What does a bill of divorce have to do with it?

What’s unclear?

Did you mean that if someone wants to divorce, then there is a commandment to divorce by means of a bill of divorce? I thought a bill of divorce was just the procedure, like doing an act of pulling in a legal acquisition.

No, simply speaking it is a commandment. Sefer HaChinukh concludes that one who divorces not with a valid bill of divorce has neglected this positive commandment, and his punishment is severe.

I see that now. Very strange.

Not strange. I explained in several articles that once he decides to divorce, he must do so with a valid bill of divorce and thereby permit her to marry others in the marketplace, and not merely send her out of his house and leave her an abandoned wife. And I explained that just as in creating the home there are two stages—the halakhic acquisition and afterward the natural-social marriage—so too in dismantling the home there is her removal from his house, which is the cancellation of the marriage, and the bill of divorce, which is the cancellation of the betrothal. A practical implication is that once he sends her out of his house—she is already a “divorcee of the heart”—he may no longer inherit her and does not become impure for her, and he has no rights to her produce, just as with a betrothed woman. Much more could be said.

I’ll admit without embarrassment that this commandment surprised me. The explanation seems at first glance quite elegant. While browsing I came to your article in the book In the Shadow of Wisdom called “A Two-Story Model for the Marital Relationship in Jewish Law,” and I’ll study it. Thanks.

A. First, I’d like to note that in tractate Gittin 20a, regarding “a bill of divorce that was written not for her sake, and then one passed a pen over it for her sake,” the Talmud distinguishes between a Torah scroll, which is invalid because of “This is my God and I will glorify Him,” and a bill of divorce, which does not require beauty.
B. We also find in tractate Yoma (70a): “Afterward each and every one would bring a Torah scroll from his house and read from it, in order to show its appearance publicly.” And Rashi writes: to show the beauty of the Torah scroll and the glory of its owner, who took pains to beautify the commandment, as it says (Exodus 15), “This is my God and I will glorify Him”… (and similarly in Rashi on Sotah 41).
Perhaps according to this, the category of beautifying a commandment applies only to commandments that are seen publicly, out in the open. But a bill of divorce, lashes, the heifer whose neck is broken, and the like do not involve being seen publicly and public display. (And don’t ask me from the commandment of circumcision, which at the time it is performed is seen publicly.)

And moving from one matter to another…
In addition, we find beauty that is not directly connected to the ritual object itself—for example, that they would place willow branches in golden holders. And that they would give drink to the daily offering in a vessel of gold.
It also seems that there are two categories in beautifying commandments: the beauty of the object itself and the beauty of the person in the preparations and performance of the commandment. As we find: “On the eve of Passover, close to the afternoon offering, a person should not eat until dark,” etc., and Rashi explains: so that he will eat the matzah of the commandment with appetite, because of beautifying the commandment.
Likewise, it seems from Maimonides that one should beautify both commandments between man and God and those between man and fellow man.

How are your distinctions enough to explain not decorating the whip?
A. If we beautify only commandments that are seen publicly and out in the open—lashes are done publicly, with proclamation, and “all the people shall hear and fear” (and therefore there is an opinion that someone liable to death is kept until the festival and executed on the festival before the eyes of the whole congregation).
B. If we beautify only commandments between man and God—lashes are certainly not a commandment between man and fellow man.

So all we are left with is “common sense”: unpleasant commandments are not beautified.

Sorry, you didn’t write that only commandments between man and fellow man are beautified. My mistake, and the books should be erased.

Be Wholehearted, to the best of my knowledge and understanding, it seems to me that you are mistaken. In Sanhedrin 89a it says: “The rabbis taught: four require proclamation: the enticer, the stubborn and rebellious son, the rebellious elder, and conspiring witnesses.”
Correct me if I’m wrong. But only in those four is there the rule of “they shall hear and fear,” in accordance with Rabbi Akiva’s view that they are executed on the festival. But stoning and the other death penalties of the religious court do not require publicity.
According to this, your question about my distinction—commandments that are not seen publicly and openly—has been reduced to only four cases.
And I would not force myself to answer those. Rather, it seems to me that the distinction of “unpleasant” commandments has no reason or logic to it. Especially since one can challenge it from the sin-offering, the offering of a leper, and the offering of a woman with a discharge. These do not seem especially pleasant, and nevertheless one should beautify the offering greatly and bring a fat sin-offering.
Therefore perhaps one could say that even in those four punishments that are seen publicly, the point is not that they be seen publicly because of affection for the commandment, but only for the sake of fear. Therefore the law of beautification does not apply.

Indeed, proclamation applies to lashes and to conspiring witnesses—that’s what I had in mind, but I wrote it incorrectly. On the contrary, since it is rare, they should take even more trouble to glorify the whip, so why didn’t they do so? And presumably more examples could be found once my mind clears. I didn’t understand your answer. There is a commandment to cause fear, so why is that any less than the commandment of taking the lulav?

You’re right. I too will wait for my mind to clear.

And as for the logic of unpleasant commandments—what is hard to understand? There are commandments that it would be better for us had they never come into the world, except that once some damage has been done, there is a way to improve it. Better that they never come to lashes, nor to the heifer whose neck is broken, nor to divorce, over which even the altar sheds tears (as was said, I know my place, etc.). But what happened happened, and now we are required to repair it. And something like that should be done by the one acting as if compelled by a demon, not with joy and decorations, because in the end the event is sad. We have gone down from 10 to 1, and now rise to 6, but in the end we are still in decline from the proper state—so what place is there for joy? [Rabbi Michi explains in general, as I understood it, etc., that a positive commandment is a commandment to rise, and a prohibition is an injunction not to descend. Now we could say that there is a positive commandment that raises one from a neutral state to an improved one, and a positive commandment that raises one from a damaged state to a less damaged one.]
And he brought a proof for this from blessings over commandments. We have not heard of a blessing for the agent of the religious court who strikes with a whip, and likewise there is no blessing over divorce (in the case of remarrying one’s ex-wife there is one because of the ordinary betrothal involved). I don’t know the official reason why there is no blessing, but it is reasonable that just as no blessing was instituted, so too there is no point in beautifying it, and the two things have the same root. (Personally, I’m not familiar with these matters of “This is my God and I will glorify Him,” and I don’t deal with it. Just the other day, a friend sent me a nice poster broadside that came out strongly against such-and-such, and then I idly wondered: according to their own view, since they are merely being zealous to fulfill the commandment of rebuke, then why did they print it in black and white and not in a colorful font because of “This is my God and I will glorify Him”?)
The offering is at first glance indeed a good challenge. But one could say that since it is brought literally before God, they are particular that it not be blemished because of “Present it, please, to your governor.” And a fat sin-offering is not a rule in all those obligated to bring a sin-offering, nor is it because of “This is my God and I will glorify Him”; rather, that wording was used to emphasize his guilt.

There is no comparison between a sin-offering and divorce. The sin-offering expresses repentance, and that is of course something joyful that is fitting to beautify. In divorce, even the altar sheds tears over it, so what place is there for joy?
Beyond that, you are also blurring “Present it, please, to your governor.” When one brings a gift to the Holy One, blessed be He, one must bring a fine gift and not a shabby one, regardless of beautifying the commandment.

And isn’t the obligation of a sin-offering unlike the obligation of lashes in terms of joy and repentance, since once he has been lashed he is “your brother” again?

It seems to me that there is someone among the halakhic decisors, by the way, who holds that there is a blessing on divorce: “Who commanded us to divorce a woman by document.”

What gives such confidence that the matter of “beauty” expresses joy in the commandment??? To me it seems more that the matter of “beauty” expresses affection for the commandment and feelings of honor. And it makes no difference whether the commandment is pleasant or unpleasant. In the end it is a commandment, and it should be performed with full intent and with feelings of holiness, honor, and dignity.
As for why we do not bless over divorce—the reason is brought in Rashba, responsum no. 18: because there can be divorce done in sin, for example if he did not find in her a matter of sexual impropriety and divorces her. (And perhaps there are other reasons too, but we have not found a reason that one does not bless over unpleasant commandments.)
And as for why we do not bless over lashes—one can say as the Rashba’s reason mentioned there regarding “a commandment that does not depend entirely on the performer,” for the law is that if the one to be lashed loosens his bonds and runs away, he is not lashed.

There’s no confidence.

If it’s because the one being lashed can run away—well, we do recite a blessing over the circumcision of a convert. And as for your point that if he ran away he is not lashed, I didn’t understand the connection.

By the way, “pleasantness” doesn’t have to mean something emotional. One could define it as: over commandments that are only a partial repair of a wrong, one does not bless; over commandments of improvement one does bless. The emotional aspect is just a sign that we are dealing with a damaged situation that would have been better never to reach in the first place. And maybe an intermediate case is preventing damage, like the commandment of a parapet, over which there is a blessing, but we haven’t heard that there is any special point in having a parapet carved from almug wood. Though in general there doesn’t have to be one single sharp criterion for everything; as long as the logic sounds reasonable, more criteria and parentheses and footnotes can be added.

A. I only quoted the law. The emphasis was on “can run away,” meaning the commandment does not depend only on the performer’s hand, like charity and the like.
B. However, if we compare the law of blessing to the law of “beauty,” then with “death penalties of the religious court” there is no blessing, and according to the above Rashba, that is because the Holy One, blessed be He, has pity on His creatures and does not desire the death of the wicked. (And perhaps one can say the same reason regarding lashes.) And well known are Rabbi Meir’s words in the Mishnah: “Rabbi Meir said: when a person is in pain, what expression does the Divine Presence use? ‘My head is heavy for me, My arm is heavy for me.’ If so, if the Omnipresent is distressed over the blood of the wicked that is shed, all the more so over the blood of the righteous.” So perhaps one could say along the lines of what you said, only not that the person is distressed by the commandment, but that the Holy One, blessed be He, is, so to speak, distressed by the commandment, and according to common sense there is no place here for ‘beauty.’
C. (As for the blessing over the circumcision of a convert, I don’t know—perhaps because of a general rule without distinctions. Or because it is clear that the convert desires the commandment?)

On the circumcision of a convert you slipped away with “a general rule without distinctions.” What will you say about the blessing “who permitted us by means of marriage canopy and betrothal”? And as for the convert wanting it, what will you say about the circumcision of a slave, over which a blessing is recited? I see this is turning into a sport of inventing ideas that don’t stand up to scrutiny. The linkage between blessing and beauty shouldn’t be taken too far—I brought the case of a parapet, where there is a blessing and we have not heard that it should have beauty.

A. I wrote that I do not know. Marriage canopy and betrothal are not a challenge—see the medieval authorities. And in the circumcision of a slave as well, his prior consent is required to become part of the proper Jewish slave class.
B. “We have not heard” is not proof. On the contrary, this whole discussion got me thinking that if a poor person asks you for charity and you have one crumpled bill and one ironed bill, you should give him the nicer one. Have you ever heard of such a thing?

To say “I don’t know” about the circumcision of a convert means that the idea you suggested for why there is no blessing over lashes is not sufficient. About a slave I’m not sure, but I seem to recall that a slave born into slavery is circumcised against his will. Marriage canopy and betrothal too—the woman can run away, so what helps that there are other reasons there to recite a blessing? It is still not entirely in his hands. “We have not heard” is excellent proof, even though one can always say “indeed” and innovate laws our ancestors never dreamed of. Regarding charity, I also haven’t heard that, so that too does not seem likely to me, and the definition still needs thought. Only if there is no logic at all would I say, indeed.

Be Wholehearted, you’re reading halfway.
The idea that one does not recite a blessing over “a commandment that does not depend entirely on the performer” is what the Rashba wrote above. That is not my idea. So the Rashba must answer for himself. I suggested connecting the Rashba’s reason to lashes, but to the same degree I also suggested his reason regarding “death penalties of the religious court”—that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not desire the death of the wicked—also regarding lashes, and you can choose. (My words are not a definite claim, only a possibility.)
As for marriage canopy and betrothal, it’s simple—your thinking should begin from the fact that the groom does not recite the blessing; it is not a blessing over commandments.
And regarding the circumcision of a slave against his will—see Yevamot 48a.

With God’s help, 20 Shevat 5781

It is obvious that “Beautify yourself before Him in commandments,” whose meaning is performing the commandment with eagerness and joy, does not apply to lashes, for when a Jew is in pain, even if he is liable by law, the Holy One, blessed be He, says: “My head is heavy for me, My arm is heavy for me.”

But there is another aspect of “and I will glorify Him” in lashes, which is expounded as “I and He”—just as He is gracious, so you too be gracious; just as He is merciful, so you too be merciful. Therefore the first tanna says that those appointed as floggers should be only men of weak strength and abundant understanding, whose blows hurt less, and Maimonides ruled in accordance with the first tanna.

Best regards, Yekutiel Wolf Petschgeber

I read everything. I didn’t look into the Rashba, but one may presume of him that he writes with providential precision, and after looking into it his words will no doubt be understood as usual—tried and tested. So I am dealing only with your own words. Looking into the Talmudic passages is hard for me, pardon me. All in all, this whole question about decorating a whip merited an answer only under the rule that anyone who stretches out a hand is given something.

In Yevamot, at first glance it is talking about purchased money-slaves, whereas I had conjectured only that a home-born slave is circumcised against his will, even if he grows up and is still uncircumcised—as opposed to a Jew, where once he is grown and uncircumcised, from then on the commandment lies on him himself; for a slave the commandment still lies on the master. In any case, I don’t know the law there regarding the slave. And if indeed every circumcision in the world depends on consent, or on the law of acting for a person’s benefit, still one could discuss the blessing over breaking the neck of a firstborn donkey, where presumably it can run away no less well than the one sentenced to lashes.

Indeed, the point that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not desire the death of the wicked is exactly the point being made here: although right now one is performing a commandment, the whole situation is damaged. You don’t have to understand the logic of pleasantness in a crude way. And this also fits a bill of divorce (and also remarrying one’s ex-wife) and the heifer whose neck is broken.

The source: in Makkot 23a: “The rabbis taught: only men of weak strength and abundant understanding are appointed as floggers.”

Yekutiel, does the heifer whose neck is broken need to be decorated with a golden hairnet and ornaments and chains?

The Dissenter,
regarding marriage canopy and betrothal—you’re right.

With God’s help, 21 Shevat 5781

And it seems to me that the main point of “Beautify yourself before Him in commandments—a beautiful shofar and beautiful tefillin,” and the like, does not require external decorations. After all, with a shofar and tefillin, if one plated them with gold they would be invalid. Rather, the intention is that the ritual object should appear nice and respectable, not blemished or dirty and the like.

There are commandments in which there is a special idea of rejoicing in their performance, such as sukkah and lulav and festival rejoicing and bringing first-fruits, which are done “with the sound of song and thanksgiving, a festal multitude.” But even in other commandments, there is an idea that the ritual object and the person performing it should appear nice and respectable, as was said about Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, that even as they went to the fiery furnace they maintained a dignified appearance, like soldiers in the armies of God.

Best regards, Yopag