Q&A: Critique of the Fine-Tuning Argument
Critique of the Fine-Tuning Argument
Question
Hello Rabbi Abraham,
In one of the critique articles on "God Plays Dice," the following passage was brought:
______________________________________
One should add the following claim (p. 158; emphasis mine):
Let us now also take into account the fact that the precision in the values of the physical constants is a state whose probability is obviously tiny (after all, they could have had any value whatsoever). Then we are in a much more serious problem. There could be laws of nature with completely different values for those constants (and perhaps even constants of entirely different kinds). What is the probability that the values of the constants would come about in such a way that they are calibrated precisely for the existence of life? Zero, of course.
Abraham points to a probabilistic problem. He seems to think that each of the constants in our laws of nature could take one of infinitely many values. The chance that one constant would get one particular value is 1 divided by infinity. That really is a negligible probability (practically speaking, it is zero). Abraham is more explicit about this elsewhere (p. 161):
We have not yet asked how one could even calculate the probabilities for the spontaneous emergence of a gravitational constant whose value allows life. How many possible values are there? Probably infinitely many. So how many tries would one need in order to get a reasonable chance of a successful result? [I think Abraham misspoke here and meant to ask, "What is the chance of getting a successful result, one that would create life?"]. One divided by the number of possible values, namely 0. […] The same applies to the spontaneous emergence of the other physical forces and their constants at an intensity that allows chemistry, biology, and life.
This argument is really popular. Many religious thinkers, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim, use it all the time. Before I explain where it fails, I want to whet your appetite. Not only the appetite of secular readers, but also that of religious readers. I want you to internalize that if you accept the flaw Abraham is making, you will reach a conclusion you won’t like. I proudly present to you the fine-tuning argument against the existence of God. Wait, what? Yes. Against the existence of God.
God could have decided to create one of infinitely many universes whose physical constants are not suited to the existence of life. Or He could have created one of infinitely many other things. A heavenly golf course, an expanded balcony on His penthouse in heaven, or a hookah that never runs out of tobacco. Only one out of those infinitely many decisions is the decision to create a universe like ours, a universe whose laws were tuned to allow the existence of life. Therefore, the probability that God would make that decision is really 1 divided by infinity, the number of God’s possible decisions. That is, 0. From this we are forced to conclude that the universe was created by an unplanned process, without God’s intervention. No more tefillin. Goodbye tzitzit. Bye kippah.
Or maybe not. Every religious person I know would cry out that I committed some kind of fallacy here. Indeed, this argument fails completely. It does not really work, because I assumed I have knowledge that I do not have. I do not really know what the probability is that God would make a certain decision. In particular, I have no reason to think the probability of His making each decision is equal. In other words, I have no reason to dismiss the idea that some of God’s decisions are more likely than others. I certainly have no reason to dismiss the idea that the decision to create a universe capable of sustaining life is in fact the decision He is most likely to make. The problem is that I also have no reason to accept that idea. All possibilities are on the table, because I know nothing about God’s decision-making process. The fine-tuning argument against the existence of God contains an unjustified assumption, and therefore it fails.
Michael Abraham also assumes he has knowledge he does not have. He assumes that in an unplanned process every value of the physical constants is equally likely. That means the probability that the value of the gravitational constant would be 0.6, 1.15, or 7 is equal to the probability that it would be what it actually is (about 6.67). Namely, 1 divided by the number of possible values of the gravitational constant. In other words, zero.
The problem is that Abraham does not really know that in an unplanned process the probability of all those values is indeed equal. Contrary to his assumption, it is entirely possible that the opposite is true. That is, it is possible that precisely those constants that allow life are the most probable physical constants, and those that do not are not. Notice that here too I am not claiming that I know Abraham is wrong. I do not. I am claiming that for his argument even to get off the ground, he has to justify his assumption. His assumption has no justification, and therefore his whole argument fails.
Those interested in an expanded and nuanced version of this argument are invited to consult the excellent article by the philosopher Neil Manson.
Manson, N. A. (2000). There Is No Adequate Definition of Fine-tuned for Life. Inquiry, 43(3), 341–351</fn>
In summary, if we allow Abraham to make strange statistical assumptions without justification, I will reserve the right to make such assumptions too. We end up in a situation where both hypotheses are in trouble. The probability that the physical constants were designed by God is negligible because of the fine-tuning argument against the existence of God. The probability that some unplanned process created them is also negligible, because of Abraham’s argument. Once again we have reached a state of no decision, and we will need to try to find another way to decide which hypothesis is correct. If we forbid unjustified statistical assumptions, once again we have reached a state of no decision, and we will need to try to find another way to decide which hypothesis is correct. Quite a dilemma facing religious people.
_______________________________________________
End quote
The rest of the article is really pretty ridiculous, either putting words in your mouth or not understanding what you are arguing, so I censored it.
At first glance this sounds to me like a stupid argument (because maybe there just wouldn’t be any coordination in the laws) — but on the other hand apparently it is based on a philosopher greater than I am, so maybe I’m just taking it easy on myself.
Do you have a good answer to this? Mainly to the "fine-tuning argument against the existence of God" that is found under the same assumptions (even though that’s pretty dishonest).
Thank you.
Answer
These arguments have already grown a long beard among atheists, and they are based on a misunderstanding. Don’t be impressed by the confident tone in which it is presented; that has always been their way (to present nonsense in the decisive tone of experts).
There are several fallacies in his words, and I’ll mention only a few:
1. He claims that I assume the existence of God, since he writes that I have no knowledge of the probability that God would take any particular step. But I do not assume His existence. I prove His existence. There is a system of very special laws. Now there are two hypotheses between which we must decide: a. the coordinated laws came about by chance. b. the coordinated laws did not come about by chance. If the coordination is indeed rare, the conclusion follows that they did not come about by chance. In other words, there was someone who created them. We call that someone God.
Now try to repeat this argument regarding the balcony or the other imaginary creatures he brings up, and you’ll see that you get nonsense.
2. In an unplanned process, the reasonable assumption (in the absence of other knowledge) is indeed that the probability of all values is equal. Even if we assume, as he suggests, that there was some other distribution in the background of the “lottery” of the constants’ values (according to those who think this was random, there was something there in the background that I call a “lottery”), then the question only retreats one step backward: what caused that distribution, and what is the probability that it happened by chance? You will not be able to escape this. Take a die that lands on 4 a thousand times in a row (and for the sake of the example let us assume there were only a thousand rolls. I won’t get into the anthropic argument here). One explanation: it’s random. A second explanation: there is a guiding hand. What would you conclude? Presumably the conclusion is that there is a guiding hand. Now an objection arises: maybe the distribution isn’t uniform, that is, the die is loaded (it has a strong bias toward 4), and so it is no wonder that it fell in such a “special” way. So I retreat and ask about the distribution: who made the die in a way that it was loaded precisely in the “right” direction (that is, exactly toward the values needed in order to get life)? And once again you are in the same situation as at the start. This counterargument is foolishness. If someone wins the lottery a hundred times in a row, the police will immediately investigate what is going on there. Either he paid a bribe, or the lottery process is not fair (the roulette wheel is biased in his favor). No one will say it just happened by chance, that’s all. And if the roulette wheel has an built-in bias, does that not arouse suspicion that the person did something illegal to cause it? Would you assume that happened by chance?
3. Some formulate this criticism differently. A state of life is not especially complex. Any system of natural laws would have yielded some other special state, and the complexity here was determined ad hoc (after we got life, we decided that something complex happened here). But this too is nonsense, because there are clear quantitative measures for complexity (entropy), and life satisfies them. Therefore the question how life came into being through a spontaneous process is a scientific question with no answer. There is an answer within the laws, but here again I return to ask who created the laws within which this is possible. Now the specialness is in the laws, not in the process within them.
Discussion on Answer
Everything was explained in the booklet and in the book. I don’t have the energy to keep dealing endlessly with these stupid arguments that keep coming back again and again. I’m worn out.
See also the parallel exchange with Reuven: https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%A2%D7%A7%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%98%D7%A2%D7%9D-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A1%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%A7/#comment-4710
I’m sorry, but there’s no answer to this question there. Here the Rabbi defines the laws as God, and that seems like nonsense. Where in the link is there an answer to that? There you only argue that laws require an explanation, but here the argument is different. Maybe I missed it.
Maybe the Rabbi should write a specific article about the laws—what exactly they are / whether they were created or not, etc. etc. Can God also have a need for a sufficient reason, etc.? Can He complete their sufficient reason, etc.?
What does “sufficient reason” mean and what does “cause of itself” mean, etc.?
Because in my opinion, and as far as I can see, the Rabbi’s words about this in his booklets are very, very brief. And his answers here on the site are even more so.
So there are many people here who do not understand the Rabbi’s words on this matter.
Joining Moshe’s request, especially regarding the current question, which was not answered.
??
Could the Rabbi point out specifically where the answer is to the statement that the laws are God?
R, this is a misunderstanding of the argument. According to the cosmological proof, everything has a cause. Let’s assume for a moment that we reach the conclusion that the first thing in the chain of causes is some law of physics (which has not yet been discovered; there is still no proof for any model that explains what caused the Big Bang). A law is not a physical entity; a law is a description of some entity in the universe (the law of gravity, for example, describes the earth). In that case we would say that the thing this first law describes is some kind of “being,” and it would be called God. Presumably, that law most likely did not describe any of the physical entities we know today, since they themselves were created in the Big Bang and therefore are not primordial. One can call it God because that being is something different from all the physics we know, that something is the cause of everything, and it itself has no other cause. That is what the cosmological proof shows.
Beyond that, we don’t need all this, because every law requires a sufficient reason, etc., and someone would have had to design them (and that is the physicotheological proof).
All this is indeed detailed in the Rabbi’s booklets (which were written with this criticism in mind and while grappling with it), and it seems to me that this is why the Rabbi is worn out from writing it here again and again.
The argument from design doesn’t claim that every law requires an explanation, only a special law.
But what is the connection between an intelligent being (God) and a law lacking intelligence and personality?
M, I don’t think I understood the Rabbi’s words. Presumably I also didn’t, but that much I understood—that you didn’t understand.
I’d be glad if the Rabbi would confirm your words—whether this is indeed his intention. Because if so, it should really be added to the booklet. Because it’s much more understandable.
**M, I don’t think you understood the Rabbi’s words.
(Presumably I didn’t either.)
But from the little I did understand, I understand that you didn’t understand.
If this is indeed his intention, I’d be glad if the Rabbi would confirm your words—whether this is his intention. Because if so, it should really be added to the booklet. Because it’s much more understandable.
** There were critical typos in the message above.
R — if the laws were not special, they would not make it possible to produce life. See all this in the booklets; only a negligible minority of them would allow that.
All the cosmological proof shows is that there is something “different” that is the cause of everything and the cause of itself. It does not enter into the question of the nature of that being.
The physicotheological proof shows that in addition to the cause of the universe, there is something that serves as its intelligent engineer. Each proof shows something different. That too is written in the booklets…. On the one hand, I feel uncomfortable telling you, “If you’re too lazy to read, manage on your own,” and on the other hand, the things are written there, and it really is frustrating to write the same paragraphs over and over.
What can I do that you don’t understand what I’m saying.
I didn’t write an argument against the physicotheological proof; in my opinion it is strong.
But to claim that the laws are “God” is nonsense.
The physicotheological argument is the topic under discussion here, and it definitely purports to determine that the first being has intelligence, and a law, as is well known, has no intelligence.
You keep running off to the cosmological proof, but that is not the claim.
I understand. So let me tell you something new: the cosmological proof indeed does not show that. Nobody claimed otherwise. It only shows that there is something that is the cause of everything and the cause of itself. And again, a law only describes an object. Nobody claims that the law is God. That something is most likely different from all the physical objects we know (since those, after all, were created in the Big Bang), and that is why it is interesting. Nothing more. No intelligence and no birds. That has been written here on the site explicitly several times.
As for the second proof, I mentioned it for 2 reasons:
1. Because a few messages above you also wrote about it (indeed, after I mentioned it in my words).
2. Because this proof is exactly what completes the point about intelligence that you asked about.
Tell me, are you serious? Are you even reading what I write?
I’m talking only about the physicotheological proof; leave the cosmological proof aside.
Calling the laws “God” does not mean you have proved His existence. This proof claims to prove an intelligent being, and laws are not intelligent.
There is no such thing as laws; there is only a being behind them.
And regarding that, it would be correct to call it God.
You bring an argument that attacks the cosmological proof (and that alone) and write a sentence like “I didn’t write an argument against the physicotheological proof; in my opinion it is strong,” and you’re surprised that I interpret your words that way?
If that is the issue, then where did you see that anyone wrote that a law is God? The physicotheological proof does not show that the first being is a law of physics; it shows that laws prevail in the world, and every law requires a designer, and therefore it requires an intelligent engineer even if it is primordial (a sufficient reason for the law). The failed argument above from “Atheology” does not attack that argument at all, but rather the point I was trying to explain earlier (that his failed interpretation says the Rabbi claimed God is a law of physics).
In any case, I don’t see any argument here that I haven’t addressed or that isn’t written on the site. I’m bowing out.
M, why bow out now, when finally there’s someone writing at some length??
At most repeat yourself two or three times until the public understands.
See footnote 107 in "God Plays Dice."
R —
Well, last night I wondered whether to answer or not. Although I really, truly did answer and explain everything explicitly, I’ll try one last time. If you understand, great; if not, too bad. Please read my words patiently even if they seem unrelated to you. I understand very well what you’re asking. And I think there is a misunderstanding here on your part.
First of all, I have to say that it isn’t clear to me whether your goal (underneath it all) is to understand whether the philosophical arguments for God’s existence hold water in the bottom line (the important question), or to understand whether there is or isn’t a specific mistake in the book (which, if yes, then what difference does it make whether they made a mistake or didn’t in one specific point in the book???). In any case, in my opinion there is no mistake in the book on this point either. By the way, I myself was the questioner above, and I understood from the outset that the objection from “Atheology” in this case is a misunderstanding of the argument.
Let me explain — in our discussion there are 2 proofs for the existence of God: the cosmological proof (wait) and the physicotheological proof. The first shows that there is a first entity that is different and is the cause of everything (that alone!); the second, that it is intelligent.
When the Rabbi wrote the book, his formulation of the physicotheological proof was, “A complex thing that was created requires an engineer.” In the book he raises the question, “What happens if we claim that the laws always existed?” — that is, they were not created. That would seemingly undermine the physicotheological argument as formulated in his book. In order to deal with this difficulty in the book, the Rabbi went back to an argument that actually belongs in the domain of the cosmological proof (at least in the booklets): a law itself is not a cause of anything; a law only describes something, and even if we discover that the law is primordial, then the different thing described by the first law is God (because again, we are not talking about one of the entities we know today). I explained this at length above.
1. If you think the Rabbi did not mean this at all and that I am putting words in his mouth, then I disagree with you. The quotation in “Atheology” is partial; when you read the original text, you see that the Rabbi is speaking there about conceiving of the laws as a “being,” since a law itself really does nothing. “Atheology” understands the Rabbi to mean that the law itself is God. But it is clear from there that the Rabbi is claiming:
– If the law that created the world is really “something” and not just a description, then it is God (as a primary cause).
– And if not, then what it describes is God.
Therefore, if you read the full paragraph, the elaboration of this claim in the booklet on the cosmological proof, and the book to which he explicitly refers in the paragraph (!!!!), you understand that the objection from “Atheology” is incorrect and he is simply putting words in the Rabbi’s mouth. He simply didn’t understand what he was arguing. Indeed, a solution of this type truly does not prove a personal entity, but only a different primary cause (which is why it is interesting), as I have explained again and again and again. That is why I went to the cosmological proof. Whether you get it or not, this is an objection to one of the Rabbi’s cosmological arguments.
2. Let us assume that this is what the Rabbi meant and that he was mistaken, and only afterward refined the proof so that it would be stronger. So what?
Subsequently, after the publication of the book, the Rabbi first published another, different argument that proves God’s existence even if we assume that the laws really are primordial — an argument that belongs more to the domain of the physicotheological proof (not that this changes anything) — the principle of sufficient reason (its source is in Taylor’s book. I don’t recall that it is written explicitly in God Plays Dice). Even a primordial entity needs a reason why it is this way rather than another. The law could have been one of infinitely many kinds of laws; why is it specifically the law that produces life? (and only a few would be like that) and therefore the law requires a sufficient reason —
an intelligent engineer who is the sufficient reason for the laws. In other words, this argument shows not only the first cause but also the intelligence. (Under the assumption that He is their sufficient reason, it is reasonable to assume the laws are not primordial and that He is also their creator, but that is not the topic here.)
Therefore, we are really dealing with 2 responses to the claim of a primordial law:
– The response that appeared in the book, which was attacked by “Atheology” and is found in the context of the cosmological proof — a law only describes something, and the “law” that produced the world describes God. Here one cannot know whether He is personal or not. He is only the first cause (and I wrote this in every one of my messages above (!!)). That and nothing more. If that seems like nonsense to you — too bad. It doesn’t to me. You have the right to think so; there’s no point discussing that further.
– Another response, which does not need the previous one and is written in the booklet — the principle of sufficient reason: every law requires a sufficient reason even if it is primordial. If it is not clear to you why that is a correct principle, read the booklet (!!).
The combination of these two alone brings us to an intelligent first cause.
Therefore, the criticism from “Atheology” is a misreading of the argument. I myself understood from the beginning what you were asking and answered it again and again and again. Hope you got it; if you don’t agree — too bad.
All the best and good luck.
Z —
With your permission, I’ll write something a bit sharp to you —
it seems to me that an expression like “finally someone is answering in detail” is a bit rude (even if I assume that’s not what you meant).
1. Really, truly, it seems to me that no one here owes anyone anything. It seems to me that it is clear to you how many hours are invested by the Rabbi and the editor in this site.
2. It seems to me that the Rabbi is frustrated that he writes material and people don’t understand it; usually that’s simply because they don’t have the patience to read or think deeply.
3. I understand how one can be exhausted from discussing the same thing again and again.
4. This is a silly discussion to begin with. Suppose for a moment that this point of “Atheology” were correct — so what? As long as the argument holds water for other reasons, it is simply not interesting. Why keep chewing it over again and again? All the more so when the things are written in the booklets, so that with a little effort you’ll find an answer there.
5. It seems to me that the Rabbi wants to teach people to think for themselves.
6. It seems to me that not everyone has time to write scrolls for each person.
The reasons I write in detail are:
1. I’m still young, so I still have energy, and in discussions where I see the Rabbi is fed up, I try to answer.
2. I don’t know how to write briefly. It’s a bug in me.
Later on he writes a criticism that seems correct; I’d be glad if the Rabbi would answer it:
"Now he knows that those same laws that created the laws of nature prevailing in our universe are themselves laws that were created. What justifies that? Nothing, really. Those laws are no more than a description of how some thing behaves. As a tribute to Robin Williams, let’s call that thing Flubber. Whatever Flubber may be, our universe came out of it. It is entirely possible that Flubber was never created at all. Again, that possibility is on the table. Why is it invalid in Abraham’s eyes?
Well, one can make an educated guess as to why Abraham thinks it is invalid from the following things he wrote (p. 162, footnote 107):
Apparently one could also claim regarding laws of nature […] that they were never created but always existed. This is an interesting claim, and we will merely note that this claim is really saying that the laws of nature here replace the concept of God, and therefore not much has changed compared to standard theism (as noted, we are not talking about a God who imposes religious obligations, but about God in the sense of philosophical theism). In the end, there is still a primary cause here that is not subject to all our considerations.
In other words, if we say that Flubber always existed, Abraham will answer that one can call Flubber God. QED? Well, Flubber is not a being with consciousness, desires, and planning ability. It does things only in the borrowed sense in which inanimate objects do things. The idea that Flubber is God is simply ridiculous. In terms religious people will relate to, Abraham claims Flubber is God, when in fact Flubber is nothing more than a golden calf. Abraham is amusing himself here with semantic word games, nothing more. Is this the ‘philosophical sophistication’ he promises his readers?"
Isn’t this nonsense? Atheism in disguise? Like pantheism?