Q&A: Doubts in Jewish Law and the Requirement of a Kosher Certificate for a Vegetable Store
Doubts in Jewish Law and the Requirement of a Kosher Certificate for a Vegetable Store
Question
Hello Rabbi Michael,
Recently I came across several rulings in Yalkut Yosef from which it would seem that there is no obligation to buy vegetables and fruits from a place that has a kosher certificate:
- "…Furthermore, terumot and ma'asrot nowadays are only rabbinic, and even in a case of a single doubt, the rule is to be lenient, according to most later authorities. [Yabia Omer, vol. 10, Yoreh De'ah, sec. 46, p. 295]." (From Yalkut Yosef, Laws of Tithes and the Sabbatical Year, section 331, סעיף 17).
- "…And even though there is some doubt whether terumot and ma'asrot were separated in the wholesale market, since sometimes there are a few merchants who smuggle their merchandise out from there so that tithes will not be taken from them, nevertheless, since in any case the majority is properly tithed, and in addition there are also fruits grown on land belonging to non-Jews and processed by non-Jews, which are exempt from terumot and ma'asrot, therefore it is permitted to buy fruits from the market and there is no need to tithe them; and one who is stringent with himself and separates terumot and ma'asrot from them, blessing shall come upon him. [Yabia Omer, vol. 9, sec. 30, p. 328]." (From Yalkut Yosef, Laws of Tithes and the Sabbatical Year, section 331, סעיף 20).
- "Grapes sold in the market [or other fruits in which orlah is common] that are sold in the market, where there is concern that perhaps they are orlah fruit: strictly speaking, it is permitted to buy and eat them without verifying their kashrut by means of a certificate from an ordained rabbi, so long as most of the fruit in the market is not orlah, for anything separated from the group is presumed to come from the majority. And one who is stringent not to buy grapes except those brought under the supervision of the local rabbinate will receive a blessing from God [for even where there is a double doubt, a measure of piety still applies to keep away from the doubt]. [Yalkut Yosef, Orlah ch. 10, sec. 3]" (From Yalkut Yosef, Laws of Orlah, section 294, chapter 10 – the law of doubtful orlah). It seems that this ruling would apply similarly to fourth-year produce as well.
Is the conclusion I drew from these rulings correct—that one does not need to be careful to buy only from a place with kosher certification?
In addition, in a place where the doubt about the kashrut of the vegetables can be clarified (say, by asking the seller whether the vegetables are kosher or not), is there an obligation to clarify it? I saw a source online that says: in a rabbinic-level doubt, when it is possible to clarify the doubt, the Ra'avad is stringent and Maimonides is lenient (Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim 160:11 and Mishnah Berurah there, no. 51). But the question is how Jewish law is ruled today: like Maimonides or like the Ra'avad?
Regarding clarifying the doubt, a similar question can be asked when one is visiting a secular person who serves fruit and vegetables. Is one required to ask him where he bought the fruit?
Answer
The accepted Jewish law is that when the doubt can be clarified, one should not be lenient in a rabbinic-level doubt. This is somewhat like the law of something that will later become permitted, regarding which they were stringent even in a rabbinic-level doubt, since he can eat it permissibly later (Beitzah 4a).
The connection to the Shulchan Arukh you cited is not entirely unequivocal. There it is talking about a case where he has another way to act without any prohibition. But here the discussion is when there is no other option, except that within this very option he can ask and clarify the doubt. I do not think this is a dispute between Maimonides and the Ra'avad.
In my opinion, yes—one should be careful to buy from a place with kosher certification. Admittedly, sources 2-3 that you cited deal with a place where there is a majority, not merely a doubt, and there there may be more room to be lenient. Even so, many halakhic decisors were stringent when there is a significant minority and it is possible to clarify.
And source 1 that you cited indeed states that the rule in such doubts is leniency, but when it is possible to clarify or to act in a definitely permitted way, I do not see in your quotation that it is giving permission.
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Questioner:
I found a source in the book Ein Yitzhak by Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef dealing with the rules of halakhic doubts, and it says:
"In a rabbinic-level doubt, we are lenient even where it is possible to clarify. However, if the clarification is something that can easily be checked by asking and the like, it is proper to clarify the matter, for if it is before us, one should ask and clarify." (See scan 1 and scan 2; there he expands at length with proofs).
That is, I understand from here that strictly speaking one may be lenient even in a place where the doubt can be clarified, and only as a proper and fitting practice should one clarify the doubt when this can be done easily, but it is not an absolute obligation.
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Rabbi:
Hello. I went quickly through his words, and in my opinion they are baseless. I did not see there even a shred of proof for his claim that in a case of doubt there is no need to clarify. The cases discussed there are where there is a majority or a presumption; those are not situations of doubt but of definite permission. And even about that, the halakhic decisors disagree whether one may rely on it without clarification when clarification is possible. But where does he get the idea that in an ordinary rabbinic-level doubt there is no need to clarify? As I wrote to you, the law of something that will later become permitted is proof against him, since there it is stated that when it is possible to eat it permissibly, they did not permit him to eat it in a case of doubt. For example, when you have a doubt about muktzeh on the Sabbath or on a holiday, that is a rabbinic-level doubt. But since it can be eaten with full permission on Sunday, they did not permit eating it on the Sabbath or on the holiday itself, even though it is a rabbinic-level doubt. By the way, the law of something that will later become permitted is also said regarding nullification in a majority, which implies that even when there is nullification in a majority, if it can be avoided then there is no permission to eat it.In short, my claim remains in place.
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Questioner:
Today I tried to go more deeply into Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef's response, and I really did not find strong proof for his words. As best I understand, he derives it from the rule that in a double doubt involving a Torah-level prohibition, when one of the doubts can be clarified, there is no need to clarify it. And since according to Maran the Shulchan Arukh, a Torah-level doubt is forbidden only rabbinically, then in practice a double doubt in a Torah-level matter is equivalent to a single doubt in a rabbinic matter. And then he says that the practical new rule that emerges is that in a rabbinic-level doubt that can be clarified, there is no need to clarify it. But he did not address the fact that the clarification possible in the first rule is only partial clarification—of one of the doubts—and not full clarification.
What seems puzzling to me is that a rabbi at his level, who dealt with this topic in depth and expanded with proofs on both sides, ultimately ruled as he did. Could it be that there is something we are missing here?
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Rabbi:
What exactly is “his level”?
Also, his assumption that according to Maimonides—who holds that the rule of being stringent in a Torah-level doubt is itself only rabbinic—a double doubt is therefore a rabbinic-level doubt, is very far from being agreed upon. Rabbi Shimon Shkop discusses this at length in Sha'arei Yosher, and many others do as well. See for example here:
http://www.yeshiva.org.il/wiki/index.php?title=%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%A7_%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%90
And especially in the discussion of a reversible double doubt, which does not fit with his assumption.