I saw that the Avnei Nezer, Orach Chayim 22:9, writes that “his bill of divorce and her hand come at the same time” applies only to the negation of an act, not to a positive act. What is the meaning of his words?

And this is his language: “My rule is that in a case where something takes effect intrinsically, and only because of some factor that prevents it can it not take effect, then since through the taking effect of that thing the impediment will be removed, the thing takes effect. Therefore, with a woman’s courtyard of milog property, where intrinsically the courtyard is hers, and only because of the marriage the husband has rights to its produce—since in divorce the marriage is removed, the divorce takes effect.”

1. What is the logic of his words?
2. Seemingly he is referring only to the problem of timing, but there is also an essential problem, namely that the cause depends on the effect.

On the contrary, it seems that he is referring to cause and effect, not to timing. From the standpoint of timing, there is no difference at all whether this is a side issue or not. But regarding the causal relation, he argues that one should distinguish when the clash is not head-on. Still, from a conceptual standpoint this seems a bit forced to me.
It may be that this should be explained as follows (see the lesson I referred you to). In principle, she can acquire a bill of divorce in her melog courtyard, but the husband’s connection to it would come back and uproot the acquisition—and therefore the divorce as well. That is the meaning of saying that the impediment is side-related. But from the moment she acquires the bill of divorce, she is released from him, and then his ownership rights in the field also lapse, so there is no longer anything preventing the acquisition of the bill of divorce (that is, at that point there is nothing that would come back and uproot it).

In the discussion of “if one forcibly seized from a priest,” Tosafot explain that silence counts as admission, and that is what turns the object into being under his ownership, whereas the Ritva writes that the consecration takes effect retroactively because they come at the same time. Is it correct to say that the essential problem does not exist there, since the cause—the object being in the domain of the one consecrating it—is not brought about by the effect (the legal effect of consecration through the act of consecrating)? The act of consecration is only the circumstance that allows us to interpret the other person’s silence as admission, but it does not directly cause the object to be defined as being in his domain. Therefore the cause is not directly dependent on the effect, and perhaps we are dealing only with a problem in the temporal order—or, since in the end without the act of consecration the object would not be defined as being in his domain, is this also an essential problem of the cause depending on the effect?

If you have a question, please formulate it properly. I don’t understand what connection this has to our discussion or what exactly you’re talking about.

You said that in cases of “they come at the same time” there are two problems: 1. How can the effect precede the cause? (the temporal order), 2. An essential problem—the cause depends on the effect. My question was whether, when the Ritva in the case of “if one forcibly seized from a priest” says that “his consecration and his possession come at the same time,” this is an easier case than usual, since here the cause does not depend directly on the effect. The reason the consecration takes effect is that the object is in his domain, and the object is defined as being in his domain because the silence is interpreted as admission, and the reason the silence is interpreted as admission is that the other person performed an act of consecration. First there is the act of consecration, which causes the other person to admit, then it is defined as being in his domain, and then the consecration takes effect. Is there here an essential problem of the cause depending on the effect or not?
Let me restate my point, since I’m not sure it was understood: the act of consecration should be viewed in two ways—a factual act and a legal act. The silence is interpreted as admission by virtue of the factual act of consecration (“why are you silent when the other person is consecrating it?”), and that causes the legal act of consecration to be able to take effect. My question is whether in such a case this is an essential problem or only a problem of temporal order.