Personally, I don’t see any difference between physical and spiritual couplings. Why is bringing examples from the world of porn supposedly necessary (???). Too bad the “kabbalists” didn’t insist on clean language…

If you see these examples as coming from the world of porn, that says only something about you (one disqualifies others by one’s own blemish). To each his own eye. By that logic, the Song of Songs also comes from the world of porn.

The Torah doesn’t say this depends on interpretation. It says: “You shall not make for yourself a carved image, nor any likeness.”
“And any likeness” includes spiritual things as well. Spiritual idolatry or physical idolatry—there is no difference.
“And any” includes every metaphorical or non-metaphorical interpretation. This is actual idolatry, literally.
In the same way, people interpreted the powers of heaven as metaphorical forces, that the sun influences the earth.
And the matter is clear.
Even when they bowed to the sun, it was to manifestations of God in the world. There is no difference.

In my opinion it’s the opposite. The interpretation that these things are “metaphorical” is childish, and comes from fear of admitting that things really are this way—that there is male and female in God. That is what Kabbalah says. Frightened children are told otherwise, that it’s only a metaphor.

Rabbi Michi, I still haven’t received an answer regarding clean language. Do the “kabbalists” disagree with the sages, as follows?
Instead of saying “my wife,” they said “my house” (Babylonian Talmud, tractate Shabbat 118b). And instead of saying sexual intercourse, they said: “the use of the bed” (tractate Moed Katan 24a), “this matter” (tractate Sanhedrin 19b), “a thing” (tractate Nedarim 91a), “a matter of commandment” (tractate Eruvin 100b), “the way of the world” (tractate Yoma 74b), “something else” (tractate Berakhot 8b), “habitual thing” (tractate Avodah Zarah 17a), “doing work” (tractate Shabbat 49b), “attending to needs” (tractate Sanhedrin 82b), as well as “to tell” (tractate Nedarim 20a) and “to speak” (tractate Ketubot 13a). We also find substitute expressions connected to eating and drinking as euphemisms for sexual relations: “ate” (tractate Ketubot 13a), “dined” (tractate Shabbat 62b), “bread” (tractate Niddah 17a), “stolen bread” (tractate Sanhedrin 75a), “tasting the dish” (tractate Chagigah 5b), “drinking from a cup” (tractate Nedarim 20b), “setting the table” (ibid.). Instead of menstruation they said “the way of women” (tractate Avodah Zarah 24b), and instead of the sin of harlotry—simply “a transgression,” without elaboration (tractate Avodah Zarah 3a).
“Face” (tractate Gittin 76b), “that place” (tractate Nedarim 20a), “flesh” (tractate Sanhedrin 19b), “his strength” (tractate Bava Metzia 84a), “mouth” (tractate Yoma 75a), “servant” (tractate Temurah 30a), “attendant” (tractate Niddah 41a), “heel” (tractate Nedarim 20a), “the essence” (tractate Berakhot 24a). Instead of womb—“mother” (tractate Sanhedrin 33a), and “grave” (tractate Sanhedrin 82b).

And I still haven’t received from you an answer as to how the sages get along with the Song of Songs.
Kabbalistic literature also uses euphemistic language. “Union” is like “coming together.” Is talking about a brush in a tube euphemistic language? So what exactly is not clean in Kabbalah? And of course the context also matters here. When it is clear that spiritual matters are being discussed, one can use more explicit expressions.

Not that I’m justifying what he said, but in Maimonides it says: “And so too one who constantly disqualifies others” [Laws of Forbidden Intercourse, chapter 19, law 17]. That implies someone who does this habitually, not a one-time case like here,. It's worth studying Maimonides, Michi,, because I see this is the second time you've disqualified something in that way,. and while you're at it, learn what an ad hominem is,, because that's what you do left and right,. And to conclude,, There's a story about Hacham Shushani: a preacher gave a lecture on the Song of Songs, and he told him that he was a bachelor,! and it's not for his sake,.

Rabbi Michi, there is a big difference between breasts and reproductive organs, and likewise between “a brush in a tube,” which teaches us halakhah and law, and a description of intercourse attributed to God Himself, as the poet says: “Her husband shall embrace her, and with his foundation in hers, which gives her pleasure, let there be pounding, pounding.”

“Dilah” means “hers.”

A.,
I usually quite like riddling writings. I don’t know why I connect less to yours.

Binyamin,
There are topics about which it’s impossible to talk with you, because even when you get an explanation you’ll shut your ears (Haredim and kabbalists). So I’ll save myself time and energy and stop wasting words.

In the same way, any pagan, idolatrous, or bizarre belief can be presented. Greek mythology can also be presented this way. The gods are manifestations of God in the world or different aspects of Him, and everything is spiritual and psychological processes. In fact, many stories there are built around and present psychological phenomena.

Hinduism too is presented today in that way. How is that different from Kabbalah? Is contemporary Hinduism not in the category of idolatry? In the ancient world too there were philosophers who interpreted the various beliefs differently—were they also not idol worshippers? And what about Christianity (Catholic and Orthodox)? There too the Trinity and the patron saints are presented as representing spiritual processes.

Maybe because I throw the truth in your face? Some cling to lies and some cling to truth. And here I wasn’t being cryptic.

Dear One Who Errs in Aramaic and Seeks Reward Like Pinchas, more power to you.

The point of the riddle is that one cannot say that someone who sees the examples as coming from a disqualified world is himself disqualified under the principle “one disqualifies others by one’s own blemish,” because according to Jewish law, the rule that one who accuses others of disqualification (mamzer, slave, etc.) is himself suspected of being disqualified applies specifically when he does so regularly. Whereas with our Binyamin, n=1.
And A. felt the need to note this because he has already found twice (n=2) that the principle “one disqualifies others by one’s own blemish” was applied to someone who disqualified just once.
[However, there is no difficulty, because someone who disqualifies others once is not strange, and perhaps he really did reveal that they are disqualified. But if he disqualifies many, apparently something is bothering him in that area, and so he sees white elephants everywhere and tries to lower others to his level. And similarly, someone who interprets something in a certain way specifically when there is another reasonable and plausible interpretation, and then also presses objections, one may suspect that the blemish stands before his own eyes. “One disqualifies others by one’s own blemish” is a reasonable explanation when there is a strange phenomenon.]
Rabbi A-dot, have I understood you correctly?

I didn’t understand the accusation of ad hominem (there was a reference here to the person, but acceptance or rejection of the claim/argument was not tied to that reference).
And whether A-dot meant that he does not justify Binyamin’s words or that he does not justify Maimonides’ words—that I do not know.

Gabriel, you can present anything in any form. The question is what is really happening there, not how things are presented. Someone who understands Hinduism as a metaphor for some psychological theory—that is of course not idolatry.
You can insist until tomorrow on presenting Kabbalah as idolatry, because anything can be presented in any form. Therefore whoever chooses a certain form of presentation, that mainly testifies about himself. Which is exactly what I said.

With God’s help, 6 Iyar 5780

In my youth I heard a lecture by Rabbi Hanan Porat (before participants in the annual conference of the Society for Biblical Research who visited Gush Etzion). He spoke about the Song of Songs being an allegory for God’s love for the Jewish people, but the fact that the love between man and woman is the allegory shows that the allegory itself is also something positive.

This point was emphasized by the kabbalists. Nachmanides, in his “Holy Letter,” disputes Maimonides’ approach that “the sense of touch is a disgrace to us,” and says that union based on love between a man and his wife is a matter of holiness. And see also Rabbi Kook’s introduction to the Song of Songs (in the prayer book Olat Re’iyah).

The complexity in the Torah’s attitude to sexuality stems from its intensity, which in its proper form can be the peak of good, and the height of love between a man and his wife. But on the other hand it can drag a person down to the height of addiction to lustful desire, to sexual immorality.

The boundaries of modesty are meant to create a clear distinction, to rule out the satisfying of sexual desire when it is not in the proper place, time, and conditions for the loving union between a man and his wife. Just as the prohibition of idolatry requires directing religious feeling solely toward the Creator and not toward any other entity—so the laws of modesty require focusing all sexuality solely on the relationship between husband and wife.

Engaging in the hidden parts of Torah is conditional on emotional and intellectual maturity. One whose passions are stirred by the allegories into a “strange fire” of sensuality or concretization should understand that he has not yet reached the proper maturity, and should act according to Maimonides’ parable (at the end of chapter 4 of the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah): first he should eat the bread and meat—the explanations of the commandments that lead to the straightening of deeds and traits—and only then taste the wine of the Torah, while being careful not to get drunk.

With blessings,
Shatz

Rabbi Michi, I’m really amazed that your honor hasn’t noticed the differences between a description of human love (completely legitimate, it’s part of life) and going into graphic “below the belt” detail about God. My claim is that these are unnecessary discussions under the influence of foreign and known doctrines. Does the “dirty mind” of the “kabbalists” deserve legitimacy to such an extent that no one notices the problem in mentioning God’s testicles and sexual organ?
Sorry in advance for the bluntness; that’s how things appear in the original “Kabbalah” books.
P.S. In my opinion one should distinguish between the ancient Hebrew secret teaching and the later Kabbalah.

To all the righteous Jews: in light of the many requests and questions from the common folk, and in order to clarify the issue, tomorrow they’re bringing an image of male and female to the Western Wall plaza to demonstrate the matter. There the rabbi, together with the rest of the community of kabbalists, will give lectures and explanations about how the spiritual fertilization takes place.

During the lecture everyone will be required to bow to the image out of honor for the divinity it represents.

Later in the evening there will be an advanced lesson on how to imitate God through acts of male-female fertilization. The matters will be practiced physically, but during the lesson the kabbalists will explain that this is only a metaphor, and therefore the musicians and drummers will stand up and put everyone into a sublime trance through which we can connect to the upper worlds, and thus we will bring about a great influence up there.

Afterwards there will be folk dancing, because “in the multitude of people is the king’s glory,” and in the multitude of fertilization the creation of connections, and thus we shall merit the coming of the redeemer, literally.

The claim that the matters of configurations and sefirot are idolatry is actually not all that radical, and not new either.
Already radical rationalists and Maimonideans like Rabbi Kapach made that claim,
and of course also Leibowitz.
You can’t really define it that way, because no kabbalist ever claimed that sefirot, configurations, or unions are some independent power that must be worshipped and that is not subordinate to the Holy One, blessed be He.
As for things like concretizing divinity and the like—the Ari, the greatest of the kabbalists, himself said that in the end the most precise and true definition of the Holy One is “the absolute zero.” The kabbalists claim that He cannot be concretized, and the manifestations of configurations and different powers are some aspect of the Holy One as He is revealed.

Rational (Relatively), see Rabbi Kapach’s book The Wars of the Lord, which cites many “kabbalists” who claim that indeed one should worship and pray to “other than Him,” God forbid.
The Last Decisor, big like.

With God’s help, Chesed within Netzach, 5780

The famous passage in the Zohar, “Patach Eliyahu,” explains the matter of the sefirot. It is customary to say this passage in Sephardic synagogues before the afternoon prayer.

There it is explained that God Himself—“no thought can grasp Him at all.” The sefirot are “arrangements” that the Holy One, blessed be He, brought forth “to conduct through them the upper and lower worlds,” and in plain Hebrew: the ways of divine governance in the world.

“Thus far the secret of unity.”

With blessings,
Shatz

And because “no thought can grasp Him at all,” the sages of charlatanry came along and had to insert things that thought can grasp. And they explained that the reasons for the commandments, or the purpose of observing the commandments—that is, the Torah—is “for the sake of the unification of the Holy One, blessed be He, and His Presence.” And that thought can grasp.

(Just to recall that Maimonides writes simply that the purpose of the Torah is the perfection of man.)

A letter to Professor Gershom Scholem
The letter is from July 1941
and is also found in the book I Wanted to Ask You, Professor Leibowitz… p. 255

Honored Professor Scholem,

I wish to set forth in writing the questions and objections to which I alluded in our brief conversation yesterday on the bus. Among them are several questions to which you will surely answer tomorrow, and let the rest of the matter appear to you merely as the conversation of an ordinary person greatly interested in your teaching.

The degree to which I failed to explain my intention to you in the few things I said orally became clear to me from the way you presented the matter in your lecture, when you said that someone had argued against you that according to your explanation the kabbalists stand on the brink of the abyss. But that is not so—I made no claim against you at all, and did not at all mean the religious position of the kabbalist; for the danger inherent in the mystical approach is open and clear, and you did not invent it, and mystics in all times recognized and emphasized it (“Four entered the orchard,” etc.), and there is in this no argument—philosophical or moral—against that approach itself: every weighty and valuable idea may conceal within it pitfalls and traps. I meant something entirely different: it seems to me that the chief conceptual innovation of classical Judaism is that the entire force of a religious outlook and religious feeling is always standing on the edge of the abyss, and one who desires closeness to God with all his soul and might is always suspended between God and idolatry. In this matter there is no stronger and bolder symbol in the world of religious thought than the incident of the calf by the very people who merited the revelation at Sinai and said, “We shall do and we shall hear.” This is the conceptual background for the historical discussion to which I am referring at this moment.

I stress that the matter under discussion is a historical one, not theological, philosophical, or moral. You did a great thing in freeing the study of Kabbalah from the burden of theological, philosophical, and moral evaluations, and in paving the way to treat it as one of the great historical phenomena of our history. I shall try to learn from you and follow in your footsteps, and not ask whether Kabbalah is “true” or “good” by any criterion, but rather about its place and role in history. That is, I mean your question placed at the head of your lectures: what caused Kabbalah to take over the minds and souls of the Jewish masses for a prolonged period and become a living historical factor, while rationalist philosophy remained something theoretical for a limited public alone, and its traces were hardly known after only a few generations? Your answer was that Kabbalah is closer to classical Judaism and breathed new life into the religious institutions—the practical commandments and prayer—while philosophy lacked a living and productive relation to those institutions. It seems to me that in the continuation of your remarks and in the details of your answer, you yourself contradicted this thesis. I ask you: to what classical Judaism do you refer? Is it that specific Judaism, constituting a distinct whole in the world of religions, that crystallized in its literary work—the Talmud and its adjuncts—and in the fixed institutions of Jewish law and prayer, or the anonymous folk Judaism of that classical period, a Judaism of individual religiosity stemming from stirrings of the heart and complexes of the religious psyche that of course dwell in the heart of the religious Jew just as they dwell in every religious human being who worships idols? It seems to me that the whole force of classical Judaism is nothing but a mighty struggle between these two religiosities, and the mighty and unique achievement of Talmudic-rabbinic Judaism (in which it continues the line of Torah and Prophets) is the suppression of the elements of myth and the restraint of wild, free individual religiosity, which is nothing but an expression of urges and desires (“Israel knew that idolatry is nothing, but they sought to permit themselves forbidden sexual relations openly,” Sanhedrin), and redirecting it into a path of conquering the impulse, imposing obligations, and developing the feeling of obligation (“Greater is one who is commanded and does than one who is not commanded and does!”). In this sense, rationalist philosophy specifically, despite all its tools borrowed from the gentiles, is precisely what continues the line of original Judaism, that is, of the unique and specific side of Judaism, whereas Kabbalah, despite the apparent originality of its symbols and intentions, is nothing but an eruption of that general human religiosity—that is, pagan religiosity—which classical Judaism tried to suppress, together with all the psychopathia sexualis involved in it (see Sefer Hasidim). I think this is what Rabbi Kook wished to express in the sentence I mentioned to you yesterday.

I will use only one example, and you, being a wise man who understands one thing from another, will no doubt grasp my meaning. You explained the great innovation brought by Kabbalah in the area of prayer through the creation of mystical intentions and unifications. But the prayer liturgy created by classical Judaism, that prayer in the formula established by the sages, was never meant to serve as an outlet for individual religious feeling and the outpouring of the individual soul; prayer came in place of sacrifices as a public institution. It is precisely to this that the philosophical explanation in the reasons for the commandments is suited, according to which prayer is a ritual through which the worshipper includes himself within the community of believers. In contrast, the mystical concept of prayer is a complete revolution—indeed a mighty revolution of great historical importance—but in no way a continuation of the historical line that preceded it, nor a revival of the classical institution of prayer. Incidentally, this revolution against the spirit of classical Judaism is expressed in the very concept of mystical intention, for the power and greatness of rabbinic and Talmudic Judaism are nowhere revealed more strongly than when it rules that commandments do not require intention.

I cannot refrain from one critical remark, which you will forgive me for. To the same degree that I was deeply impressed by the living and vivid description you give, both orally and in writing, of the inner world of the kabbalists, so was I disappointed by the pallor of your description of the inner world of the philosophers. Here you apparently followed the “rule of intellect” of Ahad Ha’am, with his John-Stuart-Mill-and-Herbert-Spencer Maimonides. Here too I will suffice with one example: is the concept of evil in Maimonides really nothing but that pale abstraction that you described? Did Maimonides not have a very deep recognition of the terror of evil from which a person cannot escape even at the height of his intellectual ascent? Is it not in Maimonides that the piercing Talmudic saying stands at the center of his thought: “Whoever is greater than his fellow, his impulse is greater than his”? Indeed, the philosophers, in order to recognize evil and understand it and feel it, had no need of the idolatrous construction of the “side of impurity,” in which you apparently see a deeper profundity.

In conclusion: as against your thesis, I dare to posit this thesis: Kabbalah triumphed among the people of Israel because it was closer to those pagan instincts against which classical Judaism fought and did not succeed in uprooting. The philosophy of Maimonides did not triumph because it continues the line of that classical Judaism that always was and always remained the possession of only a few spiritual elite. It is not for nothing that Maimonides himself says, when describing pure love of God, that “not every sage nor every pious man attains it, and it is only the level of our father Abraham,” and these are also exactly the words of Spinoza: omnia praeclara tam difficilia quam rara sunt* (end of the Ethics).

* Everything noble is as difficult as it is rare.

Binyamin,
Leibowitz is known for his unique approach, and that’s his right.
But he is not an authority on everything.
Besides, his arguments always begin from a true kernel and end with a far-reaching conclusion, as, if I’m not mistaken, Michi also once said.
So Leibowitz says that any service that is not for its own sake, and whose purpose is to create a relationship with divinity and repair the world, is idolatry—so he says. So what?
There is nothing wrong if a person keeps the commandments and along the way reaches the conclusion that the purpose of observing them is also repairing the world, or repairing sefirot, or the Jewish people. That does not turn it into idolatry. I don’t think the Ari or Rabbi Kook or any other great kabbalist were any less God-fearing than Leibowitz.

Here you’ve gone too far, and Leibowitz only presented the kernel. He says that Kabbalah plays on the pagan emotion, and therefore it spread quickly in Israel and displaced philosophy.

By the way, I didn’t understand why the opinion that commandments do not require intention is presented in the question as something non-kabbalistic. On the contrary, there’s something mystical in it and not only responsiveness to command. After all, the intention here is a basic intention to fulfill the commandment (and likewise with the Vilna Gaon on prayer), and if everything is only responsiveness to command, then without intention what remains?

Mysticism belongs to the world of idolatry.
As opposed to the Jewish people: “For there is no enchantment in Jacob, nor divination in Israel.”

And especially regarding sexuality and male and female, the Torah knew the soul of idol worshippers and warned:
“And you shall watch yourselves very carefully, for you saw no form on the day the Lord spoke to you at Horeb from the midst of the fire, lest you become corrupt and make yourselves a carved image, the form of any symbol, the likeness of male or female.”

And what the mystics want to say—that their descriptions are only symbolic and not really what the Torah warned against: “any symbol.”

To permit attributing sexual relations to God and then explain it away by saying it is a matter of interpretation is like permitting bowing to an image and saying it depends on the intention of the one bowing.

And what, in your opinion, is the Account of the Chariot that the sages mentioned, and peeking into the orchard, and the pure marble stones, and so on?

It’s not as important as people think.
Since the sages are not with us to ask them what they meant and why they said what they said.
The sages said and did many things because “it is a time to act for the Lord”; otherwise the foolish public would run off into foreign fields.

What determines things for the Jewish people is the Torah, and one should not challenge the Torah from the sages (obviously the sages knew the Torah backwards and forwards, inside and out—that’s not the point), especially when we do not know what they meant by their statements.

“Remember the Torah of Moses My servant, which I commanded him at Horeb for all Israel, statutes and ordinances.”

Rabbi Akiva said to them: “When you reach the pure marble stones, do not say ‘Water, water,’ for it is said: ‘He who speaks falsehood shall not be established before My eyes.’”

The meaning is clear. “Water, water” is mysticism, which babbling charlatans and mind-scramblers use however they want. They fit mysticism to the listener, just as water is flexible and takes the shape of the cup. That is the essence of charlatanry.

And Rabbi Akiva warns that these are marble stones. Something solid. Something that does not change its shape. It’s not mysticism. It’s mathematics. Logic. Science.

How does the rabbi know what is really going on inside Kabbalah? There are quite a few kabbalists who understood the sefirot and the matter of unification with the Shekhinah literally. Among the masses there are beliefs bordering on idolatry whose source is Kabbalah. In Hinduism too today there are quite a few people who understand the multiplicity of idols as an allegory for the many faces of the supreme being, or as powers or a metaphysical emanation descending from it. How is that different from the doctrine of the sefirot? There too there were those who truly believed that God is composed of the sefirot. I don’t see much difference between Hinduism and Kabbalah on this point.

Last Decisor, I didn’t understand what you meant. Is the sages’ Account of the Chariot, in your opinion, merely science, logic, mathematics (which seems ridiculous to me), or are these contents in the realm of knowing divinity and its influence, just structured in an orderly and solid way like science, logic, and mathematics?
The Account of the Chariot did not help “the foolish public,” because they hid it from them with all their might.

Gabriel,
What does “what is going on inside Kabbalah” mean? Are you asking what this or that kabbalist thought? That doesn’t really interest me. By the way, it seems that you do know what is going on there. But apparently that’s a privilege reserved only for you…

I don’t know what is going on inside Kabbalah as a whole, and I don’t even know whether one can speak about Kabbalah in general. I only saw that quite a few kabbalists understood the matter literally. Most people also see Kabbalah that way.
I simply don’t understand what the difference is between Kabbalah and idolatrous religions, where there too there are interpretations this way and that.

Especially since Christianity is indeed considered idolatry from the standpoint of Jewish law, while the ideas of certain kabbalists are no less problematic. Where is the line between idolatry and legitimate belief? And why is Christianity idolatry—including approaches and theologies that see the Trinity as “deep spiritual ideas” and not literally—yet kabbalistic approaches are not in the category of idolatry?

So what you are claiming is that there are kabbalists who are idol worshippers. So what? I was talking about Kabbalah, not kabbalists.
And if there are Christians who are not idol worshippers, so what? Then they aren’t. You assume certain stereotypes and then raise objections. Don’t assume, and don’t object. And in general, it’s better to judge ideas and not people.

I read your words with absolute astonishment, Rabbi Michi, regarding anthropomorphism and Gnosticism under a top-level kosher stamp. Interesting—how does your honor relate to the book Shiur Komah? Does the rabbi disagree with Maimonides’ responsum: “It is nothing but a composition by one of the preachers in the cities of Edom… destroying that book and eradicating the memory of its subject is a great commandment”? Insofar as the rabbi disagrees with Maimonides, I would ask for an explanation of his position on the matter.

I was talking about what is meant by “marble stones.”
As for the Account of the Chariot, the matters are much simpler:
“And you, son of man, do not fear them nor fear their words; though briers and thorns are with you and you sit among scorpions, do not fear their words nor be dismayed at their faces, for they are a rebellious house.”

And one must remember that even among the sages there was no doctrine of the Account of Creation or the Account of the Chariot; rather they engaged in homiletics and inquiry. And one does not challenge from homily. And just as they may have erred in the Account of Creation, so they may have erred in the Account of the Chariot. Especially since it is not at all clear what they expounded.

Binyamin,
I don’t relate to the book because I’m not familiar with it. If you are astonished, I wish you robust health and a speedy recovery from it.
I explained my position quite well, and if Maimonides thought otherwise then I disagree with him.

Rabbi Michi, could I please have a link to the place where the rabbi explained his position clearly?

Binyamin,
I think it’s pretty clear that the intent is Michi’s first comment.
He does not regard Kabbalah as idolatry because, in his view, the sexual images and the multiplicity of manifestations, sefirot, and the like in the world are not literal.
If the issue of finding pagan signs that entered Judaism over the generations interests you that much,
I refer you to Schnareb’s review in the Shabbat supplement of the book What God Cannot Do,
or to the discussion on the topic in the “Stop Here, Think” forum:
https://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?whichpage=1&topic_id=3134493

I think that’ll make your Sabbath.

By the way,
if we’re already on Kabbalah and things in it that are jarring,
Rabbi Tzadok’s deterministic doctrine, which assumes that a Jew comes out righteous and his deeds are unimportant because every act a Jew does—even a sin—is the will of the Holy One, blessed be He,
and likewise, of course, his opposite view when it comes to gentiles—
and in practice cancels free choice,
is a fascinating thing.

Rational (Relatively), “not literal” is a garbage can into which any kind of waste can be thrown, so I reject your understanding of Rabbi Michi’s words; I don’t think that’s what the rabbi meant.
P.S. Thanks for the links.

Here, for example:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%d7%9c%d7%a9%d7%9d-%d7%99%d7%99%d7%97%d7%95%d7%93-%d7%a7%d7%95%d7%93%d7%A9%D7%90-%d7%91%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9A-%d7%94%D7%95%D7%90-%D7%95%D7%A9%D7%9B%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%A2%D7%96-%D7%95#comment-34671

I very much enjoy the way the rabbi judges Kabbalah favorably while displaying impressive skills of spiritual acrobatics. Let me remind you of the Chabad approach according to which God can mate as male and female, as follows: “Although in and of itself He is not a body and has no form, it is possible that He may clothe Himself in a body, etc., since He is omnipotent and impossibilities are not impossible for Him” (Likkutei Sichot, vol. 15, p. 85 note 3). The doctrines of partnership and incarnation in flesh, with Chabad approval—veeery radical. So there is no need to go far afield and offer strained excuses that these are only images.

Binyamin, I get the impression that you are an intelligent person, and what brings you to insist and say nonsense is usually obsessions and fixations on certain issues or people, and that’s a shame.
Why didn’t you bring me notions of tribes in Africa who are idol worshippers? I told you that I’m talking about Kabbalah, not about certain kabbalists and not about certain interpretations. In Chabad there are quite a few aspects of idolatry, even apart from Kabbalah, and I already wrote that here. But from your standpoint there is no point in writing, because you don’t read (or don’t invest a gram of effort in understanding). It turns out that even when your questions look like questions (and in those cases I try to answer), they actually aren’t.

“I told you that I’m talking about Kabbalah and not about kabbalists”—would the rabbi kindly define what exactly that “Kabbalah” is…?

Kabbalah is the doctrine described in the Zohar and in the Ari and other books—not the various interpretations given to it, which of course should be discussed separately. The sefirot, the configurations, the worlds, and the different relations among them. The different interpretations given to this doctrine (whether it exists in actuality or is a metaphor, whether it deals with our world or upper worlds, if there even are such things) are different interpretations of different people. Those are explanations and interpretations, not Kabbalah. Kabbalah is the theory itself, not its interpretations.
Just as if you were to ask me about the Torah in light of one or another interpretation given to it that you don’t like (that of the Haredim, for instance). And I would answer you that I believe in the Torah but not necessarily in every interpretation. And then you would ask me what Torah I’m talking about. And my answer would be: the books with which all those interpreters deal (the Bible, the Talmud). One can argue about a section in the Torah whether it is an allegory or happened in practice, and you can even say that this interpretation or that one is heresy and idolatry. Does that mean the Torah is idolatry?
An intelligent person like you should understand this simple point even without my kind assistance, and certainly after I’ve already explained it here.

By the way, you quoted me inaccurately, and in my opinion you did so deliberately. I did not write, “I told you that I’m talking about Kabbalah and not about kabbalists,” as you quoted, but rather: “I told you that I’m talking about Kabbalah and not about certain kabbalists and not about certain interpretations.” This is another indication, one of very many, of your tendentiousness and unwillingness to accept answers.

To remove any doubt, and for the sake of “Find favor and good understanding in the eyes of God and man,” I hereby clarify that I had no malicious intention in the quotation.
My only intention was that the rabbi define that “Kabbalah.” After reading the above definition, I understood that the rabbi’s conception of Kabbalah is apparently limited to the writings of Moses de León and his successors such as the Ari (“and other books”… along the lines of the Zohar or by other paths? Unfortunately the rabbi did not explain this critical point). Kabbalah explicitly is not “a theory” but a collection of “theories,” and therefore the comparison to Torah is detached from reality. The Torah indeed is one, with many interpretations of it, but Kabbalah is a multiplicity of “intuitions” that are not allegories but the essence of the matter, similar to the Christian conception (the ancient one), which developed over the years by the free rein of imagination, and as is developing before our eyes every day.

Simply not true. But it’s hard to discuss things without listening. I suggest we end here.