Q&A: Authority and Choice
Authority and Choice
Question
Do you think it is correct to say that (formal) authority and choice go together? The only thing for which it is relevant to define authority is something that involves free choice. Or: (a) is there something that does not involve free choice and yet authority applies to it? (b) is there something that does involve free choice and yet authority does not apply to it?
If I understood your view correctly, then the answer is yes (that they really do go together). Does that mean that in your view the difference between you (as a devout believer in free choice) and a nice determinist (like me) is only in areas where authority applies?
Answer
This is a semantic issue. Clearly, authority has no meaning where there is no choice, since the meaning of authority is the obligation to obey. But if obedience is not in my hands, then there is no point talking about obligations.
But your conclusion in the second half is not correct. In the domain of morality there is no authority, and even so there is a difference between us on this issue. Admittedly, the question is not well-defined, since there is also a difference between us in that we perceive the world differently. The question is which differences you mean.
Discussion on Answer
Not necessarily. There are factual questions that we decide by means of judgment (weighing reasons one way or the other). The question is whether that judgment is deterministic or not. I am not sure.
I see. And even if that judgment is not deterministic, formal authority still of course does not apply to it. Did I understand correctly? (I have some question brewing that makes use of that conclusion, but right now it’s still only half-cooked and I need to think some more.)
Obviously
I accept that there is a difference between us in how we perceive the world, and therefore the question was not well defined. Let me revise it.
Is it correct to formulate it this way—that in your view as well, the libertarian’s worldview (what exists and what is true) is determined for him deterministically?
[By the term factual opinions below I mean, for example, scientific generalizations, or the very question of determinism versus judgment and free choice.]
That is, just as in the determinist’s view factual opinions are imposed on everyone, so too in the libertarian’s view those factual opinions are imposed on everyone.
Unfortunately, the sciences of freedom are no longer within my reach, but if I remember correctly you have a sophisticated argument saying that a determinist should not trust his factual opinions, because they are forced on him and therefore there is no reason to think they are correct with any probability greater than zero; unlike a libertarian (who is not a skeptic), who holds a coherent and reasonable position according to which he has judgment and decided to place his trust דווקא in things that are true. But right now I understand from you that regarding factual opinions (which is really what we are dealing with here), there is no difference between a libertarian and a determinist.
So regarding those factual opinions, do you think it is correct that the libertarian’s view about them is forced on him in exactly the same way that, in the determinist’s view, his opinion on the matter is forced on him—different perceptual outcomes, but an identical mechanism?