Q&A: Obligation — Moral, Halakhic, and Torah-Based
Obligation — Moral, Halakhic, and Torah-Based
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I just saw in your comments on the last article (A State of Jewish Law, Smotrich) that you acknowledge there is a Torah-based obligation to be moral ("and you shall do what is right and good"), only that it is not a halakhic obligation.
I would appreciate an explanation of the difference between a Torah-based obligation and a halakhic one. A halakhic obligation means an obligation imposed by the Torah.
Answer
A halakhic obligation is grounded in a command. A Torah-based obligation that is not Jewish law is not the product of a command. It is God's will. Therefore, "and you shall do what is right and good" is not included in the count of the commandments.
By the way, this is really the issue of the day: the giving of the Torah. The innovation that took place at the giving of the Torah was not the revelation of God's will, but the command directed at us. Even before the giving of the Torah, the Patriarchs could know what the Holy One, blessed be He, wanted. But as long as they had not been commanded, they were not obligated to do it, and it was not Jewish law. It is like going through a red light when the Knesset has not legislated any prohibition against it. It makes a lot of sense to be careful and not go through, because it is dangerous. But there is no prohibition. Legislation is what creates legal validity by force of a command.
Discussion on Answer
My claim is that even the "moral" obligations in Jewish law are halakhic and not moral. For example, when the Torah says "do not murder," it is not issuing a moral command; rather, its purpose is to add a religious layer on top of the moral layer that already existed beforehand. After all, the Holy One, blessed be He, came to Cain with a claim over the murder of his brother, even before he had been commanded about the prohibition of murder. Therefore I argue that there are no moral obligations in Jewish law at all, even those that appear to be such.
How did the halakhic decisors infer that "and you shall do what is right and good" is not a religious command layered on top of morality? Perhaps because it is general. A general command to do good sounds like an expression of an expectation of moral behavior. By contrast, do not murder, do not go about as a talebearer, or love your fellow as yourself are more specific commands.
So I do not understand: why, then, did Maimonides count the positive commandment of "love your fellow as yourself," and also count the prohibitions of "do not go about as a talebearer" and "do not hate your brother in your heart"? Are there halakhic obligations regarding the particulars of morality? (And I do not understand why the commandment of loving would be considered a "detail"; specifically that one encompasses all of life.)
In addition, if you would say that there is indeed a halakhic obligation from the Torah regarding the particulars of morality, what grounds would there be to distinguish and say that the commandment "and you shall do what is right and good," since it is general, has no halakhic obligation? On what basis should we make such a distinction?
Thanks in advance.