Q&A: Teleological and Deontological Approaches
Teleological and Deontological Approaches
Question
In the field of ethics, people commonly speak about utilitarian approaches versus deontological ones.
1) I understand that utilitarianism too is based on a deontological moral view—that one ought to do the act that brings about the greatest good. (It seems obvious, but I saw people who wrote that this is just a prudential or expedient view.)
On the other hand, the deontological argument also seems to be based on the result of the act—an act is immoral when it harms another person; that same act, if it does not cause harm, would not be immoral.
(True, Kant is famously quoted as saying one must not lie even if it would cause death, but that is difficult and hard to accept, even on the basis of his own philosophical assumptions.)
So it comes out that this is a dispute about details, mainly about the question of how much to focus on the final outcome versus the direct act itself (and here too issues of degree come in, and the distinction between an active act and a passive omission).
Or, in other words, it is about the value of the individual versus the many, and therefore about calculating harm to one person for the sake of an outcome benefiting many.
And also about the human ability to make such a calculation.
2) I saw a discussion about whether Jewish law is utilitarian or deontological. Here it seems that by definition it is deontological, since we do not know the purposes, and therefore the details too are weighed on their own.
Does the Rabbi agree with this analysis?
Answer
The main dispute is not about the content, but about the nature of the moral act and how it is evaluated. The deontologists base it on intention (obedience to the law), and the utilitarians on the outcome. So from the perspective of both, benefiting another person or the world is the essence of the moral act, but the question is whether it is enough that the act brings benefit, or whether it must be done מתוך a good intention (respect for the moral law). Beyond that, there are also differences in content, but that depends on which kind of utilitarianism or deontology we are talking about. See more on this in the fourth notebook, part 3.
From the standpoint of Jewish law, this is not connected to knowing the purposes. If I believe that the act will benefit the world even if I do not understand why or how, I can still be a deontologist. I think it is a mistake to discuss this in sweeping terms. Jewish law has aspects of both kinds.
In principle, in order to fulfill a commandment or commit a transgression, both things are required: good or bad intention, and the result. If one is missing, then there is neither a full transgression nor a full commandment. But there are still differences, and this is not the place to go into them.