Q&A: On Commitment to the Holy One, Blessed be He
On Commitment to the Holy One, Blessed be He
Question
Is the Euthyphro dilemma relevant to the question of commitment to the Holy One, Blessed be He? Because if morality—that is, the good, evil, justice, and so on—are entities to which the Holy One, Blessed be He, is also somehow “subject” (“Shall the Judge of all the earth not do justice?”), then perhaps the obligation I feel not to do evil because it is evil is not an example of general commitment to the word of God, but specifically to those entities, and it would not be possible to infer from that to the prohibition of shaatnez…? (As opposed to the possibility that the good is good because God commanded it—where in that case there is no question…)
Answer
I’ll repeat again that I brought an example, not a proof. An example is always useful. My claim is that if you feel such an obligation, then it has a basis, and there is no need to be troubled by the absence of a basis (every basis is itself also grounded in some initial intuition).
Not so with the feeling of obligation toward the Holy One, Blessed be He, as compared to the feeling of obligation toward morality. Even if we assume that morality precedes the Holy One, Blessed be He, in some sense, why would that not be a good example of the fact that a feeling of obligation is binding?
As for the question about Euthyphro, in my opinion it is meaningless. There is no such thing as before the Holy One, Blessed be He, or without the Holy One, Blessed be He. Without Him there is no world and no human beings, so what would moral obligation even mean in such a situation? Whose obligation? The only possible meaning is the question whether He can create a world without moral obligations, and here the answer is apparently yes. True, one could argue that in such a world people would not feel a moral obligation, but it would still be valid. But that is a theoretical statement and not a very interesting one.
Discussion on Answer
To feel moral obligation does not mean merely to feel that it is binding, full stop. After all, without God there is no morality (as in my fourth notebook in volume 3). Therefore, at its root this is an obligation to morality because God commanded it. But He also commanded Jewish law. So what is the difference? Someone who is committed to this is committed to that as well (to all His commandments).
Rabbi, I only just now had a chance to read your answer. First of all, thank you very much.
Second, I still have a small question. The Rabbi said that morality is only an example of a feeling of obligation. But if we assume for a moment that morality and Jewish law are disconnected—then although I have no problem with moral obligation, toward which I do feel a sense of obligation, the problem is obligation to Jewish law. What do I do if that is what I don’t feel…?