Q&A: Ontic Necessity and Epistemic Necessity
Ontic Necessity and Epistemic Necessity
Question
Did I understand correctly?
- X exists necessarily = an ontic claim.
- This conclusion can follow only from a purely logical claim (the definition of the entity + logic, where its definition proves its existence).
- Sometimes a purely logical claim is not known to us, or it does not exist, because the definition of the entity (+ logic) is not always enough by itself to prove something ontically; therefore, even if X exists necessarily, that does not mean it is epistemically necessary.
- The claim that it is necessarily true that X exists = an epistemic claim.
- This claim can follow either from a purely logical claim (the definition of the entity + logic, where its definition proves its existence), which is really an ontic claim (and in this case, since X exists epistemically, it also exists ontically necessarily).
- This claim can also follow from the definition of the entity + an assumption + a logical claim, and here there is really no ontic claim, because the assumption may not be true.
Answer
The first part is conditional on your accepting the possibility of an ontological argument that proves ontic existence by logical means.
The end of the second part is problematic, because if there is a non-necessary assumption, then there is no epistemic certainty.
By the way, conceptually I would call the first one (the ontic) necessity, and the second one (the epistemic) certainty.
Discussion on Answer
From what I understood, if something is proved epistemically (by way of definition + assumption + logical argument, and not by way of a purely logical argument that follows only from a definition, which cannot be refuted), since the assumption may not be true (I understand that the intention is that it seems true to us, but may be mistaken), then you cannot claim that if something is proved epistemically, it is proved ontically.
And that is what I meant at the end. Did I understand correctly?
Happy holiday!
I didn't understand the remark in the first message. I do indeed think as I wrote there.
As for the second message, you're right, but in the previous message you spoke about epistemic certainty, and as I noted, that isn't correct. The question is what you mean when you say "proved epistemically"—do you mean a non-certain argument (one that depends on assumptions)? If so, that's trivial.
A. I quoted your words, from which I understood what I understood. In that passage you argued that if something is proved epistemically, it is not necessarily proved ontically, and I understood that this is because the assumptions that served as the basis for its being proved epistemically may not be correct.
And from what you answered me, your words refer to an epistemic proof that contains non-necessary assumptions. But if there is something that is proved epistemically with certainty (meaning that it seems true to us, but may be mistaken), then it is also proved ontically. Right?
B. Does the very existence of the Proslogion, chapter 3, prove that the argument in chapter 2 contains assumptions and is not purely logical, and that therefore chapter 3 is needed to move from an epistemic claim to an ontic claim? (You wrote a different proof of this there.)
A. There is no certain epistemic proof that may be mistaken. If it may be mistaken, then it is not certain.
B. In my opinion, Anselm did not think that his argument was based on assumptions. He thought it was purely conceptual analysis.
I didn't understand the answer.
I quoted your words, from which I understood what I understood. In that passage you argued that if something is proved epistemically, it is not necessarily proved ontically, and I understood that this is because the assumptions that served as the basis for its being proved epistemically may not be correct.
And from what you answered me, your words refer to an epistemic proof that contains non-necessary assumptions. But if there is something that is proved epistemically with certainty (even if it is based on assumptions, they are certain assumptions), then it is also proved ontically. Is that correct?
B. An assumption, from what I understood, comes from intuition, and it is always possible that it is mistaken, even if it appears necessary to us—is that right?
Sorry for bothering you during the holiday preparations. Happy holiday!
A. I wrote that if you accept the possibility of an ontological proof, that is, a proof based on conceptual analysis with logic alone, then the epistemic also entails the ontic.
B. Correct.
We've exhausted it.
"Now we can see that the second direction of the identity above is also incorrect. Even if we have a logical proof for the existence of something, we have to distinguish between two situations: if this is a purely logical argument, that is, an argument based not on assumptions at all but only on conceptual analysis, then one may perhaps say that its existence follows from its definition. But if the argument is based on some assumptions (not factual ones, of course), then the truth of the claim 'X exists' depends on the truth of those assumptions. If so, the existence of an ontological proof does not mean that the existence of the thing proved is ontically necessary. It depends on the truth of the assumptions. However, if the proof is purely logical, then it would seem that the existence of such a proof indicates that the entity whose existence was proved indeed also exists with ontic necessity."
Those are your words in Booklet 1, chapter 8.