Teshuva: Its Meaning and Laws – Rabbi Michael Abraham – Lesson 4, Part B

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t sound like they missed this commandment. I don’t know, maybe Rabbi Chaim Vital knew too, I just don’t know whether that’s some small thing one can know.

[Speaker B] So what’s the source? What’s the source in the Torah? Why the source? “And cleave to Him,” “to walk in His ways,” and “to cleave to Him.”

[Speaker C] Come on, say it’s not character work, it’s simply being compassionate, but that doesn’t mean working on your character traits.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Behavior, exactly. Here: commandment 8, He commanded us to resemble Him, may He be exalted, as much as we can, and that is what He said: “And you shall walk in His ways.” And this command was repeated: “to walk in all His ways,” and it was explained: just as the Holy One, blessed be He, is called gracious, so you too should be gracious. The positive commandment is “and you shall walk in His ways.” Yes. But cleaving to His attributes, that’s “to cleave to Him,” “and you shall walk in His ways,” yes, it’s the same commandment. In any case, it seems to me that the point is that walking in the ways of the Holy One, blessed be He, is a behavioral command — meaning, to do what He would do, okay? But refining your character traits is not a behavioral command. Refining your character traits means simply having more refined traits, repairing the soul; that’s inner spiritual work. There is no commandment for that inner work. Is compassion part of inner work? What? No — “compassionate” means to have compassion, to do acts of mercy; that is what “compassionate” means in the commandment. Not that that’s the literal meaning of the word compassionate — I’m saying that the commandment to be compassionate and gracious means to show grace to someone, to have mercy on someone, to walk in the ways of the Holy One, blessed be He.

[Speaker D] So if you have — if you worked on your character traits and now you have the trait of compassion,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then

[Speaker D] now you no longer need a commandment, because from the trait itself you’ll already do it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. You don’t need a commandment, but you are fulfilling a commandment. There is a commandment. In order to… you can help yourself fulfill the commandment by refining your character traits, and of course that has value beyond merely helping on the practical level. Once all your traits are refined — great, maybe you would do it even without a commandment, fine, but you are still fulfilling a positive commandment. For example, the issue of a positive commandment overriding a prohibition — that’s a practical difference, right? If there were no positive commandment, then it would not override a prohibition. Now that there is a command, a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. Does the act of refining character traits override a prohibition? By the way, there is… yes, difficulties. There’s an interesting Sefat Emet on Maimonides; we’ll get to that in a moment. And what is repentance? In chapter 2, halakhah 2. Ah no, in chapter 2, halakhah 1. What is complete repentance? It is when a person is confronted with the thing in which he once sinned, and it is in his power to do it, and he refrains and does not do it because of repentance — not out of fear and not because his strength has failed. How so? If he had relations with a woman in a forbidden way, and later he is secluded with her again, while still loving her, still physically capable, and in the same place where he sinned, and he refrains and does not transgress — that is a complete penitent. And this is what Solomon said: “Remember your Creator in the days of your youth,” etc. So the Sefat Emet discusses here — several later authorities discuss it — whether one may do this deliberately from the outset. If someone sinned in a certain situation with a certain woman, and now he wants to seclude himself with that same woman…

[Speaker D] To put himself back into the situation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, to seclude himself with that same woman in the same place, in the same situation, and maybe even to violate a prohibition…

[Speaker D] A positive commandment overrides a prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only in order to… yes, exactly, that’s why I remembered it. Maybe this is a case of a positive commandment overriding a prohibition. The positive commandment of repentance — if we say that according to Maimonides it’s a positive commandment, though apparently there is no such commandment, I don’t know — but maybe there is some kind of positive commandment here overriding a prohibition.

[Speaker D] And what if you don’t withstand it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? If you don’t withstand it, then you’re done for — so be careful, don’t do it. But if you think you can withstand it and you really want to complete your repentance fully… I don’t remember the Sefat Emet’s conclusion; it seems to me that he says it is permitted. He discusses this Maimonides — take a look in Frankel, Frankel there.

[Speaker B] We say every day in prayer, “Do not bring us to a trial.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but a penitent is a different story. A penitent has special paths in any case. For example, if someone lent money with interest, then part of his repentance is not to lend with interest even to a non-Jew; to tear up his promissory notes — meaning, not even to take back the principal from the loans he made. So there are special practices for a penitent. Here the novelty is that these practices involve a prohibition, which is a bigger novelty. Anyway. But for our purposes, I think Rabbi Chaim Vital’s question is why the Torah does not command character refinement — not walking in the ways of the Holy One, blessed be He. Because in truth, in that sense, there is nothing to cleave to in God by being compassionate as He is compassionate. He is not compassionate — in the sense of a personality trait. You cannot describe Him in terms of what His traits are or what His heart is like. That’s irrelevant. What we can describe is what He does, meaning how He behaves. Therefore the command to walk in His ways or to cleave to Him means to do what He does, to behave as He behaves. Character refinement is not in order to cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He; character refinement is in order to become a complete human being. And a complete human being is one whose traits are refined — and that is a matter of reason. And therefore the Torah does not command it, because the Torah deliberately wants to leave it as a matter of reason, because doing it out of reason is greater than doing it because of a commandment. Now repentance, in some senses, is not even an example — it’s the same thing. Repentance in the larger sense is character refinement: adopting the right values, meaning not behaviorally but inwardly. The inner revolution I spoke about — which is basically character refinement in a certain sense. Right? It’s not an example; it’s the same thing. And therefore it is clear why according to Maimonides there is no commandment of repentance. Because the Torah wants to leave it so that it will be done out of motivation that comes from us, from below, not because of a command from above.

[Speaker E] Wait, this is like Rabbi Chaim Vital, it’s like Maimonides when he brings “a person should always say: I could not bring myself to eat pork, I could not bring myself to wear shaatnez,” where he says there’s a contradiction between the halakhic ruling and the philosophy in chapter six, right? So there too, basically, the distinction among commandments is commandments a person should do on his own, rational ones and revealed ones. Things a person should do on his own even without the command of the Holy One, blessed be He.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. The question is — it’s not exactly doing them on one’s own even without the commandment, but rather, once there is a commandment, how to do them in a more complete way. Should one do them out of identification, or do them out of alienation? Only because there is a command — on the contrary, I don’t identify with it at all, but I’ll do it because I am a servant of God, there is a command. Or no — I need… this is a comparison between two options for fulfilling commandments once there is a commandment, not necessarily a comparison between whether a commandment is needed or not. Maimonides doesn’t discuss that there; maybe you could say that it also follows from there. The question is whether one should identify with commandments, whether there is any value in that, or on the contrary, perhaps one specifically need not identify, and maybe if you don’t identify it is even greater — it depends on the matter.

[Speaker E] Yes,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then Maimonides says that with rational commandments there is a point in identifying, and with revealed commandments there is specifically a point in not doing so — specifically to do it because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded it, and not out of my own identification.

[Speaker D] And a person doesn’t need to work on himself not to love pork.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. There is no value in pork becoming disgusting to me. That does happen quite often, by the way — I think it happens to many people — but there is no value in it; it’s not an achievement.

[Speaker H] That’s Maimonides’ view.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, Maimonides,

[Speaker H] Yes.

[Speaker F] Regarding “a jealous and avenging God” — is there any point in being jealous and avenging?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, so we talked about that once when we discussed, I think, Jewish law and morality. I said that obviously morality precedes the Torah. Even when we are told to cleave to the attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He, the fact is that there are attributes we do not cleave to. Why not? If the obligation to behave in these ways comes from that verse, from cleaving to the attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He — those are the attributes, go with them. Clearly we choose which attributes it is proper to imitate and which not. Meaning, we already know in advance what is proper and what is improper. Only afterward does the Torah come and tell us to walk in His ways, “and you shall do what is right and good,” and all these things, when the Torah does not specify what exactly is “right and good,” because it assumes we also understand on our own what “you shall do what is right and good” means. It just wants to tell us that this has religious value; it is not only a human value. Contrary to Leibowitz, who said that morality is an atheistic category. No — it is not an atheistic category, it is a theistic category, meaning a religious category, but not a halakhic one. Those are two different things.

[Speaker H] I think I once saw, or heard, that in Guide for the Perplexed he writes — that Maimonides writes — that there is also something to learn from the attributes of vengeance; I think the Shelah writes about it, that one should learn from it regarding a ruler, that he should punish, but not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even if that’s true — I’m not familiar with it. Even if it’s true, the fact is that we don’t do that. So the ruler yes, and we no. Why not? Formally speaking, there are all the attributes, so do all of them. No — we understand that for us it is not fitting, and for a ruler it is fitting. Meaning, I have never seen anyone learn from those attributes something that his natural morality does not already tell him to do. There is no such thing. It always works out. So with a ruler there is logic in his behaving that way, so you say okay, then “jealous and avenging” applies to the ruler. Fine. Even if Maimonides had not said it, the ruler would still do that without Maimonides, because it makes sense. In the end, reason determines. We talked about the fact that there is no such thing as Jewish morality — that’s an oxymoron, “Jewish morality”; there is morality. What people understand to be moral — that is morality. There is Jewish law. In any case, how did we get to that? Yes — so why doesn’t the Torah command repentance? Because repentance, as part of character refinement, is something the Torah deliberately wants us to do out of our own understanding and not because of a commandment. And really, at least the larger repentance. The smaller repentance — fine, we do that out of self-interest; meaning, here there is no need to command it, because it is our way to erase sins. If you want, do it; if you don’t want, don’t do it — that’s your problem. But the larger repentance is something the Torah truly expects from us, but it does not command it in order to leave it for us to do on our own initiative. In the structure of Maimonides’ laws, it could be — as I said, I began this whole move with the two mechanisms of repentance from that Maimonides about the intermediate person and the Ten Days of Repentance — but in Maimonides himself it doesn’t really look that way. In Maimonides himself it seems that he is talking about the smaller repentance with the rules and confession and all the — what are called the laws of repentance, yes, the laws. But maybe Maimonides is also talking about this; I’m not one hundred percent sure. I don’t know whether this is a nice insight or not — you tell me what you think. In Maimonides, Laws of Repentance, he writes: all commandments in the Torah, whether positive commandments or prohibitions — that’s what we read earlier — one confesses; confession is a positive commandment, and likewise one is obligated to confess; the scapegoat, atonement like Yom Kippur, and nowadays when the Temple does not exist, the day itself brings atonement, and the categories of atonement together with suffering and all that. That ends chapter one. Chapter two: what is complete repentance? One could have read it as follows: until now he said there is a commandment to repent or to confess, there is a matter of repentance; now he explains — meaning, what it means to repent. Only he didn’t explain it till now, now he explains it. But what is “complete repentance”? He should say: what is repentance? That the sinner returns from his sin — no, “what is complete repentance?” What does “complete repentance” mean? Until now I was speaking with you about the laws of repentance — there are rules, confession, stages: leave the sin, do what you want — do what you need, excuse me. In chapter 2 he says: what is complete repentance? Complete repentance is full repentance, the inward reversal. Then he says: when a person is confronted with the thing in which he sinned and it is in his power to do it, and he refrains and does not do it because of repentance, not out of fear and not because his strength failed. How so? If he had relations with a woman in a forbidden way, and after some time… And what is repentance? That the sinner returns from his sin and removes it from his thoughts and resolves in his heart never to do it again, as it says, “Let the wicked forsake his way”; and likewise he regrets what has passed, as it says, “For after I returned, I regretted”; and the Knower of hidden things will testify concerning him that he will never return to this sin again, as it says, “Nor will we any longer say to the work of our hands, ‘our god.’” And he must confess with his lips and state these matters that he resolved in his heart. Anyone who confesses verbally but has not resolved in his heart to stop is like one who immerses while holding a creeping thing in his hand. And what should he confess? And among the ways of repentance are that the penitent constantly cries out before God with weeping and supplication, gives charity according to his means, distances himself greatly from the thing in which he sinned, changes his name — meaning, I am someone else and not the same person who did those deeds — changes all his deeds for the good and onto the straight path, and goes into exile from his place, for exile atones for sin because it causes him to be subdued and to become humble and lowly of spirit. And so on. So there is “what is complete repentance” — I understood that maybe he is talking about the larger repentance — but afterward he comes back and begins detailing

[Speaker D] the laws of repentance with confession and regret and accepting for the future

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] for the future, all those stages, which again brings us back to the smaller repentance. And then in halakhah 4, among the ways of repentance, he says there, “I am not the same person” — that’s in halakhah 4. And then in halakhah 4, after he details the ways of repentance, he goes back again and says “I am not the same person,” which is again the larger repentance. Now I’m not exactly — again, I’m saying there is some sort of reference here to complete repentance as opposed to repentance with stages, but the arrangement does not look as though Maimonides had before him some structured approach of two mechanisms of repentance that he wanted to distinguish between. So maybe it’s a nice insight, maybe not, I don’t know. I do see two tracks here, but it’s not arranged clearly enough to convince me that Maimonides really had those two tracks in mind. But on the other hand, it is there: there is complete repentance, and there is superior repentance, and “I am not the same person,” and chapter 2 in some way speaks more about the…

[Speaker E] There is a distinction in Maimonides that in chapter 2 he brings acceptance for the future at the end, unlike chapter 1 where acceptance for the future seems to appear before abandoning the sin…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he doesn’t mention acceptance there in chapter 2.

[Speaker E] In chapter 2.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Acceptance for the future is mentioned.

[Speaker E] Where does he mention it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not here. But in the wording of the confession: “and they shall confess their sin which they committed” — this is verbal confession. Confession is a positive commandment. How does one confess? He says: Please, Lord, I have sinned, I have transgressed, I have rebelled before You, and I have done such and such, and behold I regret and am ashamed of my deeds, and I will never return to this matter again. And this is the essence of confession.

[Speaker D] And here too at the end, in the very last part, in the confession itself,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here too I don’t see acceptance for the future in the wording of the confession. At least it seems to me — unless I missed something.

[Speaker H] “And I will never return to this matter again.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And similarly, one who injures his fellow or damages his property — even though he has paid him what he owes him, he is not atoned for until he confesses and returns from doing such a thing forever, as it says, “from all the sins of man.” Here too I don’t see anything here.

[Speaker E] Does Maimonides bring acceptance for the future as one of the four?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In chapter 2 he does.

[Speaker H] I thought that if it’s not acceptance for the future, then what is “and returns from doing such a thing forever”? That he won’t actually do it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it doesn’t say that he should accept upon himself not to do it. We see that he in fact does not do it. That’s how it seems. But if he does not do it, why — why does he…

[Speaker H] Why won’t he do it if he didn’t accept it upon himself? It seems that’s the intention.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why won’t he do it? Because the Torah forbids it.

[Speaker H] What do you mean, why won’t he do it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if he didn’t decide — if he is now refraining, that means he decided to refrain from it. But in the language of the laws of repentance there is not supposed to be an active act of decision. He simply doesn’t do it. Meshekh Chokhmah — from the fact that you don’t do it because there is a prohibition against doing it, then no. Therefore all the extras beyond that — regret and acceptance and confession — all those are not required by the Torah’s commandment itself not to do it.

[Speaker H] Yes, but it seems to me that if you truly won’t do it, that means you also accepted it upon yourself — unless it’s by chance.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, he doesn’t write it, so let him write it. Maybe one has to infer it, but if there is a general rule, if there is such an obligation, then let him say so.

[Speaker H] That he won’t do it forever.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because in chapter 2, halakhah 2, he does write it: “And what is repentance? It is that the sinner abandon his sin and remove it from his thoughts and resolve in his heart not to do it again,” as it says, “Let the wicked forsake his way,” etc. “And likewise he regrets what has passed.” So that means abandoning the sin, acceptance for the future, regret, and confession.

[Speaker E] There, in the confession it says… the confession appears at the end of the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. In the wording of the confession that we read earlier.

[Speaker E] Here acceptance for the future appears first.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. As I said, in the wording of the confession the order is different from when he details the laws. But I don’t know whether that is a difference between chapter 1 and chapter 2, because there he brings the wording of the confession; he doesn’t bring the law of accepting upon oneself for the future. So again, I don’t know whether in Maimonides one can really see these two elements, or whether it’s just a nice idea and he basically sees it all as one thing. I don’t know. Beyond that, if I continue in Maimonides’ Laws of Repentance, there is in chapters 5–6… In chapter 3 he talks about the intermediate, the righteous, Rosh Hashanah, heretics and apostates, and various matters of people who have no way to repent. Twenty-four things that impede repentance — that’s chapter 4. In chapters 5 and 6 there is the whole discussion of free choice. And the question is: why does the discussion of free choice appear specifically in the laws of repentance and not in the laws of Grace after Meals? After all, every person needs to choose freely to recite Grace after Meals, or I don’t know what, to observe the Sabbath. Why specifically in the laws of repentance? If repentance in its essence is some kind of re-choosing of values, or an inward reversal as I called it earlier, then there is logic to placing the discussion of choice in the laws of repentance. Why? Because it’s true that in every commandment or transgression there is an element of choice — to choose correctly and not choose incorrectly. But the commandment of repentance, or the obligation of repentance — because for Maimonides it is not a commandment but an obligation of repentance — is to choose. Meaning, in Grace after Meals, the commandment is to choose to recite Grace after Meals. So there is no point in inserting the discussion of choice there, even though choice is a condition for fulfilling the commandment of Grace after Meals — you need to choose to recite it. But in repentance, what you do in repentance is simply return to being a chooser. We talked about weakness of will last time: you return to being a chooser. So the whole essence of repentance is precisely choice. And exactly because of that, repentance is not counted among the commandments, because… you cannot command… If you are not choosing, what good does it do to command you to be a chooser? You have to choose. That is the whole idea: to return to being a chooser. Therefore the discussion of choice appears here in… And is choice itself a commandment? No — that’s exactly my next sentence. And of course it says, “Choose life.” Right? There is a verse, “Choose life.” But no one counts that among the commandments, at least no one I know. Why not? For the same reason repentance is not counted. There is no meaning in saying that you were commanded to choose. You won’t choose that either. You were commanded to do various things; there is no point in commanding choice itself. But on the other hand, there is value in choosing. Suppose I do only good deeds all my life and avoid transgressions, but merely because that’s what I feel like, not because I chose.

[Speaker D] That’s what I like doing. What? That’s what I like doing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So does that have value? That’s Amnon Yitzhak’s sheep. And it doesn’t…

[Speaker H] It didn’t do good deeds, it just didn’t commit sins.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, come on, let’s imagine a sheep that also does good deeds. Not committing sins is much more…

[Speaker D] Doesn’t matter.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the principled level, that’s Amnon Yitzhak’s sheep. It’s also a sheep that does good deeds; it got a genetic upgrade. That has no value whatsoever, right? In the end, you have to choose. And once you want to repent, you basically have to return to being a chooser. And in order to return to being a chooser, you can’t be commanded to be a chooser. So that’s another explanation for why there is no commandment to repent: precisely because there is no commandment to choose. On the other hand, there is discussion of choice in the laws of repentance, because repentance means being a chooser. That’s the other side of the same coin. Therefore we were not commanded, and therefore everything appears here. And as I just said, there is also value in being a chooser. Meaning, reason tells us that there is value in being a chooser. Right? Therefore choice is not just a means for me to behave well. There is value in being a chooser. Let’s say there is a person who behaves well by inertia — everything is perfect, but just inertia, he doesn’t choose. Another person chooses evil. Who is better? In my view it’s complicated.

[Speaker F] Right, there are two planes here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. There is one plane on which the first is better, and another plane on which the second is better. The second is at least a human being — he chooses. The first doesn’t choose. The first does good deeds; the second does bad deeds.

[Speaker D] The outcomes favor the first; teleologically the first is better.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in terms of the conduct itself, the second is better, because at least the second chooses.

[Speaker H] Why is the second better? I wouldn’t say that; I’d say the second is also worse. What does it mean that he chooses evil?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It means he chooses, but…

[Speaker H] He initially chooses to do… but on the contrary, that too is worse in terms of conduct. Why? Because he chooses evil. So what? In terms of outcomes, in terms of intention, in terms of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in terms of intention too it’s bad, fine. But the very fact that he chooses is good.

[Speaker I] Even though according to what you said earlier there is no such thing as choosing evil; you only break free.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We discussed that then.

[Speaker I] And then he becomes like the second one again.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We discussed that then. The question is whether there is such a thing as choosing evil at all. Sometimes, you know, one chooses not to choose, and as a result one will do evil. It’s also connected to weakness of will. Fine, but we won’t get into that here. On the principled level I’m only saying there is some… This has practical implications for how we measure success in education, for example. Usually it is accepted that someone who leaves is an educational failure, and in my opinion that is not necessarily so. If he leaves because he genuinely reached the conclusion that he does not identify — truly reached the conclusion that he does not identify — there is an element of success in that. Meaning, the person after all made decisions and carries out what he believes in. I very much disagree with him, I’m sorry he chooses that way, but there is a certain element of success here — as opposed to those who remain out of inertia and continue on the correct path in my view, but not out of choice. Meaning, evaluations of a person have to be more complex than we are used to. Just yesterday — not yesterday, on Monday — I met a mother who once, two years ago or something, asked me to speak with her son, who had all kinds of questions. He was in high school, 12th grade I think, and he had all sorts of questions and doubts and so on. The parents were hysterical. Rabbi Stav — Rabbi Stav contacted me and asked if I was willing to speak with the boy. I said of course, I’ll try, whatever I can do. So I spoke with him, but before that I spoke with the mother. I told her: first of all, calm down, overall you succeeded in education. Meaning, the boy thinks — that in itself is a success. Because the parents’ hysteria in a situation like that is very disturbing. In any event, it’s both disturbing and wrong, two separate things, not just tactically. On Monday I met her; the boy is in yeshiva today. I always say that I meet a lot of young people who come with all kinds of questions, but I get no feedback. I don’t know what happened with them afterwards. I don’t know whether what I said worked or didn’t work. Here and there I do meet someone where I didn’t succeed; I’ve met various such cases too. But I don’t know, I have no statistics. I try to form patterns of what is and isn’t the right way to behave. Fine, a kind of open yeshiva setting, great, but he made a mistake and still continues on his path. I told her they succeeded nicely; I’m happy for them. Anyway, back to our topic. So this discussion of choice appears here because repentance means returning to being a chooser. I’ll just say a few more sentences about the laws of repentance in general. Afterwards Maimonides really wanders off into all sorts of places: “Since every person has free will, as we explained, a person should strive to repent and confess verbally for his sin.” You see? “Since every person has free will, as we explained, a person should strive to repent and confess verbally for his sin.” What does “should strive” mean? There’s a positive commandment — so do it. Why are you confusing people? What do you mean, “should strive”? Since this thing is so important, a person should strive to recite Grace after Meals — do you write that? He writes that nowhere. Why? Because repentance is not a commandment. This whole collection called the laws of repentance looks like a book of ethics; a large part of it does. Look at chapter 7 — it’s all a book of ethics, with poetic praise for repentance. What is that doing in the Mishneh Torah? Usually at the end of collections of laws there’s some sort of philosophical section or something like that, but here three quarters of the laws of repentance are all kinds of poetic descriptions and praise of the penitent. What is that doing in a law book? The point is that because there is no commandment to repent, Maimonides has to persuade us to repent. He has to explain to us that it is important, and therefore one should repent. This “therefore” — always like Tosafot in Bava Batra 9b, where the Gemara begins with “therefore”; the lomdim always make nice insights out of the “therefore” — why is the conditioned thing dependent on the gift? So this “therefore” is that. Why is that the reason they do it? There’s always some Talmudic conceptualism that comes out of the “therefore.” So that’s what he says: “Since every person has free will, as we explained, a person should strive to repent.” Because you have the ability to choose, therefore you should strive to repent. What does that mean? Strive to be a chooser. That is the essence of repentance: to be a chooser. Not because you have the possibility to repent so make use of it and repent; rather, being a chooser is repentance. That’s what he said in chapters 5–6, and therefore in chapter 7 he returns to it, and then there are all sorts of poetic lines about how great repentance is, that he was distant and now he is near, and things like that. All this poetic language is meant to tell us why it is important to repent; he is trying to persuade us. In no other collection of laws in the book does he persuade us to keep the laws. He tells us what happens if we keep them, what happens if we don’t keep them — that’s all well and good, but this is a law book. In the laws of repentance it is exceptional; it looks like a book of ethics. So it looks like a book of ethics because that is the essence of repentance: it is not a commandment, so you have to persuade people that it is important. For someone who does not understand that on his own, you explain why it is important, and therefore you should repent. And therefore repentance really does contain something somewhat exceptional compared to other halakhic contexts, because usually we are accustomed to the relation between thought and Jewish law as two sides of the same coin. Meaning, Jewish law tells us what should and should not be done, and thought explains the ideas behind it. With repentance, “the thought of repentance,” so to speak, is often not at all the thought behind repentance; it is simply an alternative mechanism of repentance. The repentance involved in all the thought — Orot HaTeshuvah of Rabbi Kook, which expands this greatly, doesn’t matter, all those who soar through all the themes of repentance — that is not the repentance of regret and accepting for the future and confession and all those things. It is simply an alternative way to repent. It is not the thought that explains what stands behind the laws of repentance; it is a mechanism not connected to the laws of repentance at all. It is a mechanism that bypasses the laws of repentance — if you use it, you don’t need the laws of repentance. It’s a different mechanism. It is not thought explaining the halakhah; it is two channels. Now, apparently this is a non-halakhic channel, which is why “the laws of repentance” is not a very successful expression in this context, because it is a non-halakhic channel. These are poetic passages meant to persuade us why it is worthwhile; there are no positive commandments and prohibitions here. But on the other hand, clearly, since there is an obligation to repent, one must know how to do it, what to do, that it is possible to do, and why to do it — because without that we won’t do it. So it is important to Maimonides to include this whole matter. It looks like a book of thought or a book of ethics, but it’s not; it is actually almost a book of law, because it is a book that tells you how and why to do the greater repentance. By the way, I think — let me just complete a few more sentences — I think that the final chapters of the laws of repentance, which really go off into the World to Come, serving for its own sake, excision from the World to Come, Torah study for its own sake, the reward of commandments, the messianic era — what is all that doing here? What is it doing in the laws of repentance, all these things? Put it in the laws of the foundations of the Torah; say there’s a messiah here, there. In the laws of kings he talks a little about it — what does that have to do with the laws of repentance? Rather, first of all Maimonides is trying to persuade us to repent. So he says there is reward, and this and that, and over there too — he has to persuade us. But afterwards he says: “A person should not say: I will fulfill the commandments of the Torah and engage in its wisdom in order to receive all the blessings written in it, or in order to merit the life of the World to Come; I will separate myself from the transgressions against which the Torah warned in order to be saved from the curses written in the Torah or so as not to be cut off from the life of the World to Come. It is not fitting to serve God in this way, for one who serves in this way serves out of fear, and this is not the level of the prophets nor the level of the sages. And only the ignorant, women, and children are trained to serve out of fear until their knowledge increases and they serve out of love.” One who serves out of love, halakhah 2, engages in Torah and commandments and walks in the paths of wisdom not because of anything in the world, and not out of fear of evil, and not in order to inherit good, but does the truth because it is true, and the good will ultimately come because of it. And that is serving for its own sake. Meaning, everything up till now where I persuaded you to repent because there is a World to Come and excision and reward and punishment and so on — now he says yes, but really that is not why you should perform commandments. That is also not repentance. Rather, one should do the truth because it is true. And now here we have come back and closed the circle from the beginning of the laws, because doing the truth because it is true is exactly returning to being a chooser. Meaning, to grasp the true, correct values and to act on them out of my own choice, not because I have some interest or some calculation or reward and punishment and things of that sort. And if you look, he also talks about love of God, for example — love and fear. What is all that doing here? It appears also in the laws of the foundations of the Torah. After all, there is love of God there; chapter 5 of the laws of the foundations of the Torah deals with love of God. What is the path to loving Him and fearing Him, and all these things? And sanctifying God’s name, which is part of love of God, and things like that. So why does it come back here? He comes back here to all kinds of things — Torah study for its own sake, fulfilling commandments for their own sake, and things of that kind. He comes back to all the things that are not halakhically mandatory. In my opinion, in the laws of repentance you will find all the laws that are not halakhic. Anything that reappears and also appears in another collection of laws reappears here in its non-halakhic dimension. Here Maimonides makes use of the laws of repentance, which in their very essence are such laws — laws that do not fit into the halakhic mold, because one has to do them because reason says that this is the right way to return to being a chooser. So he says, fine, serving for its own sake too, and all those things too — that too is really doing the truth because it is true. You could call that part of repentance if you want, but that doesn’t matter; that too is an obligation that should be done because it is right. Not because there is a commandment of “and you shall love the Lord your God.” The love being spoken of here is not that — yes, doing the commandments out of love is not the definition of that love.