Torah and Torah Study, Lesson 12

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But this isn’t a means; that’s exactly the point. Because this is an explanation of the deductive kind. And just as helping another person is not a means for being a good person, that is what’s called being a good person. It doesn’t achieve some additional result that if you do it, you’ll also get there. If you do it, you’re there. It’s not that afterward you’ll arrive there. That is what it means to be there. It’s a definition, it’s not— it’s not. Let’s give an example, say the prohibition of a vow. “He shall not profane his word,” that’s what it’s called. Suppose I vowed to forbid myself benefit from a piece of bread, okay? Now the bread is forbidden to me. Is the prohibition of the bread a means in order not to violate “he shall not profane his word”? It’s the realization of “he shall not profane his word”; it’s not— that’s the thing itself, and therefore now, since I’m forbidden to profane my word, I’m not supposed to eat this bread. It’s not a means to fulfill “he shall not profane his word.” It’s the way one fulfills “he shall not profane his word.” Even though in principle I could have vowed about something else entirely and not about the bread. True, but once I vowed, now the commandment “he shall not profane his word” applies to this. And in that sense, say, it’s like Maimonides says— we also talked about this once years ago— Maimonides says that the obligation to obey the sages too, their decrees and enactments, comes from “do not turn aside.” Now there are later authorities, it already starts with Nachmanides but even more among later authorities, who understand that anyone who violates a rabbinic prohibition, eats poultry with milk, has violated the Torah-level prohibition of “do not turn aside,” because he did not obey the sages. Because they understand it like a vow. Just as there is an obligation of “he shall not profane his word,” a prohibition against profaning his word, now if I vowed about this, then it is my word, and therefore I’m forbidden to profane it. And that is a Torah-level prohibition even though I created this prohibition myself; I could have chosen not to vow about this piece of bread. I vowed. Fine, but after you vowed, the Torah told me, listen, to profane it is a Torah-level prohibition. They understand that “do not turn aside” in relation to poultry with milk is the same relationship. That’s what I called there a relationship of specification or realization. As opposed to that, I think Maimonides does not mean that. That’s how they explain Maimonides. I don’t think Maimonides means that. Maimonides means branching-out, not realization or specification. Specification. That is, it is not true that everyone who eats poultry with milk thereby violated “do not turn aside.” He did not violate a Torah-level prohibition. Otherwise, as Nachmanides asks, then cases of doubt should require stringency, and all Nachmanides’ well-known questions. Rather, rather, out of the fact that one must obey the sages, the prohibition against eating poultry with milk branches out. Now for example, if I eat poultry with milk unintentionally, there is room to say that I did not violate any prohibition. Why? Because I didn’t know that the sages forbade it, so there is no disobedience here. There is no turning aside from their words. One could say: since “do not turn aside” only reveals— it’s not specification. Rather, “do not turn aside” only says that after the sages said it is forbidden to eat poultry with milk, now the prohibition of poultry with milk is a prohibition. Where do I know that from? From “do not turn aside.” But now it is a prohibition, and it is a rabbinic prohibition, not a Torah-level prohibition. The verse “do not turn aside” reveals that there is a rabbinic prohibition to eat poultry with milk, after the sages established it. Now it could be that even unintentionally I would violate it.

[Speaker D] But what prohibition would that be?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the prohibition now is not to turn aside from the words of the sages. The prohibition is the prohibition of poultry with milk. The obligation not to turn aside from the words of the sages only reveals to me that when the sages say something, it becomes a prohibition too. But now, the prohibition is the prohibition of poultry with milk, not the prohibition to obey the sages, not to obey the sages. The prohibition of poultry with milk is a prohibition in its own right, and then it may be that even unintentionally I violate the prohibition. Just as with a Torah prohibition, if I do it unintentionally, I violate the prohibition, even though I did not rebel against the one who commanded all this because I didn’t know He forbade it. What difference does it make? The Holy One, blessed be He, said that pork is forbidden, and that is a prohibition. True, there isn’t the dimension of rebellion here. But the prohibition concerning pork is not “not to obey the Holy One, blessed be He”; the prohibition concerning pork is eating pork. It’s just that the fact that one must obey the Holy One, blessed be He, reveals to me that whatever the Holy One, blessed be He, said becomes a prohibition. Now regarding the sages, one could say the same thing. To say that… what is the difference between the two interpretations I said before? Then this is exactly the question: is it interpretation in the deductive sense, and then indeed it is not means and end but the very same thing itself, or is it branching-out, and then it really is means and end. One could say, and perhaps one can say, that the way in which I come to obey the sages is by not eating poultry with milk. But still, eating poultry with milk is only a rabbinic prohibition. It is not the realization of the Torah-level prohibition of “do not turn aside.” Okay? So that’s…

[Speaker C] But Sefer HaChinukh writes there that this applies only to the Great Court in Jerusalem, right? Yes. But you’re saying it also relates to decrees and enactments from later times.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not necessarily to enactments and decrees of the Great Court. It’s not clear that they have the same status as the Great Court, yes, and that’s it. Sefer HaChinukh wants to claim that this applies to the sages of all generations and so on, and that’s a minority view, but the simple understanding is that it applies only to the Great Court.

[Speaker A] A minority view like whom? The Radbaz or someone who mentions the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This— or do they disagree with this outright? No, several do disagree with it outright. In Maimonides it’s clear that it’s not so. Maimonides says explicitly that “do not turn aside” applies only to the Great Court. Others, from the way they discuss it, it’s clear it’s not only the Great Court.

[Speaker A] It also says in the verses, “If a matter is too difficult for you,”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Then you shall arise and go up to the elders” and so on— that’s the Great Court.

[Speaker A] And also the rebellious elder, which is written in those same verses of “do not turn aside,” speaks about the Great Court; he only rebels against the ruling of the Great Court. Fine, but once they expanded it to the Talmud, then it’s also possible to say… Yes, because the Talmud has the status of the Great Court, but they expanded it to every rabbi. No, to every rabbi… the meaning is… everything the rabbis agreed on, everything that was accepted. Everything the rabbis agreed on.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are halakhic disputes. So things under dispute, no, and things not under dispute, yes. If suddenly a dispute arises, then does the dissenter violate “do not turn aside”? After all, until now it had been agreed upon. That doesn’t sound reasonable to me. So the point is that he says involvement in Torah is the definition of whether I am in a state of cleaving, it is not a means to achieve an experience of cleaving. So that’s the point. And therefore I say that apparently there is some appearance here of turning them into a means, but I think for him it is unequivocally not like that. Therefore “speak of them” sounds— I read what he wrote in chapter 2— “speak of them” seems to mean for the sake of Torah itself. Torah— why they defined it that way. In the Tanya, I said, this is expressed in a very similar way. And here in chapter 4— chapters 4 and 5 are the main thing for our purposes. “And in this every divine soul has three garments, namely thought”— thought, speech, and action of the 613 commandments of the Torah. “When a person performs in action all the practical commandments, and with speech he engages in the explanation and study of Torah, all 613 commandments and their laws, and in thought he grasps all that he is able to grasp in the orchard of Torah, then all the totality of the 613 organs of his soul are clothed in the 613 commandments of the Torah. And specifically, the faculties of Chokhmah, Binah, and Da’at in his soul are clothed in the comprehension of Torah according to the capacity of his understanding and the root of his soul above.” His claim is that when you fulfill commandments, then you cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He, with the body, because you engage bodily in the commandments, and when you learn with your mouth, speech cleaves to the Holy One, blessed be He, and when you think— the attainments, the graspings— that is cleaving to Him in thought, in the Chokhmah, Binah, and Da’at of the mind. And there is no difference between the commandments and Torah?

[Speaker A] No, here there is no difference.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And behold, these three garments of Torah and its commandments, although they are called garments for the soul, spirit, and higher soul, nevertheless their rank is infinitely and endlessly higher than the level of the soul, spirit, and higher soul themselves. As is written in the Zohar: the Torah”— that is, the levels of Torah, its upper parts— “and the Holy One, blessed be He, are entirely one.” Meaning, the Torah is truly His wisdom and will, just like Nefesh HaChayim. “And the Holy One, blessed be He, in His glory and essence, is entirely one, for He is the knower and He is the knowledge,” as we wrote above in the name of Maimonides. “And although the Holy One, blessed be He, is called Infinite and His greatness is beyond searching out, and no thought can grasp Him at all”— it is impossible to grasp Him— “and likewise His will and wisdom, these too cannot be grasped. As it is written, ‘There is no searching out His understanding,’ and it is written, ‘Can you find out the depth of God?’ and it is written, ‘For My thoughts are not your thoughts.’ About this they said: ‘In the place where you find the greatness of the Holy One, blessed be He, there you find His humility.’ And the Holy One, blessed be He, condensed His will and wisdom into the 613 commandments of the Torah and their laws, and in the combinations of letters of the Hebrew Bible and their interpretations in the aggadot and midrashim of our sages of blessed memory, so that every higher soul, spirit, and soul in the human body should be able to grasp them with its understanding and fulfill them, as much as possible, in action, speech, and thought. And through this it will be clothed in all ten of its faculties in these three garments.” And really this is just a more detailed version of what Nefesh HaChayim says: when you learn, you learn in order to cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He, so that His garments will clothe you too, and then you are in fact completely cleaving to Him on all your planes: in body, in speech, and in thought. “Therefore the Torah is compared to water. Just as water descends from a high place to a low place”— and here this speaks about, we once spoke about the different levels of abstraction of Torah, remember? That’s what I started with. Levels of abstraction— so here he speaks about that. “So too the Torah descended from the place of its glory, which is His blessed will and wisdom, and the Torah and the Holy One, blessed be He, are entirely one, and no thought can grasp Him at all. And from there it journeyed and descended in the hidden order of levels, from level to level, through the chainlike progression of the worlds, until it clothed itself in material things and matters of this world, such as thieves and liars and damages”— all kinds of things that belong to this world— “or menstrual blood,” or things that belong to the material world, “which are the majority of all the commandments of the Torah and their laws, and in physical combinations of letters in ink on parchment,” the sanctity of the wording and the sanctity of the book, “the twenty-four books of Torah, Prophets, and Writings.” And behold, he is not speaking here about the Oral Torah in this context— “so that every thought can grasp them, and even speech and action, which are beneath the level of thought, can grasp them and be clothed in them. And after the Torah and its commandments clothe all ten faculties of the soul and all 613 of its organs from head to foot, then it is entirely bound in the bond of life with God Himself, and the light of God truly surrounds and clothes it.” In short, he describes the cleaving created between the person who learns and the Holy One, blessed be He: you learn His will, because He and His will are one, and if your thought contains or envelops some piece of the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, then it follows that you are completely cleaving to Him. The same description as in Nefesh HaChayim; the similarity is more than merely accidental, I think. And he adds in chapter 5, he says: “And to explain well the term ‘graspes’ that Elijah said, ‘No thought can grasp You’— behold, whenever the intellect understands and comprehends some concept, then the intellect grasps the concept and comprehends it in its intellect, and the concept is grasped and encompassed and clothed within the intellect that understood and comprehended it, and the intellect is clothed in the concept at the time it understands and grasps it with its intellect. For example, when one understands and comprehends some law properly and thoroughly in the Mishnah or in the Talmud, then his intellect grasps and encompasses it, and his intellect is also clothed in it at that time”— both from within and from without. “And behold, this law is the wisdom and will of the Holy One, blessed be He, for it arose in His will that when Reuven should plead such and such, for example, and Shimon such and such, the ruling between them should be such and such. And even if this matter never was and never will be”— that doesn’t matter at all; it doesn’t matter if this story never happens and cannot happen, like the stubborn and rebellious son of course, which never was— “if this matter should never come to judgment upon these claims and demands, nevertheless, since thus it arose in the will and wisdom of the Holy One, blessed be He, that if one should plead this way and the other that way, the ruling should be such, then when a person knows and comprehends with his intellect this ruling as an arranged law in Mishnah, Talmud, and the halakhic decisors, then he is grasping and encompassing with his intellect the will and wisdom of the Holy One, blessed be He, whom no thought can grasp, nor His will and wisdom, except through their being clothed in the laws arranged before us.” This is exactly what I spoke about regarding this realization of Torah, its descent through the order of levels, level after level, until in the end we are able to grasp the thing. And that really completes the circle I spoke about: that the purpose of learning— both Nefesh HaChayim and the author of Tanya say that the purpose of learning is cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He. And unlike the Hasidim cited by Nefesh HaChayim, the author of Tanya speaks in a different language; he does not say that the goal is an experience, he also says that the very act of learning itself is a state of cleaving. And that’s why I think they are really speaking in the same way, unlike the Hasidim he mentions here. And then in fact I return to the very beginning, really the very beginning, to what we said: that the spreading out of Torah, from the Torah that was given even to the angels, where honoring father and mother is not written at all, nor Sabbath observance, nor anything of the kind, but rather something much earlier, before it clothes itself in the conceptual world that belongs to our world. Then there is the clothing within our conceptual world, which creates the principles of Torah. Then there is the descent into words and interpretations, or really applications in the different situations. Why is that descent made? Why does the Holy One, blessed be He, contract Himself all the way down? As the author of Tanya says, so that we will succeed in grasping the higher abstract thing, which in itself we have no ability to touch, no way to interact with. So it clothes itself in something lower, more contracted, with which we can cleave. So that in the end the purpose of Torah study is to cleave to that abstract thing through the garments it wears, the levels of spread-out manifestation, like the three garments he speaks of here, maybe somewhat parallel to the three spread-out stages I spoke about in the first lesson. I said that thought, speech, and action are really those three stages. I said there are three contractions; one of them is Torah in itself. Then what is thought? Thought is the ideas, what we also saw in Rashba and Nachmanides, that thought is not necessarily verbal; it stands on the significant contents. What do we think about? Say honoring parents, keeping the Sabbath, eating kosher, “you shall not murder,” all kinds of things like that, which are really a collection of ideas— thought. But then how do you speak it— maybe when you think, how do you speak that? It enters words; that is already Torah, the text of the Torah itself enters words. Then you begin the interpretations and produce from it the details and applications, the realizations in specific situations, and that is action. Thought, speech, and action are really the three stages of contraction we spoke about at the beginning, and now we understand that all this was created so that we would be able to grasp this whole business from below. Because the thing above— we have no way to grasp it. And that basically means that the purpose of Torah study is to cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He, or to Torah, which is His will, and that’s it. Not character refinement, and not to know what to do, or things of that sort; rather the cleaving itself, that is really the point. Now what this means, basically, is that when we see in the Talmud that “great is study, for it leads to action,” for example, where seemingly one should learn in order to know what to do, in light of what I’m saying here we probably need to interpret that differently. “Great is study, for it leads to action” means great halakhic study. But halakhah does not have to be specifically halakhah that becomes realized in the practical world, and it’s not that learning is a means so that we’ll know how to behave, but rather the purest learning, or the central and main kind, is that learning which deals with practical obligations. Not because once we reach the practical obligation we need to know what to do and learning is the way to know what to do— not that learning is the means and realization is the goal— but the study of things that have practical realization is the main study. In other words, the study of Jewish law is really the principal study— including the laws of the stubborn and rebellious son, which never was and never will be, that makes no difference. Why? Because that is the way to cleave to the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, and He and His will are one. That is why he says it doesn’t matter whether the ox that gored the cow never was and never will be— that’s irrelevant. Because my goal is, as we spoke about with Zen, with the way of the bow and arrow or the way of flower arrangement. And the Holy One, blessed be He, chose to convey these abstract things to us through the laws of oxen that gore a cow, or garments, or Sabbath observance, or whatever it may be. That is really not important. In the end, we occupy ourselves with this garment in order, through it, to encounter the thing clothed within it, and not in order to know what to do. Once we act, the action too is a kind of cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, cleaving by means of the limbs. But learning is not a means to action, even though it says “great is study, for it leads to action.” “Leads to action” does not mean that the action is the goal and the study is the means. Certainly according to their conceptions, with which I agree. Rather, the study that is great is that study which deals with action, which deals with Jewish law. That is the great study. Not that the goal is to know what to do. The content, the domain of study, is what is primary.

[Speaker A] And this view— how accepted is it among…?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the yeshivot, I think this is the prevalent conception, certainly in the subtext, if not in the explicit text. In the Lithuanian yeshivot and the yeshiva tradition, and this spread to other yeshivot too. With Rabbi Ovadia, for example, it apparently isn’t like that. Rabbi Ovadia and his sons, those who follow in his path. With him it quite clearly seems that learning is a means in order to know what to do. Again, I haven’t researched it in depth and checked everything he wrote about this. I’ve heard it. The general impression is that there is value in learning, but basically it is so that we know what to do. That’s why he also says that it is more important to study practical Jewish law, and in short.

[Speaker A] That’s already an extreme of— no, here it seems to me there’s something in the middle, I mean.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is something in the middle. I brought Rabbi Ovadia as an opposite extreme example.

[Speaker A] Meaning in his opinion there is no value in studying—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The laws of the stubborn and rebellious son? I don’t know, I didn’t check. Hard for me to believe. But the point is, place it on the scale. Yes. In principle, the purpose of learning is to know what to do.

[Speaker C] But what about the Chazon Ish, who leans more toward—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Halakhah?

[Speaker A] I see it in his students.

[Speaker C] I’m not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Know how you define a student of his. That’s a good question. The Chazon Ish has all kinds of students, with different conceptions. I don’t know. As for the Chazon Ish, I don’t— I don’t think he— I can’t recall a clear statement at the moment, but—

[Speaker D] The conception—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The general impression I definitely have is like that.

[Speaker D] Halakhic study can also be that there is value in that form of study.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but I said that. Study is still study, and that is obvious, in yeshivot and everywhere. That’s not the point. The question is whether knowing what to do is the goal and learning is the means. That is not correct. That’s what I’m saying. The Talmud says they debated whether study is greater or action is greater. Then they said: study is greater, because it leads to action. And that is a paradoxical statement. If you are trying to prove to me that study is greater, then why are you making it instrumental? You are coming and telling me that study is a means in order to know what to do, so you are actually explaining that action is greater, not that study is greater. So how can that serve as a reason that study is greater? Therefore I’m trying to read it differently. What is greater is study that leads to action. Meaning, the study that deals with action is the greatest kind of study there is. But what does it mean to deal with action? It doesn’t mean studying the Mishnah Berurah; rather, it means studying Jewish law, halakhic analysis. Because basically what you need is to cleave to a piece of the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, which teaches that an ox that gores for the first, second, and third time pays half damages. Okay? Not in order to know what to obligate the ox’s owner with when he comes before me in court. That too is true, one needs to know, but that is not the purpose of Torah study. The purpose of Torah study is that the piece of the will of the Holy One, blessed be He— that if there is an ox that gores, for the first three times it pays half damages— once I know that, then I am cleaving to a piece of the will of the Holy One, blessed be He. And therefore it really does not matter whether it is realized or not realized.

[Speaker E] The goal is the study. Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that’s what he says, that they should study the Mishnah for the sake of Torah. Torah is an end in itself; it is not a means for— the practical world. What? It’s an essential thing.

[Speaker E] That the goal is the study. Rabbi Ovadia said that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Ovadia— again, again, I didn’t do research, but the way I get the impression from his approach and from his sons and students is that the purpose of learning is to know what to do. And maybe there is also the commandment of Torah study, which is also to know what to do, but not only as a means to action; there may also be some value, I assume he too agrees that there is some value in the very involvement in the thing. But the main thing is to know what to do. And then just stay attached to Rabbi Ovadia, and every time something comes up ask him what to do. You don’t need to study for that. Why is it important that I study? So that too is, I think, too crude a formulation of his view, but it seems to me that with him this is the clearest expression of the weight— yes, the weight given to action, and learning is to a considerable degree a means in order to know.

[Speaker A] Can we speak about the laws of Maimonides— is there also the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, in that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In principle it is the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, because He commanded it.

[Speaker A] Yes, so consequently—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the end, let’s say, clearly there is learning there in order to know what to do, yes, but one has to do it— it must be done. There is “do not turn aside.” The question is whether this has the meaning of Torah study in the sense of cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He. I’m not at all sure.

[Speaker A] Not at all sure. Specifically according to Maimonides’ own approach, where by this one fulfills the commandment of “do not turn aside,” you might have thought maybe the opposite.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I don’t know whether according to Maimonides, yes, but still—

[Speaker A] Specifically according to that I would have thought the opposite, meaning precisely because it’s kind of like… it’s like, say, for the sake of argument, seemingly you could compare it to studying the laws of the state in order to fulfill “the law of the kingdom is law.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Or a vow— learning what bread is, how bread is baked, in order in the laws of vows to know that if I vowed regarding bread, then what am I forbidden to eat.

[Speaker A] Let’s take the extreme case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but it’s similar overall, it’s the same principle. Regarding a court, for example, that clarifies the facts in order to know how to rule about them, it is commonly thought that this is part of Torah study. When a court deals with clarifying reality, that falls under Torah study. It may be that this is true in the context of issuing a ruling. I don’t think it’s true, say, when I am studying to become a judge. When I am studying to become a judge and I want to learn about human character, what a judge needs to know— it is important for a judge to know about human character— that would be preparatory to a commandment. Or in the course of issuing the halakhic ruling, if you need to clarify something connected to human character, that can be regarded as genuine Torah study, because you are engaged in implementing Torah and for that purpose you also need to clarify certain facts. I don’t know if there is some special criterion here.

[Speaker A] If it’s according to Rabbi Ovadia, for example, that it’s in order to know how to rule, then from the outset that limits it only to halakhic decisors, because not every person needs to know for himself how to rule. He goes to a decisor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And even if… no, but I said, according to Rabbi Ovadia, seemingly there is no commandment of Torah study; you just need backup on hand, so that every time you have some problem you have someone to ask. So I don’t think he meant that. Clearly everyone needs to study and there are classes; he pushed people to study. What— to say he pushed them so that halakhic decisors would emerge from them? “A thousand enter the study of Talmud and one emerges to rule,” but he gave classes in frameworks from which no decisor would ever emerge. In the Bukharan Quarter there, or I don’t know who sat there and listened to his classes— no decisors came out of there. I don’t think he meant to narrow it down that much. Doesn’t seem so to me.

[Speaker C] And also the satellite classes, on television.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, there too you could say it was so that one would encounter someone to ask something. “A thousand for study and one for ruling.” So yes, this is— we spoke about this a little once, I think— it’s a bit similar to conceptions of the relationship between science and technology.

[Speaker E] People of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Technology usually understand engagement in science as a means: to know the laws of nature in order to know how to build machines and apply them in different circumstances. By contrast, scientists usually view technology as some kind of implementation, an application of science. The goal is to understand science; now it will be interesting to see if we understood correctly— let’s build a machine and see if it works. But it’s not really that I need that machine; if I don’t build any machine, that’s not important, because my real goal is to understand the world. My goal is not to produce tools so that they can be used. These are the same two conceptions. In other words, science parallels, say, Torah, and technology parallels halakhic ruling. Okay? So there too it is clear that science is needed in order to carry out technology. But the evaluative question still remains open. You can study science as a means to produce technology, and you can do the opposite— use technology as a practical upshot of your scientific study. If the device works, that means you studied correctly, meaning that you understood the right law, discovered the right law, but it’s not really that you study science in order to create technology. I now want to go a bit into the meaning of study, to broaden even more what I have spoken about until now, study as an end in itself. In tractate Nedarim 8a, the Talmud says there: Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: one who says, “I will rise early and study this chapter, I will study this tractate,” has made a great vow to the God of Israel. On this the Talmud asks: But is he not already sworn and standing, and an oath does not take effect upon an oath? Yes, someone who in effect vows, “I will study this tractate”—

[Speaker D] There is a commandment of Torah study, so what does it mean that he swears—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here we have an oath, not a vow. There is someone already sworn to fulfill a commandment. An oath to fulfill a commandment does not take effect; one oath cannot take effect on top of another oath. And therefore the Talmud asks: after all, he is already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai, and one oath does not take effect on another oath. The Talmud says: what is it coming to teach us? That it is only for encouragement. There are vows of encouragement, where you can swear that you are going to fulfill a commandment in order to spur yourself on even more to fulfill it. That is a special novelty, that even so such an oath takes hold. And to that the Talmud answers: that is Rav Giddel’s first statement; Rav Giddel already said that in an earlier statement in the same passage. So the Talmud says: this is what it teaches us—since if he wanted, he could exempt himself by reciting Shema morning and evening, therefore the oath takes effect on him. Meaning, as far as the commandment of Torah study is concerned, he can exempt himself with reciting Shema morning and evening and thereby fulfill his obligation. Now he vows to study the third chapter of Niddah. He is not obligated to do that, because by reciting Shema morning and evening he has fulfilled the commandment of Torah study. So this is an optional matter and also a commandment-related matter. And therefore the oath takes effect on him. That’s what the Talmud says.

So the medieval authorities (Rishonim) there discuss how this can be, because there is a commandment— the commandment of Torah study is not just Shema morning and evening; one has to study Torah. There is also the concept of neglecting Torah study. But what is neglecting Torah study? Neglecting Torah study means that you had time when you could have studied and you didn’t study. In some Talmudic contexts, neglecting Torah study does not mean that at all; it simply means not fulfilling the commandments or something like that. But neglecting Torah study in the sense of failing to study—and that too is part of the commandment—means that there was a certain time when you could have studied and you didn’t. Now you say: but if by Shema morning and evening I fulfill the obligation, what’s the problem?

So in fact there is a dispute there among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). The Ran there innovates an interesting idea. He wants to claim that there is a commandment of Torah study all the time. And they derive this from “and you shall teach them diligently to your children”—that the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth, so that if a person asks you, you won’t stammer but will tell him the answer immediately. So why does it say here that Shema morning and evening is enough, and everything else is optional, such that one can swear concerning it? So he says: because “and you shall teach them diligently” comes from interpretation. It is not written explicitly in the Torah. And therefore, a law that comes out of interpretation—an oath can take effect on it. But a law that is explicitly written in the Torah—an oath cannot take effect on it, because we are already sworn and standing from Mount Sinai. A law that comes out of interpretation—an oath can take effect on it. He says he explained this elsewhere. I did not find that other place, but I think it appears in the Ran on Taanit. But that is his claim. He says he explained it in Shevuot. That’s how the Ran understands it.

But in the Rosh, in Nedarim—there is a commentary of the Rosh on the page itself, in the rulings of the Rosh. There are also the rulings of the Rosh, and also a commentary on the page itself—and there the Rosh writes that this is indeed true: it is an optional matter. Shema morning and evening is one thing, and everything else is optional. And that is also implied by other medieval authorities (Rishonim), including the commentator there—that is not Rashi, but someone else, perhaps the Rivan, Rashi’s grandson, if I remember correctly. That too seems to be his view, and that is the straightforward meaning of the Talmud. Unless you accept the novelty of the Ran, that one can swear regarding a law derived from interpretation. But the position that a law derived from interpretation is apparently Torah-level, not like Maimonides, who says that it is rabbinic. There are views that even on rabbinic law one cannot swear; there is a dispute about that. But from the Ran it seems that it is Torah-level, and nevertheless one may swear on it. Why?

And this is just in parentheses, to understand the Ran’s words. The Ran explains—contrary to what emerges from most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim). Most of them understand that the reason an oath cannot take effect on a commandment, why one cannot swear about a commandment-related matter, is because one prohibition cannot take effect on top of another prohibition. Since there is already a Torah prohibition, you cannot impose another prohibition of an oath on top of it. One prohibition cannot take effect on another prohibition. And when it says that one oath does not take effect on another oath, that is simply a private case of the general rule that one prohibition cannot take effect on another prohibition. If so, then even regarding a law derived from interpretation one should not be able to swear, because that too is a Torah prohibition.

The Ran understands that there is a special rule: one oath does not take effect on another oath—not that one prohibition cannot take effect on another prohibition, and not that this is a private case of that general rule. Rather, if one oath already applies to the matter, the second oath does not take effect because there is already an oath on that matter. Then he says as follows: something explicitly written in the Torah was told to us at Sinai, and on that we are sworn; we swore at Mount Sinai to fulfill that thing, and therefore one oath does not take effect on another oath, because it has the status of an oath. But if something emerges from interpretation, it is not written in the Torah, and that is not what we swore on. The oath that was at Mount Sinai—it’s not clear exactly what oath is being referred to there—but insofar as there was an oath at Mount Sinai, the oath applied only to what is written in the Torah. And since this has not the status of an oath but only of a prohibition, an oath can take effect on it, because it comes from interpretation, that’s all. And this is not the rule that one prohibition cannot take effect on another prohibition; here it is specifically that one oath does not take effect on another oath. So if the first thing is not an oath, then an oath can indeed take effect on it. If it were just the rule that one prohibition cannot take effect on another prohibition, then any prohibition would be included, whether it came from interpretation or not.

All right, that is only for understanding the Ran. But for our purposes, the simple reading of the Talmud here comes out that Shema morning and evening is enough to fulfill the obligation of the commandment of Torah study, and everything else is voluntary. If you swear, then the oath takes effect, because it is voluntary.

An interesting question is whether there is a non-obligatory but meaningful commandment, a kiyumit commandment, in Torah study beyond Shema morning and evening. I’m not sure about that. I assume anyone you ask will say yes. But I’m not even sure of that. Because straightforwardly, even regarding kiyumit commandments—for example, there is the Ra’avad at the beginning of the Sifra. The Ra’avad claims that even concerning a kiyumit commandment, we say that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. I have a kiyumit commandment, and the only way to fulfill it is by violating a prohibition. A kiyumit commandment is something you may also choose not to fulfill; you are not obligated. If you fulfilled it, then you fulfilled a positive commandment; if you did not, nothing happened. But when there is a prohibition standing against it, and you are going to violate the prohibition in order to fulfill that positive commandment—why should you fulfill it? What difference does it make? There is no issue here of neglecting a positive commandment if you do not do it.

And the Ra’avad says that even if this too is a kiyumit commandment, a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. Women’s leaning of hands—semikha on sacrifices—is optional. He says: but if it is optional, then ostensibly they cannot lean, because that is labor with sacrificial offerings, a prohibition. In cases where there is an obligation, there is a commandment to lean, so the positive commandment overrides the prohibition, and it overrides the prohibition of labor with the offering. But women, who are not obligated—how can they lean? Therefore he says that even a kiyumit positive commandment—women’s semikha is a kiyumit commandment, not an obligatory one—even a kiyumit positive commandment overrides a prohibition. That is the Ra’avad’s claim.

And if that were so, then I would also expect that an oath would not take effect on it. If I am sworn even regarding a kiyumit positive commandment, true, I am not obligated, but it is still a positive commandment in every sense—if it overrides a prohibition, then why should an oath take effect on it? And if we understand it this way, then it comes out that this is not even a kiyumit positive commandment. So then what is it?

Here we have to understand: obviously there is such a concept as neglecting Torah study; it is written in the Talmud, there is nothing to argue about. If the commandment is only Shema morning and evening, then what is neglecting Torah study? I did not study—and all that I did not study? That is difficult even for the view that all the rest of study is a kiyumit commandment, because neglecting Torah study means that I in effect neglected a positive commandment by not studying. But if it is a kiyumit commandment, then there is no neglect of a positive commandment here. If I did it, there is a commandment; if I did not do it, nothing happened. So what is neglecting Torah study? It sounds like there is a claim against you.

So it seems to me that the intention is that the Torah, Jewish law, or the Torah intentionally does not place the demand to study Torah into the formal halakhic framework. It wants us to do it out of understanding that it is important, something inward, in the soul, like what we saw in the Ran in Nedarim. And therefore the Torah says: there is a commandment of Torah study—Shema morning and evening is enough. Torah study is something entirely different. The commandment of Torah study, the formal obligation—Shema morning and evening is enough. But Torah study means that someone who understands what Torah is and the significance of Torah study must surely understand that one should study as much as possible, as much as one can. But that is not the fulfillment of the commandment of Torah study, perhaps not even in the kiyumit sense I mentioned earlier, but rather it is completely voluntary in the halakhic sense. But that does not mean that if you do not do it there will be no claim against you. There will be a claim against you. There will be a claim against you just as there is a claim against someone who behaves immorally. So this is not a formal halakhic prohibition, but you are not acting properly, and the Holy One, blessed be He, can come with complaints against you if you do things that are not right. And in that sense, Torah study is also like that.

Why indeed does the Torah leave it in such a way? If it wants us to study all the time, then let it define that as the commandment of Torah study—to study all the time. Why define only Shema morning and evening as enough, and rely on our understanding by ourselves that we need to study and therefore study all the time? If you want something, then say it. Why does it not command us to study all the time?

So this takes us into the topic of extra-halakhic obligations. There are certain things regarding which we are not commanded, not because they are not important enough. There are things we are not commanded in because they are not important enough. Meaning, as it were, they are not at a level of importance such that the Torah commands them. They are of lower importance—the moral law, or a rabbinic law, or something like that—but not important enough for the Torah to command them. So therefore the Torah does not command them. But there are things the Torah does not command, not because they are not important enough, but because they are too important. And if it were to command them, that would lower their importance; they would become just one more commandment out of the 613. The Torah does not want us to treat Torah study as just one commandment out of the 613.

To formulate it differently: Rabbi Kook speaks in a few places, in his letters—maybe in two or three places—and Rabbi Amital brings this in Ma’alot MiMa’amakim, I think. Rabbi Kook discusses why the Torah did not command the refinement of character traits. We mentioned this. Why did the Torah not command the refinement of character traits? This is a question of Rabbi Chaim Vital in Sha’arei Kedushah. And Rabbi Chaim Vital says: because the Torah speaks to human beings. Someone who is not a human being—the Torah does not speak to him. What is there to command you, to be a human being? If you are not a human being, then what is there to command you? Being a human being is a condition for being commanded at all. That is what Rabbi Chaim Vital says.

But Rabbi Kook goes one step further, and he wants to argue that after all we know the Talmudic saying: “Greater is one who is commanded and does than one who is not commanded and does.” The initial intuitive perception is the opposite—that one who is not commanded and does is greater, because he does it voluntarily, not because he was obligated. But the Talmud innovates: no, greater is one who is commanded and does. And Rabbi Kook says: there are places where that initial intuition is still valid. In those places where in truth it matters more to the Torah that you do it as one who is not commanded and does, there it was careful not to command. Because if it had commanded, it would have ruined it.

For example, if it had commanded us to behave morally—that “you shall be holy” or “you shall do what is upright and good,” which is not counted among the commandments—why is that not counted among the commandments? Because the Torah does not want to command it; it does not want to. “You shall be holy” belongs to another discussion, and “beyond the letter of the law.” If you put that into the count of the commandments, then it is the letter of the law; it is no longer beyond the letter of the law. But regarding “you shall do what is upright and good,” say—that is not beyond the letter of the law, but moral behavior; that is something a bit different—there, I think, the Torah does not command because it does not want morality, our moral actions, to be done because there is a command. It expects us to do them because we understand that that is what ought to be done. And the same is true with the refinement of character traits.

This is the same story I always tell in this context—I am sure that when we discussed this, I told it then too—the well-known yeshiva joke about the young man who rejected every match that was suggested to him. So the spiritual supervisor tells him to go work on his character traits; he is arrogant. No one is suitable for you? Fine. He goes and works on his character traits enthusiastically for a whole year, works on his traits, refines them, becomes extraordinarily humble. After he finishes working on his character traits, once again the candidates come back, and once again he rejects all of them. The spiritual supervisor calls him in: “What have you done? You worked on your character traits for a whole year, and you stayed with the same arrogance.” “What do you mean, Rabbi? Now I am so humble that if before, when I was arrogant, they did not suit me, now that I am humble they certainly do not suit me. After all, I am on a much higher level, so of course they don’t suit me.”

Now, that is what someone looks like when he works on his character traits because he was commanded to work on his character traits. There is something about command in this context that could ruin it. Because it would really turn us into people who do it because there is a clause that says you have to do it. And someone who becomes humble because there is a clause requiring him to be humble—you cannot be humble that way. So there are situations in which command can ruin things. In those places, the Torah does not command.

So here this is a slightly different explanation from the previous one. Before, I said there are things that are so fundamental that the Torah does not command them. Here, it is not necessarily because they are so fundamental, but because the command would ruin them. Therefore the Torah does not command, because it does not want to ruin them. Okay?

And with regard to Torah study, it may be that the reason the Torah does not command beyond Shema morning and evening—for all the views that say that really is the definition of the Torah-level obligation—is that it does not command because it wants us to do it out of understanding what it means, how important it is. And if it had commanded, it would have turned into one of the 613 commandments, like many other commandments, where it would be important to do it, but it would not receive the status that Torah study is supposed to have, because Torah study is equivalent to them all, and so on. It would not receive that special status.

But there is a concept of neglecting Torah study. The concept of neglecting Torah study means that you are expected to study beyond the formal halakhic obligation. If you understand what Torah is, then you will in fact want to use all the time you can. And if you do not do that, then it means you do not understand what it is. And if you do not understand what it is, then that is neglecting Torah study. That is the expectation directed at you in the concept of neglecting Torah study.

I will just finish here with one more point. Rabbi Zalman Sorotzkin writes this in his article called “Law and Justice,” where he brings regarding the stubborn and rebellious son that the Talmud says: a stubborn and rebellious son never was and never will be, so why was it written? “Expound it and receive reward.” So what is that? Ostensibly, with everything else too—do we need to understand something completely hypothetical just so that we can get reward? With everything else, as we said, there is something to do now. Do we need these three verses only in order to have something to do? Rather, people do not understand the Talmud correctly. When the Talmud says that a stubborn and rebellious son never was and never will be, so why was it written? “Expound it and receive reward”—that is to teach you the principle of “expound and receive reward.” It teaches you that you do not study in order to know what to do. Here, you see that the stubborn and rebellious son is also part of the commandment of Torah study, even though there it has no practical implication whatsoever; you will never encounter it. So why study it? To teach you the principle of “expound and receive reward.”

So he brings the Talmud that says: why is it uncommon for Torah scholars to have children who become Torah scholars like them? Because they did not first recite the blessing over the Torah. So he asks: what? Torah scholars do not recite the blessing over the Torah? What is this strange sloppiness? People who are careful about everything and devote themselves to Torah—but on the blessing over the Torah they are sloppy? What is the meaning of that? Before it was accepted as a binding enactment, say? What enactment? It is from the Torah. The blessing over the Torah is from the Torah; that is in the Talmud in Nedarim. But the point is that he says one does not recite a blessing over something that is merely a preparatory act for a commandment, as in the Talmud in Menachot, for example building a sukkah. And then he says: why did they not first recite the blessing over the Torah? Because they thought that Torah, Torah study, is merely a preparatory act for a commandment, in order to know what to do. I heard this from Rabbi Ovadia. And because of that, their children did not become Torah scholars like them, because they did not understand what Torah is. Someone who thinks Torah means studying in order to know what to do does not understand what Torah is, and so he is unable to pass that on to his children.