Kiddushin, Chapter 3, Lesson 7

Table of Contents

• The framework of the topics and an introduction to the didactic order
• The dispute between Rav and Shmuel over “betrothed to the second,” and Rav Chisda’s question
• The status of the rejection and the possibility that there was an earlier different understanding in the course of the Talmudic discussion
• Expiration “on its own,” inherent sanctity, and “his acquisition has ended” as the basis of Rav Chisda’s question
• The external delimitation of a legal effect, and the possibility of betrothal that does not “dissolve” but rather “does not take effect beyond”
• Half a woman, the spread of consecration, and another person’s will as an impediment
• The dispute of the Rosh and Nachmanides, the Jerusalem Talmud, and the practical difference in the case of the second man’s death
• The Shulchan Arukh, the nature of betrothal, and the connection between the two laws
• Conclusion and continuation: speech comes and cancels speech, and the nature of betrothal

Summary

General overview

The lecture continues the discussion of the Mishnah in Kiddushin 59b about “Behold, you are betrothed to me after thirty days” as opposed to “from now and after thirty days,” and explains that despite the order of the Talmudic discussion, the teacher chooses to dwell on a seam that still requires clarification in the case of betrothal after thirty days, and that also leads into the question of speech comes and cancels speech. In that context, he presents the dispute between Rav and Shmuel, which at first appears to concern “betrothed to the second,” Rav Chisda’s question about the possibility that the second man’s betrothal could expire, and Rav Yosef’s answer that the dispute belongs to the latter clause and not the first case. He then proposes two ways to understand why Rav Chisda’s question forces the shift to the latter clause, and ties the discussion to a dispute among the medieval authorities (the Rosh versus Nachmanides), to the wording of the Shulchan Arukh, and to a precise understanding of the nature of betrothal, while emphasizing a metaphysical conception of legal effects as “entities” subject to causality.

The framework of the topics and an introduction to the didactic order

The teacher states that the Mishnah presents two relevant cases: in betrothal after thirty days, if another man comes and betroths her during those thirty days, she is “betrothed to the second”; and in “from now and after thirty days,” if another man comes and betroths her during those thirty days, she is “betrothed and not betrothed.” The teacher explains that didactically he wanted to move to “from now and after thirty days,” because it is constantly compared to betrothal after thirty days, and to postpone the discussion of speech comes and cancels speech, even though in the Talmud it appears earlier. He says that when he began the topic of “from now and after thirty days,” it became clear that there is a “seam” requiring further discussion in betrothal after thirty days itself, and that it also partially leads into the question of speech comes and cancels speech; therefore he is devoting at least this lecture to that seam before moving on.

The dispute between Rav and Shmuel over “betrothed to the second,” and Rav Chisda’s question

On the phrase “betrothed to the second,” the Talmud brings Rav’s statement that the view of the Mishnah is that she is “betrothed to the second forever,” and Shmuel’s statement that she is “betrothed to the second until thirty days; after thirty days the second man’s betrothal expires and the first man’s betrothal is completed.” Rav Chisda immediately asks, “By what does the second man’s betrothal expire?” and maintains that it is unacceptable that the second man’s betrothal should simply lapse on its own at the end of the period. Rav Yosef answers that Rav Chisda asked this because he had learned the dispute as applying to the first clause, whereas Rav Yehuda had learned it as applying to the latter clause, and therefore he had no difficulty. The conclusion is that one should not attribute to Shmuel a position according to which, in the case of betrothal after thirty days, the second man’s betrothal expires automatically at the end of the thirty days and things revert to the first man.

The status of the rejection and the possibility that there was an earlier different understanding in the course of the Talmudic discussion

The teacher points out that the quotation “betrothed to the second” at the beginning of the discussion looks like the language of the first case in the Mishnah, so there is room to understand that the dispute between Rav and Shmuel was originally stated about betrothal after thirty days, and that Rav Chisda understood it that way as well. He suggests another possibility, according to which “betrothed to the second” is not a quotation from the original wording of the dispute, but rather a framing by the anonymous voice of the Talmud that initially understood the matter as referring to the first case, and only after Rav Chisda’s question corrected it and established it on the latter clause. He ties this to the question whether there is reason to look for internal logic in a position that was rejected, or whether it should be seen as a didactic mistake that was entirely erased.

Expiration “on its own,” inherent sanctity, and “his acquisition has ended” as the basis of Rav Chisda’s question

The teacher explains one reading of Rav Chisda’s question on the basis of the principle that “inherent sanctity does not expire on its own,” from the discussion in Nedarim 29 (Abaye and Bar Padda, and according to Jewish law, Bar Padda), and the Ran’s extension of that principle that an acquisition of the body also does not expire without an act. He presents the assumption that legal effects are conceived as a kind of reality, and therefore any change in them requires a cause at the time of the change, and he applies this to betrothal: if the woman is betrothed to the second man, expiration without a bill of divorce or death is hard to understand. He then proposes a second reading in which the main problem is not how the second man’s betrothal can expire, but how the first man’s betrothal can take effect after the woman became a married woman during the interval, because that raises the problem of his acquisition has ended, and the first man’s legal effect or lien is nullified when she is no longer “available for betrothal.”

The external delimitation of a legal effect, and the possibility of betrothal that does not “dissolve” but rather “does not take effect beyond”

The teacher argues that there is no necessity to understand the expiration of the second man’s betrothal as something that “dissolves” without cause, because it may be that the second man’s betrothal from the outset cannot spread across the entire timeline when there is an external factor that delimits it. He brings analogies for this: the sanctity of the wood of a sukkah in Beitzah 30 and Rashba’s question how that sanctity expires after eight days, and he proposes a distinction according to which it is not that the sanctity expires, but that the “object” ceases to be the same halakhic object (“after eight days this is no longer a sukkah, it’s a pergola”). He adds an example from the contradiction regarding a Hebrew slave who has his ear pierced, between “and he shall serve him forever” and the fact that he goes free in the Jubilee year, and cites Hanechka that the Jubilee is “the King’s annulment”: the acquisition is a bodily acquisition “forever,” and only an external power annuls it, not because the acquisition was originally time-limited. From this he formulates a principle that when there is “another hand” that stops the spread, there is no obstacle to a legal effect being limited in time without this counting as expiration on its own, and he illustrates this also through an analogy to the second law of thermodynamics and the need for an external force to preserve a “bounded” state against expansion.

Half a woman, the spread of consecration, and another person’s will as an impediment

The teacher cites the discussion in Kiddushin 7a: “Be betrothed to me with half of me” works, but “half of you is betrothed to me” does not work, because “the Merciful One said ‘a woman,’ and not half a woman,” and he adds the Talmud’s reason that the difference between a man and a woman is that “a woman is not fit for two men.” He emphasizes the Talmud’s comparison there between betrothal and consecration: when one consecrates the leg of an animal, there is a possibility that the sanctity spreads to the whole animal, but in betrothal there is “another person’s will” that prevents such spread, and the Talmud compares this to an animal jointly owned by two partners, where one consecrates half of it and the sanctity does not spread because there is an impediment. He uses this to argue that division along the axis of time can be considered parallel to division within the object, and that when there is “partnership” or another hand operating along the timeline, there is no necessity that the betrothal spread beyond the interval in which the woman is unmarried.

The dispute of the Rosh and Nachmanides, the Jerusalem Talmud, and the practical difference in the case of the second man’s death

The teacher connects the two approaches of understanding to the dispute between the Rosh and Nachmanides in the case where the first man betrothed her for after thirty days and the second man betrothed her within those thirty days, and asks what the law is if the second man dies within the thirty days. He presents the Rosh’s view that the first man’s betrothal does not take effect even if the second man dies, whereas Nachmanides in the name of the Jerusalem Talmud holds that it does, and explains this through the same two approaches that already appeared in previous lectures for solving the problem of his acquisition has ended: either the first man’s legal effect “hovers” and waits to land if the woman is unmarried at the target time, or the giving of the money creates a lien and the money becomes betrothal money at the end of the period. The teacher states that according to the Rosh, the moment the second man’s betrothal took effect, the first man’s legal effect or lien “dissolved,” so there is nothing left to take effect after thirty days; whereas according to Nachmanides there is something there that can take effect, except that it can be blocked as long as she is a married woman. The practical difference is a situation where the second man dies or divorces her within the thirty days.

The Shulchan Arukh, the nature of betrothal, and the connection between the two laws

The teacher reads the wording of the Shulchan Arukh: “She is betrothed to the second forever… and after the thirty days, when the first man’s betrothal would come, it finds her a married woman… and the first is thus like one who betrothed a married woman,” and identifies in this very clearly the view of Nachmanides, that the first man’s betrothal exists but is blocked because she is a married woman. He adds the continuation in parentheses, about the second man’s death or divorce within the thirty days, that “the first man’s betrothal reverted,” and the phrase “and some disagree” as representing the view of the Rosh. He cites Tiv Kiddushin (Even HaEzer, section 40, subparagraph 6), which notes that this wording is the wording of Maimonides, and from it inferred that Maimonides agrees with the Jerusalem Talmud brought by Nachmanides; and he emphasizes that Tiv Kiddushin sees a fundamental connection between the two laws in the Shulchan Arukh.

Conclusion and continuation: speech comes and cancels speech, and the nature of betrothal

The teacher concludes that the entire discussion sharpens the conception that legal effects are something like entities in reality, with a language of “hovering,” “landing,” and causality that produces or halts change. He notes that at the next stage he wants to continue with Tiv Kiddushin, but that in order to understand his question about the identification between the laws, it is necessary to enter to some extent into the discussion he skipped—the dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding speech comes and cancels speech. He invites everyone to continue on Thursday and remarks that the participant is almost the only one in the lecture.

Okay, we were talking about kiddushin after thirty days, and I said that the passage that comes after that is also about kiddushin, so for now it’ll connect up later, and I’ll bring it up when we need it. We spoke about kiddushin after thirty days, and the next passage after that is “speech comes and cancels speech,” okay, Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish. After that there’s Kiddushin 59b, kiddushin “from now and after thirty days,” which is really the second—well, actually the third—case in the Mishnah. Kiddushin after thirty days is the second case; kiddushin from now and after thirty days is the third case. I said that pedagogically it seems better to move to the discussion of kiddushin “from now and after thirty days,” because the whole idea is constantly to compare it to kiddushin after thirty days, and we’ll postpone the issue of “speech comes and cancels speech” until later, even though in the Talmud it appears קודם. But now, when I started the passage of “from now and after thirty days,” I saw that there’s some kind of seam here that requires us, first, still to talk a bit more about kiddushin after thirty days in itself, and that will also bring us a little into “speech comes and cancels speech.” So after all I’m going to devote at least this class—we’ll see if we get through it—to this seam before we move on to kiddushin “from now and after thirty days.”

So, the Talmud—the Mishnah says, “And so too one who says to a woman”—right, I’m just reminding us of the Mishnah—“Behold, you are betrothed to me after thirty days,” and another came and betrothed her within those thirty days, “she is betrothed to the second. If she is an Israelite woman to a kohen, she may eat terumah. If he says, ‘From now and after thirty days’”—that’s the third case; the first case it doesn’t bring here at all—“and another came and betrothed her within the thirty days, she is betrothed and not betrothed. If she is an Israelite woman to a kohen or a daughter of a kohen to an Israelite, she may not eat terumah.” Those are the two cases.

Now our game is the question: what are we talking about? The first case or the second case? So let’s look at the Talmud on 59b, the Talmud where I’m already skipping over “speech comes and cancels speech”; I’ll come back to that later. This Talmud brings a dispute between Rav and Shmuel on 59b: “She is betrothed to the second.” Rav said: she is betrothed to the second forever. And Shmuel said: she is betrothed to the second until thirty days; after thirty days, the kiddushin of the second lapse, and the kiddushin of the first are completed. That’s an interesting novelty.

Meaning: I betroth a woman after thirty days. Now you come and betroth her after a week, so she is betrothed—that’s what the Mishnah says. Shmuel says: yes, she is betrothed for three weeks, and after three weeks your kiddushin basically dissolve, and mine, after the thirty days, arrive and take effect on her. Now she is betrothed to me. And Rav says no: once you betrothed her, she is betrothed to you and that’s it; it doesn’t lapse, it remains forever.

The Talmud immediately rejects this: Rav Chisda sat and challenged him—“By what does the second kiddushin lapse?” Rav Chisda says: how can that be? Why should the second kiddushin lapse after three weeks, dissolve—how can such a thing happen? In other words, Rav Chisda says: it can’t be that this is talking about that first case in the Mishnah, because the second kiddushin can’t just lapse like that.

Now that challenge basically says that apparently this is not talking about the first case. Rather, immediately afterward the Talmud says: Rav Yosef said to him, “The master taught it on the first clause and found it difficult; Rav Yehuda taught it on the last clause and had no difficulty.” In other words: you made a mistake. This doesn’t deal with the first case of the Mishnah, in the middle clause, but with the end, the second case of the Mishnah.

In short, according to the conclusion of the Talmud, there cannot be an opinion like Shmuel’s saying that the kiddushin of the second lapse at the end of the thirty days and return to the first automatically. Therefore, in kiddushin after thirty days this cannot be; and from here on, the Talmud begins discussing: okay, so in the second case, what exactly are we talking about, and what is Rav’s opinion and what is Shmuel’s opinion, what is their dispute. That’s the subject we’ll deal with later.

But I דווקא want to focus on this part of the Talmud, the first part: why can’t it be that it deals with the first part? Before I get to the question why it can’t be, there’s room to discuss whether the first opinion really was rejected, since this appears as anonymous Talmud. The anonymous Talmud says here: “She is betrothed to the second.” Rav says she is betrothed to the second forever, and Shmuel says she is betrothed to the second until thirty days. After thirty days, the kiddushin of the second lapse and the kiddushin of the first take effect. The quotation begins with “she is betrothed to the second,” which is a quotation from the Mishnah about the first case in the Mishnah. Meaning that the dispute between Rav and Shmuel originally really was said about the second case in the Mishnah—what I mean is, the middle clause. Again, “second” is terribly confusing, so let’s call them the first case and the second case. The first is the middle clause and the second is the last clause.

The first case, kiddushin after thirty days—the quotation says “she is betrothed to the second,” and on that Rav and Shmuel disagree. Now Rav Chisda asks a question on this. Why? Because he too apparently understood that this speaks about the case of kiddushin after thirty days. But that can’t be. To that the Talmud answers: no, no, this is talking about the case of kiddushin “from now and after thirty days.” Right, that’s Rav Yosef saying this, and that’s what we have here. So Rav Yosef goes against Rav Chisda and against the anonymous Talmud and says: no, this is talking about the last case of the Mishnah.

What did they think? So maybe someone disagrees with Rav Yosef? The question is whether there is anyone who disagrees with Rav Yosef. You can read the Talmud as saying no—you just got confused; Rav Yosef, or Rav Chisda, set us straight, then Rav Yosef corrects it, and that’s it, end of story. There is no such opinion, and there cannot be such an opinion. But it is definitely possible—and it seems from the structure of the Talmud—that earlier there was an opinion here that really understood this as the second case. Because, as I said before, in the quotation itself it explicitly starts with the words “she is betrothed to the second.” “She is betrothed to the second” is the case of kiddushin after thirty days, and on that the dispute of Rav and Shmuel is brought.

Now Rav Chisda challenges that with a question, and therefore we correct it, or Rav Yosef proposes a correction. But Rav Yosef needs to propose a correction because from the quotation of the dispute it explicitly looks like it is speaking about the case of kiddushin after thirty days. So it could be that there is indeed an opinion here—even if it doesn’t appear in the Talmud, and the answer of that opinion doesn’t appear in the Talmud—but there is an opinion here that held that this really speaks about the case of kiddushin after thirty days, the first case, not the second. Rav Chisda challenges, and Rav Yosef changes the matter as a result.

You could say that this quotation is not really a quotation; it’s some interpretation. “She is betrothed to the second” is what the Talmud says, and on that it brings the dispute of Rav and Shmuel, because the Talmud initially understood that this referred to the first case, and then Rav Chisda challenges it and the Talmud realizes there was a mistake and goes back and establishes it in the second case. And then it’s not a quotation of the dispute between Rav and Shmuel; rather, the words “she is betrothed to the second” are a framework the Talmud inserts—it’s not a quotation of the original dispute. And if that’s so, then it really does fall away and there is no such opinion.

So there are two possible ways to read this move, because the question is simply how much I need to look for a way to establish the dispute on the first case in the Mishnah. Is there in principle such a possibility, or is this only a pedagogic form of the Talmud, but in the end it’s clear that this is rejected, there isn’t even such a possibility, and everything is fine? Or not—there is such an opinion; maybe it was rejected, maybe the Talmud doesn’t agree with it, but it still has to have some sort of logic to it.

So let’s see. Let’s now once again enter into the question why the Talmud really rejects it. Rav Chisda says—we are currently establishing it on the first case in the Talmud, kiddushin after thirty days. Someone comes and betroths her, the second one betroths her after a week; Shmuel says she is betrothed to the second for three weeks. After that, the kiddushin of the second lapse and she returns to being betrothed to the first. Okay, that’s what appears in the Talmud. Why does Rav Chisda say that this can’t be? Then we’ll see whether it’s possible to disagree with that, right? That’s really what I’m looking for. Could there be another position? Could the anonymous Talmud hold this? Let’s see why Rav Chisda thinks this can’t be. What exactly is difficult for him?

So apparently he assumes—and that’s also what you see in some of the commentators—the principle that a sanctity of the body does not lapse, not “sanctity of the body” exactly, but a legal reality cannot change for no reason. Right? Basically the source of this is the Talmud in Nedarim 29, where the Ran discusses “his acquisition has expired.” That’s exactly in the passage there. The Talmud there discusses what happens if someone consecrates an animal with bodily sanctity for two weeks, and after that it should expire. Or he consecrates an animal conditionally—on condition that it rain tomorrow, or if it rains tomorrow then it will no longer be holy, something like that. The Talmud there brings a dispute between Abaye and Bar Padda, and in Jewish law we rule like Bar Padda: bodily sanctity does not lapse on its own.

What does that mean? You have a thing that is holy with bodily sanctity for two weeks—then it remains holy forever. To terminate bodily sanctity, an act is required, for example, sacrificing it. Right? An act is required. But on its own, just like that without an act, bodily sanctity cannot lapse.

Now the usual conception—and the Ran seems to imply this there—is: why indeed can’t it happen? If you remember, we talked about how in Jewish law legal effects are treated as some kind of reality. And therefore the principle of causality applies to legal effects. In other words, “his acquisition has expired”—that whole idea basically comes from that perspective. Here too, essentially, the same thing is being said. You want the offering suddenly to stop being holy? How would that happen? Just by itself, suddenly, without a cause? There is a principle of causality. If there was a change in reality, there has to be a cause that generated the change. If there was no cause, that change cannot happen. If you do some act—maybe misuse of consecrated property removes the thing from its sanctity, whatever—then you can say the sanctity lapses because the act is the cause that removed the sanctity. But there has to be a cause. Such a result—a change in legal status—cannot occur unless there is a cause that generates it. And a cause in real time. Therefore the Ran gets there into “his acquisition has expired” and all that; it’s all in the same passage.

Now the Ran there also writes that the same applies to ownership of the body—it also does not lapse on its own. I can’t transfer to you an object as full ownership of the body for two weeks. If it’s yours, it’s yours. How can it suddenly stop being yours and revert to being mine? Unless you do an act. What’s the act? You sell it back to me. Fine. But if from the outset I want to transfer it for two weeks, there is no such thing. Bodily sanctity does not lapse on its own. Bodily sanctity—the conception is simply that bodily sanctity is some sort of reality, and reality does not change without a cause that changes it. Okay?

Now if so, then here too the Talmud apparently assumes—Rav Chisda assumes—that if the kiddushin of the second took effect, if after a week you betrothed her, now for three weeks she is your wife. How, after three weeks, will she suddenly stop being your wife? If you give her a bill of divorce, giving the bill of divorce is an act. It is not an automatic lapse that terminates the kiddushin. But if there was no act, and just like that the kiddushin lapse on their own, there is no such thing. Kiddushin is like bodily sanctity. It cannot lapse on its own. Okay? That is basically the claim. Like ownership, like anything else.

So the claim is that what prevents Rav Chisda from applying the dispute between Rav and Shmuel to the first case in the Mishnah is that what Shmuel says contradicts the principle that bodily sanctity does not lapse on its own. If this woman is betrothed to someone, it cannot be that the kiddushin suddenly dissolve without anything happening. Someone died, gave her a bill of divorce, something like that. “She acquires herself in two ways,” either by the husband’s death or by a bill of divorce, as the Mishnah says. Those are the acts that can terminate the kiddushin or dissolve the kiddushin. But just like that, on its own, that cannot happen. That is apparently what bothers Rav Chisda.

But it’s not simple. So keep remembering: I’m always looking for whether it could be rational to take the approach that doesn’t accept this. Meaning, those who disagree with Rav Chisda—I’m trying to see why Rav Chisda’s reasoning is not necessary, or how one could say that bodily sanctity can lapse. What? Can it dissolve? Can kiddushin dissolve? Yes. Now I want to make the following claim.

There is—when the sanctity, let’s formulate it this way—there is a Talmud in Beitzah 30. The Talmud there discusses the sanctity of the wood of a sukkah. What does that mean? When I—after all, the wood of the sukkah is holy: “A festival for God” and “a sukkah for God”; one may not use it, and so on. And straightforwardly this is a Torah law, not rabbinic muktzeh; it is a Torah law. Now the Talmud there discusses whether one can make a condition regarding the sanctity of the wood of the sukkah—say that I am placing it in the sukkah on condition that it not be holy. I want to leave myself the option of continuing to use it. So the Talmud brings a dispute about this.

The Rashba asks there, in Beitzah 30: apparently, if the Talmud concludes that one cannot make a condition regarding the wood of the sukkah, then this is difficult against Abaye in the passage in Nedarim 29 that I mentioned earlier, because Abaye holds that bodily sanctity does lapse on its own. Bar Padda holds that it does not; Abaye holds that it does. In Jewish law we rule like Bar Padda. But Abaye holds that bodily sanctity does lapse on its own. So the Rashba asks: then why does the Talmud in Beitzah say that one cannot make a condition regarding the wood of the sukkah?

Now the Rashba of course assumes that the sanctity of sukkah wood is actual sanctity in the object itself. The usual approaches say it’s only a prohibition on use; it’s not really sanctity, and then there’s no problem at all. Because sanctity in the object is a reality, and reality cannot dissolve by itself. But obligations on the person can apply for a limited time; there is no principled problem with that. But the Rashba assumes this is truly bodily sanctity, in the object. So he asks this question, and never mind the answer he gives.

I’m asking about the Rashba. I was puzzled when I learned him. Bodily sanctity not lapsing on its own has two implications brought in Nedarim 29. One implication is that you can’t make a condition on it. The second implication is that you can’t make it for a limited period. You can’t make a condition on it, and you can’t make it for a limited period. Both of those are called automatic lapse. Because if you make a condition, you are basically removing the sanctity by the force of speech alone; you did no act, so that is called “on its own.” And if you make the sanctity for a limited period, it also expires after the time on its own. Those are the two implications.

Now regarding the sanctity of sukkah wood, the Rashba claims that the discussion whether one can make a condition or not depends on the question whether bodily sanctity lapses on its own or not, and therefore he asks against Abaye. But if that were so, then how do you explain the fact that after eight days the sanctity of the sukkah wood lapses? That too is a limited period. And if you assume that bodily sanctity does not lapse on its own even for sukkah wood, then how does it lapse after eight days?

Necessarily, the Rashba is not right and this is not really bodily sanctity in the object; it’s just a manner of expression—one may not use the wood of the sukkah. But not that this is actually bodily sanctity. However, according to the Rashba’s own view, since he holds that this really is bodily sanctity, he says: so you can’t make a condition on it—but you too agree that after eight days there is no longer any prohibition on using the sukkah wood. So what do you say about that? Well, what do you say? What could one answer on behalf of the Rashba?

I don’t know. Look, let’s say I consecrated an offering and after a week the offering evaporated. It was sacrificed? No—sacrificed is something else; that’s an act. It evaporated. I don’t know, some hocus-pocus guy evaporated the offering. It’s gone, doesn’t exist anymore, the animal isn’t here; its molecules dispersed in every direction. Okay? Now clearly there’s nothing holy here anymore. It’s over. Finished. Exactly. Which means that the fact that it was holy for a week doesn’t mean that the sanctity lapsed. Sanctity lapsing means that the very same object that was holy stops being holy. But here what lapsed was not the sanctity; what lapsed was the object. Okay?

The same with a sukkah. After eight days there is no sanctity in the wood of the sukkah. Why? Because after eight days it’s not a sukkah; it’s a pergola. And a pergola is not holy. What lapsed is the object, not the sanctity of the object. That isn’t a problem. Essentially, the sanctity is eternal sanctity as long as the object exists; then it is holy forever. And if in fact the sukkah remained a sukkah an entire year? No, it still wouldn’t be holy. Why? Next Sukkot? No, next Sukkot is something else. It could be that after this already lapsed it’s a new sukkah. Not certain. But I mean on the principled level: all the objects remain, the wood remains. And that wood is a pergola; it is not a sukkah. Therefore this does not threaten the Rashba; the Rashba sees no problem here with the claim that bodily sanctity here seemingly lapsed on its own. It didn’t lapse on its own; the body lapsed on its own, not its sanctity. Okay?

It’s like, for example, the Talmud—there’s a contradiction between the portion of Mattot and the portion of Mishpatim regarding a Hebrew slave whose ear was pierced. If the slave does not want to go free, then “his master shall pierce his ear and he shall serve him forever”—that’s what is written in Mishpatim. In Mattot it says he goes free in the Jubilee year. So is it forever or in the Jubilee? The Talmud in Kiddushin says: “for his forever of Jubilee.” What does that mean, “for his forever of Jubilee”? Forever or Jubilee—what is this, a word game?

I once saw in an article by Henshke here from the Talmud department—he wrote it at age nineteen, by the way, genius—that his claim was this: how do you really reconcile the contradiction between “he shall serve him forever” and the fact that he goes free in the Jubilee? What does “he shall serve him forever” mean? That there is ownership of the body, meaning he has ownership of the body. That’s what we saw earlier with the Ran. Ownership of the body cannot be for a limited time. Eternal ownership is ownership of the body; ownership for a limited time is ownership of fruits—usage rights, not ownership of the thing itself. Ownership of the thing itself cannot be for a limited time.

Now what happens if there is something that is acquired by me, in its very body, for a limited time? If the Torah wants to tell me that a Hebrew slave with a pierced ear is acquired by me as ownership of the body for a limited time, how does it say it? It says “he shall serve him forever,” in the sense of ownership of the body, but he goes free in the Jubilee. So “he shall serve him forever” is not really about time; it’s a type of acquisition. Exactly. If it only said “he shall serve him forever,” I would understand ownership of the body forever. If it said only that he goes free in the Jubilee, I would understand ownership of fruits. So in order to tell me that it is ownership of the body for a time, it has to tell me both verses. He is acquired forever in the sense that all of him is mine, but he goes free in the Jubilee.

Now what is the idea behind this? The idea is that if, say, I sold you land forever, completely, body and all, everything is yours. After a week you sell it to someone else, or the king comes and expropriates it from you. Does that contradict the fact that the land was yours until that moment? No. Why not? But that means it was for a limited time—how can ownership of the body be for a limited time? Because ownership of the body, in its essence, when I transferred it to you, was forever. The fact that suddenly the king comes and takes it from you is not because the rights were originally time-limited. Your rights completely passed to you; they are eternal. In the end the king comes and expropriates them from you—fine, that’s his right. But if I had sold you rights in advance only for a week, that is not ownership of the body. Here I sold you full rights, that’s ownership of the body, and the king comes and expropriates it from you. The Talmud says that the Jubilee is “the king’s expropriation.” The king comes and—exactly. I sold it to you; it’s not only ownership of the body, it’s also forever, really forever. I sold it to you forever. Yes, exactly. If the Jubilee were canceled, for example, then it would continue. Exactly. The fact that the Jubilee arrives and removes it does not mean the original sale was for a limited time. The sale was eternal. The king came and removed it—the King of the universe in this case, whatever. The Jubilee is the king’s expropriation. Therefore it is ownership of the body for a time.

And that is the meaning of what Henshke says there. And it’s not just a word game—ownership of the body but for a limited time. No. As long as it was ownership of the body, it was also eternal. It is not an ownership bounded by time. It is an ownership that, in essence, when I applied it, I applied forever; just when the Jubilee comes, it removes it. Fine—like a king can remove something that is yours. That is basically the claim.

What does that mean? It means there is no impediment to some reality ceasing after a certain time. What cannot happen is that when I apply it, and nothing interferes, it suddenly dissolves on its own after a limited time. But what if there is something that interferes with the matter? For example, in our case—and I’m coming back to our case because that’s where I’m heading—I betrothed the woman after thirty days. So these kiddushin—if the second had not come—she would become my wife after thirty days, right? Essentially there are already kiddushin here on her; in thirty days she is already my wife. I’ve already done the act; the act has already taken effect in principle; in thirty days it will be actualized. Right?

One could certainly have said that he betroths her only for three weeks, as Shmuel says. What about bodily sanctity not lapsing on its own? Irrelevant. If the woman—what? No, because from the outset the span in which she was available was only three weeks. So he betrothed her with respect to something bounded by something external. That’s fine; then it can be bounded. If he had betrothed her when nothing at all prevented it, and now after three weeks it would fade away, that can’t happen. But if there is something external that bounds the second kiddushin, then there should be no principled impediment to the kiddushin taking effect only for three weeks. After three weeks they won’t lapse—they were never there. Because the woman, if you look at the whole timeline with respect to the woman, is single for three weeks, and a married woman from three weeks onward. Now you come and betroth her—what on the timeline is available for kiddushin? Only the coming three weeks are available for kiddushin. So betroth her for that time in which she is available. It’s not that after three weeks your kiddushin lapsed; your kiddushin from the outset were not on the entire timeline, because she was not available on the entire timeline. There is something that stops it.

It sounds a little strange. Huh? Why should it apply only to that? I didn’t say—again, I’m not saying this is necessary. I’m saying it isn’t absurd. Not absurd. And Rav Chisda says no. I’m saying let’s try to understand whether one can say otherwise. You can say otherwise. In a place where there is something external that bounds your kiddushin, that does not allow them to spread over the whole timeline, there is no principled impediment to their being for a limited time.

Still, though, it would have to be that one has more force than the other. So say in the case of king and ordinary person: I have ownership of the body, and the king has ownership of the body. A king is greater than a person. No, that’s the reason why he can expropriate. But I’m not asking why he can expropriate. I’m asking after he expropriates. Is the ownership until the point at which he expropriated still considered ownership of the body? My question is not whether the king can expropriate—he can expropriate, he has more force than I do, more than my ownership, fine. The only question is: after he expropriates, is my ownership considered ownership of fruits and not of the body, because it was for a limited time? My answer is no. Because only where the ownership is from the outset for a limited time is it ownership of fruits and not ownership of the body. But here the ownership was really full, over the whole timeline and the whole space; the king simply came and expropriated.

And here too with the woman, if the second man’s something were now to lapse, yes, right—but only for three weeks. Why? Because after three weeks she simply isn’t available to receive kiddushin; she is already a married woman. And if within the three weeks she had died? If she dies after three weeks, then that’s it. Yes, right. There is no woman here who can say—there is no hand here to receive kiddushin; she isn’t available. So it’s not that your kiddushin lapsed after three weeks; they from the outset took effect only for three weeks.

But what about there being no kiddushin for a period? Where did you invent such a thing? We don’t know such a thing. We know that an external thing that can break kiddushin is either death or a bill of divorce. No—or that she isn’t available. If you now try to betroth a woman who is already married, will it take effect? No. Good. Now this woman is already married. How can you betroth her if she is a married woman? After all, she is a married woman from day thirty onward. That’s exactly what I’m saying. To terminate your kiddushin, one needs either death or divorce, but here my claim is that we are not terminating your kiddushin; they were never there. She is a married woman; she isn’t available. You couldn’t have betrothed her from day thirty onward.

I don’t know where you invented that just now. No, I think it definitely can sound plausible to me. I’ll give you an example—I brought this example from the Talmud in Kiddushin 7. Look here. 7a. Rava said: “Be betrothed to me in half of yourself”—she is betrothed. “Your half is betrothed to me”—she is not betrothed. What interests me is the second case. I betroth half a woman. Abaye said to Rava: what is different about “your half is betrothed to me,” that she is not betrothed? The Torah said “a woman,” and not half a woman. Here too it said “a man,” and not half a man. So what’s the difference—why is this possible and that not?

He said to him: how can you compare? There, a woman is not fit for two men; she cannot be the wife of two husbands. But is a man not fit for two women? He is. And this is what he says to her: if I want to marry another, I can marry another. Mar Zutra son of Rav Mari said to Ravina: then let the kiddushin spread to the whole of her. Didn’t we learn: if one says, “The leg of this animal shall be an offering,” the whole of it becomes an offering? Half an animal—the sanctity spreads through the whole animal. So too, one who betroths half a woman—and the medieval and later authorities discuss this—that there is here a comparison between the kiddushin of a woman and the consecration of an animal. It’s not for nothing that it’s called kiddushin. There is some dimension of consecration here. Fine, let’s leave that aside for now. That’s what the Talmud compares here, okay? That the sanctity should spread through all of her.

You can already see the parallel to our case. Now let’s talk about the kiddushin of the second spreading beyond the three weeks in which he betrothed her. It’s on the timeline, not over the woman, but the idea. He said: and even according to the one who says it does not all become an offering—there is a dispute there regarding one who consecrates the leg of an offering—that is only where he consecrates something on which the life does not depend, like a leg. But if he consecrates something on which the life depends, the whole becomes an offering. So the whole should become an offering.

So that is the question. It’s difficult—why do you say that one who betroths half a woman, she is not betrothed? Let her be betrothed and let it spread to all of her. The Talmud says: are the cases comparable? There it’s an animal; here there is another mind involved. When I consecrate an animal, I consecrate the leg of an animal. Now that spreads to the whole animal—or to something on which the life depends, say the heart, right? Then it spreads to the whole animal. Why? Because there is nothing to stop the spread. The animal is not a mind; it has no independent legal status; it’s an object. Okay? So if I consecrated half the object, it spreads through the whole thing.

But with a woman, suppose I betrothed half a woman—the other half of the woman belongs to her. She is the owner of it, and she is a legal entity; she is a person. Now how can it be that what I consecrate as half spreads to the whole without her allowing it? After all, it belongs to her. I’m not speaking right now in terms of ownership, right? “Belongs to her” only metaphorically. Okay? Therefore it cannot spread, because there is something else stopping it. And in such a case, what should it be? So half is holy, betrothed. It didn’t spread to the other half because there is something that stops it—the woman’s own mind. Okay?

Rather, says the Talmud, it is comparable to what Rabbi Yohanan said: if an animal belongs to two partners, and one consecrated half of it, then went back and bought the other half and consecrated it, it is holy but may not be offered, and it makes a substitute, and its substitute is like it. Right? I have an animal owned by two partners. I consecrated half of it—my half. I said: half yours and half mine. I consecrated my half. What is the law? Half is holy; it does not spread. Why doesn’t it spread? Because there is another mind holding it back. It can’t spread; it’s not entirely in your hands. There is another mind holding it back.

What do I see here? Exactly an illustration of what I was saying earlier. If I were to betroth a woman for thirty days, it would spread over the whole timeline; it doesn’t lapse on its own, obviously. But if this woman is already a married woman after thirty days, there is, as it were, another partner in the woman—a partner along the timeline. It’s not half a woman—why? Along the timeline, so what? By the way, even the division of partnership—how does the Talmud say in the chapter “The Partners” in Nedarim? How do you divide a partnership? Suppose the two of us are partners in an animal. So you’ll use the two back legs and I’ll use the two front legs? You can’t. What do you do? You use it one day and I use it one day. Meaning that the division of partnership is generally done along the time axis. That is perfectly fine. So division along the timeline is the same as division of the object.

No, division along the timeline is only with respect to objects, not with respect to a woman. Why? What difference does it make? No, no—I’m speaking, leave aside the “other mind.” That’s exactly my claim. No, that’s exactly it—leave aside the “other mind” for the moment. “Other mind” is exactly the point; that’s what I’m talking about. But for the moment, if there were no other mind, what would happen here? Half and half. Meaning: you are her owner until day thirty, and I am her owner from day thirty onward. Here I would not say that the kiddushin spread until the end of time, to the end of the timeline. Why not? Because there is another mind stopping it. Right?

In this case it’s not the woman’s own mind, because the woman consents, no problem, so she isn’t the one holding it back. Very nice that she consents—but I am her husband at day thirty, and I hold it back. So in such a case, even if you say kiddushin do not lapse on their own, meaning if I betrothed a woman for a week it would spread over the whole timeline to its end, that’s true when there is nothing external at all holding back that spread. But if there is something that holds back that spread, there is no impediment to its taking effect only for a week, and after a week what happened happened. That is basically the claim.

Therefore I claim that what Rav Chisda says is not necessary. Rav Chisda says: it doesn’t lapse on its own. I say: fine, then let it not lapse on its own. So what? It doesn’t lapse on its own; it simply never took effect beyond day thirty in the first place. It doesn’t need to lapse. Okay?

This reminds me, yes, of what I wrote here about entropy. There is a rule in thermodynamics that a system does not become more ordered on its own. It tends toward disorder. Right. Meaning: a system cannot become more ordered just like that. And if in some system you see that it is becoming more ordered—exactly—there is something involved there, some other force involved here, as they say. Right? So that’s basically the claim why a world that is so orderly must have a God who created it. Because some kind of order arose here from something simply devoid of order. So apparently there is some—it’s not a closed system. There is something from outside involved here that arranges it, investing information, energy, however you want to formulate it.

In other words, often we relate to some rule and say: such a thing cannot be bounded in time; it will spread all the way—unless there is another external hand that stops it and says, “up to here and no further.” By the way, that really is entropy. A system that is located over a segment in space is considered more ordered, or less chaotic, than a system spread out over all of space. Like a gas in a container. A gas in a container—one expression of the second law of thermodynamics: take a bag of gas, put it inside a container, and put it in the upper right corner of the container. Now rip open the bag. At first all the gas was concentrated in the upper right corner, and afterward it spreads throughout the whole container. Right? But the reverse will never happen: the gas is spread throughout the whole container and suddenly all gathers into the upper right corner—if there is no cause, yes, if there is no external cause, exactly. That is basically the second law of thermodynamics.

Meaning that the gas being all compressed in the upper right corner is a more ordered or more special state than a state in which it is spread throughout the whole container. And you can’t reach a more ordered state unless there is a hand that orders it. But from ordered to disordered—that happens by itself. Okay? What is the causal logic? No, the logic is statistical. Check how many states there are; in statistical mechanics that’s what you learn. Learn how many states there are. Say, for example, let’s look at all of space as a chain of ten cells—a toy model, okay? Now I take two particles and I want to distribute them in the container. Okay? Now I say: when the two particles are in one cell, how many such possibilities are there? Ten. Either in the first cell or the second, right? If they are in two different cells, how many possibilities are there? Ten times nine. Ten times nine, right? And if they are identical then divide by two. Because if particle A is in cell three and particle B is in cell five, that’s the same as particle A—so divide by two, never mind. But it’s much more. Forty-five instead of ten. Take three particles and it’s much more already.

Meaning that when the particles are concentrated in one place, that’s rarer. There are fewer states that allow it; therefore it has less entropy. The logarithm of the number of states equivalent to the macroscopic state—that’s the definition of entropy in statistical mechanics. The log of the number of states. We say “log” for convenience, but the number of states corresponding to the description “the two particles are in one cell”—that’s the entropy of that state. Okay? So if there are many states corresponding to particles spread across several cells, then that means the entropy of that is low—sorry, that’s minus the log actually, not the log, it’s the log of one over. What I’m basically trying to say is that here I’m talking about distribution along the time axis. Look at distribution along the time axis as like distribution in space. If it is bounded along the time axis, that is a more special state than if it is spread over the whole timeline. For that to happen there must be a cause—something bounded along the time axis needs something to stop it and not let it spread over the rest of the timeline. Otherwise it won’t remain bounded there. It’s basically the same idea as entropy, only on the time axis instead of in space. Okay?

Now it could be—coming back to our Talmud—what does Rav Chisda want? Why is it so obvious to Rav Chisda that it cannot be that the kiddushin of the second lapse on their own? It could be that what he is claiming is a different claim: that the kiddushin of the second can lapse, but the question is how the kiddushin of the first can take effect after thirty days. It’s not that the problem is that bodily sanctity does not lapse on its own—how can it be that the kiddushin of the second lapse after thirty days, or after three weeks lapse? It could be that they lapse. I’m asking: how can it be that suddenly the first betroths her? “His acquisition has expired.” Because the other one entered in the middle. Exactly.

Meaning: earlier I said there is no problem of “his acquisition has expired” when no second one came in the middle. Why? Because it keeps hovering there the whole time. Exactly. I created a legal effect and it keeps hovering there—that’s one possibility. The second possibility is that I said that the giving of the money created an obligation, and I betroth her through the obligation; at the end of the time I simply give her the obligation, and that is the kiddushin money. Now I’m saying: the moment she became betrothed to someone else, then she no longer—then she is already a married woman, she is no longer available for kiddushin. The moment she is not available for kiddushin, the money that was given dies; the legal effect hovering over her dissipates, no longer exists. Then in the middle, that person’s kiddushin ended after thirty days. Fine. Now I want the kiddushin of the first to settle on her, to take effect on her. There is nothing to settle on her, because it dissipated.

Only if there had been no second one in the middle would there not have been a problem of “his acquisition has expired,” with all the explanations we gave earlier—according to the Ran, according to the Ritva. Rav Chisda, not Rav Yosef. Really this is on the last clause, and therefore that problem isn’t there. No, it’s the same as Rav Chisda. Because of Rav Chisda’s difficulty, Rav Yosef shifts it to the second case. I’m saying yes—Rav Chisda himself. Rav Chisda and Rav Yosef are the same view. Rav Chisda asks the question and Rav Yosef gives the answer. It’s the same view. The anonymous Talmud is the one standing against them. Fine?

So I’m saying this: the anonymous Talmud I explained earlier. There is something external here that holds back the spread, and therefore the thing does not spread. What do Rav Chisda and Rav Yosef hold? They claim: true, in terms of “his acquisition has expired”—sorry—not in terms of bodily sanctity lapsing on its own, because there is something here that removes it; it is bounded by something external, so it can indeed be bounded for a limited time. What they claim, though, is that even if it did lapse, the kiddushin of the first cannot come back and take effect, because there is nothing to take effect—he is already no longer in existence there; his acquisition has expired. That is Rav Chisda’s problem.

Earlier I understood that Rav Chisda was troubled by the question how bodily sanctity lapses on its own—how after thirty days the kiddushin of the second lapse. Now I’m saying no, that’s not the problem. That the kiddushin of the second lapse, I can understand, because there is something else that removes them. But I claim there is no something else that removes them, because the something else that would remove them has itself expired. If there had been no second one, then there would have been no “his acquisition has expired,” with all the explanations we gave earlier. But when there is a second one, then “his acquisition has expired”; there is nothing to stop it, and therefore this continues—not because of the rule that bodily sanctity does not lapse on its own.

Those are two possible ways to understand Rav Chisda’s question and Rav Yosef’s answer. The first possibility is by force of “bodily sanctity does not lapse on its own”: if she is the wife of the second, then that continues forever. But to that, as I said earlier, there is an answer. Maybe what he means to say is something else: it could be that it lapses on its own, no problem; that doesn’t count as “on its own.” The problem is that afterward the first cannot come and betroth her. Of course, as a consequence, the second also won’t lapse. So once the first is not there to seize her after thirty days, then he also cannot limit the kiddushin of the second. And that is the result, but it’s a result, not a reason. Fine? Those are two possibilities.

Now I want to show you that these two possibilities actually depend on a dispute among the medieval authorities that we already encountered in previous classes: the dispute between the Rosh and Nachmanides. In previous classes we saw: what is the law if the first betrothed her after thirty days, and now the second comes and betroths her within that time, after a week? There are two ways to explain the anonymous Talmud—wait, now look at the conclusion. There are two possibilities. In other words, someone betroths a woman after thirty days, then a second comes and betroths her after a week. What happens in that situation? Betrothed forever. That’s what we just saw: betrothed to the second forever. Fine? Apparently according to everyone. According to Rav certainly, but really Shmuel also doesn’t say otherwise in this case. So apparently she is betrothed to the second forever, right?

What happens if the second dies after a week? We talked about this—whether he made the money, whether he has to return it—no, even before the question whether he has to return the money, if he changed his mind or whatever. I’m asking: the second dies after a week. Do the kiddushin of the first take effect? Right? Dispute of the Rosh and Nachmanides. The Rosh says no. Nachmanides brings a Jerusalem Talmud that says yes.

What is the explanation of Nachmanides’ view? Two possibilities. One possibility is that Nachmanides understands that if the kiddushin of the second took effect, that does not mean the kiddushin of the first evaporated. The legal effect continues to hover in the air; it just cannot settle on the woman because she is the wife of the second. So if the second stays alive after the thirty days, then the kiddushin of the first don’t exist in practice. But if the second dies within the period, meaning that by the time thirty days arrive the second is already dead, then that legal effect waiting above settles on her. That is what Nachmanides says in the name of the Jerusalem Talmud.

A second way to explain it: not that the legal effect is floating in the air, but that an obligation was created as a result of giving the money, and the kiddushin of the first are basically giving the woman that obligation, and that is the kiddushin money at the end of the thirty days. These are two solutions to the problem of “his acquisition has expired,” what we talked about, right? So it will be a practical difference—fine, in the Milu’im that we saw—but right now I’m not going into the practical difference. These are the two possibilities we saw for solving the problem of “his acquisition has expired.” Okay? According to both of these possibilities, it’s clear this is Nachmanides. Nachmanides basically says that if the second dies after a week, it is not that the first is no longer in the arena. He is in the picture. Either the legal effect of kiddushin was already created and is only waiting to settle on the woman, and if she is available at day thirty it will settle on her; or the obligation created by giving the money, after thirty days I’ll give it to the woman and then the legal effect of kiddushin will be created. And if she is available then, that can be done, no problem. Therefore Nachmanides says that if the second dies, the kiddushin will take effect. Okay?

By contrast, what does the Rosh hold? The Rosh claims no—even if the second dies, the first is already no longer in the arena. What is he saying? He basically disagrees with both possible explanations in Nachmanides. After all, either one by itself would lead us to Nachmanides, right? And if Nachmanides can go with either of the two explanations, then the Rosh, who disagrees with him, presumably disagrees with both. And what does the Rosh say? The Rosh claims that once she has already become the wife of the second, the legal effect dissipated; the obligation dissipated; there is nothing. The legal effect can exist only when the woman is standing available for kiddushin and waiting for the legal effect to land on her. But if the woman is the wife of the second—and if the second remains alive then she will remain his wife forever—then even if he dies it makes no difference; the legal effect already dissipated at the moment she married the second. Therefore when the thirty days pass, there is nothing to land on the woman.

The same with the obligation, Nachmanides’ second explanation. The Rosh says: the woman has an obligation to become betrothed to the first, but she no longer has an obligation to become betrothed to the first because she is married to the second. If the second remains alive, then maybe she has to return the money, but there is no obligation on her to become betrothed to him in return for the money she received. As an unmarried woman, an obligation was created upon her to become betrothed to him, but if she is a married woman, the obligation is gone. So there is nothing here with which to betroth the woman at the end of the thirty days. Both of Nachmanides’ explanations are unacceptable to the Rosh. Right? That is the dispute between Nachmanides and the Rosh.

For our purposes, these are exactly the two possibilities for understanding the discussion here. What will happen according to the Rosh here? According to the Rosh here, the Rosh holds that once she married the second, the legal effect evaporated, the obligation evaporated, there is nothing, right? If so, Rav Chisda asks: how can it be? Bodily sanctity does not lapse on its own. If the second is her husband, then he will remain her husband forever, because there is nothing external stopping the spread of the kiddushin; the first is no longer in the arena. That’s according to the Rosh. Okay?

But according to Nachmanides, that isn’t so. Because according to Nachmanides there is something that stops it: the legal effect is sitting and waiting to land after thirty days, or the obligation is waiting to be given as the kiddushin money. So there is something external here. So according to Nachmanides, all the difficulties I raised earlier apply. What is bothering Rav Chisda? There is something external that bounds the kiddushin of the second. So necessarily, what bothers Rav Chisda is not that bodily sanctity does not lapse on its own.

According to the Rosh, the problem is: how can the kiddushin of the first take effect after thirty days? Why on earth? According to the Rosh, once the kiddushin lapse, then the kiddushin of the first are no longer in the world. So that’s obvious. Then clearly Rav Chisda immediately asks: wait—if the first is no longer in the world, then how did the kiddushin of the second lapse? So he is really asking that bodily sanctity does not lapse on its own. After all, there is nothing at all stopping the kiddushin, so these kiddushin that were for a limited time—what would stop them? So here it is according to the Rosh.

According to the Rosh, the difficulty is: bodily sanctity does not lapse on its own. But according to Nachmanides, it is not “on its own”; there is something stopping the kiddushin, so there is no difficulty in understanding Rav Chisda in terms of why the kiddushin of the second lapse and the first take effect. Right? The question is how the kiddushin of the second could lapse at all. I understand. According to the Rosh, the question is: the kiddushin of the second—there’s nothing to stop them, so they spread over the whole timeline, because the first is no longer in the arena. The first is the “other mind” that stops the kiddushin—exactly, according to the Rosh.

So according to the Rosh, what he will explain in Rav Chisda is that if there is nothing at all stopping the second, then why should his kiddushin suddenly stop after thirty days? What stops it? After all, only the first can stop it—but the first is no longer in the arena. Right? But according to the Rosh—according to Nachmanides, sorry—the first is still in the arena. So in principle there is no problem understanding that the kiddushin of the second from the outset took effect only until day thirty. He claimed—Nachmanides—that the kiddushin of the first cannot take effect on her because she is a married woman belonging to the second. According to the Rosh, the problem after thirty days is that there is nothing to land on the woman. According to Nachmanides, the problem is that it can’t land—there is something to land, but it cannot land because there is a married woman there.

Rav Chisda says: after thirty days, how can it be that she goes back to being betrothed to the first? That is Rav Chisda’s question. There are two possible ways to understand it. One possibility is: how can she be betrothed to the first if the first is no longer in the arena? And that is according to the Rosh, right? There is nothing to land on the woman. Meaning: the kiddushin of the second never lapse. The kiddushin of the second do not lapse, period. And the kiddushin of the first do not take effect on that because there is nothing to take effect— the legal effect dissipated, the obligation no longer exists, there is no act of kiddushin here. According to Nachmanides, there is something to land on the woman; it just can’t land. Exactly. Do you see? But according to the Rosh, the problem is there is nothing to land. According to Nachmanides, there is something to land; the question is that it can’t land because she is occupied, she is a married woman. Okay?

Now look at the Shulchan Arukh. You see? Look at its wording. “If a second came and betrothed her within the thirty days, she is betrothed to the second forever.” According to—here, this is our law—betrothed to the second forever, like Rav Yosef. “Because at the time the second betrothed her, she was not yet betrothed,” right? “And therefore the kiddushin of the second took effect on her and she became a married woman.” That’s simple. Now look at the continuation—this is the key sentence. “And after the thirty days, when the kiddushin of the first come, they will find her a married woman.” What is that? Pure Nachmanides. Right? Meaning that the first still has kiddushin here; they try to land on the woman, but she is a married woman, so they can’t land. Exactly Nachmanides. Right? “And it turns out that the first is like one who betrothed a married woman, for whom kiddushin do not take effect.” According to the Rosh this is not correct at all. According to the Rosh, the first is not betrothing anyone at all—not because she is a married woman. There is no one betrothing. Not “whom to betroth,” but “who is betrothing”—there is no legal effect, no obligation, no act of kiddushin. This is really Nachmanides.

Now immediately afterward in the Shulchan Arukh, in the gloss there, look: “But if the second died or divorced her within the thirty days, the kiddushin of the first return, and therefore she requires a bill of divorce from the first. And there are those who disagree.” Exactly according to the Rosh. Right? Exactly. Meaning the first part is according to his own view, because he goes like Nachmanides, and “there are those who disagree” is the Rosh. And what I am claiming is that the Rosh would also disagree with the first part, not only with the second part. What does it mean that he disagrees with the first part? Not in practical law. He disagrees with the explanation of the first part. The explanation of the first part according to the Rosh is not because he is betrothing a married woman, but because he is not betrothing anyone—there is no one betrothing, no legal effect, no obligation. According to Nachmanides there is an act of kiddushin; it’s just that a married woman cannot become betrothed.

Meaning, the fact that the Shulchan Arukh brings these two laws together looks like it’s because there’s a connection between them. It really takes the view of Nachmanides. In Tiv Kiddushin on the Shulchan Arukh—it’s straightforward. There is Tiv Gittin and Tiv Kiddushin. He says: “after thirty, when the kiddushin of the first come,” etc.—that is the language of Maimonides. And they inferred from this language that Maimonides holds like the Jerusalem Talmud—this Jerusalem Talmud is what Nachmanides brought. The Jerusalem Talmud is the source of Nachmanides. “For if the second died or divorced her, the kiddushin of the first take effect,” as the Rema writes here. That is exactly the inference. Right, so Maimonides also holds this way.

But you see in Tiv Kiddushin that he notices there is a connection between these two laws in the Shulchan Arukh, that one depends on the other. The Shulchan Arukh brings these two laws. Tiv Kiddushin notices that these two laws stem from the same root. Because you hold like Nachmanides—you asked me before what the implication is. The implication is the dispute between Nachmanides and the Rosh. You asked what the implication is of how we understand Rav Chisda’s difficulty. The implication is the practical difference if he dies. Exactly. Meaning, regarding Rav Chisda himself there’s no practical difference, because if he doesn’t die she remains betrothed to the second, but for different reasons. Where will there be a practical difference? If he dies. Fine? That is the practical difference in the dispute between the Rosh and Maimonides.

Now this whole story—I’ll stop here, and just end with one remark. This entire picture I described here basically sharpens, perhaps much more, what I also said in previous classes: that the whole story here is really about seeing legal effects as a kind of entities, realities. And therefore it hovers in the air, it lands, there has to be a cause that stops it, a cause that generates it, “his acquisition has expired,” it hasn’t—all this is really a language that relates to legal effects as existing entities, like physical entities. There is causality and so on, and if it was placed there, what removed it from there and what didn’t. These are not pure legal definitions, but a kind of reality. This whole discussion here greatly strengthens that perspective. This is the metaphysical conception of Jewish law.

Now what I want to do in the next stage is to continue with that same Tiv Kiddushin. If you want to look at it, it’s recommended. Tiv Kiddushin on the Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer, siman 40, se’if katan 6. Number 6 of Tiv Kiddushin. It appears in the responsa project, it appears in—he’s a bit long-winded, but after he makes this identification, he starts to question it. He says this is not a necessary identification, and in order to understand his hesitation, we need to get a bit into the passage we skipped—the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish about whether speech cancels speech. So next time I’ll talk a little about that dispute—not really go deeply into it, but as much as needed—and then we’ll move to Tiv Kiddushin to see how he disconnects, how he proposes to disconnect the link between these two laws. Come on Thursday. Oh yeah? Finishing with the lab. Okay, you’re the only one here in the class, because that Jew is sleeping, he’s not with us. Okay.