Teshuvah: Its Meaning and Laws – Rabbi Michael Avraham – Lesson 4, Part A

Table of Contents

• Two mechanisms of repentance: technical and essential
• Grace and justice in the acceptance of repentance
• The problem of the possibility of major repentance and changing a value system
• Inside and outside, divine partnership, and two planes of choice
• Expanding the question: choosing values from the outset
• Beyond Maimonides: the Ten Days of Repentance and the structure of the Laws of Repentance
• The commandment of repentance and the commandment of confession: the Minchat Chinukh’s comment and the contradiction between Sefer HaMitzvot and the Mishneh Torah
• A non-obligatory fulfillment commandment, a conditional commandment, and defining the obligation of confession
• Maimonides’ principles in counting the commandments, the roots, and the implication for repentance
• The basis of the obligation of repentance as reason: Rabbeinu Yonah, Sefat Emet, and Rabbi Elazar ben Dordaya
• The status of reason in Jewish law: “Why do I need a verse? It is logical,” blessings over enjoyment, and Maimonides’ distinction between types of rabbinic law
• Why there is no explicit command about repentance and character refinement: Rabbi Chaim Vital and Rabbi Kook

Summary

General Overview

The text presents two channels of repentance: technical repentance in four stages, and essential repentance as a spiritual revolution, and argues that both involve a departure from the normal rules and a special act of grace. In technical repentance, the grace lies in the very possibility of erasing sins through a procedure that has no natural justification; in major repentance, accepting the repentance is a matter of justice if the person has truly changed, but the very ability to change in that way is an act of grace that goes beyond ordinary logic. From there, the discussion opens into a philosophical-halakhic question about whether values can be changed from within or from without, and about a possible easing of the problem through blurring the boundary between the person and the Holy One, blessed be He, and through distinguishing between different planes of choice. Later the text moves to an analysis of Maimonides, to the tension between Sefer HaMitzvot and the opening of the Laws of Repentance regarding the commandment of repentance and confession, and to the suggestion that the obligation to repent is grounded in reason even though it is not counted as a formal commandment, similar to the broader discussion of obligations that are not explicitly commanded and of character refinement according to Rabbi Chaim Vital and Rabbi Kook.

Two mechanisms of repentance: technical and essential

The text states that technical repentance is built from four stages: abandoning the sin, regret, confession, and acceptance for the future, and that it erases the sins for which the procedure was carried out, in accordance with “He clears, but does not clear entirely—He clears those who repent and does not clear those who do not repent.” It presents major repentance as a spiritual revolution that works on all transgressions together, as a repentance of “The Lord, the Lord,” and links it to the Maharal’s distinction. It argues that in reality there is no absolute dichotomy between the mechanisms, and that the distinction is meant to clarify concepts, because in most situations there is a mixture of the technical and the essential.

Grace and justice in the acceptance of repentance

The text argues that in minor repentance, the grace is that it is accepted, because as Ramchal writes, there is no reason that after a person has sinned it should be possible to “rewrite history.” It argues that in major repentance, if a person truly has done it, its acceptance is a matter of justice and not beyond the letter of the law; therefore even a righteous person who rebels at the end loses his merits, because we relate to him as he is now. It states that the grace in major repentance is that such a change is possible at all, and even if acceptance is a matter of justice, the very possibility is an act of grace beyond ordinary logic and the accepted rules.

The problem of the possibility of major repentance and changing a value system

The text defines the problem as a phenomenon that seems impossible: how can a person change a value system in which he believes—not merely as something difficult, but as something “not even really definable.” It argues that if a person wants to change the system, then he has already changed, and so he already believes in the new system; and if he does not believe in the new system, then there is no reason he would want to change the system he believes in for another one. It concludes that if the change “apparently just changes on its own, by itself,” then it seems meaningless, because “it just happened,” and therefore it is not an orderly or intentional process of repentance.

Inside and outside, divine partnership, and two planes of choice

The text suggests that the problem stems from the assumption that forces us to decide whether repentance is done from within or from without: if the person does it himself, then he “can’t do it,” and if the Holy One, blessed be He, does it to him, then it is “meaningless.” It suggests a possible softening through giving up the sharp distinction between the person and the Holy One, blessed be He, so that the boundary between outside and inside is not absolute, and there may be “a joint action that happens inside and outside together.” It brings from Tanya the phrase “one who blows, blows from within himself,” and connects this to the idea of the “divine point” within each person, suggesting that this may be connected to the solution, though without certainty. It also adds a distinction between two planes of choice—“the choice to choose versus the content of the choice,” or “the intensity of choice versus the content of the choice”—and argues that combining them may solve the problem, though he remains uneasy and stresses that the difficulty remains difficult.

Expanding the question: choosing values from the outset

The text argues that the question of possibility can be asked not only about repentance but about choice itself, because the same puzzle exists with regard to the ability to choose foundational values in the first place. It presents this as “the next step,” expanding the discussion beyond repentance.

Beyond Maimonides: the Ten Days of Repentance and the structure of the Laws of Repentance

The text connects the opening of the discussion to the question of why, during the Ten Days of Repentance, for the intermediate person it helps only to repent, and not to add commandments in order to tip the scale in the usual way, and it presents two directions of repentance that led to the two channels. It notes that the focus of the discussion is in chapter two of the Laws of Repentance, and seeks to see the implications of the conception within the structure by which Maimonides builds the Laws of Repentance.

The commandment of repentance and the commandment of confession: the Minchat Chinukh’s comment and the contradiction between Sefer HaMitzvot and the Mishneh Torah

The text cites the opening of the Laws of Repentance: “There is one positive commandment, namely that the sinner should repent from his sin before God and confess,” and presents the Minchat Chinukh’s comment that in Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 73, the wording is: “He commanded us to confess our iniquities and sins… and to state them together with repentance,” from which it seems that there is no commandment to repent, but rather that when one repents one must confess. It shows that in halakhah 1 Maimonides returns to the wording of Sefer HaMitzvot: “When he repents and turns from his sin, he is obligated to confess… this confession is a positive commandment,” and emphasizes the tension between “there is a commandment to repent and confess” and “the confession is the positive commandment.” It suggests the possibility of understanding that confession is the form that repentance takes and not a separate commandment; on the other hand, it raises the possibility that confession is a non-obligatory fulfillment commandment or a conditional commandment, and rejects the understanding of a conditional commandment because it would mean that someone who repented but did not confess is worse off than someone who never repented.

A non-obligatory fulfillment commandment, a conditional commandment, and defining the obligation of confession

The text defines a non-obligatory fulfillment commandment as one that can be fulfilled but not violated, whereas a conditional commandment is one whose obligation depends on a condition, and when the condition is met and the commandment is not performed, one has neglected a positive commandment, as with tzitzit or Grace after Meals. It argues that the wording in Sefer HaMitzvot sounds like a conditional commandment, but that this “sounds strange,” and therefore suggests instead a framework in which there is no neglect of a positive commandment in failing to confess; rather, simply, “you have not repented.” It suggests that it makes more sense to say that repentance is an obligation that is not necessarily a commandment counted among the 613, and from here opens the distinction between the count of commandments and the broader system of halakhic obligations.

Maimonides’ principles in counting the commandments, the roots, and the implication for repentance

The text presents a rule in Maimonides that counted commandments are only those commandments that have a written source in the Torah, and that even commandments derived through the thirteen hermeneutic principles are considered “from the words of the Sages” because they are not written explicitly. It cites Abu Hamparl’eh’s question about a contradiction in the ninth root between cases of repeated commands and a general prohibition, and concludes that there is no contradiction, because counting commandments requires not only a command but also unique content that is not included in another commandment. It concludes that regarding repentance, if “and they shall confess their sin” is a command only about confession, then there is no verse commanding repentance, and it notes that Maimonides interprets “and you shall return to the Lord your God” as a future promise in chapter 7, halakhah 5, and not as a commandment, unlike Nachmanides. It explains that therefore in Sefer HaMitzvot Maimonides counts only confession, whereas in the Mishneh Torah Maimonides also brings obligations that are not counted commandments, including rabbinic obligations and obligations grounded in reason, and therefore the obligation to repent appears there.

The basis of the obligation of repentance as reason: Rabbeinu Yonah, Sefat Emet, and Rabbi Elazar ben Dordaya

The text argues that the added value of repentance beyond simply not sinning is regret, acceptance for the future, and verbal confession, and asks where these requirements come from without an explicit command. It suggests that the basis is reason, and cites Rabbeinu Yonah’s parable of someone for whom a tunnel was dug out of prison: once it is known that such a mechanism exists, “reason says to make use of it,” and no command is needed—only the knowledge that it exists. It brings from Sefat Emet in capital law the idea of combining “an awakening from below” with assistance from “above,” and connects this to the partnership between inside and outside. It cites Rabbi Elazar ben Dordaya as a literary description of someone seeking help from outside in order to change himself, and concludes that the obligation to repent is grounded in reason even if it is not a counted commandment.

The status of reason in Jewish law: “Why do I need a verse? It is logical,” blessings over enjoyment, and Maimonides’ distinction between types of rabbinic law

The text argues that “Why do I need a verse? It is logical” does not give reason the status of Torah-level law when it introduces an entirely new principle, but only when it interprets a commandment that already has a verse. It cites the topic of blessings over enjoyment and the dispute between Pnei Yehoshua and Tzelach, where Pnei Yehoshua asks why a doubtful blessing should not be treated stringently if the source of the obligation is reason, and Tzelach attacks the assumption that reason is Torah-level law. It suggests that Pnei Yehoshua can still argue for stringency in a case of doubt on the basis of the substance of the issue, and presents Maimonides’ view that there are several types of rabbinic laws, including laws whose source is reason or derivation, whose doubtful cases are treated stringently even though lashes are not given for them, as opposed to laws whose source is “do not turn aside,” whose doubtful cases are treated leniently. It concludes that in Maimonides’ terms, repentance as an obligation emerging from reason is not counted among the commandments and is not Torah-level in the sense of an explicit command, but it is still an obligation that must be fulfilled; therefore Maimonides in the Laws of Repentance brings both the obligation of repentance and the obligation of confession.

Why there is no explicit command about repentance and character refinement: Rabbi Chaim Vital and Rabbi Kook

The text asks why the Torah did not command repentance if it expects it, and compares this to the broader question of things one is expected to do without being commanded. It cites Rabbi Chaim Vital in Shaarei Kedushah, who asks why the Torah does not command work on one’s character traits, and answers that the Torah speaks to human beings, and if someone is not a human being, “you don’t talk to him”; it adds the possibility that the Torah commands certain things in order to impose punishment and define a prohibition. It cites Rabbi Kook, who argues that generally “greater is one who is commanded and does” than one who is not commanded and does, but that there are areas in which the original intuition is preserved—that greater is the one who is not commanded and does—and therefore the Torah intentionally does not command, so as not to “ruin” an act that is greater and more whole. It illustrates how refining one’s character out of a legal clause can appear distorted. It adds a difficulty, because the Torah in fact does command character refinement in the commandments “to cleave to His traits,” “just as He is merciful, so you shall be merciful; just as He is gracious, so you shall be gracious,” and states that this is a counted commandment of cleaving to Him, and is not identical to Nachmanides’ “You shall be holy” about being “a degenerate within the permission of the Torah.”

Okay, we saw the two mechanisms, or the two channels, of repentance: technical repentance and essential repentance. The technical one is basically four stages: abandoning the sin, regret, confession, and resolution for the future. And that erases the sins regarding which I carried out that procedure: “yet He does not entirely clear”—He clears those who repent and does not clear those who do not repent. And the great repentance, the spiritual revolution, which works on all transgressions together—that is the repentance of “the Lord, the Lord,” and the Maharal’s distinction. I said that in both of these mechanisms there is some deviation from the rules, or some special grace that the Holy One, blessed be He, does for us. In the small repentance, the technical one, the grace is that it is accepted, because really there is no reason—as Ramchal writes—there is no reason that after a person has sinned it should be possible to rewrite history. And in the great repentance, my claim was that the fact that it is accepted is actually required by law. It is not beyond the letter of the law. That is why even the righteous person who rebels at the end loses his merits, because if you truly change, truly regret, then of course they relate to you as you are now. It doesn’t matter what you once were—that is the letter of the law. The grace is that it is possible at all to do such a thing. If you did it, then by law they accept you, but the grace is that such a thing is possible in the first place. And I explained that the problematic side of the great repentance is that there is something here that on the face of it seems impossible. How can a person change a value system in which he believes? Not that it’s hard, not that it’s beyond his powers—it isn’t even defined. Because if he wants to change it, then it has already changed, so he already believes in the new system. And if he doesn’t believe in the new system, then why would he want to change the system he believes in to another one? So if it has already changed, let’s step one step back and ask: how did it change? Did he change it? Then once again the same question returns. Rather, what? It apparently changes on its own, by itself. And if it changes by itself, then it has no value—it just happened. So it is not an orderly or intentional process of repentance. At the end I spoke about this perspective that basically says the problem comes from the fact that I am discussing whether this repentance is done from within or from without. Say, does the Holy One, blessed be He, do it to me, or do I do it myself? I myself cannot do it, and if He does it to me, then it has no value. And I said that maybe the difficulty can be softened a bit, or solved—I’m a bit undecided about this—if we give up the sharp distinction between us and the Holy One, blessed be He. The claim that we stand opposite Him and have to decide whether this is being done from outside or from inside—it is not certain that the boundary between outside and inside is such a sharp boundary. It may be that there is some kind of joint action taking place inside and outside together. I saw this week in the Tanya that it says, “One who blows, blows from within himself,” meaning that the soul, the neshamah, has within it part of the… it is part of the Holy One, blessed be He. Now maybe this is connected to that; there is some part of Him here. Yes, that’s from the Zohar, I think: “One who blows, blows from within himself.” Yes, people talk a lot about the divine point that exists in each person, or all kinds of things of that sort, each in his own style. So I’m saying, maybe that helps solve this problem. I’m not sure. I also added to that the two planes of choice: the choice to choose, as opposed to the content of the choice—what we are doing—or the intensity of choice as opposed to the content of the choice. And together maybe that solves the problem. I said I’m not one hundred percent at ease with it, not one hundred percent sure of it, but in any case there is a serious problem there. And therefore it seems to me that even in the great repentance, although its very acceptance, if you did it, is by law, the ability to do it is basically grace, and something that goes beyond conventional logic, beyond the accepted rules. One moment. Now, the question of how it is possible to do this—you could also ask how it is possible that in the first place you have choice regarding values. How do you choose foundational values? Yes, I think that question arises regarding choice in general, not only repentance. About choice in general—that’s my next step. Basically what all this means… am I unclear? What? Regarding regret, the second repentance, the first mechanism—isn’t that also difficult? I said, after all there is a continuum, it’s not two separate mechanisms. Clearly, everywhere I am, apart from the two… let’s say the full extreme of pure technicality—aside from that, any slight movement away from there already contains something of the great repentance, with all its problems and everything. Yes, I said that. The dichotomous discussion is only to clarify the concepts. Clearly, in reality it’s mixed.

I want to look at this a little in Maimonides, or at a few implications of this matter in Maimonides. First of all, in the way he builds his Laws of Repentance. So I began, if you remember, with the question why during the Ten Days of Repentance, for the intermediate person, only repentance helps, and not doing additional commandments in order to tip the scales in the usual way. I said there are two directions for answering that, and those opened up for us these two channels of repentance. This whole discussion is actually found in chapter 2 of the… wait. Yes, in chapter 2 of the Laws of Repentance. But the structure of the Laws of Repentance starts like this: “All the commandments in the Torah, whether positive commandments or prohibitions…” Wait, before I get into that structure, one second—one earlier remark. At the beginning of the Laws of Repentance it says: “There is one positive commandment, namely, that the sinner should repent from his sin before God and confess.” The Minchat Chinukh already comments on this, because in the Book of Commandments, positive commandment 73, there is a commandment—and here too, in the Book of Commandments, commandment 73—“He commanded us to confess the iniquities and sins we have committed before God and to state them together with repentance.” Meaning, we are commanded basically to confess. When one repents, one must confess. So the Minchat Chinukh says: from here you see that there is no commandment to repent, but rather that if you repent, you have to do it in this way, in the form of confession. By contrast, at the beginning of the Laws of Repentance, in the commandment he brings in the introduction: “There is one positive commandment, namely, that the sinner should repent from his sin before God and confess.” So here the wording is that there is a commandment to repent and confess. Now, true, this is one commandment, and when… what? The kaf is missing, but not… I tried checking; there are no different textual versions. In law 1 he goes back to being like the Book of Commandments; I’ll note that in a moment. So the wording here is: “namely, that the sinner should repent from his sin before God and confess,” meaning there is a commandment to repent and confess. True, there are two details here, but it is still one commandment, and that one commandment includes two details, like the four species. There are commandments that include several details. But clearly there is an obligation, or there is a commandment, to repent and also to confess; meaning these two things are both parts of the commandment of repentance.

The Minchat Chinukh asks: how does that fit with the wording in commandment 73, where the commandment is to confess together with repentance—meaning, if he repents, then he should confess? That really is a good comment. Within the laws it says: “All the commandments in the Torah, whether positive commandments or prohibitions—if a person transgressed one of them, whether intentionally or unintentionally, when he repents and turns from his sin, he is obligated to confess before God, blessed be He, as it says: ‘A man or a woman, when they commit… and they shall confess the sin they committed.’ This is verbal confession. Confession is a positive commandment. How does one confess? He says: Please, O Lord, I have sinned…” So here he goes back to the formulation found in the Book of Commandments. Meaning, confession is the positive commandment, even though above he writes that there is a commandment to repent and confess.

First remark: how are we to define the commandment in the Book of Commandments? What does it mean that “we were commanded to confess the iniquities and sins we have committed and to state them together with repentance”? Sela, turn on the lights there. Yes, yes. I think we’re here. “We were commanded to confess the iniquities and sins we have committed before God and to state them together with repentance.” So how should we understand that? Is this an existential commandment? Is it a conditional commandment? Is it a commandment—how do you understand that wording? What does it mean that “we were commanded to confess the iniquities and sins we committed before God and to state them together with repentance”? I’m talking now about the commandment of confession; there is no commandment of repentance. What is the commandment of confession? It sounds like it’s existential, no? Meaning, if you repent, then confess; and if you do not repent, fine, nothing happened. That’s not an existential commandment; it’s a conditional commandment. In the terminology, an existential commandment is something else. There are later authorities who confuse the two, and that’s simply a mistake. An existential commandment is a commandment that can be fulfilled but not violated. Right? If you fulfilled it, you have a commandment; if you didn’t, nothing happened. A conditional commandment is a commandment that can also be violated. For example, like fringes—it is conditional on your wearing a four-cornered garment. If you wear a four-cornered garment, you have to attach fringes. But that is not an existential commandment. How do I know? Because this commandment can be violated. After all, if you wear a four-cornered garment and did not put fringes on it, you have neglected a positive commandment. So what is the difference between that and an ordinary positive commandment? It’s that this is a conditional commandment. Meaning, your obligation in this commandment is conditional upon certain conditions being met—wearing a four-cornered garment. Grace after meals is also a conditional commandment. Meaning, if you ate to the point of satiety, you are obligated to recite Grace after Meals. Meaning, many of our commandments are conditional commandments. But that has nothing to do with an existential commandment; they are two completely different things.

Why am I saying this? Because in the wording of positive commandment 73, it seems we are dealing with a conditional commandment. Meaning, if you repent, then confess. But if we really understand it that way, then something odd comes out—maybe the Minchat Chinukh notes this, I’m not sure, not one hundred percent sure, but I think so. Something odd comes out, because then it turns out that if you repented and did not confess, then you neglected a positive commandment; but if you did not repent at all, then nothing happened. Meaning, someone who repented and did not confess is worse than someone who did not repent. That sounds strange. Therefore it is not likely that this is a conditional commandment. So what is it, then? The truth is that one could perhaps say, especially in light of the Minchat Chinukh’s contradiction, that when we say “he should confess together with repentance,” the meaning is: that is the form in which one does repentance. This is really a commandment to repent; it is just that the proper way to repent is to confess along with repentance—that is, not to do repentance only in one’s heart. But basically what we have here is a commandment to repent, not a commandment to confess. And this means it has to be verbal? What? And this means it has to be verbal? Yes. No, that is obvious; it says so explicitly. That’s not connected to what I’m saying now. But it only explains what exactly the proper way to repent is, with the underlying assumption that confession is not a separate commandment. Confession is simply the form in which repentance is done. That’s all.

Now, in Maimonides’ wording, this is really not entirely clear. What is the source for that? What? “And they shall confess their sin which they committed”—it is written in the Torah. So if I don’t understand it this way, then I probably have to say here that this is an existential commandment. Because a conditional commandment is hard to define here as a conditional commandment. Apparently it is an existential commandment. Meaning: repent—it is proper to repent—but you are not obligated. But if you do repent and you want to do it fully, then confess. No, then you simply didn’t repent. It’s not neglect of a positive commandment; you just don’t have repentance. Could one say that repentance is an obligation, it’s just not a commandment because it does not fall under the framework of the 613 commandments? Yes, that’s where I’m getting to in a moment. Yes, I think that’s what makes more sense to say here.

So if we really accept that definition—that basically we have here a definition of an existential commandment as opposed to an obligatory commandment in the Laws of Repentance—it seems to me, and I don’t know of a better answer to this contradiction, assuming that it is a contradiction. I said before that I’m not one hundred percent sure there is a contradiction here. But assuming there is a contradiction—I don’t know of an answer except what I’m about to say. It seems to me that this is what has to be said here. For Maimonides, the rule is that only commandments that are enumerated are commandments that have a source in the Torah. Meaning, if there is no verse commanding it, then the commandment is not counted. And it also will not really be Torah-level. Even in the second principle he writes that even commandments derived through the thirteen hermeneutical principles are commandments of the Sages, and he explains there that this is basically because they are not written. Meaning, commandments derived by exposition are not written in the Torah, but are only learned or inferred somehow from Torah verses. And since that is not written in the Torah, it is not counted in the enumeration of the commandments. So all the more so a commandment for which there is no verse commanding it at all. I mentioned the contradiction in Rav Saadia Gaon’s Book of Commandments—Abu Hamparle says there is a contradiction in the ninth principle between its first part and its second part. I think I mentioned this once. The first part says that we do not count commandments that repeat themselves. Since the Torah repeats the commandment to keep the Sabbath twelve times, we count one commandment. In the second part of the principle, Maimonides says that we count a general prohibition only once. Like “Do not eat over the blood”—Maimonides sees this as the warning regarding the stubborn and rebellious son. The Talmud says this is the warning regarding the stubborn and rebellious son, because in the passage of the stubborn and rebellious son only the punishment appears. So the warning is learned from “Do not eat over the blood.” But there are additional laws learned from there, like that a religious court should not eat on the day it decrees a death sentence, not to eat before prayer—in Maimonides it sounds as if that is Torah law, which is interesting. In any case, he brings that too, and he counts it only once.

So Abu Hamparle asks: there is a contradiction here, because in the first part of the principle it seems that everything goes according to content. Meaning, we do not count commandments that repeat several times in the Torah because they have one content. Meaning, what determines the count of the commandments is that it has a unique content, and it does not matter how many commands there are. In the second part of the ninth principle it seems the opposite. It seems that what determines it is the command, because in a general prohibition there are several different contents, and nevertheless Maimonides says we count it only once—only one commandment—even though these are different contents. So you see that we go by the number of commands, not by the number of contents. So Abu Hamparle asks: there is a contradiction between the first part of the ninth principle and the second part of the ninth principle. And of course it contradicts nothing. What is needed is both. Meaning, for a commandment to be counted, it has to have a command, and it has to have its own unique content, meaning that it is not included in another commandment. But for our purposes, what matters is this: the first part of the principle deals with a situation where there are commands but they have no distinct contents—so it is not counted. The second part deals with a situation where there are contents but no separate command—so that too is not counted. Okay? It is clear that this is what Maimonides meant to say.

In any case, what comes out from this is that we count only a commandment that, beyond its content, also has its own special command. Is there a command concerning repentance? If I read Maimonides according to the first reading I suggested in the Book of Commandments—“and they shall confess the sin they committed”—then there is a command to confess. And if confession is simply the way one does repentance, then perhaps one can say that this verse commands us to repent, and then there is a verse commanding repentance. And that is if I read Maimonides in the first way, not like the Minchat Chinukh. If I read it in the sense that when he speaks of the commandment of confession he really means the commandment of repentance, only that the way to do it is to confess verbally—but basically it is the commandment of repentance. But if I read it like the Minchat Chinukh, that there is a commandment to confess, an existential commandment, but there is no commandment to repent, then basically “and they shall confess the sin they committed” is not a commandment to repent. So where is there a commandment to repent? There is the verse, “And you shall return to the Lord your God.” But concerning that verse Maimonides writes explicitly that it is not a commandment. In chapter 7 of the Laws of Repentance, chapter 7, law 5: “All the prophets commanded concerning repentance, and Israel will be redeemed only through repentance. And the Torah already promised that in the end Israel will repent at the end of their exile, and immediately they will be redeemed, as it says: ‘And it shall be, when all these things come upon you… and you shall return to the Lord your God… and the Lord your God will return your captivity,’ etc.” So Maimonides interprets “and you shall return to the Lord your God” as a promise, a prophecy, a promise of what will happen in the future. In fact Nachmanides on that verse says it is a commandment—but that is Nachmanides. Maimonides says it is not.

So according to Maimonides, if that verse is not a command to repent, then according to Maimonides there is no verse commanding repentance. If there is no verse commanding repentance, then there cannot be an enumerated commandment to repent. Therefore in the Book of Commandments Maimonides brings only “and they shall confess the sin they committed,” only confession, because only regarding that is there a command. There is no command to repent. In the Book of Commandments these are the enumerated commandments. You cannot bring there a commandment that we have no command for, no verse commanding it. In the Mishneh Torah, by contrast, in the Mishneh Torah Maimonides brings all our obligations, not only enumerated commandments. Rabbinic obligations also appear in the Mishneh Torah. Obligations based on reason, obligations from expositions—of course, the whole of Jewish law appears in the Mishneh Torah. Therefore in the Mishneh Torah, when Maimonides brings the obligation, then there is an obligation to repent. Why? Because true, there is no command, but there clearly is a halakhic obligation. There clearly is an obligation, even if there is no command. And therefore in the Laws of Repentance, when he writes what one must do, he writes to repent and confess. Why, at the beginning of the legal section, does he return to the wording of the Book of Commandments? Because Maimonides’ way is to construct his legal sections such that at the beginning he brings the commandments, and then he details and adds the rabbinic laws, the rationales, the expositions, and everything around them. But at the beginning he always opens—every legal section always opens—with the commandment, with what we were commanded in the Torah, and afterward he expands and adds what goes beyond that.

Therefore I think that at the beginning of the laws he really brings the wording of the Book of Commandments, where he is trying to define what the positive commandment is. So he says: “All the commandments in the Torah, whether positive commandments or prohibitions—if a person transgressed one of them, whether intentionally or unintentionally, when he repents and turns from his sin, he is obligated to confess before God, blessed be He, as it says, ‘A man or woman, when they commit…’ and so on, ‘and they shall confess the sin they committed’—this is verbal confession.” So he brings the verse and what we are commanded from it. “Confession is a positive commandment.” He always begins—every legal section begins—with the commandments that are there. We have such and such commandments. Then he begins to explain what that commandment means and to add to it. Where do we really learn the obligation from? From reason. From reason? Yes. One could also say there is no obligation, because it is like there is no reasoning that there is a commandment to believe. Because if I am already repenting, then I am doing it on my own. So there is no need to command it. Meaning, I’m not going to come repent because there is a commandment to repent. A command to repent. No, also from reason. Meaning, if there is such reasoning to repent, then that is what will cause me to repent. Obviously, that reasoning is not two different things. The reasoning is what I understand—that it is right to repent. That is the reasoning. Nothing beyond that. No, but even without the reasoning there was some primary thing. Without reasoning I wouldn’t do it. What? If there is no reasoning, why do it? Why? You’re saying: I repent not because of that reasoning, but because I want to fulfill the obligation which the reasoning says is to fulfill the commandments. No, that is the Meshekh Chokhmah. There is a Meshekh Chokhmah who wants to claim why according to Maimonides there is no commandment to repent—because there is no need. To abandon the sin and not continue sinning is obvious. We are already commanded and standing from the very fact that the Torah defines it as a transgression. What is there to repent about? I spoke about this once. I don’t think he is right. Because after all there is also verbal confession; the resolution for the future—I do have to do that. Why do I have to do that? On the contrary, there is no logic at all in making a resolution for the future. I am already obligated and standing not to transgress any prohibition, whether I make a resolution or not. So what kind of extra demand of zeal is this, this resolution for the future? After all, in any case I am obligated not to commit those transgressions from the very fact that the Torah defines them as transgressions.

So if you tell me that repentance is something more than simply not committing transgressions, then regarding that extra element there is room for a commandment. Maimonides claims there isn’t one, but that is not an explanation. There is something here that could have been commanded. Okay? So now, this point—if indeed there was no command on it, then why does one have to do the things that are beyond merely not sinning? Not sinning is obvious, but that is not repentance. The added value in repentance beyond not sinning is the regret, the resolution for the future, the verbal confession—not the mere not sinning. Okay? All these things—where do they come from? On the one hand, they do not emerge from the fact that these acts are defined as transgressions. I need not to sin; who said I need to regret what I did, or resolve for the future, or confess verbally? Where does all this come from? On the other hand, there is no command for it. So why do it? Here I say that one probably has to say that it comes from reason. And the reasoning is like what Rabbenu Yonah writes at the beginning of the book, which I already brought last time when I spoke about the special grace in great repentance, with his parable of the tunnel—yes, that they dug their way out of prison. Yes, they dug a tunnel there and one person didn’t leave. Once you know there is such a mechanism, reason says to make use of it. There is no need to command you to make use of it; what is needed is only to tell you that such a mechanism exists. Now, in the small repentance one has to say that you are told that such a mechanism exists. But in the great repentance, as I said before, it is also a matter of reason that such a mechanism exists—or that it is accepted—or that there is such a mechanism. Meaning, if I do great repentance then certainly I am a different person, so they no longer come to me with claims. It is simply straightforward reasoning to do great repentance. The only question is: how is it possible at all to do this? Okay, fine, that already maps onto the question of choice in general. Maybe if we assume that we have free choice and that we have the ability to change, then if such a tunnel has been dug for us, reason says that one should make use of it. And therefore there is an obligation to repent, an obligation grounded in reason.

And I remembered that the Sefat Emet says, regarding capital cases, that there is a combination of awakening from below, and through that, those above kind of help you in the process of repentance. So this goes back to the point that there is cooperation here, a kind of “two who performed it.” And we also saw this in Rabbi Elazar ben Dordaya: “The heavens asked for mercy on my behalf, the mountains asked for mercy on my behalf.” Meaning, he understands that he cannot do this by himself; he is looking for some something, or someone, from outside, who will help him do it—because what does it mean, how can I change myself? It’s a strange, unclear thing. So what basically comes out is that the obligation to repent is grounded in reason. True, we spoke about this—we had a whole series on reasoning, right? It seems so.

Now, we spoke about the fact that although the Talmud writes in several places, “Why do I need a verse? It is logical,” and seemingly what comes out from this is that reasoning has the status of a verse, but that is not true. It is clear that it is not true. Reasoning has the status of a verse when it comes to interpret a commandment that already has a verse. So to remove a detail, add a detail, or shape the commandment, reasoning can do work like something written explicitly in a verse. But when reasoning introduces a new foundation, it does not have Torah-level status. We saw this regarding blessings over benefit, in tractate Berakhot, with the dispute between the Pnei Yehoshua and the Tzelach. The Talmud says one must recite a blessing before food based on reasoning, because “whoever eats from this world without a blessing is as if he committed sacrilege.” So the Pnei Yehoshua asks: then why shouldn’t its uncertainty be treated stringently? After all, “Why do I need a verse? It is logical”—meaning reasoning has a status like Torah law, so uncertainty should be treated stringently. And the Tzelach attacks him. He says: what are you talking about? Where have we ever heard such a thing—that reasoning is Torah law? What do you mean, where have we heard it? The Talmud says, “Why do I need a verse? It is logical.” And the Tzelach was aware of those Talmudic passages. Rather, what he means is that “Why do I need a verse? It is logical” speaks in a place where the reasoning shapes an existing law that already has a verse. For that, you don’t need verses; the reasoning can shape it. But here, regarding blessings over benefit, the reasoning establishes a new law; it is not shaping or interpreting an existing law. Such a law will not be Torah-level. For something to be Torah-level, it needs a command. Without a command, it is not Torah-level.

By the way, I don’t think the Pnei Yehoshua disagrees with him. I think I said that. I don’t think the Pnei Yehoshua disagrees with him either. He says that true, there is no command, but still, since there is reasoning that says there is essentially something wrong with eating without a blessing, in a case of doubt one should still be stringent. And this is not like an ordinary rabbinic law. In Maimonides there are several kinds of rabbinic laws. There are rabbinic laws whose doubts are treated stringently, and rabbinic laws whose doubts are treated leniently. Meaning, a law that comes from reasoning, or a law that comes from exposition—the same thing—both are laws that are not Torah-level in Maimonides’ classification; they are not counted among the commandments. But their doubts are treated stringently. There are other practical differences—for example, one is not flogged for them. A law that comes from reasoning or from exposition—one is not flogged for that, okay, according to Maimonides. And he says this explicitly. But their doubts are treated stringently. And by the way, many attacked Maimonides from various places where one sees that laws that emerge from expositions are treated stringently in cases of doubt. That is not an attack. Maimonides agrees that their doubts are treated stringently. They think that “rabbinic law” is some umbrella term and that all rabbinic laws have the same rules. Anything that is a rabbinic law, uncertainty about it is treated leniently, and human dignity overrides it, and all sorts of things of that sort. But that is not correct. According to Maimonides there are several kinds of rabbinic laws, and each kind has its own parameters. So a law whose basis is reasoning or exposition is a law that has substance but no command, and therefore its doubt is treated stringently. A rabbinic law that has the command of “do not turn aside” but has no inherent substance—therefore its doubt is treated leniently. Because a doubtful command, or a doubtful act of rebellion, is not rebellion.

Like you said that non-Jews are obligated by reason, by a commandment of reason. Yes, Rav Nissim Gaon writes in his introduction to the Talmud that anything dependent on inner understanding, a person has already been obligated in it forever. Commandments newly introduced that are Torah-level? I don’t know such an example. I don’t know—present one to me, show me an example; I don’t remember one right now. Meaning—not, where the attitude toward it is that of a Torah-level commandment, a commandment from reason. Unequivocally no. It cannot be. It is not counted, and one is not flogged for it. What? You can call it Torah-level if you want, but it is not counted and one is not flogged for it. Counting—that is not really a practical difference. If it’s not counted, so what—that doesn’t decide whether it’s a Torah-level commandment. But there are also practical legal differences: one is not flogged. You can say it is Torah-level and one is not flogged for it. Fine, that’s already terminology. In Maimonides it is “of the Sages.” If you transgressed words of Torah, you transgressed words of the Sages. The issue of practical difference is not a question of labels. The label doesn’t matter. One has to fulfill this and that. In general, according to Maimonides, who has this category: Torah law, rabbinic law. So basically, if I return to the commandment of repentance, the commandment of repentance basically comes from reason. And since it comes from reason, it cannot be counted among the commandments. But there is an obligation to do it—and perhaps even an obligation that other medieval authorities would call Torah-level—but there is an obligation to do it. Never mind right now how exactly to define it. And therefore in the Laws of Repentance Maimonides brings both the obligation to repent and the obligation to confess. Okay.

Now the question that arises here is: why really were we not commanded about this? About the commandment to repent? Why did the Torah leave this as an obligation that is supposed to emerge for us from reason? Why didn’t it command it? If it wants us to repent, let it command it. And this comes up regarding all the things we are expected to do, but there is no command regarding them. So this is what I have mentioned more than once already—what Rabbi Kook writes about character refinement. He says that character refinement—because Rabbi Chaim Vital asks this in Sha’arei Kedushah: why doesn’t the Torah command character refinement? So Rabbi Chaim Vital says: the Torah speaks to human beings. Someone who is not a human being—it does not speak to him. So then why is there a commandment “Do not murder,” for example? Apparently, first of all, it may be that the Torah wanted to impose punishment, because in truth the prohibition on murder is not dependent on “Do not murder,” but in order to impose punishment for it—for character refinement there is no punishment—and for that you need a command. The prohibition, for example, in the case of Cain—they came to him with claims even before any command on murder. Meaning, you see that there is a prohibition on murder that we are supposed to understand on our own. But in many such matters the Torah commands because there is punishment, because it must define it as a prohibition, as a negative commandment. It is also written in the Torah not in the context of punishment—there are all kinds of “cursed be…” All the “cursed be”s, not only for punishment. “Cursed be” is not a commandment. Okay. All sorts of character traits are written in “cursed be.” “Cursed be” does not talk about character refinement. It talks about ugly behaviors, but not character refinement. What “cursed be” is there on character refinement? “Cursed be he who strikes his fellow in secret”—fine. “Who makes a graven image.” That is not character refinement. Bad actions come from bad traits, but refinement… okay, I’ll sharpen this in a moment. Character refinement is in the soul; it is not the act. You have to define what character traits are. Yes, exactly.

So Rabbi Chaim Vital says yes, there is no point in commanding character traits, because someone who does not refine his traits is not subject to command in the first place. So what is the point? Rabbi Kook adds to this: he claims that generally it is accepted that “greater is one who is commanded and performs than one who is not commanded and performs”—that is what Hazal say. The ordinary intuition, if you asked people, would be that greater is the one who is not commanded and performs. But Hazal say that greater is the one who is commanded and performs. And Rabbi Kook says: there are things regarding which the original intuition remains, that greater is one who is not commanded and performs. And those things the Torah deliberately does not put into the form of a command, so as not to destroy the possibility of doing them in a greater, fuller way. Yes—someone who refines his character because there is a section in the Shulchan Arukh saying one must refine one’s character—that’s not it. Not like someone who refines it because he understands that one needs to be a human being. And therefore the Torah deliberately does not command it, so as not to make it into a small thing. Because here, smaller is the one who is commanded and performs as compared with the one who is not commanded and performs.

Yes, the example that always comes to my mind in this context is matchmaking. Yes, with the young man who rejected all the… we already spoke about this—the young man who rejected all the girls and none of them suited him. The spiritual supervisor sends him to work on his character for an entire year with inspired devotion. After a year he comes back, the parade of girls returns, and once again he rejects all of them. So the supervisor says to him: what did you do this year? Did you work on your character? Of course I worked on it. A year ago, when I was arrogant, none of them suited me. Now that I’m humble, all the more so none of them suits me. So character refinement, when it comes because it’s written in a verse and in a section of the Shulchan Arukh that one has to refine one’s character—it looks like that. That is what someone looks like who refines his character because there is some section and he wants to discharge his obligation of character refinement. And the Torah expects us to refine our character because we understand that a human being should be refined.

And just as an aside, I’ll add: the interesting question is—yes, it’s like the famous story about Rabbi Chaim that “there is no such Tosafot.” So this question of Rabbi Chaim Vital always bothered me, because the Torah does command character refinement, and this is a kind of difficulty. It says to cleave to the attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He: just as He is merciful, so you too be merciful; just as He is gracious, so you too be gracious. And there is an explicit commandment—every enumerator of the commandments counts it—to cleave to the attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He. So what kind of question is that? “You shall be holy”? What? That is Nachmanides. Perhaps one could… no, no, “You shall be holy” is not connected to this issue. That means to act beyond the letter of the law. It is not connected to what I am saying now. “To cleave to His attributes” is “and to cleave to Him,” not “You shall be holy.” “Just as He is merciful, so you too be merciful; just as He is gracious, so you too be gracious.” Doesn’t Nachmanides say that from “You shall be holy”? Of course not. No, “You shall be holy” means not to be a degenerate within the bounds of Torah law, to do things beyond the letter of the law. These are two different things. “To cleave to the attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He” is an enumerated commandment. Even Nachmanides does not disagree about that. That is “to cleave to Him.”