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Q&A: A Woman Who Committed Adultery with Her Husband’s Consent

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A Woman Who Committed Adultery with Her Husband’s Consent

Question

Hello Rabbi.

I have a question that interests me, and even though I tried to find sources to study, I was disappointed to see that there are almost no sources to examine on this.
If a woman willingly committed adultery with her husband’s consent (as people do today in wife-swapping), is that considered adultery?
On the one hand, I saw that the Talmud in Chagigah (9a) indeed says: “Who is the one whose wrong cannot be corrected…? One who has relations with another man’s wife and thereby forbids her to her husband.” On the other hand, the verses in the passage of the sota say, “and she has betrayed him,” implying that this was done without the husband’s consent, while under him and in secret: “and it is hidden from her husband’s eyes,” “and she was not seized.”
I also saw that the great author of Igrot Moshe touched on this somewhat (Even HaEzer, part 4, siman 44, section 6), regarding a woman who had relations with a non-Jew with her husband’s consent, and he suggested that there may be room to say that if she did this in complete error, thinking she was compelled to commit adultery in order to satisfy her husband, perhaps one could say that she is not forbidden to him.

And I saw that one can indeed distinguish between two aspects of adultery: one is the sin toward Heaven, as in the passage in Kedoshim, “And a man who commits adultery with another man’s wife, who commits adultery with his neighbor’s wife—the adulterer and the adulteress shall surely be put to death,” which does not depend on betrayal of the husband but on the sin itself. On the other hand, with regard to the very “prohibition,” that she becomes forbidden to her husband—does that depend on whether she “betrayed him,” so that if it was done with his consent there is no betrayal and she is not forbidden to him?

Also, the very prohibition by which she becomes forbidden to her husband is not learned explicitly, but from the exposition: “Just as she is forbidden to the husband, so too she is forbidden to the adulterer.” But is she forbidden because she is simply forbidden, or because under ordinary circumstances a husband would divorce such a woman once he discovered she had committed adultery—but in a case like this, where he wanted it, what is the law?

And one may also note Tosafot in Zevachim (2b): “An ordinary woman is not presumed to be standing for divorce” — “even if she committed adultery while married,” and they imply there that he can keep her and not divorce her, only he may not have relations with her.

I would be happy to hear a broader explanation of the topic.

Answer

Meir, hello. I didn’t really understand your question. As far as the prohibition itself is concerned, it is clear that she and the man involved both transgressed a prohibition and both are liable to death. I assume you are asking only about whether she becomes forbidden to her husband; if this was intentional, she is liable to death, so the question is hypothetical. If we are speaking about an unintentional violation with respect to the prohibition, but intentional with respect to the adultery, and with the husband’s consent, then perhaps there is room to discuss it. Practically speaking, it seems clear to me that adultery makes her forbidden, with no connection whatsoever to whether the husband agrees or not. Where do we find that if the husband agrees it is any different? The Maharik, regarding “and she has betrayed her husband,” derives on his own reasoning a distinction between a woman who erred about the prohibition and a woman who erred about the act itself. That distinction applies only with regard to whether she becomes forbidden to the husband and the adulterer, not with regard to the prohibition itself or the punishment. This is his own novel idea, based on his own reasoning. You want to expand that to a woman whose husband agrees to the adultery. If this is a logical argument, it does not seem convincing to me. And if you are claiming that you did not find anyone who rejects it, I assume that is because no one ever imagined such a situation. But I do not know of any clear proof or source that discusses this.

Discussion on Answer

Ailon (2017-02-05)

There are two sources I remember that might help you:

1. The prohibition to the husband is learned from “her first husband may not take her back… after she has been defiled,” which in its plain meaning speaks about taking back one’s divorced wife after she has married another man. But it seems to me there is an exposition saying that from here we also learn about one’s wife who has been defiled. I don’t remember which Talmudic passage this is from, but it appears in Maimonides. Look in Sefer HaMitzvot.

2. There is a very strange story I heard, that Rabbi Wosner (responsa Shevet HaLevi) permitted to their husbands some 17 young brides who, after their weddings, had slept with the bridal instructor (or whatever it was), because he had innocently convinced them that this was something that needed to be done (perhaps as part of preparation for married life), and that there was no prohibition involved (only among Haredi Hasidim could something like this happen). And he argued that this did not involve “and she has betrayed her husband,” and therefore they were not forbidden, perhaps on the basis of the Maharik that the Rabbi mentioned. Granted, this was not the case that interests you, because of course it happened without their husbands’ knowledge, but if you find that ruling, I’m convinced you’ll get a lot of material on the subject and maybe even a direct reference.

Michi (2017-02-05)

Regarding 2, see Rabbi Daichovsky’s article in Techumin (the latest volume or the one before it) about the women who had relations with Ezra Sheinberg in Safed because they thought it was a spiritual repair for their souls or something like that. He raises a similar argument there. But that is a discussion of the question of what counts as coercion, not a discussion of what happens if the husband agrees.

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