Kiddushin – Chapter 3 – Lesson 6

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? He retracts from the betrothal, so you owe me the debt. I no longer want betrothal in exchange for that debt; give me back the money.

[Speaker B] The money was created only for the sake of betrothal.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. Therefore, the moment there’s no betrothal, give it back to me, because you received it by mistake.

[Speaker B] If someone comes and says, I’m selling you a cow—actually, I don’t feel like selling the cow anymore—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then of course he has to return the money. I received the money and he didn’t receive the merchandise. So what? Then why does the Ran say here that she is not obligated to return it? His reasoning is actually strange, because he says—he says that if the husband retracts, then she does not have to return it. Why? Because otherwise they are not fully hers until the very end, and if the money was already spent in the meantime, then how is she betrothed? What does that have to do with anything? What do you mean, yes? Why can he prove that they are not fully hers until the end, and if they were spent in the meantime, then with what is she betrothed? So we spoke about a debt. Okay, so there is a debt. Fine—but if she is betrothed because there is a debt, then if there is a debt, why doesn’t she have to return him the money if he does not betroth her? There is no betrothal. What is the meaning of this reasoning? It could be that he means to say: what does “for otherwise” mean? She is not obligated to return the money, because otherwise—if she had been obligated to return the money—then it would not be clear, generally, with what he betroths her when the money has already been spent. Why? Because if she had been obligated to return the money, then that means the money was not acquired by her. Right? And it was already spent in the meantime. So how would she become betrothed? Therefore it’s clear that she is not obligated to return it. And then what? Then the money really is acquired by her from the start. Again, everything he says—“for otherwise, with what does he betroth her, since they are not acquired by her until the end of the thirty days”—what he means is that he wants to prove that they are acquired by her from the beginning. In my opinion, he is not claiming that they are not acquired by her until the end; on the contrary. He is saying: let me prove to you that they are acquired by her from the beginning. Because what happens? If she were obligated to return him the money, then it would come out that they are not acquired by her until the end, and therefore she has to return him his money—so with what is she betrothed?

[Speaker B] So it follows that the money is already hers from the beginning.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then if—

[Speaker B] The giving is done as though for an extended action? No, exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, then it seems that the Ran apparently understands from this whole blow-up that the act of betrothal is done at the beginning, not at the end. Therefore he says: if the act of betrothal is done at the beginning and the person retracts, then she does not need to return the money. He gave her the money, she acquired the money, it’s no longer his money. The fact that he decides to destroy it and throw it into the sea—that’s his problem. He threw the betrothal into the sea, not the money. The money he already gave her. What is due to him in exchange is betrothal, right? The betrothal he decides to throw into the sea—fine, his problem. He threw his own money into the sea. If the money were his, and he says to her, wait, I don’t want you to become betrothed to me, and the money were his, then she would have had to return the money. Why? Because the money is his and he did not receive the betrothal in exchange for it, right? Through his fault, not hers. But what he threw into the sea was not the money, it was the betrothal. But the money is hers—so should she give him back the money? That’s what the Ran says: no. The money is hers. What is due to him? Betrothal is due to him. The betrothal he threw in the trash. He says, I don’t want the betrothal—your problem. The money was given to me; why should I return the money?

[Speaker B] The betrothal took place at the beginning—it’s not that this is an extended action?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So now, basically, the act of betrothal is the transfer of money, which happened at the beginning. Why is there no issue of “his means of acquisition has expired”? Because there is an ongoing action over time, because a debt was created against it. So the Ran apparently understands—yes—because if he understood the other possibility, the first possibility, that in essence he betroths her with the debt created at the end, then his whole proof is incorrect. After all, if the betrothal is done with the debt created at the end, then what is the problem with him betrothing her at the end? The fact that the money was spent long ago—so what? He is betrothing her with a debt. What is the problem? Therefore it seems that the Ran understands that he betroths her at the beginning; he betroths her with the money that was given at the beginning, and the debt only bridges the problem of “his means of acquisition has expired.” He is not betrothing her with the debt; he is betrothing her with the money. Okay? That is the Ran’s claim. Now, in Avnei Milu’im, siman 40, subsection 1—let’s read him now bit by bit, because I think what stands behind his discussion is exactly this point. “Even though the money was spent,” says the Avnei Milu’im, at the beginning of the chapter HaOmer, 59a—this is Rav and Shmuel in our passage. “And these coins are not like a loan, and not like a deposit. They are not like a loan, because they were given for betrothal; and they are not like a deposit, because the coins are consumed under her control.” And the Ran writes: “Nevertheless, it appears that if he retracts”—this is the Ran we just saw—“she is not obligated to return the money. For otherwise, with what does he betroth her, since they are not acquired by her until the end of thirty days, and they were spent in the meantime; see there.” This is the quote from the Ran that we just saw. “And in the novellae of the Maharit, he concludes that the money too remains under the control of the betrother until thirty days, and if he retracts within the thirty days, she must return the money.” What is he saying here? What does the Maharit hold?

[Speaker B] That if he retracts—what? That the whole time the money is still his.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right—that she acquires the money only at the end. The Maharit claims that throughout all thirty days the money remains under the control of the betrother, and therefore he says that if the betrother retracts within thirty days, she has to return him the money. True, he is the one at fault and he threw his betrothal in the trash—but she has his money that she does not deserve. Give me back the money; after all, I didn’t receive betrothal. This proves what I said above about the Ran. In other words, you see that he understands that the Ran, who said above that she does not have to return the money, says so because she acquired the money already at the beginning. That is the dispute between the Ran and the Maharit. According to the Ran, she acquired the money immediately at the beginning, and the betrothal is effected by the money. The debt created in exchange for the money only solves the problem of “his means of acquisition has expired.” That’s all. But the betrothal money—the money of betrothal—is the money that was given at the beginning. Consequently, says the Ran, she does not have to return the money if the man retracts. Why? When he gave her the money, she already gave him the betrothal in exchange. Everything is fine, that’s it. It only takes effect in thirty days, and there is no problem of “his means of acquisition has expired,” because this is an ongoing action. Now he doesn’t want it to take effect at the end. Fine, he doesn’t want it—his problem. And he received the consideration for the money; I do not have to return the money. If I retract, that’s something else, because then he did not receive what… But if I am willing to give him the betrothal and he already gave me the money in exchange for the betrothal, and he simply does not want the betrothal, that is his problem. It’s like saying, for example: I gave you money and bought an animal from you, and now I took that animal and threw it in the trash, or gave it back to you as a gift—do you have to return my money? Of course not. I gave you the money; in exchange you gave me the animal. The fact that afterward I decide to throw the animal in the trash is my problem. I received the consideration. Here too, same thing. He gave her the money and betrothed her; she gave him the consideration. The consideration is the betrothal given in exchange for the money. That’s it, it’s over. The legal effect takes hold only in thirty days, and there’s no issue of “the beginning of his means of acquisition,” that’s in parentheses, but overall he received the consideration for the money. Now he says, I don’t want the betrothal. Fine—you threw your animal in the trash. Why should I return your money? If she does not give him the betrothal within the thirty days—she retracts—that’s something else. He did not receive the animal at all. He did not receive the animal—return the money. That’s the Ran. Therefore the Ran assumes that the betrothal is done at the beginning, with the money given at the beginning. The Maharit disagrees with him precisely on that; that’s what the Avnei Milu’im says. “In his novellae, the Maharit concluded that the money too remains under the control of the betrother until thirty days.” That’s the point on which he disagrees with the Ran, because he thinks that the money belongs to the betrother until thirty days. So with what does she become betrothed at the end? With what does she become betrothed, sorry? She becomes betrothed with the debt created at the end. What does it mean that the money belongs to the betrother? It means that she owes him money, a debt. The money is “a loan given to be spent,” meaning she can use the money. It is not the coins themselves, but the debt that is created in exchange for the money—when the money was given, a debt was created against it. That debt is the betrother’s money that is located with the woman. And I betroth the woman with the debt, as in the first understanding; that is what the Maharit holds. Meaning that throughout all thirty days there is a debt, some value of mine, that is with her, with the woman. And if in the end I did not effect betrothal, then give it back to me; I did not give you the debt—return it to me. So really, I think that in a very clear way, this is the practical implication of the difference between the two conceptions. And according to this, it really comes out that the Ran learns like the second conception—that this is an ongoing act—and we saw above that this is indeed the Ran. And the Maharit holds that no: the coins betroth her at the beginning, and the obligation created against the coins that were given only solves the problem of “his means of acquisition has expired,” and the betrothal money is the money itself, not the debt. Sorry—according to the Maharit, the betrothal money is the debt. It is the debt. He betroths her with the debt at the end of the thirty days, and therefore if he did not betroth her, then there is a debt—return the debt to me. So that is exactly the dispute between the Maharit and the Ran. It seems to me that here the implication of that dispute is very clear. Okay, I remind you that the Ran really writes that this can be done also with a document, not only with money, as long as the document remains under her control. Why? Because the Ran understands that what betroths is the initial money. The only reason you need the debt afterward is to bridge the gap of “his means of acquisition has expired.” Right? So with a document too, the betrothal would be done by transferring the document at the beginning; the document is still in the world, so there is no problem of “his means of acquisition has expired.” If I understand, like the Maharit, that the betrothal is with the debt and not with the money given at the beginning, then with a document you cannot say such a thing—a document does not create a debt. Right? So the Ran, who says that this can also be said in betrothal by document and not only in betrothal by money, is consistent with his own view that he understands it like the second interpretation: this is an ongoing act in which the initial act itself made the betrothal, and all that is needed afterward—that there be a debt or that the document remain in existence—is only so that there not be a problem of “his means of acquisition has expired.” According to the Maharit, the fact that a debt was created means that the problem of “his means of acquisition has expired” never arises; not that we solve it. Since the betrothal is done with a debt that exists there, and that happens at the end of the thirty days, the legal effect is created immediately with the performance of the betrothal. With a document you can’t do such a thing.

[Speaker B] It wouldn’t be possible to betroth with a document taking effect later.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. According to the Maharit, I claim that it wouldn’t be possible to betroth even if the document still exists. Now let’s continue reading the Avnei Milu’im. “And in the Ritva on Kiddushin 6, regarding one who betroths with a loan, this is his language: There are those who ask, what is different about betrothing with a loan”—where she is not betrothed—“from one who says to a woman: Behold, you are betrothed to me after thirty days with this money”? For if she did not retract within the thirty days, she is betrothed after thirty days with this money. If she retracted, then of course she is not betrothed; that’s the Talmud later on, which we’ll still discuss. Speech comes and cancels speech. But if she did not retract, then no further act of betrothal is needed; she is betrothed, even though the money was spent. “But there, those coins are in her possession as a loan until the thirty days, and even though they are no longer present at the time the betrothal takes effect, she is betrothed through them.” So what is the difference? What is the difference between this and betrothing with a loan? And I explained what the difference is. In betrothing with a loan there is no debt in this sense; there is a gift. But he says: “And one can say that there it is different, because since he gave them to her for the purpose of betrothal, it is as though he explicitly stated that she should become betrothed to him through the benefit that he lent her and from which she is released; for certainly that is why he advanced them to her and gave her permission to spend them—that she should benefit from them and become betrothed through that benefit.” Why doesn’t he just give her the money at the time of betrothal? I mean, let him come in thirty days, give her the money, and betroth her immediately. Why does he give her the money now and want the betrothal in thirty days? It is with that benefit, the fact that he advanced the giving of the money to her, that he wants to betroth her. Not with the loan money itself, but with that benefit—that he lets her spend the money thirty days earlier. The Ritva claims that this is not called betrothing with a loan. This parallels betrothing with the benefit of forgiving a loan, which the Talmud in Kiddushin says does create betrothal. Betrothing with a loan does not create betrothal, but one who betroths with the benefit of forgiving a loan—she is betrothed. So this is a very fine distinction, because on the face of it this is really exactly betrothing with a loan. He is not forgiving her the loan; there is a loan, and he is betrothing her with that loan. Why isn’t every case of betrothing with a loan the same? I lent her money; after I don’t know how long she needs to repay me, I say, forget it, don’t repay me—be betrothed to me through this loan. It doesn’t work. Why? After all, it’s the same thing—basically he is forgiving her the loan. He gave her thirty days to use it—she is betrothed. The difference is that in an ordinary case of betrothing with a loan, I lend her money, and after thirty days I say, you know what, instead of repaying me, become betrothed to me. That doesn’t help, because I gave her nothing. But if from the very moment I give her the loan I say to her: become betrothed to me with this after thirty days—there she is betrothed, says the Ritva. That is not called betrothing with a loan. Why? Because from the outset, when he gave her the money, the loan was given for the sake of betrothal. It’s not that he changed his mind about the loan and says, forget about repaying me, I want to betroth you. That’s the usual case of betrothing with a loan. The loan was originally just an ordinary loan. After thirty days he says, you know what, instead of giving me back the money, become betrothed to me. That doesn’t help, because he gave her nothing. But if he says, look, I am lending you the money, and this loan is being given to you for betrothal—the ability to spend the money for thirty days before you return it, with that I want to betroth you—then she is betrothed. That is not betrothing with a loan. Why? Yes, therefore the Ritva says this parallels the benefit of forgiving a loan. And it could be that indeed what is happening is this. Really, the question is why when he betroths with a loan she is not betrothed, but with the benefit of forgiving a loan she is betrothed. Because the loan is not—

[Speaker B] Here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m saying, with the benefit of forgiving a loan I’m talking about the case in Kiddushin 6, not our case. I lent her money; after thirty days I come to her and say: become betrothed to me through this loan. She is not betrothed. But if after thirty days I come and say: become betrothed to me through the benefit that I forgive you the loan, then she is betrothed, even though I didn’t tell her that in advance. I say it at the end. What is the difference between betrothing her with the loan and betrothing her with the benefit that I forgive her the loan? Come on—then in the loan too it’s like that. When I betroth her with the loan, doesn’t she receive the benefit that I forgave her the loan? After all, she won’t have to return the money to me.

[Speaker B] So that’s a benefit—that the money remained with her.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And with a loan she is not betrothed?

[Speaker B] One who betroths with the benefit of forgiving a loan—no, I mean ordinary betrothing with a loan.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ordinary betrothing with a loan is also the benefit of forgiving a loan. After all, I come to her after thirty days and say, forget it, this loan of yours—I want to betroth you with it. So basically I forgave her the loan.

[Speaker B] Right, fine, but he didn’t—she already could have… now a whole month has passed in order to get that money back. So what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And now I say to her, keep it.

[Speaker B] But she didn’t—fine, but the money with which he betrothed her, from the beginning, that money is not money—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So this is just a kind of formal distinction. She actually does receive a benefit from me. It’s just that I am not betrothing her with the benefit she receives from me, but with the loan money, which no longer exists. But she does receive a benefit from me, and still she is not betrothed—which is absurd. After all, clearly I intend to betroth her. It’s like finding an ownerless object and intending to acquire it through one’s four cubits and not through this—

[Speaker B] So it could be that if he falls on it and acquires it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So really, according to this, it indeed connects to an effective acquisition act that one did not intend to be effective—Rabbi Akiva Eiger and the Ran there at the beginning of Bava Metzia. No, it’s an effective acquisition and an ineffective one. Meaning, I actually performed an acquisition act that is effective, but I did not intend to acquire through that act, only through another act. For example, one who throws himself upon an ownerless object—he thinks that falling on the object acquires it. Now, if he fell on the object and it is also within his four cubits in the public domain, then it is within his four cubits in the public domain. So he performed an effective act; it’s just that he intended to acquire not through the effective act but through the ineffective one. Okay? So the dispute there is whether that works or not. And according to this, here too one would have to say: he did indeed give her a benefit, but he does not intend to betroth her with the benefit, rather with the loan money, so she is not betrothed even though she received the benefit. But in the case of betrothing with the benefit of forgiving a loan, there he explicitly intends to betroth her with that benefit, and she receives the same benefit as in betrothing with a loan. The difference is what he intends. Does he intend to betroth her with that benefit? Then she is betrothed. If he gave her a benefit and does not intend to betroth her with that benefit but with something else, then she is not betrothed. The entire difference lies in his intention. Even though she received a benefit and he wants to betroth her, why should she not be betrothed? It’s conceptually strange; some kind of formal distinction, and it’s very strange conceptually. Also in the case of an effective and ineffective acquisition act, it’s a dispute. It is not obvious that she would not acquire in the case of someone falling on an ownerless object. So it could be that he simply did not intend to acquire at all—that’s one discussion. If he intended to acquire, but not through this acquisition act, rather through another one—that is a dispute whether it works or not. And here too, seemingly, it should be the same thing. According to the Ritva, it comes out more substantive. Because according to the Ritva, essentially what is happening is that if he tells her from the beginning that he is betrothing her through the loan, then even if he betroths her with a loan she is betrothed. Because after all, he effectively intended to give her the money for her expenses thirty days in advance. The proof is that he did not give her the money in thirty days when he wants to betroth her, but gave it to her now. So when there is a tangible benefit that she receives, she really is betrothed. Okay? And it could be that betrothing with the benefit of forgiving a loan is really this. And in betrothing with the benefit of forgiving a loan, he is essentially saying to her: listen, I am now giving you this forgiveness as the benefit through which you become betrothed. Fine—then she really is betrothed through that. Okay, according to how I’m saying it, of course, you don’t have to get to that. The Avnei Milu’im, and apparently the Ritva as well, assume that there is no difference between a loan and sale proceeds. In a loan too, she has with her something of monetary value that is mine, and still one cannot betroth with it. So he asks: then why with the benefit of forgiving a loan can one do so? But according to what I’m saying, that’s not the case. According to what I’m saying, with a loan one cannot betroth because she received nothing—not because he did not intend to betroth her with the benefit she received. She really did not receive anything. She received nothing.

[Speaker B] Yes?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s simpler. Now why in our case is she betrothed? Because she did receive something, because this is like sale proceeds. She has something of mine with her, and that is what she received. What happens with the benefit of forgiving a loan? In the benefit of forgiving a loan, maybe when I forgive the loan I’m essentially saying to her: this money will now become—now, I want you to repay me the loan, okay? But don’t actually do it. So now I already have money with you; it’s like sale proceeds. And now that is what I am giving you for betrothal. Do you understand? It’s like the reverse, but like we saw in the Mishnah about the Sabbatical year, where the Mishnah says that, for example, a hired worker’s wages and a storekeeper’s running account are not cancelled in the Sabbatical year, right? Because we said that this is like a deposit. What happens if he records them against him as a loan? Then it is cancelled. Meaning, I bought on credit at the store, and the shopkeeper—so basically I owe him a hundred shekels, okay? Or I owe her a hundred shekels. Now he wants to betroth me—or the question there is whether the debt is cancelled; there the discussion is about whether the debt is cancelled, yes? So they say that the debt is not cancelled. Why is it not cancelled? Because the shopkeeper has, with me, a hundred shekels. Cancellation of debts in the Sabbatical year does not mean giving me his money; rather it means exempting me from the duty to give him gifts. But if I have his money with me, cancellation of debts does not turn his money into mine. Okay? That is basically the claim. But if he records it against me as a loan, then it is cancelled. What does it mean to record it against me as a loan? Even now I owe him money, so what does it mean that he turns it into a loan? What is accomplished here by classifying it as a loan? Clearly what is happening here is that the seller is basically saying: look, you have with you a value of one hundred shekels that is mine, because sale proceeds are not a loan. Take this value of one hundred shekels that I have with you as a loan. Now what happens? Now that value becomes yours; you received it as a gift. That’s it; now I have nothing with you. Instead, there is a loan that you are obligated to repay me with a gift in exchange, to pay it back in thirty days. That is what the Sabbatical year cancels, because that is a loan. Meaning, classifying it as a loan is exactly that. Otherwise, understand: according to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), the concept of classifying it as a loan is just a strange concept. What is classifying it as a loan? It was also a loan before. I owed you a hundred shekels by virtue of sale proceeds. Now you say to me, you know what, let it be a loan. What does that mean, a loan? Before too the money was with me and I could spend it. What changed? What does classifying it as a loan do? What changed in the situation as a result of classifying it as a loan? According to Maimonides it’s simple. Because a debt of sale proceeds means you have with me a value of one hundred shekels. When you lend it to me—when you classify it against me as a loan—what are you saying? Take these hundred shekels as a loan. Take them. And now you will owe me. But a debt in a loan means that I do not have with you a value of one hundred shekels—you received that value as a gift, and now you have an obligation to pay me later. So my money that was with you disappears. Therefore now the Sabbatical year cancels it; it is a full-fledged loan. According to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), before too it was a loan, because both in a loan and in sale proceeds I have with you a value of one hundred shekels. So what does classifying it as a loan do? According to them one has to say that classifying it as a loan simply changes the basis of the debt. After all, we saw that the basis of a debt from sale proceeds is commercial efficiency; it is not because you are miserable and I am helping you because you have no money. Rather it is simply so that I won’t take three shekels from you each time and have to give you change, and so on—come in a month and give me everything you owe me. That is credit, right? When I classify it as a loan, what am I basically saying? You come to me and say, listen, I don’t have money right now. I owe you a hundred shekels; I don’t have it. And I say, you know what, fine, then you’ll owe me. What does that mean? From now on this is a loan on a social basis, not on the basis of commercial-economic efficiency. Ah—if so, then this is a loan and the Sabbatical year cancels it. Because according to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), the difference between sale proceeds and a loan is not in the character of the debt but in its basis, in its essence, in the motivation for the debt. Is it an act of kindness toward a poor person, or is it merely commercial efficiency? And the moment I classify it against him as a loan, he is basically coming to me as someone in need. And I said to him, listen, fine, so the hundred shekels you owe me—let’s postpone it for a month. Then that really is a loan. It is a loan to a needy person. I don’t care that it began as sale proceeds. That is classifying it as a loan. Okay? “And it appears from the Ritva’s words that the reason why it works even though the money was spent is because he betroths her with the benefit she derived from them—that she had permission to do with them as she wished, and he gave her permission to spend them. And this is difficult for me: granted, at the moment of giving she had a benefit”—when she received the money she had a benefit; she can do with it as she wishes—“nevertheless, at the time of betrothal that benefit has already expired.” So how can you betroth her? With the money itself you cannot betroth her; the money no longer exists. The giving of the money involved a benefit—it enabled her to spend the money—but that benefit no longer exists in the world; it died. “And one who says, pull this cow and do not acquire it except after thirty days, does not acquire it because the pulling has already expired, and here too the benefit she had had already expired at the time of betrothal.” But according to how we explained it, there is no difficulty at all. Why? Because he betroths her—yes—with a cow, pulling it does not create a debt against it. Right? Pulling does not create a debt against it. Here, this is what the Ran explained: it is the giving of money that creates a debt against it—so what? So now he can betroth her with the debt. This is not difficult at all. It’s just that in the Ritva it indeed does not say that he betroths her with a debt, because the Ritva holds that a loan and sale proceeds are the same thing. So he really says: then how can you betroth with a benefit? That benefit existed at the time of betrothal, at the time of giving the money, but at the time the betrothal takes effect, thirty days later, nothing remains. It has already expired. Of course, one can say the second way—that there is here an act of betrothal through the debt that was created—and then nothing is difficult. After all, she has a debt; he owes her money, right? With that debt he can betroth her. It is not similar to the cow. So he says: “And it is possible according to what the Ran wrote in the chapter HaKotev, regarding ‘pull this cow and it shall not become yours until after thirty days’—see there—that he concluded that where the cow is standing in an alleyway after thirty days, the pulling of the cow from the time of his statement, when he said ‘this cow shall be acquired by you,’ is effective for him, even though the acquisition takes effect only after thirty days. However, if after thirty days the cow stands in the public domain, it is not effective. And the pulling of the cow before the thirty days has expired, because even his property leaves his possession when placed in the public domain. But in an alleyway, where it does not leave his possession, the original pulling is effective for him, since it is still in his possession.” End quote. The Ran says as follows: if the cow is standing in an alleyway—an alleyway is not the public domain—then it has not yet been removed from being mine; the cow is still mine. Therefore I can acquire it even after thirty days, as long as after thirty days the cow is still in the alleyway. If after thirty days the cow is in the public domain, then its being in the public domain means it is no longer mine. What do you mean it is no longer mine? It only becomes mine now. In the alleyway too it is not mine. It’s just that in the alleyway there is no obstacle to its being mine. Why not? Because it is considered perhaps as if I am pulling it now. But if it is in the public domain, I am not pulling it now. I said that perhaps the very presence of the cow bridges the gap of “his means of acquisition has expired.” So even if I am not pulling it now, the earlier pulling works. Okay? “If so, here too she is betrothed with that benefit that he gave her permission to use as she wished. And even though after thirty days that benefit has already expired, since that benefit remains with her and she is exempted from paying him after thirty days, it is no worse than an alleyway, since it has not left his possession. And here too this benefit is still in his possession in that she is exempted from paying him. And even though with that alone she is not betrothed, because one who betroths with a loan is not betrothed—for there too, if it stands in the alleyway and he did not pull it, he does not acquire it—still the original pulling helps him, since it did not leave his possession; so too here the original benefit helps, since it still remains in that she is exempted from it.” And he gets very tangled up. He gets tangled up in the question of how this is similar to, and how it differs from, betrothing with a loan. In betrothing with a loan too, the benefit of the money is still with her. So why can’t he betroth her with that? But according to what I’m saying, there is no difficulty at all. At the time he betroths her with the debt created here, and that debt is not like a loan debt, it is a debt like sale proceeds—one can betroth with it. So what’s not difficult?

[Speaker B] What? You also mentioned in the previous lesson that everything depends on cancellation in the Sabbatical year.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There I prove the difference between sale proceeds and a loan.

[Speaker B] So—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This whole twisting around that the Avnei Milu’im is doing here never even starts; there is no problem. It is not similar to betrothing with a loan, because this is betrothing with sale proceeds, and one who betroths with sale proceeds—she is betrothed. But if it really is the same thing, as the Avnei Milu’im assumes, then it is indeed very hard to understand what the difference is between this and betrothing with a loan. And why does the fact that the money—the benefit of the money—in some sense, the benefit of the money is still in her possession, like the cow still standing in the alleyway—why is that comparable? The benefit of the money is still in her possession? Then why is one who betroths with a loan not betrothed? In an ordinary case too, when one betroths with a loan, the benefit that the money is hers and she can use it is still in her possession. And we see that one can betroth with the benefit of forgiving a loan. The whole thing is unnecessary entanglement. But that entanglement stems from the fact that he, like most commentators, does not think there is a difference between sale proceeds and a loan. And the whole story here is precisely this difference. In the end he brings the Rashba, and the Rashba in his novellae at the beginning of the chapter HaOmer says as follows: “Even though the money was spent,” like in our passage, yes? “And the reason for the matter is that since it was given initially for the sake of betrothal, even though at the time it is fit to take effect it is no longer in the world—the money was spent—nevertheless, since if the acquisition is not completed she must return it, we regard it as though it is still present, and with that benefit she becomes betrothed, similar to the case where she becomes betrothed with the benefit of forgiving a loan.” What is he saying here? Yes, he is troubled by the same difficulty. After all, at the time the betrothal is supposed to take effect, the money is no longer in the world, right? And he says: since if the acquisition is not completed she has to return it—what does it mean, if the acquisition is not completed? Ah? Right—for example, if the husband… because if she retracts, everyone agrees that the money is returned. If the husband retracts, we saw that this is a dispute between the Ran and the Ritva and the Maharit. The Rashba holds like the Maharit: that if the husband retracts, then she has to return it. The Rashba says: therefore, what?

[Speaker B] Therefore we see that the acquisition keeps continuing the whole time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so clearly this is the view that says she becomes betrothed with the debt at the end. The money belongs to the betrother, yes, and with the debt at the end she becomes betrothed. And the moment he does not betroth her, she has to return it. According to the Ran—this is the Maharit. And therefore she has to return it.

[Speaker B] According to the Ran, the Rashba and the Ran disagree. Right, the Rashba is like the Maharit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, according to the Ran, where the betrothal is through the money given at the beginning, then the money is hers. Why should she return it if he doesn’t want to betroth her? That’s his problem; he threw his cow into the sea. Okay, so the Rashba is like the Maharit. “And from his words it appears”—sorry a moment—“we regard it as though it is still present, and with that benefit she is betrothed.” We regard the money as still present—why is it still present? Because the debt corresponding to it is still present. “And with that benefit she is betrothed”—what does that mean? She is betrothed with the debt, not with the money. Exactly like the Maharit. Okay, that is the first of the two conceptions. Why did he say that this is an acquisition of betrothal through the benefit of forgiving a loan?

[Speaker B] Right, and he compares it to the benefit of forgiving a loan. As though money once given—the act is created at the end.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Basically he understands that the benefit of forgiving a loan is not to betroth with the loan money itself, because it is gone, but rather with the benefit that you received by means of that money, because that money created a corresponding obligation. And of course he treats a loan as equivalent to sale proceeds; he does not make the distinction. Fine. Rather he claims that the moment you betroth with the benefit of forgiving the loan, you are betrothing with the money that is with you, and there is a benefit in the fact that you receive that money. That is possible. To betroth with the loan money itself is impossible because it is no longer in the world. Okay? “And from his words it appears that after thirty days she is betrothed with that benefit by which she is released from him.” He says it explicitly, right? That she is betrothed with that benefit given to her at the end of the thirty days, not with the money given to her at the beginning, as the Ran learned, but she is betrothed with the money given at the end, like the Maharit. “And even though in the case of a loan she is not betrothed in such a manner unless he says to her ‘with the benefit of forgiving the loan,’ here, since it was given for the sake of betrothal from the outset, since had she not agreed initially he would not have given her the money at all and would not have lent to her at all, unlike an ordinary loan that already came into her possession as a loan”—what is he saying here? He says that the money was given to her for the sake of betrothal. So why is this different from an ordinary loan? Because the ordinary loan was given to her for ordinary spending. So what? What is the difference? He apparently understands as follows: when the money was given to her for the sake of betrothal, then essentially the money was given and a debt was created against it—that is what I explained in the Maharit. Now, here he deviates a bit from the Maharit, it seems to me. He is not claiming that she is betrothed through a debt that she owes him. She does not owe him a debt; she owes him betrothal. She does not owe him money; she owes him betrothal. So therefore even if the money was spent, after thirty days she still owes him the betrothal, and therefore she is betrothed. Because the obligation of betrothal is the lien created by the transfer of money. Except that according to this explanation, it should have come out specifically like the Ran.

[Speaker B] Because really the Rashba is here and taking from both ends.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying: the wording at the end seems to indicate that he is basically saying that he would not have given her the money at all if she had not agreed at the beginning. Fine—she did agree at the beginning. Now the master of the house retracts, not she. So if she agreed, then everything is fine. The fact that he retracts—why should she have to return the money? It’s a little strange. So maybe he means to say: if the acquisition is not completed, not because he didn’t agree—if he didn’t agree, then indeed she does not have to return the money, and then it is like the Ran, and then it is like the Ran—but rather if the acquisition was not completed for other reasons not dependent on him: she died, she retracted, I don’t know, something happened in the middle. Someone else betrothed her, and if someone else betrothed her, we saw that she is betrothed to the second one. That too means the acquisition was not completed. So in such a case she has to return the money to the betrother because it is basically her fault. It is as though she did not agree, right? Because she became betrothed to someone else. But if he did not agree, then indeed it could be that he goes like the Ran and not like the Maharit. In the end the Avnei Milu’im concludes: “And the clear conclusion is like the view of the Ran, that he gave her the money immediately for the sake of betrothal and he is not entitled to retract within thirty days.” He cannot retract, and therefore if he did retract, that is his problem; he will not get the money. He cannot retract—he can retract, it’s just that he cannot get the money if he retracts. “But he gave it to her entirely with betrothal in mind. And if she retracts within the thirty days”—you feel here, wait, so if she received it then even if she retracts…? He says no: “If she retracts within the thirty days, she has to return him the money.” Why? Because he gave her the money in exchange for her becoming betrothed to him; if she retracts, he did not receive the consideration, so certainly she must return him the money. We saw that even according to the Ran. “If so, after thirty days it is not a loan at all, and it is like what we say in the chapter HaIsh Mekadesh: according to the one who says wages accrue only at the end, it is not a loan at all, but rather he betroths her with that benefit that no debt remain upon her at all. And here too, after thirty days, since if she retracts there would be a loan upon her, but if she consents to the betrothal there is no debt upon her at all, since from the outset he gave her the money completely, and it was never a deposit and never a debt in her possession at all.” She is essentially betrothed through the money given to her at the beginning. It really appears from his words that this is basically a third option. What he wants to say here is this: until now we saw two ways to understand why she is betrothed after thirty days. One possibility is that she is betrothed through the debt created at the end. The second possibility is that she was betrothed at the beginning, through the money given at the beginning, and the debt only serves as a bridge so that there not be a problem of “his means of acquisition has expired” until the moment the legal effect takes place. Here his claim is that a debt was created—but not a monetary debt; rather a debt to become betrothed. She does not owe him money; she owes him becoming betrothed. Okay? Therefore, if she retracts, then she did not give him what she owed him—to become betrothed—so she should return him the money, because the money was given to her only in exchange for that. But if he retracts, then she does not have to return the money, because no monetary debt was created here. What was created here was an obligation to become betrothed. Fine? She was willing to become betrothed; he did not want it. Okay? Therefore in such a situation she does not have to return the money. So there are apparently three formulations here. One formulation: I betroth her with the initial money. That money created a debt corresponding to it, but the betrothal was effected with the initial money, and the whole debt that was created there is only to prevent the problem of “his means of acquisition has expired” when the legal effect is created at the end. But the betrothal money, the money of betrothal, is the money given at the beginning. Second possibility: no. The money creates a debt, and the debt is the betrothal money; at the end of the thirty days he gives her the betrothal money. Third formulation—and this is what seems to come out here—the giving of the money creates a debt, a debt to become betrothed. Not a debt of money, but a debt to become betrothed. So if she does not give him that—because if it were a monetary debt, then even if the husband retracts she would have to return him the money, because she owes him; what difference does it make whether the husband retracted or she retracted? But if it is a debt to become betrothed, and she is willing to become betrothed, what do you want from her? She fulfilled her side of the deal. You don’t want it? That’s your problem. Why should I return the money to you? Because the debt created here is a debt to become betrothed, not a monetary debt. That is the third formulation. And the practical difference is that if the husband retracts—if it were a monetary debt, then even if the husband retracts she would have to give him the money back. But if it is a debt to become betrothed, then if the husband retracts, why should she give him the money back? She is willing to become betrothed; she gave what she obligated herself to give. The fact that you don’t want to take it—that’s your problem.

[Speaker B] Is there such a thing? What? A debt to become betrothed? Why not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the merchandise, that’s the sale—I bought it. I gave her money, and that money—it’s basically like sale proceeds, but without—

[Speaker B] Like if I bought a challah in the grocery, and then he just doesn’t come to take it. Right. He says: I agreed to give it to you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, take the challah. You don’t want it? You poured the challah into the sea—what do I care?

[Speaker B] What does the Meiri—what does the Ran explain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Meiri really does not claim this. The Meiri claims that he betroths with the debt at the end. A monetary debt is created, and he betroths with the debt at the end; it is not a debt to become betrothed. A monetary debt is created, and he betroths her with the debt.

[Speaker B] And therefore if he retracts—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A monetary debt was created, so in any case it has to be returned. That’s what the Meiri says: even if he retracts, it has to be returned. And the Rashba says that if he retracts—

[Speaker B] retracts—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] She does not need to return it—that’s how it seems from his wording at the end. The Ran certainly says this, and in Rashba at the beginning it looks like Meiri, but the wording at the end sounds like the Ran. Okay, this is where I’ll stop. We’ve basically finished the discussion about betrothal taking effect after thirty days. The next stage in the topic is: speech comes and cancels speech, which is still within the topic of betrothal after thirty days. If the woman changes her mind, can that cancel the betrothal? Because after all, everything has already been completed. So there’s a question here of speech coming and canceling speech, and that runs here for a page or something like that. And the topic after that is betrothal from now and after thirty days. Now I’m going to reverse the order. Meaning, in the next lesson I’ll talk about betrothal from now and after thirty days. That’s on 59b, 59a and 59b. The Talmud is on the last section of the Mishnah, and the Talmudic discussion of it is on 59a–59b. Okay? And I want to talk about that because it will be contrasted with betrothal after thirty days, so I want to do them back-to-back in order to see the differences. After that we’ll return to speech coming and canceling speech, which is really a different topic. Okay?