There are the Urim and Tummim, so why do you also need them? To examine the king’s considerations?? Let them ask the army commander and the experts!?

It’s definitely reasonable to have oversight over the considerations of the experts and the king. Sometimes they have interests and biases.

And still, that doesn’t explain the need for their opinion, since there are the Urim and Tummim.
B. What do the Sanhedrin—who are supposed to issue rulings only on matters of Jewish law—have to do with war considerations?
C. If this is also the will of the people, why is it not their right to decide for themselves? If it is not the will of the people, why not set up a committee that represents the people and let the people decide?
D. How do we know that the Sanhedrin’s considerations will be free of any personal interest?

You need to think. Everything has been answered. You can keep extending this forever with questions of “who says?”

I did think before asking. (At least I hope so.)
What I came up with after thinking on my own is this: Rashi wrote in tractate Berakhot 3b that the role of the Sanhedrin is to pray for the success of the war. But that somewhat contradicts what he says in tractate Sanhedrin 16b, that the role of the Sanhedrin is to grant permission to go out to war. And many explanations and resolutions were offered by the later commentators on Rashi. Likewise, there are many opinions among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) regarding the role of the Sanhedrin in this matter (for example, there is an explanation that they represent the will of the people), and there is a practical halakhic difference if the Sanhedrin do not agree to going to war—does one go out or not?
And since I already mentioned my personal thought: I found that the Talmud in tractate Berakhot 29b used similar language regarding the traveler’s prayer: “Take counsel with your Creator and then go out.” According to the Tzelach, this means that one should recite the traveler’s prayer and see whether the prayer flows naturally from his mouth, and if not, he should not go out. According to this, perhaps one can connect the two explanations in Rashi—namely, that the Sanhedrin should pray, and if they see that their prayer flows naturally from their mouths, they should approve the going out to war.

But the whole subject still seems tangled to me, mainly because there are the Urim and Tummim—so why is there a need for the Sanhedrin? And I was also curious to know your plain reading of the matter, especially in light of your view that the sages have no authority outside matters of Jewish law.

From your answer it דווקא seems clear that you justify their authority even though this is not a matter of Jewish law. So how does that fit with your approach? But really, even from your answer I couldn’t understand: if we assume the sages do have authority outside matters of Jewish law, what exactly is contained in their agreement—a blessing for success, “Torah wisdom,” thinking outside the box?? And what are they actually supposed to do when the Sanhedrin opposes going to war?
(If possible, I’d also be glad to know why in your answer you ignore all the opinions of the medieval authorities on the subject.)

There’s nothing tangled here. Apparently you still haven’t thought enough.

The Urim and Tummim provide divine approval and blessing, but in addition human approval and blessing are also required. The Sanhedrin serve as the supreme spiritual body, legislature, and judiciary, and it makes a great deal of sense to consult them as well. Beyond that, there are wise people there, and it is certainly proper and fitting to consult them before making such a political decision.

The Sanhedrin’s agreement has nothing to do with the question of authority in non-halakhic matters. Here they are giving political and social approval, not halakhic approval. They are not functioning here as halakhic decisors but as overseers (a governmental authority). It’s just that Jewish law requires such approval before a king goes out to war (especially an optional war, which is sometimes undertaken for his personal needs, and therefore it is important that there be oversight by the public or its representatives over such decisions). There are other actions of the Sanhedrin that are not acts of halakhic decision, as you can see in the Mishnah at the beginning of tractate Sanhedrin.

I don’t see any contradiction in the Rashi you cited. The explanation you offered is quite compelling.

As for the question of what is done when the Sanhedrin opposes it, that of course depends on whether “consulting the Sanhedrin” means that it is indispensable or not. Israeli law also sometimes has provisions of this sort (an obligation to hear someone before a decision, even though one may choose not to obey him). In practice, the king would do what seemed right to him, and at most there would be a jurisdictional clash.

I don’t use the medieval authorities here because this isn’t the place to write a comprehensive survey. If someone wants to know my opinion, I write it. Beyond that, in my view the opinions of the medieval authorities on such a hypothetical matter don’t carry much weight.
Especially since one must remember that these rules were written by sages who did not live at a time when there was a king and the issue was relevant, and I’ve explained more than once that from then until today people have had the feeling (mistakenly, in my view) that everything is subordinate to the government of Jewish law (search for a column of mine where I discuss “the historical accident”). It is not at all certain that when there actually was a Sanhedrin, this is what they really would have done. Similar to what Aharon Shemesh wrote about capital punishment (which I’m not sure I agree with), and so on.
Therefore I generally don’t get into clarifying governmental and state-related issues in light of halakhic sources. Partly because the sages did not live those situations, so it is hard to accept their theoretical interpretations and rulings, and partly because there is no tradition about it.

This is interesting…
A. You wrote, “The Sanhedrin serve as the supreme spiritual body, legislature, and judiciary,” and “They are not functioning here as halakhic decisors but as overseers (a governmental authority)”—who gave the Sanhedrin the authority to oversee and perhaps even delay the will of the people and the king?
B. I searched the columns and couldn’t find “the historical accident”—but according to what you wrote, “It is not at all certain that when there actually was a Sanhedrin, this is what they really would have done”—the novelty then is that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi wrote things in the Mishnah without any source or tradition. And the Talmud’s interpretation, which brought a source for the Mishnah’s statement from King David consulting the Sanhedrin, is a distortion and falsification of the verses??
What follows from your words is that the sages of the Mishnah and Talmud do not even have authority to teach us the laws of the Sanhedrin and the laws of kings and wars???

A. I didn’t understand the question. Who gave them permission to issue rulings in Jewish law? The same authority gave them this too. Maybe you didn’t notice, but in the halakhic picture the Sanhedrin functions as the legislative and judicial branch (and after the accident, also as the executive branch). And within the judicial branch it is both the High Court of Justice (constitutional court) and the Supreme Court.
B. See column 164 and 190 (a simple Google search). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi wrote what seemed right to him, exactly as every sage in every generation did. That can come from tradition, from interpretation of the verses, from midrashic exegesis, or from reasoning. This is not my innovation; every beginner in the study hall knows it. And if you take Talmudic exegesis as historical sources, then you probably really don’t understand how to read anachronistic midrash and aggadah. Next you’ll bring me a homily of Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz according to which Vashti and Ahasuerus disputed along the lines of a dispute between Rabbi Akiva Eiger and Ketzot.

That is not what follows from my words. They have authority in every halakhic area, within the limits of common sense. In every generation, when there was a Talmudic law that was not implementable, it was not implemented. There are many examples of this. Especially laws of statehood, which were already not implemented in Talmudic times, so it is clear that the discussions there about them were theoretical, and it is hard to take them as mandatory for practical application.

I saw a lecture by Rabbi Asher Weiss in which he said that in order to issue rulings on matters like these (laws of the state, etc.) he sometimes uses the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) in addition to sources from the Talmud. Do you agree with his approach?

Rabbi Cherlow has an article like that (and maybe also a book). I don’t believe people really do that. They go with common sense and then find dubious proofs from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh).

It really is strange that I didn’t find the column (“the historical accident”). In any case, fascinating reading.
As for the aggadah (in Sanhedrin 16b), you threw an accusation at me (“then you probably really don’t understand…”) but left me without an answer.
The Talmud asked: “From where are these matters derived?” and brought a statement of Rav Acha bar Bizna and a statement of Rav Yosef. I’m interested in the plain understanding of the passage, and I’d appreciate it if you could explain it according to your approach.

I didn’t understand the question, and I also didn’t find where I said that you don’t understand. Do you mean the contradiction in Rashi?

Your response above: “And if you take Talmudic exegesis as historical sources, then you probably really don’t understand how to read anachronistic midrash and aggadah.”
You left me without an answer—the Talmud asked “From where are these matters derived?” (that one consults the Sanhedrin), and answered on the basis of a statement of Rav Acha bar Bizna and a statement of Rav Yosef. I’m interested in the plain understanding of the passage, and I’d appreciate it if you could explain it according to your approach.
*(Thank you for taking the time. It really isn’t something to be taken for granted.)

So that is exactly what I explained. Rav Acha brings us a story about the harp that hung above David’s bed, and that Israel came in to ask him questions and receive permission to go out to war. Do you really think this aggadah is a historical event that actually happened in reality? If so, then you don’t know how to read aggadah. And Rav Yosef’s statement also derives it from verses, but there is no necessity to say that this is indeed what happened historically. One can also say that the verse was written this way in order to teach this law (on the level of exegesis, because on the plain level it is clear that the verse merely describes the figures who were present there and is not dealing with halakhic instructions for going out to war), but it does not describe events and David’s actual mode of conduct.
Similar to what the Magen Avraham wrote regarding “It is not done so in our place, to give the younger before the firstborn” — and they asked: is Laban a binding halakhic or moral source? And the accepted answer is that the Torah wrote this in order to teach us a law, not that this is what Laban was after, or even if he did say it, that is not the purpose of the verses (to describe what Laban said).
And that is why I wrote that this is similar to pilpulim that hang the dispute of Vashti and Ahasuerus on the dispute between the Ketzot and Rabbi Akiva Eiger. This is an anachronism whose purpose is to teach Jewish law, not to decipher what happened in historical reality.
And I’ll add one more secret for you: Abraham our forefather probably did not observe the laws of eruv tavshilin, and I’m not even sure he held Eliezer’s organ when he made him swear, even though it says, “Please place your hand under my thigh.”

With your permission, I’d like to preface with a story (whether it happened or not) about a student who asked his rabbi many difficulties. And the rabbi rebuked him: “Are you some beast that keeps raising objections?” The student answered and said: “I’m the one asking about the cow…”
I ask your forgiveness if I’m drilling into you. But this is the way I know how to communicate with you. And since I want to get to the precise meaning of your words all the way to the end, I keep asking. So I hope I’m not bothering you.

I’m quoting from your answer above: “It is not at all certain that when there actually was a Sanhedrin, this is what they really would have done” (namely: consulted the Sanhedrin).
Therefore I objected that according to your words:
A. The Mishnah teaches us a law that is not historically correct.
B. The Talmud brought a source for the Mishnah’s words (Rav Yosef’s statement), and about that you wrote, “One can also say that the verse was written this way in order to teach this law” — but in reality you claim that “it is not at all certain that this is what they really would have done.” So according to you, the Talmud distorts the verse in order to teach us a law that is not historically correct.
Or else that is not what you meant, and then I’m completely confused…

And besides that, regarding the aggadah you were vague and did not explain. I’m waiting eagerly to understand your plain reading of the aggadah. And you only reply to me that it is not a historical occurrence in its literal sense—so what is the plain reading, then??

Again, if I’m bothering you then accept my apology—I’ll leave the area. (And it will be with regret, because until now this has been very interesting.)
But if it’s okay, I’d also like later to discuss with you what you call “the historical accident” and the words of Ran that you cited there.
Waiting for your reply..

[A note from the bleachers. The Urim and Tummim sometimes give a misleading answer or don’t answer. And the proof is that sometimes Israel went out to war and lost even though on every detail they could have asked the Urim and Tummim. And even when they brought the Ark into the camp (at the beginning of I Samuel), and presumably they could have asked it with fig-stalk pointers, what happened in the end was that the Ark itself was taken by the Philistines. In the episode of the concubine at Gibeah, God answered the Israelites twice that they should go up to war against Benjamin; Israel went up—and lost. Only the third time did they receive an explicit promise, “Tomorrow I will deliver him into your hand,” and then they won. So too David asked whether to go out against the Philistines to save Keilah, and when God answered, “Go, and you shall strike the Philistines,” the people still hesitated: “Behold, here in Judah we are afraid,” until he asked again and received an explicit promise, “I am giving the Philistines into your hand.” So it is understandable that they also wanted human-halakhic oversight.]

Well said, Tulginus, for your note from the bleachers. It’s not really the subject I wanted to discuss, and I’m afraid a discussion may open up that isn’t directly connected to the central topic of the Sanhedrin and their authority.
But since you already entered the issue of the Urim and Tummim, and according to your words the Urim and Tummim “kind of fudges it” and needs “human-halakhic oversight” — then what is the point of asking the Urim and Tummim at all? Surely one cannot rely on their words?
In some of the cases you mentioned, the commentators explain that the question was not asked properly, and therefore the answer was also not given properly. (Of course, you can ask: but doesn’t the Holy One know what they intended to ask?)
Therefore there really is an explanation that “consulting the Sanhedrin” means that the Sanhedrin pray and request that the Urim and Tummim give a correct answer.
But I’m still waiting for the Rabbi’s answers, which will shed a bit more light. At least I hope so.

Hello Rabbi,
Since I don’t want to trouble you too much, I’ll already bring the questions regarding “the historical accident,” which is directly connected to our topic. (Unfortunately I can’t find a way to emphasize words, so I’ll mark the emphases with quotation marks.)

A. In column 164 you wrote: …Ran, in his Derashot (homily 11), notes that in Jewish law there is a duplication between two legal systems: that of the Sanhedrin and the courts beneath it, and that of the king. He innovates that the king also has judicial authority (and not only governmental authority), and the role of his legal system is to plug the gaps that pure Jewish law (which is judged in religious court) cannot cope with. “My starting point is that this is in essence exactly punishment not according to the law. If so, in the original halakhic situation this authority is entrusted to the king and not to the religious court.”

So we emphasized the starting point, which indeed is written explicitly in Ran.
But Ran added another passage that you did not mention. And in my humble opinion it completely contradicts your interpretation of “the historical accident.” Here is the quote from Ran’s Derashot:
“And do not object to me from what we learned in the chapter ‘The Verdict Is Concluded’ (Sanhedrin 46a): It was taught, Rabbi Eliezer says, I heard that ‘a court may flog and punish not according to the Torah, not in order to transgress the words of Torah but in order to make a fence for the Torah,’ etc., from which it would seem that the court is appointed to judge according to the needs of the time and circumstance.
And this is not so. But when there are in Israel a Sanhedrin and a king, the Sanhedrin are to judge the people with righteous judgment alone, not to rectify their affairs beyond that, unless the king gives them his authority. “But when there is no king in Israel, the judge includes both powers, the power of the judge and the power of the king,” for we find in the chapter ‘The Verdict Is Concluded’ (Sanhedrin 49a): He said to Amasa, ‘He was expounding the words “only” and “surely”; he went and found the sages opening a tractate.’ He said: It is written, ‘Whoever rebels against your command…’ one might think this applies even to matters of Torah? Therefore the verse says, ‘Only be strong and courageous.’ Behold, they gave Joshua royal authority even though he was not a king; and similarly our sages expounded, ‘And there was a king in Jeshurun’—this alludes to Moses.”
I repeat again the line I separated in the text: “But when there is no king in Israel, the judge includes both powers, the power of the judge and the power of the king.”
Meaning: the starting point you spoke of is written in Ran with respect to a time “when there is a king in Israel.” But when there is no king, the explicit Talmud is that the Sanhedrin are given both powers: the power of the judge and the power of the king.
No historical accident at all! Ran brings that these things are learned from verses.

B. In my humble opinion, from here we also learn that all the monarchical powers that the Sanhedrin / sages / leading rabbis of the generation took are powers that the Torah “imposes” upon them for the needs of the hour, to complete the political arrangement in the absence of a king.

C. Ostensibly I would define the political powers, like you, as powers that “are not matters of Jewish law.” But there is certainly room to include them in the law books, because this is the rabbis’ role in the absence of a king according to Ran.

D. Certainly today’s wicked government is no substitute at all for a king and does not take away from the sages the powers that the Torah granted them until a king is appointed according to the laws of the Torah.
And indeed you wrote there in column 164: “It is important to understand that this authority is not conditional on the government acting according to Jewish law, or even on it being a Jewish government at all.” — From where do you get that???

Wow, this is long. I hope you have time…

A. That is what I answered. It is indeed entirely possible that the Mishnah teaches a law that was not actually practiced in the past. Why do we need to repeat this again and again? You can accept it or not, but I wrote it very clearly. I have no problem if we keep discussing and, as far as possible, I keep answering, but I do expect that we not simply repeat ourselves.
B. The Talmud is not distorting the verse; it is expounding it. I already wrote that too. Does the Talmud distort the verse “an eye for an eye” when it expounds it to mean monetary payment? הרי this is not the plain meaning of the verse, and it is likely that in the past they also did not practice it that way (despite the Talmud’s words about Rabbi Eliezer). When one expounds a verse, the exegesis obligates the expositor and whoever agrees with him. It does not mean that all previous generations also had to interpret it that way. When they expounded “until it is brought down” to mean that one must wage war on the Sabbath, did the previous generations also do that?

You ask what was there in actual practice according to the plain sense? What do you think—that the plain meaning of the verses is about consulting before war? Are you serious? Did you read the verses? What is described there is a collection of those people who were close to David and his advisers, or his counselors. That’s all. Where do you get from there that there was among them the process described by the Talmud? Maybe they were discussing the Talmudic topic of an imparted taste of an imparted taste. I expect you to think a little before raising a question.

What you’re doing here is definitely annoying. Not because you’re continuing the discussion. That’s perfectly fine from my point of view; as long as I have time I’ll continue with you. But here you’re repeating yourself or just raising silly questions.

As for the historical accident, you are repeating exactly what I said explicitly (that when there is no king, the two powers pass to the Sanhedrin) and for some reason put a question mark there at the end as though you had written something different. The authority was not transferred to the Sanhedrin by the Torah, since this is not a matter of Jewish law; rather, by the nature of things, when one authority disappears, the other takes its powers until things are reorganized. There is no halakhic authority here, and therefore there is also no obligation to hand these powers to them and obey them. The public can establish any other body to govern it (as was the case with Ahab, who was also not from the house of David, and nevertheless the public entrusted him with royal authority).
Ahab was probably righteous in your eyes, but what can be done—the Hebrew Bible and the Talmud cry out otherwise. And nevertheless he had powers and the honor due a king, as is explicit in Elijah’s words. And so it is with any governmental authority, righteous or wicked, so long as the public accepts it upon itself. Simple.

Greetings and blessings.
With your permission and the permission of those listening to us, I will now pass the floor to my friend (who is presumably rather hated by you), namely Tzachi (whom you call “a fool and ignoramus”).

Hello to you, “owner of the site.”
I don’t even know where to begin clarifying the magnitude of your heresy and what you are dragging along after you—foolish and naïve believers. Throughout the whole thread in your replies to Yehuda, you dodge again and again, and sometimes you also pretend not to understand the questions.

1. The Mishnah teaches a law (that one consults the Sanhedrin), and you write that this law is not historically correct. That is, it was invented by Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. And when the Talmud asks, “From where are these matters derived?” and brings a verse as proof, from your perspective the Talmud is babbling nonsense and inventing things that never existed. Are you okay??? And you still preach to others that they don’t know how to learn??? Do you have any support for your claim that this law did not exist??
2. True, there are aggadot in the Talmud that express some idea allegorically. So the entire aggadah never existed at all? Then why did the Talmud bring it? To confuse our minds?
3. They ask you what your plain reading of the aggadah is, and you dodge again and again because you have no other plain reading of the aggadah!! You only know how to say that it’s not what we interpret. But you have no support for that. You simply mark a target and then shoot the arrow. And whatever doesn’t suit you remains unexplained, except for your empty accusations that others don’t know how to learn.
4. They ask you a question about the plain meaning of the Talmud, and you ignore the approaches of the medieval authorities because in your opinion you know how to learn better than they do??
5. But what is most severe in my eyes is the column on “the historical accident”—you quote half a Ran. (Who according to your method is one of the medieval authorities whose words need not be considered.) And when a full and completing quotation from the entirety of Ran is brought to you, you ignore it and claim that this is exactly what you said.
No!!! That is not what you said!! According to Ran there is no “historical accident” here, but a transfer of powers according to the Torah!! And Ran brings the verse about this from Joshua!!
And not only that, but I will bring you additional early sources about the authority of the court to punish not according to the law, learned from verses, and it is worthwhile for you and the listeners to look into them.
(See Megillat Ta’anit, where the source is brought: “And you shall remove the evil from your midst”; and see Sifrei on Deuteronomy [section 86 and more], Nachmanides on the Torah in his commentary to the verse [Leviticus 27:29] “No devoted thing that shall be devoted from among men shall be redeemed; it shall surely be put to death,” Rashba in his responsa [part 6 no. 254] “according to the instruction that they shall teach you,” and also Rashba responsa [part 5 no. 238].)
But what happened? You marked a target that there is an “accident,” and from there you sell your wares to believers. Half a Ran, distortion of Talmudic passages and sources, accusations and mockery of others.
6. If there is an “accident” in the Jewish people, it is the authority of wicked kings.
But this is truly something beyond our ability to understand. Can you understand how Ahab, who worshipped idols, wins all his wars because the whole generation did not speak slander? Can you understand how Manasseh king of Israel, who worshipped idols, rebukes Rav Ashi for calling him “my colleague” and asks him difficulties that he cannot answer?! Or will you throw at me that I don’t know how to learn aggadah??? You compare those kings to Bibi Netanyahu or to Aharon Barak???
And you explicitly wrote: “any governmental authority, righteous or wicked, so long as the public accepts it upon itself.” — who accepted the government or the High Court upon himself??? The Haredim??? Even Smotrich wants a state governed by Jewish law!!!
So here, we’ve finished bothering you, because we also have no patience for nonsense and evasions. And you will no doubt respond that everything written here is “declarations,” “nonsense,” “ignorance,” and the like. But by all means, let the public come and learn and judge.

As one of the public sitting in the bleachers who was invited to learn and judge, I have indeed learned and judged, and I hereby update my conclusion that whoever took the trouble to speak with you at such length, our honored rabbis, cedars of Lebanon, Yehuda and Tzachi—certainly a spark of Hezekiah king of Judah entered him, of whom it is said: “And Hezekiah turned his face to the wall … saying.”

To my dear troll friend Tzachi/Yehuda/etc., I haven’t been this entertained in a long time. Well done.

Let me begin by saying that after the chapter you studied above in Google searching, I hereby update you on the next chapter in our course in internet science: as the site administrator, your email is visible and known to me the whole time, not only the changing nicknames, so the fact that you switched the nick from Tzachi to Yehuda—I didn’t even notice. It was obvious to me all along that I was speaking with Tantush, may he live long, whatever his nickname, of blessed memory.
But contrary to your suspicions, my way is to answer every person’s questions, regardless of the fact that he is a pest and an idiot, and even if his reading comprehension is as poor as yours. My practice is to address the question, not the questioner, even if at times I rebuke the questioner for his foolishness. I freely admit that this is part of my character work (and I know very well that, thank God, I still have much to improve in these areas too). Believe me, this correspondence with you is a real challenge for my character work, and the desire to block a pest like you is always there, and I overcome it because I’m a great believer in criticism and freedom of speech and chatter.
Therefore, in the future I suggest you spare all of us the trolling games and nickname-switching and the smooth talk you planted here (“thanks, and it’s not something to be taken for granted, and if you would be so kind, etc. etc.”). Not only because it’s pestering, and not only because of the lying and deception and mind-stealing involved, but simply because it doesn’t work on me (maybe it does on the readers). I knew all along who I was talking to.
And in the future, if you want to comment or ask, you are of course welcome, and you can spare us your antics. You will receive a substantive response, as is always my way with every questioner. If there are questions in your words, they will be answered to the best of my ability, even if you don’t thank me from the bottom of your heart and say it’s not something to be taken for granted, etc. There is no need for that. And if there are no questions there but just pestering, I’ll tell you that too, and I’ll do that regardless of whether or not smooth words appear in your remarks. So that is something you can save from now on. You can use the time to improve your reading comprehension, Torah study, character traits, and logic. And you definitely still have a lot of work to do in those areas.

As for your questions: they are indeed rather foolish and suffer badly from faulty logic and poor reading comprehension, and our rabbis taught us, “Do not answer a fool according to his folly”; nevertheless, because your persistence is so great, this may confuse some readers, so I will explain again briefly.
1. In those columns I brought Ran’s model of dual jurisdiction. And indeed, as you correctly pointed out, I do not think the medieval authorities have authority, and therefore I did not rely on him as an authority but as a source that faithfully describes the picture that is also correct in my humble opinion. Simply to say things in the name of the one who said them. Are you familiar with that value? Or perhaps one who is suspect regarding falsehood is also suspect regarding citing things in the name of their source.
2. If you had bothered to read instead of clinging to the fire of pure zealotry and jihad and striking heretics with the rod of your tongue in the name of God, you would have seen that the point from which I set out in the discussion of the historical accident was not Ran’s model but the amazement people feel when reading his words. I argued that this amazement is rooted in the historical accident I described.
3. I stress that the whole matter of the accident is my claim, and mine alone, and as far as I remember you will find nowhere that I attributed it to Ran. It simply doesn’t appear there. So your whole loaf has fallen into the pit.
4. The question whether this accident is the hand of God, and whether there is a halakhic obligation to transfer secular authority to the sages, or whether this is a decision of the public—that is a different question, and Ran’s opinion about it neither adds nor detracts. I did not bring his opinion. Whether your precision in his words is correct or not can be debated. But it makes no difference to the discussion. Here I wrote only my own opinion.
5. Moreover, I have clear proof as an egg for this opinion of mine. Most of these innovations were formed in a period when there was no longer a Sanhedrin and after the sealing of the Talmud, and therefore even if sages wanted to insert them into Jewish law, they do not have the power and authority to do so. And this includes the Rosh and the Rashba and the Shulchan Arukh, which inserted communal laws into his table for no fault of their own. So even if you were right that in truth this does belong to Jewish law—and you are not right—there is no institution that can establish such a norm as a permanent obligation, and therefore there is no obligation to obey, even someone who is not as great a heretic as I am.
6. As for the rest of your zealous nonsense about the heresy in my hands, I find no point in addressing it, for I know little foxes like you, destroyers of vineyards, who are built on the one combination worse even than a fool or a zealot: both in one person. When lack of reading comprehension and severe logical deficiencies such as you demonstrated here are joined to zealotry—and especially when all this is accompanied by self-confidence so detached from reality—the result is a rather ridiculous phenomenon that truly needs no response. Stuff the zealot and the fool and he will die. And see column 63 regarding irrelevant arguments of this sort. And that is what was said: My father chastised you with whips…
And may the listener enjoy.

Rashi in tractate Berakhot explains that “consulting the Sanhedrin” does not mean asking their opinion, but requesting that they pray for success in war.

That was already brought above, and the contradiction in his words was mentioned.