Changes in Halacha, Lesson 3
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Changing reality, the eternity of the Torah, and Meiri
- Error of the Sages versus changed circumstances
- What is wrong with Reform, and Leibowitz on leaving the Jewish people
- Fox parables, the need to speak indirectly, and the example of swimsuits in the desert
- Too good to be kosher, and suspicion toward “reasonable” solutions
- Three models: plain conservative, heretic, and midrashic conservative
- Not classifying people but arguments, and the problematic move from argument to person
- Halakhic decisors, lenient and stringent rulings, and what “halakhic truth” is
- Motives, agendas, and the Women of the Wall
- Searching for a fourth model and defining the Reform position as “partial commitment”
- Sociological mapping: Haredim, Modern Orthodox, heretics, and Reform
- The Israeli traditionalist and the gap between identity and argument
Summary
General Overview
The text presents a principled halakhic change that follows from a change in reality, and tries to distinguish between changing the Torah and changing halakhic rulings because of new circumstances, while confronting the idea of the Torah’s eternity and the immediate suspicion that any such change is “Reform.” The speaker examines how moves like those of Meiri can be committed to Jewish law and not “Reform,” and emphasizes that the question is not what one does in practice but what kind of argument justifies the act. He suggests classifying not people but arguments, and builds a model of four logical types of attitudes toward Jewish law, through which one can also understand the distinction between Orthodoxy, conservatism, heresy, and Reform.
Changing reality, the eternity of the Torah, and Meiri
The speaker argues that changes in halakhic rulings can result from changes in the reality around us, and not from “tricks” like ways of peace, saving life, or fear of “what they’ll do to us.” He asks how a move like Meiri’s, or similar arguments raised today, can be reconciled with principles such as Maimonides’ “this Torah will not be exchanged” and with “do not add and do not subtract.” He distinguishes between a situation in which the Torah has changed and one in which reality has changed and therefore halakhic conduct changes as well, and presents this as a deep point with implications that go beyond the issue of change itself.
Error of the Sages versus changed circumstances
The speaker gives the example of changing natural knowledge, like tiny insects that people once thought “came from dust,” and discusses what one does when it seems that an assumption of the Sages does not fit current knowledge, such as the discussion whether it is forbidden to kill a louse on the Sabbath. He notes that many halakhic decisors “twist themselves into knots” in order to say that the Talmud did not err, and distinguishes this from his own position, which prefers a different case: not arguing with the earlier authorities, but claiming that the circumstances changed, and therefore they too would relate differently today. He says that even this position, which is less radical than accusing them of error, still arouses antagonism, mainly because of Reform.
What is wrong with Reform, and Leibowitz on leaving the Jewish people
The speaker flips the question around and asks what exactly is the problem with Reform if changed circumstances are a legitimate argument, and where the boundary lies between a halakhic argument and an illegitimate claim. He cites Leibowitz as saying that no one ever left the Jewish people because of theology; rather, someone leaves the Jewish people when he is not committed to Jewish law, and he illustrates this by referring to Spinoza. He sharpens the point that even when there are cases where the Sages themselves set a criterion dependent on circumstances, that is different from a case where we interpret the Sages as having intended circumstantial dependence where they did not say so explicitly, such as in relation to non-Jews.
Fox parables, the need to speak indirectly, and the example of swimsuits in the desert
Using Rashi’s comment that Rabbi Meir knew “three hundred fox parables,” the speaker explains that in order to rebuke the public on charged issues, one has to avoid labels and discuss a parable instead, in order to make calm discussion possible. He gives a parable about a group walking through the desert in swimsuits by force of ancestral tradition; then they reach a colder area and split: one group puts on clothes or a coat because it is cold, while the other continues with swimsuits in the name of ancestral tradition despite the suffering. He argues that in an intuitive sociological classification it seems that the sufferers are “conservatives” and those who adapt are “Reform,” but the parable is meant to show that the classification is not so simple, because it depends on the reasoning.
Too good to be kosher, and suspicion toward “reasonable” solutions
The speaker says that the public feeling is that if something is “reasonable, convenient, pleasant,” then it cannot be what the Torah wants, and therefore anyone who reaches a convenient result is immediately suspected of being Reform even if his argument is conservative. He connects this to a cultural assumption that identifies suffering with religious “authenticity,” and explains that the intuitive criticism does not necessarily stem from knowledge of principles like “when the reason lapses” but from an earlier concept than that. He presents the idea that the problem is not only the halakhic rules, but the way people already interpret in advance what “could possibly be kosher.”
Three models: plain conservative, heretic, and midrashic conservative
The speaker divides the arguments into three types through the parable: a plain conservative, who holds by “what is written without interpretations” and keeps walking in a swimsuit even when it is cold; a heretic, who puts on a coat simply because it is cold, without commitment to tradition and without trying to justify it within the system; and a midrashic conservative, who changes clothes based on an interpretation of ancestral tradition as a deeper principle, such as “wear clothing suited to the weather,” and presents this as a midrash of Jewish law rather than aggadic midrash. He emphasizes that two groups can behave exactly the same way in practice and both wear a coat, but one is heretical and the other is committed, and therefore the distinction is determined by the type of reasoning and not by the act.
Not classifying people but arguments, and the problematic move from argument to person
The speaker clarifies that he is classifying types of attitudes toward Jewish law by means of fox parables, but he is not classifying people, only arguments, because people identified as Orthodox can raise heretical or Reform arguments and vice versa. He says that nevertheless, classifying arguments can in the end also be used to judge people if it turns out that someone “is willing to make arguments of the sort that show lack of commitment to Jewish law.” He tells a personal story about a sharp article he wrote against a rabbi, and about a rebuke he received from a teacher in Yeruham who argued that one must not infer from the logical analysis of an argument that the person himself is “a heretic in fundamentals,” because a person can err, get confused, or fail to understand the implications of his words. Therefore, the move from the argument to the person is “very problematic,” and so is the reverse.
Halakhic decisors, lenient and stringent rulings, and what “halakhic truth” is
The speaker says it is wrong to think in categories of “being lenient” and “being stringent” as a halakhic decisor, except in special situations such as permitting an agunah, where Jewish law itself directs one to look for leniencies. He argues that the decisor is supposed to ask, “What is the halakhic truth in this situation?” and that only an outside researcher characterizes a tendency toward leniency or stringency as extra-halakhic categories. He adds that a decisor can rule differently for two people asking the same question because the circumstances differ, and he calls that objective within the circumstances.
Motives, agendas, and the Women of the Wall
The speaker says that he does not like judging people by psychological motives, but rather discussing arguments, and he illustrates this through criticism of an article by Rabbi Cherlow about the Women of the Wall, which argued that they should be tested by practical consistency, such as wearing tzitzit daily before putting on a prayer shawl at the Wall. He argues that feminism is legitimate, and that every rabbi and every person has agendas, and that even if the motive is unworthy, that does not justify “digging into motives” instead of discussing the legitimacy of the argument itself. He adds that even if a person lies about his motives, that does not mean he is forbidden to perform commandments, and that “the upright shall walk by them and the sinners shall stumble by them” — meaning that the same act can be a commandment or a transgression depending on the context.
Searching for a fourth model and defining the Reform position as “partial commitment”
The speaker searches within the model of the parable for a niche not covered by the three types, and explains that writing a “new constitution” or a “new tradition” is similar to the Mormons and not to Reform, because that is a rejection of the previous tradition. He suggests that the failure lies in a dichotomous way of looking at things — “either committed or not committed” — and gives an example about exams to show that dilemma arguments miss the middle. He defines the Reform person as a model of “partial commitment”: someone who respects the tradition of his ancestors but does not see it as binding at all costs, and does not offer a halakhic midrash showing that the change is required by Jewish law, but instead sets out additional considerations that have independent validity and sometimes override commitment to tradition.
Sociological mapping: Haredim, Modern Orthodox, heretics, and Reform
The speaker maps the logical types onto sociological groups and warns that sociology is not identical with logic: the heretic is the heretic; the plain conservative is the Haredi or Hardal ethos, even though in practice “no one is a plain conservative” because everyone uses interpretations; the midrashic conservative is Modern Orthodox and also Conservative Judaism, and he argues that there is no essential difference between them, only a sociological one. He says that many Reform figures explicitly speak as people who recognize Jewish law but add “other considerations” that limit its absolute authority, and he gives as an example Moshe Zemer, who wrote Sane Halakha with “almost entirely midrashic-conservative arguments” despite being the head of the Reform movement in Israel.
The Israeli traditionalist and the gap between identity and argument
The speaker is asked, “Where does the Israeli traditionalist fit?” and answers that it depends on what he says and what his reasoning is, not on what he does in practice, and that sometimes this is a Reform phenomenon of non-absolute commitment. He tells a story about a local council head in Yeruham who tried to establish a Reform or Conservative prayer quorum and nobody came, even though he claimed that “all the people here are Reform,” and he concludes from this that sociology and logic do not go together. He ends by saying that there are four logical niches of argument, and that one must always examine the “why” and not the “what,” and at the end he asks why it is called “Reform” and remarks that “Reform is not a bad thing either,” closing with “Sabbath peace.”
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And even from Torah-level prohibitions, in order to save them, and not because of all the gimmicks people use today — I don’t know, ways of peace, saving life, or what they’ll do to us if we don’t do this, and all kinds of things like that — but because of a principled change, a principled change that follows from the fact that the reality around us changes. And today I want to talk a bit about the significance of this, because for me that was only an example. I want to talk about the significance of this, what it actually means about changes in Jewish law in general, about Reformism, and really it touches the question of what Torah is, what Torah even is, what is it that must not be changed. So I want to touch on that a bit today. Basically, in Meiri there is a change that if it were, not only
[Speaker B] If it were,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] when it comes up today, when arguments similar to Meiri’s are raised today, it automatically meets some kind of resistance: this is Reform, if not outright heresy, this is lack of commitment to Jewish law, all kinds of things of that sort. And the question really is whether that is correct, and if not, then why not? I mean, what really is the difference between this and that same change about which we saw in the first lessons that Maimonides says, “this Torah will not be exchanged”? The Torah is supposed to be eternal, not to change. The Holy One, blessed be He, is supposed to take all situations into account, and it is unreasonable to say He made a mistake. So how can you suddenly change things? There are theological problems here, there are halakhic directives that say you do not change Jewish law. How does the move made by Meiri, or similar moves, fit with this conception of the eternity of the Torah, or of the fact that you cannot change, “do not add and do not subtract”?
[Speaker C] But here reality changed. Right, it’s not that the Torah changed.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but now as a result of that we also behave differently; halakhically too, we behave differently. The reason is the change in reality.
[Speaker C] Fine, but it’s not that you changed the Torah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, right. So now we’ll see — I want to sharpen that point a bit, because it has deeper implications than just the question of
[Speaker C] change.
[Speaker B] There’s the issue of reality changing, like the issue of the tiny mosquitoes that they said come from the dust, and today
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] they say
[Speaker B] it’s something else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so the question really is what do you do with something like that? So, for example, when you ask halakhic decisors whether today it is forbidden to kill a louse on the Sabbath
[Speaker D] or
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] things of that kind, most of them really twist themselves into knots. I mean, they say, look, maybe one should be stringent, but clearly the Talmud didn’t make a mistake, and things like that. That’s even worse, because there it really is change — there we are claiming that what existed in the past was a mistake. There is change; one claims it was an error. Right, I say “we” because I’m among those people too, but many don’t make that claim. I’m speaking about another situation. I’m speaking about a situation where I’m not really disagreeing with the earlier sages; I’m saying that the circumstances changed and therefore one has to relate to them differently. They too, if they were alive today, would relate differently. So it’s less radical than those changes, and still, of course, it arouses a lot of antagonism, mainly because of Reform. And the question really is how to relate to this issue. Or in other words, from the other side of the coin, you could ask: so what exactly is bad about Reform, if anything? If this argument is fine, then what’s the problem? What are Reform Jews? What is illegitimate here?
[Speaker C] Where does the issue come in that the Torah was not given by the Holy One, blessed be He?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I’m talking about arguments for change, Reform-type ones. I don’t mean that the Torah was not given by the Holy One, blessed be He — that’s already theology. Leibowitz once said that no one ever left the Jewish people because of theology. I think he was right. The one who leaves the Jewish people is someone who is not committed to Jewish law. Spinoza. Exactly, he spoke about Spinoza too.
[Speaker E] I still don’t understand the question. For example, on a Jewish holiday the rule is that it has to be something equal for everyone. What does “equal for everyone” mean today — a shower or something?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, there by definition the criterion is one dependent on circumstances, so that’s simple. Where the criterion itself depends on circumstances, then obviously the Sages themselves said: look at the circumstances and act accordingly. But regarding non-Jews they didn’t say that; that’s our interpretation. What the Sages said regarding non-Jews was: do this and don’t do that, period. We claim — or Meiri claims — that because he has a certain interpretation, he is actually changing the rabbinic statement. He doesn’t see it as a practical directive, but as a directive of attitude dependent on behavior, dependent on circumstances. And if that’s so, then when the circumstances change — that is already a more far-reaching interpretation. So here, it seems to me, I think I may already have mentioned this. I mentioned this example of swimsuits, right? About people walking in the desert in swimsuits? No, we haven’t talked about it yet? Okay, then I’ll talk about it now. For some reason I thought I had. This is an example a friend of mine once gave me. We like to amuse ourselves with examples; we collect examples. Examples in general, doesn’t matter examples of what. Examples are a very beautiful thing. Yes, I have a collection; I’ve got alternatives if you want, all kinds of examples. In any event, this is one of the examples he once gave me, very nice. I added it to the collection. What? Who’s the author? A guy named Amnon Levav. He’s not religious at all, just, we like to philosophize. It’s not really connected to Jewish law and such, but it connects for me. So he says like this: suppose there is a group of people walking in the desert in swimsuits. It’s hot there, so they walk in swimsuits. Their fathers walked in swimsuits, their grandfathers walked in swimsuits. They keep the tradition and walk in swimsuits. Fine. At a certain stage they reach a colder region. Then the group splits in two. Half the group says, fine, we — it’s cold — so at this stage we put on a coat or clothes. Later maybe a coat. They start to deteriorate and put on clothes, and after that they might even end up with a coat, so you have to be careful. But we put on clothes because it’s cold. The other group says, what are you talking about? We have the tradition of our ancestors in our hands, and we pay a price for preserving tradition. We keep walking in swimsuits even though it’s cold. Fine. So when I ask myself, between these two groups, how…
[Speaker G] Commandments were not given for enjoyment. What? Commandments were not given for enjoyment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Commandments, yes, not for enjoyment — no, not for enjoyment but not for enjoyment. Anything pleasurable is too good to be kosher, yes, that’s the point there. It can’t be something that fits our desires. In any event, when I look at these two groups and try to classify them according to the sociological categories common in our circles, then I think we would agree that the group walking in swimsuits are the conservatives, and the group wanting to wear clothes or coats are the Reform. The innovators, the Reform — “Reform” already has a certain connotation.
[Speaker H] Why did you bring this desert story? If you have people who lived in Europe and wore a wool hat, a big fur hat to keep warm,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and then
[Speaker H] they came to a hot place and stayed with that hat?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’ll tell you, I’ll tell you why I went
[Speaker C] there.
[Speaker H] But why bring an invented example? There are real examples.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s an example he invented
[Speaker H] and it’s funnier.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I liked it. But I’ll tell you why I went there. Rashi writes about Rabbi Meir that he knew three hundred fox parables. So Rashi asks: what does he need to bother with fox parables for? Is he telling stories in kindergarten for children? What are fox parables? He says that when he wanted to rebuke the public, he couldn’t tell them, look, you’re not okay, you’re like this, you’re like that. He says: look, there was a group of foxes and they… “Whoever wants to lie should distance his testimony.” You understand, there are charged issues where if you talk about them directly, you are immediately labeled — you’re against it and he’s for it — and it becomes impossible to discuss calmly, coolly. So let’s talk about those people in the desert with the swimsuits and discuss those funny people, what do we care? Afterward we’ll see what it means.
[Speaker I] Nobody dies from too much clothing? Huh? Nobody dies from too much clothing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not sure, but not all the way. Actually, sometimes I feel like I’m dying from too much clothing, and I don’t even wear a shtreimel. Anyway, yes, if I had to classify these two groups, one would be the conservatives and one the Reform. But it’s not so simple. Why isn’t it so simple? Because the question is what argument is made by those who want to wear clothes. They can make two types of arguments. The first argument says: we’re cold. If I’m cold, I put on clothes. That argument I wouldn’t even call Reform, but heresy. Right? Meaning, they simply don’t care that their ancestors’ custom was to walk in swimsuits; they go with what suits them. Until now they walked in swimsuits; now they wear a coat because it got cold. So those are the heretics. We already talked about the conservatives — they continue with the swimsuit even though it’s cold.
[Speaker J] What? A transgressor out of appetite?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A transgressor out of appetite, yes, maybe. A transgressor out of appetite has the connotation that he accepts the system, he just has an evil inclination. Here I’m talking about people who don’t — come on, what’s the problem? It’s cold, so I wear a coat. In other words, no. A transgressor out of appetite is still somewhat inside the system. He just can’t overcome it; he has an appetite. But he understands that it is forbidden, he is committed to the prohibition. We’ll get to the transgressor out of appetite in a minute, actually. In any event, that’s one type of argument: it’s cold. The second type of argument says: we of course keep the tradition of our ancestors with devotion. Our ancestors walked in swimsuits because the weather was hot, so the tradition of our ancestors is to wear clothing suitable to the weather. So we too will keep our ancestors’ tradition with devotion and wear clothing suitable to the weather. Now it is cold, so clothing suitable to the weather is a coat or long clothes. Now, this group, behaviorally, behaves exactly like the previous group, right? They too switch to clothes and a coat. But philosophically it is hard to call them heretics. They are actually preserving the tradition of their ancestors. They may disagree about what that tradition means. The first group says you preserve the tradition of walking in a swimsuit, that’s it — just as our ancestors did, so do we. And these people say: what are you talking about? Our ancestors wore swimsuits because that suited the weather, but the principle to be preserved is not the principle of wearing swimsuits; the principle to be preserved is wearing clothing suitable to the weather. That principle we preserve with devotion. When they go over to those people in swimsuits they say: you are heretics. Those who continue walking in swimsuits say to them: you are heretics, because our ancestors and teachers said that one must wear clothing suited to the weather. How can you walk in a swimsuit in cold weather? That goes against our tradition. That is heresy. You need to understand that in fact you can take this all the way. I mean, it’s not a game. Why does it sound like a game? It sounds like a game because all of us are basically captive to the concept of “too good to be kosher.” That’s the only reason. When we think that if a person suffers, then he’s a real religious person — that’s the feeling. Therefore, if someone finds an argument that supposedly is a conservative argument, but in the end he goes with what is comfortable for him, then come on, he’s Reform. Because it can’t be that that’s what the Torah says. It can’t be that the Torah tells me to put on a coat when it’s cold, right? So obviously he’s Reform. Understand that behind this sits an assumption that it cannot be that something reasonable, something convenient, something pleasant, is what the Torah wants from me. No — how could that be?
[Speaker K] It’s more than that, but not in that approach. There is — I assume we’ll get to it — the whole issue of when the reason lapses but the enactment does not.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, then we’re already entering halakhic principles. I’ll get to that in a second.
[Speaker K] It’s not only “too good to be.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, fine. So I’m saying: among us it’s “when the reason lapses,” but I’m not talking at that level. I’m talking before “when the reason lapses.” Most people don’t know that principle at all, and still, ask them how they would relate to the one who puts on a coat. They’ll say: that’s Reform, obviously. Not because of the halakhic principle of “when the reason lapses.” We’ll talk about that — it’s not so simple.
[Speaker I] Yes. There is a certain difficulty here with what you said at the beginning: that there are places where our sages explicitly said that it depends on circumstances, that Jewish law is circumstance-dependent. From there to infer that when they didn’t say it, maybe that means it is less circumstance-dependent — fine, you’re arguing over the argument. Right, and therefore arguments like Meiri’s, without a very strong defense of the claim that it depended on circumstances, are pulled out of thin air, with all due respect. I’m very much in favor of Meiri, but practically speaking he has no defense at all, except that it’s convenient for me to think like him. But give me some halakhic argument.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So right now I’m not going to give a halakhic argument; maybe I’ll get to that later. What I want to say now is just one thing: you can argue with the argument, you can say the argument is wrong — you cannot say that this argument is Reform. Do you understand? Those are two different things. You can say: I disagree, your argument is wrong, you have no basis. But when a person makes this claim, this is the interpretation he is proposing for the Jewish law under discussion. If that is the interpretation he proposes, then he is conservative.
[Speaker I] The Reform person too, the real Reform person, is like that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the question. We’ll see in a moment. That’s what we’re going to discuss. That’s exactly the question I’m asking: what is the difference between this and that? That’s why I’m using this example.
[Speaker G] There’s another aspect here. There’s the broader question: wait, and what if it’s bad? It’s bad because there is a large group of people in the desert who say, no, now we’ll walk with coats because the whole world walks with coats and it’s no longer suitable to walk in swimsuits. Okay? And that is a lot of the Reform — that’s basically their argument. He says, listen, I’m willing to make a great sacrifice.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what does that mean? Look at the environment as part of the desert too, and you’ll see that this is equivalent to a situation in which the region became colder. Why do you call that “the desert”? Once reality changed, and they claim that in this reality it is no longer correct to behave that way but rather one should change what we used to do, that is exactly the argument for putting on coats in a cold region. Why are you detaching the custom of the world or the norms of the world from the circumstances under discussion? That too is part of the circumstances.
[Speaker K] How the whole world walks.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that too is part of the circumstances. What?
[Speaker K] Or else that’s the group of heretics you defined at the beginning.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. I’m saying: it depends on the argument. And then, if the argument is a heretical one, then fine, it’s heresy — no, we are not committed to the system. But I’m asking: what do we say about those who, from within the system, raise an argument to do the same thing? So in practice, if I want to divide this into headings, I’d say the group that keeps walking in swimsuits is what we can call the plain conservative. He keeps the plain meaning. What is written, without interpretations, okay, or without midrashim. A fundamentalist, you could call it too.
[Speaker F] The group that wears coats just because it’s cold — those are the heretics.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They are not committed to the system, they’re not wrestling with it, they’re not raising arguments for why the system itself says to wear coats; they simply wear them because it’s cold. Up to now they wore swimsuits because it was hot. Even until now they weren’t preserving tradition — they wore swimsuits because it was hot, simply, not because their ancestors wore them. So they are the heretics. So now we already have a model for heretics and a model for plain conservatives. Those conservatives who make this midrash, who say that our ancestors wore clothing suited to the weather, so we too wear clothing suited to the weather — I’ll call them midrashic conservatives. That is, they make a halakhic midrash on the law under discussion, and that midrash they preserve; they are conservatives, unlike the heretics who don’t bother to offer a midrash. The heretics interpret nothing; they provide no reason why they are doing it. They simply do it because they are not committed.
[Speaker C] That’s something else. But midrash is not logic, let’s say. Midrash is a story.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, you’re talking about aggadic midrash. I’m talking about halakhic midrash. We’re talking about how one behaves, not what Abraham our father did in the fiery furnace. Halakhic midrash is interpretation of this kind — you expound the verse, you try to show what lies behind it, and sometimes that yields conclusions that under different circumstances might be different. “An eye for an eye” means monetary compensation. The verse tells you “an eye for an eye,” and you interpret it to mean, no, it’s money. I’m calling it midrash for the sake of simplicity.
[Speaker C] Yes, it’s very hard to define a person as belonging to this group or that group, because in the end you have to look at each case individually. Suppose that in this halakhah someone thinks it follows the midrash, and in another halakhah…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, here I really do have to add another introduction. Good that you’re pointing it out. I wanted to get to this at the end, but I’ll say it now. What I’m doing now is basically classifying types of attitudes toward Jewish law through the swimsuits — doesn’t matter, these are fox parables. In the end this is a classification of what types of attitudes toward Jewish law we know. But this is indeed an important point: I am not classifying people, I am classifying arguments. Because, for example, you will hear people whom you would call Orthodox raising Reform arguments, heretical arguments, whatever — and you’ll encounter Reform Jews who raise arguments that in my view are Orthodox, or what I called earlier midrashic-conservative. Meaning, the fact that a certain argument appears in a book written by someone Reform, or is said by someone who is Reform, does not mean the argument itself is Reform. Or vice versa. Yes, or vice versa. You have to examine the argument on its own merits. So when I make this classification here, I am classifying arguments, not people. Okay? That really is an important point. But I do think it is important to make this classification eventually also in order to judge people, because if you see, for example, a person who in some situations raises heretical arguments or Reform arguments, then he is Reform — never mind that some of his other arguments are conservative or Orthodox. Because if he is willing to make arguments of the type that show a lack of commitment to Jewish law, then he probably is not fundamentally committed to Jewish law, even if by chance he also has arguments that fit within the halakhic framework. But right now I’m dealing with arguments, not people.
[Speaker C] Yes, and in the opposite direction it comes out that someone who is conservative in certain sets of laws, that doesn’t mean he doesn’t think other laws should be… Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if in other laws he does otherwise, then he really will be defined according to those other laws. Apparently there is no such thing as a partial conservative. In other words, if you are committed, then you are committed. Otherwise it’s not that. It’s like someone who is committed to the whole Torah except for one letter, what the Sages say about conversion except for one detail, and so on. Although on the personal level there is trending
[Speaker D] like Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai that…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but I think I spoke about that there too. I don’t think that was a trend of leniency and stringency. The same is true today. Once I was on a panel with Moshe Lichtenstein from Gush and Rabbi Ra’am HaCohen from Otniel. They were talking — I don’t remember in what context this came up there — and then I argued that it’s not correct at all to think in this category of lenient and stringent. A halakhic decisor is not supposed to think that way, except again in certain cases like permitting an agunah. In permitting an agunah, a decisor looks for leniencies by definition; Jewish law says to do that. But when a decisor approaches an ordinary question, he is not supposed to ask, how can I be lenient or how can I be stringent? He is supposed to ask, what is correct in my view, what is the halakhic truth in this situation? Afterward a researcher may come and say, this decisor tends toward leniency, or this decisor tends toward stringency — but those are extra-halakhic categories. Those are categories of a researcher trying to characterize how a decisor operates or how a certain study hall operates or something like that. The decisor himself is not supposed to come with such a consciousness. He is neither lenient nor stringent; he simply says what seems correct to him in this situation.
[Speaker L] But the decisor, under the same circumstances, with two different people who have the same question, can rule differently. Yes, right, because of the circumstances.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, that’s what seems correct to him.
[Speaker L] No, but there’s no objective right; the right is also subjective according to the circumstances.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In my view that’s objective. I’ll get to that in a moment. That is called objective. Under those circumstances, that is the ruling.
[Speaker J] But I think that’s the point, the difference between Reform and something else. Because if you see someone who always goes in the direction of being lenient or in the direction of being stringent.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe he thinks the Torah always wants us to be stringent? Or he thinks the Torah always wants us to be lenient? Always? He always thinks the Torah wants us to be lenient.
[Speaker J] On the logical level that’s possible.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. Suspicions are fine; it’s possible.
[Speaker J] But you really have to think that maybe there’s something behind it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, maybe yes, maybe no.
[Speaker J] So instead of saying lenient, you say to yourself maybe it’s just an issue of how he feels inwardly?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, maybe not and maybe yes. But then in the end he’s not Reform but a heretic. Because then in fact he doesn’t really have an argument; he doesn’t believe in that argument. He just wraps himself in the cloak of one, so he’s a heretic. Again, we still haven’t discovered the Reform type. In a minute we’ll see how to discover the Reform type. But I’ll tell you: in general I don’t like to get into people’s motives. I don’t like getting into people’s motives not because I can’t or because I don’t trust my ability to do it. I think I can estimate. You can always be wrong, of course, but yes, we do estimate people’s motives. I just don’t think it’s right to judge people on the level of motives. I want to judge arguments. And if he raises a certain argument, I want to know: is this argument legitimate? I don’t care why he raises it. Is he raising it because he wants life to be easier? Legitimate — we are all human beings, all driven by many reasons. It’s like in the context of various demands for equality for women. There was once an article, I think by Rabbi Cherlow, about the Women of the Wall — I think that was quite a few years ago; today I don’t know if he would write it. He said there that before they put on a prayer shawl, let’s see them walking around with tzitzit, a four-cornered garment, in everyday life. Don’t go to the Wall and put on a prayer shawl; in day-to-day life wear a four-cornered garment, as the commandment requires, if you want to fulfill the commandment of tzitzit. What stood behind that? Not behind it — he said it. He said that his feeling was that these demands come from a place that is not reverence for Heaven, not some desire to fulfill additional commandments that we can’t fulfill, but some wish to provoke, or whatever, to advance some feminist agenda or another. And I already didn’t agree back then, and today I agree even less. First, because feminism is legitimate. Rabbi Cherlow also has agendas, I have agendas, and they have agendas. It’s allowed. Deal with the agenda. If you think that agenda is not okay, fine, then address it. But what does it mean to say that someone is driven by an agenda? So what? Halakhic decisors are also driven by agendas; all kinds of people are driven by agendas. What’s the problem with that? Yes, only Aharon Barak looked for people without agendas for the Supreme Court, so Ruth
[Speaker C] Gavison,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] yes, he said she has an agenda, so he wasn’t willing to accept her. In any event, what was I trying to say — it slipped my mind, not
[Speaker C] important, that one point is enough for me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So in short, what I want to say is that I don’t judge people through their motives. Even if the motive — right, yes, that’s the point, that’s the second thing. First, I’m saying: who said this motive is bad? Everyone has motives. The question is whether the motives are legitimate, good motives or bad ones. If you think not, then judge them, but don’t go digging into their motives and say: you have an agenda. And you don’t have an agenda? Of course you have an agenda.
[Speaker K] Rabbi Cherlow certainly has an agenda, but that’s exactly the bonus you’re giving, because the classification there is that people — the Women of the Wall for the sake of the discussion — say that their argument is reverence for Heaven.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Right, exactly.
[Speaker K] Therefore I… Even feminism can be reverence for Heaven. So he says, if that’s the argument, let’s test them by that argument.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but their reverence for Heaven includes feminism. Feminism comes out of reverence for Heaven. I’ve met people like that; they told me. It’s completely authentic. They think the Torah and the Holy One, blessed be He, expect equality for women, feminism. That’s one point. And second, even if that motive is not correct, or not legitimate, or not worthy, or whatever term we want to use — that is the second point on which I disagree with Rabbi Cherlow — so what? We all have motives. Judge the matter on its own merits. Is it legitimate? If it is legitimate, then leave them alone. What do you want? We all have… When I come, I don’t know, to pray or to do some commandment or another, do I always come in a state of perfectly pure holy intention?
[Speaker I] But we’re human beings. But they claim a different intention. If they were judged… so what about their claims?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then they’re liars. Fine.
[Speaker I] So what? Is a liar forbidden to fulfill commandments? I’m saying: I want it because of this, and then I see him because of this.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So you’re saying he’s a liar. Fine. But is a liar forbidden to perform commandments? This liar wants to perform commandments. He’s allowed to. That’s all. Why do I care that he’s a liar? Let him judge himself—why do you need to judge him? That’s what I’m saying. First, who said the motive isn’t legitimate? Second, even if the motive isn’t legitimate, why are you getting into motives? And you don’t have motives? It’s irrelevant. Judge the argument, not the person. Judge what he says. If what he says is legitimate, then it’s legitimate.
[Speaker C] Suppose someone were arguing in the name of the Women of the Wall, really pushing it—whether she would be allowed to wear a miniskirt even if her thought was kind of…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, not about the thought. I’m talking about what she argues, what she says. I’m not going into her heart. What you’re saying is: why are you wearing a miniskirt?
[Speaker C] You’re saying she’s wearing a miniskirt because… for an unacceptable purpose… okay. But if it’s permitted to wear…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. I’m not claiming that actions determine everything; I’m not going with Leibowitz that far. I’m not claiming that only actions determine things, absolutely not. “The upright will walk by them and the transgressors will stumble on them”—the ways of God, the righteous walk by them and the sinners stumble on them. You can do the same thing, and in one context it’s a commandment and in another context it’s a transgression. No, I’m only claiming that if a person says something to me, I relate to what he says. I do relate to the reasons he raises—but the reasons he actually said. I’m not interested in his psychological motives and what he’s hiding. Maybe I’m right, maybe not, but fine—we all have things like that.
[Speaker I] And if he states his motive?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so what?
[Speaker I] I shouldn’t relate to that because it’s a motive?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course I should relate to it. That’s exactly what I just said.
[Speaker I] The Women of the Wall state their motive, and it’s false. And how do you know it’s false?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How do you know it’s false?
[Speaker I] Because it doesn’t fit with the rest of their behavior.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? They want to perform commandments. I don’t understand. When I come to pray in the morning, they won’t let me in because yesterday I didn’t come to prayer?
[Speaker I] No, but you didn’t say you’re coming because it matters to you…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m coming because it matters to me to pray. Right now I’m coming to the synagogue—it matters to me very much to pray. So you’ll say, where were you this past week? Or why aren’t you wearing tzitzit? Since when? Who checks people according to motives? I don’t understand. That’s a different issue. I check motives if he raises an illegitimate argument—then I examine it. Not in the sense of “go perform the commandment, do whatever you want, it’s a democratic state.” I’m only saying: you’re Reform, a heretic, whatever. I’m allowed to judge him by what he says. I want to know what kind of argument he’s making. Is it a Reform argument, an Orthodox argument, a heretical argument? Fine—that I’m prepared to judge. I don’t judge the person by his motives. That’s not… By the way, once I wrote a very sharp article against some rabbi who spoke about the legitimacy of the attitude toward secularism and that this should be given legitimacy and so on, and whether they’re right like us or not right like us—I don’t remember exactly, it was many, many years ago. So I did a kind of logical analysis of his words and reached the conclusion that maybe he’s a wise man, and being a wise man is very important in order to be a rabbi, but denying the fundamentals of faith is not one of the parameters required in order to serve as a rabbi in Israel. That was more or less the closing sentence. Depends… And they didn’t accept that article because… I don’t know. Maybe it was early in my career. I think they didn’t accept the article because they did accept the argument. But afterward—and I’m saying this because of what came later—afterward, a friend of mine who studied with me in Yeruham, one of the teachers there, rebuked me harshly, and I accepted the rebuke. He said to me, listen, you’re judging a person based on your analysis of his arguments. That’s not right. A person can also make a mistake. Meaning, it could be that he didn’t do the logical analysis you did, and he didn’t really understand that behind his words sits this problematic conception that you called denial of the fundamentals of faith. That doesn’t mean he denies the fundamentals of faith. It means he made a mistake in reasoning. Even if you’re right—he may have explanations and maybe you’re not right—but even suppose my analysis is correct and he would have agreed with me if he had read it, it’s still not right to move from judging the argument to judging the person. A person is a complex creature. Sometimes he makes mistakes, he’s full of arguments he doesn’t intend, he gets confused, he doesn’t notice. A lot of things. What, with me you can’t find all kinds of things I wrote where someone could surely do some logical analysis and see that I too deny the fundamentals of faith? It could be that first, maybe I really do deny the fundamentals of faith, and second, maybe I really made an honest mistake and I’d say, okay, I was wrong, I really was wrong in that argument. That’s all. The move from the argument to the person is a very problematic move—I’m finishing the answer to you. And also the reverse. What? Also the reverse. What does that mean? From the person to the argument. Certainly. The argument has to be examined on its own merits. That’s first of all, and not through the person, no matter who raises it. If the one raising it is Reform, that’s not important—check the argument. If the argument holds water, then why do I care that a Reform person raised it? And on the other hand, after you examined the argument and reached the conclusion that the argument is Reform, that doesn’t mean the person is Reform. Because it could be that if you show him that it doesn’t meet halakhic criteria, maybe he’ll retract, maybe he made a mistake, and that can happen to anyone. Okay? So here, that comment I really, really accepted. I think it’s truly an important point. Anyway, so we basically have three models. We have the midrashic conservative, the simple conservative, and the heretic. Okay, so where does the Reform person fit in? Who is a Reform person?
[Speaker L] When you say “Reform” you have to be careful. Is Reform someone who makes changes, or the Reform movement that…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said, as far as I’m concerned, let me ask differently. Is there another model? Is there another kind of argument besides those three?
[Speaker L] In terms of American sociology, you’ve drawn the Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I’ll get there in a moment, I’ll get there in a moment.
[Speaker L] In your parable—I’ll get to the sociology in a moment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right now I’m still with the foxes. I’ll get to the meaning, to the allegorical point, in a moment, okay?
[Speaker B] I still want to say: there are people who didn’t think—say the leaders say, let’s switch sweaters, and the person just does it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so that’s not Reform, that’s just someone who doesn’t think. I’m talking about an ideological conception that I would call Reform or… In short, is there a fourth model? Of the rules of the game? I sat there with this picture and tried to define for myself: okay, I found the heretic, I found the simple conservative, I found the midrashic conservative. Is there room on this map for another model?
[Speaker F] All three of these agree there is a tradition. The fourth is someone for whom there was no tradition at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? The heretic too can say there was no tradition.
[Speaker F] No, but the way you described the heretic, he says fine, there’s a tradition, I don’t care, I do what’s convenient for me. No, no, no, no.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The heretic says there is a tradition but I don’t care; the heretic can also say there is no tradition, just the same—it’s the same thing. I’m willing to accept two models, but for me they’re both the same heretic.
[Speaker E] There’s what’s called an apostate out of appetite, like we discussed. He says I agree that you need to wear Jewish clothing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An apostate out of appetite—within the usual classifications, in my opinion, that’s a conservative. It’s a conservative who has an impulse and doesn’t withstand it. I’m talking about ideology, not a person who fails because of psychology. Understand? A person who fails because of psychology, I’m not judging him. Again, maybe I do judge him as a judge in court, but I’m not judging him on the logical plane. I mean, none of us always does exactly what we think. We all have psychology, we have urges, we fail. I think we once talked about weakness of the will. So yes, that’s just how it is. I’m talking about types of arguments. Meaning, someone raises an argument, and I ask whether I can point to a fourth type of argument that would be called Reform.
[Speaker I] Yes. It seems to me there are—I don’t know whether it’s exactly the Reform or the Conservatives—there’s an argument that comes up a lot among people who aren’t committed to Orthodox Jewish law in its literal sense. They dismiss any halakhic argument that is procedural at base and not substantive. For example, we don’t have a Sanhedrin with the same authority as back then, and therefore the law changed. All these arguments that are essentially procedural.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand, but if I ask myself: what is the argument? Why do they reject it?
[Speaker I] The argument says: this is not an integral part of the Jewish law that binds me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then they’re conservatives. They’re saying it’s not part of Jewish law. That’s interpretation. They’re not claiming they aren’t bound by Jewish law; they have a dispute with you about what Jewish law says. Maybe they’re wrong. Again, I didn’t say a conservative can’t be wrong. I’m asking what kind of argument he raises. If he raises an argument committed to Jewish law, he’s only explaining why within Jewish law this is what should be done, then as far as I’m concerned he’s a conservative.
[Speaker I] So if you say that,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anyone who has Jewish law is a conservative. No, not everyone who… not who has a different Jewish law, but who has a different interpretation of this Jewish law—yes, correct.
[Speaker H] And those who remained in the desert and decided to change their clothes to something else? What about them? They say, listen, we have a tradition—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We have everything, and we’re doing something new. Either way: if it’s not binding, then he’s a heretic. I don’t care what you do if it’s not binding. Whether you wear orange or something else—that’s not important. The word is “change.” But I’m asking why they make the change. What is the argument in favor of the change? If they don’t accept the authority of the tradition, then they’re heretics. I don’t care what they do after the heresy. If after the heresy they wear orange, wear nothing, or wear a parka—it doesn’t matter. But their argument toward the tradition is a heretical argument.
[Speaker J] And there are those who hear and think maybe those swimsuits were nice, we remember them, it was something beautiful, here it’s hard like this. So on Sunday morning we’ll wear the swimsuits. The rest of the days we’re not obligated. On that one day.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I think we’re getting somewhat closer, in my opinion, but in a second, just a moment, I…
[Speaker K] I think what’s missing here in the model or the example in relation to the allegory is that you attribute everything—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, I don’t want to jump to the allegory, because in a moment I’ll first try to finish the map.
[Speaker K] But what’s missing here is the issue of Torah from Heaven. Meaning, everything you’re saying here is the tradition—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This one, of going around in swimsuits.
[Speaker K] But the tradition, you say, fine—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So we received it from the Holy One, blessed be He, to go around in swimsuits. Our forefathers received it from the Holy One, blessed be He. Add that if you want.
[Speaker K] No, then the Reform person will say: true, our fathers’ tradition is like this, I’m not disputing that this is the tradition—historically, fine, obviously.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who disputes that historically?
[Speaker K] But I’m saying, in the end, our fathers didn’t say it was because it was hot, but I interpret the original intention—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then that’s the midrashic conservative.
[Speaker K] That’s the midrashic conservative. He interprets the tradition, he doesn’t go against it. He interprets it. Fair enough.
[Speaker F] So maybe to take it one step further, I too can interpret what the fathers intended…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the midrashic conservative. He wants to interpret the Torah differently from what it was.
[Speaker F] No, but one more step: the sages a few generations ago said so because of very important considerations. I also have important considerations.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? That’s still the midrashic conservative. Again, as long as he presents a reason that is within the halakhic rules, even if you don’t agree with it, even if you think it’s terribly dangerous or incorrect or whatever—but as long as the discussion… Beit Shammai also thought Beit Hillel were wrong, and vice versa, but the discussion was within the halakhic framework. Is he changing the custom? So what? But he says, within the halakhic framework: I think I too have the right to interpret. Then that’s perfectly fine—that’s a halakhic claim. Maybe it’s a mistaken halakhic claim; again, maybe he’s not right. Fine. But he’s playing the game within the halakhic framework. That’s what I called a midrashic conservative. Yes.
[Speaker C] So I didn’t understand—someone who goes with a swimsuit as opposed to someone with a coat.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but why is he doing it? I’m saying what matters is not what he does. That’s exactly what I showed you. Two different groups wear a coat, and still one is heretics and the other is a midrashic conservative. The lesson is: don’t describe to me what he does. What he does doesn’t matter. I’m asking you why he does what he does. What kind of argument he raises in favor of what he does.
[Speaker G] Why, what’s the argument? Yes—why? Because it looks nice.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think that’s an interesting point.
[Speaker G] He could be both.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He could be both. So he’s a heretic and a conservative together? Fine, but he’s not Reform. So what is Reform? So maybe there is someone who is both a heretic and a conservative, I don’t—
[Speaker C] know if such a thing is possible. Maybe as a combination of the two types of conservatives.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the question with a combination is what he thinks. Does he think you need to go with a swimsuit, or with a parka? Does he think Jewish law says both—to wear clothing suited to the weather and also a swimsuit? Fine, then he’s a midrashic conservative. It’s not a combination—then he’s a midrashic conservative.
[Speaker B] And there’s another group of people where someone gets up in the morning and says: last night I received a new tradition, and this whole business of swimsuits is nonsense, and he’s a Mormon of Jewish law as far as I’m concerned. Then he’s not a conservative and not a heretic. He denies the previous tradition; he doesn’t care that he’s establishing a new tradition, but he doesn’t accept the previous tradition. He’s Mormon. Fine. And I was looking for the Mormons.
[Speaker H] Although—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You should know, I’m now reading a book—
[Speaker H] I read—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I just read a book about Mormons, a beautiful book. Really.
[Speaker H] About Mormons?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, about—about—a woman who used to be Mormon and left. “A Song for Issy Bradley,” that’s what it’s called in Hebrew, “A Song for Issy Bradley.” A beautiful book, in my view. I even wrote to her a bit. Because it raises lots of thoughts. The Reform—why? Not the Reform among us. When it was 200 years ago—what is this nonsense? Do they really think some person had the Holy One, blessed be He, reveal Himself to him and tell him things? Are they idiots?
[Speaker K] But what if he proved it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a fictional story by a novelist who was Mormon and left, and she describes a story about Mormon life. So yes—and two thousand years ago that was okay? Or three thousand, or four thousand years ago that was okay? Why? “One who wants to lie keeps his witnesses distant.” Why is it that those from two hundred years ago we hospitalize because they’re not sane, while we say the same thing about Moses our teacher, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, all of them. There are more witnesses. Fine, I say okay—and if they brought you witnesses too, would that be okay?
[Speaker I] Bring them, bring them, then we’ll talk. There are witnesses. There are witnesses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have a friend—I told this here once. I have a friend, that same friend as an example, Amnon. He spent about half a year in Bolivia, there in the forests, in places no white man had set foot. And he told me he found some area there, a district, I don’t know exactly what, of Indians, really deep in the jungle. Indians who are Christians. A white man had somehow gotten there. There had been some German there, I think, a hundred years before him, some German missionary or something. And they strongly claim that they all saw the Holy Virgin reveal herself to them in some place, I don’t know where, and this is the tradition they pass on to their children—a broad tradition, we’re talking tens of thousands of people.
[Speaker K] In Bolivia they have good stuff. Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He also tried those substances. There are very interesting substances there, very interesting substances, he told me. He has no connection to Judaism whatsoever. He says there are plant-based narcotic substances there such that when you take them, you see the divine chariot. Everyone does. No matter what background you come from, that’s what he said, that’s what he told me, I don’t know—and he has no connection, he’s not doing outreach for Arachim. You see the divine chariot. And everyone sees the same thing no matter what culture you come from. It’s not culture-dependent. Anyone who comes sees the same thing. So he brought a little of the substance back to Israel. Truthfully, I hesitated, but it’s not addictive and not something people get hooked on. Later there was a professor from Hebrew University, Benny Shanon, a psychologist from Hebrew University, with whom I arranged some meeting—he’s a friend of his—and he disappeared on me to Bolivia too, he followed him to Bolivia. No, really, he went after him to Bolivia to investigate the phenomenon.
[Speaker H] He got on the chariot.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. He went to investigate this phenomenon, and he wrote articles about it. He’s back in Israel now, and since then I met him; this was many years ago. But he investigated the phenomenon, and it’s a documented phenomenon. What did he say? He believes in it; he thinks there are such things. He doesn’t keep commandments, he’s totally secular, and that’s… the professor. Amnon is nothing of the sort. But yes, he says there are such things, and apparently you get exposed through these means. But that doesn’t tell him anything about religious practice. Meaning, it’s not…
[Speaker M] Maybe two other examples that could shift the thinking a bit. Maybe there was, a hundred years ago, a leader who said there is nothing new. Meaning, a hundred years ago he came to the group and told them: there is nothing new. “Innovation is forbidden by the Torah.” Right. Then someone innovates—there are other arguments. And second, suppose they said to the environment: this whole environment has a law, an external law, saying you have to wear a coat. External from… would that change the model a bit?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question again is what they do and what their reason is. They wear a coat—but what do they say? About that law—are we bound by it, not bound by it, are we interpreting it, is it overridden, is it permitted—everything depends on the argument. Meaning, what they do won’t help.
[Speaker M] I’m talking about a case where they’re not rebelling, they’re not rebelling, they’re obeying something else—they’re not rebelling.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But we were told that innovation is forbidden by the Torah—so what, we’re coerced? Coercion is fine, that’s not… no problem at all. If we’re not coerced but rather it’s overridden, or permitted, I don’t know—if you have a halakhic argument, everything is fine, you’re a midrashic conservative. That’s why I said: it’s very important always to understand not what they do, but why they do what they do. That’s what determines the model.
[Speaker K] Do you define the midrashic conservative as someone committed to the rules of midrash?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Someone committed to the halakhic rules.
[Speaker K] Or an argument—any midrashic argument.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As long as the goal of the argument is to show that what I’m doing fits Jewish law, even if that argument is questionable, even if I don’t agree with that argument. And if I’m not committed? Then that’s it—I’m a heretic.
[Speaker H] So then what is Reform? But that already… to wrap you up—I’ve got a watch in my hand, you’ve got five more minutes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In short, there’s an important methodological lesson here too, because I got stuck on this issue. I spent quite a bit of time on it. I tried—I saw there was good potential here for defining the sociological groups, but I was missing this niche. Now, on the map it looks like everything is covered, there’s no additional niche.
[Speaker C] You can dig inside the group of interpreters—whether they go by, say, original intent or whether… within constitutional law in the United States, say, when you look at the constitution, there are two groups regarding how to interpret it. Do I need to think about what the one who wrote it really meant? That’s…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Purposive interpretation or originalist interpretation?
[Speaker C] So within the camp of interpreters maybe one could divide between… but they’re still interpreters.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Once you’re an interpreter—if you interpret the constitution, then you’re committed. I don’t care how you interpret it or what you think should be interpreted, but as long as you make the effort to interpret, then you’re committed, no matter what your conclusions are.
[Speaker H] No, but you know that in… he wants to write a new constitution.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He wants to write a new constitution? Then he’s a heretic.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He falls either here or there, there’s no middle.
[Speaker I] Maybe he wants to argue that some sections of the constitution are not original.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah—so one could have said, and that was my first thought, that maybe someone who regarding some things is a heretic and regarding some things is a conservative—that’s what would be called Reform.
[Speaker I] No, but he’s not claiming… Guys, let’s hear this. I think this is…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s fine. The methodological lesson is important. No, no, intentionally—I’m saying it’s important not only to reach the result, but to understand where you’re making a mistake, where you’re missing it. Because I too understood where I was missing it when I understood that there is another model. And this—so I’m saying—it doesn’t sound to me like a plausible model that with regard to some laws you’re conservative and with regard to others you’re a heretic.
[Speaker I] I’m saying: I’m within Jewish law, I’m Reform, I’m within Jewish law, and I claim that this book I’m holding in my hand is partly forged. And I know how to identify what is original, and I’m committed to that, and the rest that people added illegitimately…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In my view that’s conservatism. In my view that’s conservatism. You have a claim that some things are forged—we know that some things are forged. Even great Orthodox figures, the Meiri, say that this is forged, so what? Great decisors among the conservatives say it’s forged—or not forged, but I don’t know, because of the fear of censorship—
[Speaker F] That type of interpretation—and that’s exactly the interpretation you’re raising. So that’s complete conservatism.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All right, look. We talked about the heap paradox, right? And about not judging things in black-and-white terms. The way out, in my opinion, is here. Usually when there’s a dichotomy, check carefully whether the mistake isn’t in the very dichotomous way of looking. And the claim is that in fact no—the world isn’t divided into heretics and the committed. Rather, there is someone who is semi-committed, somewhat committed. Right? Up to now, it was either you’re committed or you’re not committed, because it’s a dilemma. Now, dilemma arguments are always suspicious. Yes? We talked—I’m almost sure we talked about this—that if someone says there’s no point giving exams, because diligent students study even without the exam and lazy students won’t study even with the exam, then there’s no point in giving exams—why give students exams? Where is he mistaken? He’s mistaken in that there are people who are neither pathologically diligent nor pathologically lazy, but rather are somewhere in the middle, and an exam can help motivate them to study, right? The dichotomous perspective is the fallacy. Now, a dichotomous perspective is a fallacy in many, many places. I’m almost sure we already talked about this—I don’t remember—but in any case, for our purposes here, what I basically want to say is that the concept of committed or not committed also should not be judged in dichotomous terms. It could be that I’m somewhat committed. That is the Reform person. And the theoretical Reform person, I’m saying—the sociology I’ll say a few words about in a moment—the theoretical Reform person basically says this: I respect the tradition of our fathers; I think it should be observed, but not at too high a price. Meaning, there are other things that override it. I’m half-committed to it. Now when I don’t do it, I don’t refrain because I have a different interpretation of the principles of the tradition, because then I’m a midrashic conservative. I refrain because the tradition is not mandatory. It’s not something that binds me and that’s the end of the story. Okay, it’s also one of the considerations I take into account, but I have other considerations too. Now such a position—I think that’s the niche that was missing for us. And if I return from the parable to the sociology, to the allegory, then I’m basically saying this: it seems to me this too is an interesting point. When I talk about types, not about people—about types of arguments. So the heretic is the heretic, yes? That’s clear. The simple conservative is basically the Haredi, more or less, or the Haredi ethos. It’s not that every Haredi is a simple conservative—nobody is really a simple conservative; they all make lots of midrashic arguments. But the Haredi ethos is an ethos of simple conservatism, including the Hardalim, it doesn’t matter, they’re all Haredim in the same way, it doesn’t matter whether they say Hallel or don’t say Hallel. And the midrashic conservative is basically the modern Jew, the Modern Orthodox. And if you want, that’s also the Conservative Jew. I don’t think there’s a difference between them, by the way. In my opinion there’s no difference between those two groups—it’s a sociological difference, not an essential one. Both of these groups are basically midrashic conservatives, while the Reform person is that fourth model I mentioned. That’s the model not fully committed to Jewish law. When he changes Jewish law, he won’t say that Jewish law itself requires me to act differently here. He won’t offer a midrash that grounds the change; rather he’ll say, fine, I respect Jewish law, but I also have other things in my world to which I’m committed. I’m committed to Jewish law, but not completely. What? Reform Jews? That’s how they claim? That’s how they express themselves? Yes, certainly, many do. There are those who don’t believe in the Holy One, blessed be He, or in anything at all, but there are those who say yes, Jewish law is like this, but I have additional considerations and they too have to be taken into account. Now if I—again, when I identify—wait—when I identify the Reform Jews, I’m not saying that everyone called Reform falls into this slot. He’s called Reform because sociologically he’s classified as Reform. Ask me what he really is? Check according to the criteria I gave. He may be a heretic, he may be a midrashic conservative. Or he may go to the Reform temple on the Sabbath—that doesn’t matter. Where does the traditional Israeli fit? The traditional Israeli? What we call the traditional Israeli?
[Speaker C] I don’t, I don’t know, it depends—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On what he says. It’s very vague. He sometimes goes to synagogue, sometimes plays soccer? No—that’s what he does, that’s what he does. I’m asking what he says, not what he does. Again, that’s exactly what I keep coming back to. It doesn’t matter what he does; I’m asking what he says. Why does he do it? Does he think it’s correct? Is it permitted according to Jewish law? Does he have a reason or not? In the simple sense, the phenomenon as I know it is a Reform phenomenon. I have a friend today who is the head of the local council in Yeruham, who is married to a Conservative woman, I think, and they once wanted to establish a Reform or Conservative minyan, I don’t know, in Yeruham, and nobody came. And he says, I don’t understand, all the people here are Reform. Really. Traditional people—after all, lots of people in Yeruham are basically Reform. They’re traditional: they come to synagogue on the Sabbath, sit this way, sit that way, then afterward they go to a soccer game or to watch television or whatever—that’s exactly Reform. They are committed, they feel some commitment, but not completely—not at any price; he has other things in his world. Nobody comes to his minyan.
[Speaker L] Because they’re simple conservatives?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they’re conservative about their Reformism.
[Speaker L] Not conservatism of the plain sense, but conservatism of “I make my own personal compromises”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—there are some among them who really are complete conservatives, and it’s just apostasy out of appetite. Meaning, basically he says, leave me alone, I can’t hold out, but the truth should be like the Orthodox.
[Speaker L] The synagogue I don’t go to has to be Orthodox.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—that’s the right one, exactly. He says, I’m really not okay. But among them there are also those who say today—certainly today this is developing more and more—there are those who actually voice the Reform claims. That “no, it’s fine, that was right for the past, today it’s less right”—there are such people too, and still they won’t go to his synagogue. Now what does that mean? It means that sociology does not align with logic. And it’s not only with them—don’t be dismissive, it’s also with us. It means that in many places sociology and logic do not go together, and therefore I think—and again I said, I’m not judging sociology and not psychology, we all have these things. I want to judge arguments, the logic of the argument. And in the logic of arguments I don’t see another model; there are four. Now anyone you meet—don’t look at what he does, look at why he does it, what he claims is the reason he does it. And then it seems to me he will always fall into one of these four categories, no matter whom you meet and however he classifies himself. Broadly speaking, if I had to give labels, I’d call them Haredim, Modern Orthodox, heretics, and Reform. Those are the four models. The arguments fall into those four categories; the people are classified in ways—
[Speaker L] That don’t always overlap. What is the argument of the fourth group?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Reform? The Reform say that we’re committed to Jewish law, but not completely. Partial commitment. Meaning, when there are heavy costs—but not because of impulse, not “there are heavy costs and I can’t hold out.” My model says one ought not do it, not that I’m an apostate out of appetite: “This is how it should be done, but what can I do, my inclination overcame me”—that’s Orthodox. I’m talking about someone whose model says: I’m conservative, but not completely, not at any price. You also need to enjoy life a little, also be with the environment, be with general society, all kinds of things of that sort—but not because the Holy One, blessed be He, says so, because then you’re a midrashic conservative. Rather because these values too are important in my eyes, and they sometimes override the values of commitment to tradition. That, in my opinion, is Reform, as opposed to a heretic, who doesn’t accept the commitment at all.
[Speaker L] Why isn’t that the traditional Israeli?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said—that is also the traditional Israeli. The sociological identifications are less important; there are many more sociological labels. But logically there are four niches. Shabbat shalom.
[Speaker L] Why is it called Reform? Reform? Reform. I thought that—there’s something in the expression “reform,” reform—
[Speaker H] Yes, I thought about that—
[Speaker C] This year, and there it’s really interesting—reform is not necessarily a bad thing either. I see you’re obviously recording.