search in the cracks and chase after the evil inclination and I don’t know what—all sorts of things. There are midrashim like that too, yes, it is not something Hasidim invented. But the truth is that this is a baseless invention. Because in the end the prohibition of leaven is explicit in the Torah: it is a remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt. At the Exodus from Egypt our ancestors’ dough did not have time to rise. “This matzah that we eat—for what reason? Because our ancestors’ dough did not have time to rise.” The flip side of that same matter is leaven. We do not eat leaven because our ancestors then did not eat leaven. We eat matzah because our ancestors then ate matzah. What does that mean? It means that unlike all the other prohibitions of eating and benefit in the Torah, where the thing itself is repulsive—repulsive—and therefore the Torah says: keep away from it, don’t eat it, don’t benefit from it, leave it alone, you may not benefit from the repulsive thing, you have to distance yourself from it—leaven is not a repulsive thing. On the contrary, the exact opposite of all those midrashim: leaven is not at all repulsive. If our ancestors, when they left Egypt, had eaten leaven and not matzah, then on Passover we would have had to run after matzot and avoid them, and eat only leaven, in order to remember historically what happened there. It is part of the commandment of remembering the Exodus from Egypt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Remembering the Exodus from Egypt means eating matzah and refraining from eating leaven, that’s all. That means that leaven in itself is not repulsive; the Torah is not trying to distance me from it. The Torah is commanding me to remember what happened there. How do I remember what happened there? I eat what they ate, and I do not eat what they did not eat. Or in other words, I eat what is called matzah, and I do not eat what is called leaven. But the point is not deriving benefit from eating leaven; the point is the act of eating something called leaven. That is what is forbidden. And the idea here is that this prohibition is fundamentally a historical prohibition, a remembrance of something that happened once in history. Unlike pork or creeping creatures or blood or forbidden fat and so on, which are repulsive things from which the Torah wants us to distance ourselves. But here the thing is not repulsive at all. It is simply that the historical event happened that way, and now I eat or do not eat something as a remembrance of that historical event. Therefore, what do I need to do? Perform the same action they performed then, or refrain from the same action they did not perform then. The discussion is about the action, not about deriving benefit from the thing. One need not distance oneself from the thing, because the thing is not repulsive. It is a prohibition on an action. Like “a person is obligated to see himself as if he left Egypt”—you are supposed to reenact the Exodus. Leaven and matzah are a simulation of the Exodus from Egypt. We eat matzah and do not eat leaven, just as it was then. I think that is the simple explanation of the prohibition of leaven, before all the midrashim about the evil inclination.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is this important? Because if that is true, then the prohibition of leaven is a prohibition on the act of eating leaven; it is not a prohibition on deriving benefit. And if that is true, then obviously sourdough, which is even more leaven than bread, is certainly forbidden to eat. Why should I care that I get no pleasure from it? There is an act of eating being done on something called leaven, and it is even more leaven than bread, so all the more so it should be forbidden, as both the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel say. And that is what Maimonides says at the beginning of the laws of leaven and matzah: if sourdough is called leaven, because it is what is used to leaven, then the prohibition of eating leaven applies to it. I do not care that it is unfit for eating. Being unfit for eating matters in prohibitions whose basis is the benefit of eating, but here the prohibition is on the act of eating.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From this it is also clear why Maimonides brings Hezekiah’s derivation for the prohibition of benefit regarding leaven. Why? Because the prohibition of eating leaven is a prohibition on the act of eating. I cannot derive benefit from that, because it is not one of the examples of benefit. The Torah did not forbid me the benefit of eating; it forbade me the act of eating, exactly like meat in milk. Therefore you need another source if you want to prohibit benefit, just like with meat in milk. Maimonides says: the source is “Leaven shall not be eaten,” the passive form of Hezekiah. You need an additional source in order to prohibit benefit. It cannot be derived from the prohibition of eating, because here the prohibition of eating is a prohibition on the act of eating, not on deriving benefit from eating—so you need another source. So it is not merely for rhetorical flourish, as the Kesef Mishneh says; here it is essential, specifically so. Where do I have proof for this? I have many proofs for it in Maimonides; read the article later if you want. One proof is from the sciatic nerve. Yes? If I asked you what other prohibition in the Torah also begins with a historical event, and is not something repulsive in itself but starts with a historical event—sciatic nerve, right? As a remembrance of what happened with Jacob and the angel. And as a remembrance of that event, we too do not eat the sciatic nerve—explicitly in the Torah. The prohibition of the sciatic nerve is a remembrance of a historical event. First, there is a tannaitic dispute whether sinews impart flavor. Maimonides rules that sinews do not impart flavor. So why is it forbidden if there is no flavor? It is not fit for eating; it is like wood. The Talmud calls the sciatic nerve wood—you taste wood when you eat it. So what kind of food prohibition is the sciatic nerve? The answer is: there is no need to derive pleasure from the eating. It is a prohibition on the act of eating; this is a simulation of what happened to Jacob. So I do not care that there is no pleasure in the thing; it is forbidden even though it has no taste.

[Speaker B] More than that, the Talmud says that according to the one who says there is no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If sinews impart flavor, then there is a prohibition on deriving benefit from the sciatic nerve. And whoever says that sinews do not impart flavor says there is no prohibition on deriving benefit from the sciatic nerve. That’s what the Talmud says here. I’m not going into it because it’s a bit complicated, but that’s the passage in tractate Pesachim. Yes, Rabbi Shimon, you see: as it was taught in a baraita, the sciatic nerve is permitted for benefit—these are the words of Rabbi Yehuda—and Rabbi Shimon prohibits it. And Rabbi Shimon is the one who holds that sinews do not impart flavor. Right? Who do you hear saying that sinews do not impart flavor? Rabbi Shimon. And the Talmud links the two; never mind, these are derivations. Okay? Now Maimonides rules like Rabbi Shimon, that sinews do not impart flavor. On the one hand, it is forbidden to eat even though it does not impart flavor, so why should it be forbidden? Isn’t it like eating wood? Like leaven. And the answer is: like leaven, because it is a historical prohibition. But Maimonides also writes that there is no prohibition on deriving benefit from the sciatic nerve. So everyone asks him: Rabbi Shimon, who says that sinews do not impart flavor, holds that there is a prohibition on deriving benefit from the sciatic nerve. Maimonides consistently claims that the whole discussion in Pesachim is not the practical Jewish law. The passage in Pesachim explains the dispute between Rabbi Abbahu and Chizkiyah about leaven. And regarding leaven they disagree, right? From where do we derive the prohibition on benefit from leaven? “Leaven shall not be eaten”—that’s Chizkiyah, and that is not in accordance with Rabbi Abbahu. Maimonides claims that regarding leaven, the dispute between Chizkiyah and Rabbi Abbahu does not stand. The passage in Pesachim is not the practical Jewish law. Maybe the passage in tractate Beitzah is his proof for that, I don’t know, but consistently—I can show it; we learned Pesachim a few years ago—I showed that in some… And in fact the Jewish law follows the Talmud in Beitzah, which says that historical prohibitions are prohibitions of action. And once they are prohibitions of action, then you cannot derive the prohibition of benefit from the prohibition of eating. You need an additional source. So for leaven you have that additional source, “it shall not be eaten” in the passive sense, like Chizkiyah. But for the sciatic nerve you do not. Therefore with the sciatic nerve, precisely because sinews do not impart flavor, Maimonides says this is a prohibition of eating, a prohibition on the act of eating. Consequently there will be no prohibition of benefit, against the Talmud in Pesachim. Because with historical prohibitions, if the Torah forbids eating, you cannot derive from that a prohibition of benefit. You need a separate source prohibiting benefit, as with leaven, as with meat and milk. But with the sciatic nerve there is no additional source. So it is permitted for benefit, and everyone remains perplexed—the Rosh, the Ran, and Maimonides’ commentators—how he rules that with sinews there is no prohibition of benefit. And I claim it is because this is a historical prohibition, exactly like leaven. I’ll give you another practical difference.

[Speaker B] Half a measure. The law of half a measure. Maimonides in chapter 1, law 7.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the laws of leaven and matzah, Maimonides writes as follows: “One who eats even the smallest amount of leaven itself on Passover—this is forbidden by Torah law, as it is said: ‘Leaven shall not be eaten.’” That is Chizkiyah’s verse, “Leaven shall not be eaten.” “Nevertheless, he is liable to karet or to bring an offering only for the full measure, which is an olive-bulk. And one who eats less than an olive-bulk intentionally is given disciplinary lashes.” So Maimonides’ commentators ask him—the Kesef Mishneh again doesn’t leave him alone—“One who eats leaven itself on Passover”—this is difficult for me: why do I need a verse for leaven on Passover? Don’t we hold that for all prohibitions in the Torah, half a measure is forbidden by Torah law? And throughout the Torah the rule is that half a measure is forbidden by Torah law; you are not flogged for it, but the prohibition exists even for half a measure. So why does Maimonides need to bring a special source here for half a measure with leaven?

[Speaker B] And there is another difficulty: if he is bringing me the verse “it shall not be eaten,” he should have learned the opposite from it. Because “it shall not be eaten” implies a measure of eating—specifically a full measure and not less than the measure. And it requires further analysis. Fine, we won’t continue with the rest. And behold—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Mishneh LaMelekh here brings a fascinating answer from Maharalnach. “And I saw that Rabbi Maharalnach, in responsum 51, was troubled by our master’s question on this”—that is, why a verse is needed for half a measure—“and he answered that the prohibition of leaven is not like the prohibition of forbidden fat, from which they learned that half a measure is forbidden, because with forbidden fat, any amount whatsoever is forbidden fat.” So forbidden fat is the source for the prohibition of half a measure. So he says: the prohibition of leaven is not like the prohibition of forbidden fat. Why? Because forbidden fat is always prohibited and never had a time when it was permitted, whereas leaven is permitted before Passover; therefore a separate verse was needed for leaven to forbid half a measure. This is absolutely astonishing. Astonishing. Where does the Talmud discuss the law of half a measure? It appears in the eighth chapter of Yoma, in our chapter—that is, regarding the prohibition of Yom Kippur. Half a measure on Yom Kippur. That is the dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. From there they learn for the whole Torah. True, but the discussion is about eating half a measure on Yom Kippur. So how can Maharalnach want to say that a prohibition dependent on time does not have the law of half a measure?

[Speaker B] Yom Kippur is the very passage about half a measure, and that’s a prohibition dependent on time. So I’ll tell you how. What Maharalnach means is not that a prohibition dependent on time—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —does not have the law of half a measure, the way people usually understand him. That is not correct. Rather, the fact that it depends on time is an indication. After all, from the fact that leaven is forbidden only on Passover and not the rest of the year, what do we see? That it is not intrinsically repulsive. Pork is forbidden all year, forbidden fat is forbidden all year, creeping creatures are forbidden all year. Why is leaven forbidden only on Passover? Because it is a remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt. The fact that it depends on time is an indication that leaven is not intrinsically repulsive. So what? Therefore the prohibition of eating leaven is a historical prohibition. If it is a historical prohibition, then it is a prohibition on the act of eating, not on the benefit from eating; it is not something intrinsically repulsive. At the beginning of tractate Shabbat, the Sefat Emet talks about this—it begins already in the Rosh, but the Sefat Emet discusses it, and many later authorities as well—that prohibitions of action do not have the law of half a measure. Why? For example, if I carry something two cubits in the public domain on the Sabbath, would that be forbidden because of half a measure? Four cubits is a Torah prohibition, so are two cubits half a measure—or one cubit, because that’s half of two and a half? No. There is no half a measure for actions. Or someone who only lifts an object but does not put it down when transferring from a private domain to a public domain. That is the Rosh there at the beginning of Shabbat: there is no prohibition of half a measure. Why? Because, he says, prohibitions of action do not include half a measure. Once you did not perform the action, the essence of the matter is missing; you did not perform the forbidden action. With forbidden food or a forbidden object, if you ate a quarter of an olive-bulk or half an olive-bulk, then you ate the forbidden thing—you just did not eat a sufficient quantity. So the quantity matters only with respect to punishment, but clearly the qualitative aspect of the prohibition is present, because you ate a forbidden thing. But where an action is forbidden, the measure is essential to the very definition of the action. Certainly in lifting and placing that is obvious; with four cubits in the public domain it is harder, but still, in prohibitions that are prohibitions of action there is no law of half a measure—if you didn’t do the action, it is not forbidden. Now he says—now I say—if so, the prohibition of eating leaven is a prohibition on the act of eating leaven, not a prohibition on benefit from leaven, a prohibition on action. And in a prohibition on action there is no law of half a measure, and that is what Maharalnach meant. The fact that it is not forbidden all year but only on Passover is not because it is a time-dependent prohibition, but because that is an indication. It is an indication that the thing is not intrinsically repulsive; it is a historical prohibition. A historical prohibition is a prohibition on action. In prohibitions of action there is no law of half a measure. From where did Maimonides learn that nevertheless there is a law of half a measure here? From “it shall not be eaten,” Chizkiyah’s verse. Why? Because Chizkiyah’s verse also adds a prohibition of benefit regarding leaven. And then what? Then it adds here, as with all the other prohibitions of the Torah, that on Passover you should relate to it as if it were something repulsive—do not even derive benefit from it. So if that is the case, then of course half a measure is also forbidden. And with this, both questions of the Kesef Mishneh are resolved. The first question was: why do we need a verse, since throughout the Torah half a measure is forbidden? The answer is: because leaven on Passover is not like the eating prohibitions in the rest of the Torah. Second, he says: from the verse “it shall not be eaten” you should have learned the opposite, that specifically the full measure is forbidden—“it shall not be eaten” in the normal manner of eating, but less than the measure is not. The answer is: he didn’t understand. “It shall not be eaten” is the same derivation he brought, which the Kesef Mishneh himself also did not understand in law 1, in law 2. There too he did not understand it. I want to claim that the root of it is anchored in law 2. When Maimonides brought Chizkiyah’s derivation from “it shall not be eaten,” what did he mean to say? That after there is another verse forbidding benefit from leaven, you learn that with leaven there is also the regular prohibition like all the rest of the Torah’s prohibitions—not only a prohibition on the act of eating; there is also a prohibition of benefit. So if that is the case, then obviously half a measure is also forbidden. By the way, according to my approach, half a measure of leaven would be forbidden because of the prohibition of deriving benefit from leaven, not because of the prohibition of eating leaven. The enjoyment you get from eating half a measure of leaven would be a prohibited benefit, but there would not be a prohibition of eating here, because the prohibition of eating is a prohibition on the act of eating. In any event, you are not flogged for it, so practically it makes no difference. And that is what I am saying. So now both questions of the Kesef Mishneh are answered. What remained difficult was Maharalnach. After all, Maharalnach claims that prohibitions dependent on time do not have the law of half a measure. So people ask him: what do you mean? Yom Kippur is a prohibition dependent on time, and the whole discussion in the Talmud about half a measure is conducted there. The answer is: no one ever said that a prohibition dependent on time has no law of half a measure. The fact that with leaven it depends on time was only an indication that the thing is not intrinsically repulsive, but rather a prohibition of action, that’s all. What happens on Yom Kippur? Here we are really arriving at Yom Kippur itself; this will be the topic of the coming classes. On Yom Kippur the prohibition of eating is different from the rest of the Torah’s prohibitions. There is a prohibition of enjoyment—it is not a prohibition on the act of eating—but it is only a prohibition on enjoyment. It is not an eating prohibition that belongs to enjoyment, because there really is no prohibition in itself; the obligation is to afflict oneself. What counts as not being in affliction? That you have the pleasure of eating, that feeling of satiety, right? Meaning that on Yom Kippur—even though the prohibition depends on time and clearly bread on Yom Kippur is not intrinsically repulsive, that is true exactly as with leaven, because otherwise you would also have to avoid eating it on other days, not only on Yom Kippur. It depends on time, and therefore it is not intrinsically repulsive, that is true. Up to this point it is like leaven, but from here on they diverge. Because with leaven, true, it is not repulsive, but it is a historical prohibition, a remembrance of what happened there, so it is a prohibition on the act of eating. But on Yom Kippur the prohibition is not on the act of eating—quite the opposite. The prohibition is on the enjoyment from eating on that day, not because the thing is repulsive, but because one may not become satiated; one must be in a state of affliction. So if that is the case, there is certainly a law of half a measure here—why shouldn’t there be? My whole claim is that dependence on time is only a sign, not a cause. That’s the point. Okay? And then everything falls neatly into place. By the way, there is a nice practical difference on this issue: I claim that with the sciatic nerve there would be no prohibition of half a measure according to Maimonides. Why? Because the sciatic nerve is a historical prohibition like leaven, and therefore it is a prohibition on the act of eating, which has no half-measure law unless you bring a source. There is no special source for the sciatic nerve. More than that: with the sciatic nerve, after all, it does not say the expression “it shall not be eaten” that completes for us the prohibition of benefit in leaven, right? So in effect we are left only with the prohibition on the act of eating the nerve. Half a measure will not be forbidden. And indeed the Pri Megadim argues that there is no law of half a measure regarding the sciatic nerve. He does not say this within Maimonides’ position, but I claim—and people already challenged him, why shouldn’t there be, and so on—I claim that according to Maimonides it comes out this way even without the Pri Megadim. I claim that according to Maimonides, what I am saying here yields the conclusion that there is no prohibition of half a measure in eating the sciatic nerve. In fact, here we are already beginning to touch on the essence of eating prohibitions on Yom Kippur, because this is already a kind of hint toward what follows. We see here how the eating prohibitions of Yom Kippur differ from all the other eating prohibitions in the Torah. It is like leaven in the sense that there is nothing intrinsically repulsive here, because otherwise it would have had to be forbidden all year. With leaven it is a remembrance of a historical event; the sciatic nerve is a remembrance of a historical event; and therefore even something not fit for eating is forbidden, both with the sciatic nerve and with leaven. Okay? On Yom Kippur it is not something intrinsically repulsive, and the proof is that it depends on time, but the definition of what it is—this is not like leaven. What is it? It is breaking the fast. What is required is that the person be in a state of affliction. It is not a prohibition on the object being eaten; the object itself is not repulsive. It is an obligation on the person to remain in affliction. Therefore if I eat, then I have broken the fast—that is the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur. Okay? Now we will see implications of this and discussions further on. I just want to finish here with two more sentences, to close the issue of Chizkiyah and Rabbi Abbahu. I’m not getting into more landmines here about lashes for benefit and so on—it’s a bit of a complicated story; look at the summary if you want. There are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who rule like Chizkiyah—I already mentioned this—for example the Rosh in Chullin, and it also seems that way in the She’iltot and somewhat in the Rif—that rule like Chizkiyah and not like Rabbi Abbahu. The question is whether according to them it is true that in all the Torah’s prohibitions these are in essence prohibitions on action and not prohibitions on benefit, because on the face of it that is the dispute between Chizkiyah and Rabbi Abbahu. Right? I said that Maimonides understands the dispute as follows: Rabbi Abbahu understands eating as an example of forms of benefit, while Chizkiyah understands that eating is prohibited in its own right and not as an example of forms of benefit. And then it seems to follow that the debate is exactly about this question. Chizkiyah understands eating prohibitions as prohibitions on the act of eating—what I defined with leaven, with the sciatic nerve, and so on—so Chizkiyah understands all the Torah’s eating prohibitions that way. And Rabbi Abbahu understands that no, it is a prohibition on benefit from eating, and therefore eating is only an example, but all forms of benefit are implied. Now, according to the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who rule like Chizkiyah, it would seemingly have to emerge that in their view all eating prohibitions in the Torah are prohibitions on the act of eating and not on the benefit from eating. That cannot be correct, because we know that one is not liable for prohibited eating without benefit. I mentioned this earlier: if someone eats something scalding hot, in ordinary Torah eating prohibitions, if you eat it boiling hot you are exempt. More than that, there is a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish—which we’ll see next time—about whether pleasure in the throat is required, or pleasure in the intestines; but everyone agrees that some enjoyment is required. No one argues that eating requires benefit in order to be prohibited. Therefore—we’ll return to this in more detail—but I just want to conclude here that even according to the medieval authorities (Rishonim) who rule like Chizkiyah and not like Rabbi Abbahu, there is no necessity to say that they held that the prohibition is on the act of eating, that all eating prohibitions in the Torah are prohibitions on the act of eating. They simply do not learn the dispute between Rabbi Abbahu and Chizkiyah the way Maimonides does. They can certainly learn that Chizkiyah understands that what is prohibited is the enjoyment of eating, but you cannot derive from that that other forms of benefit are prohibited; it is not merely an example. That is the benefit that was prohibited: the enjoyment of eating. That’s all. For other forms of benefit to be prohibited, you need a source. But not that he fundamentally disagrees with Rabbi Abbahu over the idea that when you prohibit something in eating, you prohibit benefiting through eating. No, Chizkiyah agrees to that too. Therefore the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) who rule like Chizkiyah do not necessarily say that this is a prohibition on the act of eating and not a prohibition on benefit from eating. They too can agree. But in prohibitions where there is no prohibition of benefit, only a prohibition of eating, what is prohibited is only the enjoyment of eating and not other kinds of benefit. That’s all.

[Speaker B] Okay, I’ll stop here. If anyone wants to comment or ask. Everything all right? Okay then, goodbye, may you have a good year, may you be inscribed and sealed for good, and let’s hope the coronavirus finally leaves us already. Amen, happy new year, Rabbi.