Premise: In matter there is nothing important. For example, we don’t think it matters whether a stone exists or not, and we also don’t think it matters whether the rooster Cock-a-doodle-doo exists or is dead. So too there is no reason to think it matters whether so-and-so is alive or dead, or regarding the existence of the human species as a whole, just as with the existence of stones in general.
Claim: Our world is material.
Conclusion: The world has no importance.

Difficulty: People feel that there is importance in life, but such importance, as we have shown, cannot come into being.
Resolution: This is a psychological need that comes from the evolutionary tendency of the organism to survive.

Asaf, there is another possibility: a person’s importance is not on account of his body but on account of his spirit.

I understand that you’re asking yourself and not me. You assume materialism and then raise difficulties. So answer them yourself. I’m not a materialist.

Dualism or idealism will not solve the problem either. Importance does not stem from spirit:
Premise: In spirit there is nothing important. For example, we don’t think it matters whether the rooster Cock-a-doodle-doo exists or is dead. Or the fly, or whether the mosquito class is alive or not. So too there is no reason to think it matters whether so-and-so is alive or dead, or regarding the existence of the human species as a whole, just as with the existence of simple consciousnesses in general. And so one can continue the parts of the argument by replacing matter with spirit.
If so, where does the importance come from according to your view? It is not found in any inanimate or living object. As Ecclesiastes says:
For the fate of human beings and the fate of animals is the same; as one dies, so dies the other, and they all have one spirit, and man has no advantage over the beast, for all is vanity.

Okay, this is really just stubbornness. I’m done.

What?
Do you see that part of the description of the concept of spirit or soul includes belief in its importance?

No. Importance is a property of the spirit, not part of its definition. A=And if you’re asking why that is important, you’re testifying about yourself that you don’t understand what importance is and how one justifies it. What kind of justification are you expecting? What do you consider important (in a value sense), and how do you justify that?

What is the difference between a property and a definition? A property is a product of the spirit, but if so where does it come from?
A=Morality is considered something of value, but the difference is that morality is an ethical matter. It is not part of the body of the spirit like a property or definition. It is more a relation between the spirit and what ought to be done. But that is not the nature of the spirit. By contrast, the assumption that an object like spirit has a property of importance sounds completely absurd, because facts are just plain and mundane.

You’re writing that morality is important. Do you have an example? Is the prohibition against murder important? Why? Because life has value (=importance). Is not stealing important? Why? Because property (=inanimate objects) has value (=importance).
If life is not important, then the prohibition against murder is also not important. And if you insist on hair-splitting, then define it as: life has no importance, only the prohibition against murder does. That’s about the same thing in different words.
I really do not understand this bizarre discussion.

It’s not hair-splitting. For example, is there value in putting on tefillin? Yes, because of the deontological command, but is there value in the tefillin themselves just as such? Not clear. The tefillin are only the practical means for putting them on.
The same regarding morality: is it forbidden to murder? Yes, because of the categorical imperative. But does life itself have importance? You can’t learn that from here. Because all morality succeeds in doing is creating links on the ethical plane.
But the objects themselves remain devoid of any importance.

I still didn’t understand the difference between property and definition that you claim solves this.

As I said, I don’t understand this argument. In what respect are you asking? You accept all the moral commands regarding life. So in what respect do you not accept the importance of life? Isn’t this just semantics? When people say that life has value, that is said only in the sense that there are moral commands regarding it.

The difference between a property and a definition is simple. But it doesn’t solve anything, because there is nothing to solve. I haven’t seen any difficulty here that requires some solution.
There are components of objects or concepts that are included in their structure. The totality of those components is the object/concept. By contrast, there are characteristics of objects/concepts that are external to them—our judgments about them. Importance is not a component included in the very definition of life. Life is simply a biological-mental complex, and that’s all. But that complex has importance from a moral standpoint. The importance of life is a moral statement (a judgment) about life, not a description of life itself.

No, I’m asking because I read in various books that certain thinkers saw the world in what is considered a more pessimistic way: that life has no value, or at least not in the form we know it, but only, for example, through nirvanas. And from what I understand from other places, they did not necessarily think there were no moral values, nor were they Epicureans or atheists.
By contrast, religious thinkers, or at least Jewish ones, are usually presented as those who saw importance and sanctity in life as it is. Perhaps this can be compared to the fact that one may desecrate the Sabbath to save a life, even if that person will not manage to fulfill even one commandment.
And in that respect I asked how one can say that sanctity takes effect upon life itself, even apart from the direct connection to morality, which by its nature is deontological, but upon the object itself. I think the tefillin example can be compared to this—that there are people who would say sanctity rests upon them.
Hope it’s clearer now. I’m not talking about the ethical dimension of what ought to be.

If so, I understand you to be saying that claiming the table is big is a property (because it is a judgment relative to something else), but claiming the table has a length of 150 cm is part of its structure and definition.

To my mind the question is completely meaningless. What does this have to do with pessimism? If you’re talking about sanctity taking effect, that has no meaning beyond Jewish law. It’s not a moral question. There is no sanctity that takes effect on a human soul in any halakhic sense that I know of.
As for the table, I partly agree. It’s true that saying it is big is a judgment, but one can still see that as part of its own properties. Saying that it is important is something more detached from its essence. Size is a description (albeit subjective and relative) of the table, but saying that it is important does not describe the table at all. It judges it.

Sanctity in its halakhic sense was brought only to illustrate the idea. By pessimism I meant that a thinker may think there is no importance in life, or at least in the way we see it, and still accept that values exist.

If I understand correctly, you mean that size is a property connected to the characteristics of the table and therefore it describes it, but importance is directed toward the concept itself that contains the characteristics?
But if it is judging, then relative to what would that be?

I’ve completely lost you. I suggest we stop here.