But morality has no meaning without God, so how can He be subject to morality?

If the answer is yes, and God is “subject” to morality,
is the proof for God’s existence from morality, as you present it in the first book of the trilogy, still valid?
If morality is an objective law and there is no need to create it, since God is “subject” to it, then there is no need for God’s existence in order to give binding force to the obligation to morality?

Morality and He are one and the same (He and His will are one).

Sorry, but I didn’t understand the answer.
I’d be happy for more detail.

So how is He subject to morality? Isn’t He only subject to His own view?

As for morality, I wrote that I’m undecided. The side that says God is “subject” to it is because that is His nature (to be moral). That is what Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto wrote: the nature of the good is to do good. This is not something outside Him, so you can’t say He is subject to something else (His nature and He are one), and on the other hand, He cannot deviate from it.

Thank you for the answer,
and regarding the proof of God’s existence from morality, as you discussed at length in the first book,
on the assumption that morality was not created, including for the reason that He and morality are one,
is the proof valid?

Absolutely. Why not?

The proof is a revealing proof.
The structure of the proof as you present it is:
If a person believes that morality obligates him and all beings with free choice (human beings), that means he believes that there exists an objective binding law and not just a natural tendency.
If that law exists, as the moral person believes,
then there must be a creator who created it.
From this it follows that a person who believes in binding morality believes in a Creator, believes in God.

But if God is also subject to this law, that means this law exists without Him and does not depend on the Creator, so seemingly the proof is not valid.

Only someone who believes in snakes that speak Hebrew can believe that God is subject to the laws of morality.

Yaakov, historically the Euthyphro dilemma has had 3 kinds of answers—each of them leaves the moral argument intact.

First, for now one must remember that the only alternative to morality from God (assuming one accepts that there is such a thing as objective morality, etc.) is ethical realism. That alternative has 4 problems:
1. The argument from evolution—if there is no God, who says our moral intuition is aimed at what is right rather than only at what is useful for survival?
2. The argument from disagreement—there are many moral opinions; how can you know that your opinion is correct without the command of God? (This is an argument Rabbi Michi won’t accept because he doesn’t see morality as command, but in my opinion it is a valid argument.)
3. The argument from queerness—the claim that there are moral ideas in a naturalistic world is not rational. In a world without God, it makes no sense to assume there are ideals.
4. The argument from authority—suppose there is a moral ideal; what obligates me (and not merely makes it “right”) to be bound by it?

Now when we come to the above dilemma—each of the 3 possibilities leaves those points in place—

Option 1. If God is subject to morality—you still have to ask why you are **obligated** to do good and not merely that it is “right” to do so. This is possible only given a lawgiver that creates something like obligation (like a law of the Knesset). The same is true of the other points as well.

Option 2. If God is not subject to morality—that is straightforward. In that case the moral argument remains intact.
Now, what people don’t like about this answer is that one can say it is an “immoral” view (that is, that morality is arbitrary or not binding without God), but in my opinion this misunderstands the argument. What exactly is the alternative? In the end I see valid morality—either it has no foundation whatsoever or it has a foundation. So saying that God created morality is perfectly fine. It’s not as if there’s another option… Moreover, if someone goes with option 1 (God is subject to morality), I’ll ask: and what is the foundation of the morality to which God is subject? The answer is that you have to stop somewhere. So you must choose where to stop: with morality, to which God is subject—but it itself has no foundation (except a tautology—it’s right because it’s right—which is of course an evasion), or with God—and then at least according to the approach that God created morality, morality does have a foundation. In the end this is a zero-sum game, and every option is both morally problematic and doesn’t solve the problem. In the end there will be something without a foundation. Just choose whether it is morality that has no foundation at all, or God who has no foundation at all. It seems to me that the alternative of saying morality is foundationless comes to rescue us from the difficult statement that only because of God does morality have a foundation, but in fact it is much worse. Because then it turns out that morality itself has no foundation behind it.

Option 3. God is identical with morality—why did God command morality? Because that is His character. That’s it. Why is that His character? Because that is His character. Just so.

In short—in every one of the alternatives the moral argument remains valid. In my opinion that’s what everyone misses—namely, however we solve the dilemma, the reasons for inferring God’s existence from morality exist in every one of the 3 options, and therefore the dilemma neither adds nor subtracts anything.

Now, there is a point that I think quite a few people don’t notice. Beyond that, this dilemma, as part of the question of the proof from morality, in my opinion misses the fact that once one looks for a basis for morality and arrives, say, at God, one can end the discussion. That is, one can indeed ask: and what is the reason God is like this (that is, moral)? (That is the dilemma.)
But one can of course say: “I don’t know.” In fact that really doesn’t matter. We have a question—where does morality come from? We found it a binding source—God. All the facts required for us have been explained; I do not have to supply any further explanation.
The facts required for the inhabitant of planet Earth have been explained—morality is valid and I arrived at God. That’s it. Exactly as if I found a reason for something (the carpenter built the table), the question how the table came to be has been completely explained. I do not have to say how the carpenter came to be. The question of how there is a table here has been explained. The discussion is over. One can of course say that this is not true because even God’s act must have a reason—but what is the basis for that claim? Unlike the turtle parable, where it is clear that as long as there is no “stable” base the Earth will collapse, in the case of morality there is no basis for this. Whether or not there were considerations for God is a fascinating question, but it is not relevant to the topic under discussion. There is morality, all the facts have been explained, we have finished the discussion. Now God’s reasoning can be discussed as an interesting hypothetical, but nothing more than that.

Well, the matter is even longer than this and has been clarified in the philosophical literature dealing with this issue.

(Regarding option 3—carry this over to option 1. In option 1 God is subject to morality. What is the reason morality is like this? Just so. Same thing—what is the reason this is God’s character? Because this is His character. Why is this His character? Just so! Exactly as the claim that God is subject to morality says that morality is right because “that’s how it is.” Just as morality is tautological (according to that approach), so too God’s moral character is tautological. This is His character because—tautology.

And why is this option preferable to moral realism? Because of the 4 problems with that position that I detailed above.)

In short—this dilemma raises an interesting question, but it is not relevant to the discussion.

Similarly—one can also say in option 3 that God is moral because He is perfect (a reasonable theological and philosophical assumption).
But then does it come out as though morality preceded God? No. Since God is eternal, morality did not precede Him…
(And sorry for going on at length.)

The basis of morality is simply the fear of being harmed / dying. The solution: turn from evil and do good.
From an evolutionary-survival perspective, causing injustice to another is dangerous.
As the intellect develops with age, a person understands causality in broader contexts, and thus his moral perception develops. There is nothing mystical about this.

Professional moralists would love for God to be like them, so they created such a God in their image and likeness. Snakes.

To M, thanks for the response,
it’s hard for me to get into every step of your response.
One comment:
If God created morality,
why does morality obligate us?
Because God created it?
What is there in divine creation that causes us to be obligated to it?
Because He commanded us to it?
Why is His command binding?

https://mikyab.net/responsa/the laws of morality and logic

Dvir, thanks for the reference.
It seems pretty clear, from this reference too, that Rabbi Michael holds that morality stands on its own and does not depend on God, and the good God does good.
If so, it’s not clear to me why Rabbi Michi holds that the proof of God’s existence from morality is valid insofar as morality does not depend on Him.

Yaakov—Michi explained this in his first available book. Obligation is created automatically from the fact that there is a “law.” Seemingly, there is no necessity to obey the law, but rationally the very existence of a law turns something into a “binding” state. The difference between ethical realism and divine command is that ethical realism says there is an ideal that defines what is good, and God adds the law that one is obligated to be good. Something like Knesset laws.

As for why Rabbi Michi holds this—indeed, in my humble opinion, the treatment of this specific question in the trilogy is relatively confusing and limited, and it really is hard to get to the bottom of what Rabbi Michi means there (on this site, by contrast, it appears much more extensively in one of the columns). However, even in the trilogy he spoke about the difference between “right” and “obligation.” But in fact all 4 advantages of divine command over ethical realism are valid, and therefore in any of the possibilities (God subject to morality, and morality subject to God) the proof, as I understand it, is valid. Soon a book is going to be published on the argument from morality (by Moshe Rat). Admittedly, there the author rules in accordance with a certain approach in this dilemma, but there is a more comprehensive analysis there (in my opinion) of the argument from morality. Be patient. (Discussion of this issue can also be found in Moshe Rat’s dissertation, which can be found online on his website. Rabbi Michi was among those who helped guide that dissertation.)

This is the column in question:

נהמא דכיסופא – מבט נוסף על מחשבת ישראל (טור 278)

I don’t see what is problematic here or what is confusing in the book. Even if God is good by nature, the law that obligates us still requires a legislator. Without a legislator there is no valid law. The fact that the “legislation” is not done by way of free choice (if indeed He is subject to it, and as I wrote, I’m a bit undecided about that) is not important. As long as God requires that we do something, that obligates us regardless of the question why God wants it and whether He had another option. I don’t see how any of this touches the proof from morality, and I explained this above as well.

By the way, M, you contrast ethical realism with the view of morality by God’s authority, and discuss the differences and the preferences, but in my opinion this is the very same view. When you speak about ethical realism you are speaking about an ontic source by whose power the laws of morality have validity. That is God, or at least something God created. Therefore this discussion is empty of content and unnecessary. On the contrary, my entire path from morality to God passes specifically through ethical realism (without which there is no valid morality).

1. Regarding the book—as I said, when I read it, it was not entirely clear how the proof remains intact. One can of course attribute that to my lack of reading comprehension, but it seems to me that this section really is written less well (/perhaps this is an editing issue. I have no idea, but that is my impression).
2. Regarding realism—well, realism says there is only a moral ideal and simply no one created it and there is no entity behind it. There is moral obligation, and that’s it.
Why was it necessary for me to make this distinction?
A. Precisely because this is a very common view in the philosophical literature that argues against the proof from morality.
B. I listed the advantages of adding a creator to the ideal precisely because afterward I needed those points in the discussion about the Euthyphro dilemma, which is the subject of the question. Those arguments show that in fact, in every one of the options for solving the Euthyphro dilemma, one ends up needing to add a creator to the equation. And that indeed answers the questioner’s question how the proof remains entirely valid together with the claim that God is subject to morality (as stated, it is not only the problem of “obligation,” but also the argument from evolution, the argument from disagreement, and the argument from queerness).

With Heaven’s help
1. This is not very different from the other difficulties with naturalism, and in particular combining dualism with evolution would presumably be identical. And still, he will simply say he doesn’t know.
In any case, according to your approach one can accept the “proof from the soul.”
2. This also attacks religious people who hold there is objective morality, but after all there are tons of opinions… unless you claim morality comes only from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), but that sounds a bit puzzling, because the proof from the outset comes from the fact that we know what is moral to some degree intuitively, but that itself you are cutting off. And if so, how does God solve this?
3. Again, this is no different from dualism; see 1.
4. Here I agree, and I think even more than that: insofar as there is an ideal there are two possibilities:
1. It is contingent.
2. It is a necessary existent.
If 1, then the Euthyphro dilemma is child’s play compared to the difficulty of something contingent that obligates—after all, one could have imagined any other ideal obligating to the same degree…
And if 2, then if you assume this world is contingent, it is very easy to stop the regress of the cosmological proof at that same object, and there we have an “upgraded” God :).
Regarding your catch-22, I think I agree too, but I only skimmed it.

I forgot to add a nice proof. I’m not sure it is correct according to the Rabbi’s approach, although I learned it from him, but it may very well be correct.
The proof from religious potential: if God were revealed to you, would you keep His commandments “for their own sake” and not because of reward, etc.? If yes, then one can say that you see value in serving God,
and if so the question arises whether such an ideal, had God not legislated it, would cause anyone to see value in serving God.
The reason according to the Rabbi’s view, as I understand it, is that serving God comes from gratitude, so according to his view I’m not sure there is a proof.
But whoever thinks this is something axiomatic (“Surely if God commanded something, then we do it… right?!”), then it sounds very plausible to say that behind this ideal there is a legislator. Or that the a priori probability of producing such an output approaches zero…

K—the difficulties you raised are very weak. Still, you didn’t really expect me to lay out here the entire give-and-take of the arguments, right? It’s like if we wrote each of the proofs for God’s existence in one line and then, unsurprisingly, there would be objections. When I went through the fuller analyses of these points, to the best of my impression these are valid arguments.

I’ll respond briefly only to the points you raised (though of course even on this one could keep digging. But spare me)—

Evolution—the evolutionary arguments against naturalism are not relevant here (without getting into whether they are valid or not). If only because one can say that truth indeed raises, at least to some extent, the probability of survival (though that doesn’t require everything to be 100% accurate). But can one say that about what is morally right? Well, if you define in advance “morally right” as helping a friend or as the morality we know—then you’re right that evolution can lead to that. But who says that is what is morally right? In order for your intuition to be aimed at the “correct” ideal, you need someone who aimed it there. Otherwise, maybe the correct moral ideal is to murder cats?

((((Well, one can try to reject this and say of course that the revealing argument assumes by definition a specific “good” ideal, and it senses an ideal. Then indeed the revealing argument + evolution can arrive at an ideal that says “good.” Except that if evolution is true, then from the outset the thought that this morality is right becomes irrational (there is no logic in evolution leading to what is right, but if anything evolution would only lead to what is “good”), and therefore from the outset one cannot accept the revealing argument as valid, because evolution says there is no reason to say that the moral thought on which you built the revealing argument is correct. For the assumption that you know what is “right” (and accordingly believe in an ideal) is itself probably mistaken, statistically. ))))))

Disagreement—that doesn’t mean there is nothing objective, only that only one side is right. No one said this is the morality of the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), only that if there is a God He can solve the disagreement on the theoretical level. In addition, as a revealing argument for belief in the ideas as they appear in the Torah—it is definitely valid.

Queerness—if you have 2 alternatives—naturalism and an ideal (which contradict each other), or a full worldview that is not naturalistic, the preferable alternative is obvious. It is strange to say there is naturalism and an ideal. It is not strange to say there simply is no naturalism because there is God.

Obligation versus ideal—of course a law cannot exist without a legislator. It does not just exist “for no reason.” By contrast, to speak about right and wrong (an ideal, for present purposes) is certainly something one can speak about rationally.

Yes, one can continue the give-and-take even on what I wrote here and it will go on forever, so I have no interest in doing that. To the best of my understanding from my study of the matter in the philosophical literature that dealt with this proof (there are excellent Oxford books on the subject representing both sides), these are overall valid arguments.

I’ll try to explain more why, if God is subject to morality, the proof from morality is seemingly invalid.
I understand the idea that God is subject to morality exactly the way I understand that God is subject to logic. These are laws that cannot be thought outside of. In morality too I cannot think that it is permissible to harm another; this is a first axiom. I am bound not to harm, for the reason that I cannot conceive of any other thought. It seems to me to say that God is subject to this just as He is subject to logic.
Can one bring a proof of existence from the laws of logic?

Seemingly, there is no point in separating between the content of the law itself and the obligation to the law; the law (its content) and the obligation to it are one axiom.

Yaakov—
A. I’m not sure. Take crosswalks, for example. Suppose there were no such law at all. Ask yourself whether the fact that it’s not *right* to cross a road outside a crosswalk turns it into an obligation—something like a legal obligation. It seems to me not. There is “it is right to do X” and there is “it is obligatory to do X.” That is what God adds to this equation.
Exactly just as the fact that it is right (perhaps) to donate to the needy in Africa does not turn it into an obligation… and likewise in other examples.

B. As I said, there are other arguments why God is required even in such a case.

C. There are other ways to understand the Euthyphro dilemma (and they may actually be preferable).

D. As I explained, this question is not required from the outset. One can say “I don’t know,” and that is a valid answer.

Yaakov, this is mixing apples and oranges.
At most, there is no possibility of defining the laws of morality otherwise, but the question whether they obligate depends on God. To say that the laws of morality instruct murder is a logical oxymoron. But when the law forbids murder and I am nevertheless not obligated by it—there is no oxymoron here.