Yoma Chapter 8 – Lesson 13

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, let’s see where we’re up to. I started talking about prohibitions of eating and drinking, and I tried to define those prohibitions through the dispute between Rabbi Abbahu and Hizkiyah in Pesachim. Let’s mute for a second. And through the dispute between Hizkiyah and Rabbi Abbahu in Pesachim we saw that, at least according to Maimonides, Rabbi Abbahu defines prohibitions of eating as prohibitions of benefit, and eating is an example of the most common kind of benefit, so the Torah used that language even though what it really means is a prohibition of benefit. So when the Torah prohibits something by eating, it doesn’t need to prohibit it separately in benefit as well, because eating is only an example. But, as I mentioned, in a great many of the prohibitions of eating, they are nevertheless prohibited only in eating and not in benefit, and Rabbi Abbahu agrees to that as well. The whole passage in Pesachim is a long discussion, and then the Talmud brings, for every such prohibition, a separate source that exempts it from benefit and leaves only the prohibition of eating. And still, the claim was that even after we exempt it—or don’t make one liable—for benefit and leave only eating, the basic definition of the prohibition in eating is still the pleasure of eating, okay, according to Rabbi Abbahu. In contrast, I said that in prohibitions like leavened food and the sciatic nerve, which are historical prohibitions, there the prohibition is on the act of eating, and the implication is that even something unfit for eating, as long as it still carries the name of leavened food or sciatic nerve, is still prohibited. As for the prohibition of benefit, that needs a separate source. With leavened food we have one—Maimonides brings Hizkiyah’s source. With the sciatic nerve we don’t. The same with meat and milk. There too, Maimonides says that because there are three sources, one of them is a prohibition on the act of eating, and another adds a prohibition of benefit that also includes the pleasure of eating, therefore with meat and milk the prohibition applies even if one ate not in the normal manner of enjoyment. And then in the end we arrive at the conclusion that there are three types of prohibitions of eating. The ordinary prohibitions of eating are prohibitions on the pleasure of eating. In those prohibitions, the object itself is repulsive, and the Torah wants us to distance ourselves from it. Therefore a prohibition of eating also includes a prohibition of benefit—don’t come near it. I said that this is true even according to the Rosh and those with him, who rule like Hizkiyah and not like Rabbi Abbahu; except that according to them what was prohibited is only the pleasure of eating. Eating is not an example for other benefits, but still what was prohibited is the pleasure of eating and not the act of eating. Those are the ordinary prohibitions. There are prohibitions of the second type, like the sciatic nerve and leavened food, historical prohibitions, or meat and milk, which are prohibitions on the act of eating. In those prohibitions the object itself is not repulsive. You don’t need to distance yourself from it. What is prohibited to you is performing an act of eating on it as long as its name is upon it, as long as it is called sciatic nerve or leavened food and so on. Then you are forbidden to perform an act of eating on it. And I said that if there is a prohibition of benefit, it needs a separate source for that. But the object in itself is not repulsive, and therefore you can’t derive a prohibition of benefit from the prohibition of eating. The third type is the prohibitions of eating on Yom Kippur. And so in the end I had already reached prohibitions of eating on Yom Kippur as well. The claim was that prohibitions of eating on Yom Kippur are basically prohibitions on the pleasure of the person, without the object being repulsive. That’s why it’s a third type. On the one hand, these are prohibitions on pleasure, not on the act of eating. In that sense they’re like ordinary prohibitions of eating, not like leavened food and the sciatic nerve and meat and milk. But unlike ordinary prohibitions of eating, here the object is not repulsive. You’re not supposed not to enjoy it because you need to distance yourself from it; you’re supposed not to enjoy it because on Yom Kippur there is an idea of afflicting oneself. So the point is affliction, not distancing oneself from the thing. So on the one hand there is here a prohibition of pleasure—or in the language of the Talmud, what’s called settling the mind. It is forbidden for his mind to be settled by this eating, and therefore it’s some sort of category that is a little like the first type and a little like the second type. But the fact that the prohibitions of Yom Kippur depend on time doesn’t mean they are the same as the prohibitions of leavened food, which also depend on time. We saw an implication regarding half a measure. A measure. The Maharnach, whom the Mishneh LaMelekh brings, says that half a measure does not exist in prohibitions that depend on time, and therefore he explains that with leavened food we would not know the law of half a measure if not for a separate source, “it shall not be eaten,” even though in the rest of the Torah half-measures are prohibited by Torah law. So I asked: then what about Yom Kippur? After all, the whole Talmudic discussion of half a measure is talking about Yom Kippur, which is also a prohibition that depends on time. And the claim was that the Maharnach does not mean that every prohibition depending on time has no law of half a measure. Rather, he brings in the fact that the prohibition depends on time as an indication. Meaning: once leavened food depends on time, that means it is not repulsive. If it is not repulsive, then the prohibition is a prohibition on an act. Once it is a prohibition on an act, prohibitions of action do not have a law of half a measure. True, eating on Yom Kippur is also a prohibition that depends on time, but there that does not mean the prohibition is a prohibition on the act. It is still a prohibition on pleasure—one may not enjoy the thing, or have one’s mind settled by it on Yom Kippur—and therefore there the law of half a measure will apply. And that is what the Talmud discusses, the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish regarding prohibitions of eating on Yom Kippur, which from the Talmud’s perspective is like the other prohibitions in the Torah: in the end these are prohibitions of benefit, and half-benefit is prohibited by Torah law even if there is not a full measure of complete benefit. So that’s where we got to in the previous lecture. What I want to do now is continue this discussion a bit about prohibitions of eating and drinking in general, perhaps with some comments about Yom Kippur, and I think that next time we’ll already get to dealing with Yom Kippur itself, and with that we’ll finish. Thursday is the last lecture in this series. So let’s begin like this: in the Talmud in tractate Hullin—I’m sharing the file here—the Talmud says as follows: “When Rav Dimi came, he said: Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yohanan, if he divided it outside, what is the law?” It’s talking about the prohibition of a limb from a living animal. So if he divides it—he has an olive-bulk of a limb from a living animal, and he divides it into several pieces, two, three, four pieces, and eats them one after the other—he said to him: exempt. “Inside, what is the law?” He said to him: liable. “When Ravin came, he said: if he divided it outside, exempt. Inside, it’s not simple that he’s liable; it’s a dispute: Rabbi Yohanan said liable, and Reish Lakish said exempt. Rabbi Yohanan said liable: after all, his throat enjoyed an olive-bulk. And Reish Lakish said exempt: we require eating in his intestines, and that is not present.” Meaning, if he divided it outside, then he is exempt—he ate less than the required measure, basically. If he divided it inside, then Rabbi Yohanan claims he is liable. Why? Because in the end his throat enjoyed an olive-bulk. True, piece after piece, but bottom line, he enjoyed an olive-bulk. Reish Lakish says exempt. Why? Because he requires pleasure of the intestines, and each time only a small piece went into the intestines. Meaning that in the throat it was all, in effect, an olive-bulk, but in the intestines it entered piece by piece, and therefore he is exempt. We won’t get into it here—you could start discussing the question of how long it took him. After all, if he ate it within the time of eating a half-loaf, why should I care that he divided it? Let’s leave that; for now let’s assume we’re talking about more than the time of eating a half-loaf. So there is a dispute here between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan over whether pleasure of the intestines is needed or pleasure of the throat, and in the simple reading this is a dispute regarding all prohibitions of eating in the Torah: do we need pleasure of the intestines or pleasure of the throat? As a matter of law, we rule like Rabbi Yohanan. Look at Maimonides, Forbidden Foods, chapter 5: “If he divided this limb and ate it little by little, if over the course of his eating there was an olive-bulk of meat, he is liable; and if not, he is exempt. If he took an olive-bulk from the limb in its natural state—meat, sinews, and bones—and ate it, even though it split inside his mouth before he swallowed it, he is liable.” Meaning, he rules like Rabbi Yohanan. Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan—the law follows Rabbi Yohanan. But practically, what do we see? We basically see that according to both Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, pleasure is required. The whole question is only which pleasure—pleasure of the intestines or pleasure of the throat. What does that mean? It means that apparently no one—certainly not any of the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—can disagree that prohibitions of eating require pleasure. Meaning, no one holds that the prohibition is merely on the act of eating and not on the pleasure of eating. Here we see that according to all views there has to be some pleasure in this eating for it to be prohibited. The whole question is just which pleasure, intestines or throat. Now I remind you that the Rosh and other medieval authorities (Rishonim) ruled like Hizkiyah, and Hizkiyah says that a prohibition of eating—eating is not an example of benefit. And I said that I suspect that even according to them, pleasure is still required in the eating in order to violate the prohibition. According to Maimonides that’s simple—Rabbi Abbahu. But according to Hizkiyah there was room to hesitate. Here in the Talmud you see the proof for that. The Talmud here says it as something obvious; it does not tie it to the dispute between Hizkiyah and Rabbi Abbahu. Meaning, it seems that Hizkiyah too would agree, at least with one of these opinions—pleasure of the throat or pleasure of the intestines. Or in other words: even Hizkiyah, who sees eating as an independent prohibition and not as an example of prohibitions of benefit, would still require pleasure. And that is what I said earlier as well: even according to Hizkiyah and the authorities who rule like him, the prohibition of eating is a prohibition in the pleasure of eating and not a prohibition on the act of eating. But still, it could be understood in two ways. I formulated it basically in a way similar to Maimonides’ formulation—that the prohibition is a prohibition on the pleasure of eating. And the argument between Hizkiyah and Rabbi Abbahu is whether the Torah prohibited all forms of benefit and eating is only an example, or whether the Torah prohibited the pleasure of eating and other benefits need a separate discussion. But it could have been said differently. Maybe according to Hizkiyah the Torah prohibited the act of eating, not the pleasure of eating. But in order for the act of eating to count as an act of eating, there has to be pleasure. If you don’t enjoy it, it isn’t called an act of eating. Meaning, not that the prohibition is a prohibition of pleasure. The prohibition is on the act of eating, but a condition for defining the act as an act of eating is that there be some pleasure there. Maybe you could call this something like a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose on the Sabbath: where you do the action for a different purpose than the normal one, it isn’t called the action that the Torah prohibited. True, a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose is an exemption only on the Sabbath, but I’m saying the idea is the same idea. I don’t mean it for the whole Torah; that concept is only on the Sabbath. But the idea can be the same idea. Even when, say, I don’t know, you extinguish a fire not in order to produce charcoal but because you want darkness—then you did the same action, the act of extinguishing. But the purpose for which you did the action was not because you needed charcoal but because you want darkness. So that’s called a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose. Or erasing not in order to write, or things like that. So too, eating not for the sake of enjoyment is some sort of labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose, or in other words, it just isn’t what’s called an act of eating. And again, I’m saying, this is not really the exemption of a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose. That exemption exists only on the Sabbath. I’m just bringing it as an example of this line of reasoning. The later authorities (Acharonim) already say, even in the laws of the Sabbath, that there are places where the exemption of a labor not needed for its own intrinsic purpose is essential to the very definition of the labor, not just an exemption in the laws of the Sabbath—simply the definition of the labor. When the labor is done for a different purpose, it is not even the labor that the Torah prohibited. In such a situation it would be permitted in the rest of the Torah as well, not only on the Sabbath.

[Speaker B] For example, laundering.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s forbidden on the Sabbath, and it’s also forbidden to launder the priest’s garments. It’s forbidden to launder the priest’s garments, and there too the discussion is about the definitions of the prohibition of laundering blood—whether the parameters are like the Sabbath or not like the Sabbath. And there they say that there are certain definitions where it will be the same thing even though this isn’t from the laws of the Sabbath. There are certain definitions that define the act as laundering. If you don’t fulfill that, it isn’t an act of laundering. Okay. In any case, that’s the initial conclusion that comes out of the passage in Hullin: we see that pleasure is required. And I said that there is still room to discuss whether the prohibition is actually defined as a prohibition on the pleasure of eating, or whether the prohibition is defined as eating, except that eating that is not done for pleasure is not eating. Now the question is specifically in Maimonides. Because Maimonides explicitly understands the prohibition as a prohibition of benefit. Eating is only an example, but basically the Torah prohibits benefits. Now if the Torah prohibits benefits, one could have said that according to Maimonides the discussion is about the definition of the act of eating, and that applies only to those prohibitions where the act of eating was really prohibited. I said there are three types of prohibitions: the sciatic nerve, leavened food on Passover, meat and milk. Then indeed I have to define the act of eating, and here the question is whether this pleasure or that pleasure defines the act of eating. Fine—the question is, when have I transgressed the prohibition of the act of eating? But then it comes out that the whole discussion between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish is only in that specific type of prohibition. First, that’s unlikely, because from the Talmud it looks like this is a general dispute. Second, the Talmud in Hullin itself is dealing with a limb from a living animal. A limb from a living animal is not from those prohibitions. A limb from a living animal, simply speaking, is something repulsive; one should distance oneself from it. Therefore there too I would have expected it to be like Maimonides, and seemingly there is no room for a discussion whether it is pleasure of the intestines or pleasure of the throat—why should I care, as long as there is pleasure. But—

[Speaker B] We need to remember, there was—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One could say that the dispute of the—let’s put it this way, I didn’t manage to get to this in the previous lecture—but even though Maimonides says that the prohibition of eating is an example of prohibitions of benefit, there is still a difference between a situation where a person ate and a situation where a person benefited.

[Speaker B] When a person eats, then he is liable to lashes, but if—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the person benefited—when a person benefited, he is not liable to lashes. That’s what Maimonides says. And first of all this is indeed very puzzling, because according to Maimonides benefit is only—the eating is only an example of benefits. So why in the world should there be a difference in liability between when a person ate and when a person benefited? Eating is only an example. So here Maimonides’ commentators hesitate a bit about this. The Maggid Mishneh, for example, says it’s simple: this is called not in the normal way of eating. It’s basically a kind of alteration. When he eats without pleasure, that is some kind of alteration, and then we see that even though the prohibition is a prohibition of benefit, there is nevertheless an exemption from punishment when you do it in an altered way, not in the normal manner. Then there is room for discussion between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish over what exactly defines the normal way of eating. For example, if he divided it inside his mouth, maybe that is already something not in the usual way of eating, and then even though there was pleasure here, because you did not eat it in the ordinary way of eating, you will be exempt. Especially since according to the Maggid Mishneh every kind of benefit is basically not in the normal way of benefiting; only eating is in the normal way of benefiting. So in all the prohibitions of eating, when he benefited, that is basically not in the normal way of benefiting, and he is exempt from punishment. Then what remains is only the discussion of what is called eating for purposes of defining the act of eating. Because for the pleasure of eating one is not liable to lashes. The question is when you performed an act of eating; for that you are liable to lashes. Regarding the definition of the act, one can understand the dispute over whether what defines the act is pleasure of the intestines or pleasure of the throat. And then even according to Maimonides it comes out that this dispute really does have practical significance. In other words, there is a point to disagreeing about this. And in fact, if you look at the Talmud, the discussion there is whether he is liable or exempt; it doesn’t say whether it is prohibited. But this whole business really requires looking at things again. Why? Because with a limb from a living animal, this is one of the prohibitions that has been excluded from benefit. Meaning, in the end only eating is prohibited. So here this whole principle of Rabbi Abbahu—that basically the foundational prohibition is a prohibition on benefits—does not really exist, because after all the benefits were excluded and only the prohibition of eating remains. Then it is easier to understand why Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish can argue over what type of pleasure defines the prohibition of eating here, because the prohibition of a limb from a living animal really is a prohibition of eating; it is not a prohibition of benefit. But I said that even in these prohibitions, from which benefit was excluded and only the prohibition of eating remained, this is still a prohibition of the pleasure of eating. True—but there is still room to discuss what exactly the pleasure of eating is: pleasure of the intestines or pleasure of the throat. Fine. Therefore, for example, in a place where there is also, with leavened food on Passover for instance, a prohibition of benefit as well, or just things that are prohibited both in benefit and in eating, like orlah or something like that, then there, in my view, there will be no practical difference even if he divided it inside his mouth—it won’t change anything. In the end both Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish will say that he transgressed a prohibition. As for lashes, that is a different discussion, because for lashes it is not enough that there be benefit; there also has to be an act of eating. More generally, I just want to make a somewhat broader point. My way in these lectures is that I try to present the more general face of the principles we’re learning. There is often discussion, especially among the later authorities (Acharonim), about various commandments, whether they are commandments of action or commandments of result. For example, be fruitful and multiply. Is it a commandment to produce children—a son and a daughter, say—or is it a commandment on the action, to make the effort to have children? Now, as we know, we do not derive law from the reason for the verse. That means we can think about why the Torah prohibited something, but we do not engage that reason when we try to shape the parameters of the prohibition. The reason will not affect the parameters of the prohibition. Let me return to procreation for a second. In procreation, for example, it is quite clear that what the Torah wants is for me to have a son and a daughter. It is quite clear that what the Torah wants is the result. But that still does not mean that the definition of the commandment is a commandment on the result rather than on the action. Sometimes there is a gap between what the Torah wants and how the Torah defines the halakhic obligation. By the way, that is one of the reasons why we do not derive law from the reason for the verse. Usually the reason for the verse is there to tell you the purpose of the commandment, but very often the legal definition is not a direct consequence of the reason. And here, look at the example: with procreation the Torah really wants me to have children, but it may be that in terms of definition—what is incumbent on me—it says to me: what is incumbent on you is the effort. Once you have reached a son and a daughter, you can stop—that’s another matter. But what is incumbent on you is the effort. Meaning, when you do the act, that itself is an act of commandment; it is not merely a preparatory act for the commandment. When you have relations in order to bring about the son and daughter, that is not a preparatory act—it is the commandment itself. Why? After all, what the Torah wants is the result. It wants me to have a son and a daughter. True, but what the Torah imposes on me in defining what task rests on me is the effort, because in the end the result is not in my hands. I cannot know whether I will have them. I have no control over whether I will have a son and a daughter, or children, or not. That is in Heaven’s hands. What I can do is make an effort. Therefore, what the Torah requires of me is the act of effort. Once I’ve reached the desired result I can stop, but the definition of the commandment or the prohibition can be a definition on—also in the context of prohibitions of eating one can definitely discuss this. It may be that the Torah is really saying this: when you talk about pleasure of the throat, say in what Rabbi Yohanan says—that pleasure of the throat is what creates liability—it could be that the Torah does not… basically what is written here is not pleasure of the throat, but rather once there is pleasure for the throat, that is defined as an act of eating. That defines the action. Or in other words, the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish is precisely over this point: is the prohibition a prohibition on the act of eating, with the pleasure only defining the act as an act of eating? And Rabbi Yohanan says: therefore pleasure of the throat is decisive, because pleasure of the throat is what defines the action as an act of eating—that your throat enjoys the eating. In contrast, Reish Lakish says no, it’s a result. It’s a prohibition of result. Once it has landed in your stomach, yes, you become satiated or something like that, then you have transgressed the prohibition. Meaning, it is a prohibition on the result. Now that does not mean Rabbi Yohanan disagrees that what the Torah wants is to prevent the result. But the definition of the prohibition could be a definition of prohibition of action, for the reasons I said here. And then it could indeed be that even if what the Torah wants is that we distance ourselves from the thing because it is repulsive, or all the explanations I gave the previous time, that still does not mean that when Rabbi Yohanan requires pleasure of the throat, he too agrees that the prohibition is really a prohibition of pleasure. It may be that the legal definition of the prohibition is a prohibition on an act. Therefore he says: not pleasure of the intestines. Pleasure of the intestines defines the undesired result. But the prohibition itself is a prohibition on an act of eating. What defines an act of eating? Pleasure of the throat. Once your throat enjoys it, that thing is called an act of eating. And if so, then it really comes out that Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagree on this very point. Rabbi Yohanan claims that pleasure is not what is required. What is required is only the definition of the action as an act of eating—and at least for lashes, as I said earlier, because a prohibition probably exists for every benefit. But in order to receive lashes, the action has to be defined as an act of eating. Reish Lakish says: once there was pleasure, the result has been achieved, and you have violated the prohibition of eating. The prohibition is a prohibition of result, not a prohibition of action. And then what I said earlier is not precise. I said that we see here that according to all views pleasure is required; the whole question is only which pleasure, and then I asked about Maimonides—so what’s the discussion, why should I care, according to Maimonides all benefits are prohibited. But I’m saying no. Rabbi Yohanan speaks about pleasure of the throat, but he really means to define the act of eating, not the pleasure. The act of eating is defined when your throat enjoys the eating. In contrast, Reish Lakish claims there is a prohibition on the result. Once it has gone down into my stomach, then I have violated this prohibition. This is not a question of the time of digestion, of course; in that sense that’s not the point. Actually this question is a strange question. The Helkat Yoav himself resolves it. He says that even according to Reish Lakish the intention is… Now one more note. There is a Mishnah in Keritot 12b. The tannaim dispute there regarding the measure of eating. In the end, you need the measure of the time of eating a half-loaf. The Magen Avraham writes in section 489 that the measure of the time of eating a half-loaf includes the pauses between acts of eating too, not only the chewing itself. Bottom line, you need to eat within the time of eating a half-loaf, and that is the practical conclusion. We rule like the Sages in the Mishnah there in Keritot that you need the time of eating a half-loaf. The Helkat Yoav in Yoreh De’ah, section 9, raises a difficulty on Reish Lakish. According to Reish Lakish, after all, the prohibition is pleasure of the intestines. So why should I care how long it takes you to eat it? Bottom line, the required amount that you ate is sitting in your intestines. So what difference does the pace of the time of eating a half-loaf make? Because in the end what remains is the pleasure of the intestines.

[Speaker B] And according to Rabbi Yohanan, if he divided it in his mouth he’s liable,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So then why do you need the time frame of “within the time it takes to eat a half-loaf”? You could have said that according to Rabbi Yohanan, if he divided it up in his mouth, what’s required is benefit to the throat, and that benefit to the throat defines the act of eating—not that enjoyment is independently required. Once that defines the act of eating, then it could be that if you don’t do it within that time frame, it’s not defined as an act of eating. And according to Reish Lakish, it’s a result—that there has to be satiety in the end, in the stomach. So why should I care if in the end there is intestinal benefit? Why should I care at what pace it went down? The main thing is that in the end it all settled in my stomach. Unless the prohibition is not the intestinal benefit itself—that is, not a result-based prohibition—but rather the prohibition is on placing the food in the intestines. Not on its passing through the throat, but on placing it in the intestines. How do I know that? Actually, that’s simply how it is. How do I know? If the prohibition were on intestinal benefit, then what practical difference does the Talmud bring for the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish? The practical difference is that he divided it up inside his mouth, right? And in that case, at the end of the day, why should I care that he divided it in his mouth? In the end, the full measure settled in his intestines. And on that Reish Lakish says he is exempt. Why? Because you need intestinal benefit—and there is intestinal benefit. He divided it in his mouth, but in the end it all settled in his intestines. There is intestinal benefit. You see that Chelkat Yoav is right: what? That the prohibition is not a result-based prohibition on the fact that the food is lying in my intestines, but rather the prohibition is on the act of placing the food in my intestines. There’s some joke that I already don’t remember about Ger Hasidim, right? That they pack the food into the intestines. Something in Yiddish, “packen,” right. They pack the… I don’t remember anymore, never mind. In any case, Chelkat Yoav says that the prohibition is on placing the food in the intestines. That’s an interesting definition; seemingly it emerges from the Talmud. And then the definition becomes even more interesting, because before I had raised the possibility that Rabbi Yohanan isn’t talking about enjoyment at all, but about the definition of the act of eating, while Reish Lakish is talking about a result-based prohibition: once the enjoyment occurred, you’ve transgressed the prohibition. Now we actually see that no—even according to Reish Lakish, the prohibition is a prohibition on an act. Reish Lakish just defines what the prohibited act is: not passage through the throat, but placement in the intestines. But not the fact that it is lying in the intestines—not the result. Because if that were so, why should I care that he divided it in his mouth? In the end it’s all lying in the intestines. Rather, you see that even according to Reish Lakish there is fundamentally a prohibition on an act, not on the result. And the enjoyment, or what kind of enjoyment, only defines what the act is. And if that’s so, then by the same token there’s no difficulty on Maimonides, and everything I said above comes back into place. The whole discussion is really only about lashes. But enjoyment—if there was enjoyment here, it could be that there is a Torah-level prohibition even though there are no lashes. That’s not our discussion. Especially since we’re dealing with a limb taken from a living animal, which is excluded altogether from the prohibition of deriving benefit; there there is only a prohibition of eating. Okay? But still, even if he derives benefit, clearly he does not receive lashes. And therefore the whole discussion that can exist here is only a discussion about the prohibition on… really, the whole discussion here is only about the punishment and not about the prohibition.

[Speaker C] Can I ask a small question? Yes. Seemingly, if you really divide a commandment or a transgression into an act and a result, then the fulfillment of the commandment would certainly be only in the result. In the case of someone who tried to fulfill “be fruitful and multiply” and didn’t succeed, or as the Talmud says, he had children and they died—so he tried, and in terms of preparation there may be a positive commandment overriding a prohibition, but he did not actually fulfill the commandment. And seemingly for a prohibition too…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but then you would define the result as a condition. Meaning, the commandment is fulfilled only if the condition is fulfilled. The definition of the commandment is the effort, but the fulfillment of the commandment comes only if the condition is met—that children were born. In contrast, in a transgression…

[Speaker C] In a transgression it would also be like that, seemingly. What? In a transgression it would also be like that, seemingly. Right. What, but the Talmud says that if he vomited—if he went back and vomited up the food—according to Rabbi Yohanan, if there was benefit to his throat he is liable, no? So then—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? What does that prove? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker C] That the condition of the intestines was not fulfilled.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously. So you don’t even need to get to the case of vomiting it back up.

[Speaker C] But it’s hard to say this idea that I distinguish between the act and the result, and that the purpose of the prohibition is really in the result, yet he is already liable for the act of eating.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker C] And that it’s not a transgression. Just like it’s not a commandment as long as he hasn’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it is a transgression. It is the thing the Torah does not want. But what is imposed on me is what defines the transgression. The legal definition defines the transgression, not the reason for the verse; we do not derive law from the reason for the verse. We do not derive law from the reason for the verse in the sense of what the Torah wants to achieve. What defines it is what is imposed on me. Even though it’s true that that is what the Torah wants to achieve. No—we don’t say we don’t derive law from the reason for the verse because it isn’t true. It is true; the reason is…

[Speaker C] Okay, I understand the principle in that. So it wouldn’t even be a condition? It wouldn’t even be a condition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Sometimes it would be a condition, sometimes it would not be a condition; it depends on the definitions. Each place has to be judged on its own. Yes, for example in guarding against damages: if it began with negligence and ended with an unavoidable accident. Abaye and Rava in tractate Bava Metzia on page 30. The Rif’s understanding of Abaye is that if it began with negligence and ended with an unavoidable accident, even when there is no connection between the negligence and the accident, he is liable. Meaning, if he opened the door in front of the animal and in the end the animal died in its normal way, he would be liable. The Angel of Death—what difference does it make to me whether here or there? Still, he would be liable. Why would he be liable? Rabbi Akiva Eiger explains there that the prohibited thing he did was opening the door. If the animal had not died, he would also be obligated to pay; he could pay with the animal itself, it’s still here. But fundamentally, the obligation exists by virtue of the fact that he opened the door. You do not need the animal to be harmed or to die or to be lost in the end; he is liable by virtue of opening the door itself. True, if the animal still exists there is no practical consequence, because he can discharge what he owes by returning the animal. But if the animal does not exist, why should I care that the accident was unrelated to the negligence? The negligence itself obligates me. Now it is quite clear that when they impose on me a duty of guarding, that is so that the animal will not be lost. Clearly the purpose is the result; they don’t want me to perform acts of guarding for their own sake. The acts of guarding are not a value in themselves. Clearly the purpose is that I can return the object to the owner who deposited it with me. But still, what is imposed on me is what is in my hands, and what is in my hands is to perform an act of guarding. That is another example for our issue here. It’s an interesting question how you would define that. Is it defined as a condition that the animal be lost, or is it not even a condition? I claim that according to the Rif’s reading of Abaye, it is not even a condition. You are basically liable even if the animal was not lost. It’s just that if the animal was not lost, you return the animal itself, and that will be the payment—but you are liable. Meaning, the loss of the animal is not even a condition for your liability.

[Speaker C] But the depositor can demand his animal, even if I want to take the animal and pay him with other money, he doesn’t have to accept that. Certainly—“my property is with you.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that is under the claim of “my property is with you.” So he can ask for the animal. The moment he gets the animal, I no longer have to pay him anything else. But in principle the payment obligation is imposed on me. Once the payment obligation is imposed on me, that means it is not conditional on the animal’s being lost. True, if the animal was not lost, that obligation has no practical significance because I return the animal itself. But the obligation exists even if the animal still exists. And then that means that fundamentally the loss of the animal is not even a condition for my obligation. Even though it’s quite clear, as I said before, that the duty to guard is so that the animal will not be lost. It’s not some mere scriptural decree. Clearly the reason here is so that the animal will not be lost. Sorry, that’s not the reason for the verse, it’s the purpose of the contract. Okay? And nevertheless, the definition is: once you performed an act of negligence, you become liable. Even though we do not rule that way in Jewish law, I’m only bringing it as an example of this kind of thinking, where here it’s not even a condition. And according to the views that say that if it began with negligence and ended with an unavoidable accident, there needs to be a connection between the negligence and the accident—which is how we rule in practice—then what one can still say there is that the obligation imposed on me is still an obligation due to the negligence, only there is a condition that the animal be lost; without that I am not liable. And the dispute is not over whether what is imposed on me is the result or the act. Everyone may perhaps agree that what is imposed on me is the act of guarding, and the claim against me is if I did not do that. The dispute is only whether there is a condition for liability that the animal be lost, or whether I am liable even without that. Fine. The Minchat Chinukh writes that even Reish Lakish agrees that benefit to the throat is required. He only argues that benefit to the throat is not enough; you also need intestinal benefit. Filling the belly without throat benefit is not eating. Eating without filling the belly is eating without enjoyment, or something like that. So according to him it turns out that there is both a condition in the act and a condition in the result—or in the act and in the enjoyment, according to all the definitions we mentioned. And if that is indeed so, then Chelkat Yoav’s difficulty never gets off the ground.

[Speaker B] Chelkat Yoav asks—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What practical difference does the pace of “within the time it takes to eat a half-loaf” make according to Reish Lakish? At the end of the day, the whole amount is lying in his intestines. Why should I care that I did it slowly? But if Reish Lakish agrees with Rabbi Yohanan that you need the act to be defined through benefit to the throat, and he only adds that you also need intestinal benefit, then if the pace isn’t fast enough, just as according to Rabbi Yohanan he will be exempt because he didn’t do it within that time frame, and if he does it slowly that is not an act of… of eating, so too Reish Lakish would agree that if he does it slowly that is not an act of eating. Because he too agrees that benefit to the throat is required; he only argues that intestinal benefit is also required. And then Chelkat Yoav’s difficulty never begins. And according to this, we can go back and say that intestinal benefit really is enjoyment, and not a condition in defining the act. You don’t need placement in the intestines; you need it to be lying in the intestines—but not only that, you also need the act, the benefit to the throat. Okay. Yes, the Achiezer also proves, with several proofs, like the Minchat Chinukh. Meaning, this is not some esoteric view; there are quite a few proofs for this conception. Actually, I thought maybe it could be resolved another way as well. Just from our everyday experience, a person who eats quickly—in the end, we have some impulse to eat quickly, even though perhaps you’re even less satiated that way. We have some impulse to eat quickly. What is that impulse? It basically says that there is a greater enjoyment in eating quickly than in eating slowly. And if so, then the pace can also define the result of the enjoyment. Until now I assumed that the pace is irrelevant to the result. If what is required here is that in the result there be enjoyment, then why should I care about the pace? Right, as Chelkat Yoav asked. But pace defines the act of eating. And if I am right that a person enjoys eating quickly more—a person eats fast because he enjoys eating fast, there is some such enjoyment, I don’t know why but that’s how it is—then in that situation it could be that even if the definition is that you need a result of enjoyment, “within the time it takes to eat a half-loaf” defines the resulting enjoyment. And then that would be another answer to Chelkat Yoav’s difficulty.

[Speaker B] Okay. Fine, now I want to move on to the prohibition of drinking. Regarding the prohibition of drinking there are several Talmudic passages that say that drinking is included in eating. For example, the Talmud on page 76a.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m sharing the Talmud here. Basically you have the passages, I hope. The Talmud says: “Forbidden in eating.” “These five afflictions correspond to what? They correspond to the five afflictions in the Torah,” and so on. The Talmud asks: Are there five? But didn’t we learn six: eating, drinking, washing, wearing shoes, marital relations? So there are six afflictions here. So the Talmud says: drinking is included in eating. Five—because drinking and eating are one. As Reish Lakish said: From where do we know that drinking is included in eating? As it is said, “And you shall eat before the Lord your God the tithe of your grain, your wine, and your oil.” The Talmud asks: “Your wine” is wine, and yet it calls it “and you shall eat”? What does it mean, “you shall eat your wine”? Do you eat wine? So the Talmud says: you see from here that eating and drinking are the same thing—drinking is included in eating. The Talmud asks: How do you know? Perhaps he ate it by means of anigeron—that he swallows it with some food and eats the food with the taste of wine. As was said: anigeron is beet-water, aksigeron is the water of all boiled vegetables; never mind. Rather, Rav Acha bar Yaakov said from here: “And you shall spend the money on whatever your soul desires: cattle, sheep, wine, and strong drink,” and again you see: strong drink is something you drink, and yet the Merciful One calls it “and you shall eat.” And again—anigeron, and so on. In short, there is a whole discussion in the Talmud here, but in the end the conclusion is that drinking is included in eating. They ultimately learn it from the Nazirite laws; in the conclusion they learn it from Nazir. So the claim is that drinking is included in eating. That same Talmud also appears in tractate Shevuot on page 22 regarding someone who swore a prohibition against eating something—do we ask whether he is allowed to drink it? Now there is in fact a difference in the measure, as the Talmud says: eating is measured by an olive-bulk, and drinking by a quarter-log. A quarter-log. Let’s talk for the moment about ordinary prohibitions of eating, not Yom Kippur, okay? So drinking is by a quarter-log. What does that mean? In drinking, do all the discussions we had until now about eating—intestinal benefit, throat benefit, within the time it takes to eat a half-loaf—all those discussions also apply when I drink the prohibited substance, or is drinking a different act? Do you need an act, do you need a result, and so on. In simple factual terms, I think with liquids it’s a little hard to talk about intestinal benefit. Intestinal benefit in the sense of that satiety, that settled feeling that you have food in your intestines. Right? So it’s a little hard, a little difficult, to speak about liquids in that context. Indeed, there are later authorities who say that the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish really does not apply with regard to liquids. To divide it inside the mouth is also not really clear whether such a thing is possible. But there is still some room here to discuss the issue. As for the measure, what does become a discussion among the later authorities is the duration of drinking. The measure for drinking is different from eating—it is a quarter-log and not an olive-bulk. But the issue of the duration of time: the medieval authorities disagree about that. Maimonides in the laws of forbidden foods claims that the time is “the time it takes to drink a quarter-log,” which is something like a minute; that’s the usual estimate. And there are medieval authorities who disagree with him and say that it has to be “within the time it takes to eat a half-loaf.” The commentary Maran to Yoma and others. And in the Shulchan Arukh both opinions appear as well—that it is within the time it takes to eat a half-loaf. And what is “the time it takes to eat a half-loaf”? Eating a half-loaf belongs to eating. Seemingly, the dispute is over whether the rule that drinking is included in eating means that drinking is literally a kind of eating, and everything we discussed regarding eating is in fact relevant to drinking as well—or whether drinking is something entirely different, it’s just that there is a law that drinking too is considered like eating, but that does not mean that all the definitions we gave concerning eating are also relevant to drinking. That is the practical difference between whether the duration for drinking is the time it takes to drink a quarter-log or the time it takes to eat a half-loaf. If I say that the duration for eating is within the time it takes to eat a half-loaf—I don’t know, four minutes or whatever estimate is used—then drinking too has to be done within that same time, because that is what defines the act as an act of eating. But if I say that the act of drinking is a different act, only halakhically it is considered like an act of eating, then the relevant definitions are those relevant to drinking, not to eating. Now, this raises an interesting question: what happens with combining eating and drinking? Can I combine a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of drinking together? Say I ate half a measure of this and drank half a measure of that. In truth, the Talmud discusses this on page 81 in our tractate regarding Yom Kippur. But for ordinary prohibitions, I did a bit of searching—not very comprehensive, admittedly—and I didn’t find anything. The underlying assumption, generally, from the style of the Talmud, is that it speaks about combining eating with eating, or two different prohibitions, or drinking with drinking; it does not speak about combining eating and drinking. From the Talmud’s silence it seems—and that is also how I understand the halakhic authorities—that eating and drinking in all prohibitions do not combine. If you ate half an olive-bulk and drank half a quarter-log, they do not combine. I mean even where it’s the same prohibition. Not different prohibitions; combining different prohibitions is another question. I’m talking even where it’s the same prohibition. We’ll see examples in a moment. Regarding Yom Kippur, the Talmud discusses—we’ll see this shortly—whether eating and drinking combine. It links it to a tannaitic dispute, and in the conclusion it says they do not combine. We’ll see that later. Why indeed do they not combine, both in the other prohibitions and on Yom Kippur? What is the explanation here? We’ll see that in a moment, but before that I want to bring two approaches about this. Is it still shared with you? Wait. Here I’m not—wait, I’m not tracking what is shared and what isn’t. I’m going back to the file. Look at the Talmud in tractate Hullin. The Talmud in Hullin page 120 says as follows: “We learned there: if one congealed blood, turning it from less substantial into solid form, and ate it”—he is eating blood, congealed blood—“or if he melted forbidden fat, let it rest, turned it into liquid, and gulped it down, he is liable.” Fine—so even if he eats a liquid or drinks a food, he is liable. The Talmud asks: Granted, if he congealed blood and ate it—once he congealed it, he thereby gave it significance. Right, because the measure for drinking, a quarter-log, is larger than the measure of an olive-bulk. Meaning, the eating measure is more stringent. So if he congealed the blood, he gave it significance, right, he turned it into something more important because it became food. But if he melted the forbidden fat and gulped it down—the verse says “eating” with regard to it, but this is not eating. It says it is forbidden to eat forbidden fat, and this is not eating. Forbidden fat also has no prohibition of deriving benefit, only a prohibition of eating. So this is not eating; since it is not in the normal manner of eating, he should be exempt. Reish Lakish said: The verse says “person” to include one who drinks. Right, in the verse regarding forbidden fat it says “person,” so “person” comes to include one who drinks. On this Tosafot asks as follows: If so, why do I need a verse? Drinking is included in eating, as we expound in the third chapter of tractate Shevuot and also in Yoma—from the verse “and you shall eat before the Lord your God the tithe of your grain and your wine,” where wine is called eating, and so on. So what do we see? That drinking is included in eating. So why is a verse needed here to teach me that if he melted the forbidden fat he is liable? Obviously he is liable; drinking is included in eating. Tosafot says: No. There it is talking about things normally drunk, such as wine and oil; here it is talking about something normally eaten, which he melted and drank. Tosafot says: when we say drinking is included in eating, that is when you are drinking beverages. But there was room to say that even if drinking is included in eating, when you melt forbidden fat, which is a food, turn it into liquid, and now drink it, that is worse. Here we would not say that drinking is included in eating, and that is what the verse comes to teach us—that even for that one is liable. Meaning, Tosafot assumes that melted forbidden fat is less “eating” than drinking wine. Even though the forbidden fat is a food, once you melted it, it is less eating than drinking wine. You need an additional verse. Even though drinking is included in eating, you still need another verse to say he is liable for drinking melted forbidden fat. So that is indeed what Rabbi Akiva Eiger says here: “This is apparently difficult from the passage in Shevuot 23, where we ask: since he said ‘I will not eat,’ is there a prohibition on drinking? But that does not refer to foods that were melted in order to drink them, whereas from the angle of ‘I will not drink’ he is liable even for such liquids.” Meaning, in Shevuot we see that if he melted food, that is not included in an oath not to eat. Okay? And even though the Mishnah there is certainly talking about actual beverages, since the first clause teaches “I did not eat,” “I will not eat,” and he ate and drank, he is liable only once—implying that he drank in a way that violated the oath. And if so, it must be that it is not talking about melting and drinking. He proves it from the Talmud there: if he melted, say, something he prohibited to himself from eating—fat—and he melted the fat and drank it, he did not violate the oath. If so, then the second clause, “he ate and drank, he is liable twice,” must also be talking about a case where he drank in that kind of way. In any case, he is liable there because of “including,” “since…” and so on. Meaning, he leaves it unresolved. What is he saying? That drinking melted food, in his view, is not eating—that is drinking. Drinking melted food is drinking. So therefore the claim is: why do you need an additional verse? After all, drinking is included in eating. That is his difficulty on Tosafot. And in Tosafot apparently it says: true, it is drinking, but it is drinking of a food. It is not drinking a beverage; it is drinking a food. And drinking a food—were it not for the verse—I would not have thought that is included in eating. Meaning, drinking food is worse than drinking a beverage. Fine? Drinking a beverage is certainly included in eating. Drinking melted food is less eating than drinking a beverage, even though the melted food is food; but it is less eating than drinking a beverage. Look at Tosafot HaRosh. He seemingly repeats Tosafot’s question, but there is a reversal here. “And if you say, it is expounded in Shevuot, then why do I need the verse here? Let it be derived from there.” How does he ask? He asks the opposite. What did Tosafot ask? Tosafot asked: since drinking is included in eating, why do we need a verse here to teach about eating melted forbidden fat? Tosafot HaRosh asks the reverse: since here there is a verse to include eating melted forbidden fat, why do I need a verse to teach that drinking is included in eating? What is the difference between them? The difference between them, as you also see in the answer, is the question of what counts more as eating: drinking wine, or drinking melted forbidden fat. According to Tosafot, drinking melted forbidden fat is less eating; drinking wine is more eating. According to Tosafot HaRosh, drinking wine is less eating. That is what he answers here: “And from here too we do not learn that something whose normal way is to be drunk is called eating.” Meaning, melted food is more eating than ordinary drinking. What is their dispute? Their dispute is over what more defines the act of eating: the thing eaten—after all, melted food is more of a food—or not, rather the manner in which I eat. And to drink melted food cannot be defined as an act of eating. Meaning, there is some dispute here over what exactly an act of eating is. Is the act of eating defined by the object on which the act is performed? And if that object is more of a food, then this is more eating? Or is the act defined by the way in which we perform the act? In that case, drinking melted food is less eating than drinking wine. Drinking wine—drinking is included in eating. But drinking melted food is neither drinking nor eating; it’s this strange sort of act, and so it is less well-defined as eating.

[Speaker D] So basically, according to Rabbi Abraham—what? There too, melted food would still incur liability, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, because there is a verse, and you cannot derive it from drinking wine.

[Speaker D] So it’s basically just a question of what the initial assumption was and what the actual law is?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. The question is which one is more “eating” than the other. In fact, the conclusion is the same conclusion—it’s all verses—but the question is which is the basic verse and which verse comes to explain. And the difference is about where you place the emphasis in defining the act of eating: on the thing that you eat, or on the way in which you do it. Now notice: to drink melted forbidden fat is a normal act of drinking. Right? It’s clear that in the end it starts from the thing itself, but when you drink melted forbidden fat, the act is not defined as an act of eating. Even though the difference between that and drinking wine is only the question of what you’re drinking. But still, what you’re drinking defines the act. Fine? In contrast, according to Tosafot HaRosh, what you are drinking here is forbidden fat, so that is certainly more “eating” than drinking wine, because the fat is food. Okay? Then it could be that the dispute really is over what defines the act of eating. Is what defines it the form of performing the act, or the thing that I eat? It could also be that the dispute is over whether drinking being included in eating is legal or factual. Is drinking simply another kind of eating in the very definition of the act itself, or legally the act of drinking is considered an act of eating? Then of course there would be a difference regarding drinking melted food. If it is legal, then I don’t care what I eat or what I drink; the question is only to what the law was stated to apply. Okay? In any event, let me add one more sentence. Very often when a person eats something prohibited that is unfit for eating, the claim is not only that he gets no enjoyment from the thing, but that this is not called an act of eating. Therefore “not in the normal manner of eating” and “not in the normal manner of enjoyment” are very often interchangeable expressions in the Talmud, even though originally they are brought with different meanings. But many times you see both in the medieval authorities and in the Talmud that when the expression “not in the normal manner of enjoyment” or “not in the normal manner…” is brought, the intention is basically “not in the normal manner of eating.” When you eat something not in the normal manner of enjoyment, that is not considered an act of eating. Now, to drink melted forbidden fat is not in the normal manner of enjoyment, or not in the normal manner of eating. Meaning, the problem is not in what you drank, but that the act is not the normal act of eating. Okay? There is a dispute—and in Zikhron Shmuel, yes, Rabbi Shmuel Rozovsky brings this in section 5—he brings in the name of Rabbenu Manoach, who holds that for melted leaven, what is the measure required for liability? A quarter-log, not an olive-bulk. If you melted the leaven and turned it into liquid, then it is by a quarter-log. But from Maimonides it appears that it is by an olive-bulk. Again, the question is whether melted leaven is considered food, in which case Maimonides says its measure is an olive-bulk, or whether it is considered a beverage, in which case its measure is a quarter-log. When you drink it, you drink—it, you do not eat it—and drinking is included in eating. Fine? That seems to be the same dispute. Now there is a passage in the Talmud in Yoma—I mentioned it earlier—the Talmud in Yoma page 81 says as follows: “Eating and drinking do not combine.” Rav Hisda said—the meaning is: if he ate part of a measure and drank part of a measure. Rav Hisda said: this Mishnah reflects a tannaitic dispute. And it follows Rabbi Yehoshua, and our Mishnah is according to Rabbi Yehoshua. For we learned: Rabbi Yehoshua stated a general rule: anything whose impurity and measure are the same combines. If its impurity is the same but its measure is not, or its measure is the same but its impurity is not, or neither its impurity nor its measure is the same—they do not combine. Fine? Rabbi Yehoshua basically says that for things to combine, they have to have the same measure and the same type of impurity. The exact definitions of impurity are not important for us now; they have to be the same. So the Talmud assumes that there is a tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Yehoshua. Never mind the medieval authorities on that point, but it is a tannaitic dispute, and our Mishnah follows Rabbi Yehoshua, according to whom in our case eating and drinking do not combine. Why, according to this? Because their measures are different, right? On Yom Kippur food is measured by a large date, and drinking by a quarter-log. What about the other Torah prohibitions? As I already said, in simple terms it seems that eating and drinking also do not combine in the other prohibitions. Seemingly at this stage of the Talmud, that too is because of the difference in measure. In Torah prohibitions, eating is by an olive-bulk and drinking by a quarter-log. On Yom Kippur it is a large date and a quarter-log. Fine? Their measures are different. This raises the question a bit: then why is a special discussion raised regarding Yom Kippur at all? Let them ask it in general. What difference is there? Never mind—in both places the measures are unequal. It seems that there is some particular initial assumption here that perhaps on Yom Kippur there is something different than in the other Torah prohibitions. We’ll soon see. Rav Nachman said—and I continue reading in the Talmud—even say it is according to the Rabbis. Up to there the Rabbis only said that with regard to impurity, because there it is one single category of impurity. But here the issue is settling the mind, and this does not settle his mind. Rav Nachman says no—even the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehoshua and say that things with different measures can still combine—even they would say that on Yom Kippur eating and drinking do not combine. Why? Because what is required is settling the mind, and this does not settle his mind. The medieval authorities here explain what “does not settle his mind” means: the calming or settling that drinking brings and the calming or settling that food brings are not of the same kind. I said earlier that intestinal benefit, in simple terms, does not exist in drinking. Fine, so the mental or bodily settling brought by eating and the settling brought by drinking are not of the same type, and therefore they cannot combine. Therefore here, according to all opinions, eating and drinking do not combine, and our Mishnah, which says that eating and drinking do not combine, is according to everyone. The dispute is only in the Torah impurity case. And so too Reish Lakish said: it reflects a tannaitic dispute, and it follows Rabbi Yehoshua, as we learned, and so on. And Rabbi Yohanan said: even say it is according to the Rabbis. Right—Reish Lakish also says, like Rav Hisda, that our Mishnah reflects the tannaitic dispute concerning impurity, and again Rabbi Yohanan joins Rav Nachman—not for a different reason, but the same reason: here the issue is settling the mind, and this does not settle his mind. Same thing. Fine? Now there is some initial assumption here that there would be reason to say that eating and drinking combine, just as in impurity cases they combine, just as in other prohibitions—sorry, in impurity they combine. And what about the other prohibitions? As I said, in simple terms eating and drinking do not combine in the other prohibitions. It doesn’t seem from the Talmud here… it seems this is a discussion specific to Yom Kippur, whether it is similar to impurity. The other prohibitions are not raised here. Now the question is why not? If the point is whether things with different measures can combine, and there is a tanna who says that things with different measures can combine, and therefore there was an initial assumption here that on Yom Kippur too they would combine—an initial assumption; that is what Rav Hisda and Reish Lakish hold, that on Yom Kippur too they would combine—then in the other prohibitions too they should combine. But maybe not. Why not? Because in the other prohibitions they do not combine—and I repeat, that is the plain sense of the Talmudic passages; it does not appear that there is any dispute about this. They do not combine because they really are two different things. Eating and drinking are two different things. Especially in light of what I said above, that drinking is not really eating; rather, legally it has the same status as eating. Combining eating and drinking would have to be a combination on the factual plane, not on the legal plane, and therefore it doesn’t happen. So why was there an initial assumption on Yom Kippur that it would be similar to impurity? And whoever says that in impurity one can combine, on Yom Kippur too one can combine? Because precisely on Yom Kippur the issue is settling the mind. On Yom Kippur it is not a prohibition on the act; it is fundamentally a prohibition on the result—that you not remain in a state of fasting. If you are no longer in fasting, then there was an initial assumption that you would combine eating with drinking. An initial assumption—there is an amoraic opinion like that. It is interesting that the opposing amoraim say, because of that very reason, that on Yom Kippur it is not so. Why? Because they say that on Yom Kippur, true, what is required is settling the mind, but the settling of eating and the settling of drinking are not the same settling. Meaning, the same initial assumption that led us to think that on Yom Kippur they would combine in the end leads us to the conclusion that specifically on Yom Kippur they do not combine. Because on the one hand you say—and this brings me back to the start of the lecture—on the one hand you say Yom Kippur is a different kind of prohibition from the other food prohibitions. On Yom Kippur what you need is simply to remain in fasting. The moment you break the fast, it is no longer Yom Kippur. So there was an initial assumption: fine, then if I broke it with half an olive-bulk of this and half an olive-bulk—half a quarter-log—of the drink, then I broke the fast. Why should I care that these are two different things? After all, the definition is not the act of eating; the definition is not being in a state of fasting. Therefore there is an opinion among the amoraim that indeed on Yom Kippur this would combine, even though in the other Torah prohibitions it does not combine. In conclusion—not in conclusion, rather according to the opposing amoraim, Rav Nachman and Rabbi Yohanan, and this is how we rule in practice, by the way—on Yom Kippur it does not combine, even according to the tanna who says that in impurity it does combine. Why? Because the settling of eating and the settling of drinking are not the same settling. There are two kinds of settling here, and therefore they do not combine. Look—

[Speaker B] In the book Tosefet Yom HaKippurim, here on this passage: “One can inquire according to the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehoshua and said that they do combine—”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whether we judge it by the lighter of the two or by the more stringent of the two. And likewise regarding eating and drinking on Yom Kippur if they combine. Since there is a side here that they do combine, according to Rav Hisda and Reish Lakish—that the tanna who says they combine in impurity says they also combine on Yom Kippur, unlike the tanna of our Mishnah—what does “combine” mean? How does the combination work? Do we go by the measure of a large date or by the measure of a cheekful? What is the determining measure? Do they both combine to the standard of a large date—half a large date of drinking and half a large date of eating—or to a cheekful—half a cheekful of drinking and half a cheekful of eating? What is the determining measure? And since in the conclusion we do not rule this way, he does not elaborate on it. Because in the conclusion this is not the law, since we rule like Rabbi Yohanan and Rav Nachman, therefore they did not elaborate on it. But still, there is room to discuss it according to the tanna and the amoraim who say yes, that they do combine: to what do they combine? To a large date or to a cheekful?

[Speaker E] Rabbi, here what is the lighter one and what is the more stringent one? What is the lighter and what is the more stringent? I mean, according to what is being said here—whether we judge by the lighter or the more stringent of the two—what is the lighter and what is the more stringent?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t remember. It seems to me that the amount of a dried date is smaller than a cheekful. Smaller? A dried date is a date. Compare that to a cup, yes, to a quarter-log or a cheekful—I think it was more. But whether we go leniently or stringently, it doesn’t matter right now which is the lenient side and which is the stringent side. Now, regarding impurity, Maimonides rules in chapter 4 of Forbidden Foods, law 11, like Rabbi Yehoshua. Meaning, they do not combine. Fine, so therefore with regard to impurity too there’s nothing to discuss here, not only with regard to Yom Kippur. So basically he is in doubt whether the combination is toward a quarter-log or toward an olive-bulk. Meaning: are we talking here about half a quarter-log of drinking and half a quarter-log of eating, or half an olive-bulk of drinking and half an olive-bulk of eating? And on Yom Kippur, half a dried date and half a dried date, or half a quarter-log and half a quarter-log? What’s the idea? Why should such things combine at all? And combine into one common measure? Apparently because we understand that eating and drinking are really the same thing. And then the relevant measure is also the same measure. Look, for example, at the wording of the Rosh here on the passage. “And Rabbi Yohanan—and Rav Nahman also agrees with him—that the Mishnah is according to everyone and there is no dispute. Rather, with regard to impurity, there it is one kind of impurity. But here, on Yom Kippur, if he ate an amount equal to a dried date and drank a quarter-log, his mind is settled. But half a dried date of foods and half a quarter-log of liquids, his mind is not settled.” The Rosh understood it unlike either of the two sides presented by the author of Tosafot Yom HaKippurim. According to him, the combination is half a quarter-log of liquid plus half a dried date of food. That is what the Gemara discusses—whether it combines or does not combine. That matches neither side in Tosafot Yom HaKippurim. Tosafot Yom HaKippurim discusses whether this means two halves of a dried date or two halves of a quarter-log. He says no: half a dried date of food, half a quarter-log of drink. Why? Because he holds that eating and drinking are not the same thing. You can’t combine them into one measure. What relevance does the measure for eating have for drinking? After all, eating and drinking are not the same thing. So the question is whether the mental settling produced by half a measure of drinking combines with the mental settling produced by half a measure of eating—each according to its own measure. He does not really see drinking as eating. Both settle the mind in some way, but each according to its own measure. And then it comes out that, according to Tosafot Yom HaKippurim, the discussion here is really a formal discussion: do we combine prohibitions whose measures are different? And the whole discussion is formal. And even if we do combine them, does that mean we measure the drinking by the measure of food, or the food by the measure of drinking? According to the Ran, the discussion is substantive: what really settles the mind? And therefore the fact that their measures differ is irrelevant. In the end, half an olive-bulk of this and half a quarter-log of that, and half a dried date of this—I’m not mixing them, it’s not the same thing. The question is still whether the mental settling effects combine. It’s an interesting point. I’ll comment on it for a few minutes, since I don’t have much time left, because I won’t have time to go on. The next stage is really to enter Yom Kippur itself and all the implications of what we said for Yom Kippur. So let me tell you for a few minutes something interesting. There is a discussion among psychologists in a field called psychophysics. Psychophysics is basically the question of how we measure mental effects. For example, when I ask someone—say I turn on one lamp, and now I turn on another lamp—and I ask him: by what factor is the new light greater than the previous light you saw? If I measure it with instruments in terms of field strength or energy intensity—it doesn’t matter, field strength squared, energy is the field squared—but never mind, I add the intensities, so it’s twice as much light because I turned on two lamps. The question is: when he sees the light in his mind, does he see a light that is twice as great or not? That’s a question you can’t answer, and it’s very doubtful to what extent it is even well-defined. This is a philosophical point. In philosophy, Bertrand Russell once asked in his book The Problems of Philosophy: what is light? Or what is the color yellow? We are used to saying that yellow is an electromagnetic wave of a certain wavelength. We know that a certain wavelength is the color yellow. That is of course a foolish answer. When an electromagnetic wave of a certain wavelength hits my retina, in my consciousness there arises the sensation of the color yellow. The color yellow exists only in my consciousness; in the world there is no yellow. Yellow is a phenomenon of consciousness, not a physical phenomenon. The physical phenomenon is the electromagnetic wave. The famous question: if a tree falls in the forest and nobody is there, does it make a sound? The answer is of course no. Obviously not. Why? Because sound is a phenomenon of consciousness. What it does is move air there, an acoustic wave is created, a pressure wave in the air. But if I do not place an eardrum there for that acoustic wave to hit, the phenomenon we call sound will not be produced. Because sound is a phenomenon of consciousness. In the world itself there are no sounds; sounds exist only in our heads. People say that if someone hears voices you should hospitalize him, but we’re all like that. Sounds exist only in the head; they don’t exist. What exists in the world is an acoustic wave. Likewise, an electromagnetic wave exists in the world. Color, or light, is a phenomenon of consciousness. Now the interesting question is: when I increase the electromagnetic wave by a factor of two, by what factor does the light I see in my consciousness increase? It is not at all clear, first, that one can answer this, and second, that it is even defined, that it is a well-defined question at all. What does “by what factor” even mean? Is this something that can be measured at all? It is a completely subjective question. Now, among psychophysicists there is a dispute—there used to be a long-standing dispute. There is a book by Rabbi Shem Tov Gafen, Dimensions, Prophecy, and Adventurous Earthliness—this is from the early twentieth century—and there he presents a dispute among researchers about this. Some claim the scale is logarithmic and some claim the scale is a power scale. There is also a debate about what the power is: 1.2, 1.7—there are all kinds of disputes. Why? Because there is really no way to measure it. How are you going to measure by what factor a person sees more light between two situations? All you can do is ask him: give me some estimate. By what factor is the new light greater than the previous light you saw? Try to think to yourselves whether it is even possible to answer such a question. There really is no way to answer such a question; it is completely subjective. So in fact what we measure is how people relate to it; we are not measuring any actual phenomenon. And therefore they average what people answer.

[Speaker F] If so, then maybe now you could train a person to notice more precisely when there is twice as much light in terms of magnitude.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter. When he says he sees twice as much light, that only means he is sensitive in the same way to twice the electromagnetic field. So the claim is basically that there is no defined linkage between the stimulus and the conscious response—the stimulus being the phenomenon in the world, and the conscious response. Okay? It’s a fascinating question. By the way, there’s a little book in the Open University series by Daniel Algom from Bar-Ilan, a psychologist at Bar-Ilan, who wrote about this issue. It’s worth reading—it’s really fascinating, how they do experiments, how they nevertheless try to see whether it’s a power law or a logarithmic law or something like that. It’s a very interesting question. In any case, the more interesting question in my eyes is whether it is defined at all, not how you answer it. That you can’t answer it is obvious. Whether it is defined—that’s the interesting question. I’m not entirely sure the question is even defined. Why do I say that? Because think about Tosafot Yom HaKippurim and the Gemara we saw earlier. What did we see there? The question was whether the mental settling that results from eating and the mental settling that results from drinking combine or do not combine. Right? That was basically the question. But the question of settling the mind is a mental question. Right? What do I feel after I ate or drank? How can you combine two such phenomena at all? How can you combine the level of mental settling from half an olive-bulk? In fact I’ll say more than that: an olive-bulk—half an olive-bulk of food and half an olive-bulk of food, do they produce twice the pleasure? Leave aside drinking and eating; let’s talk about food. Half an olive-bulk of food and another half an olive-bulk of food. I ate them. Is there twice the pleasure here compared to eating half an olive-bulk? It depends on the psychophysical problem. Is it linear? Is it a power law? Is it a logarithmic law? Pretty clearly, almost everyone agrees that it is not twice as much. It’s not linear, not one-to-one. Maybe it’s a power law of 1-point-something, maybe it’s logarithmic, but it’s not linear. So in fact the combination of measures is itself problematic even to define. It seems that the combination here is a combination on the level of the stimuli, not on the level of the mental responses. We combine the measures themselves. Therefore the author of the…

[Speaker G] But why is that a problem? After all, combining two types of drink is certainly not a problem, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m talking now—leave that—I’m talking now about the very same drink. You drink half an olive-bulk of libation wine and another half—half a quarter-log of libation wine and another half quarter-log of libation wine. Is your pleasure from that twice the pleasure of half an olive-bulk of libation wine?

[Speaker G] Why does that matter? I don’t need to compare it to whether it’s twice half an olive-bulk; I need to compare it to an olive-bulk.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It will matter when we talk about combining different pleasures. You’re right. Because in that definition they are telling me that the pleasure of an olive-bulk is the forbidden pleasure. And maybe half an olive-bulk is not half the pleasure. And therefore, by the way, half a measure is not necessarily half; it could also be a third or a fifth or whatever. Meaning, it doesn’t matter. In the end there is really no reason to assume that the pleasure from half an olive-bulk is half the pleasure of a full olive-bulk. But it will matter in a case where I combine. If I combine half the pleasure of half a quarter-log of drinking with the pleasure of half an olive-bulk of food, then it matters very much. Because if each one of them really gives me half the pleasure, then I can… And if each of them gives me, say, only a quarter of the pleasure of drinking, and that gives me a quarter of the pleasure of eating, when I put them together—even if I am willing to combine eating with drinking—what I got is only half.

[Speaker G] Why don’t you ask that question regarding two kinds of drinks?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I ask the same thing there too. I ask the same thing. Ah—but if I assume it is pleasure of a different type, then I’ll ask the same question.

[Speaker G] No, exactly. My answer is that we don’t have to assume it is pleasure of a different type, and then we’ve solved it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course it’s a different type of pleasure—what do you mean?

[Speaker G] If it’s always a different type of pleasure, then the question also exists for two kinds of drinks.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Eating and drinking are different types—that’s what the Gemara says: the type of mental settling is different, therefore you can’t combine them. So that’s exactly what the Gemara says. But drinking this and drinking that—the Gemara doesn’t see that as two different things. Yes, okay. This applies only to eating and drinking. The practical difference will be in combining eating and drinking when these are different types of settling the mind. Because then, if it were linear, there would be room to say that you can combine them even though they are different. But if it’s not linear, then you can’t. Even though within each one separately they do combine, even if it’s not linear, because there is no need to combine. Within each one separately, that is the measure the Torah forbade—an olive-bulk. I don’t care whether that is twice half an olive-bulk or not. That is the amount of pleasure the Torah forbade. But now that I want to combine and construct what the Torah forbade, who says I succeeded in constructing it?

[Speaker G] Fine, okay. One more small comment. I think this doesn’t depend on whether the psychological effect is actually produced or not. Meaning, if a person ate the measure that settles the mind, even if his mind wasn’t actually settled for some reason, he is liable. In the end, it’s only an indication for determining the measure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not entirely sure you’re right.

[Speaker G] Because otherwise we would have to say that the measure changes depending on the person. And it doesn’t seem that way—the measure of a dried date is…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is such a possibility. Very often that’s how it works: the average person. And what happens with another person whom you—wait—what happens with another person about whom you don’t know? The simple assumption is that he is like the average person. If you have some positive evidence that he is different—here I’m not sure it would be different; it could be different. So then would he really be liable only if he ate two olive-bulks? The Gemara discusses delicate people, for example, where there is a difficulty there, because we see other things there regarding washing and so on. They are willing to make person-dependent definitions. It’s not always so simple… But regarding eating I think…

[Speaker G] I’m not sure that with eating too we go by the individual person.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean “we go by”? It depends on what—do you have evidence for that? Of course you think so—have you seen decisors who say this or that? I’m not sure it’s necessary. Fine, I’m not at all sure that this is…

[Speaker G] And assuming I’m right—fine, not certain, but assuming I’m right—then the question is a bit different, because we don’t care whether the effect was actually produced; we’re asking about the combination of measures, so the question is more formal.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the question is still whether the effect in the average person is produced, and that will be the indication of what the formal measure is.

[Speaker G] No, you could say not so. Since I don’t care about the effect at all, since I have here two times half an effect, I can simply add them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not two times half an effect—

[Speaker G] It’s—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] two times half a stimulus, not two times half an effect. That’s exactly the difference. The stimulus is half, not the effect.

[Speaker G] Yes, right, right, okay. Two times something that, if we multiplied it, would make a whole—so maybe you can make the combination? Because I don’t care that the effect actually be produced.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a novelty; for that you need to bring proofs. The simple understanding is not like that. The simple understanding is that you need a level of pleasure like what the Torah forbids. Okay, in any

[Speaker B] case,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m bringing this only as an anecdote, of course. I have no way to decide it, so it’s just an interesting remark, because there really is an interesting psychophysical question here. One could talk about benefiting in an unusual way and eating in an unusual way—all these things—the question of what happens if someone does in fact enjoy it. Yes, all kinds of things of this sort. Someone who enjoys it, someone whose mind is settled with less than the measure. Do we say here, “his opinion is nullified by that of all people”? I don’t know. Usually they say…

[Speaker G] There is the passage about someone seized by ravenous hunger.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Usually they say—I’m saying—usually they say that his opinion is nullified by that of all people. But if I have positive evidence that he is different, there are places in Jewish law where we see otherwise.

[Speaker G] Why? In the passage about someone seized by ravenous hunger on Yom Kippur, they first give him food until his mind is settled. Okay, so…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that’s because they want to remove him from a life-threatening situation; it has nothing to do with…

[Speaker G] No, true, but the question is whether one can’t prove from that passage that if you give him just a little, less than the measure, that isn’t considered that he violated the prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because it says there that they feed him until his mind is settled.

[Speaker G] Yes, even though that will settle his mind. But it could be that the settling of mind in ravenous hunger is not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the same settling of mind as that of the fast. And second, it could be that in fact it won’t happen. His mind simply won’t settle as a matter of fact. Because for a person’s mind to settle, he needs that measure—maybe, I don’t know.

[Speaker G] It doesn’t say a measure there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no way to decide; I don’t think you’ll manage to prove it from there. Okay, we’ll stop here. In the next lesson we’ll simply finish with the implications regarding Yom Kippur. Okay, we’ll stop here. In the next lesson we’ll simply finish with the implications regarding Yom Kippur of all these things, and if I have time to touch a bit more on half a measure, I’ll do that too. Okay, that’s it.