Q&A: Giddulei Horowitz — a question about unintentional action and an inevitable result
Giddulei Horowitz — a question about unintentional action and an inevitable result
Question
Giddulei Horowitz, sec. 12.
And this is what he writes:
“However, this requires investigation from the Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim sec. 10: regarding a cloak that is closed halfway, one may not go out with it to the public domain. And this is difficult: if the cloak is exempt, then the fringes are not needed, and he does not intend to take them out, except that it is an inevitable result, since he goes out with them to the public domain. But this is difficult: why is it an inevitable result? Perhaps the cloak is obligated in tzitzit, in which case he is allowed to take them out, so automatically it is not an inevitable result. This requires investigation.” End quote.
If you have an understanding of his words, please explain them to me, because I really did not understand his words at all. The original question of the Giddulei Tziyon does not seem to exist in the first place. For what is this that the Giddulei Tziyon asks: “If the cloak is exempt, then the fringes are not needed and he does not intend to take them out”? In practice he is taking them out. Rather, his intention seems to be to frame this as though there is one possibility that he will commit a prohibition and another possibility that he will not commit a prohibition, and then it is not an inevitable result; and since he also does not intend to commit a prohibition, it should be permitted under the law of unintentional action.
But this is puzzling, because he certainly does currently intend to take them out. And to exempt him with the argument that, had he known that this cloak was exempt, he would not have taken it out—that is astonishing. For in that way you could turn anyone who intends into someone acting unintentionally, and turn every inevitable result into an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him. For example, let us say in a case of dragging a heavy chair, where he certainly makes a furrow: if he had known that by dragging the chair he would violate the prohibition of plowing, he would not want that. And we would likewise exempt anyone who commits a prohibition unwittingly, such as actual plowing with a plow when he did not know it was forbidden, and exempt him from a sin-offering by saying that it is a case of unintentional action—because had he known it was forbidden, he would not have done it, and so it is unintentional action.”
Answer
If the cloak is obligated in tzitzit, then there is no prohibition of carrying here. Therefore the fact that he certainly intends to carry them out is irrelevant. There is still a doubt here regarding the prohibition of carrying. Therefore, according to his approach, this is not an inevitable result. True, this can be made dependent on the dispute between the Taz and Rabbi Akiva Eiger regarding a doubtful inevitable result, and in my opinion Rabbi Akiva Eiger is more reasonable and one should be stringent about this. That is probably your difficulty. And see my series of columns on doubtful pseudo-ontic cases (especially 326), where I also explained why this does not empty of content the distinction between an inevitable result and ordinary unintentional action.
Discussion on Answer
I explained what I had to explain.
It is true that if the cloak is obligated in tzitzit there is no prohibition of carrying here, as you say. But if it is exempt, then there is a prohibition of carrying here. And the fact that he wants to go out to the public domain with these two possibilities in mind—Shulchan Arukh says it is forbidden because of the doubt.
Giddulei Tziyon asks: why is this governed by the laws of doubt? Let us instead turn it into the laws of unintentional action, which is permitted if it is not an inevitable result.
And his words are puzzling, as I explained above (and notice his puzzling wording—that is not the way you are explaining him). And again I will spell out his words: he means to say as follows—that supposedly the laws of unintentional action apply here, because on the possibility that it is exempt and the tzitzit are a burden, then automatically he has no need for them, and automatically he does not intend to carry them out. So then let us apply the laws of unintentional action and permit it. As he writes: “And this is difficult: if the cloak is exempt, then the fringes are not needed, and he does not intend to take them out.”
What will you say—that here it is an inevitable result that the tzitzit will go out to the public domain (because in practice he is taking them out)? As he writes, “except that it is an inevitable result, since he goes out with them to the public domain.” Giddulei Tziyon answers: “Why is it an inevitable result? Perhaps the cloak is obligated in tzitzit, in which case he is allowed to take them out, so automatically it is not an inevitable result. This requires investigation.” This is like what you wrote in post 708: namely, he really wants to permit placing a yoke on the calf used in the eglah arufah ceremony under the law of unintentional action, because if the law is that a yoke disqualifies it, that is not what he wants. Here too, if the law is that the tzitzit are exempt (though here it is not because of the punishment, but the idea is the same), he does not want the carrying out of the tzitzit. And in this way you can turn anyone who intends into someone acting unintentionally, and turn every inevitable result into an inevitable result that is not beneficial to him. (And tonight I read all the posts on doubtful ontic inevitable-result cases).