Q&A: Torah and Morality
Torah and Morality
Question
Have a good week, Rabbi. I wanted to ask about the well-known story of the convert who asked to convert on condition that Hillel teach him the entire Torah while standing on one foot. Hillel converted him and said to him: What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow; the rest—go and learn. At first glance, it seems that Hillel's view is that the Torah is a moral system whose only axiom is "What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow" (and from that all the other commandments are derived). True, in order to arrive at the prohibition against eating pork, a non-trivial process of derivation would be required. But still, on the face of it, this does seem to be Hillel's view. I wanted to ask how this fits with your conception that the Torah contains values that are not moral values.
With blessings,
Answer
It can be understood that Hillel was only making a preliminary demand of him: someone who accepts "Love your fellow" will then be able to go and learn the rest. But there is not necessarily any claim here that everything else is logically derived from "Love your fellow." For example, if he is willing to make sacrifices for his fellow and for various values that he believes in, then there is reason to accept him and teach him Torah. If not, then there is no point in it.
Discussion on Answer
It's hard to establish a Torah outlook and understanding on the basis of aggadah,
because, like an allegorical interpretation, it is clay in the hands of the potter,
in the hands of the commentator of the moment, who stretches and trims it according to his prior outlook.
For example, one could explain that surely the Creator's intention was to command us to behave morally as a basis for fulfilling the commandments of the Torah,
something like "proper conduct precedes Torah," and "let a person always be"—and only afterward "God-fearing,"
and so on; the land of homiletics is broader than the sea…
Set your worldview first, and then go find support for it in aggadot and parables.
Shammai was not willing to settle for testing seriousness, and wanted the whole package. Hillel was willing to go with him after he became convinced that there was potential.
But Moishele is right that it's hard to establish a worldview on the basis of aggadot.
I agree that one shouldn't base a worldview on aggadah, but seemingly there is counter-evidence here against the view that there are non-moral values in the Torah. I'm trying to reconcile this, and also to understand whether there is any need to reconcile it at all. For example, if for the sake of discussion we assume that Hillel had said explicitly to the non-Jew that there are no non-moral values in the Torah—would that be evidence strong enough to refute the view? Or at most could one say that this is Hillel's opinion, and one can think differently as well? Or is the matter perhaps subject to a dispute between Shammai and Hillel?
As I wrote, in my opinion there is no proof here. Beyond that, it's doubtful to what extent an aggadah like this is enough to build a general conception of the Torah on (whether because it should be interpreted differently, or because there are those who disagree with Hillel about this, and so on along those lines).
If this is only about testing seriousness and intentions, then Shammai could also have done that, yet he pushed him away with the builder's cubit. To explain the dispute between Hillel and Shammai on this issue, you have to say that this was an attempt to formulate the Torah concisely.