Question

I recently read parts of the book, and there’s something there that doesn’t sit right with me:
You explain there that all the scientific agreements from computer science, or the explanations from brain science, cannot serve as proof—because that only shows that something dualistic can be imitated by materialistic means. (I hope I understood the argument correctly.)
But earlier in the book, you address the materialist argument based on Occam’s razor and say that this is not a proper use of Occam’s razor, because we see or experience phenomena that do not fit the materialist assumption. a0
Facing that argument, all those demonstrations from computer science and the explanations from brain science come along and say that Occam’s razor can in fact be used here—because you have no way to distinguish between a material phenomenon and a non-material phenomenon, and therefore you can’t claim that because you see phenomena that are non-material, you are not using Occam’s razor.